Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little	 
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches (22-APR-04,	 
GAO-04-505T).							 
                                                                 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in	 
fundamental changes in the way the United States screens airport 
passengers and their property. One of the most significant	 
changes was the shift from using private screeners to using	 
federal screeners at all but five commercial airports in the	 
United States. These five airports are part of a pilot program,  
where private screeners perform screening functions. The mission 
of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as defined by the	 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is to test the	 
effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport
level that contractors may provide. GAO was asked to describe (1)
the challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot	 
program, (2) the operational flexibilities TSA has provided to	 
the private screening companies, and (3) the performance of	 
private and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. This  
testimony is based on our prior and ongoing work on TSA airport  
passenger and baggage screeners.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-505T					        
    ACCNO:   A09853						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have    
Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches		 
     DATE:   04/22/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Airport security					 
	     Baggage (personal effects) 			 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Contractor personnel				 
	     Federal employees					 
	     Inspection 					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     Comparative analysis				 
	     Operational flexibility				 
	     Passengers 					 
	     TSA Private Screening Pilot Program		 

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GAO-04-505T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT AVIATION SECURITY

Thursday, April 22, 2004

 Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative
                                   Approaches

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice

GAO-04-505T

Highlights of GAO-04-505T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in fundamental
changes in the way the United States screens airport passengers and their
property. One of the most significant changes was the shift from using
private screeners to using federal screeners at all but five commercial
airports in the United States. These five airports are part of a pilot
program, where private screeners perform screening functions. The mission
of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as defined by the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), is to test the effectiveness of increased
operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors may provide.
GAO was asked to describe (1) the challenges and limitations of the
private screening pilot program, (2) the operational flexibilities TSA has
provided to the private screening companies, and (3) the performance of
private and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. This testimony
is based on our prior and ongoing work on TSA airport passenger and
baggage screeners.

In prior reports, GAO has made recommendations designed to strengthen
airport passenger and baggage screening. GAO also has several ongoing
reviews related to the issues addressed in this testimony, and will issue
separate reports related to these areas at later dates, with additional
recommendations as appropriate.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-505T.

April 2004

AVIATION SECURITY

Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative
Approaches

A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not
established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences
in the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for
those differences. TSA provided the screening contractors with little
opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve efficiencies, and
implement initiatives that go beyond the minimum requirements of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. TSA officials said they had not
granted contract officials more flexibility because they wanted to ensure
that procedures were standardized, well coordinated, and consistently
implemented throughout all airports to achieve consistent security.
However, TSA recently requested input from the private screening
contractors about the additional flexibilities they would like to
implement.

Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only limited
operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some
airportspecific practices. These practices include screening candidates
before they are hired through the assessment centers, hiring baggage
handlers in order to utilize baggage screeners more efficiently, and,
during the initial hiring, selecting screener supervisors from within
their screener workforce rather than relying on the decisions of TSA's
hiring contractors. These practices have enabled the private screening
contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not currently available at
airports with federal screeners.

Little performance data are currently available to compare the performance
of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat objects.
The primary source of available performance data is the results of the
covert tests performed by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program
Review, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects
through screening checkpoints. Although the test results cannot be
generalized either to the airports where the tests have been conducted or
to airports nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance
in detecting threat objects and indicate that, in general, private and
federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the testing
identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and federal screeners
to detect threat objects. TSA recognized the need to improve screener
performance and has taken steps in this direction, including enhancing its
training programs.

Airports Participating in the Pilot Program and Contractors Responsible
for Conducting Screening Operations

Airport Contract screening company

San Francisco International Covenant Aviation Security

Kansas City International First Line Transportation Security

Greater Rochester International McNeil Security

To view the full product, including the scope Jackson Hole Jackson Hole
Airport Board
and methodology, click on the link above. Tupelo Covenant Aviation
Security
For more information, contact Norman J.
Rabkin at (202) 512-8777 or Source: TSA.
[email protected].

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) private screening program.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in fundamental
changes in the way the United States screens airport passengers and their
property. One of the most significant changes was the shift from the use
of private screeners to perform screening functions to the use of federal
screeners at all but five commercial airports in the United States. The
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted on November 19,
2001, mandated the federalization of airport security screening and
required that five airports be part of a pilot program where screening
functions are performed by private screeners. The mission of the Private
Screening Pilot Program, as defined by TSA, is to test the effectiveness
of increased operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors
may provide. ATSA also includes a provision that allows an airport to
apply to opt out of using federal screeners beginning on November 19,
2004.

My testimony today addresses TSA's implementation and evaluation of the
contract screening pilot program. In particular, I will address (1) the
challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot program, (2) the
operational flexibilities TSA has provided to the private screening
contractors, and (3) the performance of private and federal screeners in
detecting threat objects. My testimony is based on our prior work and
preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of TSA's passenger
screening program, all of which have been done in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

In summary:

o  	A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was
not established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the
differences in the performance of federal and private screening and the
reasons for those differences. TSA has provided the private screening
contractors with little opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve
efficiencies, and implement initiatives that go beyond the minimum
requirements of ATSA. Because TSA requires the pilot screening contractors
and Federal Security Directors (FSD) at airports with federal screeners to
operate under the

same procedures, they faced many of the same challenges.1 For example, the
private screening contractors, like FSDs at airports with federal
screeners, must rely on TSA to authorize the hiring of screeners and
establish assessment centers, where screener applicants are assessed.2 The
inability to conduct hiring on an as needed basis has limited their
ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. TSA officials stated
that they had not granted contract officials more flexibility because they
wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well coordinated, and
consistently implemented throughout all airports to achieve consistent
security. However, TSA recently requested input from the private screening
contractors about the additional flexibilities they would like to
implement.

o  	Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only
limited operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some
airportspecific practices. Flexible practices implemented by private
screening contractors include screening candidates before they are hired
through the assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to
utilize baggage screeners more efficiently,3 and, during the initial
hiring, selecting screener supervisors from within rather than relying on
the decisions of TSA's hiring contractors. These practices have enabled
the private screening contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not
currently available to FSDs at airports with federal screeners.

o  	Little performance data are currently available to compare the
performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat
objects. The primary source of available performance data is the results
of covert tests performed by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program
Review (OIAPR), in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat
objects through screening checkpoints and in checked baggage.4 Although

1FSDs are responsible for providing day-to-day operational direction for
federal security at airports. Additionally, the FSD is the ranking TSA
authority responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA security
activities at the airports.

2An assessment center is a temporary testing site that TSA's hiring
contractor assembles to conduct assessments of screener applicants. The
centers are generally constructed at locations such as hotels and TSA
training facilities that are in close proximity to the airport(s) where
the FSDs have requested additional staff.

3Baggage handlers move baggage from carts to belts and back. They do not
perform any screening functions, nor are they hired through TSA's
assessment centers.

4OIAPR conducts covert tests designed to (1) assess screeners' ability to
detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved procedures and (2)
identify systemic problems in the areas of training, policy, and
technology.

the test results cannot be generalized either to the airports in which the

tests have been conducted or to airports nationwide,5 they provide an
indicator of screener performance in detecting threat objects and indicate
that, in general, private and federal screeners performed similarly.
Specifically, the testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both
private and federal screeners to detect threat objects.6 TSA recognized
the need to

improve the performance of both private and federal screeners and has
taken steps in this direction, including enhancing its training programs.

Background 	ATSA created TSA to ensure security for all modes of
transportation, including aviation. ATSA set forth specific enhancements
to aviation security for TSA to implement and established deadlines for
completing many of them. These enhancements included federalizing
passenger screeners at more than 440 commercial airports in the United
States by November 19, 2002; enhancing screener hiring and training
standards; and establishing and managing a 2-year pilot program at 5
airports-one in each airport security category7-where screening of
passengers and property would be conducted by a private screening company
and overseen by TSA. Additionally, ATSA included a provision that allows
airport operators to apply to TSA to use private rather than federal
screeners beginning in November 2004. TSA has acknowledged that one of its
key challenges in 2004 will be designing appropriate criteria for the
potential expansion of contract screening.

As required by ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract
screeners in lieu of federal screeners at 5 commercial airports-one in
each airport security category. ATSA sets forth numerous requirements
regarding the pilot program. Specifically, it requires that

o  	the private screening company be owned and controlled by a citizen of
the United States;

5The results of the tests cannot be generalized either to the airports in
which the tests have been conducted or to airports nationwide because the
sample tests were not identified using the principles of probability
sampling. For cost and operational reasons, however, using probability
sampling techniques to identify sample tests may not be feasible.

6We cannot disclose the actual results of the covert tests because they
are classified.

7There are five categories of airports-X, I, II, III, and IV. Category X
airports have the largest number of enplanements and category IV airports
have the smallest number.

o  	the private screening company, at a minimum, meet employment
standards, compensation and benefits rates, and performance requirements
that apply to federal screeners;

o  	all private screener candidates meet the same minimum qualifications
as federal screeners, including U.S. citizenship,8 high school diploma or
equivalent, English proficiency, and pass a criminal background check; and

o  	all private screener candidates undergo the same battery of employment
screening tests that federal screener candidates undergo.

In June 2002, TSA selected the 5 airports that would comprise the contract
screening pilot program. In October 2002, TSA awarded contracts to four
private screening contractors to provide passenger and baggage screening
services. TSA's role at the airports with private screeners is to provide
onsite federal supervision of all passenger and property screening.9 Table
1 provides a list of the airports participating in the pilot program and
the private contractors responsible for conducting screening operations.

Table 1: Airports Participating in the Pilot Program and Contractors
Responsible for Conducting Screening Operations

             Airport                            
            security                            
            category                    Airport Contract screening company    
                   X San Francisco               Covenant Aviation Security   
                     International              
                   I Kansas City International      First Line Transportation 
                                                                     Security 
                 III       Jackson Hole Airport  Jackson Hole Airport Board   
                  IV             Tupelo Airport  Covenant Aviation Security   

II Greater Rochester International McNeil Security

Source: TSA.

Prior to the passage of ATSA, air carriers were responsible for screening
passengers and most used private security firms to perform this function.
Long-standing concerns existed regarding screener performance in detecting
threat objects during covert tests at passenger screening

8Federal screeners must be either United States citizens or nationals of
the United States (persons who, though not citizens of the United States,
owe permanent allegiance to the United States).

9A federal security director and his or her management team, including
screening managers, oversee screening operations at each of the airports
with private screening contractors.

checkpoints. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the
potentially dangerous objects Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
undercover agents carried through checkpoints during tests-a level that
was considered "significant and alarming." In 1987, screeners did not
detect 20 percent of the objects during the same types of tests. In
addition, we reported that FAA tests conducted between 1991 and 1999
showed that screeners' ability to detect objects was not improving, and in
some cases, was worsening. In tests conducted in the late 1990s, as the
testing objects became more realistic and the tests more closely
approximated how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint,
screeners' ability to detect dangerous objects declined even further.
Inadequate training and poor supervision, along with low wages, rapid
turnover, and inadequate attention to human factors,10 were historically
identified as key contributors to poor screener performance.

The results I am presenting today are based on preliminary observations of
our ongoing review of TSA's passenger screening program, which includes a
review of TSA's efforts to implement and evaluate the contract screening
pilot program. As part of our ongoing review, which we are conducting for
this subcommittee, we interviewed TSA officials and visited all 5 pilot
program airports and 23 airports with federal screeners. During these
visits, we observed screening operations and interviewed FSDs, their
staffs, and, at some airports, airport authority and airline officials. At
the 5 pilot program airports, we also interviewed representatives of the
private screening contractors. Additionally, we interviewed
representatives of several aviation associations. We plan to conduct
additional analysis during the remainder of our review, including
assessing the results of our recent survey of all 155 FSDs regarding their
screening operations. We will also review the results of the final report
submitted to TSA by BearingPoint, Inc., which compared the performance of
private screeners

11

to federal screeners.

10Human factors refers to the demands a job places on the capabilities of,
and the constraints it imposes on the individuals performing the function.
Some of these factors include repetitive tasks screeners perform, the
close and constant monitoring required to detect threat objects, and the
stress involved in dealing with the public who may dislike being screened
or demand faster action to avoid missing their flights.

11ATSA gave TSA the responsibility to review the requests for those
airports wishing to opt out of using TSA screeners in November 2004. TSA
contracted with BearingPoint Inc., to develop an evaluation plan for
assessing screening at the pilot program airports, and conduct an
evaluation of the performance of private screening contractors, as well as
compare screener performance at airports with TSA screeners.

  Private Screening Contractors Have Had Little Opportunity to Demonstrate
  Innovations and Achieve Efficiencies

A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not
established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences
in the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for
those differences. TSA has provided the private screening contractors with
little opportunity to demonstrate innovations and achieve efficiencies.
Because TSA requires the pilot screening contractors and FSDs at airports
with federal screeners to operate under the same procedures, they faced
many of the same challenges. For example, the private screening
contractors, like FSDs at airports with federal screeners, must rely on
TSA to authorize the hiring of screeners and establish assessment centers,
where screener applicants are assessed. The inability to conduct hiring on
an as needed basis has limited their ability to respond quickly to
staffing shortages. TSA officials stated that they had not granted
contract officials more flexibility because they wanted to ensure that
procedures were standardized, well coordinated, and consistently
implemented throughout all airports to achieve consistent security.
However, TSA recently requested input from the private screening
contractors about the additional flexibilities they would like to
implement.

Private Screening Contractors Lack Authority to Determine Staffing Levels
and Conduct Hiring

TSA determined the screener staffing needs of the private screening
contractors using the same computer-based staffing model that was used for
airports with federal screeners.12 This staffing model was based on the
congressionally mandated nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time
equivalent13 federal screeners. Both the contractors and FSDs at airports
with federal screeners have raised concerns about the adequacy of the
staffing model in accounting for the unique needs of each airport,
particularly given that the model is based on a full-time equivalent
ceiling. Two representatives of the private screening contractors that
were at or near their TSA authorized staffing levels told us in February
2004 that they were concerned about having adequate staffing levels to
meet demand during the peak 2004 travel season. TSA had required one of
these contractors to lay off screeners in 2003 as part of its nationwide
screener downsizing effort, even though, according to TSA, private
screeners do not count toward TSA's ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalent
screeners. TSA

12The staffing model took into account factors such as the number of
screening checkpoints and lanes at an airport; originating passengers;
projected air carrier service increases and decreases during calendar year
2003; and hours needed to accommodate screener training, leave, and
breaks.

13One full-time equivalent is equal to 1 work year or 2,080 non overtime
hours.

acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the
screener workforce and hired a consultant in September 2003 to conduct a
study of screener staffing levels, including levels for the 5 pilot
program airports.14 The study, which TSA initially expected to be
completed in April 2004, is now scheduled for completion in May 2004. We
will continue to review TSA's efforts to determine appropriate staffing
levels during the remainder of our review.

The private screening contractors' concerns regarding their staffing
levels are compounded by TSA's requirement that the contractors coordinate
their hiring through TSA headquarters. These contractors, like FSDs at
airports with federal screeners, must rely on TSA to authorize the hiring
of screeners and establish assessment centers-a process that can take
several months. The inability to conduct hiring on an as needed basis has
limited their ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. In one
instance, an FSD for an airport with private screeners stated that in
response to continued attrition at his airport, he notified TSA in advance
that additional screeners would be needed before the peak summer travel
season. However, an assessment center was not opened until mid-June 2003,
and the FSD had to request assistance from TSA's Mobile Screening Force,15
a team of TSA screeners deployed around the country where additional
screening staff are needed. These screeners were in place for 2 months
while TSA scheduled and conducted screener applicant assessments and
trained candidates who were selected for employment by the private
screening company. The private screening contractor and the FSD at this
airport told us that the inability to hire screeners during the first
several months of the attrition problem contributed to screener
performance issues, such as absenteeism or tardiness, and screener
complacency because screeners were aware that they were unlikely to be
terminated due to staffing shortages.

14Specifically, the consultant is to, among other tasks, develop a model
for collecting and analyzing data to realistically portray specific
airport conditions rather than using a generalized large/small airport
protocol; develop a comprehensive modeling approach with appropriate
details to account for the considerable variability that occurs among
airports; and implement a staffing analysis model to be used as a
management tool to determine daily and weekly staffing levels and deploy
the model to commercial airports nationwide.

15TSA's Mobile Screening Force-replaced by the National Screening
Force-was created in early 2002 primarily to support the initial
deployment of federal screeners to commercial airports. The National
Screening Force provides screening support to all commercial airports in
times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances
that require a greater number of screeners than currently available to
FSDs.

Pilot program contractors have requested the opportunity to independently
establish and operate assessment centers on an as needed basis.
Accordingly, in December 2003 and February 2004, TSA submitted to the
screening contractors requests for proposals for additional flexibilities.
TSA's December 12, 2003, request for proposal, which solicited input from
the private screening contractors on potential program innovations
regarding day-to-day operations, was followed by a more specific request
for proposals, dated February 24, 2004, to provide human resource
services, such as screener assessments, qualification, examination, and
selection of security screener candidates.16 TSA received proposals from 3
of the private screening contractors, and found that they were
insufficient in meeting the requirements set forth in the request for
proposal.17 However, TSA officials said they are providing the contractors
a second chance to clarify their proposals.

Private Screening Contractors Have Limited Authority to Implement Training

According to TSA, there are three key elements of passenger screening
training: (1) basic training, (2) recurrent (refresher) training, and (3)
remedial training. As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic screener
training program comprised of a minimum of 40 hours of classroom
instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training for all passenger and
baggage screeners. TSA also requires private and federal screeners to
participate in 3 hours of recurrent training per week, averaged over a
quarter. Consistent with ATSA, TSA further requires remedial training for
any private or federal screener who fails an operational test.18

Representatives of the private screening contractors stated that a
challenge they face in implementing their screening functions is the
limitations TSA places on them in developing and implementing locally
based training programs. Private screening contractors at the pilot
program airports are required to participate in the basic screener
training

16In addition to stating the required standards that each private
contractor must meet during the hiring process, the request details TSA's
expectations for the proposals. For example, the request requires the
contractor to propose the manner in which administration of the
assessments will be accomplished, including the most effective and
efficient way to deliver the assessments.

17TSA officials said they had not received any proposals in response to
the December 2003 request for proposal.

18ATSA requires that screeners who fail an operational test be prohibited
from performing the screening function related to the test they failed
until they successfully complete remedial training on that screening
function.

provided by TSA's training contractor and to maintain the same recurrent
and remedial training curriculums used by TSA. To provide training beyond
TSA's curriculums, the private screening contractors must have their
training reviewed and approved by TSA. Contractors expressed concern that
TSA had either rejected or was slow to approve their requests to provide
additional training outside of TSA's approved curriculum. This was of
particular concern during the first year of the pilot program when TSA had
not yet deployed a recurrent or supervisory training program to airports
to ensure that screeners were effectively trained and supervised. TSA
officials told us, on the other hand, that the private screening
contractors have yet to submit any requests for approval of locally
developed recurrent training.

Private screening contractors also expressed concerns about the lack of
specific feedback regarding screeners' performance on the annual
recertification tests, which assess their proficiency in identifying
threat objects and adhering to standard operating procedures. TSA stores
the results of the recertification tests in a database that FSDs can
access to determine whether screeners for their respective airports passed
or failed. However, private screening contractors told us they cannot view
how screeners performed on specific questions. These performance data
would provide private screening contractors with information on the
specific training needs of screeners, and enable them to appropriately
tailor training to address screener performance deficiencies at their
airports.

FSDs at Airports with Federal Screeners Faced Similar Challenges as
Contractors

FSDs at airports with federal screeners faced many of the same challenges
as the private screening contractors, particularly regarding imposed
staffing levels, a cumbersome hiring process, and limited flexibility in
implementing local training programs. In September 2003, we reported that
FSDs had little input in determining their screener staffing levels.19
Since then, FSDs have continued to express concerns about their limited
role in establishing airport-specific staffing levels and the need for
realistic staffing levels based on the unique needs of each airport. In
February 2004, we reported that many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed
concern with the lack of a continuous hiring process to backfill screeners
lost through attrition, and their lack of authority to conduct hiring on
an as

19U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary
Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003).

needed basis.20 The FSDs also complained of the time lag between their
requests for additional staff and having trained and certified screeners
onboard. Some FSDs reported that this time lag has hindered their ability
to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints and oversee
screening operations at their airports. Contractors at 3 of the pilot
program airports reported difficulties in getting an assessment center
established for hiring at their airport, particularly after the first
cadre of screeners had been hired, trained, and deployed. Likewise, an FSD
at an airport with federal screeners reported that inadequate staffing is
his most critical issue. He stated that to address the staffing
inadequacies and maintain a reasonably acceptable passenger wait time
level, FSD staff and screening management personnel have assisted in
staffing of exit lanes, checking boarding passes, and transporting bags,
among other tasks. However, he noted that these practices are not
sustainable in the long term.

We recently surveyed all 155 FSDs regarding their screening operations. As
of April 13, 2004, we had a response rate of about 90 percent for our
general survey and about 85 percent for our airport-specific survey.21 We
asked the FSDs the extent to which they needed additional authority to
perform their staffing and screening operations. As shown in table 2, the
overwhelming majority of the FSDs, and in two instances all five of the
FSDs at the pilot program airports, reported that they needed additional
authority to a great or very great extent.

20U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in
Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations,
GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).

21We sent two surveys to the Federal Security Directors on March 23, 2004.
In the general survey, we asked FSDs to answer security-related questions
that will pertain to all of the airports for which he/she is responsible.
In the airport-specific survey, we asked FSDs a number of airport-specific
questions about screening and other security concerns.

     Table 2: Summary of Selected FSD Survey Responses as of April 13, 2004

"In your opinion, to what extent, if at all, do you need or would you like
to have the following to better address specific staffing or security
needs at the airport(s) that you oversee?"

Source: GAO analysis of survey of 155 FSDs, including the five FSDs at
airports with private screeners.

Note: The percentages do not total 100 because we did not include the not
applicable/no opinion response.

Flexibilities Have Although, overall, TSA has not provided private
screening contractors with

much operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some Been
Provided to airport-specific practices. Practices implemented by the
private screening Private Screeners in a contractors include screening
candidates before they are hired though the

assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage

Few Areas 	screeners more efficiently, and promoting screener supervisors
from within rather than hiring them directly from the assessment center.
These practices have enabled the private screening contractors to achieve
efficiencies that are not currently available to FSDs at airports with
federal screeners.

Contractors Have Greater Role than FSDs in Screener Selection Process

Although the private screening contractors can only hire applicants who
have been screened through the assessment center, the contractors have
greater flexibility than FSDs at airports with federal screeners in
weeding out candidates they deem unsuitable. For example, at one airport,
following the applicants' successful completion of the first assessment
phase at the assessment center, the private screening contractor
interviews the candidates to assess whether the company thinks they are a
good fit for the job. Individuals whom the contractor agrees to hire are
sent through the second phase at the assessment center and, upon
successful completion of that assessment phase, to training. FSDs at
airports with federal screeners have expressed the need for a role in the
hiring process. Several FSDs told us that it is important for them or
their

staff to participate in the hiring process to both build a rapport with
the screeners early in the process and to determine whether the screener
candidates would be a good fit for their airport, thereby possibly
reducing the high levels of attrition. TSA officials told us that they are
planning to redesign and streamline TSA's hiring process, particularly the
assessment center process, to allow for greater involvement by FSDs and
their staff. Specifically, officials reported that they are beginning to
(1) ensure that the recruiting contractor includes the FSD in recruiting
planning, including obtaining input regarding where and how the contractor
recruits; (2) allow FSDs to participate with TSA's hiring contractor in
the structured interview of the candidates; and (3) ensure that FSDs swear
in the candidates and provide organizational briefings on their first day
of orientation.

TSA Allowed Contractor to Hire Baggage Handlers

TSA has also allowed a private screening contractor to hire baggage
handlers to enhance checked baggage screening operations. The contractor
uses baggage handlers instead of trained baggage screeners to move checked
baggage to and from the explosive detection system or explosive trace
detection equipment and onward through the baggage system. While the
baggage handlers still count toward the full-time equivalent authorized
staffing level established by TSA for that individual airport, both TSA
and the contractor report that this flexibility has provided a means to
reduce costs without diminishing security by allowing trained baggage
screeners to devote a greater proportion of time to screening bags. The
contractor officials also told us that while they were operating below
their authorized staffing levels, they were still able to effectively
operate screening checkpoints due in part to their use of baggage
handlers.22 TSA has not provided FSDs with the authority to hire baggage
handlers, and thus, FSDs at airports with federal screeners where baggage
handlers would be useful are more limited in their ability to efficiently
maximize staffing resources.

22The same contractor also has a system in place to continuously monitor
lines at checkpoints and check-in counters in order to deploy resources
where they are most needed. This system, which uses security cameras at an
airport operations center that was already in place at the airport, is
used to determine if and where screeners should be redeployed. The
monitoring system has also contributed to the contractor's ability to
effectively operate below its authorized staffing level. TSA officials
told us that any FSD could work with an airport that has such an
operations center in place to implement this effort.

This contractor is working with a local university to set up a program
where college students working as baggage handlers would earn a regular
hourly wage and tuition reimbursements in lieu of benefits. Officials at
this company told us that the use of baggage handlers would provide relief
to current full-time screeners by relieving them of time spent carrying
bags to and from checked baggage screening systems and enable them to
focus more on screening functions. While this proposal has yet to be
implemented, it demonstrates how private screening contractors might use
their flexibility to recruit employees. In contrast, TSA officials told us
that the agency has not established a tuition reimbursement program for
federal screeners.

Selecting Screener Supervisors from Within

  Little Information Exists to Measure Differences in Performance of Private and
  Federal Screeners

TSA describes its screening supervisors as the key to a strong defense in
detecting threat objects. During the initial hiring of screeners, TSA's
hiring contractor selected screener supervisors for both the airports with
federal and private screeners. However, one of the private screening
contractors did not hire screener supervisors directly through TSA's
assessment center process, but instead hired all applicants as screeners
and, after monitoring their performance, promoted screeners to the
supervisor position. Thus, rather than accepting the decisions of TSA's
hiring contractor regarding applicants who would be suitable supervisors,
it determined which screeners should be made supervisors based on actual
screener performance. This decision to promote from within gave the
private screening contractor more decision-making authority in the
staffing selection process. In contrast, many of the FSDs we interviewed
and numerous FSDs who have responded to our FSD survey reported that they
were dissatisfied with the quality of the screening supervisors initially
assigned to the airport. FSDs have attempted to address this performance
gap by conducting subsequent promotions based on their observations of
screeners' ability to effectively supervise staff.

Little performance data are currently available to compare the performance
of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat objects.
The primary source of performance data currently available is the results
of the covert tests performed by TSA's OIAPR, in which TSA undercover
agents attempt to pass threat objects through screening checkpoints and in
checked baggage. However, relatively limited testing has been conducted to
date. Although the results of the covert testing cannot be generalized
either to the airports in which the tests have been conducted or to
airports nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in
detecting threat objects. The results indicate that, in

general, private and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically,
the covert testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private
and federal screeners to detect threat objects. TSA is in the process of
collecting and analyzing additional performance data on screener
performance, including data from the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system,
which places images of threat objects on the x-ray screen during actual
operations and records whether screeners identify threat objects, and the
annual screener recertification program. TSA has recognized the need to
enhance screener performance and has taken steps in this direction,
including enhancing its recurrent training program.

TSA Has Enhanced Efforts to Measure Screener Performance

Covert Testing

TSA recognized the need to strengthen its assessment of the private and
federal screener workforces and has taken action in this vein.
Specifically, TSA has increased its covert testing, fully activated TIP
and deployed a new library of 2,400 TIP images, and implemented the
screener recertification program. However, with the exception of the
covert testing and recent TIP data, data are not yet available to assess
how well screeners are performing; how the performance of federal and
private screeners compare; and what steps, if any, TSA needs to take to
improve performance. In September 2003, TSA also hired BearingPoint, a
consultant, to evaluate the performance of the contract screening program.
The consultant's report was delivered to TSA on April 9, 2004, but TSA has
not yet publicly released the results of the study.

TSA's OIAPR conducts unannounced covert tests of screeners to assess their
ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved procedures.
These tests, in which undercover OIAPR inspectors attempt to pass threat
objects through screening checkpoints and in checked baggage, are designed
to identify systematic problems affecting the performance of screeners in
the areas of training, policy, and technology.23 Currently, OIAPR's covert
test results are the primary available data source on screener performance
in detecting threat objects. However, relatively limited testing has been
conducted to date. Between September 9, 2002, and February 1, 2004, OIAPR
conducted 1,164 checkpoint tests on passenger screeners at 127 airports
and 245 tests on baggage screeners at

23The descriptions of OIAPR's various covert tests are classified. OIAPR
designs its covert testing methods based, in part, on intelligence
regarding the most recent threats.

119 airports.24 Of the 1,164 checkpoint tests OIAPR conducted, 98 were
performed at the 5 pilot program airports and 1,066 were performed at
airports with federal screeners. Of the 245 checked baggage tests, 10 were
performed at the 5 pilot program airports and 235 were performed at
airports with federal screeners. Overall, these tests have shown
weaknesses in both private and federal screeners' ability to detect threat
objects. While the results of OIAPR's covert tests cannot be generalized
either to the airports in which the tests have been conducted or to
airports nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in
detecting threat objects. The results indicate that, in general, private
and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the testing
identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and federal screeners
to detect threat objects. Similar testing conducted by the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General has also identified
comparable screener performance weaknesses.

OIAPR initially focused most of its resources on testing passenger rather
than baggage screeners. While OIAPR began conducting covert tests of
passenger screeners in September 2002, it did not begin conducting covert
tests of checked baggage screeners until January 2003. Consequently, OIAPR
has collected less data related to the performance of baggage screeners.
OIAPR has increased the number of checkpoint and checked baggage tests it
conducts in recent months. Additionally, TSA is developing protocols to
help FSDs conduct their own airport level screening testing-a practice
that TSA had previously prohibited at all airports, including those with
private screeners.

TIP System 	Another key source of information on screener performance in
detecting threat objects is the results from the TIP system. TIP is
designed to test screeners' detection capabilities by projecting threat
images, including guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened
during actual operations. Screeners are responsible for positively
identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once
prompted, TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and
then records the screener's performance in a database that could be
analyzed for

24As of February 1, 2004, OIAPR conducted covert tests at 137 airports, of
which 109 included tests of both passenger and checked baggage screening.
Additionally, OIAPR conducted repeat testing at 27 airports-2 of which
were tested three times and 25 of which were tested twice. Of the 5 pilot
program airports, 1 was tested 3 times and the remaining 4 were tested
twice.

performance trends. TSA only recently began collecting and analyzing TIP
data and TIP is not yet available for baggage screening.25

TSA is not currently using TIP data as a formal indicator of screener
performance, but instead is using TIP to identify individual screeners'
training needs in terms of identifying threat objects on the X-ray
machine.26 TSA recently completed deploying and activating TIP with the
new library of 2,400 images at all but 1 of the more than 1,800 passenger
screening lanes nationwide.27 TSA considers February 2004 to be the first
full month of TIP reporting with the new library of 2,400 images. TSA
collected these data in early March 2004. Officials told us that they plan
to analyze at least 3 months of data-February, March, and April 2004-to
determine more precisely how the data can be used to measure screener
performance in detecting threat objects and to validate what the data
tells TSA about screener performance. Additionally, officials stated that
they plan to use TIP as an evaluation tool once sufficient data are
collected to establish firm performance standards.

A third indicator of screener performance is the results of the annual
recertification testing. ATSA requires that TSA collect performance
information on all screeners by conducting an annual proficiency
evaluation to ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications
and standards related to the functions that he or she performs. To meet
this requirement, TSA established an annual recertification program
comprised of two assessment components, one of the screener's knowledge
and skills and the other of the screener's performance. The knowledge and
skills assessment program consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of
standard operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical
demonstration of skills. As part of the performance assessment, screeners
are rated on both organizational and individual goals, such as maintaining

                         Annual Recertification Program

25TSA officials stated that they are currently working to resolve
technical challenges associated with using TIP for checked baggage
screening on explosives detection systems (EDS) and have started EDS TIP
image development. On April 15, TSA issued a request for proposal inviting
EDS vendors and other third-party vendors to submit research proposals to
improve TIP training technology for EDS.

26TSA officials said TIP performance information has been available to
FSDs on a local level since full activation in January 2004.

27TIP is not yet operational at one airport (an airport with federal
screeners) due to construction at the screening checkpoint to prepare for
its installation. However, the TIPready X-ray machines have already been
procured for the airport and will be installed once the construction
issues have been resolved.

the nation's air security, vigilantly carrying out duties with utmost
attention to tasks that will prevent security threats, and demonstrating
the highest levels of courtesy to travelers to maximize their levels of
satisfaction with screening services. To be certified, a screener must
have passed all the applicable modules and have a rating of "met" or
"exceeded" standards on their annual performance assessment.

Screeners have completed all three modules of the knowledge and skills
assessment program. TSA is currently analyzing the results of the fiscal
year 2004 recertification tests and plans to report on the results of the
certification process to TSA's Acting Administrator in late April 2004.28
The report will include the results of all three modules of the knowledge
and skills assessment tests, the outcomes of screener performance
assessments, and the total number of screeners terminated due to failure
to successfully pass the recertification program.29

TSA Efforts to Enhance Performance of Private and Federal Screeners

In October 2003, TSA began implementing a screening performance
improvement program for private and federal screeners. The goal of the
program is to improve screener performance through several training and
management initiatives, including increasing covert testing at screening
checkpoints, completing installation of TIP at all airports, enhancing
screener training, and strengthening supervisors' skills through
leadership and technical training. As part of TSA's efforts to enhance
screener performance, TSA requires all screeners to participate in 3 hours
of training per week averaged over each quarter. One hour is required to
be devoted to X-ray image interpretation and the other 2 hours to
screening techniques or reviews of standard operating procedures. TSA
recently provided FSDs at all airports, including airports with private
screeners, with additional training tools. Specifically, according to TSA
officials, TSA has

o  	provided every airport, including the 5 pilot program airports, with
at least one Modular Bomb Set (MBS II) kit-containing components of an
improvised explosive device-and one weapons training kit, in part

28Screeners certified at the end of their on-the-job training on or before
June 30, 2003, must complete the fiscal year 2004 recertification program.
All other screeners are to participate in the annual certification process
for fiscal year 2005.

29Based on the results of the screener recertification testing, TSA
officials anticipate terminating less than 1 percent of the screener
workforce due to failure to successfully pass the recertification testing.

because screeners had consistently told OIAPR inspectors that they would
like more training with test objects similar to ones used in the tests;30

o  	instituted a program called "Threat in the Spotlight" that, based on
intelligence TSA receives, provides screeners with the latest in threat
information regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past
screening checkpoints;

o  established video training and fielded the first two videos in the
series; and

o  	fielded an Online Learning Center-a Web based tool with 366
self-guided training courses available to all screening staff, including
staff at the 5 pilot program airports.

As we reported in February 2004,31 staffing shortages and lack of
highspeed connectivity32 at airport training facilities have made it
difficult for screeners to fully utilize these programs. According to TSA
officials, the Online Learning Center is now available via the Internet
and the Intranet; therefore the issues of connectivity have been
mitigated.33 In January 2004, OIAPR began to gather data on selected
training initiatives and to conduct repeat covert testing at airports. At
each of the airports OIAPR visited to conduct covert tests between January
5, 2004, and February 1, 2004, OIAPR inspectors interviewed screeners
about whether they had participated in the training initiatives. Based on
these interviews, OIAPR found that the training initiatives they discussed
with the screeners had not been fully implemented at every airport.

TSA officials said that they have begun to focus attention on airports
where screeners performed particularly poorly on covert tests. For
example, TSA officials said that mobile training assist teams were
deployed in November 2003 to identify causes of poor performance at these
airports and work with FSDs to devise and implement solutions.
Additionally, in January 2004, OIAPR began conducting repeat covert

30The MBS II and weapons training kits were fielded to airports to address
the identified training gap by allowing screeners to see and feel the
threat objects that they are looking for. These kits contain some of the
test objects used by OIAPR to conduct the covert testing.

31GAO-04-440T.

32High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA's field
operations training sites and checkpoints.

33TSA officials stated that the Chief Information Officer's office is
currently working with FSDs who have not received high-speed connectivity
to identify alternative means of connectivity.

testing at airports to determine whether TSA's initiatives designed to
enhance screener performance, such as additional recurrent training, have
in fact improved performance.34 Furthermore, FSDs are to be held
accountable for screening performance and delivery of security.
Specifically, annual performance assessments for all FSDs are to be tied
to the overall performance level of their screeners as well as to their
ability to address deficiencies quickly and adequately.

Despite its efforts to collect screener performance data and enhance
screener performance, TSA officials acknowledged that they had not
established overall performance targets by which to assess whether
screeners within and across airports are achieving a desired level of
performance. However, TSA has made progress in establishing performance
standards for one screening function-X-ray image interpretation. In March
2004, TSA established interim TIP performance standards and plans to
finalize these standards in May 2004. TSA is currently considering
developing performance indexes for representing the performance of
passenger and baggage screeners. During the remainder of our review, we
plan to continue to examine TSA's efforts to measure screeners'
performance, establish performance standards, and assess the performance
of the private screening pilot program. As part of this effort, we will
review the results of the BearingPoint, Inc. evaluation of the private
screening pilot program, which was provided to TSA on April 9, 2004.

The private screening pilot program was not established in a way to enable
an effective evaluation of the differences in the performance of federal
and private screening and the reasons for those differences. In developing
the pilot program, TSA did not develop an evaluation plan or performance
targets by which to assess how the performance of federal and private
screening compares. Additionally, TSA did not collect data in ways that
would enable it to reach generalizable conclusions about the performance
of private screeners. Further, the program was not designed to achieve its
intended mission, as defined by TSA-to test the effectiveness of increased
operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors may provide.
Key operational areas, such as staffing and training have to a

34Between January 5, 2004, and February 1, 2004, OIAPR conducted repeat
testing at 15 airports. OIAPR officials reported that they conducted
repeat testing at an additional 29 airports between February 2, 2004, and
March 31, 2004.

  Concluding Observations

large extent been held constant across all airports, and therefore, are
not within the control of the private screening contractors. Therefore, it
is not surprising that TSA's available screener performance data indicate
little difference between federal or private screeners in detecting threat
objects. It would have been informative to have an evaluation of a true
pilot program where the private screening contractors were provided with
operational flexibility that could assist in identifying practices that
lead to improved screener performance and higher security at the most
efficient cost to the taxpayer. Without data to better assess the
performance of private screening operations and flexible practices, TSA
and airport operators have little information on which to plan for the
possible transition of airports from a federal system to a private
screening contractor. We will continue our work and make recommendations
for TSA actions, as appropriate, in a future report.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at
this time.

For further information on this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin at
(202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
include David Alexander, Lisa Brown, Dave Hooper, Christopher Jones,
Thomas Lombardi, Stuart Kaufmann, Maria Strudwick, Cady Summers, and Susan
Zimmerman.

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