Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD's	 
Development and Fielding Efforts (17-MAR-04, GAO-04-530T).	 
                                                                 
The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has	 
been under development since the 1980s. UAVs were used in	 
Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, 
and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest
in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD). Congress has been
particularly interested in DOD's approach to managing the growing
number of UAV programs. GAO was asked to summarize (1) the	 
results of its most current report on DOD's approach to 	 
developing and fielding UAVs1 and the extent to which the	 
approach provides reasonable assurance that its investment will  
lead to effective integration of UAVs into the force structure,  
and (2) the major management issues GAO has identified in prior  
reports on UAV research and development.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-530T					        
    ACCNO:   A09504						        
  TITLE:     Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing 
DOD's Development and Fielding Efforts				 
     DATE:   03/17/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Appropriated funds 				 
	     Budget obligations 				 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Military budgets					 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Military procurement				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Planning programming budgeting			 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Budget requests					 
	     Interoperability					 
	     Unmanned aerial vehicles				 
	     DOD Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap		 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-04-530T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST UNMANNED AERIAL

Wednesday, March 17, 2004

VEHICLES

     Major Management Issues Facing DOD's Development and Fielding Efforts

Statement of Statement of Neal P. Curtin, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

and

Paul L. Francis, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management

GAO-04-530T

Highlights of GAO-04-530T, testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical
Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services

The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under
development since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in
2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These
successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of
Defense (DOD). Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach
to managing the growing number of UAV programs.

GAO was asked to summarize (1) the results of its most current report on
DOD's approach to developing and fielding UAVs1 and the extent to which
the approach provides reasonable assurance that its investment will lead
to effective integration of UAVs into the force structure, and (2) the
major management issues GAO has identified in prior reports on UAV
research and development.

In our most recent report, GAO recommends that DOD (1) establish a
strategic plan to guide UAV development and fielding and (2) designate the
UAV Task Force or other appropriate body to oversee the plan's
implementation, ensuring sufficient authority is provided.

______________________________ 1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force
Structure:

Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance

DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO

04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-530T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Neal Curtin at (202)
512-4914 or [email protected]; or Paul Francis at (202) 512-2811 or
[email protected].

March 2004

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Major Management Issues Facing DOD's Development and Fielding Efforts

GAO's most recent report points out that while DOD has taken some positive
steps, its approach to UAV planning still does not provide reasonable
assurance that the significant Congressional investment in UAVs will
result in their effective integration into the force structure. In 2001,
DOD established the joint UAV Planning Task Force in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts
and to establish interoperability standards. To communicate its vision and
promote UAV interoperability, the task force issued the 2002 UAV Roadmap.
While the Roadmap provides some strategic guidance for the development of
UAV technology, neither the Roadmap nor other documents represent a
comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and other DOD
agencies focus development efforts on systems that complement each other,
will perform the range of priority missions needed, and avoid duplication.
Moreover, the Task Force has only advisory authority and, as such, cannot
compel the services to adopt its suggestions.

GAO's prior work supports the need for effective oversight of individual
UAV programs at the departmental level. UAVs have suffered from
requirements growth, risky acquisition strategies, and uncertain funding
support within the services. Some programs have been terminated. Success
has been achieved as a result of top-level intervention and innovative
acquisition approaches. For example, in 2003, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense had to intervene to keep the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
program viable. As UAV programs grow in the future, they will face
challenges in the form of increased funding competition, greater demand
for capabilities, and spectrum and airspace limitations. Moreover, UAVs
are no longer an additional "nice-to-have" capability; they are becoming
essential to the services' ability to conduct modern warfare. Meeting
these challenges will require continued strong leadership, building on the
UAV Roadmap and Planning Task Force as GAO has recommended.

The Air Force Predator UAV

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
major management issues that we identified in our current and prior work
on the research, development, and fielding of the latest generation of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by the Department of Defense (DOD). The
current generation of UAVs has been under development for defense
applications since the 1980s, and as DOD continues to transform the way in
which it conducts military operations, UAVs are becoming a vital part of
the force structure.

For our statement today, you asked us to discuss the results of our most
recent report to the subcommittee, which is being released today.1 In this
report, we summarized recent UAV costs and funding, and analyzed DOD's
approach to developing and fielding UAVs to see to what extent the
approach provides reasonable assurance that UAV programs will be
efficiently integrated into the force structure. You also asked that we
summarize the major management issues we have identified in prior reports
on UAV programs, including our 2003 report on the unmanned combat aerial
vehicle.2

Summary 	In our report being released today, we point out that funding for
UAV research and development and procurement has been increasing in recent
years, and Congress has actually provided more funds for UAV acquisition
than DOD requested. During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided
about $2.7 billion in funding for UAV development and procurement as
compared with about $2.3 billion requested by DOD. Additionally, spending
on operations and maintenance for UAVs has been increasing as DOD has
begun using UAV systems in recent military operations. This growing
spending reflects the importance that Congress has placed on UAVs as they
have demonstrated success in recent operations. We also report that DOD's
approach to planning for UAVs does not provide reasonable assurance that
the investment will result in the effective

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Improved Strategic
Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).

2 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources
with Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's
Success, GAO-03-598 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).

integration of UAV programs into the force structure. We recognize that
DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the UAV program's
management. For example, to help manage UAV development, in 2001 DOD
established a joint UAV Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts and to
establish interoperability standards. Also, to communicate its vision and
promote UAV interoperability, the Task Force issued the 2002 UAV Roadmap,
which describes current programs, identifies potential missions for UAVs,
and provides guidance on developing emerging technologies. Our concern,
however, is that neither the Roadmap nor other defense planning documents
represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and
other DOD agencies focus development efforts on systems that complement
each other, will perform the range of priority missions needed, and avoid
duplication. Moreover, the joint UAV Planning Task Force does not have
program directive authority and serves only in an advisory capacity to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics.
Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient authority
to implement the plan, DOD risks poorly integrating UAVs into the force
structure, which could increase development, procurement, and logistics
costs, and increase the risk of future interoperability problems.
Consequently, in our most recent report we recommended that DOD (1)
establish a strategic plan to guide UAV development and fielding and (2)
designate the joint UAV Planning Task Force or other appropriate body to
oversee the plan's implementation, ensuring sufficient authority is
provided.

Our prior work on UAV systems identifies the growing importance of UAVs to
effective military operations and the need for the effective oversight of
service programs at the departmental level. Over the years, UAV
acquisition programs have suffered from requirements growth, risky
acquisition strategies, and uncertain funding support within individual
services. Some of these programs have been terminated. Program success has
been achieved as a result of leadership intervention and the use of
innovative approaches like the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration.3
DOD's experience with the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program is a case in
point; intervention by the Office of the Secretary of Defense was
necessary to keep the program viable. Over the

3 The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program was initiated by
DOD in 1994 as a way to get new technologies that meet critical military
needs into the hands of users faster and at less cost than the traditional
acquisition process.

Background

years, we have reported that DOD has faced some expensive lessons in
managing its UAV program. As UAVs become more and more integral to the way
the U.S. military carries out operations, it will become even more
important that the department manages its program effectively. UAVs are no
longer an additional "nice-to-have" capability; they are becoming
essential to the services' ability to conduct modern warfare. The
acquisition environment for new UAVs will be characterized by increased
funding competition, greater demand for UAV capabilities, and
electromagnetic frequency spectrum and airspace limitations. This will
require strong leadership at the departmental level, building on the UAV
Roadmap and efforts of the joint UAV Planning Task Force, to ensure that
the most cost-effective solutions are adopted as we have recommended in
our previous work.

DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a human
operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic forces to
provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be expendable
or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Generally,
UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle; a flight control station; information
and retrieval or processing stations; and, sometimes, wheeled land
vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms.

UAVs have been used in a variety of forms and for a variety of missions
for many years. After the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane in 1960,
certain UAVs were developed to monitor Soviet and Chinese nuclear testing.
Israel used UAVs to locate Syrian radars and was able to destroy the
Syrian air defense system in Lebanon in 1982. The United States has used
UAVs in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation Enduring Freedom, and
Operation Iraqi Freedom for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions and to attack a vehicle carrying suspected terrorists in Yemen in
2002. The United States is also considering using UAVs to assist with
border security for homeland security or homeland defense.

The current generation of UAVs has been under development for defense
applications since the 1980s. UAVs won considerable acceptance during
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003,
respectively. They were used in these operations to observe, track,
target, and in some cases strike enemy forces. These and similar successes
have heightened interest in UAVs within DOD and the services. In fact, by
2010, DOD plans to have at least 14 different UAVs in the force structure
to perform a variety of missions. Moreover, in the fiscal year 2001
National Defense

Authorization Act, Congress established the goal that one-third of the Air
Force's deep-strike capability be provided by UAVs by 2010.4

The overall management of UAV programs has gone full circle. In 1989 the
DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering set up the UAV Joint
Project Office as a single DOD organization with management responsibility
for UAV programs. With the Navy as the Executive Agency, within 4 years
the Joint Project Office came under criticism for a lack of progress.
Replacing the office in 1993, DOD created the Defense Airborne
Reconnaissance Office as the primary management oversight and coordination
office for all departmentwide manned and unmanned reconnaissance. In 1998,
however, this office also came under criticism for its management approach
and slow progress in fielding UAVs. In that same year, this office was
dissolved and UAV program development and acquisition management was given
to the services, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence was assigned to provide oversight
for the Secretary of Defense.

Our report being issued today (Force Structure: Improved Strategic
Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO04-342,
Mar. 17, 2004) analyzes recent funding trends for UAVs and makes
recommendations to strengthen DOD's strategic planning and management
approach for UAVs.

  GAO's New Report
  Calls for Improved
  Strategic Planning

UAV Funding Has Increased

During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided funding for UAV
development and procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD, and
to date the services have obligated about 99 percent of these funds. To
promote the rapid employment of UAVs, Congress appropriated nearly $2.7
billion to develop and acquire UAVs from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal
year 2003, compared with the $2.3 billion requested by DOD. The majority
of the funds-$1.8 billion (67 percent)-have been for UAV research,
development, test, and evaluation. Figure 1 displays the trends in
research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement funding from
fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003.

4 P.L. 106-398, Section 220.

Figure 1: UAV Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and
Procurement Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003

Over these 5 years, only three systems-the Air Force's Predator and Global
Hawk, and the Army's Shadow-have matured to the point that they required
procurement funding, amounting to about $880 million by fiscal year 2003
and another estimated $938 million needed by fiscal year 2005.

Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the services
are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For example,
in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7 Predator
UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million, enough to buy 29 Predators.
The Air Force had obligated 71 percent of the Predator's fiscal year 2003
funding during its first program year.

The Hunter, Predator, Pioneer, and Shadow are among the UAV systems
currently being used, and therefore we determined the level of DOD's
operations and maintenance spending from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal
year 2003 for these systems. Operations and maintenance funding has
steadily increased over that period from about $56.6 million for three of

the systems to $155.2 million in 2003 for all four. These increases are
the result of a larger inventory of existing systems and the introduction
of new systems. Figure 2 displays the operations and maintenance spending
for these UAV systems for fiscal years 1999 to 2003.

Figure 2: Operations and Maintenance Funding for UAVs, for Fiscal Years
1999 to 2003

DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the management of the UAV
program by establishing a program focal point in the joint UAV Planning
Task Force and trying to communicate a common vision for UAV development,
the UAV Roadmap. While the creation of the Task Force and the UAV Roadmap
are important steps to improve the management of the program, they are not
enough to reasonably assure that DOD is developing and fielding UAVs
efficiently. The Task Force's authority is generally limited to program
review and advice, but is insufficient to enforce program direction.
Moreover, the UAV Roadmap does not constitute a

Progress Made, but Challenges Remain in UAV Planning

Some Positive Steps Have Been Taken to Improve Program Management

The Joint UAV Planning Task Force Has Limited Authority

comprehensive strategic plan for developing and integrating UAVs into
force structure.

Since 2000, DOD has taken several positive steps to improve the management
of the UAV program. In October 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the joint UAV Planning Task
Force as the joint advocate for developing and fielding UAVs. The Task
Force is the focal point to coordinate UAV efforts throughout DOD, helping
to create a common vision for future UAVrelated activities and to
establish interoperability standards. For example, the Task Force is
charged with developing and coordinating detailed UAV development plans,
recommending priorities for development and procurement efforts, and
providing the services and defense agencies with implementing guidance for
common UAV programs.

The development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task Force's primary
product to communicate its vision and promote interoperability. The
Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military planning for UAV development
through 2027, and describes current programs, identifies potential
missions, and provides guidance on developing emerging technologies. The
Roadmap is also intended to assist DOD decision makers to build a
long-range strategy for UAV development and acquisition in such future
planning efforts as the Quadrennial Defense Review or other planning
efforts.

The joint UAV Planning Task Force's authority is generally limited to
program review and advice, but is insufficient to enforce program
direction. The Task Force Director testified before the House Armed
Services Committee in March 2003 that the Task Force does not have program
directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and recommended
actions.5 Without such authority, according to the Director, the Task
Force seeks to influence services' programs by making recommendations to
them or proposing recommended program changes for consideration by the
Under Secretary. According to defense officials, the Task Force has
attempted to influence the joint direction of service UAV efforts in a
variety of ways, such as reviewing services' budget proposals, conducting

5 Statement of the Director, Joint UAV Planning Task Force before the
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Armed Services
Committee, March 26, 2003.

DOD Has No Comprehensive Strategic Plan

periodic program reviews, and participating in various UAV-related task
teams and has had some successes, as shown below:

o  	The Task Force has encouraged the Navy to initially consider an
existing UAV (Global Hawk) rather than develop a unique UAV for its Broad
Area Marine Surveillance mission.

o  	The Task Force has worked with the Army's tactical UAV program to
encourage it to consider using the Navy's Fire Scout as an initial
platform for the Future Combat System class IV UAV.

o  	The Task Force convinced the Air Force to continue with the Unmanned
Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air Force wanted to
terminate it, and the Task Force ultimately helped the then-separate Air
Force and Navy programs merge into a joint program.

o  	The Task Force convinced the Navy not to terminate the Fire Scout
rotary wing UAV program as planned.

However, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt any of its
suggestions and consequently has not always succeeding in influencing
service actions. For example, according to DOD officials, no significant
progress has been made in achieving better interoperability among the
services in UAV platform and sensor coordination, although efforts are
continuing in this vein.

Neither the Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents represent a
comprehensive strategy to guide the development and fielding of UAVs that
complement each other, perform the range of missions needed, and avoid
duplication. DOD officials acknowledged that the Office of the Secretary
of Defense has not issued any guidance that establishes an overall
strategy for UAVs in DOD. While high-level DOD strategic-planning
documents-such as the National Military Strategy, the Joint Vision 2020,
and the Defense Planning Guidance-provide some general encouragement to
pursue transformational technologies, including the development of UAVs,
these documents do not provide any specific guidance on developing and
integrating UAVs into the force structure.

At the same time, while the Joint Requirements Oversight Council6 has
reviewed several UAVs and issued guidance for some systems, neither the
Joint Staff nor the council has issued any guidance that would establish a
strategic plan or overarching architecture for DOD's current and future
UAVs. In June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to provide a topdown
capability-based process. Under the system, five boards have been
chartered, each representing a major warfighting capability area as
follows: (1) command and control, (2) force application, (3) battle space
awareness, (4) force protection, and (5) focused logistics. Each board has
representatives from the services, the combatant commanders, and certain
major functions of the Under Secretary of Defense. Each board is tasked
with developing a list of capabilities needed to conduct joint operations
in its respective functional areas. The transformation of these
capabilities is expected, and the boards are likely to identify specific
capabilities that can be met by UAVs. Nonetheless, according to Joint
Staff officials, these initiatives will not result in an overarching
architecture for UAVs. However, the identification of capabilities that
can be met by UAVs is expected to help enhance the understanding of DOD's
overall requirement for UAV capabilities.

Moreover, according to officials in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the UAV Roadmap was not intended to provide an overarching
architecture for UAVs. The Roadmap does state that it is intended to
assist DOD decision makers in building a long-range strategy for UAV
development and acquisition in such future planning efforts as the
Quadrennial Defense Review. Nonetheless, the Roadmap represents a start on
a strategic plan because it incorporates some of the key components of
strategic planning, as shown below:

Long-term goals-The Roadmap states its overall purpose and what it hopes
to encourage the services to attain. The Roadmap refers to the Defense
Planning Guidance's intent for UAVs as a capability and indicates that the
guidance encourages the rapid advancement of this capability. At the same
time, it does not clearly state DOD's overall or long-term goals for its
UAV efforts. Similarly, while it states that it wants to provide the
services with

6 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is a joint organization made up
of senior representatives from each of the services to review joint
experimentation and make appropriate recommendations to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3180.1 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2002).

clear direction, it does not clearly identify DOD's vision for its UAV
force structure through 2027.

Approaches to obtain long-term goals-The Roadmap's "Approach" section
provides a strategy for developing the Roadmap and meeting its goal. This
approach primarily deals with identifying requirements and linking them to
needed UAV payload capabilities, such as sensors and associated
communication links. The approach then ties these requirements to
forecasted trends in developing technologies as a means to try to develop
a realistic assessment of the state of the technology in the future and
the extent to which this technology will be sufficient to meet identified
requirements. At the same time, however, the Roadmap does not provide a
clear description of a strategy for defining how to develop and integrate
UAVs into the future force structure. For example, the Roadmap does not
attempt to establish UAV development or fielding priorities, nor does it
identify the most urgent mission-capability requirements. Moreover,
without the sufficient identification of priorities, the Roadmap cannot
link these priorities to current or developing UAV programs and
technology.

Performance goals-The Roadmap established 49 specific performance goals
for a variety of tasks. Some of these goals are aimed at fielding
transformational capabilities without specifying the missions to be
supported. Others are to establish joint standards and control costs.
Nonetheless, of the 49 goals, only 1 deals directly with developing and
fielding a specific category of UAV platform to meet a priority
mission-capability requirement- the suppression of enemy air defenses or
strike electronic attack. The remaining goals, such as developing
heavy-fuel aviation engines suitable for UAVs, are predominantly
associated with developing UAV or related technologies as well as
UAV-related standards and policies to promote more efficient and effective
joint UAV operations. However, the Roadmap does not establish overall UAV
program goals.

Performance indicators-Some of the 49 goals have performance indicators
that could be used to evaluate progress, while others do not. Furthermore,
the Roadmap does not establish indicators that readily assess how well the
program will meet the priority mission capabilities.

As the services and defense agencies pursue separate UAV programs, they
risk developing systems with duplicate capabilities, potentially higher
operating costs, and increased interoperability challenges. The House
Appropriations Committee was concerned that without comprehensive planning
and review, there is no clear path toward developing a UAV force
structure.7 Thus, the committee directed that each service update or
create a UAV roadmap. These roadmaps were to address the services' plans
for the development of future UAVs and how current UAVs are being
employed. Officials from each of the services indicated that their UAV
roadmap was developed to primarily address their individual service's
requirements and operational concepts. However, in their views, such
guidance as the Joint Vision 2020, National Military Strategy, and Defense
Planning Guidance did not constitute strategic plans for UAVs to guide the
development of their individual service's UAV roadmap. These officials
further stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2002 UAV
Roadmap provided some useful guidance, but was not used to guide the
development of the service's UAV roadmaps. Moreover, they did not view the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Roadmap as either a DOD-wide
strategic plan or an overarching architecture for integrating UAVs into
the force structure. According to service officials developing the
service-level UAV roadmaps, there was little collaboration with other
services' UAV efforts.

As we have described for you today, DOD has an opportunity to enhance its
strategic planning to improve the management of UAV development and
fielding. In the report released to you today, we make two recommendations
to assist DOD to enhance its management control over the UAV program. We
recommend that DOD establish a strategic plan or set of plans based on
mission requirements to guide UAV development and fielding. We also
recommend that DOD designate the joint UAV Planning Task Force or another
appropriate organization to oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic
plan. In responding to our report, DOD stated that it partially concurred
with the first recommendation but preferred to address UAV planning
through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process.
DOD disagreed with the second recommendation saying that it did not need
to provide an organization within the department with more authority
because it believes that the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology already has sufficient authority to achieve
DOD's UAV goals.

7 Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 2003 Report, H.R. Rep. No.
107-532 at 207.

  Oversight Challenge Is Framed by Experiences of the Past and Demands of the
  Future

Our report states clearly that we continue to support both
recommendations. We believe that the growth in the number and cost of UAV
programs, and their importance to military capabilities, will need more
formalized oversight by DOD.

Our reviews of system development efforts over the last several decades
show that the road to fielding operational UAVs has not been easy. Success
has been achieved as a result of intervention by leadership and the use of
innovative processes. Even when put on a sound footing, these programs
have continued to face new challenges. In the future, UAVs will be growing
in number, sophistication, and significance, but will also have to compete
for increasingly scarce funds, electromagnetic frequency spectrum, and
airspace.

Lessons From Past Experience

Since the mid 1970s, we have reviewed many individual DOD UAV development
efforts.8 A list of our reports is attached in the section entitled
"Related GAO Products." Our previous work has highlighted problems that
addressed congressional efforts to bring the development process under
control and subsequently led to the termination or redesign and retrofit
of a number of these development efforts.

In 1988 we reported on a variety of management challenges related to UAV
development.9 At that time, congressional committees had expressed concern
about duplication in the services' UAV programs, which ran counter to the
committees' wishes that DOD acquire UAVs to meet common service needs. In
1988, we noted that DOD was to provide, at minimum, a UAV master plan that
(1) harmonized service requirements, (2) utilized commonality to the
maximum extent possible, and (3) made trade-offs between manned and
unmanned vehicles in order to provide future cost savings. After budget
deliberations for fiscal year 1988, Congress eliminated separate service
accounts for individual UAV programs and consolidated that funding into a
single Defense Agencies account. This in turn led to the formation of
DOD's UAV Joint Projects Office, which promoted joint UAV efforts that
would prevent unnecessary

8 U.S. General Accounting Office, Status of the Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Programs. GAO/PSAD-77-30 (Washington, D.C.: February 18, 1977).

9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 9, 1988).

Factors That Limit UAV Development

duplication. This effort was led by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which has since been
disbanded.

Our analysis of DOD's 1988 UAV master plan identified a number of
weaknesses: (1) it did not eliminate duplication, (2) it continued to
permit the proliferation of single-service programs, (3) it did not
adequately consider cost savings potential from manned and unmanned
aircraft tradeoffs, and (4) it did not adequately emphasize the importance
of common payloads among different UAV platforms.

In testimony presented in April 1997, we recognized the strong support
that Congress had provided for DOD's UAV acquisition efforts and how it
had encouraged the department to spur related cooperation between the
services.10 We noted that problems with UAV development continued and were
leading to cost, schedule, and performance deficiencies; continued
duplication of UAV capabilities; and even program cancellations in many
instances. In 1997, only one UAV-the Pioneer-had been fielded.

Since 1997, we have continued to evaluate the department's UAV development
efforts, including plans to develop a lethal variant of UAVs called
unmanned combat air vehicles. Our reviews over the last 27 years have
revealed several reasons why UAV efforts have not been successful,
including requirements that outstrip technology, overly ambitious
schedules, and difficulties integrating UAV components and UAV testing. We
have also found that UAV system acquisitions processes were not protected
from what is known as "requirements creep." These requirements changes
increase development and procurement costs significantly. For example:

o  	The Aquila was started in 1979 with a straightforward mission to
provide small, propeller-driven UAVs to give group commanders realtime
battlefield information about enemy forces beyond ground observers' line
of sight.11 Requirements creep increased complexity and development and
anticipated procurement costs significantly. For

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's
Acquisition Efforts, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138 (Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997).

11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Its
Potential Battlefield Contribution Still in Doubt, GAO/NSIAD-88-19
(Washington, D.C.: October 26, 1987).

example, in 1982 a requirement for night vision capability was added which
increased development costs due to the additional payloads and air
vehicles needed to meet the new requirement. During operational tests, the
Aquila successfully fulfilled all requirements in only 7 of 105 flights.

o  	When the Air Force's Global Hawk reconnaissance UAV was started in
1994, it was expected to have an average unit flyaway price of $10
million. Changes in the aircraft's range and endurance objectives required
the contractor to modify the wings and other structural parts, and by 1999
its cost had increased by almost 50 percent. In our April 2000 report, we
concluded that the cost of air vehicles to be produced could increase
still further, because the Air Force had not finalized its design
requirements.12 In 2002, the Global Hawk program adopted a higher-risk
strategy that calls for both a larger, more advanced aircraft and an
accelerated delivery schedule.

o  	In June 2003 we reported that the original requirements for the Air
Force's unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) program posed significant, but
manageable challenges to build an air vehicle that is affordable
throughout its life cycle, highly survivable, and lethal.13 Subsequently,
however, the Air Force added requirements-adding a mission and increasing
flying range. This action widened the gap between requirements and
resources and increased the challenge for the development program.

Aside from the air vehicle, other ground and airborne systems are also
needed for the UAV to be complete. DOD's practice of buying systems before
successful completion of testing has repeatedly led to defective systems
that were terminated, redesigned, or retrofitted to achieve satisfactory
performance. Our reviews have shown that, before production begins, DOD
needs to test to ensure that all key parts of the UAV system can work
successfully together, and that it can be operated and maintained
affordably throughout its lifecycle.

12 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of
the Global Hawk Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, GAO/NSIAD-00-78
(Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2000).

13 GAO-03-598.

Factors That Lead to UAV Success

o  In March 1999, we examined the Medium Range UAV, which began in

1989 as a joint effort of the Navy and Air Force.14 The Air Force was to
design and build the sensor payload, including cameras, a videotape
recorder, and a communications data link that would send back the imagery
from the UAV. The Navy was to design and build the air vehicle. Splitting
and then integrating these development efforts became problematic. The Air
Force ran into major payload development difficulties, which impacted
payload development costs. As a result of the difficulties, the payload
program fell behind schedule, developmental tests on a surrogate manned
aircraft15 were

unsuccessful, and the payload was too big to fit in the space the Navy had
allotted inside the aircraft. In 1993, the program was terminated.

o  	In 1999, the Army began low-rate initial production of four Shadow
systems at the same time that it began the engineering and manufacturing
development phase. In February 2001, the Army sought to revise its
acquisition strategy to procure four additional Shadow systems before
conducting operational tests. We recommended in a 2000 report that the
Army not buy these four additional systems until after operational testing
is completed.16 In our opinion, only operational testing of the system in
a realistic environment can show whether the overall system would meet the
Army's operational needs. Subsequently, we reported that problems
encountered during early tests forced the program to delay completion of
operational testing by one year. The results of operational tests revealed
that the Shadow was not operationally suitable, survivable, and may not be
affordable.

Our body of UAV work also made several observations about factors that
contribute to success, including the use of innovative approaches and
high-level interventions by individuals and organizations. In August 1999,
we concluded that DOD's use of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
projects improved UAV acquisitions because it focused on maturing
technology and proving military utility before committing to a

14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range
System Components Do Not Fit, GAO/NSIAD-91-2 (Washington, D.C.: March 25,
1991).

15 A surrogate manned aircraft is a conventional aircraft with unmanned
controls that is being operated as a UAV with a pilot on board to override
controls in the event of an emergency.

16 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable
Basis for Revisions to Shadow 200 Acquisition Strategy, GAO/NSIAD-00-204
(Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2000).

UAV.17 We found that DOD's Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
approach was consistent with the practices that we typically characterize
as leading commercial development efforts. Predator UAV used a 30-month
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration approach and prototypes were
deployed in Bosnia in 1995 and 1996 as part of the demonstration.
Performance data gathered there convinced military users that Predator was
worth acquiring.

High-level individuals intervened to set resource constraints and
encouraged evolutionary acquisition strategies on the Air Force's Global
Hawk, the Army's Shadow UAV, and the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System
programs.

o  	In the initial Shadow program, the Army's top military acquisition
executive reached an agreement with his counterpart in the requirements
community that limited the program to "must have" capabilities and
restrained resources such as cost. This resulted in the need to make
trade-offs-so the Army lowered the performance requirement for the imagery
sensor so that existing technology could be used.18

o  	In the Global Hawk program, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) became personally involved and
insisted that the program take an evolutionary approach, developing and
fielding different versions of increasingly capable UAVs. He also placed
cost constraints on the initial version, which enabled more advanced
imagery sensor capabilities to be deferred for later versions of the UAV.

o  	In our report on the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program, we reported
on Air Force plans to have initial deliveries of a lethal-strikecapable
aircraft by 2011.19 The Air Force had abandoned the Unmanned Combat Air
Vehicle initial low-risk approach to development, and increased
requirements and accelerated its program schedule shortly

17 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's
Demonstration Approach Has Improved Project Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-33
(Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999).

18 U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Matching of
Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288
(Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001).

19 GAO-03-598.

before it was to shift to the product development stage. As previously
reported, it took intervention by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to resolve requirements and funding challenges and maintain strong
oversight over the program. The Task Force also was instrumental in
getting the funding restored to the program, creating a joint effort
between the Air Force and Navy, and accelerating the Navy's version. Their
strong oversight and intervention might have saved the program, which is
now known as the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System program.

Future Challenges in Oversight of UAVs

Over the next decade, DOD plans show that UAV investments will increase,
greater numbers will be fielded, and these systems will play more
significant roles than in the past. In addition to overcoming the problems
and pressures that have impaired past programs, managers of future UAV
programs will face increasing competition for money, electromagnetic
frequency spectrum bandwidth, and airspace.

By 2010, DOD plans to invest $11 billion in UAV acquisitions, quadrupling
the number of systems in its inventory today. As UAV programs vie for
increased funding, they will have to compete against very large programs,
such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. If the costs of
acquisition programs continue to exceed what has been set aside in the
budget, competition will intensify and funding could be jeopardized.

Initially, UAVs were seen as complementary systems that augmented
capabilities the warfighter already had. They were, in a sense, "another
pair of eyes." We are already seeing the evolution of UAVs into more
significant roles, for which they provide primary capability. For example,
the Global Hawk is being seen as replacing the U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft, and the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle may eventually perform
electronic warfare missions that the EA-6 Prowler aircraft performs today.
UAVs are figuring prominently in plans to transform the military into a
more strategically responsive force. UAVs are expected to be an integral
part of this information-based force. For example, UAVs may serve as relay
nodes in the Future Combat System's command and control network. As UAVs
perform increasingly significant roles, their payloads and designs will
likely become more sophisticated.

UAVs depend on the available space in the electromagnetic frequency
spectrum to send and receive signals. Such signals are essential to UAV
control, communications, and imagery. As the number of UAVs grows, the
systems will have to compete for more room on the spectrum. Spectrum

  Concluding Remarks

resources are scarce and facing increased demands from sources other than
UAVs. Because of the changing nature of warfighting, more and more
military systems are coming to depend on the spectrum to guide precision
weapons and obtain information superiority. Recently, because of advances
in commercial technology, a competition for scarce frequency spectrum has
developed between government and nongovernment users.

Moreover, as the growing number of UAV systems become available for
military units and civilian agencies, such as the Department of Homeland
Security, their operation will also need to be integrated into the
national airspace system. Currently, the Federal Aviation Administration
requires detailed coordination and approval of UAV flights in the national
airspace system. The Federal Aviation Administration and DOD are working
on how to better integrate military UAVs within the national air space
system. In the future, UAVs are going to be used for homeland security,
and their acceptance into civil airspace may be difficult to accomplish
until significant work is accomplished in the areas of reliability,
regulation, communications, and collision avoidance.

Recent operations are convincing military commanders that UAVs are of real
value to the warfighter. That success on the battlefield is leading to
more and more demand for UAVs and innovative ways of using them, creating
pressures such as a greater need for interoperability of systems and
competition for limited resources like money, electromagnetic frequency
spectrum, and airspace. The UAVs that are successful today survived an
environment characterized by a number of canceled programs, risky
strategies, uncoordinated efforts, and uncertain funding. It took
additional measures for them to succeed, not the least of which was strong
management intervention. In recent years, DOD has taken positive steps to
better manage the development of UAVs by creating the joint UAV Planning
Task Force and the UAV Roadmap. The question is whether these steps will
be sufficient to make the most out of current and future investments in
UAVs. We believe that DOD should build on these good steps so that it will
be in a better position to provide stewardship over these investments.
Taking these steps will give Congress confidence that its investments' in
the technology will produce optimum capabilities desired of UAVs.

                                     -----

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy to
answer any questions that you or Members of the subcommittee may have.

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements

For future questions about this statement, please contact Mr. Curtin at
(202) 512-4914, Mr. Francis at (202) 512-2811, or Brian J. Lepore at (202)
512-4523. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include
Fred S. Harrison, Lawrence E. Dixon, James K. Mahaffey, James A. Driggins,
Jerry W. Clark, Jose Ramos, Jr., R.K. Wild, Bob Swierczek, and Kenneth E.
Patton.

Related GAO Products

Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of Cruise
Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T. Washington, D.C.: March
9, 2004.

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology Exports
for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175. Washington,
D.C.: January 23, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to the
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success. GAO-03-598. Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow 200
Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.: September 26,
2000.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.: April 25,
2000.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved
Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude Endurance
Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.: December 15,
1998.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate to
Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.: September
23, 1997.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts. GAO/ T-NSIAD97-138.
Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy Fleet
Use. GAO/NSIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short Range System Still in
Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of Short
Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4, 1992.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit.
GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of
Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September 28,
1990.

Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master
Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

GAO's Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm
of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of
the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of
public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through the Internet. GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts
and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding
archive of older products. The Web site features a search engine to help
you locate documents using key words and phrases. You can print these
documents in their entirety, including charts and other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files.
To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and
select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order GAO Products"
heading.

Order by Mail or Phone 	The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington, D.C.
20548

To order by Phone: 	Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

To Report Fraud,	Contact: Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

Waste, and Abuse in E-mail: [email protected]

Federal Programs Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202)
512-7470

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800

Public Affairs 	U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
*** End of document. ***