Coast Guard Programs: Relationship between Resources Used and	 
Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer (22-MAR-04, GAO-04-432).	 
                                                                 
The Coast Guard has responsibility for protecting America's	 
ports, waterways, and waterside facilities from terrorist	 
attacks. At the same time, the Coast Guard remains responsible	 
for many other missions important to the nation's interests, such
as conducting search and rescue and protecting important fishing 
grounds. GAO's past work found that despite substantial budget	 
increases, the Coast Guard's extensive homeland security	 
responsibilities resulted in a reduction in the levels at which  
the agency's ship, boat, and aircraft resources were applied to  
non- homeland security programs. GAO was asked to update and	 
expand this work by analyzing: the trends in resource usage, the 
trends in performance results, and the implications of these	 
trends. 							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-432 					        
    ACCNO:   A09536						        
  TITLE:     Coast Guard Programs: Relationship between Resources Used
and Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer			 
     DATE:   03/22/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Emergency preparedness				 
	     National defense operations			 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Coast Guard personnel				 
	     Work measurement					 
	     Comparative analysis				 
	     Agency missions					 
	     Budgets						 
	     Homeland security					 

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GAO-04-432

United States General Accounting Office

GAO	Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Committee
             on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate

March 2004

COAST GUARD

  Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer

GAO-04-432

Highlights of GAO-04-432, a report to the Subcommittee on Oceans,
Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate

The Coast Guard has responsibility for protecting America's ports,
waterways, and waterside facilities from terrorist attacks. At the same
time, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions
important to the nation's interests, such as conducting search and rescue
and protecting important fishing grounds.

GAO's past work found that despite substantial budget increases, the Coast
Guard's extensive homeland security responsibilities resulted in a
reduction in the levels at which the agency's ship, boat, and aircraft
resources were applied to non- homeland security programs. GAO was asked
to update and expand this work by analyzing: the trends in resource usage,
the trends in performance results, and the implications of these trends.

GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop a time frame for proceeding
with plans to more accurately account for resources expended, and ensure
that it develops a strategy for identifying the intervening factors
affecting performance results, and systematically assesses the
relationship between these factors, resources used, and results achieved.
The Coast Guard reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with
the facts and recommendations presented, but did not take a formal
position on the recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-432.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Margaret Wrightson at (415)
904-2200 or [email protected].

March 2004

COAST GUARD

Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard has experienced
a 32 percent increase in its budget, a 9 percent increase in personnel,
and major shifts in the hours in which its ships, boats, and aircraft are
used in the agency's various programs. Hours these resources are used for
most homeland security programs greatly exceed their pre-September 11
levels, in part because of an infusion of new boats, with the number of
hours for the ports, waterways, and coastal security program up more than
twelve-fold. (See fig. below.) Conversely, with the exception of hours for
ice operations, hours dedicated to each non-homeland security program
remained below their pre-September 11 levels.

Percentage Change in Boat, Ship, and Aircraft Resource Hours, by Program,
Pre-September 11 Baseline through Fiscal Year 2003

Percent change

Ports, waterways, and Up 1,220coastal security

Defense readiness

Undocumented migrant interdiction

Ice operations

Aids to navigation

Foreign fish enforcement

Search and rescue

Living marine resources

Illegal drug interdiction Down -44

-200 -100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 1,100 1,200 1,300

Programs with decreasing Programs with increasing resource hours resource hours

           Homeland security programs Non-homeland security programs

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard resource hour data.

The Coast Guard's performance results-measures used to track each
program's annual progress-generally did not mirror the trends in resource
use. Instead, results for programs GAO reviewed were generally stable or
improved regardless of the resources applied, and nearly all of the
programs that GAO reviewed met their performance targets-the goals they
set out to achieve-in fiscal year 2003. Coast Guard officials said that
various factors besides resources, such as increased operating
efficiencies or unexpected events, also affected performance results, but
they have limited information for assessing the impact of these factors.
Initial steps have been taken to better develop this capability, but many
are in early stages, and the Coast Guard does not have a time frame for
completing the work or assurance that they will result in a systematic
approach for assessing the results.

Contents

  Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 5
Generally, Resource Hours Devoted to Homeland Security

Programs Have Increased Substantially, while Hours for Other
Programs Have Decreased 9
Performance Results Remained Largely Unchanged or Improved
for the Eight Programs We Assessed 13

More Systematic Understanding of Resource Usage and
Performance Results Is Important for Management and
Accountability 19

Conclusions 27
Recommendations 28
Agency Comments 28

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Appendix II Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource

  Hours 32

Programs with Increasing Resource Hours 32
Programs with Declining Resource Hours 36
Programs with Stable Resource Hours 40

Appendix III Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard

  Performance Measures 42

Programs with Generally Stable Performance Results 44
Programs with Improved Performance Results 49

Appendix IV Examples of Coast Guard Approaches to Enhance

  Operational Efficiency 54

Intelligence 54
Technology 55
Tactics 55
Partnerships 56

  Appendix V	GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 58
  GAO Contacts 58

                            Staff Acknowledgments 58

Related GAO Products Tables

Table 1: Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by Mission
Area (as of March 2004) Table 2: Performance Results by Program from
Fiscal Year 2001

through Fiscal Year 2003 Table 3: Performance Targets by Program for
Fiscal Year 2003 Table 4: Selected Examples of Operational Efficiencies
Cited by

Coast Guard Officials Table 5: Selected Examples of Actions Under Way to
Improve

Linkages between Resources and Performance Results Table 6: Coast Guard
Performance Measures by Program Table 7: Selected Examples of Intelligence
Efforts Table 8: Selected Examples of Technology Efforts Table 9: Selected
Examples of New Tactics Table 10: Selected Examples of Coast Guard
Partnership Efforts

                                       7

                                     14 16

21

27 43 54 55 56 57

  Figures

Figure 1: Total Resource Hours for All Coast Guard Programs 10 Figure 2:
Percentage Change in Resource Hours, by Program, Pre-

September 11 Baseline to Fiscal Year 2003 11 Figure 3: Ports, Waterways,
and Coastal Security Resource Hours 33 Figure 4: Undocumented Migrant
Interdiction Resource Hours 34 Figure 5: Defense Readiness Resource Hours
35 Figure 6: Ice Operations Resource Hours 36 Figure 7: Foreign Fish
Enforcement Resource Hours 37 Figure 8: Living Marine Resources Resource
Hours 38 Figure 9: Illegal Drug Interdiction Resource Hours 39 Figure 10:
Search and Rescue Resource Hours 40 Figure 11: Aids to Navigation Resource
Hours 40 Figure 12: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Performance

Results and Target by Fiscal Year 45 Figure 13: Illegal Drug Interdiction
Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal Year 46

Figure 14: Ice Operations Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal Year
47

Figure 15: Living Marine Resources Performance Results and Target by
Fiscal Year 48

Figure 16: Search and Rescue Performance Results and Target by Fiscal Year
49

Figure 17: Foreign Fish Enforcement Performance Results and Target by
Fiscal Year 51

Figure 18: Aids to Navigation Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal
Year 52

Figure 19: Defense Readiness Performance Results and Target by Fiscal Year
53

Abbreviations

CAG collisions, allisions, and groundings
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
HITRON Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron
HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System
IACM Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement
LED light-emitting diode
MARSEC Maritime Security Condition System
NYPD New York Police Department
PWCS ports, waterways, and coastal security
VMS Vessel Monitoring System

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

March 22, 2004

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe
Chairman
The Honorable John F. Kerry
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries, and Coast Guard
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate

These are challenging times for the Coast Guard. As the lead federal
agency for maritime homeland security within the Department of
Homeland Security, the Coast Guard is facing extraordinary, heightened
responsibilities to protect America's ports, waterways, and waterside
facilities from terrorist attacks and from becoming an avenue for
terrorists
to bring weapons of mass destruction into the country. The Coast Guard
also remains responsible for many other missions important to the nation's
interests, such as helping stem the flow of illegal drugs and illegal
migration, protecting important fishing grounds, and responding to marine
pollution. These expanded responsibilities come at a time when budget
resources are increasingly constrained, making prioritization among
competing agencies and programs an even more critical factor in
congressional decision making. Our past work has shown that
notwithstanding substantial increases in the Coast Guard's budget to
accommodate its increased responsibilities, the Coast Guard's emphasis
on homeland security has resulted in a reduction in the level of resources
devoted to non-homeland security missions.

This report updates our earlier work on Coast Guard efforts to balance its
homeland security and non-homeland security missions.1 At the
committee's request, we have expanded the scope of the prior work to
examine both the trends in resource usage and corresponding

1U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Challenges during the
Transition to the Department of Homeland Security (GAO-03-594T, April
2003); U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Comprehensive
Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and Measure
Performance for All Missions (GAO-03-544T, March 2003); U.S. General
Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring
Levels of Effort for All Missions (GAO-03-155, November 2002).

performance results between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. Specifically, as agreed
       with your offices, this report addresses the following questions:

o  	What are the trends in resource usage for each Coast Guard program
within its homeland security and non-homeland security mission areas?

o  What are the trends in performance results for each Coast Guard
program?

o  	What are the implications of these trends for Coast Guard management
and accountability?

To answer these questions, we analyzed Coast Guard data, reviewed
documents and records, and visited Coast Guard installations to determine
how operations were being affected. Because the Coast Guard does not have
a system that tracks how its personnel spend their time by program, our
work on resource usage focused on resource hour data showing the number of
hours that Coast Guard ships, boats and aircraft were used in conducting
each Coast Guard program. This approach, while covering a considerable
amount of the Coast Guard's activities, could not completely account for
all of the resources used to achieve program results. Most notably, two of
the Coast Guard's 11 programs-marine safety and marine environmental
protection-are largely carried out without using ships, boats, and
aircraft, and thus much of the effort dedicated toward these programs is
not captured in the resource hour data.2 Our work on performance results
focused on data that the Coast Guard collects and analyzes under the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to determine how well the
agency is achieving its goals.3 For this part of our work, sufficient data
were available to fully analyze 7 of the Coast Guard's

2Although resource hour data is captured for all of the Coast Guard's
programs, to a much greater extent than other programs, the marine safety
and marine environmental protection programs are carried out in ways other
than using Coast Guard assets-ships, boats, and aircraft. Instead, marine
safety office personnel are extensively involved in such things as
conducting ship inspections in port, examining shore-side facilities, and
carrying out port security activities. The Coast Guard's current
information systems do not capture the majority of the time devoted to
these activities, which appear to be increasing in importance as a result
of the Coast Guard's new port security responsibilities.

3These performance measures were developed following the implementation of
the Government Performance and Results Act in 1993. Many agencies,
including the Coast Guard, began developing performance measures to
strengthen government performance and accountability by focusing on the
results of activities and spending. The act required agencies to establish
missions, goals, and performance measures as well as clearer linkages
between resources and results.

  Results in Brief

11 programs.4 For those programs that we could not fully analyze, because
they had only resource hour information or performance data but not both,
we provided limited information in relevant portions of this report. We
conducted our work at Coast Guard headquarters and at five of the Coast
Guard's nine districts that span three coasts-East, West, and Gulf. Our
work, which was conducted from June 2003 through March 2004, was done in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
detailed description of our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.

Total Coast Guard resource hours increased 39 percent over their
pre-September 11 levels in fiscal year 2003, and there have been major
shifts in the distribution of these resource hours among the various Coast
Guard programs as well. Not unexpectedly, homeland security programs were
the greatest beneficiaries of the increased hours, as more vessels devoted
to homeland security have been added to the fleet. Conversely, the
resource hours for most non-homeland security programs have decreased as
many more resources are now generally devoted to protecting the nation's
ports and waterways. For example, resource hours for several programs that
the Coast Guard has traditionally conducted, such as living marine
resources, and search and rescue, declined by 26 percent and 22 percent,
respectively.

The performance results-or indicators-that track a program's progress from
year to year-remained stable or improved for seven of the eight programs
we reviewed, when comparing fiscal year 2001 and 2003 results. Although
there was some fluctuation in fiscal year 2002, four programs had stable
performance results, three were improved and one had pending results for
fiscal year 2003. For example, the living marine resources program-whose
performance is assessed by measuring the percentage of fishermen that the
Coast Guard found in compliance with certain fishing regulations-had
stable results with a consistent compliance rate of about 99 to 97 percent
between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. Results for the aids to

4We excluded the marine safety and marine environmental protection
programs because they did not have complete resource-hour data that would
allow us to compare resourcehour trends with performance results. We
provided only resource hour information for the Coast Guard's newest
program-called ports, waterways, and coastal security, or PWCS- because
the Coast Guard has not yet established performance measures for it.
Finally, we provided limited performance results information for the
illegal drug interdiction program because performance results for this
program for fiscal year 2003 were not yet available.

navigation program-which helps to ensure the safe passage of vessels-
fluctuated in fiscal year 2002, but showed improvement when comparing
fiscal years 2001 and 2003, as the number of vessel incidents (such as
collisions and groundings) decreased. In addition to demonstrating stable
or improved results in fiscal year 2003, five of the eight programs we
reviewed also met their pre-established performance targets-the goals they
aim to achieve each year. For example, the search and rescue program's
target for fiscal year 2003 was to save 85 percent of mariners in distress
and the program achieved this goal by saving over 87 percent of them. Two
programs, defense readiness and undocumented migrant interdiction, missed
their performance targets in fiscal year 2003-defense readiness achieved a
78 percent readiness status result with a 100 percent target, and illegal
migrant interdiction missed its target of interdicting 87 percent of
illegal migrants by less than two percentage points. Results for the drug
interdiction program were not yet available for fiscal year 2003.

When comparing the trends in the Coast Guard's use of resources and its
performance results, the relationship between resources used and results
was not always what might be expected-that is, the resources expended and
performance results achieved did not have consistent direction of movement
and sometimes bore an opposite relationship. For example, performance
remained stable for four programs, even though resources dedicated to them
increased or decreased; and three programs demonstrated improved results
despite decreases in resource hours for two of them. These results have
important implications for resource management and accountability
especially given the Coast Guard's limited ability to explain them. In
particular, the results prompt a logical question as to why, despite
substantial changes in the resource hours of a number of programs over the
period we examined, the corresponding performance results for these
programs were not necessarily affected in the same way-that is, they did
not rise or fall in keeping with changes in resources. The Coast Guard
cannot say with any assurance why this occurred. For example, the resource
hours invested in the migrant interdiction program increased by 81 percent
and its performance results-which measure the program's success in
interdicting illegal migrants entering the United States by sea-remained
stable when comparing fiscal year 2001with fiscal year 2003. Likewise,
search and rescue resource hours dropped by 22 percent, but the
measurement of the Coast Guard's ability to save mariners in distress
remained stable for the same period. These results suggest that
performance was likely affected by factors other than resources. One set
of factors, cited by the Coast Guard as helping to keep performance steady
despite resource decreases, involved strategies such as using new
technology, better operational tactics, improved intelligence, and
stronger

partnering efforts. For example, the Coast Guard identified improved
intelligence and technology, along with efforts to partner more closely
with other federal agencies, as contributors to its stable performance
results in protecting living marine resources despite a decrease in hours
dedicated to the program. Coast Guard officials also pointed to another
set of factors, which are largely beyond its control (such as severe
weather conditions), to explain performance results that did not improve
despite resource increases. However the supporting data the Coast Guard
was able to provide to account for the effects of these two sets of
factors was limited. The Coast Guard has initiatives under way to better
measure its resource usage and manage program results, but many of these
initiatives are still in early stages of development and some do not have
a time frame for their completion. In addition, the Coast Guard does not
have a systematic approach for ensuring that these efforts will allow the
agency to link its resources and performance results. As we have reported
in previous studies on performance management, agencies that understand
the linkage between resources expended and performance results achieved
are better positioned to allocate and manage their resources effectively.
And by building this type of environmental assessment into its strategic
planning process, organizations can stay focused on their longterm goals
even as they make changes in the way they intend to achieve them. An
ability to understand these types of effects is important to the Coast
Guard and the Congress to make informed decisions about resource needs.

We are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to (1) develop a time
frame for expeditiously proceeding with initiatives to account more
completely for resources expended and (2) ensure that through its planning
process the agency develops a strategy for identifying the intervening
factors that affect performance results, and systematically assesses the
relationship between these factors, resources used, and results achieved.

Background 	Now a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Coast Guard has grown considerably in the aftermath of the September 11
terrorist attacks. The agency's operating budget in fiscal year 2003 was
$4.9 billion-an increase of 32 percent in real terms over its fiscal year

2001 operating budget.5 Corresponding to this funding increase, the
agency's personnel numbers have also grown significantly, and at the end
of fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard had almost 44,500 full time positions
about 9 percent more than it had in fiscal year 2001.6

The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall under 11 programs within
two broad missions-homeland security and non-homeland security.7 (See
table 1.) While maritime homeland security duties are not necessarily new
to the Coast Guard, the agency's resources used for this mission area
prior to September 11, 2001, had been minimal when compared with most of
its other programs.8 After September 11, the Coast Guard focused much more
of its efforts on homeland security and established a new program area-
the ports, waterways, and coastal security program (PWCS).

5The fiscal year 2003 operating budget included $628 million in
supplemental funding for Iraqi Freedom and Liberty Shield (P.L. 108-11,
April 16, 2003). It also included a .65 percent rescission (P.L. 108-7,
Feb. 20, 2003).

6In fiscal year 2003, there were about 38,300 military and 6,200 civilian
personnel. In addition, the agency had about 7,900 reservists who support
the national military strategy and provide additional operational support
and surge capacity during emergencies, such as natural disasters.
Furthermore, about 36,000 volunteer auxiliary personnel helped with a wide
array of activities, ranging from search and rescue to boating safety
education.

7The Coast Guard's homeland security and non-homeland security missions
are delineated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. 107-296, Nov.
25, 2002).

8Prior to the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Coast Guard included
maritime security activities under its marine safety program area.

 Table 1: Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by Mission Area
                               (as of March 2004)

Mission and program Activities and functions of each program

Homeland security mission

Ports, waterways, and coastal security	Conducting harbor patrols,
vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and analysis, and other
activities to prevent terrorist attacks and minimize the damage from
attacks that occur

a

Illegal drug interdiction	Deploying cutters and aircraft in high drug
trafficking areas and gathering intelligence to reduce the flow of illegal
drugs through maritime transit routes

a

Undocumented migrant interdiction	Deploying cutters and aircraft to reduce
the flow of undocumented migrants entering the United States by maritime
routes

Defense readiness 	Participating with the Department of Defense (DOD) in
global military operations, deploying cutters and other boats in and
around harbors to protect DOD force mobilization operations

Other law enforcement (foreign fish enforcement)b	Protecting United States
fishing grounds by ensuring that foreign fishermen do not illegally
harvest United States fish stocks

                         Non-homeland security mission

Search and rescue 	Operating multi-mission stations, and a national
distress and response communication system, conducting search and rescue
operations for mariners in distress

Living marine resources 	Enforcing domestic fishing laws and regulations
through inspections and fishery patrols

Aids to navigation 	Managing United States waterways and providing a safe,
efficient and navigable marine transportation system; maintaining the
extensive system of navigation aids; monitoring marine traffic through
vessel traffic service centers

Ice operations	Conducting polar operations to facilitate the movement of
critical goods and personnel in support of scientific and national
security activity; conducting domestic icebreaking operations to
facilitate year-round commerce; conducting international ice operations to
track icebergs below the 48th north latitude

Marine environmental protection 	Preventing and responding to marine oil
and chemical spills; preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and
garbage in United States waters; preventing biological invasions by
aquatic nuisance species

Marine safety	Setting standards and conducting vessel inspections to
better ensure the safety of passengers and crew aboard commercial vessels,
cruise ships, ferries, and other passenger vessels; partnering with states
and boating safety organizations to reduce recreational boating deaths

Source: Coast Guard.

aIn previous GAO work, these programs were identified as non-homeland
security missions. However, with the implementation of the Homeland
Security Act, the Coast Guard considers these programs to be under its
homeland security mission. Prior to the passage of the act, the Coast
Guard did not categorize its programs into non-homeland security and
homeland security missions.

bForeign fish enforcement is a key subset of the Coast Guard's other law
enforcement program. For the purposes of this report, we consider only the
resource hours and performance results associated with the foreign fish
aspect of the other law enforcement program. We subsequently refer to this
program as foreign fish enforcement.

To achieve its wide range of responsibilities, the Coast Guard is
organized into two major commands that are responsible for its overall
mission performance-one in the Pacific Ocean area and the other in the
Atlantic area, including the Gulf of Mexico region. These commands are
divided into nine districts, which in turn are organized into a number of
groups, marine safety offices, and air stations.9 Groups provide more
localized command and control of field units and resources, such as multi
mission stations, and patrol boats. Marine safety offices are located at
coastal ports and on inland waterways, and are responsible for the overall
safety and security of maritime activities and for environmental
protection in their geographic areas. Air stations conduct search and
rescue, law enforcement, environmental response, ice, and defense
operations.10

The Coast Guard has systems in place to track its resource hours and
performance results for each of its program areas. Resource hours,11 which
are accumulated and reported by quarter, represent the time spent by the
Coast Guard's major assets-ships, boats, and aircraft (helicopters and

9In total, the Coast Guard has 32 group commands, 75 marine safety offices
or related units, and 31 air stations located throughout the United States
and its territories.

10The Coast Guard recently announced an organizational restructuring that
would combine marine safety offices and groups into single command
structures to be known as sectors. The Coast Guard stated that the purpose
of this new organizational structure is to strengthen unity of command in
port, waterway, and coastal areas of operation by specific geographic
areas of responsibility. According to the Coast Guard, sweeping changes to
the agency's operational environment brought about since September 11
reinforce the need for these combined commands that will provide an
interdependent approach to mission accomplishment, a common operating
picture, and a focal point for intra-departmental, interagency, and other
maritime stakeholders.

11The Coast Guard maintains information, on a program-by-program basis,
about how resources (assets such as ships, boats, or aircraft) are used to
conduct its program missions including search and rescue; aids to
navigation; defense readiness; other law enforcement (foreign fish
enforcement); ice operations; marine environmental protection; illegal
drug interdiction; living marine resources; undocumented migrant
interdiction; ports, waterways, and coastal security; and marine safety.
Each hour that these resources are used is called a resource hour.
However, resource hours do not include such things as the time that the
resource stands idle or the time that is spent in maintaining it. Resource
hours associated with Coast Guard training for personnel and asset
maintenance are captured in the miscellaneous support category of resource
hours. Resource hours also do not represent the vast majority of marine
safety and marine environmental protection efforts carried out by marine
safety office personnel as these programs are largely carried out without
using Coast Guard assets, and there are no similar data for making
comparisons in the levels of effort. As a result, resource levels and
performance results for the marine safety and the marine environmental
protection programs were not analyzed for this report. In addition, the
hours reported in the miscellaneous support category are not included in
the total resource hours analyzed in this report.

  Generally, Resource Hours Devoted to Homeland Security Programs Have Increased
  Substantially, while Hours for Other Programs Have Decreased

fixed-wing aircraft)-conducting its programs. The Coast Guard measures its
performance, that is, what these resource hours and its personnel hours
accomplish, using a set of performance measures developed in accordance
with the Government Performance and Results Act. The Coast Guard uses
these performance measures and their corresponding goals to annually track
the agency's progress in attaining its strategic goals.

Total Coast Guard resource hours devoted to its various programs have
substantially increased since the terrorist attacks, and a major
redistribution of these hours has also occurred, as many hours shifted
from non-homeland security programs to homeland security programs. Total
Coast Guard resource hours (for boats, ships, and aircraft devoted to all
programs) increased by 39 percent from a level of about 534,000 resource
hours prior to the terrorist attacks to about 741,000 hours by the end of
fiscal year 2003.12 Coast Guard officials told us that the addition of
more ships, boats, and personnel contributed to the overall increase in
resource hours. In particular, one official noted the acquisition of
smaller boats as being a contributor to the increase in ports, waterways,
and coastal security hours in fiscal year 2003.

As figure 1 shows, homeland security resource hours accounted for all of
the increase, while total hours for non-homeland security programs
decreased.

12The Coast Guard calculated a resource hour baseline from which the
change in resource hours since the September 11 attacks can be estimated.
This baseline is an average of the eight fiscal year quarters preceding
September 11, 2001 multiplied by four to put it in terms of a full fiscal
year. For the purposes of this report, we refer to this calculation as the
pre September 11 baseline or as pre-September 11 levels. According to
Coast Guard officials, there is no special significance to this baseline
period, other than it represents the historical mission activity of the
Coast Guard at that period in time.

Figure 1: Total Resource Hours for All Coast Guard Programs

On a program-by-program basis, there is a marked difference in the degree
to which resource levels rose or declined. (See fig. 2.) Of the various
programs, the ports, waterways, and coastal security program saw by far
the largest increase, over 1,200 percent. Before the September 11 attacks,
this program was a small component of the Coast Guard, with a baseline
level of slightly more than 19,000 hours-less than 4 percent of the Coast
Guard's overall resource hours.13 By the end of fiscal year 2003, the
Coast Guard had expended nearly 255,000 resource hours on this mission,
representing about 34 percent of total resource hours. By contrast,

13According to a Coast Guard official, while the ports, waterways, and
coastal security program did not exist as a separate program prior to
September 11, 2001, resource hours related to this program's activities
were collected under four categories: port safety, port security-military,
port security-other, and military operations-peace. The hours from these
categories were combined after September 11 to make up the pre-September
11 baseline of resource hours for what the Coast Guard now defines as the
ports, waterways, and coastal security program. After September 11, 2001,
the Coast Guard began identifying resource hours under a ports, waterways,
and coastal security program category.

resource hours spent during the same period on the illegal drug
interdiction program declined from slightly less than 123,000 hours to
just under 70,000 hours, a decrease of 44 percent. (See appendix II for
the program-by-program trends by year.)

  Figure 2: Percentage Change in Resource Hours, by Program, Pre-September 11
                          Baseline to Fiscal Year 2003

                     Ports, waterways, and coastal security

(19,291 to 254,640 hours)

Defense readiness

(6,446 to 39,853 hours)

Undocumented migrant interdiction

(29,642 to 53,559 hours)

Ice operations

(11,935 to 17,217 hours)

Aids to navigation

(112,148 to 110,456 hours)

Foreign fish enforcement

(7,953 to 6,712 hours)

Search and rescue

(82,689 to 64,383 hours)

Living marine resources

(91,255 to 67,576 hours)

Illegal drug interdiction

(122,694 to 69,268 hours)

Percent change

Up 1,220

Down -2

Down -16

Down -22

Down -26 Down -44

-200 -100 1,200 1,300

Programs with decreasing Programs with increasing resource hours resource
hours

            Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard resource hour data.

Homeland security programs

Non-homeland security programs

Coast Guard officials cited a number of factors that contributed to the
actual resource hours expended for its programs each year. One key factor,
noted by several officials, is the impact of unplanned events on planned
resource hours. For instance, although the agency may have planned to
spend resource hours in a certain way at the beginning of a fiscal year,
the actual resource hours expended often reflected the unexpected
circumstances or events to which the Coast Guard had to react in that
year. For example, when the nation shifts to an orange, or

high-alert, status,14 the Coast Guard concentrates more of its resources
on security-related activities than initially planned. Severe weather,
such as hurricanes, can also cause shifts away from planned resource use
to spending time repositioning navigation markers that shift from their
proper locations as a result of storms. The war in Iraq is another example
of where resource hours shifted from planned usage when the Coast Guard
deployed assets-11 ships, 24 boats, 2 aircraft, and 1,195 personnel in
all-to the Persian Gulf; yet when the fiscal year 2003 budget was
developed, the Coast Guard had anticipated using these assets for other
programs.

The Coast Guard's Commandant noted that reductions in resource hours did
not necessarily reflect changes in the agency's program emphasis. For
example, while resource hours devoted to the search and rescue program
declined, this program remained a top agency priority. Coast Guard
officials suggested that the decline in resource hours for this program
was due to three key factors. First, search and rescue is largely demand
driven, and as a result, its hours largely reflect the number of incidents
referred to the Coast Guard for action. The Coast Guard received fewer
distress calls; therefore, resource hours decreased. Second, Successful
preventive efforts such as fishing vessel safety examinations and boating
safety classes may have prevented mariners from getting into
distress-again, resulting in fewer distress calls to the Coast Guard.
Third, Coast Guard boats were more frequently on security patrols, and as
a result, these boats were sometimes closer to the search and rescue
incident and thus could respond more quickly.

14According to a Coast Guard official, the Maritime Security Condition
System (MARSEC) alerts all Coast Guard components of any perceived threats
or risk to various Coast Guard ports or a particular industry. MARSEC 1 is
equivalent to the Department of Homeland Security's Advisory System's
(HSAS) threat level green (low risk of terrorist attack), blue (guarded or
general risk of terrorist attack), and yellow (elevated or significant
risk of terrorist attack). MARSEC 2 is equivalent to HSAS orange (high
risk of terrorist attack) and MARSEC 3 is equivalent to HSAS red (severe
risk of terrorist attack). In fiscal years 2001, 2002 and 2003, higher
security levels existed for 19 days, 73 days, and 90 days, respectively.

Performance Results For the period we examined, the Coast Guard's
performance results for

the eight programs we reviewed remained either largely unchanged or
Remained Largely improved. In addition, in fiscal year 2003, most of the
programs also met Unchanged or their pre-established performance
targets.15 Still, some caution is needed in

interpreting the Coast Guard's performance results because of limitations
Improved for the in some of the performance measures.

Eight Programs We

  Assessed

All Assessed Programs Of the eight programs we reviewed for performance,16
four showed Had Stable or Improved relatively stable performance results,
although some minor fluctuations Performance Results existed. For example,
one of the stable programs, search and rescue, which measures its results
as the percentage of lives saved each year, varied only a few percentage
points from a low of 84.2 percent in fiscal year 2001 to a high of 87.7
percent in fiscal year 2003. Three programs (foreign fish enforcement,
aids to navigation, and defense readiness), demonstrated improved results
when comparing fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2003, although their
results fluctuated a little within this period.17 We were unable to assess
the results of the remaining program-illegal drug interdiction-because its
performance results for fiscal year 2003 were not yet available at the
time we did our analysis. (See table 2.) Appendix III provides a detailed
summary of the performance results for all programs.

15According to GPRA, performance results are defined as the outcome of
direct products and services delivered by a program. Performance targets
or goals are defined as a set of annual goals that establish the agency's
intended performance, stating a particular level of performance in either
an absolute value or as a targeted level of improvement.

16We did not analyze detailed performance results for the marine safety
and marine environmental protection programs because we were unable to
obtain complete information on the resource hours for these programs;
therefore, we had no basis for comparing resource levels with performance
results. However, the performance results for the marine safety program
for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 showed that there were 1,651 and 1,459
maritime injuries and fatalities in those years, respectively. Marine
safety program performance results for fiscal year 2003 were not available
at the time we completed our work. The marine environmental protection
program had not yet developed a performance measure in fiscal year 2001,
but its results for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 respectively showed that
there were 43.3 and 29.4 spills (oil spills over 100 gallons and chemical
spills) per 100 million tons of oil and chemicals shipped.

17For the purposes of this report, we were most interested in comparing
performance results for our baseline year-fiscal year 2001-with the most
currently available results- fiscal year 2003. As a result, we defined
programs as "stable" or "improved" based on the known results for these
two years. All programs defined as "stable" showed a differential of less
than 4 percentage points when comparing fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year
2003 results.

  Table 2: Performance Results by Program from Fiscal Year 2001 through Fiscal
 Year 2003 Performance results by fiscal year Program Performance measure 2001
                                   2002 2003

Stable results

Undocumented migrant interdiction Percentage of interdicted illegal
migrants entering the

             82.5% 88.3% 85.3% United States through maritime means

        Ice operations      Number of waterway closure days     7     7 
                            Percentage of fishermen found   98.6% 97.3% 97.1% 
Living marine resources  in compliance with                          
                                      regulations                       
      Search and rescue        Percentage of distressed     84.2% 84.4% 87.7% 
                                 mariners' lives saved                  
      Improving results                                                 
                            Number of detected Exclusive                
Foreign fish enforcement Economic Zone (EEZ)a                        

219 250

incursions by foreign fishing vessels 11.7% 10.6% NAe cocaine entering the
                         United States through maritime

Aids to navigation   Number of collisions, allisions, b  1,677 1,936 1,523 
                                  and groundings                        
    Defense readiness  Percentage of time units meet combat  67%   70%    78% 
                       readiness status at                              
                                    C-2 levelc                          
     Pending results                                                    
      Illegal drug     Percentage of cocaine seized out of              
      interdiction               total estimated                        

                                       d

                                     means

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard performance data.

aThe EEZ is defined by the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act as an area within 200 miles of U.S. shores in which U.S.
citizens have primary harvesting rights to fish stocks.

bThe Coast Guard defines an "allision" as a vessel collision with a fixed
object.

cAccording to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as the
level at which each unit possesses the resources and is trained to
undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is organized or
designed.

dThe illegal drug interdiction performance measure only includes cocaine
as cocaine has an analyzed flow rate, and it constitutes the preponderance
of illegal drugs entering the United States through maritime means (that
is, cocaine shipments are measured in tons while heroin, marijuana, and
other illegal drugs are measured in pounds).

eThe illegal drug interdiction performance result for fiscal year 2003
will not be calculated until the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine
Movement (IACM) publishes its flow rate in spring of 2004.

Most Assessed Programs Another way that the Coast Guard assesses its
performance is by
Also Met Their determining whether programs have achieved their
performance targets
Performance Targets each year. These targets-which represent the goals
that the programs aim

to achieve each year-were met in fiscal year 2003 by five of the eight

programs we reviewed.18 (See table 3.) Two of the programs that did not
meet their performance targets were defense readiness and undocumented
migrant interdiction. Coast Guard officials reported that the defense
readiness program did not meet its target, in part, because of equipment
problems associated with operating aging ships, and unit training
deficiencies, such as cutters not having sufficient training time to
perform gunnery exercises.19 As for the undocumented migrant interdiction
program, Coast Guard officials reported that they consider their results
to be a minimal decline in light of the substantial increase in the number
of migrants they successfully interdicted during the year.20 For example,
of the key migrant populations tracked by the Coast Guard, about 5,300
illegal migrants were interdicted in fiscal year 2003 compared with about
2,400 in fiscal year 2002, an increase of 120 percent.21 We could not
determine whether the remaining program, illegal drug interdiction, met
its performance target because the performance results for fiscal year
2003 were not yet available at the time we conducted our work. (See app.
III for a detailed summary of the performance targets and results for all
programs.)

18The marine environmental protection program also met its performance
target in fiscal year 2003 but was not included in our analysis. Also,
since the marine safety program does not yet have performance results for
fiscal year 2003, discussing its target is not relevant here.

19According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as the
level at which each unit possesses the resources and is trained to
undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is organized or
designed.

20The undocumented migrant interdiction performance measure indicates the
percentage of migrants interdicted or deterred from entering the United
States via maritime routes. More specifically, it is the number of
interdicted migrants divided by the estimated flow of undocumented
migrants (which includes the number of law enforcement interdictions,
known successful migrant arrivals, and the estimated number of migrants
deterred from leaving their countries of origin). This estimate is
prepared annually by the Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center.

21According to the Coast Guard, the 2002 and 2003 illegal migrant numbers
stated here include only those counted in the undocumented migrant
performance measure, which uses the following four migrant populations,
Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the People's Republic of China.
The total number of all migrants interdicted in fiscal years 2002 and 2003
were 4,104 and 6,054 respectively.

Table 3: Performance Targets by Program for Fiscal Year 2003

                                                Fiscal year     Target met in 
                                                       2003       fiscal year 
         Program       Fiscal year 2003              result             2003? 
                       performance targets                  
                        Interdict or deter                  
      Undocumented     at least 87 percent                  
         migrant                of                          
                       illegal migrants                     
      interdiction     entering the United                  
                       States                               
                         through maritime             85.3%                No 
                              means                         
      Illegal drug      Seize 20.7 percent                  
      interdiction      or more of cocaine                  
                       entering the United                  
                       States through                       
                       maritime                             
                              means         To be           To be determineda 
                                            determineda     
                       Limit waterway                       
                       closures to 8 days                   
     Ice operations    during                               
                          severe winters             7 days               Yes 
      Living marine    Raise percentage of                  
        resources      fishermen found in                   
                       compliance with                      
                       regulations to 97                    
                       percent                              
                             or above                 97.1%               Yes 
                       Save at least 85                     
    Search and rescue  percent of all                       
                       mariners in                          
                             distress                 87.7%               Yes 
                       Reduce number of                     
      Foreign fish     detected EEZ                         
       enforcement     incursions                           
                       by foreign fishing                                     
                       vessels to 202 or     153 incursions               Yes
                       less                                 
                         Reduce five-year                   
                            average of                      
Aids to navigation      collisions,                      
                       allisions, and                       
                       groundings (CAGs) to                 
                       2,010                                
                             or less             1,523 CAGs               Yes 
                       Maintain an overall                  
    Defense readiness  combat readiness                     
                       status                               
                         at C-2 level or                    
                          better for 100                    
                            percent of                      
                              assets                    78%                No 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard performance data.

aThe illegal drug interdiction performance result for fiscal year 2003
will not be available until spring of 2004.

    Continuing Efforts Are Under Way to Strengthen Performance Measures

While the Coast Guard has been recognized in the past for its performance
measurement efforts,22 Coast Guard officials also recognize that, as is
true for all organizations, continual improvements are needed in their
measures, and they are working toward these enhancements. And while the
Coast Guard's performance for the majority of its programs was

22In recent years, the Coast Guard has been publicly recognized in several
forums for its performance efforts including receiving one of the highest
grades of 20 agencies identified by the Clinton administration as having a
high impact on the American public. The Coast Guard was one of two
agencies that received an agency grade of A in the Government Performance
Project grading system-compiled by journalists from Government Executive
and academics from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at
Syracuse University-and it was one of two agencies that received an A for
managing for results. The criteria for managing for results included
engaging in results-oriented strategic planning; measuring progress toward
results and accomplishments; using results for policymaking, management,
and evaluation of progress; and communicating results to stakeholders.

favorable in fiscal year 2003, there are reasons to be cautious in
interpreting these results. That is, Coast Guard officials acknowledged
that limitations exist in the measures and efforts are under way to
improve their clarity and objectivity.23 Coast Guard officials provided
the following illustrative examples:

o  	Some measures do not currently distinguish among critical factors-such
as how certain items are weighted-within the measure. For example, Coast
Guard officials stated that the foreign fish enforcement performance
measure-which counts the number of times foreign fishing vessels are
identified as illegally entering into the United States Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ)-does not distinguish the severity of each entry. As a result, a
single fisherman in a small boat catching a few fish in the Western
Pacific is weighted equally with a large foreign trawler in Alaskan waters
that is harvesting fish by the tons. Each of these events would be counted
as one incursion even though their impact could be significantly
different. The Coast Guard is currently reevaluating the Fisheries
Enforcement Strategic Plan to address this issue.

o  	Some measures are affected by fluctuations in demand; thus, the
results may not directly reflect agency efforts. For example, the foreign
fish enforcement performance measure-which counts the number of EEZ
incursions by foreign fishing vessels-can be affected by oceanic and
climatic shifts that can cause significant fluctuations in the migratory
patterns of fish. As a result, EEZ encroachments could increase (or
decrease) as fishermen follow their intended catch across EEZ boundaries
(or stay within their own territories), depending on where the fish are
located. According to Coast Guard officials, this type of migratory factor
can influence the number of encroachments in a given year, and they are
reviewing issues such as these to refine the measure. They plan to have a
revised target in early 2004.

o  	Coast Guard officials reported that some measures might have
inaccurate estimates that affect the quality of the measure. For example,
the undocumented migrant interdiction performance measure contains
estimated information, such as the number of illegal migrants entering the

23Clarity issues relate to whether data in the measure could be confusing
or misleading to users; objectivity issues relate to whether the
performance assessment may be systematically over- or understated.

United States.24 As a result, the Coast Guard reported that the estimated
number of potential migrants, which is a key part of this performance
measure, might contain significant error. Coast Guard officials explained
that they are working to strengthen this measure, in part through an
external program evaluation that will be completed by the summer of 2004.
At this time, however, they believe their current measure is the best
available.

o  	Some performance measures rely on the Coast Guard's presence or direct
observation of events. A change in Coast Guard presence could skew results
for these indicators. For example, an increased Coast Guard presence in a
fishing area could result in more incursions being observed, and a
decreased presence could result in fewer observations. To the extent such
factors come into play, the results may be inaccurate. For example, the
number of incursions might not have increased or decreased, but instead
the Coast Guard simply had greater or lesser ability to identify them. The
Coast Guard has acknowledged that some of its measures are subject to
these weaknesses and directed its field personnel to be mindful of these
issues in its planning guidance.

One measure-for illegal drug interdiction-was recently refined and
illustrates how the Coast Guard can improve upon and incorporate better
performance measures into this refinement process. The illegal drug
interdiction performance measure was recently reevaluated because the
former measure-cocaine seizure rates-did not adequately account for
cocaine thrown overboard or destroyed by smugglers. Consequently, the
Coast Guard changed its illegal drug interdiction performance measure for
fiscal year 2004 to measure the cocaine removal rate-a measure that
includes not only the cocaine seized but also cocaine that was jettisoned
or lost. Coast Guard officials stated that the new measure, which
encompasses both the cocaine lost to the smuggler (through seizures,
jettison, burning, and other non-recoverable events) as well as the
cocaine seized, will more accurately reflect the Coast Guard's counterdrug
efforts and results.

24The Coast Guard reported that the number of illegal migrants entering
the United States is an estimated flow number generated by the Coast Guard
Intelligence Coordination Center and Immigration and Naturalization
Services. And, according to the Coast Guard, because of the speculative
nature of the information used, and the secretive nature of illegal
migration, particularly where professional smuggling organizations are
involved, the estimated potential flow of migrants may contain significant
error.

  More Systematic Understanding of Resource Usage and Performance Results Is
  Important for Management and Accountability

While resource hours changed substantially for some programs between
fiscal years 2001 and 2003, their corresponding performance results did
not necessarily reflect the direction of these changes. In particular,
performance remained stable for four programs even though resources
increased for two and decreased for the other two. This suggests that
performance results were likely affected by factors other than usage of
these resources. One set of factors, cited by the Coast Guard as helping
to keep performance steady in some programs despite decreases in
resources, involves strategies such as using new technology, better
tactics and operations, and stronger partnering with other agencies. Coast
Guard officials also pointed to a set of other factors, often called
externalities, which are largely beyond its control but have the ability
to negatively affect performance results despite resource increases. For
the Coast Guard, such externalities include such developments as an
increase in the number of immigrants seeking to enter the country by sea
and unpredictable or severe weather conditions. The Coast Guard has a
variety of initiatives under way to better measure resource usage and
manage program results. However, many of these initiatives are still in
early stages of development and some do not have a time frame for their
completion. In addition, the Coast Guard does not have a systematic
framework that would allow it to better understand how the various factors
are affecting the link between resources and performance. As we have
reported in the past, agencies that understand the linkage between
expended resources and performance results are better able to allocate and
manage their resources effectively.

    Coast Guard Officials Cite Various Factors Affecting Consistency between
    Expended Resources and Results Achieved

For most of the Coast Guard programs we reviewed, there was no clear
relationship between the change in resource hours from pre-September 11
levels to fiscal year 2003 levels and the performance results reported for
the program between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. One might expect that a
significant change in resource hours over time would result in a
corresponding change in performance results. However, for most of the
seven programs we reviewed with complete performance results in fiscal
year 2003, this was not the case.25 For example, the four programs with
stable performance results were evenly divided-two (undocumented migrant
interdiction and ice operations) had increased resource hours of

25The ports, waterways, and coastal security program does not yet have a
performance measure, the illegal drug interdiction and marine safety
programs' performance results have not yet been calculated for fiscal year
2003, and we did not analyze performance results for the marine
environmental protection program.

at least 44 percent, and two (living marine resources and search and
rescue) had decreased resource hours of at least 22 percent. Similarly, of
the remaining three programs, two (foreign fish enforcement and aids to
navigation) had improved results despite decreases in their resource
hours. The only program with consistent direction of movement between its
resource hours and performance results was the defense readiness program,
which had improved results and a 518 percent resource hour increase.

Coast Guard officials acknowledged the apparent disconnect between
resource hours expended and performance results achieved and offered two
types of explanations for it. The first involved operational
efficiencies-strategies that essentially allowed the Coast Guard to
accomplish the same or greater results with fewer resources. These
efficiencies were of four main types-improved technology, improved
tactics, stronger partnerships, and improved intelligence. A limited
sample of these efficiencies, described by Coast Guard officials during
our visits to Coast Guard districts, is highlighted in table 4, and
additional efficiencies are discussed in more detail in appendix IV. Many
of these efficiencies stemmed from internal changes within the Coast
Guard, such as using new equipment, a different procedure, or a new
organizational alignment to do a task more quickly. However, some of the
efficiencies, particularly those related to partnerships, involved the use
of non-Coast Guard resources as well.

Table 4: Selected Examples of Operational Efficiencies Cited by Coast
Guard Officials

Improved technology 	New ships. The recapitalization of the buoy tender
fleet offers a number of improvements, including greater transit speed,
reducing travel time and allowing more work to be done in a day; a larger
buoy deck, allowing the completion of more work during a single deployment
and fewer trips back to base; and improved navigation systems, enabling
safer navigation with fewer people.

Different lighting for navigation aids. In its aids to navigation program
and in other aspects of its operations, the Coast Guard now uses lanterns
with light emitting diodes (LEDs). Using LEDs results in fewer and quicker
service visits, freeing time for other work.

Improved data-monitoring system. Coast Guard officials stated that the
National Marine Fisheries Service's Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) helped
to improve their operational efficiency in protecting United States
fisheries. The Coast Guard leveraged this technology-which monitors
fishing vessel information such as the vessel's name, catch data, and
location-and used it in conjunction with industry intelligence and efforts
to work more closely with federal and state enforcement partners. Although
not yet fully operational, according to the Coast Guard, the system was
responsible for 7 of the 97 significant violations detected in fiscal year
2003.

Improved tactics 	Use of armed helicopters. The Coast Guard reported that
the Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) provides personnel,
training, and resources necessary to employ armed helicopters in support
of counter drug operations. Prior to November 2002, the Coast Guard used
two armed helicopters simultaneously with two cutters when responding to
drug interdiction operations. The Coast Guard has since changed its
tactics to use one HITRON with one cutter per operation and has seen no
degradation in the effectiveness of this drug interdiction tactic.

Use of helicopters for at-sea boardings. One Coast Guard district
identified a procedure whereby it uses helicopters rather than ships to
conduct at-sea boardings of vessels of interest bound for United States
ports. Doing so allows Coast Guard boarding personnel to reach their
destination more quickly-for example, in 30 minutes rather than 2 or 3
hours. The time that the helicopters are in use is incorporated into the
mandatory training schedule, resulting in no additional usage of air
resources and a decrease in ship hours for this purpose.

Stronger partnerships 	Interagency flight schedules. In Miami, the Coast
Guard and another Department of Homeland Security agency, the Immigration
and Customs Enforcement office have developed a combined flight schedule
to integrate patrol schedules and assets, which has led to less overlap in
response efforts, saving time and resources for both agencies.

Coast Guard/police department partnership. The Coast Guard and the New
York Police Department (NYPD) have a formalized partnership, and officials
of the two organizations communicate several times daily on a variety of
topics. They also often participate in joint training and first responder
exercises. This partnership with NYPD adds significant communication and
intelligence networks as well as a large number of additional assets to
the Coast Guard's capabilities in New York.

Improved intelligence 	Intelligence-sharing arrangements. In 2001, the
Coast Guard joined the United States Intelligence Community, a federation
of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and
together in intelligence-gathering activities. According to Coast Guard
officials, this step greatly enhances the agency's access to information.

New intelligence centers. Created in 2003, one Maritime Intelligence
Fusion Center is located on each coast. These centers increase collection
and analytical capabilities, enhancing the Coast Guard's ability to fuse
intelligence from various sources and improving the timeliness and quality
of theater-level intelligence support to Coast Guard operational forces.

Source: Coast Guard.

The second type of explanation provided by Coast Guard officials involved
externalities-events or developments that were largely beyond the Coast
Guard's control but had an influence on the amount of work the Coast

Guard had to confront. In fiscal year 2003, these factors included such
things as "surge" demands, related to the Iraq War; a large increase in
the number of undocumented migrants attempting to enter the United States
by maritime routes, and poor weather conditions that increased icebreaking
needs. According to Coast Guard officials, these externalities had a
negative effect on performance results-that is, they made it more
difficult for the Coast Guard to meet its goals, even when more resources
were added. In the case of ice operations, because the Great Lakes region
had one of the most "severe" winters it has experienced in the past 50
years and unpredicted amounts of ice formed ahead of forecasted dates,
icebreaking needs in this region were higher than normal in fiscal year
2003. Despite this, the Coast Guard was still able to meet its performance
goal in fiscal year 2003. However, according to Coast Guard officials,
externalities were a factor in not meeting its goal for undocumented
migrant interdiction because of the very large increase in illegal
immigrants seeking to enter the United States by sea during fiscal year
2003.

    Coast Guard Lacks Clear Understanding of Extent to Which These Factors
    Affect Results

While the factors cited by the Coast Guard likely have an effect on
mission performance, the extent of that effect is largely unknown. Our
site visits suggested that the efficiency factors cited by Coast Guard
officials likely had positive effects on the agency's performance by
improving its effectiveness and productivity. For example, Coast Guard
officials acknowledge that local authorities such as police and fire
departments have assumed some of the Coast Guard's search and rescue
workload. Likewise, our site visits suggested that the various
externalities cited by Coast Guard officials could have negatively
affected the performance of some missions as well. For example, as noted,
the Coast Guard did not meet its undocumented migrant interdiction
program's fiscal year 2003 performance target of interdicting or deterring
87 percent of the illegal migrants entering the United States by sea.
Coast Guard officials identified the significant increase in migrants
attempting to enter the United States in fiscal year 2003 (an externality
that the Coast Guard has no control over) as one factor that contributed
to the program missing its goal. However, the Coast Guard does not have a
mechanism in place to systematically determine the extent to which either
of these factors affects performance. For instance, it does not have data
on the search and rescue cases handled by local responders and, therefore,
is unable to determine the extent to which this assistance has reduced the
workloads of small boat stations.

Accounting for the effects of such factors can be a difficult task. In
past work, we have examined the efforts of a number of agencies to
understand and assess the many factors that influence their performance
results as a basis for better allocating and managing their resources.26
Like the Coast Guard, other federal agencies face the challenge of having
limited control over the achievement of their intended objectives. In past
work, we have found that when various federal agencies attempted to assess
performance, their greatest challenge in the analysis and reporting stage
of the performance review process was separating a program's impact on its
objectives from the impact of external factors, primarily because the
program's objectives were the result of complex systems or phenomena
outside the program's control. Thus, it is not surprising that the Coast
Guard would have difficulty in attempting to account more precisely for
the effects of these various factors, both internal and external.

Our reviews of various efforts to address these analytic challenges showed
that agencies employed a wide range of strategies to respond to them. For
example, some broke out data on subgroups or made statistical adjustments
to attempt to reduce the influence of external factors on their measures.
While there is no simple or standard approach, best practices suggest that
managers should stay alert to the many factors-both inside and outside
their organizations-that can influence their ability to achieve their
goals. The successful organizations we studied tracked and monitored their
internal and external environments continuously and systematically. By
building environmental assessment into the strategic planning process,
organizations can stay focused on their long-term goals even as they make
changes in the way they intend to achieve them. An ability to understand
the effects of these various factors is also important in helping Coast
Guard managers and the Congress make informed decisions about resource
needs.

The Coast Guard's ability to evaluate its resource needs is also affected
by the lack of data about resource usage in two of its programs-marine
safety and marine environmental protection. While the Coast Guard collects
some resource hour data for these programs, the vast majority of

26U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Effectively
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118,
June 1996); U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Analytic
Challenges in Measuring Performance (GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 1997); and
U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Measuring Program
Results That Are under Limited Federal Control

(GAO/GGD-99-16).

time dedicated to these two programs is not captured because these are
people-intensive rather than asset-intensive programs, and the Coast Guard
lacks a data collection mechanism for capturing these hours. More
specifically, these programs may involve Coast Guard personnel conducting
a facility inspection or responding to an oil spill in a marina-
activities that often do not involve using Coast Guard ships, boats or
aircraft. This "information deficit" became particularly significant after
September 11 when the Coast Guard undertook significant additional port
security responsibilities under the ports, waterways, and coastal security
program. Coast Guard officials have acknowledged that resource hour shifts
occurred from the marine safety and marine environmental programs to the
ports, waterways, and coastal security program. However, they are
generally unable to estimate the total effort dedicated to these programs
or determine the level of resources the agency is likely to need to
maintain program performance levels. In addition, to help meet its new
responsibilities in the ports, waterways, and coastal security program,
the Coast Guard issued guidance to its field units authorizing the
suspension of certain marine safety and marine environmental protection
program requirements. For example, Coast Guard units were given the
flexibility to not perform lower-priority vessel boardings and to reduce
the frequency of certain vessel inspections. They were also directed to
leverage state and local agencies to respond to small spills to the
maximum extent possible. While the guidance indicates that the marine
safety office personnel should use risk-based decision making in
implementing these types of measures, and negative impacts from these
actions have not yet become evident, the potential effects of such
reductions on future program performance could become a concern.

    Coast Guard Has Started Efforts to Better Understand Effects of Internal and
    External Factors, but Impact Is Uncertain

Coast Guard officials agreed there is value in taking a more systematic
approach to assessing performance, including better understanding of the
effects of internal and external factors that affect their performance. As
a result, the agency has begun a number of steps directed at improving
various aspects of performance assessment. Many of these steps are still
in their early stages, and while they represent a good beginning, it is
not yet clear when they will be completed and whether they will tie
together to address the weaknesses we have identified.

One step the Coast Guard has begun involves addressing the information
gaps that currently exist regarding resource usage in the marine safety
office programs, but the time frame for completing these projects is
unknown. Specific actions under way that are expected to improve
information about the level of Coast Guard personnel hours dedicated to

various programs include measuring the personnel overtime hours for
certain programs, and a survey of Coast Guard units to assess how
personnel hours were reallocated within the programs after September 11.
In addition to making these efforts, the Coast Guard also recently
estimated the marine safety office personnel hours it believes will be
necessary to implement its new port security responsibilities-a positive
step toward determining what its resource needs are likely to be in order
to successfully implement these requirements.27 The Coast Guard has also
begun a broader effort to develop a system for tracking personnel hours at
marine safety offices and related units. Development of this system is
currently in a pilot stage, and Coast Guard officials did not know when it
might be implemented Coast Guard-wide. As a result, the Coast Guard
currently remains unable to account for the vast majority of the hours
dedicated to two programs-marine safety and marine environmental
protection, and this is a concern considering that together these programs
account for 11 percent of the fiscal year 2004 enacted operating budget.

In addition to obtaining a better understanding of how resources are used
to produce results, the Coast Guard has also made some program-specific
efforts to better manage and allocate resources. In the illegal drug
interdiction program, the Coast Guard has taken steps to better quantify
the effect of specific operational strategies on performance results. By
examining successful drug seizures, the Coast Guard has been able to
determine how it is getting the most results. For example:

o  	Stationing Coast Guard personnel aboard Navy ships. According to Coast
Guard officials, certain Coast Guard law enforcement units operating
aboard navy ships (including those from the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium) were responsible for 58 percent of
the Coast Guard's cocaine seizures in fiscal year 2003.

o  	Using armed instead of unarmed helicopters. Use of armed helicopters
was deemed an effective approach for the drug interdiction program, as
Coast Guard officials determined that these helicopters could more
effectively deter drug smugglers from escaping. According to the Coast

27Responsibilities that are required under the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) (P. L. 107-295, November 25, 2002).

Guard, this strategy accounted for 34 percent of cocaine seizures in
fiscal year 2003.28

These specific efforts are noteworthy, but there is no indication that
efforts such as these are occurring across the broad range of Coast Guard
missions. Coast Guard officials were unable to identify similar actions
across all programs to quantify operational strategies and establish more
systematic linkages between resources expended and performance achieved.

Separate from these program-specific efforts, the Coast Guard is beginning
an agency-wide strategic planning effort to better assess linkages between
the agency's strategic goals and mission programs and the agency's overall
strategic intent. Specific actions involve data collection and development
of analytical models and decision support systems. Table 5 shows some of
the specific actions. If properly designed and implemented, such actions
should help the Coast Guard with its long-term strategic planning and its
ability to make connections between the agency's resources and
performance. Again, however, whether these efforts will address the
weaknesses we identified or result in reliable means to link resources
expended with performance achieved is unknown, since most of the efforts
have just begun or are in progress.

28According to a Coast Guard official, the results obtained from these two
strategies (law enforcement units on navy ships and armed helicopters) are
not mutually exclusive. In some cases, these two strategies worked in
tandem, so there is some overlap in the seizure results.

Table 5: Selected Examples of Actions Under Way to Improve Linkages
between Resources and Performance Results

Mission cost model 	Designed to capture mission operating costs on a
program-by-program basis, this model allows the Coast Guard to calculate
the operating expenses (including the direct costs, support costs, and
overhead costs) associated with each program.

Readiness management system 	This Coast Guard-wide system, currently under
development, is designed to assess the agency's ability to respond to
mission requirements in accordance with standards. This system will assess
six facets of readiness: people, training, equipment, supplies,
infrastructure, and information.

Analysis of long-term strategic planning The Coast Guard is using a
"scenario planning" approach to analyze its future long-term

needs 	strategic planning needs. Called Project Evergreen, it involves
developing "alternative future world scenarios," developing strategies for
addressing these future scenarios, and determining potential resource
needs.

                          Model for examining maritime

operations

This computer model was designed to help the Coast Guard address the
complexities of the deepwater maritime environment as the agency assessed
its core needs for the Integrated Deepwater System, a 30-year, $17 billion
acquisition program. It simulates the core functions of the Coast Guard's
maritime operations, analyzes alternative approaches, and projects
performance results derived from adding and subtracting different asset
combinations from its vessel and aircraft fleets.

Source: Coast Guard.

In discussions with us, the Coast Guard has not clearly articulated a
strategy for how these various efforts will weave together. However, Coast
Guard officials told us that more information regarding these efforts will
be included in the agency's strategic blueprint.

Conclusions 	The Coast Guard, like other federal agencies, needs to
continue transforming itself into a more efficient, results-oriented
organization if it is to meet the many fiscal, management, and policy
challenges it is likely to face. At present, the Coast Guard lacks a
systematic approach for explaining the relationship between its
expenditure of resources and its performance results, limiting its ability
to critically examine its resource needs and prioritize program efforts.
Its new steps to improve the tracking of resource usage and assessment of
external factors that may also have a bearing on its ability to meet
performance goals are laudable, though it is still too early to determine
the effect they will have. However, there is currently no assurance that
such efforts will give the Coast Guard a systematic means to effectively
understand and link resources expended with performance achieved. Without
a clear understanding of this linkage or a time frame to ensure that it
gets completed, the agency is at risk of misdirecting resources and
missing further opportunities to increase productivity and efficiency to
ensure the best use of its funds.

In our view, the Coast Guard needs to be clearer about two matters: how
soon it will be able to have comprehensive program-by-program data

about how its personnel spend their time, and how the many actions under
way in its agency-wide strategic planning effort can collectively be used
to establish clearer links between resources and performance. With regard
to the first point, the Coast Guard's project for tracking personnel time
is currently in the pilot stage and has no time frame for completion. With
regard to the second point, the agency's strategic blueprint, which is a
likely place for explaining how the Coast Guard will go about analyzing
the relationship between resources and results, is still in development.
Action on both fronts is necessary to provide information that allows the
Coast Guard to manage more effectively and the Congress to balance the
Coast Guard's resource needs against those of other agencies and programs
at a time when our nation's financial condition and fiscal outlook are
sobering.

  Recommendations

o

o

  Agency Comments

To provide the Coast Guard and the Congress with critical information
necessary for an efficient and effective allocation of resources, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of
the Coast Guard to:

develop a time frame for expeditiously proceeding with plans for
implementing a system that will accurately account for resources expended
in each of its program areas, and

ensure that the Coast Guard's strategic planning process and its
associated documents include a strategy for (1) identifying intervening
factors that may affect program performance and (2) systematically
assessing the relationship between these factors, resources used, and
results achieved.

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security
and the Coast Guard for their review and comment. The Coast Guard
generally agreed with the facts and recommendations presented in the
report. Coast Guard officials provided a number of technical
clarifications, which we incorporated to ensure the accuracy of our
report. Neither the Department of Homeland Security nor the Coast Guard
took a formal position on GAO's recommendations. In its response, the
Coast Guard raised two points that merit specific responses. The Coast
Guard believes that early in the report, GAO does not fully consider the
changing environment in which the Coast Guard operates, and how this
affects the resources used and results achieved. We believe that we
addressed this issue fully later on in the report where we outline a
number of intervening factors and externalities that could have affected
the agency's performance results. In addition, although the Coast Guard
generally

agreed with our recommendations, the agency believes that its multimission
nature poses a higher degree of difficulty for the agency to implement
these recommendations. We recognize this added challenge, but we do not
believe that it mitigates the Coast Guard's responsibility to take these
steps.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Commandant of the
Coast Guard. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me on (415) 904-2200. Other contacts and acknowledgments are listed in
appendix V.

Margaret T. Wrightson Director, Homeland Security

and Justice Issues

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To determine the trends in resource hours for each Coast Guard program
following the September 11 terrorist attacks, we reviewed our previous
report and resource hour data from the Coast Guard's Abstract of
Operations (AOPS), and the Coast Guard's Aviation Logistics and
Maintenance Information System (ALMIS). The resource hour data, reported
by crews of cutters, boats, and aircraft, represents the hours that these
assets spent in each of the Coast Guard's program areas. We analyzed
resource hour data from fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. We then
compared the fiscal year 2003 data with a pre-September 11 resource hour
baseline level developed by the Coast Guard. This baseline is calculated
by determining the average of the eight quarters of resource hour data
from fiscal year 1999 quarter 4 through fiscal year 2001 quarter 3 and
then multiplying this quarterly average by four to obtain a full year's
average. We recognize that there is an overlap between the pre-September
11 baseline data and some of the fiscal year 2001 data. However, because
the comparisons we made were between the baseline and fiscal year 2003
data we were not concerned that this overlap would affect our results or
our ability to meet our objectives. To determine the reliability of the
data, we (1) reviewed existing documentation about the data and the
systems that produced them, and (2) interviewed knowledgeable agency
officials. We determined that the data was sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report. However, we did not analyze resource hour data
for the marine environmental protection, marine safety, or the other law
enforcement programs. We did not analyze the resource hour data for marine
safety and marine environmental protection programs because these programs
are largely carried out without using Coast Guard assets, and thus the
vast majority of effort related to these programs is not captured in AOPS
or ALMIS. And furthermore, there are no data available that would allow us
to make similar comparisons in the levels of effort for these programs. In
addition, the Coast Guard reported that a surge in resource hours for the
other law enforcement program (hours that were not related to foreign fish
enforcement), was the result of a misinterpretation of port security
activities, and as a result, we did not analyze changes in hours
specifically related to the other law enforcement program.

We reviewed the resource hour data for the remaining programs-search and
rescue; aids to navigation; defense readiness; foreign fish enforcement;
ice operations; illegal drug interdiction; living marine resources;
undocumented migrant interdiction; and ports, waterways, and coastal
security-to identify how resources were utilized across programs both
before and after September 11. In addition, we also spoke with officials
at Coast Guard headquarters and at the Atlantic Area Command in

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Portsmouth, Virginia, and in various Coast Guard district offices and
operational units in Boston, Portsmouth, Miami, New Orleans, and Seattle,
as well as personnel at operational units under these district commands.

To identify changes in performance results compared with increases or
decreases in resource hours, we analyzed the Coast Guard's Periodic Table
of Program Performance as well as its 2003 Performance Report. We assessed
the reliability of the performance data by reviewing existing
documentation about the data and the systems that produced them, and we
interviewed knowledgeable officials. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

We reviewed the performance data to determine how performance changed
between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. We also interviewed Coast Guard
officials within the Coast Guard's Office of Plans, Policy, and Evaluation
and program officials in all 11 of the Coast Guard's programs. We also
reviewed incomplete drafts of the Coast Guard's Strategic Blueprint.

To identify the Coast Guard's efforts to utilize intelligence, technology,
tactics, and partnerships to enhance mission effectiveness, we reviewed
our previous reports, and Congressional Research Service reports. In
addition, we discussed efforts in utilizing intelligence and technology,
developing partnerships, and employing new tactics at Coast Guard
headquarters and district offices that we visited, as well as at local
Coast Guard units under these districts' commands. We also reviewed Coast
Guard mission planning guidance and the Coast Guard's Maritime Strategy
for Homeland Security.

We conducted our work between June 2003 and March 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

This appendix shows, for the nine Coast Guard programs with measurable
resource hours, the trend in these hours from the Coast Guard's
pre-September 11 baseline through fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. In
all, four of the nine programs saw resource hours increase, four saw
declines, and one remained essentially the same.

Homeland security programs such as ports, waterways, and coastal security;
undocumented migrant interdiction; and defense readiness1 were the primary
beneficiaries of the growing Coast Guard resource hours. One non-homeland
security program, ice operations, also experienced an increase in resource
hours. However, compared with the other programs, this program accounted
for relatively few hours.

  Programs with Increasing Resource Hours

    Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security

Prior to the events of September 11, the ports, waterways, and coastal
security program was relatively small, with few resource hours. However,
the program grew significantly after fiscal year 2001. (See fig. 3.) The
program surged from a pre-September 11 baseline of 19,291 resource hours
to 254,640 resource hours in fiscal year 2003. A Coast Guard official in
Group Seattle attributed this substantial increase in resource hours to
the many additional homeland security activities it was performing,
including conducting port security patrols.

1One additional program, other law enforcement (Other LE) also experienced
an increase in resource hours. However, according to Coast Guard
officials, it is likely that the surge in hours in fiscal year 2002 was
the result of a misinterpretation of port security activities. Some Coast
Guard crew entered what should have been PWCS hours under Other LE because
of their interpretation of this data category. Coast Guard officials took
action in fiscal year 2003 to clarify the appropriate categorization of
port security activities and the hours have subsequently declined.

      Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

        Figure 3: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Resource Hours

    Undocumented Migrant Interdiction

The undocumented migrant interdiction program's resource hours surged
significantly in fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 4.) From its pre-September 11
baseline of 29,642 hours, undocumented migrant interdiction resource hours
declined to 21,836 hours in fiscal year 2001 and then grew to 53,559 hours
in fiscal year 2003. A District 7 Coast Guard official indicated that the
additional hours resulted, in part, from increased priority for this
program because of a growing recognition that illegal migrants
successfully entering the United States were the equivalent of a security
breach. In addition, another District 7 Coast Guard official also
attributed the increase to the growing political instability in the
Caribbean, which increased the flow of migrants from that region.

Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

Figure 4: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Resource Hours

Defense Readiness	Defense readiness resource hours grew incrementally
until fiscal year 2003 and then surged upward. The pre-September 11
baseline level of about 6,000 hours accounted for 1 percent of total Coast
Guard hours; by fiscal year 2003, the number of hours had grown to nearly
40,000 hours, or about 5 percent of total hours. (See fig. 5.) The
increased hours were generally a result of 11 cutters and 24 boats being
deployed to Iraq, where they provided security for United States assets.

      Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

                   Figure 5: Defense Readiness Resource Hours

                                 Ice Operations

Ice operations is the one non-homeland security program with resource
hours that increased from its pre-September 11 baseline levels. Ice
operations resource hours increased from a pre-September 11 baseline of
11,935 hours to 17,217 hours by fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 6.) Coast
Guard officials told us that the icebreaker Healy became fully operational
in 2001 and that the addition of this asset contributed to the increased
icebreaking hours as well. Furthermore, according to the Coast Guard, the
weather conditions in fiscal year 2003 contributed to the increased hours
as icebreaking assets needed additional time to address the more severe
ice conditions. However, the increase in hours was smaller, on both a
percentage and an actual basis than the increases for homeland security
programs, and this program has considerably fewer resource hours than most
of the other Coast Guard programs. In fiscal year 2003, the program
accounted for about 2 percent of total Coast Guard resource hours.

      Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

Figure 6: Ice Operations Resource Hours

Resource hours for foreign fish enforcement, living marine resources,
illegal drug interdiction, and search and rescue have declined from their
pre-September 11 levels. Coast Guard officials acknowledged that the
continued emphasis on ports, waterways, and coastal security has made it
difficult for some programs to rebound to their pre-September 11 resource
hour levels.

  Programs with Declining Resource Hours

                            Foreign Fish Enforcement

Resource hours for the foreign fish enforcement program remained below
their pre-September 11 baseline. From the baseline of about 8,000 hours,
foreign fish enforcement hours declined to about 5,100 hours in fiscal
year 2001. By fiscal year 2003, the number of hours had increased to
approximately 6,700 hours, but this was still 16 percent below the
pre-September 11 baseline level. (See fig. 7.) Coast Guard officials
explained that the program is largely demand-driven, in that the incentive
for foreign fishermen to violate regulations is based on such factors as
weather, currents, market rates for fish, and where the fish are located.

      Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

               Figure 7: Foreign Fish Enforcement Resource Hours

                            Living Marine Resources

Living marine resources showed a similar decline in resource hours between
its pre-September 11 level and fiscal year 2003. Resource hours declined
from the pre-September 11 baseline of 91,255 to 67,576 in fiscal year
2003-a 26 percent decline. (See fig. 8.) Coast Guard officials said the
early part of fiscal year 2003 was an unusually low year for domestic
fish; because of the harsh winter weather fishermen did not venture out to
fish. Coast Guard officials also said resource hours in the program tended
to decline when the security threat level was raised, because boats,
ships, and aircraft were reassigned to high security risk areas.

      Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

                Figure 8: Living Marine Resources Resource Hours

                           Illegal Drug Interdiction

The pre-September 11 baseline for illegal drug interdiction resource hours
totaled 122,694 but declined in fiscal year 2002 to 78,002 hours and then
to 69,268 hours in fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 9.) Overall, illegal drug
interdiction resource hours declined 44 percent between the baseline and
fiscal year 2003. According to Coast Guard officials, the illegal drug
interdiction program continued to successfully seize illegal drugs,
despite the decrease in resource hours, in part because improved
intelligence allowed them to better target their drug interdiction
operations. Another factor that the Coast Guard believes has contributed
to their drug interdiction efforts is a 1997 bilateral agreement with the
government of Colombia that has improved cooperation and resulted in
additional seizures and information.

      Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

               Figure 9: Illegal Drug Interdiction Resource Hours

                               Search and Rescue

The search and rescue program's resource hours also remain below
pre-September 11 levels. From its pre-September 11 baseline of 82,689
hours, search and rescue declined to 64,383 resource hours in fiscal year
2003. (See fig. 10.) Coast Guard headquarters officials stated that the
drop in search and rescue hours after September 11 probably resulted from
increased security concerns that discouraged people from boating and fewer
boaters could have resulted in fewer distress calls-a reduced caseload for
the Coast Guard. In addition, a Group Seattle official believed that the
group's prevention efforts and more frequent security patrols may have
contributed to a reduction in hours as well.

Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

Programs with Stable 	Only one Coast Guard program, aids to navigation,
which is a nonhomeland security program, had stable resource hours between
the pre-

Resource Hours September 11 baseline and fiscal year 2003.

Aids to Navigation 	From their pre-September 11 baseline of 112,148 hours,
aids to navigation resource hours rose to 127,827 hours in fiscal year
2001, (an increase of 14 percent), and then declined to 110,456 hours in
fiscal year 2003, which was 2 percent below the pre-September 11 level.
(See fig. 11.) A Coast Guard official said the slight decline resulted
from the addition of more technologically advanced assets, which allow the
Coast Guard to achieve the same results in less time.

Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource Hours

Resource hours 130,000 120,000 110,000 100,000 90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000
50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0

                                    127,827

Pre-9/11 2001 2002 2003 baseline Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard resource hour data.

Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance Measures

To measure its accomplishments, the Coast Guard uses a set of performance
measures developed in accordance with the Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA). GPRA is a key component of a statutory framework that
the Congress put in place during the 1990s to promote a new focus on
results.1 Finding that waste and inefficiency in federal programs were
undermining confidence in government, the Congress sought to hold federal
agencies accountable for the results of federal spending through regular
and systematic performance planning, measurement, and reporting. With the
implementation of GPRA, federal agencies, including the Coast Guard, are
required to set goals, measure performance, and report on their
accomplishments. The act requires that federal agencies establish
long-term strategic goals, as well as annual goals. Agencies must then
measure their performance against the goals they set and report publicly
on how well they are doing.

Coast Guard officials said their performance measures help focus efforts
and link performance to a strategic outcome, manage programs at the
headquarters level, and identify performance gaps.

The Coast Guard currently has performance measures for 10 of its 11
programs.2 While some programs have historically contained multiple
measures, they have been adjusted to one measure per program since the
Coast Guard's transition to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as
shown in table 6 below. The performance measures consist of performance
results, which track the annual progress of each program, and performance
targets, which are the goals their results aim to meet each year.

1For a fuller discussion of the framework, see Managing for Results: The
Statutory Framework for Performance-Based Management and Accountability

(GAO/AIMD/GGD-98-52, January 28, 1998).

2According to Coast Guard officials, performance measures for the ports,
waterways, and coastal security program are under development.

  Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance Measures

Table 6: Coast Guard Performance Measures by Program

       Mission and program Performance measure Homeland security mission

Defense readiness Percentage of time units meet combat readiness status at
C-2 levela

Foreign fish enforcement Number of detected Exclusive Economic Zone
incursions by foreign fishing vessels

Illegal drug interdiction Percentage of cocaine seizures entering the
United States through maritime means

Ports, waterways, and coastal security Not yet determined

Undocumented migrant interdiction	Percentage of interdicted illegal
migrants entering the United States through maritime means

                         Non-homeland security mission

       Aids to navigation Number of collisions, allisions, and groundings

Ice operations Number of waterway closure days

Living marine resources Percentage of fishermen found in compliance with
regulations

Marine environmental protection 	Number of chemical and oil spills greater
than 100 gallons per 100 million short tons shipped

Marine safety	Number of passenger vessel, maritime worker, and
recreational boating fatalities and injuries

Search and rescue Percentage of distressed mariners' lives saved

Source: Coast Guard performance data.

aAccording to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as the
level at which each unit possesses the resources and is trained to
undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is organized or
designed.

For the purposes of this report, we studied performance for 8 of the 10
programs with performance measures. We did not analyze the marine safety
and marine environmental protection programs' performance results because
we were unable to obtain any reasonable measurement of the levels of
effort being directed into these programs, and therefore had no basis for
comparing their resource levels with their performance results.

Overall, for the eight programs we studied, performance results remained
stable or improved between fiscal years 2001 and 2003.3 Of these programs,
all but defense readiness and undocumented migrant interdiction met their
performance targets for fiscal year 2003.

3Illegal drug interdiction was the only exception. Because its fiscal year
2003 performance results will not be calculated until the spring of 2004,
we were unable to assess its results between fiscal years 2001 and 2003.

  Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance Measures

  Programs with Generally Stable Performance Results

    Undocumented Migrant Interdiction

The undocumented migrant interdiction performance measure, which measures
the percentage of migrants interdicted or deterred on maritime routes, had
a result that remained relatively stable, between 82.5 percent to 88.3
percent. (See fig. 12.) Although the Coast Guard did not reach the
program's target level of 87 percent in fiscal year 2003, the result has
remained in this range, plus or minus about six percentage points, since
fiscal year 2001.4 Coast Guard officials said they could not explain the
decline but consider it to be minimal. According to the Coast Guard, in
fiscal year 2003 there were 3,793 successful arrivals and an estimated
threat-the estimated flow of migrants into the United States-of 25,750
migrants, yielding the 85.3 percent result. Although the interdiction rate
decreased slightly, the activity level was up, reflecting the increase in
resource hours dedicated to this mission. (The 2003 Mission Planning
Guidance stipulated that 28,000 hours of cutter and aircraft time be used
for undocumented migrant interdiction, whereas the 2004 guidance
stipulated 47,000 hours of cutter and aircraft time be used.)

In fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard reported 5,331 migrant interdictions
compared with 2,409 in fiscal year 2002, an increase of over 120 percent.5
By comparison, the estimated threat rose by about 18 percent.

4According to Coast Guard officials, the undocumented migrant interdiction
performance measure target was set at 87 percent based on a study done to
incorporate deterrence as a measure of Coast Guard performance.

5The 2002 and 2003 illegal migrant numbers include only those counted in
the undocumented migrant performance measure, which uses the following
four migrant populations, Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the
People's Republic of China.

  Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance Measures

                           Illegal Drug Interdiction

The illegal drug interdiction performance measure-the rate at which the
Coast Guard seizes cocaine-remained relatively steady between fiscal years
2001 and 2002, ranging from 10.6 percent to 11.7 percent.6 (See fig. 13.)
The seizure rate is defined as the metric tons of cocaine seized by the
Coast Guard each fiscal year, divided by the estimated maritime flow of
cocaine for the same year.7 The goal is based on a 1997 Department of
Transportation requirement setting the target baseline at 8.7 percent and
raising it 10 percent every 5 years. The Coast Guard did not meet its
performance target for the drug program in fiscal years 2001 and 2002.
Starting in fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard is changing its illegal drug

6The illegal drug interdiction performance result for fiscal year 2003
will not be calculated until the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine
Movement publishes its flow rate in spring 2004.

7The illegal drug interdiction performance measure includes only cocaine,
because cocaine has an analyzed flow rate and is the preponderant illegal
drug.

  Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance Measures

interdiction performance measure to a removal rather than a seizure rate.
This new measure includes cocaine that is jettisoned or lost as well as
cocaine that is seized. Coast Guard officials believe this new measure
more accurately reflects the total impact of the program on disrupting the
flow of illegal drugs into the United States.8

                                 Ice Operations

Ice operations showed both stable performance results that met performance
targets in fiscal years 2001 and 2003. (See fig. 14.) To meet the target,
the ice operations program must keep winter waterway closures under 8 days
per year for severe winters and under 2 days per year for average winters.
The Coast Guard met this target in fiscal year 2003, with only 7 days of
closures during the severe winter season. Ice

8The target for the new illegal drug interdiction measure was set at 15
percent, determined by looking at the trend of seizures across agencies
and forecasting out 1 year. Coast Guard officials said they will not be
confident in the target for at least 3 years, when they are able to look
at trends in the removal rate and adjust the target to reflect a more
realistic goal.

  Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance Measures

operations program managers attribute their success to good planning. Each
year officials from the Canadian Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and the United States Coast Guard hold a
planning conference to develop a winter severity assessment. If the
assessment determines the weather will be severe, they develop a strategy
to dedicate more assets to ice operations in order to meet the target.

                            Living Marine Resources

The performance measure for living marine resources-defined as the
percentage of fishermen complying with federal regulations-remained stable
between 97.1 and 98.6 percent over the past 3 years. The program also met
its target of 97 percent, which was first established in fiscal year 2003.
(See fig. 15.) Coast Guard officials attribute these results to concerted
efforts to improve operational efficiency particularly through a vessel
monitoring system and better intelligence sharing while working more
closely with federal and state enforcement partners. Coast Guard officials
said 16 of the 97 significant violations detected in fiscal year 2003,
such as damage to the fish stock, were accomplished through these new
efforts.

  Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance Measures

                               Search and Rescue

Between fiscal years 2001 and 2003, the search and rescue program's
performance results were steady. The performance measure for this program
is the percentage of mariners' lives saved from imminent danger. The range
over the 3 years was 84.2 percent to 87.7 percent, and the result in
fiscal year 2003 was above the target of 85 percent. (See fig. 16.) Coast
Guard officials attributed the improvement to continued focus on the
search and rescue program. The Coast Guard has also added 950 new
positions to the program since 2001. The Coast Guard indicated that this
personnel increase is reportedly helping manage surge requirements as they
occur.

  Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance Measures

  Programs with Improved Performance Results

Foreign Fish Enforcement 	The performance results for foreign fish
enforcement, which indicate the number of foreign vessel incursions into
the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),9 dropped from 250
incursions in fiscal year 2002 to 153 incursions in fiscal year 2003. (See
fig. 17.) Because of this

9The EEZ, established by the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act, is the United States' maximum exclusive economic zone,
which extends 200 miles from U.S. shores. Within the EEZ, U.S. citizens
have primary harvesting rights to fish stocks.

Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance
Measures

improvement, foreign fish enforcement met its target for fiscal year 2003.
(In this case, since the goal is to minimize incursions, a decline is a
positive result.) The decrease was greatest along the United
States/Russian maritime boundary line (6 incursions versus 22 incursions
in fiscal year 2002) and in the Central and Western Pacific region (15
incursions versus 89 in fiscal year 2002). The Coast Guard reported that
the drop along the United States/Russian boundary line was due to a
near-constant enforcement presence, increased presence of Russian patrol
vessels in the vicinity, and a stronger enforcement posture on the Coast
Guard's part, including the option of employing warning shots and
disabling fire against violators. The decrease in observed incursions in
the Central and Western Pacific was more difficult for the Coast Guard to
explain. One potential explanation the Coast Guard gave was reduced cutter
and aircraft coverage, brought on by the need to shift resources to thwart
known ongoing illegal high seas drift net fishing in the North Pacific.
According to the Coast Guard, this lack of enforcement could have reduced
detections, but since most detected incursions in recent years have come
from third party reports and intelligence sources rather than directly
from Coast Guard enforcement assets, they do not believe lack of
enforcement to be the cause of this shift.

Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance
Measures

                               Aids to Navigation

The aids to navigation program performance measure-which assesses the
total number of collisions, allisions10, and groundings-also demonstrated
improved results between fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The number of
incidents declined from 1,936 in fiscal year 2002 to 1,523 in fiscal year
2003, a decrease of 21 percent in the last year. (See fig. 18.)
Furthermore, the program met its target level in each of the three years.
Coast Guard officials attribute their performance success to two
reasons-an improved navigational infrastructure, and use of activities
such as vessel inspection and mariner licensing and examination to reduce
causal factors in collisions, allisions, and groundings.

10The Coast Guard defines allisions as vessel collisions with fixed
objects versus collisions, which are vessel collisions with moveable
objects.

  Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance Measures

                               Defense Readiness

Defense readiness, as measured by the percentage of time units meet combat
readiness status at a C-2 level,11 improved during fiscal years 2001 to
2003. The percentage of time that defense readiness was at a C-2 level
rose from 67 percent fiscal year 2001 to 78 percent in fiscal year 2003.
However, defense readiness did not meet its target of 100 percent
readiness. (See fig. 19.) The Coast Guard reported that this was due to
equipment problems associated with operating aging ships and unit training
deficiencies such as cutters not having sufficient training time to
perform gunnery exercises.

11According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as the
level at which each unit possesses the resources and is trained to
undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is organized or
designed.

Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Performance
Measures

Figure 19: Defense Readiness Performance Results and Target by Fiscal Year

Percent

100         Target floor set at 100%. (The Coast 
               Guard must meet or exceed the target 
90         to achieve the goal.)                 
80      78 

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
2001 2002 2003
Fiscal year

Performance actuals

Performance target Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard performance data.

Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard Approaches to Enhance Operational
Efficiency

One of the issues that we discussed with agency officials at Coast Guard
headquarters and all five districts we visited was their efforts to
utilize intelligence, technology, tactics, and partnerships to leverage
existing resources. Coast Guard officials provided examples of new efforts
that ranged in scope from agency-wide to location-specific. Greater access
to intelligence information, new technologies and tactics, and a number of
new or improved partnerships have likely increased efficiency to a degree,
but in most cases the Coast Guard is unable to measure the impacts.

The following tables show selected examples of these efforts. The examples
provided in the tables are not a comprehensive list of all Coast Guard
efforts in these four areas, but they serve to illustrate the variety of
efforts under way.

Intelligence efforts are primarily aimed at increasing the Coast Guard's
collection and analytical capabilities to enhance the usage of
intelligence information. Greater coordination with external entities is
another emphasis, adding to the amount of intelligence that the Coast
Guard receives and is able to act upon. Table 7 shows examples of efforts
at various Coast Guard levels.

Intelligence

               Table 7: Selected Examples of Intelligence Efforts

                    Coast Guard location Intelligence effort

Coast Guard-wide 	Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC). This strategic
intelligence center serves as the focal point for interaction with the
intelligence components of the Department of Defense, other law
enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community. The ICC supports all
Coast Guard missions and is the center for Coast Guard intelligence
collection and management.

Atlantic area 	Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC). The Hampton Roads
JHOC is a collaborative effort of the Navy and Coast Guard that provides
an effective command, control, communications, and computer system and
information, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability. The JHOC
is to be assigned 9 Navy and 22 Coast Guard positions and is currently
staffed with Coast Guard and Navy reservists.

Districts 	Field intelligence support teams. These consist of Coast Guard
intelligence analysts and Coast Guard special agents. They provide
tactical intelligence support to Coast Guard captains of the port by
collecting information and reporting suspicious or criminal activity in
the port areas, sharing information with other agencies at the local
level, and rapidly disseminating intelligence to the captain of the port
and other local commanders.

Sector New Orleans 	Combined Operations and Intelligence Node (COIN). This
effort includes a shared operations center staffed by personnel from the
four Coast Guard commands located in or around New Orleans. The chief goal
of COIN is to improve mission performance and tactical awareness through
the efficient use of limited resources.

Source: Coast Guard.

Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard Approaches to Enhance Operational
Efficiency

Technology 	Most technology acquisitions are done Coast Guard-wide, and
the examples in table 8 reflect this focus. However, some districts and
units have purchased or developed unique technologies to operate in their
environment. The table shows several examples, including one unique to the
fifth district (Portsmouth, VA), where a database has been designed to
provide the real-time status of assets and personnel.

Table 8: Selected Examples of Technology Efforts

                      Coast Guard location New technology

Coast Guard-wide 	Night vision goggles. Used by cutter, aircraft, and
maritime safety and security team personnel during periods of darkness,
these goggles allow for safer operations and enhanced ability to detect
intrusions.

Self-locating datum marker buoys. For the search and rescue program, these
new buoys provide more up-to-date data that can be used to better
determine where to begin a search. The Coast Guard intends for this
technology to improve both search effectiveness and efficiency.

Pilot program in various Coast Guard Personal data assistant (PDA). In
several locations, PDAs are being used by boarding

locations 	officers and marine inspectors to conduct their work. The Coast
Guard expects that using PDAs will reduce redundant paperwork and
facilitate electronic database entries.

District 5 SMARTS. This is a database created by personnel in District 5
to provide information

Portsmouth, Va. 	about assets and personnel. This database is updated
throughout the day by groups within the district and can also be used to
analyze trend data. Officials in the fifth district told us that this data
system saves both time and resources, because the information it provides
would typically require numerous phone calls throughout the day.

Source: Coast Guard.

Tactics 	Modifying standard operating procedures and improving the way
that routine activities are carried out can lead to greater efficiencies,
enhancing mission effectiveness. Coast Guard officials cited various
examples of how they had done so-often with the help of the other types of
efforts (intelligence, technology, and partnerships). Table 9 outlines
examples of new Coast Guard tactics that officials described to us as
improving efficiency.

Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard Approaches to Enhance Operational
Efficiency

Table 9: Selected Examples of New Tactics

                        Coast Guard location New tactic

Coast Guard-wide 	Advanced notice of arrival (NOA). The former 24-hour NOA
prior to entering a United States port has been extended to 96 hours. The
information provided with the NOA includes details on the crew,
passengers, cargo, and the vessel itself. This increase in notice has
enabled the Coast Guard to screen more vessels in advance of arrival and
allows additional time to prepare for boardings.

Pacific and Atlantic area commands 	Maritime safety and security teams
(MSSTs). These 100-person units, established after the September 11
attacks, provide a fast-deployment capability for homeland security,
search and rescue, and law enforcement programs. MSSTs will deploy in
support of national security special events such as Super Bowls and
Olympics, as well as for severe weather recovery operations, protection of
military load-outs, enforcement of security zones, defense of critical
waterside facilities in strategic ports, and interdiction of illegal
activities.

District 8 Inland River Vessel Movement Center. Starting in March 2003,
vessels with certain dangerous

New Orleans, La. 	cargos must report their crew and cargo as they move on
the Mississippi River. The integration software the Coast Guard utilizes
for this tracking is new, but there is no new technology required for the
industry participants. This tactic allows for easier and more consistent
tracking of these cargos during transits through densely populated areas.

Source: Coast Guard.

Partnerships 	In a past examination of Coast Guard activities, we
commented that leveraging resources through partnerships provides mission
efficiency to the Coast Guard.1 The Coast Guard has attempted to develop
ways to partner more effectively with local, state, and federal agencies,
as well as with public and private entities, and we found a number of
examples in the locations that we visited, especially for homeland
security. Coast Guard officials told us that these relationships were not
necessarily new but had certainly improved since September 11. Table 10
highlights some of these examples. They include new efforts in
collaborating with other DHS entities. Coast Guard officials told us that
while in some instances these relationships existed prior to the formation
of DHS, they have grown stronger with the creation of the new department.

1U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard Strategy Needed for Setting
and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions (GAO-03-155, November
2002).

     Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard Approaches to Enhance Operational
                                   Efficiency

Table 10: Selected Examples of Coast Guard Partnership Efforts Coast Guard
                              location Partnership

District 7 DHS Partners Forum Southeast Florida Region. This group was
formed to promote closer cooperation in

Miami	southeast Florida among agencies moving to DHS. The objectives
include sharing information and developing and implementing new
coordinated initiatives. There are four interagency working groups that
include operations/communications, intelligence, information management
and public affairs, and mass migration planning.

District 8 Field Targeting Center (FTC). Customs and Border Protection's
(CBP) Office of Field Operations brings

Sector New Orleans 	together members of CBP, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard to screen and target
vessels. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans placed a watch stander at FTC to
establish a cooperative screening of all incoming vessels. As a result of
the partnership, the Coast Guard was also able to get access to two
systems that greatly improved information about incoming vessels and their
crewmembers and passengers.

District 5 Navy. In addition to collaborating with the Navy on the Joint
Harbor Operations Center (highlighted in table

Group Hampton Roads 	7), the Coast Guard partners with the Navy on a
number of different initiatives in the fifth district to combine resources
and avoid overlap. Since 2001, the Navy has provided vessels to the Coast
Guard for naval escorts, and now some of these vessels are staffed with
law enforcement detachments and MSSTs. Group Hampton Roads also maintains
an active working group with Navy officials, and the group meets often to
discuss overlapping issues including enforcement of the local security
zone and joint law enforcement boardings.

District 13 Washington State Ferries (WSF). WSF is the largest ferry
system in the United States and one of the Marine Safety Office Coast
Guard's greatest security concerns in the Northwest. WSF, the Washington
State Patrol, and local Puget Sound Coast Guard officials have established
a committee to identify goals and recommendations concerning

ferry security, including the refinement of a rapid response information
network to be used when specific

threats are detected.

Source: Coast Guard.

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts 	Margaret Wrightson (415) 904-2200 Randall B. Williamson
(206) 287-4860

Staff In addition to those named above, William Bates, Elizabeth Curda,
Michele Fejfar, Dawn Hoff, David Hooper, Dawn Locke, Allen Lomax, Heather
Acknowledgments MacLeod, Eileen Peguero, and Stan Stenersen made key
contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security (GAO-03-594T, April 1, 2003).

Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor
Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions (GAO-03-544T, March
12, 2003).

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It Transitions to
the New Department (GAO-03-467T, February 12, 2003).

Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort
for All Missions (GAO-03-155, November 12, 2002).

Managing for Results: Agency Progress in Linking Performance Plans with
Budgets and Financial Statements (GAO-02-236, January 4, 2002).

Performance Budgeting: Initial Experiences under the Results Act in
Linking Plans with Budgets (GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67, April 12, 1999).

Managing for Results: Measuring Program Results That Are under Limited
Federal Control (GAO/GGD-99-16, December 11, 1998).

The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing Agency Annual
Performance Plans (GAO/GGD-10.1.20, April 1998).

Managing for Results: The Statutory Framework for Performance-Based
Management and Accountability (GAO/AIMD/GGD-98-52, January 28, 1998).

Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring Performance

(GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 1997).

Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and
Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996).

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