    Biscuit Fire: Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability,
    and Personnel Certification Standards (12-APR-04, GAO-04-426).

    In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland
    fire seasons in the past 50 years--almost 7 million acres burned.
    These fires included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in
    the past century--the Biscuit Fire. Following a lightning storm,
    five fires were discovered in the Siskiyou National Forest over a
    3- day period beginning July 13. These fires eventually burned
    together to form the Biscuit Fire, which burned nearly 500,000
    acres in southern Oregon and Northern California and cost over
    $150 million to extinguish. GAO evaluated (1) whether policies
    and procedures were in place for acquiring needed firefighting
    resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and the
    extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when
    the fire was first identified; (2) what resource management
    issues, if any, affected the ability of personnel to fight the
    fire; and (3) what differences, if any, existed in key
    certification standards for personnel among federal and state
    agencies and whether these differences affected efforts to
    respond to the fire. In commenting on a draft of this report, the
    Forest Service stated that the report appears to be accurate and
    the agency generally agrees with its contents. The Department of
    the Interior did not provide comments.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-426
        ACCNO:   A09731
      TITLE:     Biscuit Fire: Analysis of Fire Response, Resource
    Availability, and Personnel Certification Standards
         DATE:   04/12/2004
      SUBJECT:   Emergency preparedness
    	     Environmental policies
    	     Fire fighters
    	     Forest management
    	     Personnel management
    	     Wilderness areas
    	     Internal controls
    	     Policy evaluation
    	     Policies and procedures
    	     Wildland fires
    	     Oregon
    	     Siskiyou National Forest (OR)

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    GAO-04-426

    United States General Accounting Office

                         GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

    April 2004

    BISCUIT FIRE

     Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and Personnel Certification
                                       Standards

                                           a

    GAO-04-426

    Highlights of GAO-04-426, a report to congressional requesters

    In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland fire
    seasons in the past 50 years-almost 7 million acres burned. These fires
    included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in the past century-the
    Biscuit Fire. Following a lightning storm, five fires were discovered in
    the Siskiyou National Forest over a 3day period beginning July 13. These
    fires eventually burned together to form the Biscuit Fire, which burned
    nearly 500,000 acres in southern Oregon and Northern California and cost
    over $150 million to extinguish. GAO evaluated (1) whether policies and
    procedures were in place for acquiring needed firefighting resources
    during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these
    policies and procedures were followed when the fire was first identified;
    (2) what resource management issues, if any, affected the ability of
    personnel to fight the fire; and (3) what differences, if any, existed in
    key certification standards for personnel among federal and state agencies
    and whether these differences affected efforts to respond to the fire.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service stated that
    the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with its
    contents. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments.

    April 2004

    BISCUIT FIRE

    Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and Personnel Certification
    Standards

    National policies and procedures were in place and provided the framework
    to guide personnel in the local interagency dispatch center in Grants
    Pass, Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring resources to fight the
    Biscuit Fire. These policies and procedures provide for a multilevel
    dispatching system where, if sufficient firefighting personnel and
    equipment are not available locally, resource requests can be elevated to
    other dispatch centers at the regional and, if necessary, national level.
    To facilitate the swift suppression of new fires, local dispatch center
    personnel can contact neighboring centers directly, including those in
    adjacent regions, before elevating resource requests. When the first two
    fires were found on July 13, the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have
    sufficient firefighting resources available locally. Grants Pass personnel
    requested resources from the responsible regional center in Portland, as
    well as from a dispatch center in central Oregon, but no resources were
    immediately available in the region due to other higher priority fires
    that were threatening lives and property. Grants Pass personnel did not
    request resources from a neighboring interagency dispatch center in
    Fortuna, California, located in an adjoining dispatch region, because they
    believed the center had no available resources due to fire activity there.
    State officials working at the Fortuna dispatch center later said that a
    Fortuna-based helicopter fighting fires in Northern California near the
    first of the five Biscuit fires could have been made available to suppress
    this fire. However, Forest Service officials working with Fortuna
    personnel disagreed, saying that the helicopter had been needed to fight
    fires in California. Because no request was made, there was no discussion
    on that first day about whether the Biscuit Fire would have been the best
    use of the helicopter, and it is unclear, in any case, what the outcome of
    such a request would have been.

    Following the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining needed
    personnel hampered efforts to fight the rapidly growing fire.
    Specifically, officials faced problems obtaining (1) highly experienced
    management teams to direct suppression strategies and crews to carry the
    strategies out, (2) supervisors to manage crews and equipment, and (3)
    support staff to monitor the training and experience of contracted crews.
    An unusually severe fire season, with many other higher priority fires,
    affected the availability of personnel needed to fight the Biscuit Fire.

    Finally, while some differences exist in certification standards for
    personnel between federal and state agencies responsible for fighting
    wildland fires, these differences did not appear to affect efforts to
    respond to the Biscuit Fire.

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-426.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    the link above. For more information, contact Barry T. Hill at (202)
    512-3841 or hillbt@gao.gov.

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    National Policies and Procedures Were in Place to Guide theProcess

    for Acquiring Firefighting Resources Reduced Availability of Key Personnel
    Hampered the Ability to Effectively Fight the Biscuit Fire Some
    Differences in Certification Standards Exist between State

    and Federal Firefighting Agencies, but No Effect Was Identified
    Conclusions Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    1 5 8

    12

    21

    28 30 31

      Appendixes

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 32

    Appendix II: Comments from the Forest Service 34

    Appendix III:GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 35 GAO Contact 35 Staff
    Acknowledgments 35

    Table Table 1: The Five Types of Incidents

    Figures Figure 1:

    Figure 2: Figure 3:

    Figure 4:

    Figure 5: Figure 6: Figure 7:

    Locations and Final Perimeter of the Five Fires That
    Became the Biscuit Fire 3
    Biscuit 1 Burning on Steep Terrain on July 14, 2002 9
    Example of an Extended Attack Firefighting
    Organization 10
    Illustration of the Flow of Resource Requests between
    the Local Dispatch Centers Involved in the Initial Attack
    of the Biscuit Fire 14
    Key Events on July 13 and 14, 2002, Related to the Biscuit
    Fire 16
    New Fire Starts Identified in the Vicinity of the Biscuit
    Fire on July 13 and 14, 2002 18
    Fire Size on Key Dates When Fire Management Teams
    Were Requested and Received 23

    Contents

    Abbreviations

    CDF California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
    NIFC National Interagency Fire Center
    NWCG National Wildfire Coordinating Group
    ODF Oregon Department of Forestry

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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    separately.

    A

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548

    April 12, 2004

    The Honorable Greg Walden Chairman, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest
    Health Committee on Resources House of Representatives

    The Honorable Peter DeFazio House of Representatives

    The Honorable Scott McInnis House of Representatives

    In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland fire
    seasons in the past 50 years. In total, the federal government spent more
    than $1.6 billion to suppress fires that burned almost 7 million acres.
    These
    fires included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in the past
    century-
    the Biscuit Fire.1 The fire season in 2002 began early, with major fires
    in
    Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico draining many firefighting resources
    out of the Pacific Northwest during early summer. As a result, when
    lightning storms hit California and Oregon from July 12 to 15, there were
    limited resources available to fight the hundreds of ongoing fires,
    including
    five fires that eventually burned together to form the Biscuit Fire. While
    no
    lives were lost, the Biscuit Fire burned almost 500,000 acres, including
    much of the biologically diverse 180,000-acre Kalmiopsis Wilderness. The
    Biscuit Fire was not declared extinguished until December 31, 2002, more
    than 5 months after it began. In all, the Biscuit Fire destroyed 4 primary
    residences and 10 other structures, resulted in about 15,000 residents
    being
    put on evacuation notice, required thousands of firefighters and other
    resources, and cost over $150 million to fight.

    All five fires began in the Siskiyou National Forest in southwest Oregon
    over a 3-day period, beginning July 13, 2002. On the first day, two fires
    were
    found-one approximately 4 miles north of the California-Oregon border,
    named Biscuit 1, and another, the Carter Fire, 16 miles north of the state
    border within the Kalmiopsis Wilderness (see fig. 1). The Carter Fire was
    the first fire Siskiyou Forest officials took action to suppress, and it
    was
    contained within a few days. On July 14, the third fire-Biscuit 2-was

    1Federal agencies select names for wildfires based upon nearby geographic
    features. For example, the Biscuit Fire started near Biscuit Creek in
    southern Oregon.

    found near Biscuit 1, and on July 15, the last two fires-Florence and
    Sourdough-were found (see fig. 1). The Florence Fire was located almost 30
    miles north of Biscuit 1 and 2, and by early August it had burned 244,000
    acres, about one-half of the total acreage ultimately burned by the entire
    Biscuit Fire. The Sourdough Fire was located near Biscuit 1 and 2, and by
    July 22, the three had burned together to form one fire. By August 7, the
    Florence Fire had burned south and merged with the other fires to form
    what was later called the Biscuit Fire.

    Figure 1: Locations and Final Perimeter of the Five Fires That Became the
    Biscuit Fire

    Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service data.

    Note: The names of the fires changed as they progressed. Initially, each
    of the fire starts was named individually. As these fires burned together,
    the names were modified. Ultimately, the fires merged to become one-the
    Biscuit Fire.

    Since no one agency alone can handle all wildfires that may occur in its
    jurisdiction, especially when large fires like the Biscuit Fire occur, the
    United States uses an interagency incident management system that depends
    upon the close cooperation and coordination of federal, state, tribal, and
    local fire protection agencies. At the federal level, there are five

    agencies involved in firefighting efforts-the Forest Service, within the
    Department of Agriculture; and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of
    Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park
    Service, all within the Department of the Interior. The Forest Service is
    the predominant firefighting agency among these in terms of the amount of
    resources devoted to firefighting. In addition to the federal agencies,
    state, tribal, and local firefighting agencies also play an important role
    in fighting wildland fires and share firefighting personnel, equipment,
    and supplies to facilitate cost-effective firefighting. Private companies
    are increasingly providing contracted crews and equipment to supplement
    those of federal, state, and local agencies.

    To coordinate the firefighting efforts of these agencies, the National
    Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) was established. This group adopted an
    interagency incident management system and firefighting standards for
    responding to wildland fires. This system provides an organizational
    structure that includes command, planning, logistics, operations, and
    finance functions to meet the complexity and demands of wildland fires.
    Needed personnel, aircraft, equipment, and supplies for wildland fires are
    ordered through a system of local, regional, and national dispatch
    centers. These dispatch centers are staffed or funded by federal or state
    agencies, or a combination of those agencies. Federal, state, local, or
    tribal agencies or private contractors supply the firefighting resources
    dispatched at these centers. If resources in the local dispatch area close
    to a wildland fire are insufficient, dispatch center personnel forward the
    requests to the responsible regional dispatch center2 that locates and
    sends additional firefighting resources from within the region. If
    necessary, the regional dispatch center can forward the request to the
    National Interagency Coordination Center in Boise, Idaho, which locates
    and assigns the closest available resources to the fire. This center is
    staffed jointly by Bureau of Land Management and Forest Service personnel.
    This incident management system was used to respond to the Biscuit Fire.

    Concerns about the response to the Biscuit Fire surfaced as the fire
    rapidly grew and began to threaten lives, homes, and businesses. These
    concerns included whether firefighting resources were available across the
    border in California, which could have been used during the critical early
    days of the fires, and whether better management of firefighting resources
    could have

    2There are 11 regional dispatch centers nationwide, called geographic area
    coordination centers, each of which serve a specific geographic portion of
    the United States.

    improved suppression efforts. In this context, we reviewed (1) whether
    policies and procedures were in place for acquiring needed firefighting
    resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and the extent to
    which these policies and procedures were followed when the fire was first
    identified; (2) what resource management issues, if any, affected the
    ability of firefighting personnel to effectively fight the Biscuit Fire;
    and (3) what differences, if any, existed in key personnel certification
    standards at federal and state agencies involved in fighting wildland
    fires-particularly in Oregon-and whether any such differences affected
    efforts to respond to the Biscuit Fire.

    To address these questions, we reviewed firefighting policies and
    procedures that included interagency standards for fire and fire-aviation
    operations, interagency personnel certification standards, the national
    mobilization guide, and the local mobilization guide and mutual aid
    agreement for the dispatch center in Grants Pass, Oregon,3 which was
    responsible for acquiring resources to respond to the Biscuit Fire. We
    interviewed headquarters, regional, and local firefighting officials from
    the Forest Service and Department of the Interior agencies, as well as
    state officials from California, Oregon, and five other Western states. We
    reviewed Biscuit Fire records, including daily fire reports, resource
    orders, and transcripts of key radio transmissions during the initial days
    of the Biscuit Fire. We conducted our work in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards.

    Results in Brief 	National policies and procedures were in place and
    provided the framework to guide personnel in the local dispatch center in
    Grants Pass, Oregon, responsible for acquiring firefighting resources for
    the Biscuit Fire. Guided by these policies and procedures, dispatch
    centers use a threetiered dispatching system-local, regional, and
    national-to locate and send resources to wildland fires. If sufficient
    resources are not available locally, a dispatch center requests additional
    resources from its regional dispatch center. If sufficient resources are
    not available within the region,

    3In the case of the Biscuit Fire, the local dispatch center was the Grants
    Pass Interagency Fire Center in Grants Pass, Oregon. The Siskiyou National
    Forest has contracted with the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) to
    operate this center. ODF personnel staff the center, but the operating
    costs are shared between ODF and the Forest Service. The regional dispatch
    center responsible for the Biscuit Fire was the Northwest Interagency
    Coordination Center in Portland, Oregon.

    the request is then elevated to the national level. However, to facilitate
    the swift suppression of new fires-called the initial attack phase of a
    fire- these policies also permit dispatch centers to contact neighboring
    centers directly for resources, including those in adjacent regions,
    before elevating resource requests to a higher level. For the Biscuit
    Fire, the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have sufficient resources
    available and took steps to locate resources to fight what began as five
    separate fires in the Siskiyou National Forest, found over a 3-day period
    beginning July 13, 2002. Grants Pass dispatchers contacted their regional
    dispatch center in Portland about the availability of resources, including
    helicopters, on the first day of the Biscuit Fire. There were no resources
    immediately available due to other higher priority fires burning in the
    region. In making these inquiries, Grants Pass personnel did not request
    resources from the Fortuna dispatch center,4 a neighboring center located
    in the adjoining dispatch region in Northern California. Grants Pass
    personnel believed that Fortuna had no available resources, based on daily
    fire situation reports, because Northern California was also fighting
    numerous fires. Concerns were later expressed by state and local officials
    in California that a helicopter, under the control of the Fortuna dispatch
    center, was fighting fires in Northern California near one of the five
    fires in the Siskiyou National Forest-Biscuit 1-and could have been made
    available to fight it. However, Forest Service and California state
    officials working in the Fortuna dispatch center expressed differing
    viewpoints on whether they could have provided the helicopter for the
    Biscuit Fire, had Grants Pass requested it. State officials at the
    dispatch center said that the helicopter could have been sent to Oregon.
    However, Forest Service dispatchers disagreed, stating that the helicopter
    was needed to fight fires in Northern California. Because no request was
    made, there was no discussion on that first day about whether the Biscuit
    Fire would have been the best use of the helicopter, and it is unclear, in
    any case, what the outcome of such a request would have been.

    Following the initial efforts to suppress the Biscuit Fire, fire officials
    faced delays obtaining (1) highly experienced management teams to direct
    fire suppression strategies, along with sufficient crews to carry out fire
    plans; (2) supervisors to manage crews and equipment; and (3) support
    staff to monitor the training and experience of contracted crews. These
    delays

    4The Fortuna Interagency Emergency Command Center, which we will refer to
    as the Fortuna dispatch center, is an interagency center staffed by Forest
    Service and California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF)
    personnel. The center serves Six Rivers National Forest, Redwood National
    Park, the CDF Humboldt-Del Norte Unit, and the Hoopa Indian Reservation.

    were primarily due to the severe fire season-there were many higher
    priority fires within and outside the region. By the time the most highly
    experienced type of management team had arrived at the fire, the fire had
    grown from a few hundred acres to almost 200,000 acres. Difficulties in
    filling supervisory positions for managing firefighting crews hindered the
    effectiveness of firefighting efforts. Insufficient personnel to supervise
    crews and equipment resulted in the inability to use crews to carry out
    planned actions, and as a result, fire suppression progress was delayed.
    Insufficient support personnel meant that thousands of contracted
    personnel could not be adequately monitored to determine if they met
    applicable training and experience requirements. As a result, some
    insufficiently trained or inexperienced contractor crews were not always
    able to carry out planned operations, resulting in the need to postpone or
    alter some tactical firefighting operations.

    Finally, while some differences exist in certification standards for
    personnel between federal land management agencies and state agencies
    responsible for fighting wildland fires, these differences did not appear
    to have affected efforts to respond to the Biscuit Fire. In 1993, the
    National Wildfire Coordinating Group-an interagency group comprising
    federal and state representatives-established minimum training and
    experience standards for personnel assigned to fight interagency wildland
    fires outside their home region. Federal land management agencies, as well
    as firefighting agencies in five of the seven states we contacted in and
    around the Northwest Region, have adopted these standards as the minimum
    requirements for all of their fire personnel. The state firefighting
    agency in Oregon-the Oregon Department of Forestry-uses these standards
    for firefighting personnel assigned to fight interagency fires outside
    their home region, although the state maintains its own certification
    standards for personnel assigned to state fires or interagency fires
    within the Northwest Region. Finally, the California state firefighting
    agency-the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection-has
    maintained its own requirements and certification system for fire
    personnel, but state officials said that these standards meet or exceed
    those established by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group. We did not
    find any evidence of problems at the Biscuit Fire that stemmed from these
    differing standards, based on our review of relevant documents and
    interviews with knowledgeable officials.

    We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture and
    of the Interior for review and comment. The Forest Service commented that
    the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with its

    contents. The Forest Service's comment letter is presented in appendix II.
    The Department of the Interior did not provide comments.

    Background	A severe drought in many Western states set the stage for an
    early and intense fire season. By mid-June, several major fires were
    burning, including the Rodeo-Chediski Fire in Arizona and the Hayman Fire
    in Colorado. These fires siphoned both aerial and ground firefighting
    resources from the Pacific Northwest, including helicopters, air tankers,
    agency and contract fire engines, smoke jumpers, highly trained agency
    crews (called "hot shot" crews), and contract firefighting crews. By June
    21, the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise, Idaho, was
    reporting a preparedness level of 5, the highest level, indicating that
    the nation had the potential to exhaust all agency firefighting resources.
    When lightning storms passed through California and Oregon on July 12 and
    13, igniting hundreds of fires, including the Biscuit Fire, more than 30
    large fires were already burning across the nation and firefighting
    resources available for initial attack were limited.

    The Biscuit Fire began as five separate fires in the Siskiyou National
    Forest5 in southwest Oregon. The Siskiyou Forest, encompassing more than 1
    million acres, contains diverse topography, including the Siskiyou
    Mountains, the Klamath Mountains, the Coast Ranges, and the 180,000-acre
    Kalmiopsis Wilderness. Steep terrain, together with many roadless areas,
    presented accessibility and logistical challenges for managers directing
    fire suppression efforts at the Biscuit Fire. To complicate the situation,
    the fires were also located almost 30 miles apart. As the fires rapidly
    grew during late July and early August, the southern fire burned south and
    crossed the state border into the Six Rivers National Forest in Northern
    California. While the Biscuit Fire burned primarily federal forestland, by
    early August, it threatened a number of communities in Oregon and
    California. Figure 2 shows Biscuit 1 burning on a steep hill on July 14,
    2002.

    5The Siskiyou National Forest and the Rogue River National Forest are
    separate forests but are administered jointly. However, because the
    Biscuit Fire burned only in the Siskiyou Forest, we will only refer to the
    Siskiyou National Forest.

    2: Biscuit 1 Burning oFi n Steep Terrain on Jgure uly 14, 2002

    Source: Forest Service.

    To understand the response to the Biscuit Fire, it is important to
    understand the phases of fire suppression efforts and the nature of
    interagency wildland firefighting. On a large wildland fire, such as the
    Biscuit Fire, fire suppression efforts generally fall into two phases. The
    initial attack phase is defined as efforts to control a fire during the
    first operational period, usually within 24 hours. Local fire managers
    direct these initial firefighting efforts. In fiscal year 2002,
    firefighters were successful in suppressing about 99 percent of wildland
    fires in federal, state, and local jurisdictions during the initial attack
    phase. If a fire has not been contained or will not be contained during
    this period or additional firefighting resources are ordered, firefighting
    efforts move into the extended attack phase.6 In this phase, key fire
    management officials

    6Fire managers may order more experienced leadership immediately based on
    the initial assessment if it appears that the fire will become a more
    complex incident.

    firefighting resources assigned. There are five types of incidents-type 1
    being the most complex (see table 1). For example, to manage a type 5
    incident, the incident commander may be a local district employee with
    adequate experience to direct initial attack efforts on a small fire with
    two to six firefighters. In contrast, for a type 1 incident, such as the
    Biscuit Fire, the incident commander is just one member of a highly
    qualified management team. While both type 1 and type 2 incident
    management teams have a standard composition of 28 members, type 1 team
    members receive additional training and experience in handling the most
    complex incidents.

    Table 1: The Five Types of Incidents

                    Source of incident
               Type   commander/team                                  Description
                                 Local                      Up to 10 firefighters
                                 Local                      Up to 50 firefighters
                                 Local                     Up to 100 firefighters
                                             Operations personnel normally do not
                              Regional                                     exceed
                                                              200 at any one time
                              National   Operations personnel often exceed 500 at
                                                                              any
                                                                         one time

    Source: GAO analysis of National Interagency Fire Center and National
    Academy of Public Administration data.

    Incident management teams manage a variety of firefighting resources.
    These include highly trained "hot shot" crews, agency and contracted
    crews, air tankers, helicopters, fire engines, and bulldozers. Federal
    agencies, such as the Forest Service, provide a large number of the
    personnel that work on fires. These federal agencies rely on a "militia"
    strategy to fight wildland fires whereby personnel within each agency are
    trained to serve in fire suppression or support roles, when needed and
    requested, in addition to performing their normal day-to-day work
    responsibilities. However, many factors, including past downsizing within
    the federal government, have reduced the pool of employees qualified to
    work on fires. Increasingly, private contractors provide crews and
    firefighting equipment, including engines and helicopters.

    National Policies and Procedures Were in Place to Guide the Process for
    Acquiring Firefighting Resources

    National policies and procedures7 were in place and provided the framework
    to guide personnel in the local dispatch center in Grants Pass, Oregon,
    who were responsible for acquiring firefighting resources for the Biscuit
    Fire. Guided by these policies and procedures, dispatch centers use a
    three-tiered dispatching system-local, regional, and national-to locate
    and send resources to wildland fires. During the initial attack phase of a
    fire, these policies also permit dispatch centers to contact neighboring
    dispatch centers directly for resources, including resources in adjacent
    regions, before elevating resource requests to a higher level. For the
    Biscuit Fire, the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have sufficient
    resources available and took steps to locate needed resources to fight
    what began as five separate fires in the Siskiyou National Forest. Grants
    Pass dispatchers contacted their regional dispatch center in Portland
    about the availability of resources, including helicopters, on the first
    day of the Biscuit Fire. In making resource inquiries, Grants Pass
    personnel did not request resources from the Fortuna dispatch center, a
    neighboring center located in the adjoining dispatch region in Northern
    California. Grants Pass personnel believed that Fortuna had no available
    resources, based on daily fire situation reports, because Northern
    California was also fighting numerous fires. Concerns were later expressed
    by state and local officials in California that a helicopter, under the
    control of the Fortuna dispatch center, was fighting fires in Northern
    California, just across the border from the first of the five Biscuit
    fires, and could have been provided to fight it. Forest Service and state
    dispatchers working in the Fortuna dispatch center expressed differing
    viewpoints on whether they could have provided a helicopter for the
    Biscuit Fire, had Grants Pass requested it.

    National Policies and Procedures Provide the Framework for Acquiring
    Firefighting Resources

    The National Interagency Mobilization Guide includes policies and
    procedures to help ensure the timely and cost effective mobilization of
    firefighting resources. Federal, state, tribal, and local firefighting
    agencies share their firefighting personnel, equipment, and supplies,
    following a standardized process to coordinate responses to fires and
    mobilize resources. When local dispatch center personnel are notified of a
    fire, they send available firefighting resources based on a preplanned
    response. If fire managers need additional resources, they send a request
    to the local dispatch center identifying the type and amount of resources
    needed. If the dispatch center personnel cannot fill a request locally,
    they can forward the

    7National Interagency Mobilization Guide (Feb. 1, 2002).

    request to the responsible regional dispatch center. If the regional
    center cannot fill the request with resources from within the region, the
    request is sent to the National Interagency Coordination Center in Boise,
    Idaho, the primary support center for coordinating and mobilizing wildland
    firefighting resources nationally. When requests exceed available
    resources, the fires are prioritized, with those threatening lives and
    property receiving higher priority for resources. To facilitate the swift
    suppression of new fires-called the "initial attack" phase of a fire-local
    dispatch center personnel can first contact neighboring dispatch centers
    directly, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating resource
    requests to the regional or national level. For resource sharing between
    neighboring dispatch centers in adjoining regions, a formalized agreement,
    such as a mutual aid agreement and local operating plan, is needed.

    Existing policies and procedures encourage the sharing of resources
    between local dispatch centers. The national guidance states that local
    dispatch centers should use mutual aid agreements whenever possible to
    obtain resources directly from neighboring units. In the case of the
    Biscuit Fire, a regional mutual aid agreement between the state of
    California and federal agencies in California, Nevada, and Oregon
    establishes the protocols for interagency coordination and cooperation for
    wildland fire protection in California, which includes the areas along the
    Nevada and Oregon borders.8 Local, state, and federal agencies jointly
    develop local operating plans that identify the specific resources that
    can be shared under the mutual aid agreement and the provisions for cost
    sharing. One of these plans allows the Grants Pass dispatch center in
    Oregon and the Fortuna dispatch center, located in the neighboring region
    in Northern California, to request resources directly from each other.
    (See fig. 4.) The Grants Pass dispatch center operates under a contract
    between the Siskiyou National Forest and the Oregon Department of Forestry
    (ODF). ODF operates and staffs the center, and the Forest Service
    reimburses the department for a portion of the center's operating costs,
    according to a Siskiyou official. The Fortuna dispatch center is operated
    by the Six Rivers National Forest and the California Department of
    Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) and is staffed by personnel from both
    agencies.

    8This mutual aid agreement, the Cooperative Fire Protection Agreement,
    involved the Bureau of Land Management, California and Nevada; National
    Park Service, Pacific West Region; Forest Service, Regions 4, 5, and 6;
    and California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

    Figure 4: Illustration of the Flow of Resource Requests between the Local
    Dispatch Centers Involved in the Initial Attack of the Biscuit Fire

             Source: GAO analysis of National Interagency Fire Center data.

    Grants Pass Dispatch Center Personnel Sought a Variety of Firefighting
    Resources for the Initial Attack of the Biscuit Fire

    When the first two fires were found on the afternoon of July 13, 2002, the
    Grants Pass dispatch center did not have the firefighting resources needed
    locally to fight the fires. Many resources, including the helicopter
    normally stationed at Grants Pass, had been sent to other higher priority
    fires that were threatening lives and property. The fires, located in the
    Siskiyou National Forest, were initially small-two trees and 1 acre.
    Biscuit 1 was a few miles north of the California-Oregon border, and the
    Carter Fire was about 12 miles north of Biscuit 1. Figure 5 provides
    information about the initial attack on the fires.

    Figure 5: Key Events on July 13 and 14, 2002, Related to the Biscuit Fire

    Note: For the Oregon air reconnaissance, ODF personnel used a Siskiyou
    National Forest reconnaissance aircraft.

    Biscuit 1 was the first fire found. At 3:17 p.m. on July 13, a Siskiyou
    Forest Service aircraft being used by ODF personnel to perform
    reconnaissance spotted Biscuit 1. The aerial observer reported the fire to
    Grants Pass dispatch. At 3:53 p.m., air reconnaissance spotted the Carter
    Fire 12 miles north of Biscuit 1.

    Soon after Grants Pass and Siskiyou officials became aware of the first
    fire, firefighting personnel in California also spotted the fires. At 3:51
    p.m., a CDF reconnaissance airplane, assisting the Six Rivers National
    Forest, spotted smoke columns to the north while circling a fire in
    Northern California. The airplane was directing the activity of a CDF
    helicopter and crew of six firefighters assigned to a fire in the Six
    Rivers National Forest in Northern California, just south of the
    California-Oregon border. At the request of a Six Rivers National Forest
    official, the CDF airplane flew north to investigate the smoke in Oregon.
    Reconnaissance personnel reported Biscuit 1 and the Carter Fire to the Six
    Rivers official and to the Fortuna dispatch center-an interagency center
    staffed by CDF and Six Rivers National Forest personnel. Since the
    helicopter and crew were close to finishing up their assignment in
    California, the CDF reconnaissance personnel suggested to Fortuna dispatch
    that the helicopter and crew could next take action on the fire in Oregon.
    The Forest Service dispatcher at Fortuna informed the reconnaissance
    airplane to continue patrolling while, in accordance with normal
    dispatching protocol, Fortuna notified the Grants Pass dispatch center
    about the fire. Grants Pass told Fortuna that it already had
    reconnaissance aircraft in the area. Because of the lack of communications
    between the CDF and Oregon aircraft, the Fortuna dispatch center advised
    the CDF airplane to leave the area to ensure air safety. At 4:15 p.m., CDF
    air reconnaissance reported another three lightning-caused fires in
    Northern California, and at 4:36 p.m., the CDF helicopter and crew were
    sent to fight these fires. Figure 6 shows the new fires found in southern
    Oregon and Northern California on July 13 and 14.

    Figure 6: New Fire Starts Identified in the Vicinity of the Biscuit Fire
    on July 13 and 14, 2002

                      Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service data.

    At the request of Siskiyou National Forest officials, Grants Pass dispatch
    personnel began to try to locate needed firefighting resources. At 4:30
    p.m., Grants Pass dispatch personnel requested a helicopter (with a bucket
    for water drops) from the dispatch center in Portland, Oregon. Shortly
    after 5 p.m., Siskiyou officials asked the Grants Pass dispatch center to
    check on the availability of smoke jumpers, rappellers, helicopters, and
    air tankers. Dispatchers checked with the regional dispatch center in
    Portland and were told that no helicopters or air tankers were available.
    Dispatchers contacted the Central Oregon dispatch center and were told
    that no smoke jumpers or rappellers were available for the Biscuit Fire
    for 48 to 72 hours because of higher priority fires elsewhere. Grants Pass
    personnel relayed this information to Siskiyou officials.

    By the next morning, July 14, the fires had grown. Shortly after 10:10
    a.m., Siskiyou Forest officials directing firefighting efforts departed on
    a reconnaissance flight. They flew over the Carter Fire and decided to
    staff this fire as soon as possible because of its proximity to a trail
    that would allow access to the fire and because there were natural safety
    zones for firefighters. A type 2 crew began to hike to the Carter Fire
    later that afternoon. Siskiyou officials next flew over Biscuit 1 and
    found it was about 7 acres. They also spotted a third fire, named Biscuit
    2, which was about 20 acres and located about one-half mile from Biscuit
    1. Siskiyou Forest officials believed that the Biscuit 1 and 2 fires would
    burn together in the afternoon and had a high probability of getting
    significantly larger. Due to safety concerns, limited accessibility, wind
    and fire behavior, and insufficient firefighting resources, forest
    officials decided not to staff Biscuit 1 and Biscuit 2 at that time.
    Siskiyou officials requested that Grants Pass dispatch personnel order
    additional firefighting resources, including a type 2 incident management
    team, air tankers, and other equipment for the fires. However, due to
    higher priority fires elsewhere, many of these resource orders could not
    be filled by the regional dispatch center in Portland for several days or
    longer, and the request for air tankers was never filled.

    Shortly before noon, a CDF helicopter and crew were on duty in Northern
    California performing reconnaissance and responding to reported fires. A
    Six Rivers Forest official helping to direct the helicopter crew's
    activities requested that the crew check the fire in Northern California
    they had worked the previous day to ensure it was out. She also requested
    that the crew, on the way, fly by a campground near the Biscuit 1 and
    Biscuit 2 fires to ensure no campers were there. None were seen. The
    helicopter then landed near the site of the fire they had worked the
    previous day in

    Northern California, and the crew hiked to the fire to ensure it was
    extinguished. At 2:17 p.m., the CDF helicopter reported the fire was cold,
    and the helicopter was assigned to another incident in California.

    At 6:40 p.m., in response to the July 13 request for a helicopter, a
    regional dispatch official in Portland working with officials in the
    Northern California regional dispatch center in Redding, the Fortuna
    dispatch center, and the Grants Pass dispatch center arranged for a CDF
    helicopter with a water bucket to respond to the Biscuit fires, as allowed
    under the provisions of the mutual aid agreement. The helicopter had been
    working on fires in Northern California. However, a few minutes later, as
    the helicopter was en route to Oregon, Siskiyou officials canceled the
    request because at that point the fires had spread to more than 300 acres,
    and officials stated that the helicopter would have been of limited use on
    a fire that size. Officials explained that without ground resources
    available to fight the fire, water drops alone are usually of limited
    value.

    On July 15, the last two fires that would make up the Biscuit Fire-
    Sourdough and Florence-were discovered. The Sourdough Fire was found near
    Biscuit 1 and Biscuit 2. The Florence Fire was located almost 30 miles
    north of these fires. Siskiyou officials requested the Grants Pass
    dispatch center to order numerous resources on July 15, including
    helicopters, engines, and crews. Most of these requests were not able to
    be filled for several days or longer. By July 16, the Northwest's
    Multi-Agency Coordination Group in Portland, Oregon, which is responsible
    for prioritizing fires and allocating firefighting resources in the
    region, ranked the Biscuit Fires as priority 12 out of 18 large fires in
    the region. The Florence Fire went on to burn almost 250,000 acres before
    merging with the other fires on August 7.

    Concerns were later expressed by state and local officials in California
    that a CDF helicopter, fighting fires in Six Rivers National Forest on
    July 13, just across the state border from Biscuit 1, could have been
    provided earlier to assist on the Biscuit Fire. Grants Pass personnel
    explained that they did not request assistance from the Fortuna dispatch
    center on July 13 because, based on the daily fire situation reports, they
    believed no resources would be available due to the fires in Northern
    California. California was also fighting numerous fires ignited by the
    same lightning storm that passed through Oregon. When we asked the Fortuna
    dispatch center about this issue, the Forest Service and state of
    California dispatchers working there expressed differing viewpoints on
    whether they could have provided a helicopter on the first day of the
    Biscuit Fire if such a request had been

    made. A CDF dispatcher working at the Fortuna dispatch center said that if
    the Grants Pass dispatcher had requested the helicopter at that time to
    launch an initial attack on the Biscuit Fire, he believed he would have
    provided it to them. However, a Forest Service official also working at
    Fortuna to dispatch firefighting resources had a differing opinion, saying
    that even if Fortuna had sent the helicopter to Oregon, he believes that
    it likely would have been diverted back to California to suppress other
    higher priority fires in Fortuna's direct protection area. Because Grants
    Pass dispatch did not request assistance from Fortuna on the first day of
    the Biscuit Fire, there was no discussion at that time about whether this
    would have been the best use of the helicopter. In the final analysis, it
    is unclear what the outcome of such a request would have been.

    Reduced Availability of Key Personnel Hampered the Ability to Effectively
    Fight the Biscuit Fire

    Following the initial attack of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining
    needed personnel hampered efforts to effectively fight the Biscuit Fire in
    three key ways. First, neither a management team with adequate experience
    to strategically plan and manage firefighting efforts nor sufficient
    highly trained crews to carry out the plans were initially available for
    the Biscuit Fire due to their need on higher priority fires. By the time a
    highly experienced management team became available and was assigned to
    the Biscuit Fire in late July, the fire had increased from a few hundred
    acres to almost 200,000 acres. Second, key supervisors needed to direct
    the tactical efforts of firefighting crews and equipment were unavailable
    at critical points in July and August as the fire was growing in size and
    intensity. As a result, the ability to implement aggressive fire
    suppression tactics was compromised due to concerns about the safety of
    fire crews. Finally, some fire support positions, such as contracting
    technical representatives, also were unavailable to play a key role in
    monitoring contracted crews.

    Delayed Availability of a Top Management Team Affected Initial
    Firefighting Efforts

    Siskiyou Forest officials directing the firefighting effort had difficulty
    obtaining both a highly trained incident management team with the
    necessary level of experience to plan and direct firefighting efforts on
    the Biscuit Fire, as well as needed crews to carry out such plans. Within
    one day after the initial fires were discovered, Siskiyou district fire
    managers determined that the fire would likely grow larger and require a
    more experienced incident management team to direct the firefighting
    effort than was currently available at the forest. They requested a type 2
    team and numerous type 1 crews and other firefighting resources during the
    initial days. However, because of the high level of fire activity both in
    the Pacific

    Northwest, as well as in other Western states, higher priority fires meant
    that no type 2 incident management teams or highly experienced crews were
    immediately available for assignment to the Biscuit Fire. Siskiyou
    officials' request for a team was not filled for 7 days, by which time the
    acres burned had grown from about 700 to more than 5,000.

    When a type 2 management team assumed command of the Biscuit Fire on July
    21, they quickly realized that the fire had grown beyond the scope of a
    type 2 team and that a more experienced type 1 team was needed to handle
    the increasingly complex situation. A type 1 team was ordered on July 22,
    but the Northwest's Multi-Agency Coordination Group in Portland
    prioritized the Biscuit Fire, on this day, as priority 6 of 15 fires
    burning in the region. This was largely because the Biscuit fires were not
    threatening lives and property. As a result, most requests for management,
    crews, and equipment for the Biscuit Fire went unfilled.

    In the case of the management team, rather than assigning the type 1 team
    requested, two other type 2 management teams were assigned in late July to
    assist in managing firefighting efforts on the southern fire,9 including
    the portion that had crossed into California. As these teams tried to
    direct the firefighting efforts of crews and equipment, the
    fires-especially the Florence Fire in the north-grew rapidly. Winds and
    low humidity contributed to the fires' intensity. Between July 27 and
    August 1, the size of the Florence Fire grew from 18,000 acres to 164,000
    acres, and the size of the southern fire-the Sour Biscuit Fire-grew from
    7,000 acres to 38,000 acres. Finally, on July 31, 9 days after first
    requested, two type 1 management teams arrived and assumed command of
    fighting the Biscuit Fire. Type 1 firefighting crews and many other
    resources continued to be listed as critical resource needs throughout
    August. Figure 7 shows the dates management teams were requested or
    assumed command, the personnel and equipment assigned to the fire, and the
    growth of the fires.

    9The southern fire resulted from the merging of the Biscuit 1, Biscuit 2,
    and Sourdough Fires. The southern fire was named the Sour Biscuit Fire.

     Figure 7: Fire Size on Key Dates When Fire Management Teams Were Requested and
                                        Received

                      Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service data.

    Note: The fire size information was not available for July 14.

    The first type 2 incident commander assigned to the Biscuit Fire said that
    not having a type 1 management team and other needed resources slowed the
    progress of the firefighting effort. He said that while he understood the
    Portland group's decision not to assign a type 1 team at that time, it
    nonetheless was difficult to effectively fight fires located almost 30
    miles apart with the limited resources available. The available management
    and other resources were split between the fires. He added that the type 2
    team's firefighting strategies were the same as those of a type 1 team-
    initially to improve access to the site of the fires. However, without
    needed resources, tactics had to be modified, and progress was slower. His
    operations section chief said that the complexity of the fire, coupled
    with

    the lack of a type 1 management team, type 1 crews,10 and equipment, meant
    that firefighters could not attack the fire directly and had to use more
    indirect methods, such as using bulldozers to build a firebreak, in an
    effort to slow the spread of the fire. The incident commander and
    operations section chief said that generally, when a fire is a high
    priority and qualifies for a type 1 management team, it is also more
    likely to be assigned other needed firefighting resources. In the case of
    the Biscuit Fire, a type 1 team and additional type 1 crews and other
    resources might have improved the chances of stopping the fire before it
    burned southeast to an area called Oak Flat, according to the incident
    commander. However, Forest Service headquarters officials said that in a
    severe fire season such as 2002, difficult decisions have to be made about
    where to assign limited resources. Fires are prioritized, and those
    presenting the greatest threat to life and property receive firefighting
    resources first.

    Reduced Availability of Supervisors Slowed Biscuit Fire Suppression
    Efforts

    Even as top management teams and increasing numbers of crews and equipment
    were assigned to the Biscuit Fire, some critical supervisory positions
    were not filled as quickly as needed or remained unfilled at the end of
    the fire. In all, over 200 requests for supervisory positions were never
    filled. The primary cause for reduced availability of supervisory
    personnel was the demand for these staff to work more than 30 other large
    fires throughout the nation, including other fires in Oregon. Fire
    managers and a Forest Service review11 of the Biscuit Fire stated that
    delays in obtaining needed supervisors affected their ability to implement
    aggressive fire suppression tactics or use equipment until sufficient
    supervision became available. Federal officials, however, did take some
    action to mitigate these problems, including obtaining personnel from
    Australia and New Zealand to fill certain supervisory positions. Officials
    emphasized that the difficulties in obtaining personnel to serve as
    supervisors was not a problem unique to the Biscuit Fire and that such
    issues have affected numerous fires in recent years.

    Biscuit Fire managers identified a number of key supervisory positions
    that went unfilled for a period of time in July or August when the fire
    was rapidly growing and that were critical for effective fire suppression
    efforts. These included government managers of contracted helicopters and

    10A crew normally consists of 20 persons.
    11Final Draft Biscuit Fire Review, USDA Forest Service, PNW Region (Jan.
    31, 2003).

    bulldozers (known as helicopter managers and dozer bosses); government
    supervisors directing tactical operations for a division or segment of
    crews (known as strike team leaders); and government supervisors (known as
    division supervisors) directing the activities of strike team leaders.

    Although it was not possible to measure the specific effect on fire
    suppression efforts, such as the number of additional acres burned, from
    unfilled supervisory positions, Biscuit Fire managers provided a number of
    examples to illustrate the difficulty they faced in carrying out plans
    without sufficient supervisors for aircraft or for equipment and
    firefighting personnel. For example, an incident commander and an incident
    business advisor working at the fire said that some bulldozers sat idle
    for a few days and could not be used on fire suppression efforts because
    of the lack of a dozer boss to manage and direct the equipments' use.
    Interagency requirements state that one dozer boss is required to safely
    manage the operations of each dozer. However, dozers and dozer bosses are
    ordered separately and may arrive at a fire at different times. If a dozer
    arrives first, it may sit idle until a dozer boss is available to
    supervise its operation. According to an interagency Fire and Aviation
    Safety Team Review,12 it was appropriate to not use all available
    resources, including dozers, if safety would have been compromised because
    of insufficient supervision.

    In the case of helicopters, fire officials told us that for one or two
    days several helicopters may have sat idle due to insufficient helicopter
    managers. However, fire records indicate, and agency officials agreed,
    that the major reason helicopters did not fly was due to poor visibility
    as a result of weather or smoke. To minimize the impact of helicopter
    manager shortages, fire officials used a waiver system so that, under
    certain circumstances, one helicopter manager could manage two type 1 or
    type 2 helicopters rather than only one, as permitted by interagency
    policy.13 Using this waiver process, six waivers were granted for
    helicopter managers working at the Biscuit Fire. In addition, National
    Interagency

    12Final Report: Fire & Aviation Safety Team Review of Northwest Geographic
    Area (July 19 through Aug. 1, 2002).

    13According to the Interagency Helicopter Operations Guide (January 2002),
    two type 1 or type 2 helicopters may be designated as "limited use" and
    managed by one qualified helicopter manager when (1) a second qualified
    helicopter manager is on order, and there are active efforts to fill the
    position; (2) both helicopters are physically side-by-side at the same
    helibase; (3) a helibase manager is assigned; (4) aerial supervision is
    provided; and (5) approval has been granted by the appropriate agency
    aviation manager.

    Fire Center officials requested and received numerous supervisors from
    Australia and New Zealand, including eight helicopter managers.

    The inability to fill government strike team leader positions also
    resulted in delays in fire suppression actions, according to a Biscuit
    Fire operations manager. In one effort to mitigate this shortage, three
    qualified staff were transferred from a hot shot crew to work as strike
    team leaders supervising contracted crews, according to the division
    supervisor. The supervisor said, however, this move lowered the
    firefighting effectiveness of the hot shot crew. In another case, a
    shortage of division supervisors resulted in the inability to provide
    adequate supervision in two of the four fire zones for about one week,
    according to an operations section chief. The lack of needed supervision
    resulted in the inability to use crews to carry out planned actions, and
    as a result, fire suppression progress was delayed.

    Our findings on the reduced availability of personnel to fill critical
    staff positions were confirmed by an internal Forest Service review of the
    Biscuit Fire as well as Forest Service reviews of other wildland
    firefighting efforts. The Forest Service review of the Biscuit Fire
    concluded that opportunities to halt the spread of the fire had to be
    abandoned because of limited resources, and as a result, the fire grew
    larger and threatened more communities on both the western and eastern
    perimeters. The Forest Service's January 2000 report, An Agency Strategy
    for Fire Management, highlighted the shortage of federal staff for both
    fire suppression and fire support positions. Also, during July 2002, the
    Northwest Multi-Agency Coordination Group in Portland, Oregon, reviewed
    ongoing fires in the Pacific Northwest, including the Biscuit Fire, and
    the effects of the reduced availability of personnel to fill critical
    supervisory positions for fire suppression. The group noted that some
    crews and equipment had been suspended from fire suppression efforts
    because of a lack of appropriate supervision.

    Shortage of Personnel to Effectively Monitor Contractors Working on the
    Biscuit Fire

    Contracted resources played a key role in the Biscuit Fire-at its peak
    over 1,600 contracted firefighters and over 400 pieces of contracted
    equipment and helicopters were assigned to the fire. Interagency fire
    managers acknowledged, however, that there was little, if any, monitoring
    of private contractors to ensure that contracted crews assigned to the
    Biscuit Fire met established training and experience requirements.
    Instead, fire managers generally relied on contractors to certify that
    their crews met these requirements, as stated in their contract. Despite
    contractors' assurances that their crew met all requirements, Biscuit Fire
    officials told

    us that some insufficiently trained or inexperienced contracted crews
    negatively impacted firefighting efforts because these crews were not
    always able to carry out planned operations. In contrast, contracted
    engines and other equipment had fewer problems.

    Fire managers participating on the Biscuit Fire said that poorly trained
    and inexperienced contracted crews presented significant operational
    concerns. They cited examples of contracted crews that were unable to
    carry out planned firefighting operations. Managers said that they
    postponed or changed some tactical firefighting operations because it was
    not safe using these crews in more aggressive fire operations. Crews that
    could not be used as planned were assigned minimal firefighting
    responsibilities, such as "mop up" activities at a considerable distance
    from intensive fire activity. Although the limitations on how the crews
    could safely be used likely affected progress of firefighting, the actual
    effect cannot be measured.

    Communication to and between crews also adversely impacted the use of
    contracted crews on the Biscuit Fire. There were instances where crew and
    squad bosses for contracted crews were unable to communicate in English
    with government supervisors, as required in the interagency crew
    agreement. The lack of fluency in English caused safety concerns and
    resulted in crews being assigned to far less technical tasks than planned.
    Fire managers told us that, even when assigned minimal fire tasks, some
    private crews required above normal supervision, which in turn resulted in
    supervisors having less time available to plan and implement higher
    priority fire suppression tasks.

    Under a cooperative arrangement between the federal government and the
    states of Oregon and Washington, ODF has oversight responsibility for
    private crew contractors in the Northwest. Typically, the monitoring of
    crew qualifications should take place before the start of the fire season.
    An ODF official, however, said that insufficient funding and personnel
    have resulted in few, if any, evaluations of crews' qualifications prior
    to the start of the fire season. Alternatively, interagency support
    personnel, such as contracting officers or their technical
    representatives, can perform contract crew qualification assessments. We
    found that during the Biscuit Fire, however, these key support positions
    were identified as a critical, but unfilled, resource need. According to
    federal firefighting managers, about 90 individuals have been trained as
    technical representatives to work with firefighting management teams, but
    at any given time during recent fire seasons, only about 10 percent of
    these trained technical representatives

    were available to serve on incident management teams. The ODF official
    having oversight responsibility for contracted crews in the Northwest
    concluded that because of these shortages and the significant numbers of
    contracted crews, it is likely that there was minimal monitoring of
    contract crews at the fire. Finally, we noted that these shortcomings in
    the monitoring of contracted crews were not limited to the Biscuit Fire.
    The importance of monitoring crew training and experience was also cited
    in an interagency fire and aviation safety report issued in 2002.14 The
    review stated that deficiencies in the physical fitness and job skills of
    crews raised concerns about the validity of qualifications of some
    contracted resources.

    Some Differences in Certification Standards Exist between State and
    Federal Firefighting Agencies, but No Effect Was Identified

    There are some differences in certification standards for personnel
    between state and federal wildland firefighting agencies, but these
    differences did not appear to have affected efforts to respond to the
    Biscuit Fire.

    In 1993, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)-an interagency
    group comprising federal and state representatives- established minimum
    training and experience standards15 for personnel assigned to fight
    interagency wildland fires outside their home region. These standards,
    which were updated in 2000, have been adopted by five federal land
    management agencies, including the Forest Service.16 Five of the seven
    states that we contacted in and around the Northwest Region have also
    adopted these standards as the minimum requirements for all their
    firefighting personnel.17 The Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) meets
    these standards for personnel on interagency wildland fires outside the
    Northwest Region. For fires under state management and for

    14Final Report: Fire & Aviation Safety Team Review of Northwest Geographic
    Area (July 19 through Aug. 1, 2002).

    15This system is the Wildland and Prescribed Fire Qualifications System,
    commonly referred to as 310-1.

    16The Forest Service has supplemented NWCG (310-1) standards with
    additional requirements that apply only to Forest Service personnel.

    17We spoke with wildland firefighting officials in California, Idaho,
    Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.

    interagency fires within the region,18 ODF has maintained its own
    certification standards. These standards are nearly identical to the 1993
    version of NWCG standards.19 In 2000, NWCG added some course and
    experience requirements. ODF officials are currently working to
    incorporate many, but not all, of these changes into state standards. For
    example, ODF requirements for many positions rated type 2 or below will
    meet NWCG standards. For type 1 positions, including incident commander,
    some of the most advanced courses will not be required. An ODF official
    explained that he believed, for state-managed fires, these additional
    courses were not necessary. The California Department of Forestry and Fire
    Protection (CDF) has maintained its own firefighting certification system
    for its firefighting personnel. CDF shares many of the same standards as
    those established by NWCG, including the combination of coursework and
    experience requirements for firefighting certification,20 but requires
    state-specific courses for some positions. Under an agreement with federal
    land management agencies, California state personnel assigned to
    interagency fires in supervisory roles within the state are required to be
    certified to a level equivalent to NWCG standards.21 For national
    mobilization, NWCG requires that participating agencies certify that their
    personnel meet the established interagency qualification standards. In the
    case of California, CDF officials stated that state certification
    requirements meet or exceed the standards established by NWCG. In
    addition, National Interagency Fire Center officials said they have no
    concerns about the adequacy of the standards used by CDF.

    18A 1998 agreement between Oregon, Washington, and federal land management
    agencies recognizes each agency's standards as reasonable, prudent, and
    acceptable for firefighting on lands under private, state, or federal
    protection.

    19Although Oregon standards differ from those set by NWCG, approximately
    70 percent of the state's roughly 600 permanent firefighting personnel are
    certified in one or more interagency incident command positions, according
    to an ODF official. In addition, another roughly 300 seasonal employees
    are brought in each year that, by their job duties, must be interagency
    certified.

    20California's Office of Emergency Services coordinates the sharing of
    local emergency personnel, including wildland firefighters, through the
    state's municipal aid program. The standards used are based on NWCG
    standards, and these personnel are shared with interagency efforts.

    21A May 2002 agreement between California and federal land management
    agencies specifies that supervisory personnel responding to interagency
    fires in the state and some adjacent areas shall meet either NWCG training
    requirements or those of the California Incident Command Certification
    System, which is based on NWCG standards. The agreement also provides
    recommended qualifications for engine crews.

    There was no apparent impact on the response to the Biscuit Fire as a
    result of different agency firefighting certification standards. As with
    other interagency fires, personnel that were dispatched to fight on
    interagency fires outside their home region were required to meet these
    standards. Within the Northwest Region, ODF maintains its own standards
    for state fires and interagency fires, although only NWCG-qualified
    personnel were dispatched to the Biscuit Fire, according to an ODF
    official. While CDF utilizes an independent set of requirements, NIFC
    officials said they had no concerns about the adequacy of the
    certification system used by CDF. In addition, for the portion of the
    Biscuit Fire that was located in California, CDF supervisory personnel
    assigned to the fire were required by agreement to be certified to a level
    equivalent with NWCG standards. Finally, our review of relevant documents
    and discussions with knowledgeable federal, state, and local officials did
    not identify any evidence that the differences between these systems
    created difficulties during the response to the Biscuit Fire.

    Conclusions	The cornerstone of wildland fire policy is interagency
    cooperation and coordination among federal, state, tribal, and local
    firefighting agencies. Central to that cooperation and coordination is a
    system that includes managers and personnel from many different agencies
    and that crosses jurisdictional boundaries. Such a system is facilitated
    by good communication between personnel at all levels to help ensure
    clarity of firefighting goals, strategies, and tactics. Communication is
    also important for those working in various dispatch centers to obtain
    firefighting resources. These personnel must communicate in a
    timely-sometimes immediate-fashion to other dispatch centers the resources
    they need to fight new or ongoing fires in their area. In the case of the
    Biscuit Fire, Grants Pass dispatch personnel did communicate resource
    needs to their regional dispatch center in Portland, but no resources were
    immediately available due to other higher priority fires in the region.
    However, personnel did not communicate the need for initial attack
    resources to a neighboring dispatch center in Fortuna, California,
    although this was an option available to Grants Pass personnel. Whether
    this would have resulted in any resources being provided for the initial
    attack of the Biscuit Fire is unclear because personnel in the Fortuna
    dispatch center disagree on whether any resources could have been spared,
    given that fires were also burning in Northern California at the time.
    Since no request was made, the priority of the Biscuit Fire relative to
    other ongoing fires within the Fortuna dispatch center's direct protection
    area was not discussed on the

    first day of the Biscuit Fire, and the outcome of such a request, had it
    been made, remains unclear.

    Agency Comments and 	We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries
    of Agriculture and of the Interior for review and comment. The Forest
    Service commented that

    Our Evaluation	the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally
    agrees with its contents. The Forest Service's comments are presented in
    appendix II. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments.

    As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
    after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
    report to other interested congressional committees. We will also send
    copies to the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of the Interior; the
    Chief of the Forest Service; the Directors of the Bureau of Land
    Management, the National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and
    the Bureau of Indian Affairs; and other interested parties. We will make
    copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
    available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about his report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in
    appendix III.

    Barry T. Hill Director, Natural Resources and Environment

    Appendix I

    Scope and Methodology

    To determine whether policies and procedures were in place for acquiring
    needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire,
    and the extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when
    the fire was first identified, we reviewed national policies and
    procedures that included the National Interagency Standards for Fire and
    Fire Aviation Operations and the National Interagency Mobilization Guide.
    We reviewed the interagency mobilization guides in 9 of the 11 regions.1
    We also reviewed the local mobilization guide covering the Grants Pass
    dispatch center and the mobilization guides for three other local dispatch
    centers.2 We reviewed the mutual aid agreements governing resource sharing
    for the Siskiyou National Forest. We spoke with officials at the National
    Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise, Idaho; Forest Service
    headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Forest Service Regions 5 and 6 regional
    offices; Bureau of Land Management, Oregon State Office and the Medford
    District Office; the Siskiyou and Six Rivers National Forests; the Oregon
    Department of Forestry (ODF); and the California Department of Forestry
    and Fire Protection (CDF). We visited three dispatch centers in Oregon
    (the Grants Pass Interagency Fire Center, the Medford Interagency Fire
    Center, and the Northwest Interagency Coordination Center in Portland) and
    one in California (the Fortuna Interagency Emergency Command Center) to
    discuss dispatch center operations. We also reviewed Biscuit Fire records
    stored at Siskiyou National Forest headquarters in Medford, Oregon, and
    records kept at Fortuna, including resource orders and transcripts of key
    radio transmissions during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire. The
    Forest Service provided the data used to generate the fire progression
    maps. We took steps to assess the reliability of the mapping data and
    determined that it was sufficiently accurate for our purposes.

    To determine what resource management issues, if any, affected the ability
    of firefighting personnel to effectively fight the Biscuit Fire, we
    reviewed a variety of information, including resource orders and daily
    incident reports showing firefighting resources requested and obtained,
    incident action plans showing firefighting strategies and tactics,
    close-out reports discussing firefighting progress and problems, and
    Forest Service reviews of the Biscuit Fire. We interviewed a number of
    federal and state personnel knowledgeable about the Biscuit Fire,
    including officials from the Siskiyou

    1These were the Northwest, Northern California, Southern California,
    Western Great Basin, Eastern Great Basin, Southwest, Northern Rockies,
    Rocky Mountain, and Eastern regions.

    2These dispatch centers were the Central Washington Interagency
    Communications Center, the Casper Interagency Dispatch Center, and the
    North Dakota Interagency Dispatch Center.

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    and Six Rivers National Forests, ODF, and CDF, and the management teams
    and other key support staff that were assigned to the Biscuit Fire. We
    discussed resource management issues, their effect on the fighting of the
    Biscuit Fire, and the reasons for these issues or problems. We also
    reviewed assessments of other wildland fires to determine if the issues
    identified were limited to the Biscuit Fire or were more widespread.

    To determine what differences, if any, existed in key personnel
    certification standards at federal and state agencies involved in fighting
    wildland fires- particularly in Oregon-we reviewed the interagency
    qualification standards established by NWCG. We also contacted officials
    from Oregon and California, where the Biscuit Fire burned, and five other
    states-Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Washington-to discuss the
    certification standards they use, and whether they differ from those
    established by NWCG. In addition, we reviewed state firefighting standards
    for ODF and CDF and compared them with those established by NWCG. To
    determine what effect any differences may have had on the response to the
    Biscuit Fire, we spoke with federal officials with NIFC, the Forest
    Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the National Park Service;
    officials with the National Association of State Foresters; and state and
    local officials in Oregon and California, including officials from ODF,
    CDF, and the California Office of Emergency Services.

    We conducted our work from April 2003 through February 2004 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                      Appendix II

                            Comments from the Forest Service

    Appendix III

                         GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact Barry T. Hill, (202) 512-3841 or hillbt@gao.gov

    Staff 	Andrea W. Brown, John Delicath, Cliff Fowler (retired), Janet
    Frisch, Molly Laster, Paul E. Staley, Stanley G. Stenersen, Amy Webbink,
    and Arvin Wu

    Acknowledgments made key contributions to this report.

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