    Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Continue to Collect
    and Provide Information on Tests and on Potentially Exposed
    Personnel (14-MAY-04, GAO-04-410).

    In the 1962-74 time period, the Department of Defense (DOD)
    conducted a classified chemical and biological warfare test
    program--Project 112--that might have exposed service members and
    civilian personnel to chemical or biological agents. In 2000 the
    Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began obtaining information
    from DOD about the program. Concerned that veterans and others
    might have health problems from exposure during Project 112 and
    similar DOD tests, Congress required DOD in the 2003 Defense
    Authorization Act to identify Project 112 tests and personnel
    potentially expose--service members and the number of civilian
    personnel--and other chemical and biological tests that might
    have exposed service members. GAO was required by the act and
    subsequent guidance from the congressional requesters to evaluate
    (1) DOD's process to identify the Project 112 tests and the
    service members and the number of civilian personnel potentially
    exposed, (2) DOD's progress in identifying similar tests outside
    Project 112, and (3) VA's progress in notifying DOD identified
    veterans.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-410
        ACCNO:   A10006
      TITLE:     Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Continue to
    Collect and Provide Information on Tests and on Potentially
    Exposed Personnel
         DATE:   05/14/2004
      SUBJECT:   Biological warfare
    	     Chemical and biological agents
    	     Chemical warfare
    	     Civilian employees
    	     Health hazards
    	     Military personnel
    	     Military personnel records
    	     Records (documents)
    	     Testing
    	     Reporting requirements
    	     Veterans
    	     DOD Project 112 Program

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    GAO-04-410

                        United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

              Report to the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services

    May 2004

    CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

         DOD Needs to Continue to Collect and Provide Information on Tests and
                             Potentially Exposed Personnel

    GAO-04-410

    Highlights of GAO-04-410, a report to Senate and House Committees on Armed
    Services

    In the 1962-74 time period, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducted a
    classified chemical and biological warfare test program-Project 112-that
    might have exposed service members and civilian personnel to chemical or
    biological agents. In 2000 the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began
    obtaining information from DOD about the program. Concerned that veterans
    and others might have health problems from exposure during Project 112 and
    similar DOD tests, Congress required DOD in the 2003 Defense Authorization
    Act to identify Project 112 tests and personnel potentially
    exposed-service members and the number of civilian personnel-and other
    chemical and biological tests that might have exposed service members. GAO
    was required by the act and subsequent guidance from the congressional
    requesters to evaluate (1) DOD's process to identify the Project 112 tests
    and the service members and the number of civilian personnel potentially
    exposed, (2) DOD's progress in identifying similar tests outside Project
    112, and (3) VA's progress in notifying DODidentified veterans.

    GAO is making three recommendations to enhance DOD's responsiveness to the
    legislative requirement. DOD concurred with all of our recommendations and
    agreed to implement them.

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-410.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    the link above. For more information, contact Raymond J. Decker at
    deckerrj@gao.gov or (202) 5126020.

    May 2004

    CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

    DOD Needs to Continue to Collect and Provide Information on Tests and
    Potentially Exposed Personnel

    DOD appears to have accurately identified all major chemical and
    biological tests associated with Project 112. DOD identified 134 planned
    tests of which 50 were conducted. Of the 50 tests, 19 were ship-based and
    31 were landbased. GAO found no evidence of any other Project 112 tests.
    DOD performed a reasonable investigation of service members potentially
    exposed to agents in the tests. However, GAO believes that there likely
    are service members and civilian personnel potentially exposed to agents
    who have not been identified for various reasons. First, DOD was unable to
    identify any service members for 21 land-based tests because it was unable
    to find the needed records. Second, although DOD addressed the basic
    mandate requirement regarding civilian personnel by estimating that 350
    had been potentially exposed, it did not specifically search for
    individual civilian personnel exposures or foreign national exposures. DOD
    limited its investigation of specific exposures to identifying military
    veterans who might be eligible for medical services from VA. Third, DOD
    did not pursue all possible sources of information during its
    investigation, and additional identifications continue. DOD recently
    identified 51, and VA, 172 more military personnel. GAO identified 167
    additional service members and civilian personnel who might have been
    exposed, plus additional sources of information. DOD has not determined
    the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify additional
    potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel.

    In February 2004, following GAO inquiries, another DOD office began
    preparing a plan to identify tests outside Project 112 that might have
    exposed service members. Since World War II, DOD has conducted hundreds of
    classified tests within the 48 contiguous states. Although not required by
    the act, DOD also plans to identify service members and civilian personnel
    who were potentially exposed by these tests. However, that office has not
    yet completed its plan for doing this.

    As of March 2004, VA had notified 3,397, or 58 percent, of the 5,842
    service members DOD reported in June 2003, including 751 VA determined to
    be deceased. VA is still processing over 2,400 cases but is having
    difficulty making these notifications due to the absence of key needed
    information such as military service numbers. VA is developing a plan to
    resolve these more difficult cases and expects to complete its
    notification process by September 1, 2005. To date, VA has granted 10 of
    316 benefit claims related to Project 112. Recent changes to VA's
    eligibility requirements could increase the number of Project 112-related
    medical visits.

    DOD has not designated an office to act as a single point of contact for
    collecting and providing information regarding the results of its
    investigations of DOD chemical and biological tests conducted inside or
    outside of Project 112.

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    DOD Accurately Identified Project 112 Tests, Performed a

    Reasonable Investigation for Service Members, and Estimated

    Civilian Personnel Potentially Exposed DOD Plans to Investigate Tests
    outside Project 112 VA Notified the Majority of Service Members Identified
    by DOD Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments
    and Our Evaluation 1

    3 6

    8 18 20 22 23 23

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    Appendix II Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted

    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense

            Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs 37

      Table

    Table 1: Summary of DOD Project 112 Submissions to VA as of June 30, 2003

      Figures

    Figure 1: Dispensing Chemical Simulants during a Land-Based Test 9 Figure
    2: DOD Methodology for Identifying Project 112 Tests 10 Figure 3: Results
    of DOD's Investigation of Service Members and

    Others Potentially Exposed during Project 112 Tests 15

    Abbreviations

    DOD Department of Defense
    GAO General Accounting Office
    OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    May 14, 2004

    The Honorable John W. Warner
    Chairman
    The Honorable Carl Levin
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan Hunter
    Chairman
    The Honorable Ike Skelton
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives

    During the 1962-74 time period, the Department of Defense (DOD)
    conducted a classified chemical and biological warfare test program,
    called Project 112, that might have exposed U.S. service members and
    others-including DOD civilian personnel, DOD contractors, and foreign
    nationals-to chemical or biological agents1 employed in these tests. As a
    result of questions raised by Members of Congress and veterans, the
    Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began working with DOD in
    September 2000 to obtain information about the test program and possible
    military participants. Subsequently, concerned that veterans and other
    individuals might have experienced health problems as a result of being
    exposed while participating in Project 112 and other classified chemical
    and biological tests, Congress required DOD, through the Defense
    Authorization Act for 2003,2 to develop and implement a plan (1) to
    identify the Project 112 tests and the service members and the number of
    civilian personnel3 who were potentially exposed by the tests and (2) to
    work with veterans and veterans' service organizations to identify other

    1 In this report, the term "agent" is used to mean chemical and biological
    agents, simulants (a substitute for a more-toxic agent), and tracers.

    2 Pub. L. No. 107-314, section 709 (Dec 2, 2002).

    3 For this report, we have interpreted the act's use of "civilian
    personnel" to mean DOD employees, DOD contractors, and foreign government
    participants who took part in Project 112 tests.

    chemical and biological projects or tests that may have exposed service
    members to chemical or biological agents. The act also mandated that we
    evaluate DOD's efforts to identify the tests and potential service members
    and number of civilian personnel exposed, as well as VA's progress in
    notifying potentially exposed service members.4 Thus, our objectives for
    this review were to (1) evaluate the effectiveness of DOD's process for
    identifying chemical and biological tests conducted under Project 112 and
    the service members and number of civilian personnel who might have been
    exposed to agents employed under these tests, (2) determine DOD's progress
    in identifying projects or tests conducted outside of Project 112 that
    might have exposed service members to chemical or biological agents, and
    (3) review VA's progress in notifying service members whom DOD determined
    might have been exposed.

    We assessed the reliability of DOD and VA data by interviewing agency
    officials knowledgeable about the data and by reviewing existing
    information about the data and the systems that produced them. We
    determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our
    objectives.

    To evaluate the effectiveness of DOD's identification process for Project
    112 tests and potentially exposed service members and civilian personnel,
    we visited repositories of DOD test records, analyzed test reports, and
    selected a representative sample of conducted tests for more detailed
    analyses. In addition, we reviewed other available documents and
    interviewed DOD officials and scientists, including those involved in
    developing and conducting Project 112 tests. We systematically
    corroborated the information we developed independently from various
    sources before assessing whether DOD's Project 112 identification
    methodology was effective. To determine DOD's progress in identifying
    chemical and biological tests or projects outside Project 112, we
    interviewed DOD officials concerning DOD's process for assigning
    responsibilities for such legislative mandates and its current oversight
    of such DOD testing. To review VA's progress in notifying potentially

    4 The Defense Authorization Act for 2003 mandated that we prepare two
    reports: one on DOD's plan for identifying tests and a second one on DOD's
    implementation of its plan. Because DOD conducted the planning and
    identification simultaneously, we agreed with your office to prepare one
    report. The mandate also specified Project 112 tests for the 196369
    period. However, because some Project 112 tests did not conclude until
    1974 and DOD reported on tests conducted from 1962 through 1974, we
    included the longer period in our review.

      Results in Brief

    exposed service members, we gathered and analyzed statistics concerning VA
    notifications and its identifications of deceased service members and
    interviewed VA officials about the process and likely impact on future
    medical treatment. For a more complete discussion of our scope and
    methodology, see appendix I.

    We performed our review from March 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
    with generally accepted government audit standards.

    We believe that DOD accurately identified all tests associated with
    Project 112.5 We also believe that although DOD performed a reasonable
    investigation of service members potentially exposed to agents employed in
    these tests, in view of the fact that many records were unavailable owing
    to the passage of time, DOD likely has not identified all potentially
    exposed military or civilian personnel. From October 2000 through June
    2003, DOD identified 134 planned chemical and biological tests associated
    with Project 112, of which 50 were conducted. Of the 50 tests that were
    conducted, 19 were Shipboard Hazard and Defense, or ship-based tests, 6
    and 31 were land-based. These tests were conducted primarily on or near
    U.S. territory, although some tests were in Canada, Panama, and the United
    Kingdom. DOD's methodology for identifying planned and conducted tests
    under Project 112 appears sound, and we found no evidence of additional
    Project 112 tests, planned or conducted. With regard to the identification
    of personnel potentially exposed during testing, DOD reported in its final
    report to Congress on June 30, 2003, that it had determined that 5,842
    service members had been potentially exposed to chemical or biological
    agents. Because of its extensive comparison of test and other documents in
    conjunction with other actions, we believe that DOD's methodology and
    efforts to identify potentially exposed military personnel as required by
    the mandate appear sound. Furthermore, DOD addressed another mandate
    requirement by estimating that 350 civilian personnel might have been
    exposed but did not focus on civilian personnel during its investigation.
    Nevertheless, we believe that it is likely that service members and
    civilian personnel who participated in these tests have not been
    identified for the following reasons:

    5 The DOD organization that investigated the Project 112 tests was a small
    element of the Under Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the
    Deployment Health Support Directorate.

    6 DOD public documents, such as fact sheets, refer to Shipboard Hazard and
    Defense tests as ship-based.

    o  	DOD had limited success in identifying service members exposed to
    land-based tests because it was unable to locate the needed records. DOD
    identified no service members who were potentially exposed during 21 of
    the 31 land-based tests, and in the remaining 10 land-based tests, fewer
    than the total known to have participated were identified. Approximately
    94 percent of the identified service members were from the 19 ship-based
    tests that comprised about one-third of all the tests conducted.

    o  	DOD did not specifically search for civilian personnel-DOD civilian
    employees, DOD contractors, or foreign government participants-in its
    investigation. The department's rationale for not including such
    individuals was that it believed the scope of its investigation was
    limited to military veterans who might be eligible for medical benefits
    from VA. However, the act requires DOD to report the number of civilian
    personnel potentially exposed, and following our inquiries, DOD reported
    that an additional 350 civilian personnel (250 identified in records and
    100 more estimated) might have been exposed.

    o  	DOD did not exhaust all possible sources of information during its
    investigation, and additional potentially exposed personnel continue to be
    identified. On January 20, 2004, DOD reported 51 additional potentially
    exposed service members to VA. Furthermore, through our research we
    identified and reported to DOD a total of 167 additional potentially
    exposed personnel-39 service members, 125 civilian DOD employees, and 3
    contractors-who participated in the tests. In addition, 172 other
    veterans, not identified by DOD, who reported a Project 112 connection,
    have contacted VA. We also identified and reported several possible new
    sources of additional Project 112 exposure information.

    Since issuance of its final report in June 2003, DOD has curtailed its
    efforts to identify service members and civilian personnel who were
    potentially exposed. However, DOD has continued to respond to inquiries
    from VA and individual service members concerning issues such as test
    participation. At the time we concluded our review, DOD had not determined
    the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify additional
    potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel.

    Although the Defense Authorization Act for 2003 requires DOD to work with
    veterans and veterans' service organizations to identify projects or tests
    outside Project 112 that might have exposed members of the armed forces to
    chemical or biological agents, DOD has not yet begun this investigation.
    As a result of our review questions about DOD's progress in

    responding to this requirement, in February 2004 an office under the
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics7 began preparing a plan to fulfill this mandated requirement,
    but has not yet determined such essential plan elements as the scope,
    reporting requirements, milestones, and responsibilities for those
    involved in completing the effort. This is an entirely different DOD
    office from the one that investigated the Project 112 tests, and
    coordination between these investigations has only recently begun.
    Although not required by the act, DOD plans to attempt to identify service
    member and civilian personnel who were potentially exposed by these tests.
    We determined that since World War II DOD conducted hundreds of other
    classified tests within the 48 contiguous states outside the scope of
    Project 112.

    As of March 2004, VA had sent notification letters to 58 percent of the
    5,842 veterans identified by DOD, of which 751 were determined to be
    deceased. VA is still processing over 2,400 cases, but it is having
    difficulty making further notifications owing to the absence of key
    information such as military service numbers. VA is planning to resolve
    these more difficult cases and expects to complete its notification
    process by September 1, 2005. To date, VA has granted 10 of 316 benefit
    claims related to Project 112. The passage of Public Law 108-170,8 title
    1, on December 6, 2003, changed the eligibility requirements for medical
    services, which in turn could increase the number of medical visits
    associated with Project 112 tests.

    DOD has not designated what office will serve as the primary point of
    contact for providing information relating to tests in and outside Project
    112. The DOD office that is involved in identifying tests outside Project
    112 had not begun its work and DOD has designated no entity, including the
    Project 112 investigative office, to provide information about tests
    outside Project 112. This situation could result in DOD's having no single
    point of contact for providing information-including the additional
    identification of personnel potentially exposed-to VA, individuals, and
    other interested parties, such as foreign countries.

    We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate
    DOD office(s) to (1) determine the feasibility of addressing unresolved

    7 Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical
    and Biological Defense.

    8 Veterans Health Care, Capital Asset, and Business Improvement Act of
    2003.

    Background

    issues associated with Project 112, such as identifying and contacting
    potentially exposed service members and civilian personnel; (2) finalize
    and implement a plan for identifying DOD projects and tests conducted
    outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members to chemical or
    biological agents; and (3) designate a single point of contact to provide
    information relating to tests and potential exposures in and outside of
    Project 112 to VA, individuals, and other interested parties such as
    foreign countries, as appropriate. The report contains no recommendations
    for VA.

    In commenting on this report, both DOD and VA concurred with our findings.
    DOD concurred with our recommendations and established dates for their
    implementation. Both DOD and VA also provided suggested technical changes
    and updated information, which we incorporated in the final report where
    appropriate.

    Project 112 encompassed a series of classified operational chemical and
    biological warfare tests from 1962 through 1974 that DOD initiated under
    the auspices of the Army's Deseret Test Center, Fort Douglas, Utah. The
    project was so named because in 1962 it was the 112th project of 150
    delineated by the then Secretary of Defense and involved the classified
    testing of chemical and biological agents. Annually, the armed services
    and the commanders in chief of the combatant commands submitted their
    testing requirements to Deseret Test Center where they were discussed at
    annual planning conferences and, when possible, incorporated in the test
    program for the following year.

    Project 112 included both ship-based and land-based tests. Ship-based
    tests were conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of protective measures
    against chemical and biological agents, and risks to U.S. forces.
    Landbased tests were generally conducted to learn how chemical or
    biological warfare agents behaved in different environmental conditions,
    e.g., frigid or tropical climates. The ship-based tests involved service
    members from the Navy and Army and to a lesser extent personnel from the
    Marine Corps and Air Force. According to a Project 112 chief scientist we
    interviewed, test teams consisted largely of military and civilian
    personnel from DOD's Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, with an Army, Air Force,
    or Naval officer as test director. Ship-based tests were conducted in the
    open waters of the North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and near the Marshall
    Islands, the Islands of Hawaii, Baker Island (a U.S. possession located
    1,650 miles southwest of Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean), Puerto Rico, and
    the California coast. Land-based tests took place in the states of Alaska,
    Florida, Georgia,

    Hawaii, Maryland, and Utah, as well as in Panama, Canada, and the United
    Kingdom. These land-based tests sometimes included foreign personnel
    observers-both military and civilian.

    In August 2000, following occasional veteran and congressional contacts
    concerning veterans' involvement in Project 112 tests, VA's Acting
    Secretary wrote to the Secretary of Defense requesting information on
    ship-based testing conducted by DOD. In October 2000 DOD assigned
    responsibility for this action to its Deployment Health Support
    Directorate. DOD committed to obtaining information about three
    tests-Autumn Gold, Copper Head, and Shady Grove (see app. II)-such as
    dates, locations, chemical or biological agents used, and names of
    military personnel aboard the ships during the testing. DOD investigators,
    representing only a small element of the Directorate, discovered and
    provided information on these as well as on the remaining Project 112
    tests, planned or conducted, despite having a number of difficulties to
    overcome with respect to the availability of test records. The available
    records were stored in multiple locations, not easily searchable, and
    still largely classified because of operational concerns.

    When the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act was passed, it expanded
    the requirements beyond what DOD envisioned when it began its
    investigation. The act required DOD to provide VA with the information
    developed concerning Project 112 tests VA for its use in notifying service
    members who might have been exposed. The act also required DOD to submit
    to Congress reports, which were to include the test names, test
    objectives, chemical or biological agents involved, number of service
    members and civilian personnel potentially affected by each test, and
    other information. The act also required us to review and report to
    Congress on DOD's test and personnel identification efforts, its
    procedures for providing VA with information and VA's notification
    efforts. As mandated by the act, DOD concluded its investigation of
    Project 112 with a report to Congress on June 30, 2003. In addition, the
    act required DOD to work with veterans and veterans' service organizations
    to identify other DOD projects or tests that might have similarly exposed
    service members. While this second investigation had not started when we
    began our work, an office under the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is now preparing a plan
    for doing so. This second investigation is being envisioned as completely
    separate from and is being conducted by a different office from the one
    that investigated Project 112.

      DOD Accurately Identified Project 112 Tests, Performed a Reasonable
      Investigation for Service Members, and Estimated Civilian Personnel
      Potentially Exposed

    The Defense Authorization Act for 2003 required DOD to identify Project
    112 tests, as well as the service members and the number of civilians who
    might have been exposed to agents employed in these tests. A small office
    of the Deployment Health Support Directorate that reports to the Under
    Secretary for Health Affairs conducted this investigation. We believe that
    DOD accurately identified the tests associated with Project 112 and, given
    the unavailability of many records due to the passage of time, performed a
    reasonable investigation of service members who were potentially exposed
    to the agents employed in these tests. DOD identified 134 planned Project
    112 tests of which 50 were conducted-either on land or on ships. Some
    tests were conducted on or near U.S. territory, although some were in
    foreign countries. We found no evidence of any additional Project 112
    tests. Because of its extensive comparison of test documents and ship
    personnel rosters, in conjunction with other actions, we believe that DOD
    used a sound methodology to identify 5,842 service members who were
    potentially exposed to agents employed in these tests. DOD addressed
    another mandate requirement with respect to reporting the number of
    civilian personnel who might have been exposed to agents by these tests by
    including in its final report an estimate that 350 DOD civilian personnel
    were potentially exposed. For several reasons, we believe it is likely
    that both service members and civilian personnel remain unidentified.
    First, DOD had limited success in identifying service members exposed to
    landbased tests because it was unable to find much of the needed
    documentation. Second, DOD did not specifically search for civilian
    personnel-DOD employees, contractors, and foreign government
    participants-in its investigation because it considered civilian personnel
    beyond the scope of its investigation. Third, DOD did not identify all
    possible sources of information such as additional Project 112
    repositories, and substantial numbers of potentially exposed personnel
    continue to be identified. We identified 167 additional potentially
    exposed personnel mostly associated with land-based tests.9 DOD identified
    an additional 51 and VA, an additional 172. Nevertheless, DOD has not
    determined the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify
    additional potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel.

    9 On the basis of our document search, which went beyond the records DOD
    reviewed, these personnel appear to be in addition to the 350 potentially
    exposed civilian personnel that DOD estimated in its June 2003 report to
    Congress.

        Identification of Project 112 Tests

    As required by the legislative mandate, DOD accurately identified the 134
    planned tests associated with Project 112, of which 50 were conducted. DOD
    believes that the systematic approach it used to identify these tests
    provides a high degree of assurance that it has captured all of the
    Project 112 tests, and we agree. We did not find any evidence of
    additional Project 112 tests, planned or conducted, during our review.

    Of the 50 Project 112 tests that DOD conducted, 19 were ship-based and 31
    were land-based. (See fig. 1 for an example of land-based testing.)
    According to information provided to VA, the ship-based tests occurred,
    among other places, in the Pacific Ocean off the Hawaiian Islands and off
    the coast of San Diego, California; in the Atlantic Ocean off
    Newfoundland; in the Pacific off the Marshall Islands; and off Vieques
    Island, Puerto Rico. The land-based tests were conducted in Alaska, Utah,
    Canada, the Panama Canal Zone, and the United Kingdom. The tests were
    conducted from December 1962 through May 1974. (See app. II for a summary
    of the 50 conducted tests.)

    Figure 1: Dispensing Chemical Simulants during a Land-Based Test

    In the absence of distinct overall program documents, DOD relied on a
    myriad of documents from various sources to identify Project 112 tests. As
    shown in figure 2, DOD (1) determined the repositories of potential test
    records, (2) performed electronic and physical searches of the documents
    contained at each repository to identify applicable documents, (3)
    reviewed each document to determine its relevance to Project 112, and (4)
    interviewed selected scientists and test participants. In addition, DOD
    conducted outreach programs to veterans and veterans'groups and
    corroborated the evidence obtained from the various sources.

    Figure 2: DOD Methodology for Identifying Project 112 Tests

    Repositories of Project 112 test records included but were not limited to
    Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; and the
    Navy's Surface Warfare Center located at Dahlgren, Virginia. Using this
    approach, according to DOD officials, DOD located documents that addressed
    tests planned and conducted for each of the years during which Project 112
    tests were being performed. In particular, DOD officials noted

    the corroboration of evidence from the annual and semiannual reports from
    the Deseret Test Center, Utah, the organization responsible for the tests;
    the planning documents for each of the tests; and the final test reports.
    This enabled them to close the "information gaps," thus providing a high
    level of assurance that virtually all of the tests were identified. The
    annual reports, for example, typically discussed not only the plans for
    the coming year but also included information on the tests that had been
    conducted during the previous year. DOD supplemented the evidence it
    gathered from documents and discussions with former managers of the
    Deseret Test Center.

    We did not identify any additional Project 112 tests in our review of DOD
    documents and our discussions with DOD and former officials and managers
    of the Deseret Test Center. It appears that DOD used a reasonable approach
    for identifying the locations of records and source documents,
    particularly since some of the Project 112 tests were conducted more than
    40 years ago and the record-keeping systems were much less sophisticated
    than today's.

    DOD's determination of whether Project 112 tests were conducted was
    complicated by the fact that a number of tests were postponed, had name
    changes, or were combined with other tests. DOD essentially used an
    iterative approach to track each test from its first mention in a test
    document until its final resolution-conducted or canceled. Determinations
    were made on a case-by-case basis whenever possible, on the basis of the
    evidence that was gathered for each test. The existence of a final test
    report was considered to be sufficient evidence that a test had been
    conducted; DOD obtained final test reports for each of the 50 tests that
    it concluded were conducted. DOD located specific documentation for 62 of
    the 84 tests it determined were canceled. The determination that the
    remaining 22 tests had been canceled was based on a combination of
    factors. The moratorium on biological tests that was issued on November
    25, 1969, for example, was the partial basis for the determination that
    eight tests were canceled. Other cancellation determinations were based on
    (1) the decommissioning of the fleet used for the ship-based tests, (2)
    test requirements canceled or met by other tests, and (3) the Deseret Test
    Center's closure. We agree with DOD's conclusions regarding tests that
    were conducted or canceled.

    DOD developed unclassified fact sheets that described each conducted
    Project 112 test, which were provided to VA, and made available on the DOD
    Web site. These fact sheets provide available information concerning the
    test objectives, dates, and locations as well as the names of

    participating units or ships. The fact sheets also provide information
    concerning the agents used and current information concerning the medical
    implications of exposure.

        Potentially Exposed Service Members and Civilian Personnel Remain
        Unidentified

    Although the methodology to identify potentially exposed service members
    appears to be sound, we believe that the service members that DOD
    identified and the number of civilian personnel it estimated do not
    represent all of the service members and civilian personnel who might have
    been exposed for the following reasons:

    o  	DOD had limited success in identifying service members exposed to
    land-based tests because it was unable to find much of the needed
    documentation.

    o  	DOD did not specifically search for individual civilian personnel-DOD
    employees, DOD contractors, or foreign government participants-in its
    investigation because it considered such personnel outside its scope.

    o  	DOD did not exhaust all possible sources of pertinent information, and
    additional potentially exposed personnel continue to be identified.

    Nevertheless, DOD has not evaluated the feasibility of addressing
    unresolved Project 112 issues, such as identifying additional potentially
    exposed service members, civilian employees, contractors, and foreign
    nationals who participated in the tests. DOD has also not determined what
    office has responsibility for reporting new information to VA,
    individuals, or other interested parties, such as foreign countries, as
    appropriate.

    In its last report to Congress on June 30, 2003, DOD identified 5,842
    service members who had been potentially exposed during Project 112 tests;
    some during more than one test. DOD reported an additional 51 potentially
    exposed service members to VA on January 20, 2004. Owing to the absence of
    important documentation, DOD had limited success in identifying service
    members exposed to land-based tests. DOD did not identify any potentially
    exposed service members in 21 of the 31 landbased tests and limited
    numbers in the remainder. Ship-based tests commonly had 1,000 or more
    participants. Land-based tests, according to a former Deseret Test Center
    scientist, generally involved fewer than 200 participants. Because of the
    aforementioned reasons, almost all those identified--94 percent-were from
    ship-based tests that comprised about one-third of the total number of
    tests conducted. Also, fewer service

    members were identified for some land-based tests than the number known to
    have participated. For example, in Elk Hunt I, a land-based test that
    involved personnel from at least seven Army units of various sizes, DOD
    identified only six service members.

    DOD did not specifically search for civilian personnel in its
    investigation- such as DOD civilian employees, DOD contractors, or foreign
    nationals- because it believed that the scope of its investigation was
    limited to military veterans who might be eligible for medical benefits
    from VA. DOD addressed the basic mandate requirement with respect to
    identifying the number of civilian personnel by including in its final
    report an estimate that 350 DOD civilian and contractor personnel were
    potentially exposed. However, during the course of its investigation, DOD
    did not focus on DOD civilian personnel. In April 2003, when we inquired
    about the progress DOD had made in determining the number of DOD civilians
    who might have been exposed, DOD had not performed any work to make this
    determination. Subsequently, DOD identified 250 DOD civilians using the
    records it had gathered in its investigation of service members. Since it
    had not reviewed any civilian records, it increased the aforementioned
    number by 100 to cover additional civilian participants who might not have
    been included in the records that had been gathered. Although not required
    by the legislative mandate, we noted during the course of our review that
    DOD had not disseminated information concerning civilian personnel or
    attempted to notify them about the investigation into the Project 112
    tests. A records-holding area at Dugway Proving Ground contained 1,300
    boxes with approximately 9 million historical records, but it is unclear
    how many of these relate to Project 112. Our examination of the records
    contained in 12 of the boxes that we believed might be useful resulted in
    the identification of the names of 128 civilians (DOD employees and
    contractors) who might have been exposed during Project 112 testing.

    The problems DOD experienced in making the identifications of service
    members appear to have been largely due to the lack of available
    documentation, given that some of these tests were conducted more than 40
    years ago and given the unsophisticated records systems that existed at
    that time. DOD officials indicated that there was no requirement for DOD
    during the Project 112 test period to document Project 112 test
    participants, service members, or any others who might have been exposed
    to agents employed in these tests, and it did not do so. The test plans
    and reports, for example, include quantitative data on personnel and
    equipment support requirements but do not identify the names of test
    conductors or participants. Absent this information, DOD had the rather
    complex task of collecting information from various sources, even

    informal test notes, to make these identifications. DOD's methodology used
    the information contained in the fact sheets for each test, such as the
    names of the ships or units involved, and then searched available
    documentation for service members who might have been involved. For
    ship-based tests, for example, DOD obtained archived rosters of
    participating ships for the appropriate time frames, along with messages
    regarding ship personnel changes. DOD analyzed this information to
    determine the personnel who likely participated in the ship-based tests.

    According to DOD officials, the identification of land-based test
    participants was more difficult and, for many tests, even impossible. DOD
    took several steps to identify these participants including (1) requesting
    personnel rosters of participating units, (2) conducting key word searches
    of computer databases, and (3) performing general searches of boxes
    containing test records. For example, DOD reviewed the contents of a
    number of classified and unclassified boxes of test data at Dugway Proving
    Ground, Utah seeking participant data. In addition, DOD contacted service
    members who had sought assistance from VA and former employees of the
    Deseret Test Center. (See fig. 3.)

    Figure 3: Results of DOD's Investigation of Service Members and Others
    Potentially Exposed during Project 112 Tests

    Despite some success, DOD encountered a number of difficulties in locating
    information concerning participants in land-based tests. According to DOD,
    a number of commonly available military records were not useful in its
    investigation. For example, unit history records typically did not include
    useful information because units participating in these tests were platoon
    sized or smaller and unit history records are generally not recorded for
    units of this size.10 Also, most test participants traveled to

                10 A platoon is typically fewer than 50 service members.

    the test locations from their home unit. However, the documents needed to
    identify individuals who traveled to the test sites, such as travel orders
    and vouchers, were not retained. For some tests, DOD was able to locate
    participant names and, in other cases, it could not. Ultimately, DOD
    electronically provided to VA with the names of service members who were
    deemed likely participants in either ship-based or land-based tests. These
    included the 5,842 service members that DOD reported to Congress in June
    2003 and 51 that were reported to VA in January 2004. Since issuance of
    its final report in June 2003, DOD has sharply curtailed its efforts to
    identify service members and civilian personnel who were potentially
    exposed. However, the DOD has continued to respond to inquiries from VA
    and individual service members concerning issues such as test
    participation. At the time we concluded our review, DOD had not determined
    the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify additional
    potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel.

        Additional Potentially Exposed Personnel and Source Material Identified

    During our review, both we and VA discovered additional service members,
    previously unidentified by DOD, who had been potentially exposed during
    Project 112 tests. We identified and reported to DOD a total of 167
    additional personnel potentially exposed-39 service members, 125 civilian
    DOD employees, and 3 contractors, as well as several possible new sources
    of additional Project 112 exposure information. VA identified an
    additional 172 service members. DOD is currently processing these
    additional service member identifications. We also learned of additional
    potential sources of information including films taken of all land-based
    tests and other repositories of possible Project 112 documentation.

    o  	Unidentified service members: In a records-holding area at Dugway
    Proving Ground containing 1,300 boxes with approximately 9 million
    historical records, including Project 112-related test records, our
    examination of the records contained in 12 of the boxes uncovered
    approximately 39 additional potentially exposed service members' names not
    identified on DOD's list. Since we examined only a few dozen records, it
    is very likely that more service members potentially exposed to Project
    112 testing could be identified from this recordsholding area. According
    to Dugway officials, in July 2003 a contract was negotiated to scan and
    digitize the 9 million records being held there. Once this process is
    completed, access to the records will be greatly facilitated.

    o  	Unidentified civilian participants in Project 112 tests: Our
    examination of the test records in 12 of the 1,300 boxes of historical
    records at the Dugway records-holding area also enabled us to identify
    civilian personnel not previously identified by DOD. We identified 125
    civilian DOD employees and 3 contractors who had participated in
    land-based Project 112 tests, such as the 1967 Green Mist test on the Big
    Island of Hawaii and the 1965 West Side II test in Canada for which DOD
    identified no service members. According to a former scientist responsible
    for conducting the tests, Dugway Proving Ground furnished over half of the
    personnel, mostly civilians, who remain unidentified. This official also
    stated that the civilians employed at Deseret Test Center and Dugway
    Proving Ground were exposed to 100 times more agents than the military
    personnel who participated.

    o  	VA-reported unidentified service members: Since VA began notifying
    DOD-identified service members potentially exposed during Project 112
    tests, other veterans have contacted VA directly indicating connections to
    the tests. These veterans learned of the VA interest mainly by
    word-of-mouth according to VA officials. As of January 2, 2004, 172
    veterans, in addition to those identified by DOD, have themselves reported
    a Project 112 connection directly to VA.

    o  	Project 112 films as test documentation: According to Dugway
    officials, films were made of every land-based Project 112 test; and most
    tests involved multiple phases or trials. As these trials were conducted,
    an Army photography and film team recorded the test activities, and a
    total of 109 films were made. These films, which were done in what is now
    an obsolete format, are being converted to a format that can now be
    viewed. As of January 2004, about 25 percent of the films had been
    converted. These films might be useful in identifying participating units
    as well as service members and civilian personnel. The films might show,
    for example, ships or helicopters that participated in the tests and were
    not previously identified.

    o  	Other record-holding repositories identified: During the course of our
    interview process, we were informed of additional locations containing
    possible Project 112-related documents that were not included in DOD's
    investigation. Two such locations are the Army Corps of Engineers, St.
    Louis, Missouri, and the National Personnel Records Center, also in St.
    Louis. However, investigating these repositories would likely be difficult
    and costly because these records might be voluminous, unorganized, and
    general in nature. In addition, these records might not be easily
    searchable by topics related to Project 112.

      DOD Plans to Investigate Tests outside Project 112

    The Defense Authorization Act for 2003 mandated DOD to work with veterans
    and veterans' service organizations to identify DOD projects or tests
    conducted outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members to
    chemical or biological agents. DOD has not yet begun its investigation to
    identify such projects or tests. However, the Office of the Deputy
    Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense
    (Chemical and Biological Defense Office)11 began preparing a plan for
    doing so after our inquiry about the investigation's status. According to
    DOD officials, the office plans to identify the primary projects and tests
    conducted, attempt to identify service members and civilian personnel who
    might have been exposed to agents during the tests, and provide VA or
    other interested organizations with this information. Our current review
    and prior work from the mid-1990s have shown that extensive chemical and
    biological tests and projects were conducted during the Project 112
    1962-74 time period and that much greater numbers of service members and
    civilian personnel than DOD has reported for Project 112 were potentially
    exposed.

        DOD Has Not Begun Investigating Other Projects or Tests

    While DOD has aggressively investigated the Project 112 tests, it has not
    yet begun its investigation of projects or tests outside Project 112 as
    also mandated by the 2003 act. On the basis of an internal DOD agreement
    in November 2002, the identification of tests and projects outside Project
    112 became the responsibility of the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics because this
    organization has overall responsibility within DOD for chemical and
    biological defense. Subsequent to our inquiries, in February 2004, DOD's
    Chemical and Biological Defense Office began preparing a plan for
    accomplishing this mandated requirement.

    Officials of the Chemical and Biological Defense Office stated that they
    plan to identify major chemical and biological tests and projects
    conducted outside the scope of Project 112 since World War II and will
    attempt to locate repositories of information concerning these tests and
    projects. Using these and other sources of information, they plan to
    identify service members and civilian personnel who might have been
    exposed to the agents employed in these tests. These officials indicated
    that they plan to coordinate with the Deployment Health Support

    11 This office ultimately reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Technology.

    Directorate, the DOD office that investigated Project 112, and use the
    experience gained during the Project 112 investigation to facilitate their
    own efforts. As information concerning these tests and projects is
    developed, DOD plans to provide VA and to other interested organizations
    with this information, as appropriate. DOD anticipates that it might take
    up to 5 years to complete the investigation of tests outside Project 112.

    However, this approach does not provide a single DOD focal point for
    providing VA, individuals, and other interested parties with information
    related to chemical and biological testing. Responsibility for completing
    the investigation of Project 112 tests remains with the Deployment Health
    Directorate, which reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Health
    Affairs. Responsibility for investigations of tests outside the scope of
    Project 112 now resides with the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the
    Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, which ultimately
    reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics. Under this arrangement, no one office has overall
    responsibility for providing oversight and coordination for these
    investigations. Also, neither office is currently designated to serve as
    the primary point of contact for administering the identification and
    reporting of additional potentially exposed service members and DOD
    civilian personnel. This situation could result in DOD's having no single
    official point of contact for providing VA, individuals, and other
    interested parties, such as foreign countries, as appropriate, with
    information, including the additional identification of personnel
    potentially exposed.

        Hundreds of Classified Tests outside Project 112 Were Conducted with
        Thousands of Potentially Exposed Personnel

    While there is no database that contains information concerning the
    biological and chemical tests that have been conducted, we determined that
    hundreds of such classified tests and research projects were conducted
    outside Project 112 while it was ongoing. In addition, information from
    various sources shows that personnel from all services were involved in
    chemical and biological testing.

    We learned during this review that hundreds of chemical and biological
    tests similar to those conducted under Project 112 were conducted during
    the same time period. A former Deseret Test Center scientist estimated
    that the number of chemical and biological tests conducted at just one
    location-Dugway Proving Ground, Utah-was over 100, or more than double the
    number of tests conducted under Project 112 during the same

    time period. According to an Army study, some of these tests reflected the
    same objectives as Project 112.12 This study listed 31 biological field
    tests performed at various military installations including Dugway Proving
    Ground, Utah; Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Detrick, Maryland; and
    Edwards Air Force Base, California.13 The study did not quantify the
    number of test participants nor did it identify them.

    In addition, we reported in 1993 and 1994 that hundreds of radiological,
    chemical, and biological tests were conducted in which hundreds of
    thousands of people were used as test subjects. 14 We also reported that
    the Army Chemical Corps conducted a classified medical research program
    for developing incapacitating agents. This program involved testing nerve
    agents, nerve agent antidotes, psycho chemicals, and irritants. The
    chemicals were given to volunteer service members at Edgewood Arsenal,
    Maryland; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; and Forts Benning, Bragg, and
    McClellan. In total, Army documents identified 7,120 Army and Air Force
    personnel who participated in these tests.15 Further, GAO concluded that
    precise information on the scope and the magnitude of tests involving
    human subjects was not available, and the exact number of human subjects
    might never be known.

      VA Notified the Majority of Service Members Identified by DOD

    Of the 5,842 Project 112 service members identified by DOD in its final
    report on June 30, 2003, VA sent notification letters to the majority-
    3,397-from May, 2002 through March, 2004. However, 751 of these veterans
    were determined to be deceased, and notification efforts regarding the
    remaining potentially exposed veterans-over 2,400-are ongoing. These
    numbers do not include recent additional identifications of potentially
    exposed service members by DOD, VA, or us during our review. VA is having
    difficulty making the remaining more than 2,400 notifications largely
    because of incomplete data. VA officials said that the information
    provided by DOD concerning service members was in many cases missing key
    data, such as service numbers. To resolve these more

    12 U.S. Army Activity in the U. S. Biological Warfare Programs (Feb. 24,
    1977).

    13More than 80 of these tests were conducted prior to Project 112, dating
    as far back as 1949.

    14 GAO/NSIAD-93-89 and GAO/T-NSIAD-94-266. This work covered testing
    performed by the services between 1942 and 1975.

    15 The medical research program began in 1952 and continued until 1975.

    difficult cases, VA is developing a plan involving the use of Social
    Security, the National Personnel Records Center, and other databases to
    obtain additional needed information. VA plans to complete its
    notification of the remaining service members by September 1, 2005. As of
    March 31, 2004, VA had granted 10 of 316 claims for benefits directly
    related to Project 112 tests. However, recent changes to the eligibility
    requirements for medical services could increase the number of medical
    visits.

    As of March 2004, VA had identified the addresses of and mailed at least
    one outreach letter to 3,397-or 58 percent-of the 5,842 Project 112
    veterans identified in DOD's June 2003 final report. To accomplish this,
    VA matched the list of potentially exposed service members from DOD
    against its own database to find a Social Security number. If no Social
    Security number was located, VA matched the available service member's
    information to the information contained in the National Personnel Records
    Center. Once VA received a Social Security number, it used the services of
    the Internal Revenue Service and credit bureaus to locate the veteran's
    current address, or if applicable, the date of death. According to VA,
    many additional veterans alerted by word of mouth have in turn contacted
    VA through the use of toll-free numbers, submission of benefit claims, and
    calls or visits to health-care facilities. In addition, VA has sponsored a
    number of outreach efforts to veterans and veterans' groups, including
    establishing a Web site containing Project 112 information and issuing
    press releases. According to VA officials, VA received 2,217 Project
    112-related calls since the May 2002 activation of its toll-free helpline.

    VA's notification efforts are ongoing but have slowed recently owing to
    difficulties in obtaining Social Security numbers and addresses for the
    potentially exposed service members who have not yet been notified. As of
    March 2004, more than 2,400 service members-or more than 40 percent-remain
    to be processed. VA officials said that the information provided by DOD
    concerning service members was in many cases missing key data, such as
    service numbers. While it is still possible to locate service members
    without this information, VA officials said that it is difficult to do so.
    To complete these more difficult cases, VA is developing a plan involving
    the use of Social Security, the National Personnel Records Center, and
    other databases to obtain additional needed information. VA plans to
    complete its notification of the remaining service members that DOD
    identified by September 1, 2005.

    The VA notification letters, or "outreach letters," include the name of
    the specific test(s) in which DOD indicated that the service member was a
    participant and information on the type of agent employed in the test. In

    addition, a copy of a DOD fact sheet concerning each test that the service
    member participated in was enclosed with each letter. These fact sheets
    provided available information concerning the objectives, dates, and
    locations of the tests, as well as the participating units or ships. In
    addition, the fact sheet provided information concerning the agents used,
    as well as current information concerning the medical implications of
    exposure to them.

    As of March 2004, VA had received 316 claims for benefits related to
    Project 112 tests. Of the 316 claims, 88 are pending, 168 have been
    denied, 50 have been granted for a condition not connected to Project 112,
    and 10 were granted for a condition connected to Project 112.

    VA does not anticipate significant increases in approved claims as a
    result of notifying service members who were potentially exposed during
    Project 112 testing. Notably, the requirement of eligibility has
    traditionally been that the illness or injury was service connected.
    Consequently, only 10 notified service members had met this
    service-connected requirement for Project 112-related exposures as of
    January 2004. However, the passage of Public Law 108-170 on December 6,
    2003, allows service members who participated in Project 112 tests to be
    eligible for hospital care, medical services and nursing home care from
    the VA for any illness until December 31, 2005-without having to establish
    that their illness was connected to Project 112 testing. Nevertheless, VA
    officials still do not anticipate any significant increase in the number
    of medical visits.

    DOD has made a reasonable effort to identify Project 112 tests and the
    service members who might have been exposed to chemical or biological
    agents during these tests. However, DOD has not exhausted the
    possibilities for identifying additional service members and, although not
    required by the mandate, individual DOD civilian employees, DOD
    contractors, and foreign government participants. Additional
    identifications will likely result if DOD continues this investigation.
    DOD is also only in the preliminary planning stages of a mandated second
    investigation identifying tests outside Project 112 that might have
    exposed service members. DOD officials have stated their intention to
    include the identification of both service members and civilian personnel
    in its second investigation. The completion of both DOD investigations
    would mean the review of all reasonably available documentary evidence in
    an attempt to identify those service members and civilian personnel who
    might have been exposed to chemical and biological agents. However, DOD
    has not designated a single official focal point for providing information
    from the

      Conclusions

    investigations to VA, individuals, and other interested parties.
    Furthermore, VA is having difficulty notifying more than 1,700 of the
    5,842 identified service members and recently formulated a plan for
    dealing with this problem. A single DOD focal point could be helpful not
    only for DOD's coordination with VA but also for VA's efforts to continue
    service member notifications. Without a committed effort to identify and
    notify all potentially exposed personnel, some participants, especially
    civilian personnel, might not be aware of their potential exposure to
    chemical and biological agents or be able to use this information to seek
    medical assistance, if needed.

      Recommendations for Executive Action

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the following three
    actions be taken by the appropriate office(s):

    o  	determine the feasibility of addressing unresolved issues associated
    with Project 112 and the appropriateness of and responsibility for
    reporting new information, such as the identification of additional
    potentially exposed service members, civilian employees, contractors, and
    foreign nationals who participated in the tests;

    o  	finalize and implement a plan for identifying DOD projects and tests
    conducted outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members to
    chemical or biological agents and ensure that the plan addresses the
    scope, reporting requirements, milestones, and responsibilities for those
    involved in completing this effort; and

    o  	designate a single point of contact for providing VA, individuals, and
    other interested parties such as foreign governments, as appropriate, with
    information related to tests and potential exposures in and outside
    Project 112.

    DOD concurred with our report findings and recommendations and agreed to
    implement our recommendations. In commenting on our report, DOD
    acknowledged our recognition of its aggressive investigation of Project
    112 tests and agreed to address the unresolved issues with these tests as
    well as investigate the chemical and biological testing programs conducted
    since World War II. While we did not make recommendations to VA, the
    department concurred with our report findings. Both DOD and VA also

    provided suggested technical changes and updated information, which we
    incorporated in the final report where appropriate. DOD's comments are
    shown in appendix III, and VA's comments are provided in appendix IV.

    We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
    committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the
    Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Commandant of
    the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We
    will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
    report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
    http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding
    this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6020, or my Assistant
    Director,
    William W. Cawood, at (202) 512-3959. Harry E. Taylor, Jr., Harry A.
    Knobler, M. Jane Hunt, Rebecca Shea, and David A. Mayfield were major
    contributors to this report.

    Raymond J. Decker, Director
    Defense Capabilities and Management

                           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    We assessed the reliability of the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the
    Department of Veterans' Affairs' (VA) data by interviewing agency
    officials knowledgeable about the data and by reviewing existing
    information about the data and the systems that produced them. We
    determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our
    objectives.

    We reviewed and analyzed available reports, briefings, documents, and
    records and interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD), Washington, D.C., including the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Department of Veterans Affairs,
    Washington, D.C.; and the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Utah.

    To evaluate the effectiveness of DOD's process to identify chemical and
    biological tests conducted under Project 112 and the service members and
    number of civilians who might have been exposed to agents employed under
    Project 112 tests, we (1) interviewed officials at the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., including the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Department of Veterans
    Affairs, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; and
    the Deployment Health Support Directorate, Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness (hereafter referred to as DOD), who were
    responsible for conducting DOD's investigation of Project 112 tests. In
    addition, we (1) reviewed the methodology and process that DOD used to
    locate, declassify, and review appropriate sources of Project 112 data,
    (2) obtained and systematically analyzed Project 112 data; (3) interviewed
    former employees and test participants, and (4) corroborated the evidence
    from documents and interviews.

    We evaluated DOD's methodology by reviewing the work it had performed,
    retracing its steps, and doing independent research and analysis to
    develop the universe of Project 112 tests and identify the service members
    and civilians who might have been exposed to the agents employed under
    these tests. We visited the primary repository for Project 112 records at
    Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. At Dugway, we interviewed officials,
    performed data searches,and reviewed available documentation. The
    documentation we reviewed included test plans and reports, the Deseret
    Test Center's annual and semiannual reports, and unorganized boxes of test
    materials in storage. In addition, we interviewed scientists who lived in
    Salt Lake City, Utah, who were former employees of the Deseret Test
    Center, the organization that conducted the Project 112 tests. We reviewed
    the files of the DOD investigative team, as well as the

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    periodic and final report of its investigation to Congress, to determine
    if there were "information gaps" for the time period during which the
    Project 112 tests were conducted. We developed a data collection
    instrument to systematically document the tests that DOD concluded were
    conducted. With the use of the data collection instrument, we collected
    specific, uniform information concerning test location, dates, agents
    employed, and the number of service members identified who might have been
    potentially exposed. We selected a sample of tests for more detailed
    analysis and included, in our data collection instrument, information on
    DOD's basis for determining that the test was conducted, whether specific
    participating units or ships were identified, the documents or sources
    used to determine service members who might have been exposed, and the
    likelihood that indirect exposures occurred. We also reviewed DOD's
    outreach efforts and the extent to which DOD coordinated with other
    agencies that might have useful information, including the Department of
    Veterans' Affairs. We reviewed and analyzed our prior reports as well as
    reports of other organizations to provide a historical and contextual
    framework for evaluating DOD's efforts. In formulating our conclusion as
    to whether DOD's methodology was effective, we systematically corroborated
    the information we developed independently and from various sources to
    make this determination.

    To determine DOD's progress in identifying projects or tests conducted
    outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members, we held
    discussions with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, which oversees current chemical
    and biological testing. We also contacted the OSD Office of Legislative
    Affairs, as well as the DOD Office of the Inspector General, to determine
    the process for assigning responsibilities for fulfilling mandates of this
    type within DOD.

    To determine VA's progress in notifying service members whom DOD
    determined might have been exposed, we interviewed VA officials, gathered
    statistics concerning their success in making the notifications; and, in
    response to our data request, received information in writing concerning
    pertinent issues. In particular, we documented the number of service
    members whose names had been provided to VA by DOD, and the extent to
    which notification letters were sent and service members were deceased, or
    cases where sufficient documentation was not available to make the
    notifications. In addition, we discussed with VA officials the likely
    impact of service members seeking medical treatment as a result of being
    potentially exposed and the passage of Public Law 108-170, which allows
    service members who were potentially exposed to these tests to

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    receive medical treatment from VA until December 31, 2005, without proof
    of service connection.

    We performed our review from March 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
    with generally accepted government audit standards.

    Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted

    Table 1 below shows the 50 tests conducted, with the locations and dates
    of the tests, the agents employed, participating units or organizations,
    and the number of service members identified who were potentially exposed.
    There are gaps in the test numbers for several reasons, including that
    tests were combined with other tests, cancelled, or had name changes.

    Table 1: Summary of DOD Project 112 Submissions to VA as of June 30, 2003

                U.S.                                                    Date of
                service
         Test      members                             Test            submission
        number
                           Date  Units/Ships
    and name identified  of   involved           location(s) Agent    to VA
                           test
        63-3,              Dec.                                           Oct. 3,
    Whistle             1962- Unidentified U.S.  Ft. Greely, GB, VX       2002
         Down                                       AK
                           Feb.  Army, DTC
                           1963  personnel

    63-1, Eager Belle I (ship-based)

          119 Jan.-Mar. 1963 USS George Eastman Pacific Ocean BG Jan. 31, 2002

    Eager Belle II

         1,076 Jan, Mar., June USS Carpenter, USS Pacific Ocean BG Dec. 2, 2003

    (ship-based)

                                          1963

    George Eastman

                                 USS Granville S. Hall

    USS Navarro

                                    USS Tioga County

      63-4, Big Jack A Feb-Mar. 1963 VMA 225, Marine Near Ft. BG, FP Oct. 31, 2002
                                Aircraft Group 14 (A-4)

    Sherman, Panama Canal Zone

    Big Jack B Feb.-Mar. 1963	VMA 225, Marine Aircraft Group 14 (A-4)

    Near Ft. Sherman, Panama Canal Zone

    TOF Oct. 31, 2002 63-2, Autumn Gold 1, 536 May 1963 Marine Air Group 13, Pacific
                                Ocean BG Sept. 13, 2001

    (ship-based)

    USS Carpenter, USS Granville S. Hall, USS Hoel, USS Navarro, USS Tioga
    County

    (60 mi. from Oahu, Hawaii)

     64-1, Errand Boy 95 Sept. 1963 USS George Eastman Near Pearl BG, June 30, 2003

    (ship-based)

                                        (YAG-39)

    Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii

                                   betapropriolactone

        64-5, Night                                         Ft.        BG,   Oct.
           Train          Nov. 1963-      Not identified    Greely, AK  FP     9,
                                                                             2002
                           Jan. 1964
        64-5, Night                    (F-105, F-100, and
           Train                       an
        (continued)                       Army personnel
                                             carrier)
                                                            Pacific           May
                     268                                    Ocean      GB,    23,
    64-2, Flower      Feb.-Apr.1964 USS George Eastman              S02   2002
          Drum I
    (ship-based)
                                       USS Granville S.
                                       Hall                            MAA

    Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted

    U.S. service Date of Test number members Test submission and name
    identified Date of test Units/Ships involved location(s) Agent to VA

    Flower Drum II 5 Aug.-Sept. Navy tug ATF-105 Pacific Ocean VX, phosphorous
    May 23, 2002 (ship-based) 1964 (off coast of 32

    Hawaii) Navy covered lighter BIS (barge),YFN-811

    64-6, Yellow Leaf 184 Feb. 1964 	DTC personnel, other Ft. Sherman, BG Oct.
    31, 2002 units or ships not Panama identified

    Apr.-May 1966 	DTC personnel, other Island of Hawaii Tiara units or ships
    not identified

      65-14, Elk Hunt I, 6 July-Aug. 1964 171ST Infantry Brigade Ft. Greely, AK VX
                                      Oct. 9, 2002

    Elk Hunt II 111 	June-July 1965 15TH Artillery Battalion Ft. Greely, AK,
    VX Oct. 9, 2002 & Oct.-Dec., Edgewood 1965 Arsenal, Md.

    40TH Armor Battalion Canada

                                     4th Battalion

                                      9th Infantry

                                     1st Battalion

                                     47th Infantry

    538th Ordnance Company & Selected Personnel Assigned to HHC

        65-1, Copper      Jan.-Feb.   USS     Atlantic                      Sept.
            Head      289 1965       Power      Ocean          BG, FP,        13,
                                                                             2002
        (ship-based)                        (off coast of betapropiolactone
                                            Newfoundland)
         65-3, West       Jan.-Feb. F-105D   Ft. Greely,                    Oct.
           Side I      29 1965       (Air        AK            BG, FP       9,
                                    Force)                                  2002
                          Jan.-Mar. F-105D        Central                   Oct.
         66-8, West       1965       (Air          Canada                   9,
          Side II                   Force)                     BG, FP       2002

    JHC-47 (contractor aircraft), DTC personnel

    65-13, High Low 1,120 Jan.-Feb. 1965 USS Berkeley, Pacific Ocean MAA Mar.
    31, 2002 (ship-based) USS Granville S. Hall (off coast of

    San Diego)

    USS Fechteler
    USS Okanogan
    USS Wexford County

                  Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted

                    U.S.                                                Date of
                    service
    Test number     members                          Test           submission
         and name   identified  Date of  Units/Ships location(s) Agent   to VA
                                 test    involved
                                                     Pacific      BG,
    64-4, Shady         223 Jan.-Apr. Army light  Ocean,       OU,   Sept. 13,
          Grove                1965      tugs 2080,               UL         2001
    (ship-based)                      2081, 2085, Eglin Air
                                         2086, and   Force
                                            2087      Base, FL

    Marine Aviation Group 13

                                 USS Granville S. Hall

    65-4, Magic Sword 129 May 1965 Dugway Proving Baker Island, Unaffected
    Aedes Oct. 9, 2002 (ship-based) Ground Pacific Ocean Aegypti

    (mosquitoes)

                                   USS George Eastman

                             May-June USS Carbonero,                         Oct.
    65-6, Big Tom 236         1965 USS             Oahu, Hawaii, BG, FP     9,
                                                                             2002
    (ship-based)                    Granville S.   and surround-
                                           Hall
                                                      ing waters
                                                      and
                                                        airspace

                           A-4, F-105, and an Aero Commander

    65-12, Devil Hole 151    Summer 1965 Not    Ft. Greely, AK GB, FP  Oct. 9,
               I                  identified                              2002
                         261 Aug.-Sept.1965 USS    Pacific Ocean VX,      May 23,
        65-17, Fearless      George Eastman        diethylphthlate           2002
         Johnny (ship-
            based)
                             USS Granville S. Hall      (SW of Oahu,
                                                          Hawaii)
                         310  Jan.-Feb. 1966 USS     Pacific Ocean MAA    May 23,
    66-5, Purple Sage            Thomas                                   2002
         (ship-based)                                  (off coast of
                                                         San Diego)
                               Feb-Mar. 1966 USS                             Jan.
         66-6, Scarlet   356        Thomas            Pacific Ocean BG        31,
             Sage                                                            2002
         (ship-based)                                (off coast of San
                                                           Diego)
        65-11, Sun Down       Feb.-Apr. 1966 Not     Ft. Greely, AK GB,   Oct. 9,
                                  identified             MAA, Tiara       2002
                         135  Apr.-June 1966 Not                          Oct. 9,
    64-8, Tall Timber          identified           SW of Hilo, BZ     2002
                                                           Hawaii
                          90   May-June 1966 Not                          Oct. 9,
    65-16, Pine Ridge          identified         SW of Hilo, GB, BZ   2002
                                                           Hawaii
    66-1, Devil Hole       July-Sept. 1966 Not                         Oct. 9,
              II          16      identified         Ft. Greely, AK VX    2002

    Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted

                    U.S.                                                   Date of
                  service
    Test number     members                           Test                submission
      and name   identified  Date of   Units/Ships location(s)   Agent      to VA
                               test    involved
    66-12, Half         367             Light tug    Pacific   BG, E.        Oct. 9,
        Note                Aug.-Sept.    2085        Ocean    coli, SM,        2002
                                           USS     (80            FP,
    (ship-based)               1966     Barbonero  nautical    calcofluor
                                                   mi.
                                                   SSW of
                                                   Oahu)

    Light tug 2080

    Light tug 2081

    Light tug 2086

    Light tug 2087

                                   USS George Eastman

                                 USS Granville S. Hall

    67-7, Red Cloud 	Nov. 1966-Feb. Not identified Ft. Greely, AK BG, E. coli,
    SM, Oct. 9, 2002 1967 TT, ZZ

        66-10, Pin Point 1966 U.S. Army Unknown CS Oct. 31, 2002 U.S. Air Force

                                   U.S. Marine Corps

                                     DTC personnel

    68-52, Cliff Rose Sept. 1967-U.S. Army Ft. Stewart, Ga., CS2 Dec. 9, 2002
    Jan. 1968 U.S. Air Force and Panama Canal Zone

                                     DTC personnel

    66-4, Green Mist 46 Mar.-Apr. 1967 Not identified Island of Hawaii GB, MAA Oct.
                                        9, 2002

      67-2, Dew Point June-July 1967 Not identified Ft. Greely, AK GB Oct. 9, 2002

    U.S. Army DTC personnel

    68-13, Rapid       July-Aug. 1967 Not   Porton Down,  GA, GB, GD, Oct. 9,
            Tan               identified                         VX      2002
                                                  England
                                                 (Phases I &
                                                       III),
                          May-June 1968 DTC      Ralston,
                              personnel
                            Aug-Sept. 1968        Canada
                                                (Phase II)
        67-8, Watch     Summer 1967 U.S. Army,      Near Ft.   BG, E.    Oct. 9,
            Dog                  DTC                 Greely,  coli, SM,  2002
                              personnel             AK         TT, ZZ
    66-2, Red Oak 24   Apr.-May 1967 U.S.       Island of     GB      Oct. 31,
             I                Army, DTC               Hawaii                 2002
                              personnel           and the
                                                Panama Canal
                                                   Zone
        67-6, Blue   30   Jan.-Feb. 1967 Not       Island of BG, SM, E.  June 30,
           Tango              identified              Hawaii    coli,        2003
                                                                 FP

    Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted

                     U.S.                                               Date of
                     service
        Test number     members                              Test      submission
         and name    identified   Date of   Units/Ships   location(s)    to VA
                                   test     involved         Agent
                                            USS          Oahu, Hawaii,   June 30,
    68-71 Folded         252 Apr.-May    Carbonero,        BG               03
                                1968        USS
           Arrow                            Granville S.      and
    (ship-based)                             Hall      surrounding
                                                            waters
           69-31            313             USS Herbert  Pacific Ocean    Oct. 9,
    (ship-based)             Aug.-Sept.       J.         BG, MAA          2002
                                   1968        Thomas      (off San
                                                            Diego)
           69-75                Oct.-Dec.   F-4 aircraft  Near Yeehaw     Oct. 9,
                                1968           (U.S.          TX             2002
                                             Air Force)    Junction,
                                              and DTC        Fla.
                                             personnel

    68-50, (68-11)  127   Sept.-Oct.   USS Granville Eniwetok Atoll,   May 23,
                                          S. Hall       BG, PG2, uranine     2002
    Speckled Start           1968                    Marshall Islands
                                                               dye
        (ship-based)
            69-32      150                USS Granville Pacific Ocean BG, May 23,
        (ship-based)       Apr.-June 1969 S. Hall       E. coli, SM,         2002
                                                         (SW of Hawaii)
                                                           calcofluor

    69-10 (ship-based) 786 May 1969     Landing Force Vieques      TOF Oct. 9,
                                                 Carib1- Islands             2002
                                        69/BLT 1/8, 2nd  (near Puerto
                                            Marine Div.,    Rico)
                                                VMA-325,
                                       MAG-32, 2nd
                                       Marine
                                        Aircraft Wing,
                                              USS
                                           Fort Snelling
                                                (LSD-30)

          69-12        Spring 1969 DTC personnel  Edgewood GA, GB, GD, VX Oct. 9,
                                                                          2002
                                                       Arsenal, Md.
          68-53                    Not identified                         Oct. 9,
                    Apr.-Dec. 1969                  Dugway Proving CS2    2002
                                                       Ground, Utah
          70-73                                                           Oct. 9,
                    July-Dec. 1970 DTC personnel   Dugway Proving BG, FP  2002
                                                       Ground, Utah
                                                                             June
    70-11, Phase     June 1972- Not identified                             30,
            I,                                     Dugway Proving BG, FP     2002
        Subtest 3     Nov. 1973                        Ground, Utah
                                                                             June
          70-74                    Not identified                             30,
                    Aug. 1972-Jan.                 Dugway Proving BG, SM     2003
                         1973                          Ground, Utah
                                                                             June
    74-10, Phase                Not identified  Dugway Proving DMMP,       30,
            I         Sept.-Oct.                           BIS,              2003
                         1973                                Ground, Utah
                                                         trichloropropane

    70-C (ship-based) Oct. 1972, USNS Samuel Phillips Pacific Ocean Passive
    collection June 30, 2003

    Feb.-Mar. 1973	Lee (T-AGS 31), (off San Diego) of naturally USNS Silas
    Bent (T-and Pacific occurring particles AGS 26) Ocean in a marine

    (between San environment
    Diego and
    Panama Canal
    Zone)

              73-30         Jan.-Feb. 1973 Not identified  Dugway Proving BG, SM,
                                                                  P June 30, 2003
                                                               Ground, Utah
                                           TA-4F Aircraft Dugway Proving BIS June
         70-11, Phase I,       May 1974                                  30, 2002
            Subtest 4                       (U.S. Navy)        Ground, Utah
    Sources: DOD (data):
         GAO (analysis).
                                                                 GAO-04-410 DOD's
                                                          Chemical and Biological
                                   Page 32                                  Tests

    Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted

    Legend:
    BG = Bacillus globigii
    BIS = (2 ethyl-hexyl) hydrogen phosphite
    BZ = Ester of benzilic acid
    CS/CS2 = Riot-Control Agent
    DEHP= Di (2 ethyl-hexyl) phthalate
    DMMP = Dimethylmethylphosphonate
    E. coli = Escherichia coli
    FP = Zinc Cadmium sulfide
    GA = Tabun Nerve Agent
    GB = Sarin Nerve Agent
    GD = Soman Nerve Agent
    MAA = Methylacetoacetate
    OU = Coxiella burnetii
    P = T-3 coliphage viruses
    PG2 = Staphylococcal Enterotoxin, Type B
    SM = Serratia marcescens
    SO2 = Sulfur Dioxide
    Tiara = luminescent gelatinous material
    TOF = trioctyl phosphate (tri [2 ethyl-hexyl] phosphate)
    TT = Francisella tularensis (wet)
    TX = Puccinia graminis tritici
    UL = Pasteurella tularensis
    VX = VX Nerve Agent (phosphonothioic acid)
    ZZ = Francisella tularensis (dry)

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
    report.

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

    Note: The enclosure to this letter provided technical comments, which we
    considered and incorporated in our report as appropriate.

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