Operation Iraqi Freedom: Long-standing Problems Hampering Mail
Delivery Need to Be Resolved (14-APR-04, GAO-04-484).
Mail is a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for
their families at home. More than 65 million pounds of letters
and parcels were delivered to troops serving in Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003 and problems with prompt and reliable mail
delivery surfaced early in the conflict. Congress and the White
House forwarded more than 300 inquiries about mail delivery
problems to military postal officials. GAO was directed to review
mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle East. In this
report, GAO assesses (1) the timeliness of mail delivery to and
from troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom, (2) how mail delivery
issues and problems during this operation compared with those
experienced during Operations Desert Shield/Storm in 1991, and
(3) efforts to identify actions to resolve problems in
establishing mail operations for future contingencies.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-484
ACCNO: A09773
TITLE: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Long-standing Problems Hampering
Mail Delivery Need to Be Resolved
DATE: 04/14/2004
SUBJECT: Mail delivery problems
Mail transportation operations
Military operations
Military personnel
Performance measures
Postal facilities
Postal service
Comparative analysis
Timeliness
Bahrain
DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
Iraq
Kuwait
Desert Shield
Desert Storm
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GAO-04-484
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Committees
April 2004
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
Long-standing Problems Hampering Mail Delivery Need to Be Resolved
GAO-04-484
Highlights of GAO-04-484, a report to the Senate and House Committees on
Armed Services and the Subcommittees on Defense, Senate and House
Committees on Appropriations
Mail is a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their
families at home. More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were
delivered to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and
problems with prompt and reliable mail delivery surfaced early in the
conflict. Congress and the White House forwarded more than 300 inquiries
about mail delivery problems to military postal officials.
GAO was directed to review mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle
East. In this report, GAO assesses (1) the timeliness of mail delivery to
and from troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom, (2) how mail delivery issues
and problems during this operation compared with those experienced during
Operations Desert Shield/Storm in 1991, and (3) efforts to identify
actions to resolve problems in establishing mail operations for future
contingencies.
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense (1) implement a new
system to accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit times and
(2) consolidate lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and develop
and implement a specific course of action to resolve them. DOD, in its
formal review of this report, fully concurs with GAO's recommendations and
has begun taking steps to implement them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-484.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Neal P. Curtin, (757)
552-8100, [email protected].
April 2004
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
Long-standing Problems Hampering Mail Delivery Need to Be Resolved
The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi
Freedom cannot be accurately assessed because the Department of Defense
(DOD) does not have a reliable, accurate system in place to measure
timeliness. In general, DOD's transit time and test letter data show that
mail delivery fell within the current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days.
However, the methodology used to calculate transit times significantly
understated actual delivery times. In the absence of reliable data, GAO
conducted discussion groups with a non-representative sample of 127
service members who served in-theater. More than half reported they were
dissatisfied with mail delivery, underscoring the negative impact it can
have on troop morale.
Despite differences in operational theaters and efforts by DOD postal
planners to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into
planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations faced many of the
same problems: difficulty with conducting joint-service mail operations;
postal personnel who were inadequately trained and initially scarce owing
to late deployments; and inadequate postal facilities, equipment, and
transportation. The operations plan created for joint-service mail
delivery contained certain assumptions key to its success but led to
unforeseen consequences or did not occur. Also, plans for a Joint Postal
Center were not fully put in place. One lesson learned from 1991 was
carried out with success during Operation Iraqi Freedom: mail was
transported overseas by dedicated contractor airlifts rather than by
military.
DOD has not officially tasked any entity to resolve the long-standing
postal problems experienced during contingency operations. Moreover, the
Military Postal Service Agency does not have the authority to ensure that
these problems are addressed jointly. This agency and the military
services, however, have taken some steps toward tackling these issues.
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Timeliness of Mail Delivery Cannot Be Accurately Determined
Many Problems Identified in Operations Desert Shield/Storm
Continued to Hamper Mail Delivery in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Various Military Postal Units Have Identified Solutions to Postal
Problems, but No Mechanism Is in Place to Ensure Their Consolidation and
Resolution
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
1
2 4 9
17
27 28 29 30
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense
Tables
Table 1: Example of How Methodology Is Used 12 Table 2: Planning
Assumptions, Actions and Their Effects 18
Figures
Figure 1: Mail Flow into Iraqi Theater
Figure 2: Mail Handlers at the Joint Military Mail Terminal in
Kuwait Figure 3: Truck Convoy Carrying Mail outside of Kuwait City Figure
4: Average Transit Times for Parcels and Letters, as
Reported by the Transit Time Information Standard System for Military
Mail, from February through September 2003
Figure 5: Test Letter Average Monthly Transit Times
Figure 6: Damaged Parcels at Camp Pendleton, California
Figure 7: Number of Days Army Reserve Postal Units Spent at
Mobilization Stations 7
8 9
11 14 16
23
Figure 8: Rough Terrain Container Handler (left) and Rough Terrain Fork
Lift (right) at the Joint Military Mail Terminal in Kuwait, December 2003
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
April 14, 2004
Congressional Committees
On March 19, 2003, coalition forces led by the United States began
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The operation required a high level of
coordination and planning, especially in the area of support for the war
fighting troops. One such area of support-and a necessary component in the
maintenance of service members' morale-was postal operations. Effective
postal operations are important to both the troops stationed in theater
and for their families and friends at home. Even though alternative
methods of communicating, such as the Internet and mobile phones, became
available to some troops and their families for the first time during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the mail remained the main form of communication
and the delivery of goods.
More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to U.S.
Central Command's contingency area of responsibility during calendar year
2003. U.S. Central Command is the combatant command for Operation Iraqi
Freedom. The largest amount moved in a single month was April 2003, when
over 11 million pounds of mail was delivered. This represents an average
of just over 377,000 pounds per day -the equivalent of about forty
40-foot-long trailers full of mail.
Problems with the prompt and reliable delivery of mail to troops during
Operation Iraqi Freedom surfaced during the first months of the conflict
and continued throughout. From February 23, 2003, through November 3,
2003, Congress and the White House forwarded to military postal officials
more than 300 inquiries concerned with the delivery of mail to and from
troops stationed in theater. The majority of these inquiries dealt with
the failure of troops to receive mail sent by their families and friends
and with other criticisms of the postal operations. The volume of
inquiries served as an indication that postal operations serving Operation
Iraqi Freedom were experiencing problems.
The Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriations Act, 2004, and also the
Senate Report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, directed that we review mail delivery to troops stationed in the
Middle East and compare delivery efficiency issues from Operation Desert
Storm with those of Operation Iraqi Freedom.1 As agreed with your offices,
in this report we assess (1) the timeliness of mail delivery to and from
troops stationed in the Gulf Region, (2) how mail delivery issues and
problems experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom compare with those
during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and (3) efforts to identify actions
to resolve problems for future contingencies.
To address these objectives, we obtained and reviewed DOD guidance for
military postal operations. We collected, analyzed, and assessed the
reliability of transit time data. We interviewed DOD and Joint Staff
officials in charge of developing policy for postal operations and key
postal officials stationed at various postal agencies in the United
States, Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain about their views on the implementation
of postal operations. We conducted discussion groups with a
non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines serving in Operation
Iraqi Freedom to obtain their opinions on the quality of mail service
during the conflict. We conducted our review from August 2003 through
March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Further information on our scope and methodology appears in
appendix I.
The timeliness of the mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi
Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a
reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Transit time
data reported by the Transit Time Information Standard System for Military
Mail show that average transit times for letter and parcels into the
theater consistently fell within the 11- to 14-day range-well within the
current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, we determined that the
method used to calculate these averages consistently masks the actual
times by using weighted averages that result in a significant understating
of transit times. A second source of datatest letters that were
sent to individual service members at military post offices by the
Military Postal Service Agency from February through September
2003-indicate that mail delivery, on average, met the wartime standard
during all but 1 month. However, we found that a significant number of
test letters were never returned and that test letters do not accurately
measure transit time to the individual service member because they are
sent only to individuals
Results in Brief
1Pub. L. No. 108-87, 117 Stat. 1054 (2003); Sen. Rep. No. 108-46, at 308
(2003).
located at military post offices. It could take several more days for mail
to get to forward-deployed troops. Even though the data show otherwise,
military postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to troops serving
in Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. Therefore, in the absence of
reliable data to describe timeliness, we conducted discussion groups with
a non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines who served in
theater. While their responses cannot be projected, more than half said
they were dissatisfied with mail delivery, many waiting 4 weeks or longer
to get mail. Moreover, some troops received certain pieces of mail only
after they returned home to their stateside installations. According to
this group of soldiers, one of the issues that hampered mail delivery was
that postal information was not able to keep up with changing deployment
information. Furthermore, these soldiers stated that these problems and
delays had a negative impact on the morale of deployed troops, as mail was
often their only link with family and friends at home.
Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal
planners to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into
the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems were
encountered. These problems include (1) difficulty in conducting
joint-service postal operations; (2) inadequately trained and initially
scarce postal personnel owing to late deployments; and (3) inadequate
postal facilities, heavy material-handling equipment, and transportation
assets to handle the initial mail surge. U.S. Central Command created an
operations plan for joint mail delivery, but some of the planning
assumptions were flawed and the plan was not fully implemented. This plan
included several assumptions that were key to its success, but certain
assumptions produced unforeseen negative consequences and others were not
implemented or were unrealistic. For example, the elimination of mail
addressed to "any service member" increased the number of parcels because
senders found ways around the restriction. In addition, plans to restrict
the size and weight of letters and parcels until adequate postal
facilities had been established were never enacted; and the initial surge
of mail exceeded the planned estimate, overburdening the developing mail
system. The plan also directed that a Joint Postal Center-comprising
postal officials from all services-manage and coordinate joint postal
operations in theater. However, this effort was not fully implemented, and
joint mail delivery suffered as a result. The Military Postal Service
Agency did implement one strategy that proved to be successful as a result
of lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Dedicated
contractor airlift of mail into the contingency area was employed,
avoiding the necessity of competing for military air cargo capacity, which
greatly improved the regularity of mail service to the theater.
No single entity has been officially tasked to resolve the long-standing
postal problems seen again during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Military postal
officials have begun to identify solutions to some of these issues.
However, despite early efforts made by the Military Postal Service Agency
to consolidate problems and identify solutions, this agency does not have
the authority to ensure that these problems are jointly addressed and
resolved prior to the next military contingency. During our meetings with
dozens of key military postal officials serving during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, we collected memoranda, after action reports, and their comments
regarding the postal issues and problems that should be addressed to avoid
a repetition of the same postal problems in future contingencies. These
issues include: improving joint postal planning and ensuring joint
execution of that plan; early deployment of postal troops; preparing
updated tables of organization and equipment for postal units; improving
peacetime training for postal units; and reviewing the command and control
of postal units in a joint theater. The Military Postal Service Agency
hosted a joint postal conference in October 2003 to discuss postal
problems with dozens of key postal participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom
and is currently in the process of consolidating these issues into a
single document with the intent of developing plans to resolve the issues.
In addition, the service components and the Military Postal Service Agency
have taken some initial steps in employing alternative mail delivery and
tracking systems.
We are making several recommendations aimed at (1) establishing a system
that will accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit times and
(2) designating responsibility and providing sufficient authority within
the department to address and fix long-standing postal problems identified
in this report. In written comments on a draft of this report, the
Department of Defense stated that it concurred with our recommendations
and has directed the Military Postal Service Agency to (1) implement a
more accurate system to track and report postal transit times and (2)
facilitate and track corrective actions taken by DOD entities specified in
the Joint Services After Action Report following the Joint Service Postal
Conference held in October 2003.
Background The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 created the independent
U.S. Postal Service and authorized it to make arrangements with DOD
regarding the performance of military postal services.2 Each military
service managed its
2Pub. L. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719, 724 (1970), codified at title 39 of the
U.S. Code.
own mail program until 1980, when DOD and the U.S. Postal Service entered
into an agreement for the joint provision of postal services for all
branches of the armed forces. The agreement created the Military Postal
Service Agency, which acts as an extension of the U.S. Postal Service
beyond the boundaries of U.S. sovereignty and must provide full postal
services, as nearly as practicable, for all DOD personnel overseas where
there is no U.S. Postal Service available.3 The Military Postal Service
Agency is DOD's single manager for military postal functions. Although
this joint service agency is organizationally located under the Army
Adjutant General and depends on the Army for funding and staffing, the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics) is
responsible for the agency's policies and oversight.
In October 2002, several months prior to U.S. and coalition troops
crossing the border into Iraq, a joint planning conference was held at
U.S. Central Command-the designated combatant command for Operation Iraqi
Freedom. The U.S. Central Command hosted the conference, bringing together
postal officials from all four military components, as well as the U.S.
Postal Service and the Military Postal Service Agency. The conference led
to the creation of a U.S. Central Command postal operating plan that
assigned roles and responsibilities for all joint postal operations during
the impending contingency.
The DOD doctrine for joint military operations states that postal support
for any contingency is coordinated by the combatant command in the region.
The combatant commander appoints a single-service postal manager to
direct, implement, and manage all postal operations in the joint theater.
Since the Gulf War in 1991, the single-service manager for postal
operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility has been the
Air Force's 82nd Computer Support Squadron, currently assigned to the Air
Force's Air Combat Command. However, U.S. Central Command has the
overriding responsibility for all operations in theater, including postal
operations.
The movement of mail from the Unites States to troops in the Iraqi theater
follows several complex logistical steps. Letters and parcels with
military addresses destined to Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain are sent to one
of four International Mail GatewaysNew York, San Francisco,
Chicago and
3See Single Manager for Military Postal Service, DOD Directive 4525.6 (May
5, 1980) enclosure 2, section E 3.1.1.
Miamifor processing. According to Military Postal Service Agency
data, 90 percent of all letters and parcels for Operation Iraqi Freedom
were processed through New York. The U.S. Postal Service delivers letters
to the International Service Center at John F. Kennedy Airport, in New
York; parcels are delivered to the Postal Service's International and Bulk
Mail Center in New Jersey. After the letters and parcels are sorted, they
are then packaged, placed into containers, and then transferred to Newark
International Airport in New Jersey where they are loaded onto airplanes
for transport to the Iraqi theater.4 Unlike during Operations Desert
Shield/Storm, where military planes operated by the Military Airlift
Command transported much of the mail, a dedicated contractor aircraft
carried mail during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
During the next stage of mail movement, the mail planes fly to aerial mail
terminals colocated at the international airports in Kuwait and Bahrain.
Once landed, local airport ground handlers offload the mail containers
from the planes and take them to an Air Force Mail Control Activity
located at the airport, where the mail is staged for ground
transportation. In Bahrain, mail for service members stationed in Iraq is
processed at the U.S. Air Force Mail Control Activity; mail for service
members located in Bahrain or aboard ships is processed at the U.S. Fleet
Mail Center. For troops stationed in Iraq, mail is transferred onto a
contracted cargo plane and flown directly into Iraq.5 In Kuwait, all mail
is processed at the Joint Military Mail Terminal. Figure 1 illustrates two
different examples of how military mail flows from the Newark
International Airport into the Iraqi theater.
4Military mail also flies out of John F. Kennedy Airport. However, most
mail to ground troops serving in the Operation Iraqi Freedom theater flew
on the dedicated contract carrier out of Newark International Airport.
5DOD contracted with DHL to provide planes to fly cargo and mail into Iraq
beginning in May 2003, when the Joint Military Mail Terminal was
established there. Before then, all mail was flown to Kuwait and taken by
mail truck convoys into Iraq.
Figure 1: Mail Flow into Iraqi Theater
The Joint Military Mail Terminal, which handles the bulk of the letters
and parcels entering the Iraqi theater, sorts the mail and arranges for
its transportation-either by land or by air-to the various regions
occupied by U.S. troops. Mail must be delivered to the unit level,
designated by ZIP codes provided by the Military Postal Service Agency,
before it can be distributed to individual service members. Figure 2
illustrates postal operations and a backlog of mail in February 2003 at
the Joint Military Mail Terminal in Kuwait.
Figure 2: Mail Handlers at the Joint Military Mail Terminal in Kuwait
According to the Military Postal Service Agency, more than 65 million
pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to U.S. Central Command's
contingency area of responsibility during calendar year 2003 at a cost of
nearly $150 million. The largest amount moved in a single month was April
2003, when over 11 million pounds of mail were delivered. This represents
an average of just over 377,000 pounds per daythe equivalent of
about forty 40-foot-long trailers full of mail. Figure 3 illustrates a
convoy of trucks carrying 40-foot trailers of mail leaving the Kuwait
Joint Military Mail Terminal.
Figure 3: Truck Convoy Carrying Mail outside of Kuwait City
The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi
Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a
reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Data collected
by military postal units using the Transit Time Information Standard
System for Military Mail indicate that average delivery times met the Army
wartime standard of 12 to 18 days.6 However, the methodology used to
calculate and report these times consistently masks the actual time it
takes for service members to receive mail, thus significantly understating
actual delivery times. Test letters sent to individuals at military post
offices also have produced unreliable data because many test letters were
never returned, and letters were sent only to individuals located at
military post offices. Military postal officials acknowledge that mail
delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. In
addition, more than half of the 127 soldiers and marines we talked with
during informal meetings at their home bases in the United States said
they were
6Army Field Manual 12-6 states, "the standard of service for first class
mail is 12 to 18 days from the point of origin to individual soldiers
worldwide."
Timeliness of Mail Delivery Cannot Be Accurately Determined
dissatisfied with the timeliness of mail delivery while they were
deployed. Morale suffered, as mail from home was many service members'
only link with friends and families.
DOD Reported That Average Postal Transit Times Met Wartime Standard, but
Methodology to Calculate It Is Flawed
The Army's wartime standard for first class mail delivery is 12 to 18 days
from the point of origin to the individual service member. According to
our analysis of data reported by the Transit Time Information Standard
System for Military Mail,7 average postal transit times for letters and
parcels sent to the Iraqi theater ranged from 11 to 14 days from February
through September 2003. (See fig. 4.) These times represent the time it
takes for a letter or parcel to go from its point of origin (a stateside
post office) to a service member's designated military post office, where
he or she picks up mail.
7The Transit Time Information Standard System for Military Mail is the
official DOD measurement system used to collect, compute, analyze, and
report mail transit time performance data. The Military Postal Service
Agency selects the activities to provide mail statistics into the system.
For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army's 3rd Personnel Command is
collecting the data in theater and in turn providing the statistics to the
Military Postal Service Agency.
Figure 4: Average Transit Times for Parcels and Letters, as Reported by
the Transit Time Information Standard System for Military Mail, from
February through September 2003
However, on the basis of our analysis, we found that the methodology used
to calculate and report transit times significantly understates the actual
time it takes for a service member to receive mail. According to Transit
Time Information Standard System for Military Mail guidance, transit times
should be reported by postal units in theater on the basis of a random
sample of all incoming letters and all incoming packages arriving at
military post offices in the Iraqi theater. The samples are then divided
into three categories according to the date of the U.S. postmark: postmark
less than 10 days old, postmark 11 to 15 days old, and postmark over 16
days old. Each of these three categories is given a weight value of 10,
15, and 16, respectively, which represent the break points of each
category. The sample size (number of letters or packages sampled) in each
category is then multiplied by the weight value and averaged to get the
reported transit time. Consequently, regardless of the sample size or the
actual number of days the items spent in transit, the resulting average
will always be from 10 to 16 days. For example, a piece of mail that spent
100 days in
transit would be counted in the same category and weighted the same as one
that only took 16 days. Similarly, a piece of mail that spent 4 days in
transit would be counted in the same category as one that took 10, and
again weighted the same. (See table 1 for an example of how this
methodology is used to calculate transit times.)
Table 1: Example of How Methodology Is Used
(sample size) x
Category Number in sample Weight value (weight)
10 days or less 100 10 1,000
11 to 15 days 100 15 1,500
16 days or greater 100 16 1,600
Total 300 4,100
Average (4,100)/(300) = 13.67 days
Source: GAO.
This methodology is even less viable when one considers that during the
peak of wartime operations, all mail destined for Iraq was held at the
joint military mail terminal in Kuwait for 23 days (late March through
mid-April) because of the rapid pace of troop movements.8 However, this
23-day hold on mail is not reflected in the transit time data, as the
"weighted average" methodology masks the calculation, thus significantly
understating actual transit time.
Officials at the Military Postal Service Agency and at the Army's 3rd
Personnel Commandthe Army entity providing in-theater postal
support during Operation Iraqi Freedomcould not provide
documentation that described this methodology. We reviewed the Transit
Time Information Standard System for Military Mail guidance, the standard
that explains and prescribes how military postal activities collect mail
transit time data, and could not find any mention of this particular
methodology. Only 3rd Personnel Command, the source of the transit time
data, was aware that the transit times were being reported in this manner.
According to a 3rd Personnel Command official, it had always been done
this way. We discussed the methodology with Military Postal Service Agency
officials. While they acknowledge that the Transit Time Information
Standard System is the official tracking system, they were not aware that
this
8This 23-day hold was not specifically a part of the operating plan.
particular methodology was being employed, and moreover could not tell us
why it was being used.
Test Letter Data Showed Mail Delivery Met Standard, but Information Is
Incomplete
In order to collect transit times on retrograde mail (which the Transit
Time Information Standard System for Military Mail does not collect) as
well as prograde mail,9 the Military Postal Service Agency sent test
letters to individuals located at military post offices within the
contingency area of responsibility. The letters contained instructions
asking the recipient to mark the date received and then return them
through the military postal system. The test letter data-derived from
letters sent by the Military Postal Service Agency from February through
September 2003-indicate that, on average, prograde transit times met the
Army standard of 12 to 18 days during all but 1 month. The only exception
was April 2003, when average transit time peaked at 19 days. (See fig. 5.)
However, this average obscures the fact that nearly 25 percent of the test
letters took more than 18 days to be delivered to the Iraqi theater.
Retrograde test letters were not as timely, failing to meet the 12-to
18-day standard during 2 months.
9Those articles mailed from the continental United States to service
members in the Iraqi theater are referred to as "prograde." Letters and
parcels mailed from the Iraqi theater to the continental United States are
referred to as "retrograde."
Figure 5: Test Letter Average Monthly Transit Times
In addition, the Military Postal Service Agency initially only sent test
letters to individuals at military post offices in Kuwait and Bahrain. It
was not until August 2003 that test letters were sent to locations in Iraq
as well. Therefore, the aforementioned 23-day hold on mail bound for units
in Iraq would not have affected transit time data as reported by test
letters.
Information based on test letters sent to individuals located at military
post offices is not a complete measure of transit times because many
letters were never returned. Between February and September 2003, the
Military Postal Service Agency sent more than 1,700 test letters to
service members at military post offices in various locations in Kuwait,
Bahrain, and Iraq. Based on our analysis of the agency's data, we found
that only 59 percent (1,028) of the letters were returned. In addition, of
the more than
700 letters that failed to return, we determined that 25 percent had been
sent to individuals located at post offices in or near the northern Iraqi
cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. However, only one letter from each of these
locations was ever returned out of about 180 letters mailed.
Unfortunately, there is no way of telling whether or not these or any of
the other unreturned test letters were ever actually received.
There are other drawbacks with this test letters approach. For example, it
does not accurately measure the transit time from point of origin to the
individual service member. Test letters were addressed only to individuals
located at military post offices, and not to service members located in
forward-deployed combat units. It could take several additional days for
service members deployed elsewhere to receive mail from such locations.
Also, this approach used only letters, not parcels, and parcels comprised
the bulk of mail sent into the theater.
Service Members Express Dissatisfaction with Mail Service
In the absence of reliable data to describe timeliness, we held
discussions with a non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines
who served in theater, and who were selected prior to our visits to Fort
Stewart, Georgia, and Camp Pendleton, California. Almost 60 percent of
these service members indicated that they were dissatisfied with the
timeliness of mail delivery. Nearly half said that, after arriving in
theater, they waited more than 4 weeks to get their mail, and many
commented that some mail took as long as 4 months to work its way through
the system. When asked, about half the troops we interviewed also
indicated that they were not aware of command decisions to purposefully
halt mail service. In addition, nearly 80 percent said that they were
aware of mail that was sent to them but that they did not receive while
they were deployed. In many cases, this mail was finally received after
the service members returned to their home stations. Clearly, the
non-receipt of mail became a concern for friends and family back home.
Many service members told us that they did not receive certain pieces of
mail until they returned to their stateside home installations. For
example, starting in June 2003, Camp Pendleton, California, received about
100,000 pounds of military mail that had been returned undelivered and
unopened to the U.S. Postal Service gateway in New Yorkat a cost
of about $93,000. Upon receipt in New York, the mail was sent by rail to
the U.S. Postal Service gateway in San Francisco and then put in trailers
and trucked to Camp Pendleton. Extra space considerations were needed in
order to accommodate the returned mail, including two tents staged outside
of the main post office for overflow. Many of the returned
packages were damaged and rewrap procedures had to be established in order
to try and control packages that were all but destroyed from being
mishandled or handled too often. (See fig. 6.) Postal officials at Camp
Pendleton did not clear out and deliver all of this returned mail for the
better part of 3 months, or until the latter part of August 2003.
Figure 6: Damaged Parcels at Camp Pendleton, California
According to soldiers we interviewed, one of the issues that hampered mail
delivery was changing deployment information. Mail delivery to the Army's
3rd Infantry Division was stopped when word was received that the division
was about to redeploy. When this plan changed and the division did not
redeploy, mail started to flow again. The division was told several times
that it would be redeployed and then it did not; each time, when
deployment was thought to be imminent, mail delivery was stopped. This
created a backlog. When the 3rd Infantry Division finally did redeploy,
the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division stayed behind and was
assigned to the 1st Armored Division. But this information was not
disseminated, and the 1st Brigade received no more mail while in theater.
Many Problems Identified in Operations Desert Shield/Storm Continued to
Hamper Mail Delivery in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal
planners to consider experiences from Operations Desert Shield/Storm in
planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems continued
to hamper postal operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. These problems
include (1) difficulty with implementing joint-service postal operations,
(2) postal personnel who were inadequately trained and initially scarce
because of late deployments, and (3) inadequate postal facilities,
material-handling equipment, and transportation assets to handle mail
surge.
During January 1991, at the height of Operations Desert Shield/Storm, more
than 500,000 U.S. troops supported a ground war that lasted a little more
than 4 days. These troops were concentrated in camps located in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia near the borders of Kuwait and Iraq. In contrast, Operation
Iraqi Freedom involved about half the number of troops (about 250,000),
dispersed over a larger geographical area (all of Kuwait and Iraq), and
involved a ground war that lasted about 42 days. This greater dispersion
of troops for a longer period of time increased the logistical
requirements for delivering the mail. Additionally, although the ground
war for Operation Iraqi Freedom is officially over, there is an ongoing
requirement to provide timely and efficient postal support for a large
number of personnel still in theater, fighting the global war on
terrorism.
Implementation of Joint Postal Operations Fell Short
Several key planning assumptions used in the creation of U.S. Central
Command's postal plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom proved problematic. The
embargo on Any Service Member mail10 produced unintended negative results;
mail restrictions for the first 30 days in theater were never enacted; and
the volume of mail was grossly underestimated. Table 2 summarizes these
key assumptions, the actions taken, and the consequences of those actions.
10"Any Service Member" mail refers to mail that can be sent to any service
member serving in a contingency operation overseas. This mail can be held
and delivered when deemed appropriate by ground commanders to boost the
morale of soldiers.
Table 2: Planning Assumptions, Actions and Their Effects
Assumption Action Effect
Any Service Member mail Any Service Member Persons and organizations sent
would be mail was multiple
discontinued. discontinued. packages to individual service
members to
work around the restriction.
Parcel volume
increased as a result.
Mail into theater would be restricted to Mail was never restricted. The
mail flowed into theater unrestricted,
letters for at least the first 30 days of the overtaxing the limited mail
handlers and
operation or until the proper infrastructure facilities in place and
creating huge
was in place to handle increased volumes; backlogs of mail.
however, even letters would be stopped if
conditions (lack of facilities, transportation,
or personnel) warranted.
Mail volume would amount to about Early mail surges reached about Only
limited facilities were in place; huge
0.5 pounds of mail per service member per 5 pounds per service member per
day. backlogs of mail were created owing to lack
day if restrictions were in place, or of manpower, facilities, and
equipment.
1.5 pounds per service member per day if
they were not.
Source: GAO.
Because Any Service Member mail caused delays in the delivery of other
personal mail and stressed the logistical system during Operations Desert
Shield/Storm, postal plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom placed an embargo
on this type of mail. Defense officials also discontinued Any Service
Member mail for security reasons following the Anthrax scares of 2001.
During Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Any Service Member mail acted as a
morale booster because it provided mail to troops who might not have
received mail otherwise. From an operations standpoint, this mail could be
separated and set aside until individually addressed mail had been
processed. However, the volume of Any Service Member mail taxed
transportation and storage capabilities. In order to prevent similar
problems during Operation Iraqi Freedom, planners placed an embargo on Any
Service Member mail. Despite this, individuals and organizations sending
mail developed "workarounds" that overwhelmed the postal system and
contributed to a slowdown in service. Instead of addressing mail to "Any
Service Member," senders addressed their letters and parcels to specific
individuals, enclosing a request that they share the mail with other
troops. Because this mail was addressed to specific individuals, postal
personnel had to treat it as regular mail and could not separate it and
set it aside for later processing. These "workarounds" added to the
workload at every stage in the mail delivery process. For example, when we
visited the Joint Military Postal Activity in San Francisco, California,
we observed one of these "workaround" shipments. It consisted of
approximately 40 boxes, each weighing about 8 to10 pounds. They were all
addressed to the same recipient and came from a charitable service
organization. This one shipment required its own handcart and almost
one-quarter of an airline-shipping container.
A second key assumption that did not have the intended result involved
mail restrictions. Drawing from the lessons learned from Operations Desert
Shield/Storm, postal planners for Operation Iraqi Freedom assumed that
mail would be restricted to personal first-class letters or sound/video
recordings that weighed 13 ounces or less for the first 30 days of
operations. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Military Postal
Service Agency and Army postal officials in theater asked that these
restrictions be imposed. However, U.S. Central Command officials did not
approve the request because, according the U.S. Central Command postal
planner, they believed that a sufficient appropriate postal infrastructure
was in place to handle the mail. As a result, the mail continued to flow
into theater, overtaxing the limited mail handlers and facilities in place
and creating huge backlogs of mail.
Underestimating the volume of mail was the third planning assumption that
created problems for the mail system. Postal planners in Operation Iraqi
Freedom assumed that the volume of mail per person would be less than it
actually was. They estimated that there would be from 0.5 and 1.5 pounds
of first class mail per person per day based on data from previous
contingency operations. Instead, military officials estimate that the
initial surge of mail averaged closer to 5 pounds per day, overburdening
the developing mail system. According to the Military Postal Service
Agency and Air Force Postal Policy and Operations officials we
interviewed, of the total volume of mail shipped, more than 80 percent
consisted of parcels and the rest consisted of flat mail. The mail volume
per soldier was much higher than that seen in Operations Desert
Shield/Storm. For example, mail volume reached a monthly peak of 10
million pounds in Operations Desert Shield/Storm for about 500,000 troops
compared with a monthly peak of 11 million pounds in Operation Iraqi
Freedom for half as many troops. Consequently, during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the necessary facilities and manpower needed to move this higher
volume of mail were not initially available in theater.
Coordination of Joint Postal In addition to problematic postal planning
assumptions, the single service
Operations Fell Short manager concept was not enacted to ensure the
management of joint postal operations. In both Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the single-service manager concept did not
perform as
planned. The single-service manager is assigned by the combatant commander
to be the manager and point of contact on all postal issues in the area of
responsibility.11 The single-service manager is normally appointed from
one of the military components, generally the component with the most
postal resources in theater. During Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the
single-service manager was the same for both the peacetime and the
contingency areas of responsibility. According to lessons learned from
Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the use of the peacetime single-service
manager was unsuccessful because of a lack of coordination and cooperation
between the components.
To overcome this problem, U.S. Central Command, through its operations
plan, directed the establishment of a Joint Postal Center -to be manned by
representatives from all components -to oversee all mail operations in the
contingency area and assume the duties and responsibilities of the
single-service manager. The operations plan states that a Joint Postal
Center be established and that the peacetime single-service manager for
the area of responsibility
o provide postal personnel, resources, and equipment to support the
Joint Postal Center as required;
o continue to oversee military postal operations in the area of
responsibility not in the contingency area; and
o relinquish policy and oversight responsibilities of postal operations
in the contingency area of responsibility to the Joint Postal Center once
it is operational.
U.S. Central Command postal officials told us that neither the Joint
Postal Center nor the single-service manager performed according to the
approved plan or as expected. The Joint Postal Center did not fully assume
the role of the in-theater single-service manager, as it arrived late in
theater, was not supported by all of the components, and was undermanned.
In the interim, the peacetime single-service manager for U.S. Central
Command did not have adequate personnel to assume the role for the
contingency area of responsibility. According to representatives from the
designated single-service manager, they were unable to provide
11Department of Defense Postal Manual 4525.6-M (Aug. 15, 2002) provides
planners with guidance on what needs to be included in the postal appendix
to all contingency plans, including a requirement to appoint a
single-service manager. Joint Publication 1-0 states that one component
command will normally be appointed as single-service manager and serve as
point of contact on all postal issues in the area of responsibility.
full-time staff in theater and could not adequately manage operations from
their home station in the United States.12 By the time the Joint Postal
Center's personnel began arriving in theater in February 2003, the
different components had already been receiving large quantities of mail
and had established their own postal operations. In January 2003 the
Commander of the Army's 3rd Personnel Command assumed responsibility for
postal operations supporting the combined land forces (Army and Marines)
and was making decisions that affected the flow of mail for the theater, a
responsibility the Army was not resourced to assume.
Postal Personnel Inadequately Trained and Initially Scarce Owing to Late
Deployments
In both Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal
units lacked sufficient training. According to lessons learned from
Operations Desert Shield/Storm military postal operations need to be
staffed with trained personnel who are familiar with postal operations and
the movement of mail. Similar problems surfaced during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Military postal officials told us that Army postal personnel
arriving in theater were largely untrained in establishing and managing
military postal operations, as they are traditionally not tasked for this
type of duty. Usually, Army postal personnel are tasked to support the
daily operations of military post offices.
However, even this type of training was lacking. Officials attributed this
lack of training to a number of different factors. One factor is that most
of the Army's postal units are made up of Army Reserve soldiers, who do
not have an opportunity to train in postal facilities during peacetime.
This is because there are no military post offices in the United States.
Subsequently, if a reserve unit wants to train in a military post office
they have to deploy overseas for their annual training. The second factor
is that active duty Army postal personnel do not have an opportunity to
conduct realistic postal operations during routine training exercises. The
third factor is that, unlike the other services, the active duty Army does
not have a postal career track. This means that, even if active duty
soldiers have attended postal training, they may never work in a postal
position.
Moreover, during both Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, postal units were initially scarce because of late deployments.
12The postal flight of the Air Force's 82nd Computer Support Squadron
under the Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, is
currently the designated single-service manager for all military
operations for U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S.
Southern Command.
Units should have deployed early enough to establish an adequate postal
infrastructure in advance of the mail. During Operation Iraqi Freedom,
despite plans to deploy Army postal units early, they arrived in theater
after most combat troops. Military postal officials told us that other
units had a higher priority for airlift into the Iraqi theater. The
Operations Plan specified that postal personnel needed to handle mail
would deploy within the first 10 days of the build-up for the contingency.
Even though some troops mobilized according to the original plan, our
analysis of data received from the Army's 3rd Personnel Command shows that
some of these troops were delayed at their mobilization stations up to 130
days (with the average delay being 69 days) before deploying. (See fig.
7.) Postal units did not begin arriving into theater until March 2003.
Consequently, early mail operations were conducted with insufficient
postal troops to carry out the mission. This decision ultimately affected
the timely establishment of postal operations.
Figure 7: Number of Days Army Reserve Postal Units Spent at Mobilization
Stations
Inadequate postal facilities hampered postal operations in theater during
both Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As the
theater grew during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the facilities proved
to be inadequate, and additional aerial mail terminals had to be
established in various parts of Saudi Arabia to handle the increasing
volume of mail. Although some military postal facilities set up to serve
troops during and after Operations Desert Shield/Storm were still in
operation in Kuwait and Bahrain, these facilities were inadequate to
service the influx of 250,000 troops, which began arriving in January
2003. Key postal infrastructure elements were needed to receive the
increased volume of mail and establish a joint mail terminal in Kuwait.
Postal Operations Hampered by Inadequate Facilities, Equipment, and
Transportation
At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Fleet Mail Center in
Bahrain processed mail for all the services even though it did not have
the staff or equipment to handle the surge in volume. Because of the
increased workload, it took about 5 to 7 extra days for the mail to be
delivered. As the theater matured, a joint military mail terminal had to
be established in Kuwait to relieve the Fleet Mail Center of Army and Air
Force mail and to augment existing postal facilities at Camp Doha in
Kuwait. Postal officials told us that even with this additional facility,
the biggest hindrance to processing mail was a lack of sufficient
workspace. In addition, as troops began to occupy parts of Iraq in the
spring of 2003, additional mail facilities and transportation assets were
set up to handle incoming and outgoing mail in Baghdad and other cities
and towns in Iraq.
The lack of heavy material-handling equipment during the early stages of
both conflicts also hampered the processing of mail. Lessons learned from
Operations Desert Shield/Storm recommended that modern material-handling
equipment be provided to postal units. Operation Iraqi Freedom postal
officials also underscored the need to have modern and varied types of
material-handling equipment, such as fork lifts and rough terrain cargo
handlers available to support postal facilities. (See fig. 8.) Postal
workers did not have such equipment in the early days of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, so they had to manually break down the containers and sort
thousands of pounds of mail per day by hand, adding to the time it took to
process the mail for delivery. According to military postal officials,
units did not have these types of heavy equipment because either their
tables of organization and equipment were not updated to reflect the need,
or if updated, were not properly resourced.
Figure 8: Rough Terrain Container Handler (left) and Rough Terrain Fork
Lift (right) at the Joint Military Mail Terminal in Kuwait, December 2003
In addition to a lack of heavy material-handling equipment, postal units
did not have the appropriate postal equipment and supplies to perform
routine operations. In lessons learned from Operations Desert
Shield/Storm, postal officials recommended that postal units regularly
review their equipment and supply needs and assemble prepackaged "kits"
for contingency postal operations. They also recommended that, at the
earliest indication of a contingency, an advance team of postal experts
deploy into theater to determine what postal equipment and supplies are
required. Despite these recommendations, postal units continued to arrive
in theater inadequately equipped to conduct postal operations during
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Postal officials at all levels told us that the
lists of authorized postal equipment, such as meters and scales, were
outdated and did not reflect the correct types or quantities of equipment
needed for modern postal operations. In addition, many deployed units did
not have access to the full suite of communications equipment, such as
secure radios, cellular and satellite telephones, and "landlines" for
their facilities. As a result, postal units were unable to coordinate mail
pick-up and truck mail convoys, and communicate with other units.
Moving mail once it got into theater was a challenge because postal units
were not equipped with vehicles to transport the mail. The operations plan
for Operation Iraqi Freedom made no special provisions for ground
transportation of mail. It assumed that mail would use existing commercial
trucks supplemented by military trucks as needed. Postal units at all
levels of command (e.g., company through corps) had to compete with other
units for vehicles or contract for trucks through local sources. Military
postal officials stated that, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, trucks were
scarce in theater and carrying mostly ammunition, water, and food. In
order to minimize delays in mail delivery, postal officials in January
2003 arranged with a U.S. government contractor to provide 72 trucks and
drivers to deliver the mail from the Joint Military Mail Terminal to
military post offices in Kuwait and Iraq. Although it took the contractor
several more months to obtain all the trucks, this action was a great
help, according to U.S. Central Command postal units serving in theater at
that time.
Air Transportation Was Improved Based on Lessons Learned
As a result of lessons learned from the first Gulf conflict, the Military
Postal Service Agency did implement one strategy during Operation Iraqi
Freedom that proved to be successful. At the beginning of Operations
Desert Shield/Storm, mail was initially transported overseas by commercial
airlines. Because commercial U.S. carriers reduced the number of flights
into Saudi Arabia, postal officials decided to switch exclusively to
dedicated military flights to transport mail from the United States to the
theater. Similarly, at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, mail
backlogs occurred with existing commercial air service. However, in
contrast to Operations Desert Shield/Storm, military postal officials
decided to continue using commercial airlines but arranged with the U.S.
Postal Service to contract for dedicated postal flights from the United
States to Bahrain and Kuwait. According to Military Postal Service Agency
officials, this resulted in much more reliable air delivery of mail to the
theater.
Various Military Postal Units Have Identified Solutions to Postal
Problems, but No Mechanism Is in Place to Ensure Their Consolidation and
Resolution
Although military postal officials and others have begun to identify
solutions to some of the long-standing postal problems seen again during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, no single entity has been officially tasked to
resolve these issues. Despite early efforts made by the Military Postal
Service Agency in this regard, this agency does not have the authority to
ensure that these problems are jointly addressed and resolved prior to the
next military contingency.
The identification of solutions to long-standing postal problems has begun
in a piecemeal fashion. At this time, no single entity has officially been
designated to collect and consolidate solutions to long-standing mail
delivery problems. After past contingencies, the Joint Staff's Joint
Center for Lessons Learned gathered and consolidated the lessons learned
and made them available to the field. We spoke to representatives of the
military Joint Center for Operational Analysis, formerly the Joint Center
for Lessons Learned, to determine if this process would apply to Operation
Iraqi Freedom and they informed us that military postal operations have
not been identified as an issue area for lessons learned and they do not
anticipate that postal operations will become one. Several individual
members of entities such as the U.S. Army Reserve Command, U.S. Central
Command, and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command have prepared
memoranda outlining issues and lessons learned for postal operations
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
We summarized the memoranda, after action reports and comments regarding
solutions to postal problems that we collected during our meetings with
dozens of key military postal officials. Key military postal officials
emphasized that these postal issues must be addressed to avoid a
repetition of the same postal problems in future contingencies. These
issues represent many long-standing problems that can be directly traced
back to Operations Desert Shield/Storm. The issues identified include the
following:
o improve joint postal planning and ensure the execution of the postal
operations plan;
o anticipate the levels of support and types of activities needed, and
deploy postal units early to reduce or eliminate backlogs during the
build-up;
o update tables of organization and equipment for postal units to
reflect what they actually need in terms of people and equipment to
conduct postal operations;
o develop peacetime training programs to prepare postal units for the
missions they will be required to perform during contingency operations;
and
o review the command and control of postal units to determine if the
postal function is in the right place and whether one organization should
be responsible to both develop and execute policy.
In October 2003 the Military Postal Service Agency hosted a joint postal
conference to discuss postal problems with dozens of key postal
participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is currently in the process of
developing a final report that will outline plans to resolve issues in the
areas of organization, supplies, planning, training, transportation, "Any
Service Member" mail, routing and labeling, and transit time data
collection. Although the agency has taken this initiative, it has limited
authority and cannot direct the services to jointly address the problems,
according to the Executive Director of the Military Postal Service Agency.
Military Postal Service Agency officials describe their role as primarily
the single point of contact between the military and the U.S. Postal
Service.
Service components and the Military Postal Service Agency have taken some
initial steps in employing alternative mail delivery and tracking systems.
For example, the Marine Corps is currently testing an electronic mail
system for getting mail delivered to forward deployed troops. In addition,
the Military Postal Service Agency has taken steps to solve a
long-standing problem regarding transit time data. The agency has
developed a mail bar-coding system that could be used to more accurately
track the transit time, but it has not yet been successfully deployed for
use by ground troops because of connectivity problems. The Military Origin
Destination Information System, modeled after the system that the U.S.
Postal Service employs, can be used to track transit times of bags of
letters and small packages as well as larger parcels. By bar coding these
items and scanning them prior to mailing, and then scanning them once they
reach their destination, transit times can be easily calculated. According
to officials from the Military Postal Service Agency, the Navy is
currently using this system with some success. However, the system
requires a certain level of connectivity with the Internet, which troops
in the field lacked during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Wireless networks may
be necessary in order to connect all military post offices to the
Internet, which has not been practical on the battlefield. In addition,
this system shares a shortcoming with the test letters in that transit
times are not tracked to the level of the individual service member.
Conclusions The timely delivery of mail to troops overseas involved in
contingency operations is an important mechanism to boost morale among
service members and their families and friends. Without taking action to
resolve
the identified issues in planning, building, and operating a joint postal
system, mail delivery will continue to suffer in future contingency
operations as witnessed by the repetition of delayed mail delivery from
one Gulf war to the next. Emphasis needs to be placed on establishing
joint postal responsibilities and the subsequent execution of those
duties. Past experience has shown that postal operations have not received
command attention or been designated a priority. Establishing the needs
for postal operations early in the process and dedicating the appropriate
resources is crucial for providing the timely and efficient delivery of
mail. While our work focused only on Operation Iraqi Freedom, we believe
many of these same lessons apply to other combatant commands and theaters
of operation as well.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Without clear and accurate data to measure the timeliness of mail to U.S.
troops overseas during contingency operations, no meaningful assessment
can be made on the quality of mail service. Therefore, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to work with the Army Adjutant
General to improve the quality of transit time data for postal operations
by implementing a system that will accurately track, calculate, and report
postal transit times.
In the absence of a clear plan for resolving recurring postal problems
during contingency operations, we recommend that the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) designate, direct, and
authorize an appropriate DOD agency, unit, or command to determine what
long-standing postal issues need to be resolved, and to develop a specific
course of action and timetable for their resolution, including appropriate
follow-up to ensure that the problems have been fixed. Specifically, these
actions should address the issues highlighted in this report, such as the
following:
o strengthen the joint postal planning function and specify a body to
ensure the implementation of postal operations in theater;
o deploy properly trained and equipped postal troops into theater prior
to the mail build-up; and
o dedicate adequate postal facilities, heavy equipment, and
transportation assets for postal operations.
An important part of addressing these long-standing problems is to share
the results of these lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom with all
of the combatant commands to ensure that future contingencies do not
repeat these problems.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it fully
concurred with our recommendations and has already initiated certain
actions. In response to our first recommendation, DOD has directed the
Military Postal Service Agency to implement an automated system that will
accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit times all the way
to troop delivery. In addition, the Military Postal Service Agency is also
reviewing manual transit time collection and reporting methods for use
when automated collection is not possible. In response to our second
recommendation, the Military Postal Service Agency will facilitate and
track the corrective actions taken by the Unified Commands, services,
service components, and the Military Postal Service Agency, itself, in
response to the recommendations developed in the Joint Services After
Action Report produced at the Joint Service Postal Conference held in
October 2003. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix
II. DOD also provided a number of technical and clarifying comments, which
we have incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Executive Director of the
Military Postal Service Agency; and the Director, Office of Management
and Budget. We will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (757) 552-8100.
Key contributors to this report were Laura Durland, Karen Kemper, David
Keefer, Timothy Burke, Ann Borseth, Madelon Savaides, and Nancy
Benco.
Neal P. Curtin
Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management
Congressional Committees
The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address overall issues of military mail delivery to and from the Gulf
region and determine responsibilities for mail service, we obtained and
reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance and operations plans for
mail delivery to troops serving in a contingency area, and specifically
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We then met with officials from the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics); Joint Staff for Manpower and Personnel; and U.S. Central
Command to discuss these policies. Our review focused on postal operations
as they applied to U.S. troops deployed to the countries of Bahrain,
Kuwait, and Iraq during the buildup for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
operation itself, and the ongoing military operations in Iraq (January
through December 2003).
To address the issue of the timeliness of mail service to and from troops
serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, we collected, analyzed, and assessed
the reliability of transit time data from the Army's 3rd Personnel Command
and the Military Postal Service Agency. We discussed the data with
military postal officials to ensure that we were interpreting it
correctly, especially the methodology used to report transit times from
the Transit Time Information Standard System for Military Mail. Within our
analysis, we determined that the majority of transit time data we received
was for Army mail. Some data were from the Air Force and Marine Corps, but
they were not separated out. We did not collect transit time data from the
Navy, as their postal operations run separate from and independent of the
others.1 Some data required sorting in order to eliminate irrelevant data
elements and to be able to display them on a monthly basis. To determine
the effect that the timeliness of mail service had on troops serving in
the contingency area, we designed a data collection instrument and then
conducted discussion groups with and collected data from a
non-representative sample of 127 officers and enlisted personnel-91 from
the Army's 3rd Infantry Division (stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia) and
36 from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (stationed at Camp Pendleton,
California). The data collected from this non-representative sample cannot
be projected for the entire universe of troops deployed. At each location,
the GAO "point of contact" selected a non-representative sample of
1The Navy postal system operates separate from the Army system since most
of the Navy's mail follows established procedures for delivery of mail to
sailors aboard ships. By contrast, the Army must establish and use
ground-based transportation networks and routing systems. In addition,
Navy postal operations had long been established for the Gulf region and
did not need the level of build up required for the Army during Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
military personnel who had recently returned from a deployment in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The sample size (127) is simply the total
number of the soldiers and marines who were available to meet with us
during our visits. We summarized the data we collected from the soldiers
and marines, determined percentages of individual responses for each
question, and gathered their personal accounts regarding mail delivery
problems.
To address how mail issues and problems experienced during Operation Iraqi
Freedom compare with those experienced during Operations Desert
Shield/Storm, we obtained and analyzed lessons learned from the first
Persian Gulf War and compared these with any available reports prepared by
the various offices and commands we visited regarding the postal problems
experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We met with numerous officials
and personnel from the U.S. Army Reserve Command, the Military Postal
Service Agency, the U.S. Postal Service, U.S. Central Command, the Army's
3rd Personnel Command, U.S. Army Central Command, Air Force Air Combat
Command, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Military Mail Terminal in Kuwait, Fleet
Mail Center in Bahrain, and Joint Military Mail Terminal in Iraq to
discuss the similarities and differences of the postal problems still
being encountered and what actions had been taken to resolve any
previously identified problems.
To assess efforts to resolve military postal problems for future
contingencies, we collected any available after action reports and plans
for addressing military postal problems. We attended the Joint Postal
Conference-hosted by the Military Postal Service Agency in October
2003-which addressed postal problems encountered during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. During the conference, we spoke with military postal officials
who had direct responsibility for various aspects of mail delivery to and
from the Iraqi theater, and collected pertinent documentation. We
summarized information regarding key postal issues that must be addressed
to avoid their repetition in the future. We spoke with officials at the
Joint Forces Command who are in charge of collecting lessons learned for
Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also spoke with the Army Adjutant General in
charge of the Military Postal Service Agency to assess the agency's plans
for taking actions to mitigate those problems. We then met with a key
official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics)the responsible body for military postal
policy and oversightto discuss our findings and to determine what
entity is accountable for resolving these issues.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We conducted our review from August 2003 through March 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
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