U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting
Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face
Significant Challenges (10-FEB-04, GAO-04-435T).
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic
reminder of the importance of our need to cultivate a better
public opinion of the United States abroad. Yet recent opinion
research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries
with large Muslim populations, view the United States
unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined changes
in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September
11 within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board
of Governors (BBG); the U.S. government's strategies for its
public diplomacy programs and how it measures their
effectiveness; and the challenges that remain in executing U.S.
public diplomacy efforts. Although the studies did not focus
exclusively on the Middle East, they identified systemic problems
that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-435T
ACCNO: A09243
TITLE: U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the
Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East
but Face Significant Challenges
DATE: 02/10/2004
SUBJECT: Foreign languages
Foreign policies
Interagency relations
International relations
Performance measures
Public diplomacy
Radio broadcasting
Strategic planning
Television broadcasting
Counterterrorism
Muslim countries
Afghanistan Radio Network
Near East
Radio Farda
Radio Sawa
South Asia
Middle East
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GAO-04-435T
United States General Accounting Office
GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform;
House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST
Tuesday, February 10, 2004
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the
Middle East but Face Significant Challenges
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade
GAO-04-435T
Highlights of GAO-04-435T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; Committee on
Government Reform; House of Representatives
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of
the importance of our need to cultivate a better public opinion of the
United States abroad. Yet recent opinion research indicates that foreign
publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, view the
United States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined
changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11
within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG); the U.S. government's strategies for its public diplomacy
programs and how it measures their effectiveness; and the challenges that
remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Although the studies
did not focus exclusively on the Middle East, they identified systemic
problems that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.
GAO made several recommendations to State and the BBG to address planning
and performance issues. For example, GAO recommended that State develop a
strategy to integrate its public diplomacy efforts and direct them toward
common measurable
Tuesday, February 10, 2004
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the
Middle East but Face Significant Challenges
Since September 11, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in
Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the
war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia and
the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger
audiences-particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. Also since
September 11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused on
attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa and
Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio
Network, and Radio Farda in Iran.
State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on
terrorism. However, State does not have a strategy that integrates all of
its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common
objectives. In addition, we found that while the BBG did have a strategic
plan, the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program
objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the
key focus of its plan. Furthermore, there is no interagency strategy to
guide State's, BBG's, and all federal agencies' communication efforts and
thus ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition to
strategy deficiencies, we found that State and the BBG were not
systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of
reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the
United States.
In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement, State
and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs.
Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a
lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. The BBG also faces a
number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may
hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets.
Public Opinion of the United States in Selected Muslim-majority Countries
(percent favorable view)
Countries 1999/2000 Summer 2002 Spring 2003
objectives, and that BBG revise its Morocco 77% * 27%
strategic plan to include key Lebanon * 35 27
measurable objectives. Both Indonesia 75 61 15
agencies have made some progress toward Turkey Pakistan 52 23 30 10 15 13
implementing our recommendations.
Jordan * 25 1
Source: GAO, developed from The Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press information.
*=no data available www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-435T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4128 or [email protected].
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues surrounding U.S. public
diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of our need
to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. Yet
recent opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in
countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States
unfavorably. Last September, we reported for the House International
Relations Committee on the State Department's public diplomacy efforts.1
Earlier, in July, we issued a report for that committee on the progress
that the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)-the agency responsible for
nonmilitary U.S. international broadcasting-has made in developing a new
strategic approach aimed at reversing declining audience trends and
supporting U.S. strategic objectives such as the war on terrorism.2 The
Department of State and the BBG share an annual budget of more than $1
billion for public diplomacy activities. Although neither of our reports
focused exclusively on the Middle East, each identified systemic problems
that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.
Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss our conclusions and recommendations
from these reports and, where possible, to cite specific examples of
public diplomacy actions and issues we observed during our fieldwork in
the Middle East.3 Today I will talk about (1) changes in U.S. public
diplomacy resources and programs since September 11; (2) the government's
strategies for its public diplomacy programs and how it measures their
effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public
diplomacy efforts. As part of our work, we surveyed top officials of
public affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide on such issues as
guidance from various State Department offices; sufficiency of budgetary,
staff, and other resources; and ability to adequately measure
performance.4 We met with cognizant State officials, individual members
1U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department
Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, GAO-03-951 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 4, 2003).
2U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. International Broadcasting: New
Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching Large Audience but Lacks Measurable
Program Objectives, GAO-03-772 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003).
3We conducted our Middle East fieldwork in Morocco and Egypt. We also
conducted fieldwork in the United Kingdom.
4GAO surveyed 156 public affairs officers from March through May 2003, of
which 118 completed their responses for a 76 percent response rate.
of the BBG, and senior members of each broadcast entity to discuss
management issues. We also met with academics specializing in public
diplomacy and international affairs issues, and private sector officials
from U.S. public relations and opinion research firms with international
operations. While several government entities conduct public diplomacy
activities, my comments will focus on State's and the BBG's efforts since
they were the subject of our work.5
Summary Since September 11, both State and the BBG have expanded their
public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of
strategic importance in the war on terrorism. In the two fiscal years
since the terrorist attacks, State increased its public diplomacy funding
and staffing and expanded its programs in two regions with significant
Muslim populations-South Asia and the Near East. Among other efforts,
State is emphasizing exchange programs targeting young and diverse
audiences, including high school students. State is also expanding its
American Corners program, which provides information about the United
States to foreign audiences through partnerships between U.S. embassies
and local institutions. In addition, since September 11, the Broadcasting
Board of Governors has initiated several new programs focusing on
attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa in
the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio Network; and Radio Farda in Iran.
Estimated startup and recurring costs for these three projects through
fiscal year 2003 totaled about $116 million. The Board is also scheduled
to launch an Arabic language television network in the Middle East in
mid-February 2004.
Although State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on
terrorism, we reported that State had not developed a comprehensive
strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities
and directs them toward common objectives, and that neither State nor the
BBG has focused on measuring progress toward long-term goals. The absence
of an integrated strategy may hinder State's ability to channel its
multifaceted programs toward concrete and measurable progress. In
comparison, the Broadcasting Board of Governors in July 2001 initiated a
5-year strategic approach to international broadcasting known as "Marrying
the Mission to the Market," which emphasizes the need to reach
5We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
large audiences by applying modern broadcast techniques and strategically
allocating resources to focus on high-priority broadcast markets, such as
the Middle East. However, the plan lacked a single goal or related program
objective to gauge its success in reaching larger audiences in priority
areas. While State, BBG, and other entities in the U.S. government
conducting public diplomacy have different roles and missions, it is
important to note that there also is no interagency public diplomacy
strategy setting forth the messages and means for governmentwide
communication to overseas audiences. According to State officials, without
such a strategy, the risk of making communication mistakes that are
damaging to U.S. public diplomacy efforts is high. In addition to strategy
deficiencies, we found that State and the BBG were not systematically and
comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader
audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States.
Since our reports were issued, both agencies have taken steps to address
our recommendations.
In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement, State
and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs.
According to public affairs officers at the State Department, these
challenges include insufficient resources to effectively conduct public
diplomacy and a lack of public diplomacy officers with foreign language
proficiency. More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we
surveyed said the amount of time available to devote exclusively to
executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient, and more than 50
percent reported that the number of Foreign Service officers available to
perform such tasks was inadequate. Further, about 21 percent of the
officers posted overseas in language designated positions have not
attained the level of language speaking proficiency required for their
positions, hampering their ability to engage with foreign publics. In
addition, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy public affairs sections
reported that Foreign Service officers do not have adequate time for
training in the skills required to effectively conduct public diplomacy.
The Broadcasting Board of Governors also faces resource issues, as well as
a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may
hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. These
challenges include outmoded programs and poor signal quality; the
disparate structure of the agency, which consists of seven separate
broadcast entities and a mix of federal and grantee organizations
collectively managed by a part-time Board; and the resource-intensive job
of broadcasting 97 language services to more than 125 broadcast markets
worldwide.
We made several recommendations to the Secretary of State and the BBG to
address planning and performance issues that they generally agreed to
implement but progress to date has been mixed. Among other things, we
recommended that State develop a strategy that considers private sector
public relations techniques in integrating its public diplomacy efforts;
improve performance measurement; and strengthen efforts to train Foreign
Service officers in foreign languages and public diplomacy. In response to
our recommendations, State is currently studying how to integrate private
sector techniques into its programs. State also plans to establish a new
office of strategic planning for public diplomacy. Regarding our
recommendation to strengthen performance measurement efforts, State
officials told us they are exploring ways to do so and State's Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs has, among other things, begun conducting
limited pre- and post-testing of its program participants' understanding
of the United States. State acknowledged the need to strengthen training
of Foreign Service officers and told us that the primary obstacle to doing
so is insufficient staffing to allow time for training. Officials said
they have already begun to address staffing gaps by stepping up
recruitment efforts as part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.
In response to our recommendations to the BBG, the Board has revised its
strategic plan to create a single strategic goal of maximizing impact in
areas of priority U.S. interest and made audience size a key performance
measure. The Board has added broadcast credibility and, according to Board
officials, plans to add audience awareness and whether broadcasting
entities are achieving their mandated missions. Finally, the Board
recently completed a review of language service overlap that identified
about $9.7 million in potential savings. However, the Board has yet to
revise its strategic plan to include details on implementation strategies,
resource requirements, and project time frames for the various initiatives
supporting its strategic goal of maximizing program impact.
The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and
influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a
wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print,
broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, U.S.
public diplomacy focused on foreign elites-current and future overseas
opinion leaders, agenda-setters, and decision makers. However, the
dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have forced
a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider techniques
for communicating with broader foreign audiences. The BBG, as the overseer
of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, supports U.S.
Background
public diplomacy's key objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate
information about the United States, while maintaining its journalistic
independence as a news organization. The BBG manages and oversees the
Voice of America (VOA), WorldNet Television, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, the Afghanistan Radio
Network, and Radio Free Asia. Radio Sawa and Radio Farda (Iran) provide
regional and local news to countries in the Middle East.
Together, State and the BBG spend in excess of $1 billion on public
diplomacy programs each year. State's public diplomacy budget totaled an
estimated $628 million in fiscal year 2004. About 51 percent, or $320
million, is slated for the Fulbright and other educational and cultural
exchange programs. The remainder covers mostly salaries and expenses
incurred by State and embassy officers engaged in information
dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, speaker programs,
publications, and other activities. BBG's budget for fiscal year 2004 is
$546 million. This includes more than $42 million for radio and television
broadcasting to the Middle East. Since initiating the language service
review process in 1999, the Board has reduced the scope of operations of
more than 25 language services and reallocated about $19.7 million in
funds, with the majority redirected toward Central Asia and the Middle
East, including $8 million for Radio Farda service to Iran. Figure 1 shows
the key uses of public diplomacy resources by State and the BBG.
Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Public Diplomacy Budget Resources for State
Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2003
Estimates
aEstimate includes $11 million for Radio Sawa. bEstimate includes $3
million for Radio Farda.
More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim-Majority Countries
Since September 11, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority
countries that are considered strategically important in the war on
terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and number of
Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern
Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives targeting
broader, younger audiences-particularly in predominantly Muslim countries-
that include expanding exchange programs targeting citizens of Muslim
countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies in the war on
terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims share certain
values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to support the war on
terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio
Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. In addition, the Board
plans to further expand its presence in the Middle East
through the launch of a Middle East Television Network scheduled for
launch in mid-February 2004.
State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East
Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its resources
and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim countries.
For example, while State's bureau of Europe and Eurasia still receives the
largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest
percentage increases in such resources since September 11 occurred in
State's bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs, where many
countries have significant Muslim populations.6 Public diplomacy funding
increased in South Asia from $24 million to $39 million and in the Near
East from $39 million to $62 million, or by 63 and 58 percent,
respectively, from fiscal year 2001 through 2003. During the same period,
authorized American Foreign Service officers in South Asia increased from
27 to 31 and in the Near East from 45 to 57, or by 15 percent and 27
percent, respectively.
Furthermore, in 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange resources
to better support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S. engagement
with Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to emphasize exchanges
with Muslim countries through its Partnership for Learning
Program-designed to target young and diverse audiences through academic
and professional exchanges such as the Fulbright, International Visitor,
and Citizen Exchange programs. According to State, under this program, 170
high school students from predominantly Islamic countries have already
arrived and are living with American families and studying at local high
schools. State has also carried out increased exchanges through its Middle
East Partnership Initiative, which includes computer and English language
training for women newly employed by the Afghan government and a program
to assist women from Arab countries and elsewhere in observing and
discussing the U.S. electoral process. In addition, State is expanding its
American Corners program, which uses space in public libraries and other
public buildings abroad to provide information about the United States. In
fiscal year 2004, State is planning to establish 58 American Corners in
the Middle East and South Asia. In fiscal year 2005, State plans to open
10 in Afghanistan and 15 in Iraq.
6These countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
State's Office of International Information Programs has also developed
new initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including a print and
electronic pamphlet titled The Network of Terrorism, distributed in 36
languages via hard copy, the Web, and media throughout the world, which
documented the direct link between the September 11 perpetrators and al
Qaeda; and a publication titled Iraq: From Fear to Freedom to inform
foreign audiences of the administration's policies toward Iraq.
New BBG Initiatives Target Large Audiences in Priority Markets
Strategy Deficiencies, Inability to Gauge Progress Toward Goals Hinder U.S.
Public Diplomacy Efforts
Several of the BBG's new initiatives focus on reaching large audiences in
priority markets and supporting the war on terrorism. The first of these
programs, Radio Sawa in the Middle East, was launched in March 2002 using
modern, market-tested broadcasting techniques and practices, such as the
extensive use of music formats. Radio Sawa replaced the poorly performing
VOA Arabic service, which had listening rates at around 2 percent of the
population. According to BBG survey research, Radio Sawa is reaching 51
percent of its target audience and is ranked highest for news and news
trustworthiness in Amman, Jordan. Despite such results, it remains unclear
how many people Radio Sawa is actually reaching throughout the entire
Middle East because audience research has been performed only in select
markets. Further, the State Inspector General and the Advisory Group on
Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have raised questions about
whether Radio Sawa has focused more on audience size and composition than
on potential impact on attitudes in the region. The BBG has also launched
the Afghanistan Radio Network and a language service to Iran called Radio
Farda. Estimated costs for these three initiatives through fiscal year
2003 are about $116 million. In addition, the Board is launching an Arabic
language television network in the Middle East in mid-February 2004.
While the growth in programs to the Muslim world marks State's recognition
of the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population, State
still lacks a comprehensive and commonly understood public diplomacy
strategy to guide these programs. In contrast to State, the BBG has a
strategic plan that focuses on a market-based approach to increasing
audience size in priority markets. Furthermore, there is no interagency
strategy to guide State's and all federal agencies' communication efforts
and thus ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition,
State and the BBG lacked adequate measures of progress toward reaching its
public diplomacy goals. Since our report, State and the Board have focused
on improving their performance measures.
State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide its Operations but BBG
Does
After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a
strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities
and directs them toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is
still in the development stage. State officials told us that such a
strategy is particularly important because State's public diplomacy
operation is fragmented among the various organizational entities within
the agency. Public affairs officers who responded to our survey indicated
that the lack of a strategy has hindered their ability to effectively
execute public diplomacy efforts overseas. More than 66 percent of public
affairs officers in one region reported that the quality of strategic
guidance from the Office of the Undersecretary in the last year and a half
(October 2001 through March 2003) was generally insufficient or very
insufficient. More than 40 percent in another region reported the same. We
encountered similar complaints during our overseas fieldwork. For example,
in Morocco, the former public affairs officer stated that so little
information had been provided from Washington on State's post-September 11
public diplomacy strategy that he had to rely on newspaper articles and
guesswork to formulate his in-country public diplomacy plans.
In contrast to State's lack of strategy, BBG has introduced a market-based
approach to international broadcasting that aims to generate large
listening audiences in priority markets that the Board believes it must
reach to effectively meet its mission. Early implementation of this
strategy has focused on markets relevant to the war on terrorism, in
particular the Middle East. The Board's vision is to create a flexible,
multimedia, research-driven U.S. international broadcasting system that
addresses the many challenges we noted in our report, including that the
Board is faces a diverse organizational structure consisting of several
broadcast entities with differing missions, broadcast approaches, and
constituencies.
Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy Has Not Been Established
Mr. Chairman, we believe it is especially important to emphasize as of
February 4, 2004, no interagency public diplomacy strategy has been
implemented that lays out the messages and means for governmentwide
communication efforts to overseas audiences. The absence of an interagency
strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages and thus
achieving mutually reinforcing benefits. State officials told us that,
without such a strategy, the risk of making communication mistakes that
are damaging to U.S. public diplomacy efforts is high. They also said that
the lack of a strategy diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of
governmentwide public diplomacy efforts.
Our overseas fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance of
interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a very
small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of U.S.
assistance being provided to their countries. Egypt is the second largest
recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance totaling more
than an estimated $1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to Morocco totaled more
than an estimated $13 million in 2003.
Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in
recent years. Immediately after September 11, the White House, State
Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated various
public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White House
established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One such
mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information Centers in
Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early stages of U.S.
military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were designed to
provide a rapid response capability for correcting inaccurate news
stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to generate negative
responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news favorable to U.S.
efforts.
In January 2003, the President established a more permanent coordination
mechanism, the White House Office of Global Communications, which is
intended to coordinate strategic communications from the U.S. government
to overseas audiences. The President also established a Strategic
Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by the State
Department and the National Security Council and to work closely with the
Office of Global Communications, to ensure interagency coordination in
disseminating the American message across the globe. Although it is the
committee's long-term objective to develop a National Communications
Strategy, according to State officials, the committee has not met since
March 2003.
State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals
Mr. Chairman, in addition to deficiencies in public diplomacy strategies,
we found that State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring
progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance
measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs,
rather than gauging progress toward changing foreign publics'
understanding and attitudes about the United States. Some posts judge the
effectiveness of their public diplomacy efforts by simply counting the
number of public diplomacy activities that occur in their host country-for
example, the number of speeches given by the ambassador or the number
Private Sector Public Relations Tools Could Be Relevant to State's Needs
of news articles placed in the host-country media. While such measures
shed light on the level of public diplomacy activity, they reveal little
in the way of overall program effectiveness.
State currently has no reporting requirements in place to determine
whether posts' performance targets are actually met. At one overseas post
we visited, the post had identified polling data showing that only 22
percent of the host country's citizens had a favorable view of the United
States-a figure the post used as a baseline with yearly percentage
increases set as targets. However, the former public affairs officer at
the post told us that he did not attempt to determine or report on whether
the post had actually achieved these targets because there was no
requirement to do so. Officials at the other two overseas posts we visited
also cited the lack of any formal reporting requirement for following up
on whether they met their annual performance targets. An official in
State's Office of Strategic and Performance Planning said that they have
now begun to require posts to report on whether they have met performance
targets.
Furthermore, public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not
conduct systematic program evaluations. About 79 percent of the
respondents to our survey reported that staffing at their missions was
insufficient to conduct systematic program evaluations and many officers
also reported that staffing at posts was insufficient to carry out the
longrange monitoring required to adequately measure program effectiveness.
Even if sufficient staffing were available, State would still have
difficulty conducting long-range tracking of exchange participants because
it lacks a database with comprehensive information on its various exchange
program alumni. State had planned to begin building a new worldwide alumni
database with comprehensive data linking all of its various exchange
programs. However, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs officials
told us they had received insufficient funds to do so, and thus are
seeking to improve existing information systems for individual exchange
programs.
Mr. Chairman, during our audit work, we learned that private sector public
relations efforts and political campaigns use sophisticated strategies to
integrate complex communication efforts involving multiple players.
Although State's public diplomacy efforts extend beyond the activities of
public relations firms, many of the strategic tools that such firms employ
are relevant to State's situation. While it is difficult to establish
direct links between public diplomacy programs and results, other U.S.
government agencies and the private sector have best practices for
assessing information disseminating campaigns, including the need to
define success
and how it should be measured. Executives from some of the largest public
relations firms in the United States told us that initial strategic
decisions involve establishing the scope and nature of the problem,
identifying the target audience, determining the core messages, and
defining both success and failure. Subsequent steps include conducting
research to validate the initial decisions, testing the core messages,
carrying out pre-launch activities, and developing information materials.
Each of these elements contains numerous other steps that must be
completed before implementing a tactical program. Further, progress must
be measured continuously and tactics adjusted accordingly.
BBG Has Made Progress in Measuring Performance
A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities
In conducting our work on the BBG strategic plan, we found that the plan
did not include a single goal or related program objective designed to
gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy
focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. We also
found that the plan lacked measurable program objectives to support its
strategic goals, including a measure of broadcaster credibility. The Board
has taken several steps to address the recommendations we made in our
report. First, the Board created a single strategic goal to focus on the
key objective of maximizing impact in areas of priority interest to the
United States and made audience size a key performance measure. Second,
the Board has added broadcast credibility and plans to add the additional
performance measures we recommended, including audience awareness and
whether broadcast entities are achieving their mandated missions.
Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy
resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and
the need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy
with measurable indicators of progress. There are other challenges our
government faces in executing successful public diplomacy activities.
According to public affairs officers, these challenges include
insufficient time and staffing resources to conduct public diplomacy
tasks. In addition, many public affairs officers reported that the time
available to attend public diplomacy training is inadequate. Furthermore,
a significant number of Foreign Service officers involved in public
diplomacy efforts overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. The
Board's key challenge in executing its strategy is how to generate large
audiences while dealing with a number of media market, organizational, and
resources issues.
Insufficient Time and Staff More than 40 percent of the public affairs
officers we surveyed reported that the amount of time they had to devote
exclusively to executing public
diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas fieldwork, officers
told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and other foreign embassy
receptions and functions within their host country capitals, it was
particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the capitals to
interact with ordinary citizens. More than 50 percent of those responding
to our survey reported that the number of Foreign Service officers
available to perform public diplomacy duties was inadequate. Although
State increased the actual number of Americans in public diplomacy
positions overseas from 414 in fiscal year 2000 to 448 in fiscal year
2002, State still had a shortfall of public diplomacy staff in 2002, based
on the projected needs identified in State's 2002 overseas staffing model.
In 2002, State's overseas staffing model projected the need for 512 staff
in these positions; however, 64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were
not filled. 7 In addition, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy public
affairs sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not have
adequate time for training in the skills required to effectively conduct
public diplomacy.
We reported in 20028 that as part of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,
State has launched an aggressive recruiting program to rebuild the
department's total workforce. Under this initiative, State requested 1,158
new employees above attrition over the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002
through 2004, and according to State officials, the department has met its
hiring goals under this initiative for fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
However, it does not have numerical targets for specific skill
requirements such as language proficiency or regional expertise. Although
State officials are optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in
to address the overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the
recruiting efforts will result in the right people with the right skills
needed to meet specific critical shortfalls.
Shortfalls in Foreign Language Skills
Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many
officers. As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign Service
officers filling "language-designated" public diplomacy positions overseas
did not meet the foreign language speaking requirements of their
7State's overseas staffing model operates on a 2-year cycle. Fiscal year
2002was the latest year for which data were available on the numbers of
positions actually filled.
8U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and
Ineffective Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship
Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2002).
positions.9 The highest percentages not meeting the requirements were in
the Near East, where 30 percent of the officers did not meet the
requirement. Although State had no language-designated positions for South
Asia, it had eight language-preferred10 positions, none of which was
filled by officers who had reading or speaking capability in those
languages. It is important to note that most of the foreign languages
required in these two regions are considered difficult to master, such as
Arabic and Urdu. In contrast, 85 percent of the officers filling French
language-designated positions and 97 percent of those filling Spanish
language-designated ones met the requirements. Officers' opinions on the
quality of the foreign language training they received also varied greatly
by region.
Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited and
other State officials told us that having fluency in a host country's
language is important for effectively conducting public diplomacy. The
foreign government officials with whom we met in Egypt, Morocco, and the
United Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in countries where English is
widely understood, speaking the host country's language demonstrates
respect for its people and its culture. In Morocco, officers in the public
affairs and other sections of the embassy told us that, because their
ability to speak Arabic was poor, they conducted most embassy business in
French. French is widely used in that country, especially in business and
government. However, embassy officers told us that speaking Arabic would
provide superior entree to the Moroccan public. The ability to speak
country-specific forms of Arabic and other more obscure dialects would
generate even more goodwill, especially outside the major cities.
According to the department, the largest and most significant factor
limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its
long-standing staffing shortfall, which State's Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative is designed to fill. Other planned actions include bolstering
efforts to recruit job candidates with target language skills, sending
language training supervisors to posts to determine ways to improve
training offerings, and
9Language-designated positions are graded for both speaking and reading
proficiency. Most officers who do not meet one requirement do not meet the
other one either, so the percentages are similar. For purposes of clarity,
our figures refer only to the requirements for speaking proficiency.
10These are positions for which language capability is preferred but not
required.
developing a new "language continuum" plan to guide efforts to meet the
need for higher levels of competency in all languages, especially those
critical to national security concerns.
Outdated Broadcast Services and Structure Pose Challenges to Expanding in
Priority Markets
Contacts and Acknowledgments
The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy
challenges, key among them is how to achieve large audiences in priority
markets while dealing with (1) a collection of outdated and noncompetitive
language services, (2) a disparate organizational structure consisting of
seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal agency and grantee
organizations that are managed by a part-time Board of Governors, and (3)
the resource challenge of broadcasting in 97 language services to more
than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. Although its strategic plan
identifies a number of solutions to the competitive challenges the Board
faces and provides a new organizational model for U.S. international
broadcasting11, we found that the Board's plan did not include specifics
on implementation strategies, resource requirements, project time frames,
or a clear vision of the Board's intended scope-ofoperations. The Board
recently completed a review of the overlap issue and identified six
approaches to addressing the problem while still meeting the discrete
missions of the Voice of America and other broadcast entities. All of the
Board's overlapping services were assessed against this analytical
framework and over $9.7 million in potential savings for priority
initiatives were identified.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have
at this time.
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or
Diana Glod at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony included Lyric Clark, Janey Cohen, Michael Courts, Melissa
Pickworth, Edward Kennedy, and Michael ten Kate.
11The Board views the separate entities as part of a "single system" under
the Board's direct control and authority.
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