Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the  
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations (05-MAR-04, GAO-04-499R).		 
                                                                 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal	 
Aviation Administration (FAA) issued flight restrictions to	 
prevent flights over certain areas, to include stadiums, in	 
response to increased concerns about the threat posed by	 
terrorists using aircraft as a weapon. Beginning in December	 
2001, FAA's Air Traffic Division Director of Air Traffic	 
Services, and later the Transportation Security Administration	 
(TSA), implemented processes to allow certain pilots and aircraft
to operate over these events by waiving flight restrictions.	 
However, in February 2003, Congress passed legislation that for 1
year prevented aerial advertising pilots from flying near stadium
airspace during certain sporting events by suspending the waiver 
process. In January 2004, Congress passed legislation continuing 
this restriction indefinitely. In the event that the restriction 
on waivers for aerial advertising near stadiums is repealed, the 
House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland	 
Security, asked that we (1) describe the results of FAA and TSA  
threat assessments conducted relevant to aerial advertising	 
operations and (2) identify FAA's and TSA's processes for	 
mitigating the identified threat, determine whether established  
processes were followed, and identify factors that may limit	 
their effectiveness.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-499R					        
    ACCNO:   A09445						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness 
of the Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure
Aerial Advertising Operations					 
     DATE:   03/05/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Advertising					 
	     Aircraft						 
	     Facility security					 
	     Identity verification				 
	     Records management 				 
	     Sports						 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Waivers						 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Civil aviation					 
	     Flight restrictions				 
	     Policies and procedures				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-04-499R

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

March 5, 2004

The Honorable Tom Ridge
Secretary, Department of Homeland Security

Subject: Aviation Security: Factors CouldLimit the Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration'sEfforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations

Dear Mr. Secretary:

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) issued flight restrictions to prevent flights over
certain areas, to include stadiums, in response to increased concerns
about the threat posed by terrorists using aircraft as a weapon. Larger
stadiums, some of which may house more than 100,000 fans for certain
events, may provide an attractive target for such a terrorist attack.
Beginning in December 2001, FAA's Air Traffic Division Director of Air
Traffic Services, and later the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), implemented processes to allow certain pilots and aircraft to
operate over these events by waiving flight restrictions. However, in
February 2003, Congress passed legislation that for 1 year prevented
aerial advertising pilots1 from flying near stadium airspace during
certain sporting events by suspending the waiver process. In January 2004,
Congress

2

passed legislation continuing this restriction indefinitely.

In the event that the restriction on waivers for aerial advertising near
stadiums is repealed, the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, asked that we (1) describe the results of FAA and TSA
threat assessments conducted relevant to aerial advertising operations and
(2) identify FAA's and TSA's processes for mitigating the identified
threat, determine whether established processes were followed, and
identify factors that may limit their effectiveness. Due to TSA's concern
that the public release of our detailed findings could compromise aviation
security, our report detailing the results of our review is restricted.
This letter is intended to summarize our overall findings and confirm your
agreement to take action to address vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in
the background check process for aerial advertisers in the event that the
waiver restriction is repealed. Such actions could also improve the
quality of background checks for all general aviation pilots seeking
waivers of security-related flight restrictions.

1 Aerial advertising aircraft are small aircraft that tow advertising
banners. 2 Pub. L. No. 108-199, Section 521, Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2004.

To satisfy our objectives, we assessed FAA and TSA regulations, policies,
procedures, and documents related to issuing waivers to flight
restrictions and associated threat assessments. We also reviewed a sample
of waivers approved by TSA and issued by FAA to allow aerial advertising
pilots to fly over stadiums from September 2002 through February 2003, and
interviewed responsible FAA and TSA officials. We conducted our work
between November 2003 and February 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief

While TSA does not believe aerial advertising aircraft pose a significant
threat, TSA`s summary assessment of general aviation3 concluded that a
variety of factors made general aviation vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
TSA identified that these factors, as well as the ability of terrorist
organizations such as al-Qaeda to adopt new and creative methods of
attack, highlight the need for security of all operations using general
aviation aircraft and airports, including aerial advertisers. To mitigate
this threat, TSA plans to coordinate with an industry-led initiative to
study security vulnerabilities associated with general aviation aircraft
and also plans to issue a set of "best practices," or recommended
guidelines to improve security at general aviation airports, as well as a
self-assessment guide for general aviation airport managers to use.

After assuming responsibility for processing waivers for aerial
advertisers to fly over restricted stadium airspace from FAA, TSA began to
strengthen and implement additional processes to enhance security,
including strengthening background checks on aerial advertisers. Although
we generally found documentation identifying that background checks were
conducted, we identified certain factors that could limit the
effectiveness of these checks. In addition, inconsistency in the manner in
which information was collected to identify pilots and match them to the
results of the checks conducted made it difficult to verify that the
background checks were conducted as required. Further, FAA and TSA
reported that they used additional processes to reduce the threat of
aerial advertising operations. However, we found that these processes were
not formalized in agency policies or procedures, and thereby, may not have
been consistently applied.

To address the factors we identified that could limit TSA's effectiveness
to secure aerial advertising operations, we recommended that, in the event
that waiver restrictions are repealed, the Administrator of TSA should
determine whether more comprehensive background checks are warranted to
further reduce the threat of aerial advertising operations; ensure that
documents supporting waivers granted for temporary flight restrictions are
systematically and fully maintained; and disseminate policies defining the
process and procedures for issuing waivers, conducting background checks,
and defining the circumstances under which TSA will take additional steps
to ensure verification that pilots flying over restricted stadium airspace
have been properly cleared. In commenting on this report, FAA and TSA
officials generally agreed with the information provided and our
recommendations. Officials also provided technical clarifications that we
incorporated as appropriate.

3 General aviation consists of all civil aircraft, excluding commercial
and military, as well as general aviation airports where these aircraft
are based.

Background

Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, FAA issued several
temporary flight restrictions to prevent flights over certain areas. After
its creation and assumption of aviation security responsibilities, TSA
began determining when and where securityrelated temporary flight
restrictions should be issued.4 Although TSA determines the aviation
security risks, FAA retains responsibility-due to its oversight of U.S.
airspace-for signing and issuing airspace restrictions and associated
waivers. FAA formally informs the aviation industry of such restrictions
through numbered notices to airmen (NOTAM). One restriction prohibited
flights over public assemblies and large stadiums to enhance security over
events being held at these sites.5 Beginning in December 2001, FAA's Air
Traffic Office began to allow certain pilots and aircraft to operate over
these events by waiving flight restrictions. These waiver processes
allowed pilots, such as those flying aerial advertising aircraft, to
obtain a waiver from the restriction and fly in restricted airspace. In
the spring of 2002, FAA began to conduct background checks on pilots
applying for waivers from flight restrictions.

In September 2002, TSA recommended that FAA amend previous NOTAMs to
clarify the events over which flights should be restricted. Rather than
all public assemblies, flight restrictions were narrowed to include only
flights over National Football League, Major League Baseball, National
Collegiate Athletic Association Division 1 football, and major motor
speedway events at stadiums with 30,000 seats or more. The restrictions
extended 3 miles out from the center of the stadium and 3,000 feet above
ground level. Based on experiences and knowledge gained in working with
FAA to address security issues following the September 11 attacks, TSA
developed a process for conducting background checks on pilots requesting
waivers to fly over these events and began processing waiver
applications.6 FAA, as manager of the U.S. airspace, continued to sign and
issue the waivers.

TSA's processes for approving waivers were in place until February 2003,
when Congress directed that restrictions be placed on the type of pilots
and aircraft allowed to obtain a waiver to fly over restricted stadium
airspace.7 These new restrictions allowed only aircraft having broadcast,
safety and security, or other operational purposes to fly in the airspace.
For example, law enforcement, medical, and Department of Defense aircraft
were exempted from the restrictions as well as aircraft required to fly
through the restricted airspace to arrive or depart from a nearby airport.
This legislation barred all other operations, including aerial
advertisers, from obtaining waivers through February 20, 2004, unless
extended by Congress. In January 2004, Congress passed legislation
continuing this restriction indefinitely. Figure 1 shows a time line of
events leading to the suspension of aerial advertising waivers.

4 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71,
S: 101(g), 115 Stat. 597, 603
(2001), transferred much of the responsibility for civil aviation security
from FAA to TSA.
3 NOTAM 1/3353, issued December 19, 2001.
6 TSA conducts such background checks when considering waiver requests for
all security-related
temporary flight restrictions, including checks for pilots, crew members,
and passengers.
7 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, S: 352,
117 Stat. 11, 420-21
(implemented by FAA in NOTAM 3/1840, issued Mar. 6, 2003).

 Figure 1: Time line of Events Leading to the Suspension of Aerial Advertising
                                    Waivers

TSA's Threat Assessments Found General Aviation to Be Vulnerable

While the agency does not believe aerial advertising aircraft pose a
significant threat and are not likely to be used by terrorists, TSA
concluded that a variety of factors made general aviation, including
aerial advertising operations, vulnerable to terrorist attack. TSA
identified that these factors, as well as the ability of terrorist
organizations such as al-Qaeda to adopt new and creative methods of
attack, highlight the need for security of all operations using general
aviation aircraft and airports, including aerial advertisers.

TSA plans to coordinate with an industry-led initiative to study security
vulnerabilities associated with a spectrum of general aviation aircraft
(from smallest to largest and heaviest), operating under a variety of
scenarios, and with a variety of payloads. Through this coordination, TSA
plans to provide guidance to industry participants in an effort to ensure
the results provide information that will benefit both the government and
industry. TSA also plans to issue a set of "best practices," or
recommended guidelines to improve security at general aviation airports,
and a self-assessment guide for general aviation airport managers to use
by March 2004.

TSA Enhanced Security Processes for Aerial Advertising Operations, but
Limitations Exist

When TSA assumed responsibility for managing the waiver process in
September 2002, the agency began taking steps to conduct more extensive
background checks for aerial advertising pilots than those previously
conducted by FAA. According to FAA and TSA, FAA began issuing waivers to
aerial advertising pilots in December 2001 but did not begin conducting
background checks on pilots until sometime in March or April 2002. When
TSA assumed responsibility for managing the waiver process, the agency
instituted additional processes for conducting background checks, which
included more extensive checks of a pilot's criminal history and
associated links to terrorism. TSA said the agency used these processes to
determine whether to grant waivers for any security-related temporary
flight restriction beyond only waivers for aerial advertising pilots.
Despite these efforts, however, we found weaknesses in the process used to
conduct background checks that could impact the security of aerial
advertising operations.

In addition to strengthening background checks for aerial advertising
pilots granted waivers to fly over stadiums, TSA took steps to document
that these background checks were completed. For the period between
December 2001 and September 2002, when FAA was responsible for managing
the waiver process, officials did not track waivers granted or maintain
file documentation of background check results. As a result, we could not
verify that FAA conducted all background checks as reported. After TSA
assumed responsibility for processing waiver applications, the agency
established a tracking system to document the results of background
checks.

To determine whether TSA followed their process for approving waivers and
conducting background checks for aerial advertisers requesting waivers, we
reviewed a random sample of 100 waivers (of the 900 total waivers
contained in TSA's internal tracking system as having been processed for
aerial advertising pilots from September 2002 until February 2003) and
determined whether documentation existed that showed that the additional
checks instituted by TSA were conducted. We found that although checks
were generally documented, inconsistency in the manner in which
information was collected to identify pilots and match them to the results
of the checks conducted made it difficult to verify that the background
checks were conducted as required. For example, pilots applying for
waivers were organized alphabetically in the documentation of one check,
whereas results of the terrorist threat analysis were organized by a
pilot's social security number. In addition, TSA tracked the waivers by
pilot certificate number in some cases, further complicating the process
of matching the results of one check and terrorist threat analysis to the
waivers applied for and granted.

Federal regulations require that agency record-keeping procedures provide
documentation to facilitate review by Congress and other authorized
agencies of government.8 Further, our standards for internal control in
the federal government9 require that all transactions be clearly
documented in a manner that is complete,

8 36 C.F.R. S: 1222.38. 9 31 U.S.C. 3512(c).

accurate, and useful to managers and others involved in evaluating
operations. In the absence of a more effective system for documenting and
maintaining records of the results of background checks and other
analyses, TSA cannot, among other things, hold responsible officials
accountable for completing required steps in the background check process.

In addition to the background check process used to check pilots, FAA and
TSA stated that they used additional processes to reduce the threat of
aerial advertising operations. For example, both TSA and FAA told us that
they coordinated with local law enforcement officials and FAA air traffic
control towers to inspect aerial advertising pilots and their aircraft and
to verify that they had a valid waiver. However, we found that these
processes were not formalized in agency policies or procedures, and
thereby, may not have been consistently followed related to aerial
advertising operations.

In addition to the Department of Homeland Security, we are sending copies
of this
report to the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland
Security. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me
at (202) 512
3404 or Chris Keisling, Assistant Director, at (404) 679-1917.

Sincerely yours,

Cathleen A. Berrick
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

(440298)
*** End of document. ***