Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing 
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations (12-FEB-04,		 
GAO-04-440T).							 
                                                                 
Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of
airports and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of	 
passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the 
security of commercial aviation, the Transportation Security	 
Administration (TSA) was created and charged with making numerous
enhancements to aviation security, including federalizing	 
passenger and baggage screening and screening checked baggage	 
using explosive detection systems. To assess the progress of	 
passenger and baggage screening operations, GAO was asked to	 
describe TSA's efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and	 
baggage screeners, (2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure
screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (4)	 
leverage and deploy screening equipment and technologies.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-440T					        
    ACCNO:   A09271						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and   
Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations		 
     DATE:   02/12/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Airport security					 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Education or training				 
	     Explosives 					 
	     Hiring policies					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Personnel recruiting				 
	     Research and development				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     TSA Explosive Detection System			 
	     TSA Explosive Trace Detection System		 

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GAO-04-440T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST AVIATION SECURITY

Thursday, February 12, 2004

 Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening
                                   Operations

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice

GAO-04-440T

Highlights of GAO-04-440T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives

Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task-with hundreds of airports
and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces
of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the security of commercial
aviation, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created and
charged with making numerous enhancements to aviation security, including
federalizing passenger and baggage screening and screening checked baggage
using explosive detection systems. To assess the progress of passenger and
baggage screening operations, GAO was asked to describe TSA's efforts to
(1) hire and deploy passenger and baggage screeners, (2) train the
screening workforce, (3) measure screener performance in detecting threat
objects, and (4) leverage and deploy screening equipment and technologies.

In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to
strengthen airport passenger and baggage screening. GAO also have several
ongoing reviews related to the issues addressed in this testimony, and
will issue separate reports related to these areas at later dates, with
additional recommendations as appropriate.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-440T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick, (202)
512-8777, [email protected]..

February 12, 2004

AVIATION SECURITY

Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening
Operations

TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by November
2002, but continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying passenger
and baggage screeners. Staffing shortages at some airports and TSA's
hiring process have hindered TSA's ability to fully staff screening
checkpoints without using additional measures, such as overtime. In
addition, while TSA has taken steps to enhance its screener training
programs, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed connectivity at
airport training facilities have made it difficult for screeners at some
airports to fully utilize these programs.

TSA has also undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of
passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. These efforts include
increasing covert testing at screening checkpoints and conducting annual
recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making progress in measuring
the performance of passenger screeners, it has collected limited
performance data related to its baggage screening operations. However, TSA
has begun collecting additional performance data related to its baggage
screening operations, and plans to increase these efforts in the future.

TSA also continues to face challenges in deploying and leveraging
screening equipment and technologies. TSA deployed Explosive Detection
Systems and Explosive Trace Detection equipment to all airports to screen
checked baggage. However, TSA has been unable to fully utilize this
equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage due to screener
shortages, and equipment out of service for maintenance and/or repairs.
When this equipment is not available, TSA continues to screen checked
baggage using alternative means. TSA also has ongoing initiatives designed
to increase the efficiency of screening checked baggage, including
implementing in-line baggage screening systems and streamlining screening
processes.

TSA is also conducting research and development (R&D) activities to
strengthen passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to
improve detection capability, performance, and efficiency for current
technologies, and to develop next generation screening equipment. TSA
faces a number of challenges with its R&D program, including balancing
funding with competing priorities, and working with other components of
the Department of Homeland Security to develop a strategy for merging
their R&D programs.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing to discuss
progress and challenges in airport passenger and baggage screening.
Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task-with hundreds of airports,
thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of
passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the security
of commercial aviation, the President signed into law the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) on November 19, 2001.1 ATSA created the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandated actions designed
to strengthen aviation security, including the federalization of passenger
and baggage screening at over 440 commercial airports in the United States
by November 19, 2002, and the screening of all checked baggage using
explosive detection systems.2 Notwithstanding these efforts, recent
reviews and covert testing conducted by us, the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Office of Inspector General, and TSA's Office of Internal
Affairs and Program Review revealed continuing weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in the screening system.

My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA is making in developing and
deploying tools to enhance and measure screener performance and the
challenges that remain. In particular, my testimony highlights four key
areas, including TSA's efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and
baggage screeners, (2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure screener
performance in detecting threat objects, and (4) leverage and deploy
screening equipment and technologies. My testimony is based on our prior
work and preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of TSA's
passenger and baggage screening programs, and research and development
efforts.

1Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

2According to TSA, Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive Trace
Detection (ETD) are the only technologies available to TSA for meeting
ATSA's requirement to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using
explosive detection systems. EDS operate in an automated mode and use
probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and identify the
characteristic signatures of threat explosives. ETD works by detecting
vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by
rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any
traces of explosive materials.

In summary:

While TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by
November 2002, it continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying its
screener workforce. To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a
sufficient number of passenger and baggage screeners trained and certified
in the latest TSA screening procedures and technology. However, staffing
shortages and TSA's hiring process have hindered the ability of some
Federal Security Directors (FSD)3 to provide sufficient resources to staff
screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their airports.

TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and
baggage screeners. In addition to strengthening its basic and recurrent
training programs, TSA is also enhancing and standardizing remedial
training for screeners who fail covert tests conducted by TSA's Office of
Internal Affairs and Program Review. TSA has also established leadership
and technical training programs for screening supervisors. Although TSA
continues to make progress in this area, staffing shortages and lack of
high-speed connectivity4 at many airport training facilities have made it
difficult for screeners to fully utilize these programs and complete
required training.

While TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of
passenger screeners in detecting threat objects, it has collected limited
data related to the performance of baggage screeners. In response to its
July 2003 Passenger Screener Performance Improvement Study, TSA developed
a short-term action plan that identified key actions TSA planned to take
to strengthen the performance of passenger screeners. These actions built
on several initiatives that TSA already had underway, including enhancing
training for screeners and supervisors, increasing covert testing,
completing installation of the Threat Image Projection

3Federal Security Directors are responsible for overseeing security at
each of the nation's commercial airports.

4High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA's field
operations training sites and checkpoints.

System (TIP),5 and conducting annual recertification of screeners. TSA has
focused on assessing the performance of passenger screeners, but has
collected limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners.
However, TSA has begun collecting additional performance data related to
its baggage screening operations, and plans to increase these efforts in
the future.

Although TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening
operations, it continues to face operational and funding challenges in its
efforts to screen all checked baggage using Explosive Detection Systems
(EDS) or Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) systems. TSA deployed this
equipment to all airports to screen checked baggage, but has been unable
to fully utilize this equipment due to screener and equipment shortages
and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. When
EDS and ETD equipment cannot be used, TSA continues to use alternative
screening means identified in ATSA,6 including K-9 teams, manual searches,
and positive passenger bag match.7 TSA has ongoing initiatives to increase
the efficiency of screening all checked baggage using EDS and ETD,
including the development and construction of in-line baggage screening
systems-which streamlines screening processes8 and airport operations at
larger airports. In addition, although TSA is funding research and
development (R&D) on several technologies designed to improve the
effectiveness of screening checked baggage and passengers for explosives,
progress has been delayed due to competing priorities in a tight budget
environment.

5TIP is designed to test screeners' detection capabilities by projecting
threat images, including guns and explosives, into bags as they are
screened. Screeners are responsible for positively identifying the threat
image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, TIP
identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then records the
screener's performance in a database that could be analyzed for
performance trends.

6Pub. L. No. 107-71, S: 110, 115 Stat. 597, 617, requires the use of
alternative means for screening any piece of checked baggage not screened
by an explosive detection system. Authorized alternative means include a
bag match program, manual search, K-9 explosive detection units, and other
means or technology approved by the Under Secretary.

7Positive passenger bag match is an alternative means of screening checked
baggage, conducted by the airline, which requires that the passenger be on
the same aircraft as the checked baggage.

8In-line baggage screening systems integrate EDS equipment into airport
baggage handling systems to improve the pace of checked baggage screening
(i.e., throughput).

Background

The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a
longstanding concern. Over the years, numerous initiatives have been
implemented to strengthen aviation security. However, as we and others
have documented in numerous reports and studies, weaknesses continue to
exist. It was due in part to these weaknesses that terrorists were able to
hijack four commercial aircraft on September 11, 2001, with tragic
results. Concerns continue to exist regarding the security of the aviation
system, as evidenced by the recent cancellations of several, mostly
transatlantic flights to and from the United States in response to
intelligence information regarding specific threats to those flights.

In response to the attacks of September 11th, ATSA mandated specific
actions designed to strengthen aviation security, and established
ambitious deadlines for completing many of these initiatives.
Consequently, TSA initially focused on attempting to meet these deadlines,
particularly creating a federalized screener workforce at commercial
airports nationwide by November 19, 2002. TSA also focused on screening
100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems by the
original deadline of December 31, 2002.9 These efforts resulted in the
deployment of more than 55,000 federal screeners at over 440 commercial
airports nationwide by November 19, 2002, as well as the deployment of
thousands of EDS and ETD systems.

Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside with TSA. Two
of the most important of these responsibilities are passenger and checked
baggage screening. Passenger screening involves the use of metal
detectors, X-ray machines, ETDs, and manual searches to examine passengers
and their carry-on baggage to identify threat objects. Checked baggage
screening involves the use of EDS, ETDs, K-9 teams, positive passenger bag
match, and manual searches to screen checked baggage. Performing these
screening functions can be cognitively demanding and difficult for
screening personnel.

The results I am presenting today are based on our preliminary
observations of TSA's passenger and baggage screening programs and related
research and development efforts, based on our ongoing reviews of

9Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, S: 425, 116
Stat. 2135, 2185-86 (2002), the deadline for screening all checked baggage
using explosive detection systems was extended until December 31, 2003, at
airports the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security determined
could not meet the December 31, 2002, deadline due to TSA's inability to
deploy sufficient explosive detection systems to those airports.

these areas for this committee. As part of our ongoing reviews of TSA's
passenger and baggage screening operations, we interviewed TSA officials
and visited 15 category X airports; 11 category I airports; and 7 category
II, III, and IV airports.10 During these visits, we observed screening
operations and interviewed FSDs, their staffs, and, at some airports,
airport authority and airline officials. We plan to visit additional
airports and conduct additional analysis during the remainder of our
review, including conducting a survey of all 158 FSDs regarding their
screening operations. Additionally, we will continue to assess TSA's and
DHS's research and development programs and the views of a panel of
security and technology experts that we convened with the assistance of
the National Academy of Sciences. We will report on the results of these
reviews later this year.

Although TSA successfully met its mandate to establish a federal screener
workforce by November 2002, it continues to face challenges in hiring and
deploying passenger and baggage screeners. To accomplish its security
mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of passenger and baggage screeners
trained and certified in TSA security procedures and technologies. TSA has
acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the
screener workforce and is taking steps to address these imbalances.
However, staffing shortages at some airports and TSA's hiring process have
hindered the ability of some FSDs to fully staff screening checkpoints
without using additional measures, such as overtime and the use of a
National Screening Force.11

  Although Progress Has Been Made, Concerns Remain Regarding Hiring and
  Deploying the Screener Workforce

Staffing Shortages Affect Screening Operations

TSA accomplished a significant goal by hiring and deploying more than
55,000 passenger and baggage screeners by November 19, 2002. However, TSA
continues to struggle to maintain an adequate number of screeners at
airport checkpoints, and has not yet achieved a stable screener workforce.
Recognizing these difficulties, TSA has taken several steps to address
staffing imbalances-including enhancing its workforce planning efforts,
and deploying a National Screening Force to airports with pressing
screening needs.

10There are five categories of airports-X, I, II, III, and IV. Category X
airports have the largest number of enplanements and category IV airports
have the smallest number.

11TSA's National Screening Force provides screening support to all
commercial airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under
other special circumstances that require a greater number of screeners
than currently available to FSDs.

Screener Imbalances

After meeting its deadline of deploying over 55,000 screeners by November
19, 2002, TSA recognized that its initial efforts created imbalances in
the screener workforce, as some airports had too many screeners while
others had too few. To address these imbalances, as well as congressional
concerns regarding screener-staffing levels, TSA began attempting to
rightsize its screener workforce. Specifically, TSA established a goal to
reduce its screener workforce by 3,000 screeners by June 1, 2003, and an
additional 3,000 screeners by September 30, 2003. These reductions were
achieved through attrition, voluntary transfers from full to part-time,
and involuntary transfers to part-time or terminations based on screeners'
scores on competency-based examinations.12

Currently, a congressionally imposed staffing cap13 prohibits TSA from
exceeding a screener staffing level of 45,000 full-time equivalents
(FTE).14 Figure 1 shows that based on annualized FTE data, TSA is
currently below the 45,000 cap.15

12TSA instructed FSDs to use competency-based testing at airports that
were over their authorized screener staffing levels as the identification
method for involuntary conversions to part-time and reductions-in-force.
Based on an airport's staffing plan, the FSD was required to identify the
number of screeners and screening supervisors to be converted to part-time
or be reduced-in-force. Screeners were ranked based on testing scores. The
competency-based tests consisted of two computer-based tests, including
image recognition and knowledge of standard operating procedures.

13The fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland and Security Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1141-42 (2003).

14One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-overtime
hours.

15According to TSA, an annualized number represents an estimate of the
usage of FTEs over the fiscal year assuming that the usage in a given pay
period remains constant over all future pay periods.

Figure 1: TSA Full-Time Equivalent Screeners, May 2003 through January
2004

Source: TSA annualized data.

According to TSA officials, TSA has experienced an average annual
attrition rate of 14 percent for screeners. However, attrition among the
nation's more than 440 commercial airports is sometimes considerably
higher. For example, at 8 category X airports visited during our review,
FSDs reported that average annual attrition ranged from 15 to 36 percent.

TSA has also experienced difficulties in hiring new staff, particularly
parttime staff. FSDs at 11 of the 15 category X airports we visited
reported that they were below their authorized staffing levels due to
attrition and difficulties in hiring new staff. In addition, 3 of these
FSDs noted that they were never successful in hiring up to the authorized
staffing levels. FSDs said that some of the factors contributing to their
inability to hire and retain screeners were the location of their airport,
the lack of accessible and affordable parking and/or public
transportation, and the high cost of living.

In addition, FSDs at several of the airports we visited stated that they
experienced difficulty in attracting needed part-time screeners, which
they believed to be due to low pay and benefits, as well as undesirable
hours. Additionally, FSDs stated that very few full-time screeners were
interested in converting to part-time status, and TSA officials stated
that attrition rates for part-time screeners were considerably higher than
those for full-

time screeners. TSA began actively recruiting part-time screeners during
the summer of 2003, and continues to recruit part-time screeners at more
than 80 airports.

Due to screener shortages, FSDs at 6 of the category X airports we visited
stated that they frequently had to require mandatory overtime,
particularly during the holiday season, to accomplish passenger and
baggage screening functions. FSDs' use of overtime was particularly high
during peak summer and holiday travel seasons. Figure 2 shows that between
May 2003 and January 2004, TSA used the equivalent of an annualized
average of 2,315 full-time-equivalent screeners in overtime hours per pay
period (every 2 weeks).

Figure 2: TSA Screener Overtime in Full-Time Equivalents, May 2003 through
January 2004

Source: TSA annualized data.

Workforce Planning Efforts 	In an effort to right-size and stabilize its
screener workforce, TSA hired a consultant in September 2003 to conduct a
study of screener staffing levels at the nation's commercial airports.
Specifically, the consultant was tasked with:

o  	evaluating TSA's current staffing methodology and systems to establish
a baseline for model development;

o  	developing a method for collecting and analyzing data to realistically
portray specific airport conditions rather than using a generalized
large/small airport protocol;

o  	developing a comprehensive modeling approach with appropriate details
to account for the considerable variability that occurs among airports;16

o  integrating modeling parameters into TSA's screener scheduling system;

o  	implementing a staffing analysis model to be used as a management tool
to determine daily and weekly staffing levels and deploy the model to
commercial airports nationwide; and

o  delivering user-friendly simulation software that will determine
optimum

                            National Screening Force

screener staffing levels for each of the more than 440 commercial airports
with federal screeners.

TSA expects the consultant's study to be completed in April 2004. In the
interim, TSA officials stated that they will continue to review the
staffing allocation provided through their internal modeling efforts,
which, among other things, assesses air carrier and airport growth
patterns, and makes adjustments as appropriate. We will continue to review
TSA's efforts to determine appropriate staffing levels for passenger and
baggage screeners during the remainder of our review.

To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational flexibility
to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003, TSA established
a National Screening Force to provide screening support to all airports in
times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances
that require a greater number of screeners than regularly available to
FSDs. This force replaced the Mobile Screening Force-a regionally-based
force-that was created in early 2002 primarily to support the initial
deployment of federal screeners to commercial airports. The National
Screening Force currently consists of over 700 full-time passenger and
baggage screeners, of which about 10 percent are screening supervisors.
Members of the National Screening Force volunteer to participate on the
force for a 1-year period. TSA officials stated that while these screeners
have a home airport to which they are assigned, they travel to airports in
need of screening staff approximately 70 percent of the year.

16TSA officials stated that it required the contractor to validate the
staffing model using statistical samples of all staff and equipment
operations at all category X airports and as many category I, II, III, and
IV airports as necessary.

TSA officials stated that they determine where to deploy members of the
National Screening Force based on four priorities. The highest priority is
given to those airports that need additional screeners in order to be able
to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD. The second
priority is given to small airports that have never met their authorized
screener staffing levels and have no permanent screeners. TSA officials
stated that several small airports have screening checkpoints that are
entirely staffed by the National Screening Force. They also stated that
some National Screening Force staff are deployed to airports, particularly
small airports, where they are only needed on a part-time basis. The third
priority is given to airports that are so understaffed that significant
screening delays would occur without additional staff. Finally, the fourth
priority is given to those airports with peak seasonal needs, such as Palm
Springs, airports that have a shortage of female passenger screeners;17
and airports offering new commercial service. Additionally, when DHS
recently increased the threat condition from yellow (elevated) to orange
(high),18 TSA reportedly redeployed about 50 percent of the National
Screening Force to airports determined to be at a higher risk based on
intelligence data.

TSA is also currently drafting standard operating procedures for the
National Screening Force. We will continue to examine TSA's use of the
National Screening Force during the remainder of our review.

TSA's Hiring Process Not Fully Responsive to FSD Needs

TSA's hiring process is designed to ensure that its hiring practices are
standardized and consistent throughout all airports. However, this process
has hindered the ability of some FSDs to adequately staff passenger and
baggage screening checkpoints. Several FSDs we interviewed expressed
concern that TSA's hiring process was not responsive to their needs, and
wanted to have more input in the hiring process. These FSDs faced screener
shortages that hindered their screening capability.

17TSA's standard operating procedures require that a screener of the same
gender as the passenger conduct secondary searches (i.e., hand wanding and
pat downs) of the passenger.

18DHS's Homeland Security Advisory System consists of 5 threat conditions,
ranging from low (green) to severe (red).

To ensure consistency in its hiring process, TSA headquarters manages
hiring centrally through its Aviation Operations and Human Resources
offices. In general, the process includes the following steps.

o  	FSDs identify their need for additional passenger or baggage
screeners, within their authorized allocation of screeners, and request
headquarters to initiate the hiring process.

o  	Aviation Operations reviews and prioritizes each request in
consultation with FSDs.

o  	Human Resources develops a hiring plan that identifies a schedule of
hiring events - from vacancy postings to the establishment of centers at
which the applicants' skills are assessed.19

o  	A recruiting contractor receives and assesses all screener
applications to ensure the applicants meet the basic requirements for
employment, including U.S. citizenship and specific education and work
experience. All applicants that meet the minimum qualifications are
invited to schedule themselves for the assessment process.20

o  	Upon successfully completing the assessment process, the recruiting
contractor sends the list of qualified applicants to TSA's
hiring/personnel contractor responsible for making job offers.

o  	The hiring contractor schedules the candidates for orientation and
training once they have accepted the offers.

Many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern with the lack of a
continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost through attrition,
and their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as needed basis. The
FSDs also complained of the time lag between their request for additional
staff

19An assessment center is a temporary testing site that TSA's hiring
contractor assembles to conduct assessments of screener applicants. The
centers are generally constructed at locations such as hotels and TSA
training facilities that are in close proximity to the airport(s) where
FSDs have requested additional staff.

20The assessment process consists of three phases. Phase I includes three
computer-based tests (1) the English Proficiency Test; (2) the Screener
Object Recognition Tests, which assesses an applicant's ability to
identify an X-ray images through visual observation and identification and
mental rotation; and (3) the Aviation Security Screener Employment Test,
which evaluates interpersonal skills such as customer service and
dependability and work values. Applicants who pass Phase I of the
assessment process are scheduled to attend Phase II, which includes (1) a
structured interview; (2) physical ability tests, such as luggage lift and
baggage search; (3) a medical examination such as vision, color vision,
hearing, physical coordination, and motor skills; and (4) a drug test.
Applicants who pass Phase II proceed to Phase III, which entails a
background investigation including credit and criminal checks. TSA
officials reported that approximately 8 percent of applicants pass both
the Phase I and II assessments, and about 90 percent of applicants pass
Phase III. Officials further reported that nearly 80 percent of offers
made are accepted.

and having trained and certified screeners on board. FSDs at 4 of the
category X airports we visited stated that the time lag between their
request for additional staffing and the opening of an assessment center
took several months. For example, one FSD stated that in response to
continued attrition at his airport, he notified TSA in advance that
additional screeners would be needed before the peak summer travel season.
However, an assessment center was not opened until mid-June and the
initial training did not begin until July. The FSD reportedly had to rely
on the Mobile Screening Force and overtime to accommodate the demand
during the peak summer season. This same FSD also stated that the lengthy
hiring process limited his ability to address screener performance issues,
such as absenteeism or tardiness, and contributed to screener complacency
because screeners were aware that they were unlikely to be terminated due
to staffing shortages. In another example, an FSD at one large airport
found it difficult to fill the more than 100 parttime approved screener
positions because the nearest assessment center was too far away for local
applicants to be processed.

Several FSDs we interviewed also stated that not all of the applicants who
were offered positions showed up for initial basic screener training. For
example, in November 2003, at one large category X airport, the FSD
reported that 80 individuals who accepted screener positions were
scheduled to report for basic screener training, but following
orientation, only 15 individuals (less than 20 percent) reported for
training. TSA headquarters reported that an average of 13 percent of
screeners who are hired fail to attend basic screener training.21

FSDs also expressed concern regarding the lack of input they had during
the hiring process. Specifically, they stated that they do not have a role
in reviewing applications, interviewing applicants, or making hiring
decisions. In response to these concerns, TSA officials reported that they
plan to redesign and streamline their hiring process, particularly the
assessment center process (Phase II), to allow for more involvement by
FSDs and their staff. Specifically, officials reported that they are
beginning to (1) ensure that the recruiting contractor includes the FSD in
recruitment planning, including obtaining input regarding where and how
the contractor recruits; (2) allow FSDs to participate with the contractor
in the structured interview of the candidates during Phase II of the
hiring

21TSA attempts to contact hired screeners who do not show up for basic
screener training, and reschedule training when possible.

  TSA Has Enhanced Its Screener Training Programs, but Access to Programs Is
  Sometimes Limited

process; and (3) ensure that FSDs swear in the candidates and provides
organizational briefings on their first day of orientation. Officials also
reported that they plan to establish an advisory council of FSDs to help
guide the piloting and implementation of this new process. The goal of
these efforts is to make the hiring process more responsive to the wide
range of airports' needs while ensuring efficiency and quality. We will
continue to review these initiatives as part of our ongoing review of
TSA's process for hiring and deploying passenger and baggage screeners.

TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and
baggage screeners. However, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed
connectivity22 at airport training facilities have made it difficult for
screeners to fully utilize these programs. Specifically, TSA recently
revamped its screener training program to include three main components:
(1) dual training for both passenger and baggage screeners (replaces basic
screener training); (2) recurrent (skills refresher) screener training;
and (3) technical screener training/certification for EDS.23 In addition
to strengthening its basic and recurrent training programs, TSA is also
enhancing and standardizing remedial training for screeners who fail a
covert test conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program
Review. Despite these efforts, however, FSDs at 5 of the 15 category X
airports we visited stated that ensuring screeners received required
training continued to be a challenge.

Dual Passenger and Baggage Screener Training

As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic screener training program
comprised of a minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours
of on-the-job training for passenger and baggage screeners. The initial
basic screener training courses were updated at the end of 2003,
respectively, to incorporate changes to standard operating procedures. In
addition to these updates, TSA officials stated that they recently
developed a new basic screener training program, "dual function screener
training," to address technical aspects of both passenger and baggage
screening. This training will utilize modular courses to provide skills
refresher (recurrent) training or to cross-train screeners, such as
refreshing baggage screening skills for a screener who has worked
predominately as a

22High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA's field
operations training sites and checkpoints.

23TSA plans to develop other certifications as new technologies are
utilized and integrated into the screening process.

passenger screener. TSA officials reported that beginning in April 2004,
all newly hired screeners will receive dual function screener training in
order to provide FSDs with the flexibility to staff them as either
passenger or baggage screeners.

                               Recurrent Training

Comprehensive and frequent training is key to passenger and baggage
screeners' ability to detect threat objects. TSA requires passenger and
baggage screeners to participate in 3 hours of recurrent training per
week, averaged over each quarter. One hour is required to be devoted to
x-ray image interpretation, and the other 2 hours on screening techniques
or reviews of standard operating procedures.

We reported in September 2003 that TSA had not fully developed or deployed
a recurrent training program for passenger screeners.24 Since then, TSA
has developed 12 recurrent training modules for passenger and baggage
screeners. Two of these modules have been deployed to airports
nationwide,25 while 9 additional modules are expected to be deployed by
March 2004. The final module, a Web-based x-ray image interpretation tool,
is scheduled for implementation in April 2004.

As we reported in September 2003, many of the passenger screeners and
supervisors we interviewed expressed the need for recurrent training.26
Screeners were particularly interested in receiving additional training
related to recognizing x-ray images of threat objects, and also identified
an interest in more realistic training for the detection of improvised
explosive devices. FSDs and training coordinators also emphasized that
screeners needed to receive more hands-on training using threat simulators
and emulators. TSA headquarters also identified these training needs as
part of a study of passenger screener performance, and developed and
deployed training tools to help address these needs.27 For example, TSA
officials

24U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary
Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003).

25The 2 completed modules are videos that provide training on procedures
for conducting handheld metal detector, pat down, and manual bag searches.

26As we did not select statistical samples of passenger screeners and
supervisors to interview, the views of those we interviewed should not be
considered representative of the views of all screeners and supervisors at
the airports we visited.

27While the study was focused on passenger screening, TSA officials stated
that many of the performance issues identified also pertained to baggage
screening.

reported that they provided every airport with at least one Modular Bomb
Set kit and one weapons training kit. These Modular Bomb Sets and weapons
training kits are intended to fill an identified gap in training by
allowing screeners to touch and feel the threat objects that they are
looking for. TSA also instituted a training program called "Threat In the
Spotlight" that provides screeners with the latest in threat information
regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past screening
checkpoints.

TSA is also in the process of developing specialized certification
training for technologies used by passenger and baggage screeners. TSA has
developed only one course, for EDS use, but plans to develop other
certifications and courses as new technologies are utilized and integrated
into the screening process. Additionally, in October 2003, TSA fielded an
Online Learning Center-a Web-based tool with 366 self-guided training
courses available to all screening staff. The courses provided on the
Online Learning Center Web site capture common developmental needs
identified by TSA. The Online Learning Center also enables screeners to
view the list of required and optional training courses and materials,
review their training records, and track their training progress.

                               Remedial Training

Consistent with ATSA, TSA requires remedial training for any passenger or
baggage screener who fails an operational test, and prohibits screeners
from performing the screening function related to the tests they failed
until they successfully complete the training.28 FSDs must certify that
screeners identified as requiring remedial training complete the training
before they can perform the screening function identified as a performance
weakness.

TSA is in the process of enhancing and standardizing remedial training
requirements required after failure of covert operational tests. Program
enhancements will provide specific guidance regarding materials to be
reviewed during remedial training and standardize the practice of
demonstrating proper techniques and procedures in the area of deficiency
noted during the failed test.

28Screening supervisors and managers may also require screeners to
participate in corrective action training based on their observations of
performance deficiencies, such as failure to follow a standard operating
procedure.

Supervisory Training

TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review identified a lack of
supervisory training as a cause for screener testing failures. In
addition, both FSDs and TSA headquarters officials have recognized the
need to enhance the skills of screening supervisors through supervisory
training. As we reported in September 2003, TSA had begun working with the
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Graduate School to tailor USDA's
offthe-shelf supervisory course to meet the specific needs of TSA's
screening supervisors. According to TSA, 500 screening supervisors
participated in the course during the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2003.29 Since then, TSA reportedly has sent an additional 1,500 of its
approximately 3,600 screening supervisors to the enhanced USDA Graduate
School supervisory course, and expects all screening supervisors to have
received this training by April 2004. TSA officials also stated that they
intend to schedule recently promoted supervisors to attend the USDA
Graduate School supervisory course after March 2004 if they had not yet
attended, and plan to extend the course offering to include screening
managers, once screening supervisors are trained.

In addition to the USDA Graduate School supervisory course, TSA officials
reported that the agency plans to have a Web-based technical training
course-required for all screening leads, supervisors, and managers-by the
end of February 2004. This course will cover technical issues such as
resolving alarms at screening checkpoints. Additionally, TSA's Online
Learning Center includes over 60 supervisory courses designed to develop
leadership and coaching skills. TSA officials noted that they focused
their efforts on training supervisors that were initially hired into
supervisory roles, rather than internally promoted supervisors.

Challenges Exist in Providing Screeners Access to Available Training

While TSA has begun developing and fielding recurrent training modules to
airports, staffing shortages and a lack of high-speed connectivity at
airports have made it difficult for all screeners to access these courses.
Specifically, due to staffing shortages, FSDs at 5 of the 15 category X
airports we visited stated that it was difficult, if not impossible, to
comply with the requirement that screeners receive 3 hours of recurrent
training each week, averaged over a 3-month period. FSDs stated that due
to staffing shortages, they were unable to let screeners take this
training because it would impact the FSDs' ability to provide adequate
screener

29The USDA course covers topics related to supervising staff within the
federal government.

coverage. Consequently, screeners received an average of only 3 hours of
recurrent training per month. In an attempt to ensure screeners receive
required training, several FSDs provided training through overtime, or
established training relief teams with the sole purpose of staffing
screening checkpoints while screeners participated in training.

The lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities has
also limited access to TSA's training tools. TSA's Online Learning Center
was established to provide passenger and baggage screeners with high-speed
access to over 350 training courses. However, TSA did not begin deploying
high-speed connectivity to its training sites and checkpoints until May
2003. Currently, TSA has reportedly provided high-speed connectivity to 71
airport locations, including training sites where 927 training computers
are fully connected.30 TSA expects to install high-speed connectivity at
up to 81 additional airports by the end of fiscal year 2004. Until
high-speed connectivity is fully achieved, TSA plans to continue to
distribute new training products using multiple delivery channels,
including written training materials and CD-ROMs.

  TSA Continues to Strengthen its Efforts to Measure Screener Performance in
  Detecting Threat Objects

TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of
passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA has
collected limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners. In
July 2003, TSA completed a study of the performance of its passenger
screening system, which identified numerous performance deficiencies.
These deficiencies were determined to be caused by a lack of skills and
knowledge, low motivation, ineffective work environment, and wrong or
missing incentives. In response to this study, TSA developed a short-term
action plan that identified key actions TSA plans to take to strengthen
the performance of passenger screeners. These actions build on several
initiatives that TSA already had underway, including enhancing training
for screeners and supervisors, increasing covert testing conducted by
TSA's Office of Internal Affairs, completing installation of the TIP, and
conducting annual recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making
progress in each of these areas, it has collected limited data on the
performance of its baggage screening operations. Officials stated that
they have collected limited performance data related to baggage screeners
due

30TSA defines fully connected as a training computer with the new network
image installed and connected to the TSA broadband network.

to their focus on passenger screener performance, but plan to collect
additional performance data in the future.

Performance Improvement Study and Short-Term Action Plan

In July 2003, TSA completed a Passenger Screener Performance Improvement
Study designed to identify root causes for gaps between the current
performance of passenger screeners and TSA's desired performance-defined
as 100 percent interception of prohibited items coming through screening
checkpoints. The study identified many of the performance deficiencies
that FSDs reported to us during our site visits to more than 30 airports,
including inadequate staffing and poor supervision of screeners. While the
study was focused on passenger screening, TSA officials stated that many
of the performance issues cited also pertained to baggage screeners. TSA
officials stated that they plan to assess the performance of baggage
screeners after recommendations from the performance improvement study
relative to passenger screening have been implemented.

In October 2003, to address passenger screener performance deficiencies
identified in the Screener Performance Improvement Study, TSA developed a
"Short-Term Screening Performance Improvement Plan." This plan included
nine action items that TSA plans to pursue to provide tangible
improvements in screener performance and security, and identified 6 week,
3 month, 6 month, and, in some cases, milestones of 1 year or more. These
action items include increasing covert testing at screening checkpoints,
completing installation of TIP at all airports, enhancing screener
training, and strengthening supervisor's skills through leadership and
technical training. TSA is also establishing a longer-term plan that
addresses identified deficiencies, such as the need to establish adequate
training facilities at airports and to reconfigure checkpoints to
eliminate screener distractions. Table 1 provides a summary of TSA's
short-term action items for strengthening passenger screener performance.

 Table 1: Summary of TSA's Short-Term Action Items for Strengthening Passenger
                              Screener Performance

Category Action Item Description Benefit

People

1 Increase FSD Hold FSDs accountable for      Management accountability is 
                  screening                                driven down to the 
    support and   performance and delivery                      local airport 
                  of security               
accountability                                FSD performance is linked to 
                                                                     screener 
                                             performance, creating incentives 
                                                              for maintaining 
                                                       and improving security 

2 Enhance training 	Provide ongoing training for screeners and Maintains
and improves knowledge base of supervisors to maintain their skills and
screeners provide new skills and techniques based on Ensures proper
oversight by supervisorsevolving threats and lessons learned

Ensures that screeners are capable of addressing

evolving threats

        3 Increase Increase the frequency Improved identification of systemic 
          Internal          of TSA covert                     vulnerabilities 
    Affairs covert                testing         in airport security systems 
           testing                        Immediate implementation of limited 
                                          remedial                            
                                                                      actions 

4 	Continue to pursue Better understand reasons and causes for Reduces
human-based errors human human errors and interactions with Increases
workforce morale and workingperformance technology in order to identify
opportunities conditions, leading to improved performanceimprovements for
performance improvements with a goal

of identifying optimum work conditions

Technology

5 	Continue to Continue to research alternative Identifies threats more
accurately and quickly identify screening technologies and seek short-term
Decreases number of false positives fromtechnology technological
solutions, especially for equipmentimprovements potential vectors.

6 Finish installing The TIP system is a series of 2,400 images

TIP 	of threat objects that can be automatically fed into X-Ray machines
during actual screening

7 	Expedite high-Connect all TSA offices, checkpoints and speed
connectivity screening equipment (X-rays, EDS to checkpoints and machines)
to the internet in order to training computers automate and improve
processes that are

Maintains alertness of screeners
Identifies individual screener performance issues

Provides immediate feedback on and response to
screener performance issues

Improves communication with managers in the
field

                     currently done manually or not at all

Process

8 	Refresh aviation operations policy, procedures and practice Conduct a
thorough and expedited review of all policies and procedures developed
during the rollout of TSA with a focus on increasing screening performance
and capabilities Maintains "freshness" of standard operating procedures
based on most recent intelligence about security threats

Removes or updates outdated or unnecessary screening techniques based on
lessons learned

9 	Improve workforce management

Determine the optimal workforce staffing levels based on latest passenger
flows and other factors

                  Maximizes utilization of existing resources

Source: TSA

Covert Testing

TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review conducts unannounced
covert tests of passenger and baggage screeners to assess their ability to
detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved procedures. These
tests, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects
through screening checkpoints, are designed to identify systematic
problems affecting the performance of screeners related to their adherence
to standard operating procedures and handling of equipment. TSA's testing
to date has identified weaknesses in the ability of passenger and baggage
screeners to detect threat objects.

In November 2003, we reported that the Office of Internal Affairs and
Program Review had conducted 733 covert tests at 92 airports of passenger
screeners at screening checkpoints.31 Since then, TSA has conducted an
additional 362 passenger screening checkpoint tests through January 17,
2004, for a total of 1,095 tests, and estimates that it will double the
number of tests conducted during fiscal year 2004. However, even with the
doubling of these tests, only a small percentage of the screener workforce
is subject to a covert test.

TSA initially focused most of its resources on testing passenger rather
than baggage screeners. While TSA began conducting covert tests of
passenger screeners in September 2002, it did not begin conducting covert
tests of checked baggage screeners until January 2003-after Congress's
initial deadline for 100 percent screening of checked baggage using
explosive detection systems had passed. Between January 2003 and September
2003, TSA conducted checked baggage tests as part of the Computer-Assisted
Passenger Prescreening selectee testing protocol.32 In November 2003, TSA
developed a protocol specifically designed to test checked baggage. From
January 2003 through January 17, 2004, TSA conducted 192 checked baggage
tests at 128 airports, and plans to increase the number of checked baggage
tests it conducts this fiscal year. We plan to review the Office of
Internal Affairs and Program Review's covert testing in more detail during
the remainder of our reviews.

31U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure
Effectiveness and Address Challenges, GAO-04-232T (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
5, 2003).

32The Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System is a stand-alone
application residing in an air carrier's reservation system that analyzes
certain behavioral patterns to score and calculate each passenger's risk
level for determining the appropriate level of screening.

Threat Image Projection System

Another key source of information on screener performance in detecting
threat objects is the TIP system, which places images of threat objects on
the X-ray screen during actual operations and records whether screeners
identify the threat objects. TIP was shut down immediately following the
September 11th terrorist attacks due to concerns that it would result in
screening delays and panic, as screeners might think that they were
actually viewing threat objects. Recognizing that TIP is a key tool in
maintaining and enhancing screener performance, TSA began reactivating and
expanding TIP in October 2003. Additionally, TSA has increased the number
of TIP-ready X-ray machines at passenger screening checkpoints from about
1,300 in October 2003 to over 1,770 as of January 20, 2004. In January
2004, TSA also reported that it had installed a new library of 2,400
threat images on all existing TIP ready X-ray machines-a significant
increase from the 200 images the Federal Aviation Administration had in
place. TSA has ordered an additional 30 TIP-ready X-ray machines and
expects TIP to be 100 percent operational by April 2004.

With an operational TIP program, FSDs have the capability to query and
analyze passenger screening performance data in a number of ways,
including by individual screeners, checkpoints, terminals, and airports.
However, until high-speed connectivity is available at screening
checkpoints, collecting this information for reporting and analysis
purposes will continue to be cumbersome.33 For example, at airports where
high-speed connectivity is not available, TIP data have to be downloaded
onto a disk and mailed to a remote location where they are uploaded for
analysis.

Although TIP is available to measure the performance of and train
passenger screeners, it is not currently available for baggage screeners.
TSA officials stated that they are currently working to resolve technical
challenges associated with using TIP for checked baggage screening on EDS
machines and have started EDS TIP image development.

Annual Recertification ATSA requires that TSA collect performance
information on all passenger

Program 	and baggage screeners by conducting an annual proficiency
evaluation to ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications
and standards related to the functions that he or she performs. To meet
this requirement, TSA established an annual recertification program.
Currently, there are

33TSA began deploying high-speed connectivity to screening checkpoints in
May 2003.

two parts to recertification: a knowledge and skills assessment program
and a final rating on a screener's annual assessment. The knowledge and
skills assessment is comprised of three modules: (1) knowledge of standard
operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) a practical
demonstration of skills. To be certified, a passenger screener must pass
all applicable modules of the knowledge and skills assessment program and
have a rating of "met" or "exceeded" standards on a screener's annual
assessment. However, baggage-only screeners are not required to complete
the image recognition test.34 If a screener does not meet the
recertification requirements, he/she is not certified and may not continue
employment as a screener.35 According to TSA officials, approximately 200
screeners have been terminated to date for failure to pass the
recertification program.

TSA began implementing its recertification program in October 2003, and
expects to complete testing at all airports in March 2004.36 As of January
30, 2004, TSA reportedly had completed modules one and two of its annual
screener recertification program at 100 percent of federalized airports,
and had completed module three at 50 percent of these airports. TSA does
not have a recertification track specifically for cross-trained screeners.
However, TSA officials stated that they plan to establish a dual
functioning screener recertification track for the 2004-2005
recertification cycle. Currently, all screeners who are cross-trained and
actively performing both passenger and baggage screening functions are
considered passenger screeners for the purpose of recertification.
However, the current recertification program ensures that cross-trained
screeners pass the image interpretation test for x-ray threat image
interpretation, as well as the ETD system and manual bag search, which are
also performed in checked baggage screening. We will continue to examine
TSA's progress in administering its annual recertification program during
the remainder of our reviews.

34Checked baggage screeners will not recertify on EDS as part of the
current recertification program. EDS is a separate certification program
under development. The need for other skills or equipment-certifications
is under consideration for future certification programs.

35Screeners that fail any module will receive study time, remediation, and
one retest opportunity.

36At the time the recertification testing began, TSA considered about
28,000 screeners as having already completed the first two components of
the knowledge and skills assessment because they successfully passed
competency tests TSA administered at many airports as part of a screener
workforce reduction effort.

Performance Management Information System

TSA's Performance Management Information System (PMIS) is designed to
collect, analyze, and report passenger and baggage screening performance
data. While PMIS does not contain information on screener performance in
detecting threat objects, it collects information on operational
performance, such as wait times at selected airports, workload data, and
the performance and utilization of passenger and baggage screening
equipment. TSA headquarters uses PMIS data to support external reporting
on performance and internal decision-making processes.

TSA recently surveyed FSDs or members of their staff who use PMIS by
inputting or analyzing data, to solicit their feedback on the usefulness
of the system.37 PMIS users who responded to the survey identified several
areas for improvement, including additional capabilities, such as the
ability to customize reports, and enhanced technical features, such as
split screen report viewing and data entry. TSA reported that, to the
extent possible, they plan to use feedback from the survey to make
enhancements to the system.

TSA provides FSDs and other PMIS users with monthly PMIS system updates
that include new functionalities and improvements to the system. These
enhancements have allowed TSA to collect additional information with which
to better analyze its operations. For example, when TSA began collecting
employee census data in June 2003, it only collected information on the
number of screeners. TSA is now able to collect more detailed information
on screeners including the number of part-time screeners, hours worked per
week, and screener gender. TSA also developed pilot programs in order to
determine the usefulness of PMIS data before making systemwide changes.
For example, TSA began to collect additional data regarding checked
baggage screening operations during the spring of 2003 at 36 airports.
Among other things, the 36 airports collect data on the number of checked
bags screened, number of prohibited items confiscated, and number of law
enforcement officer interventions. TSA is evaluating whether to expand
collection of baggage screening data to additional airports. TSA plans to
continuously enhance the system as it learns what data are needed to best
manage the agency.

37The PMIS user survey was conducted in July 2003 and had a response rate
of 21.9%. Given this low response rate, the results of the survey may not
be representative of the views and opinions of PMIS users. TSA plans to
administer a second survey in March 2004.

To help ensure the quality of the data, TSA has also developed PMIS user
guides and procedures. TSA officials reported that headquarters' staff and
contactors provide consultation to and review the input from FSDs to
ensure that the data provided are complete and consistent. The PMIS also
contains checks for data entries that are out of normal bounds. However,
because the PMIS system relies on self-reporting by FSDs, there may be
inconsistencies in the way in which the data are reported, reducing the
overall usefulness of the system in aiding management decisions. We will
continue to review TSAs plans to enhance the system and its reliability
during the remainder of our review.

Performance Indexes for Screeners and Screening Systems

In September and November 2003, we reported that in addition to making
improvements to PMIS, TSA was developing performance indexes for both
individual passenger and baggage screeners and the screening system as a
whole. The screening performance index will measure the effectiveness of
the screening system through nationwide TIP results and covert testing
data; efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per passenger
screened or dollars spent per bag screened; and customer satisfaction
through a national poll, customer surveys, and customer complaints at both
airports and TSA's national call center. TSA is currently developing
baseline data for fiscal year 2004 and plans to report the indexes to the
DHS in fiscal year 2005 in support of its Government Performance and
Results Act performance measures.38

38The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62,
107 Stat. 285, shifts the focus of government operations from process to
results by establishing a foundation for examining agency mission,
performance goals and objectives, and results. Under the act, agencies are
to prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the general direction for their
efforts, and annual performance plans that establish connections between
the long-term strategic goals outlined in the strategic plans and the
day-to-day activities of managers and staff. Finally, the act requires
that each agency report annually on the extent to which it is meeting its
annual performance goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify those
goals that have not been met.

  TSA Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Deploy and Leverage Screening Equipment
  and Technologies

TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening operations, but
continues to face operational and funding challenges in screening all
checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by ATSA.
Although TSA has deployed EDS and ETD equipment to all airports, TSA has
not been able to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent of
checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2003, due to screener and
equipment shortages and equipment being out of service for maintenance
and/or repairs. When TSA cannot screen 100 percent of checked baggage
using EDS and ETD, TSA continues to use alternative means outlined in
ATSA, including K-9 teams, manual bag search, and positive passenger bag
match. TSA has ongoing initiatives to increase the efficiency of screening
checked baggage using EDS, including the development and construction of
in-line baggage screening systems at larger airports-which, streamlines
the screening processes. TSA is also conducting research and development
activities to strengthen passenger and baggage screening. These efforts
are designed to improve detection capability, performance, and efficiency
for current technologies, and to develop the next generation of EDS
equipment.

TSA Is Not Fully Utilizing Equipment for Meeting the 100 Percent Checked
Baggage Screening Requirement

While TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening processes, it
continues to face challenges in attaining 100 percent screening using
explosive detection systems39 100 percent of the time. Since its creation
in November 2001, TSA has deployed over 1,100 EDS machines and 6,000 ETD
machines to over 440 airports nationwide. However, TSA has not been able
to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage
due to screener and equipment shortages, and equipment being out of
service for maintenance and/or repairs.

In its effort to meet ATSA's original requirement to screen 100 percent of
checked baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002,
TSA deployed hundreds of EDS and thousands of ETD machines to over 440
airports. As it became apparent that TSA would be unable to attain the
December 31, 2002, deadline, the Congress authorized an extension of that

39According to TSA, Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive Trace
Detection (ETD) are the only technologies available to TSA for meeting
ATSA's requirement to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using
explosive detection systems. EDS operate in an automated mode and use
probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and identify the
characteristic signatures of threat explosives. ETD works by detecting
vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by
rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any
traces of explosive materials.

deadline for noncompliant airports until December 31, 2003. In its effort
to meet these deadlines, in June 2002, TSA and its contractors began to
deploy EDS and ETD equipment to the nation's commercial airports. This
effort involved designing and implementing facility modifications for EDS
and ETD equipment, installing equipment, and developing and administering
equipment training for baggage screeners. As EDS and ETD were being
deployed to airports, TSA implemented interim solutions to screen 100
percent of checked baggage, until more permanent solutions could be
designed and constructed. For example, many large airports were equipped
with stand-alone EDS machines that were not integrated with baggage
conveyor systems. These minivan-sized machines were sometimes deployed in
airport lobbies, which led to crowding as passengers filled lobbies
waiting to have their checked baggage screened. In addition, stand-alone
EDS machines are both labor and time intensive to operate since each bag
must be physically carried to an EDS machine for screening and then moved
back to the baggage conveyor system prior to being loaded onto an
aircraft.

Realizing the inefficiencies of these interim solutions, TSA and some
airport authorities are developing more permanent solutions, such as
inline systems. TSA also continues to look for ways to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the baggage screening process, especially
ways that reduce reliance on screener personnel.

TSA has made progress during 2003 in its efforts to deploy equipment to
screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems.
However, some airports are currently unable to use this equipment to
screen all checked baggage for explosives, or reported that they do not
have enough EDS or ETD to conduct baggage screening. These airports are
unable to achieve the requirement to screen 100 percent of checked
baggage, 100 percent of the time, using EDS and ETD due to insufficient
screener staff to operate screening equipment, insufficient staff and
equipment to meet surges in passenger volume, and equipment being out of
service for maintenance and/or repairs. As a way to monitor
baggagescreening operations, FSDs are expected to report, using TSA's
PMIS, when they are unable to screen all checked baggage using EDS and ETD
and the reasons that prevented them from doing so.40 We reviewed TSA's
Aviation Operations division's report on the status of checked baggage
screening (based on PMIS data), dated January 5, 2004, to determine

40FSDs are expected to list all reasons that prevented them from screening
100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD. Also, FSDs are to report
when they do attain 100 percent screening of checked baggage using EDS and
ETD.

whether airports were conducting 100 percent screening using EDS and ETD,
and to identify reasons for not achieving this deadline. Our preliminary
review of that data showed that the most frequently cited reasons for not
being able to meet the requirement-noted by about twothirds of the FSDs
that reported they were not conducting 100 percent screening using EDS or
ETD41 ---were staff shortages, absenteeism, and a lack of training. Almost
half of these FSDs also identified that they did not have sufficient EDS
and ETD equipment to screen all checked baggage, and/or that some of their
EDS and ETD equipment was inoperable.

Of the airports reporting that they were not screening 100 percent of
checked baggage using EDS or ETD, the number of consecutive days that they
were not conducting this screening ranged from 1 to 371 days. In addition,
almost one-third of these FSDs reported that they did not conduct 100
percent screening using EDS or ETD less than 10 consecutive days, while
half of the FSDs reported not conducting 100 percent screening using EDS
or ETD for more than 200 consecutive days. This reporting status can
change daily as the events that caused airports to not conduct 100 percent
screening using explosive detection systems may be corrected. FSDs are
also expected to report whenever there is need to use alternative
screening means because fewer than 100 percent of checked bags are being
screened using EDS and ETD.

Furthermore, in our visits to several category X and I airports, FSDs
identified EDS and ETD machines that were unable to be used due to an
insufficient number of screeners to operate the equipment or because the
equipment was not in the locations where it was needed. FSDs at some of
these airports expressed concerns about not being able to resolve
operational issues that were causing them to be noncompliant with the
requirement for 100 percent screening using explosive detection systems.

41The number of airports unable to attain 100 percent screening of checked
baggage using EDS and ETD is Sensitive Security Information and,
therefore, is not included in this testimony.

To comply with a requirement from the Homeland Security Act that TSA
report on its status in achieving the checked baggage-screening
deadline,42 TSA provides classified reports monthly to selected committees
of the Congress identifying its progress in deploying EDS and ETD
equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage. As of December 31,
2003, TSA reported that it fell short of this goal at several large
airports, primarily because these airports did not have the EDS and ETD
equipment needed and/or experienced staffing shortages to operate the
equipment. We compared TSA's January 5, 2004, Aviation Operations Reports
to the December 2003 monthly report provided to the selected congressional
committees, and identified additional airports that were not using EDS and
ETD to screen checked baggage 100 percent of the time. TSA officials
stated that the discrepancies were caused because the primary focus of
their report to the selected congressional committees was on initial
deployment of the equipment, rather than fluctuations in staffing and
maintenance issues that affect TSA's ability to utilize the equipment. We
will continue to monitor TSA's compliance with the requirement to screen
100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems during
the remainder of our review.

TSA Faces Funding and Operational Challenges in Achieving Efficiencies in
Checked Baggage Screening

TSA has two major initiatives underway to achieve efficiencies in its
baggage screening operations-integrating EDS machines into the airports'
baggage handling systems and resolving EDS alarms using computer images,
referred to as on-screen resolution. Reconfiguring airports for in-line
checked baggage screening could be extensive and costly, especially when
new construction or extensive conveyor belt systems are required. TSA
estimates that the systemwide costs to complete installations of in-line
baggage screening systems may be as high as $3 to $5 billion, not
including the costs of EDS and ETD equipment. In addition, TSA's efforts
to develop protocols for on-screen resolution,

42The baggage-screening requirements of 49 U.S.C. S: 44901(d)(1), on which
TSA must report, include: (A) that explosive detection systems are
deployed as soon as possible to ensure that all airports described in S:
44903(c) have sufficient explosive detection systems to screen all checked
baggage no later than December 31, 2002 (as discussed earlier, the
Homeland Security Act extended this deadline to December 31, 2003, for
airports that the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
determines could not meet the original deadline), and that as soon as
these systems are in place at an airport, all checked baggage at the
airport is screened by those systems; (B) that all systems deployed under
subparagraph (A) are fully utilized; and (C) if explosive detection
equipment at an airport is unavailable, all checked baggage is screened by
an alternative means.

which may permit more efficient screening operations without increasing
security risks, have taken longer than anticipated.

Many large airports are planning to install in-line baggage screening
systems-installing EDS machines as an integrated part of the airport
baggage handling systems-to improve throughput of baggage and reduce
crowding in airport lobbies. These in-line systems have been funded in
part through letters of intent (LOI) signed by TSA.43 To date, TSA has
signed 6 LOIs covering 7 airports promising multiyear financial support
totaling about $772 million for in-line integration of EDS equipment. For
example, LOIs are to provide $87 million in airport modifications at
Boston Logan International Airport, and over $104 million at Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport. In addition, TSA is negotiating LOIs with 4
additional airports. The 7 airports with signed LOIs and the 4 airports
negotiating LOIs with TSA are shown in table 2.

Table 2: Airports Receiving or Negotiating Letters of Intent

Letter of intent issued Letter of Intent in negotiation Airport Amount
Airport Amount

                    BOS - Boston    $87,000,000   ATL - Atlanta  $175,700,000 
                    DEN - Denver    $71,250,000   IAH - Houston  $101,520,000 
               DFW - Dallas/Fort                  MCO - Orlando 
                           Worth  $104,437,359                    $80,000,000 
                 LAS - Las Vegas    $93,750,000   PHX - Phoenix   $65,565,000 
                   LAX/ONT - Los                                
           Angeles International                                
                     and Ontario  $256,467,000                  
                   SEA - Seattle  $159,000,000                  

Source: Transportation Security Administration

Note: Amounts reflected are TSA's contribution, which is 75% of funding
needed for an in-line EDS screening solution.

43A letter of intent represents a nonbinding commitment from an agency to
provide multiyear funding to an entity beyond the current authorization
period. Thus, that letter allows an airport to proceed with a project
without waiting for future federal funds because the airport and investors
know that allowable costs are likely to be reimbursed.

TSA also reported that 23 additional airports, shown in table 3, have
requested LOIs.44

44In addition, in-line systems have been funded through the Federal
Aviation Administration's AIP funds. The Airport Improvement Program trust
fund is used to fund capital improvements to airports, including some
security enhancements, such as terminal modifications to accommodate
explosive detection equipment. Thirteen airports are using AIP funds to
make infrastructure upgrades to support EDS equipment that TSA will
supply.

       Table 3: Additional Airports Requesting Letters of Intent Airports

Source: TSA.

TSA officials stated that they are assessing requested LOIs based on a
security evaluation, as well as a determination of return on investment.
Officials stated that top priority would be given to airports that need
inline systems to comply with the requirement for 100 percent screening of
checked baggage using explosive detection systems. However, officials
stated that they would also assess other airports that are currently
conducting 100 percent baggage screening using EDS and ETD. Officials gave
the following reasons why these airports may be good candidates for
in-line checked baggage screening systems.

o  	airports that will fall out of compliance at peak passenger load times
due to seasonal fluctuations and/or carrier moves, additions, or changes;

o  	airports with highly disruptive operational implementations and high
staffing levels; and

o  	airports with a heavy reliance on ETDs that would benefit by improved
operational efficiencies and cost reductions.

In December 2003, the Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act
shifted the funding formula for LOIs from a 75 percent TSA (25 percent
local contribution) to a 90 percent TSA (10 percent local contribution).
45 This increase in TSA's required contribution for both

45Pub. L. No. 108-176, S: 605, 2490 Stat. 2566-68 (2003).

future and previously issued LOIs could diminish TSA's capacity to
accommodate additional LOIs.

In addition, TSA has not yet approved protocols for on-screen resolution
of EDS alarms. TSA's promulgation of these protocols is an important
element in enabling efficiencies in in-line baggage screening systems and
affects the design of the systems being constructed or planned.46 Under
these protocols, EDS operators would be able to view images of alarmed
bags and either clear the bags or divert them for further screening. Using
on-screen resolution, baggage screeners could be able to view images of
the baggage from a remote location electronically connected to the EDS
machines, raising the throughput rate of bags screened. Currently, TSA is
testing protocols for on-screen resolution at 4 airports. Officials from
TSA's Office of Security Technologies initially reported that they
anticipated the protocols being completed by December 2003. However, to
date, the protocols have not been approved for nationwide use. Advance
knowledge of on-screen resolution protocols could assist airports in
developing in-line systems by providing valuable information that could be
used to design the systems for optimal efficiency. We are examining TSA's
baggage screening program, including both development of in-line systems
and its issuance of letters of intent, in an ongoing review.

TSA is Funding R&D on Screening Technologies, but Deployment Is Years
Away, and TSA Faces Several Challenges

TSA is funding R&D on several technologies designed to improve the
screening of checked baggage and passengers at the nation's airports.
However, while the majority of these technologies are scheduled for pilot
testing within the next 12 to 18 months, they are not scheduled to be
deployed in quantity for 2 to 5 years. Furthermore, progress on this
research was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA used more than half of
its R&D funds for other programs that TSA viewed as higher priorities. As
TSA moves forward with its R&D program, it faces a number of challenges,
including maintaining its schedule while planning for a merger with the
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate. TSA must also balance funding
for competing priorities in a tight budget environment, not only between
R&D and other requirements, but also between aviation and other modes of
transportation.

46On-screen resolution could also be used with stand-alone EDS machines to
potentially increase screening efficiencies.

Checked Baggage Screening Technologies

To improve the detection capability and operational efficiency of its
current checked baggage-screening program, TSA has both near-term (2 to 5
years) and long-term (more than 5 years) approaches designed to develop,
test, acquire, and deploy checked baggage screening equipment. In fiscal
year 2003, TSA obligated about $12 million for near-term activities,
significantly more than the $75,000 it obligated for long-term activities.
For fiscal year 2004, TSA has budgeted $45 million for the development of
next generation explosive detection systems, which encompass technologies
for screening checked baggage, carry-on baggage, and individuals. The
President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests a total of $155 million for
TSA's R&D program, of which $45 million is planned for the development of
next generation explosive detection systems. 47

The near-term activities for developing next-generation checked baggage
screening equipment are largely reflected in the Phoenix program, which is
funded jointly by government and industry. In September 2003, TSA
obligated about $9.4 million of the $12 million obligated for near-term
activities to enter into five cooperative agreements with private sector
firms under the Phoenix program.48 While the five agreements are designed
to enhance existing systems and develop new screening technologies, TSA
was not able to provide us with scheduled deployment dates. The five
agreements are described below:

o  	Two cooperative agreements, totaling $4.7 million, provide
enhancements to existing systems. These upgrades are intended to reduce
false alarm rates, advance screener user-interface tools, and improve
service diagnostics, thereby increasing reliability, maintainability, and
availability.

47The President's fiscal year 2005 budget is requesting a total of $155.2
million for TSA's R&D program.

48The remaining about $2.7 million was obligated for continuous
improvement to currently deployed equipment and for contractor support
activities for the Phoenix program.

o  	One cooperative agreement, for $1.2 million, is intended to enhance
detection capabilities and reduce false alarm rates by combining two new
and emerging detection technologies, X-ray diffraction, and quadrupole
resonance, with currently deployed EDS technology, and computed
tomography.49

o  	Two cooperative agreements, totaling $3.5 million, are aimed at
developing new screening technologies that perform substantially better
than current technologies. One technology is intended to triple the pace
of checked baggage screening (throughput), reduce false alarms by 75
percent, and enhance detection through superior spatial resolution. The
other technology is intended to take up less space at less than half the
unit cost of current systems.

In addition to these checked baggage-screening technologies, TSA is
testing radio frequency identification (RFID) baggage tags at several
airports, including those in Jacksonville, Atlanta, San Francisco, and Las
Vegas.50 The RFID tags, which identify baggage much more accurately than
the bar code tags that are currently used, are intended to allow TSA to
track luggage, such as bags that must be searched by hand because they
triggered alarms. The tags are also intended to allow TSA to redirect bags
that require further screening because of receipt of updated intelligence
information or interactions with the passenger who checked the bag. TSA
expects these tags to also benefit industry by reducing the incidence of
lost, mishandled, or misdirected luggage. TSA expects the pilot systems at
the previously mentioned airports to be fully operational by May 2004.

TSA's long-term approach for improving checked baggage screening systems,
called the Manhattan II program, is in the planning stages. This program
will consist of several initiatives and technologies that are designed to
achieve "revolutionary" improvements in detection capability and
operational efficiency in 5 to 10 years using new screening

49X-ray diffraction technology is based on the detection of scatter
patterns as X-rays interact with crystal lattice structures of materials.
Quadrupole resonance uses radio frequency pulses to probe bags by
eliciting unique responses from explosives based on their chemical
characteristics. Computed tomography uses an X-ray source that rotates
around a bag, obtaining a large number of cross-sectional images that are
integrated by a computer, which displays the densities of objects in the
bag. The machine automatically triggers an alarm when objects with high
densities, characteristic of explosives, are detected.

50RFID is a technology that uses radio waves to automatically identify
individual items, such as checked luggage, for tracking purposes.

Passenger Screening Technologies

Future Challenges

technologies. TSA intends to award this project's first contracts in
fiscal year 2004.

To better detect explosives and weapons that an individual may try to
carry into an aircraft cabin, TSA obligated about $1.2 million in fiscal
year 2003 for research, development, testing, and evaluation of checkpoint
screening technologies. As mentioned previously, for fiscal year 2004, TSA
has budgeted $45 million for the development of next-generation explosive
detection systems, which encompass technologies for screening checked
baggage, carry-on baggage, and individuals. For example:

o  	TSA has conducted tests of two explosive trace detection portals at
airports in Orlando and Knoxville. These portals analyze the air for
explosives as passengers pass through them. TSA anticipates that these
portals will be ready for limited deployment in 2004.

o  	TSA is funding the development of a document scanner capable of
detecting traces of explosives on a document handled by a passenger, such
as a boarding pass. TSA anticipates that the scanner will be ready for
limited deployment in 2004.

o  TSA is evaluating body-scanning technologies-such as backscatter X-ray,

millimeter wave energy analysis, and terahertz wave technology51-that can
detect a variety of weapons and explosives on passengers. However, TSA
acknowledges that it needs to resolve issues related to passenger privacy
before deploying any of these technologies.

As TSA moves forward with passenger and baggage screening R&D, it faces a
number of organizational, funding, and coordination challenges. One
challenge will be to sustain its R&D efforts during a period of
organizational uncertainty and a possible merger. Under the Homeland
Security Act, TSA is mandated to operate as a distinct entity until
November 25, 2004, but after that date its organizational future is not
specified in statute. According to a DHS official, the Secretary of
Homeland Security intends to transfer TSA's R&D program from DHS's Border
and Transportation Security Directorate to DHS's Science and

51Backscatter X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, providing an image
that highlights organic materials such as explosives on a passenger.
Millimeter wave energy analysis provides a 360-degree image of the human
body in order to detect weapons and explosives. Terahertz imaging
penetrates many common materials and reveals not only the shape but also
the composition of hidden objects, including explosives.

Technology Directorate, which is responsible for homeland security R&D.
One of the key areas that we will be reporting on later this year is the
extent to which TSA and DHS have developed strategies for the merger of
their R&D programs.

Balancing funding for competing priorities may also pose challenges for
TSA. In a tight budget environment, TSA may be under pressure to use R&D
funds for other purposes, as it did during fiscal year 2003, when it
reprogrammed about $61 million, or more than half of its $110 million R&D
appropriations to programs outside of R&D. As a result, TSA had to delay
several key R&D projects, including developing a device to detect weapons,
liquid explosives, and flammables in containers found in carryon baggage
or passengers' effects, and further development and testing of a
walk-through chemical trace detection portal for detecting explosives on
passengers. Competition for resources may also increase the difficulty
that TSA already faces in allocating funds to address security threats in
modes of transportation other than aviation. While aviation has
historically faced, and continues to face, significant security threats,
and improving aviation security is an important goal, TSA is also
responsible for security in the other transportation modes, and these
modes have significant

                                       52

vulnerabilities that remain to be addressed.

Having achieved many of ATSA's deadlines designed to strengthen passenger
and baggage screening, TSA has begun to focus on longer-term planning to
assist in stabilizing its screener workforce and screening operations.
Carefully considering how it strategically hires, deploys, and manages its
screener workforce will help TSA meet its mission and stabilize its
passenger and baggage screening operations. We are encouraged that TSA is
undertaking efforts to develop the tools needed to train its screener
workforce and measure their performance. However, as TSA works toward
improving the performance of individual screeners and screening
operations, it will also be important that the agency deploy and leverage
screening equipment and technologies and sustain its research and
development efforts.

52U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal Action
Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.:
June 30, 2003).

  Concluding Observations

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.

  Contact Information

(440289)

For further information on this testimony, please contact
Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include David Alexander, Lisa Brown,
Tammy Conquest, Kevin Copping, Gerald Dillingham, Christine Fossett,
David Goldstein, Christopher Jones, Lemuel Jackson, Noel Lance, Thomas
Lombardi, Jan Montgomery, Jobenia Odum, Jean Orland, Maria Strudwick,
Mark Tremba, and Susan Zimmerman.

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