Defense Management: Continuing Questionable Reliance on 	 
Commercial Contracts to Demilitarize Excess Ammunition When	 
Unused, Environmentally Friendly Capacity Exists at Government	 
Facilities (02-APR-04, GAO-04-427R).				 
                                                                 
In April 2001, we reported that the Army Materiel Command's	 
guidance required that 50 percent of the excess conventional	 
ammunition demilitarization budget--a figure for which we did not
find any analytical basis--be set aside for commercial firms that
use environmentally friendly demilitarization processes. This	 
resulted in the retention and underutilization of environmentally
friendly demilitarization capabilities at government facilities  
and in additional program costs. We thus recommended that the	 
Department of Defense (DOD) develop a plan in consultation with  
Congress that included procedures for assessing the appropriate  
mix of government and commercial sector capacity needed to	 
demilitarize excess ammunition. Our intent was to have DOD	 
reexamine the cost-effectiveness of using commercial versus	 
government facilities to demilitarize excess ammunition. Over the
past several months we have conducted work to determine the	 
specific actions taken to implement our recommendation. We made  
extensive use of our prior work as a baseline to compare the	 
changes in demilitarization capacity and utilization at 	 
government-owned facilities since our prior report. We conducted 
our analysis of DOD's demilitarization program in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. The purpose of 
this letter is to note that (1) the Army has taken only limited  
steps in response to our recommendation and (2) additional	 
actions are needed to address our recommendation.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-427R					        
    ACCNO:   A09665						        
  TITLE:     Defense Management: Continuing Questionable Reliance on  
Commercial Contracts to Demilitarize Excess Ammunition When	 
Unused, Environmentally Friendly Capacity Exists at Government	 
Facilities							 
     DATE:   04/02/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Ammunition 					 
	     Military budgets					 
	     Privatization					 
	     Inventory control					 
	     Surplus federal property				 

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GAO-04-427R

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

April 2, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense

Subject: Defense Management: Continuing Questionable Reliance on
Commercial Contracts to Demilitarize Excess Ammunition When Unused,
Environmentally Friendly Capacity Exists at Government Facilities

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In April 2001, we reported that the Army Materiel Command's guidance
required that 50 percent of the excess conventional ammunition
demilitarization budget-a figure for which we did not find any analytical
basis-be set aside for commercial firms that use environmentally friendly
demilitarization processes. This resulted in the retention and
underutilization of environmentally friendly demilitarization

1

capabilities at government facilities and in additional program costs. We
thus recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) develop a plan in
consultation with Congress that included procedures for assessing the
appropriate mix of government and commercial sector capacity needed to
demilitarize excess ammunition. Our intent was to have DOD reexamine the
cost-effectiveness of using commercial versus government facilities to
demilitarize excess ammunition. Over the past several months we have
conducted work to determine the specific actions taken to implement our
recommendation. We made extensive use of our prior work as a baseline to
compare the changes in demilitarization capacity and utilization at
government-owned facilities since our prior report. We conducted our
analysis of DOD's demilitarization program in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. The purpose of this letter is to
bring to your attention that (1) the Army has taken only limited steps in
response to our recommendation and (2) additional actions are needed to
address our recommendation.

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Steps the Army Can
Take to Improve the Management and Oversight of Excess Ammunition,
GAO-01-372 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2001). As described in the report,
the Army defines demilitarization as the act of removing the military
offensive or defensive characteristics from munitions or otherwise
rendering munitions innocuous or ineffectual for military use.
Demilitarization includes, but is not limited to, processes involving
resource recovery, recycling, reutilization, disassembly, conversion, melt
out/steam out/wash out, incineration, open burning, and open detonation,
to name a few.

Results in Brief

The Army continues to set aside 50 percent of the demilitarization budget
to commercial firms, resulting in program inefficiencies and additional
costs. In commenting on our recommendation in the April 2001 report, DOD
stated that the Army was preparing a study for Congress, due September 30,
2001, that could be used to address the mix of government and commercial
sector capacity needed to demilitarize excess ammunition.2 The Army study
concluded that, based upon its analysis of different commercial/government
facility mixes, more ammunition could be demilitarized through greater
reliance on existing environmentally friendly processes available at
government-owned facilities. Nonetheless, the excess ammunition
demilitarization program is still operated on Army Materiel Command
guidance that requires a 50/50 split of funding between government and
commercial demilitarization projects. This predetermined funding
allocation, combined with increased government facility capacity to
demilitarize excess ammunition and paying a commercial firm to have
ammunition demilitarized by government employees, exacerbates the costs
and related inefficiencies to operate the program.

Based on our follow-up efforts and analysis, this letter includes
recommendations for executive action to enable the Army to operate a more
efficient program and be better able to assess the demilitarization
capacity needed at its government facilities. In commenting on a draft of
the letter, DOD concurred with our recommendations and identified steps
that it is taking to implement them.

Background

The Secretary of the Army is the designated single manager of conventional
ammunition for the Department of Defense. Under that umbrella, the Product
Manager for Demilitarization is responsible for managing the
demilitarization of

                                       3

conventional munitions for all of the military services. Demilitarization
of conventional munitions takes place at government ammunition depots,
plants, and centers-operated by the Joint Munitions Command, a subordinate
command of the Army Materiel Command-and at contracted commercial firms.4
With the end of the Cold War, the services' need for conventional
ammunition was significantly reduced, and by 1993 the Army reported a
backlog of excess ammunition awaiting demilitarization that amounted to
354,000 tons, an amount that has since increased to about 381,000 tons at
the end of fiscal year 2003. To address this backlog, the Product Manager
for Demilitarization's strategic plan includes a goal to reduce,

2 Joint Ordnance Commanders Group Munitions Demil/Disposal Subgroup Closed
Disposal
Technology Study (McAlester, Okla.: Sept. 2001). The study was in response
to H.R. 106-754, directing
the Army to prepare a report on the feasibility of replacing open burning
and detontating processes
with closed disposal technologies.
3 The Product Manager for Demilitarization is a management office of the
Army Acquisition Corps and
chartered by the Army Acquisition Executive (the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics & Technology). The Product Manager for Demilitarization is under
the Office of the Project
Manager for Joint Services reporting to the Program Executive Officer for
Ammunition. The Secretary
of the Army is the DOD-designated Single Manager for Conventional
Ammunition and the Program
Executive Officer for Ammunition, as designated by the Secretary of the
Army, acts as the single
manager for conventional ammunition executor.
4 Until December 2002, the Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command, as
designated by the Secretary of
the Army, acted as the single manager for conventional ammunition for DOD.

through reasonable measures, the stockpile of excess conventional
ammunition to 100,000 tons and 30,000 missiles in future years-considered
a manageable level because higher quantities of excess ammunition are
believed to impede access to needed ammunition and hinder the Army's
ability to effectively support contingency operations.

In April 2001, we reported that the Army Materiel Command had previously
issued guidance requiring that at least 50 percent of the excess
conventional ammunition demilitarization budget be set aside for
commercial firms that use resource, recovery,

5

and recycling processes. While this guidance came about as a result of a
request by the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
Defense for DOD to look to commercial firms for environmentally friendly
processes that could be used to help demilitarize excess ammunition, the
Army Materiel Command initiated and expanded this effort without
considering the impact on government facilities that have similar
environmentally friendly demilitarization processes. Our report showed
that the increased use of commercial firms to perform demilitarization
resulted in the retention and underutilization of the more environmentally
friendly resource, recovery, and recycling capabilities at government
facilities. In fiscal year 2001, the government facilities were projected
to operate at only 20 percent of their overall resource, recovery, and
recycling demilitarization capacity. We also reported that additional
costs were being incurred when a commercial firm undertook ammunition
demilitarization for the Army, then contracted a portion of the work to
three government facilities. The Army could have demilitarized the
ammunition for less had it overseen the work itself.

Our report stressed the need for a greater emphasis on cost-effectiveness
and efficiency in deciding the appropriate mix of government and
commercial demilitarization capacities instead of setting aside a
predetermined 50 percent of the demilitarization budget for commercial
firms-a percentage for which we did not find any analytical basis. In
response to our concern, DOD stated that the Army was already preparing a
study for Congress that addressed the feasibility of replacing open
burning and open detonation with closed disposal technologies, and that
this report, due September 30, 2001, could also be used to address the mix
of government/commercial sector capacity needed to demilitarize excess
ammunition.6

The Army's Closed Disposal Technology Study used a computer-modeling
inputoutput tool that integrates operating costs, capacity, and other
variables in the demilitarization program to produce an optimal long-range
demilitarization plan to

7

help determine the government/contractor mix for its demilitarization
program. The

5 GAO-01-372.
6 Joint Ordnance Commanders Group Munitions Demil/Disposal Subgroup,
Closed Disposal
Technology Study (McAlester, Okla.: Sept. 2001). HouseReport106-754
directed the study. H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 106-754, at 99 (2000). On September 27, 2001, the study was sent
to the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense; the
Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense; and the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the House
Committee on Armed Services.
7 We did not assess the reliability of the model or validate the results;
however, we did interview
agency officials knowledgeable about the model and its data and we did
take steps to confirm that the
model results appeared to be consistent. Additional details are provided
in the scope and
methodology section.

study considered three options. Option 1 represented the current practice
of allocating a predetermined 50 percent of the demilitarization funding
to commercial firms; option 2 eliminated commercial firms from
consideration; and option 3 had no predetermined funding allocation
between commercial firms and government facilities. All three options
required a minimum 65 percent utilization of environmentally friendly
resource, recovery, and recycling processes.

According to the Army study, option 1 resulted in the greatest overall
cost per ton over the 10-year period. Option 2 resulted in the lowest
overall cost per ton; however, this was not considered a viable option
because government facilities do not have resource, recovery, and
recycling processes to demilitarize some types of ammunition. Under option
3, which was not constrained by a predetermined funding percentage
assigned to commercial firms and government facilities, the study analysis
identified a more cost-effective option than currently being pursued. The
Army's model projected that the Army could more effectively use about
$70.8 million in planned funding and demilitarize an additional 4,001 tons
of ammunition during fiscal years 2002 through 2011 compared to the
current practice of allocating 50 percent of the demilitarization funding
to commercial firms (see table 1). Under this option, over a 10-year
period 29 percent of the demilitarization budget would go to commercial
firms and 71 percent would go to government facilities, including use of
the government's own environmentally friendly processes.

Table 1: Army Study Results Comparing Costs and Tons of Excess Ammunition
Demilitarized by Devoting 50 Percent and 29 Percent of the
Demilitarization Budget to Commercial Firms, Aggregate for Fiscal Years
2002-11

                                 Study results

       50 percent commercial firms 29 percent commercial firms Potential cost
                                    savings and additional tons demilitarized

            Costs                $890.7M           $819.9M             $70.8M 
          Total tons                                            
        demilitarized            752,993           756,994              4,001 
       Average cost per                                         
             ton                $1,182.87         $1,083.08            $99.79 

Source: GAO analysis of Closed Disposal Technology Study.

The Army study concluded that, based upon its analysis, the
demilitarization program
should not assign a predetermined funding percentage to commercial firms
and
government facilities.

Army Practice Remains Unchanged,
Resulting in Inefficiencies and Additional Costs

Despite the results of the Closed Disposal Technology Study, the Army
continues to set aside 50 percent of the demilitarization budget to
commercial firms, resulting in program inefficiencies and additional
costs. According to the Product Manager for

Demilitarization, the demilitarization program is still operated on
guidance received from the Army Materiel Command that requires a 50/50
split of funding between government and commercial demilitarization
projects. Moreover, since 2001, government facilities have increased their
capacity to demilitarize excess ammunition using resource, recovery, and
recycling processes from about 81,100 tons per year to about 156,600 tons
per year, which has further exacerbated the inefficiencies associated with
the existence of excess capacities in government facilities. This excess
is further compounded by the realization that the maximum amount of excess
ammunition that the Army can demilitarize using the resource, recovery,
and recycling methods is limited to 170,946 tons out of the 381,000 tons
in the stockpile.

The increased government capacity and continued use of commercial firms to
demilitarize excess ammunition at the same time the government facilities
have existing excess capacity continues to raise questions about the
appropriate mix of government and commercial sector capacity needed to
demilitarize excess ammunition and the cost efficiency of the
demilitarization program. Specifically, based on the current practice of
setting aside 50 percent of the demilitarization budget for commercial
demilitarization, we estimate that government facilities will operate at
only 6 percent of their overall environmentally friendly demilitarization
capacity to recover and reuse 156,600 tons of excess ammunition in fiscal
year 2004 (see table 2).

Table 2: Government Facility Recovery and Reuse Demilitarization Capacity
and Planned Use in Fiscal Year 2004 Location

Recovery and reuse capacity (tons)

                           Recovery and reuse demilitarization planned (tons)

Percent of capacity to be used

          Anniston                1,000               0                     0 
         Blue Grass              14,000               0                     0 
            Crane                13,300             1,584                  12 
          Hawthorne              49,000             4,599                   9 
            Iowa                 14,000             1,517                  11 
         Letterkenny              1,000               0                     0 
          Lone Star               2,000               0                     0 
            Milan                 1,800               0                     0 
          McAlester              25,000             2,010                   8 
         Pine Bluff               3,500               0                     0 
          Red River               1,000               0                     0 
           Sierra                24,000               0                     0 
           Tooele                 7,000               0                     0 
            Total                156,600            9,710                   6 

 Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Defense Ammunition Center and the
                     Product Manager for Demilitarization.

In addition, the Army continues to incur additional and unnecessary costs
to the demilitarization program through its practice of contracting with a
commercial firm to undertake ammunition demilitarization, which in turn
contracted a portion of the

8

work to three government facilities. In essence, the Army paid a
commercial firm to have the ammunition demilitarized by government
employees and incurred higher than necessary costs. More specifically, in
one instance the commercial firm undertook ammunition demilitarization of
1,848 items for the Army for about $563 per item, and then contracted some
of the work to a government facility for about $141 per item. If the Army
had placed greater emphasis on cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency, the
Army could have demilitarized the ammunition for about $780,000 less had
it overseen the work itself.

Conclusion

As we have previously noted, while it may be appropriate to rely on the
private sector to enhance demilitarization capabilities, the continued use
of the private sector to demilitarize excess ammunition at the same time
the government facilities have excess capacity raises the question of
whether the government is sponsoring too much capacity. Likewise, such
limitations in use of government facilities continues to result in less
demilitarization than would otherwise be possible even under existing
funding levels. We do not believe that the Army has taken sufficient
action to address the recommendation we made in our April 2001 report,
which called for the department to develop a plan in consultation with
Congress that includes procedures for assessing the appropriate mix of
government and commercial sector capacity needed to demilitarize excess
ammunition and the cost-effectiveness of using contractors versus
government facilities to demilitarize excess ammunition, with specific
actions identified for addressing the capacity issue. We also do not
believe that the Army has taken sufficient action to address the results
of its Closed Disposal Technology Study, which concluded that the
demilitarization program should not assign a predetermined funding
percentage to commercial firms and government facilities, thus validating
our findings and recommendation. Further, by paying a commercial firm to
have excess ammunition demilitarized by government employees, the Army
incurs higher than necessary costs. Until the Army discontinues its
practice of setting aside 50 percent of the demilitarization budget to
commercial firms and implements a more analytically based approach to
workload allocations-such as set forth in the Closed Disposal Technology
Study-that eliminates any predetermined funding allocation and
discontinues the practice of paying a commercial firm to oversee the work
of government employees, the Army will continue to underutilize
demilitarization capacity at government facilities and risk incurring
additional program costs.

8 The commercial firm entered into agreements for demilitarization
services with government facilities at McAlester, Oklahoma; Crane,
Indiana; and Tooele, Utah.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To enable the Army to operate a more efficient program and be better able
to assess the demilitarization capacity needed at its government
facilities, we recommend that you direct the Secretary of the Army to take
the following three steps:

o  	discontinue the practice of setting aside an arbitrary 50 percent of
the demilitarization budget to commercial firms;

o  	implement a more analytically based approach to demilitarization
workload allocations such as demonstrated in the Closed Disposal
Technology Study analysis in which no arbitrary, predetermined funding
allocation is made to commercial firms and government facilities; and

o  	discontinue the practice of paying a commercial firm to have
ammunition demilitarized by government employees when the work can be
overseen by the Army for less cost.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit
a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on
Government Reform not later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
letter. A written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for
appropriations made more than 60 calendar days after the date of this
letter.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Director of Defense Systems in the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provided written
comments on a draft of this letter. DOD's comments are reprinted in the
enclosure. DOD agreed with our recommendations and identified steps that
it is taking to implement them. In commenting on our recommendation to
discontinue the practice of setting aside an arbitrary 50 percent of the
demilitarization budget to commercial firms, DOD stated that the U.S. Army
Materiel Command has rescinded this policy and that the fiscal year 2005
demilitarization program will not be constrained by a predetermined
percentage set aside for the private sector.

In commenting on our recommendation to implement a more analytically based
approach to demilitarization workload allocations, DOD stated that it will
establish a team to perform a study to determine an analytical based
approach for allocating demilitarization workload for the private sector
and government and for enhancing its computer-modeling program to be more
robust as a decision making tool, including performing planning and
analysis of government and commercial demilitarization workload. DOD
stated that it plans to complete the study during fiscal year 2004 and to
implement the results early in fiscal year 2005.

In commenting on our recommendation to discontinue the practice of paying
a commercial firm to have ammunition demilitarized by government employees
when the work can be overseen by the Army for less cost, DOD stated that
it will add language to the follow-on commercial contract, anticipated for
award in early fiscal

year 2005, addressing the involvement between industry and government that
considers an economic-cost benefit analysis and awards demilitarization
workload without regard to location of execution when an effort is in the
best interests of the government.

Scope and Methodology

To identify any limitations in the actions that the Army has taken in
response to a recommendation contained in our prior report on the Army's
management and oversight of excess ammunition, we reviewed applicable
policies, procedures, and documents governing the demilitarization
program. We made extensive use of our prior work as a baseline to compare
the changes in demilitarization capacity and utilization at
government-owned facilities since our prior report.9 We reviewed the
Army's Closed Disposal Technology Study and analyzed the report's scope
and methodology, findings, and conclusions related to the appropriate mix
of government and commercial sector utilization needed to demilitarize
excess ammunition. The Army's study used a computer-modeling tool that
integrates operating cost, capacity, and other variables in the
demilitarization program to produce an optimal long-range demilitarization
plan. Additionally, various forms of constraints can be placed on the
model, such as requiring the model to execute a certain percentage of
demilitarization operations using resource, recovery, and recycling
processes; allocating a certain minimum funding to commercial firms; or
providing a specified level of workload to selected locations, either
commercial firms or government facilities. For the study, the model used
the following input data:

o  	demilitarization capabilities and capacities available at government
and commercial facilities;

o  existing and forecasted inventory levels of excess ammunition;

o  funding levels for each year's forecasted demilitarization program;

o  	transportation costs between demilitarization locations, to include
packing, crating, and handling;

o  	percentages of resource, recovery, and recycling processes and open
burning and open detonation/incineration processes, by weight, for various
types of ammunition; and

o  costs to perform demilitarization at government and commercial
facilities.

While we did not assess the reliability of the model or validate the
results, we did interview agency officials knowledgeable about the model
and its data and we reviewed the types of input data and the constraints
placed on the model to assure ourselves that the results appeared to be
consistent. This allowed us to understand whether DOD's current practice
is the most cost-effective program, considering capability, capacity, and
cost data for both government and commercial facilities. Based on our
analyses, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this letter.

To obtain current demilitarization program information and action taken
since our report was published in April 2001, we met with officials and
performed work at the

9 GAO-01-372.

Office of the Product Manager for Demilitarization, Picatinney Arsenal,
New Jersey; McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma; Army
Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and U.S. Army Defense Ammunition
Center, McAlester, Oklahoma. For example, to assess the extent that the
Army used commercial firms to demilitarize excess ammunition and its
impact on the utilization of environmentally friendly demilitarization
processes at government facilities, we obtained Army data on the
government facilities' capabilities to demilitarize excess ammunition and
compared the Army's demilitarization plans to these capabilities. This
allowed us to identify and calculate excess capacity situations and
compare this data with our prior work done on excess capacity at
government facilities. We also obtained and reviewed contractor agreements
with government facilities to perform the demilitarization work and
evaluated contract information provided by the Army and by one government
facility to determine if the government facility could have demilitarized
the ammunition for less cost than was incurred by the Army's contract with
this firm. We interviewed Army officials about the cost-effectiveness of
relying on commercial firms to demilitarize excess ammunition at the same
time that government facilities have similar demilitarization
capabilities.

We conducted our analysis of DOD's demilitarization program from June 2003
through January 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

-----We are sending copies of this letter to the appropriate congressional
committees and interested congressional committees and members. The letter
is also available on GAO's homepage at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your
staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this letter, please
contact me at (202) 512-5581. Key contributors to this letter were Ron
Berteotti, Roger Tomlinson, Chad Factor, and Robert Wild.

Sincerely yours,
Barry Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosure

                         Enclosure Enclosure Enclosure

(350394)

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