Tactical Aircraft: Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22
Business Case (15-MAR-04, GAO-04-391).
Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete
F/A-22 development, Congress asked GAO to assess the Air Force's
F/A-22 development program annually and determine whether the Air
Force is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. On
April 23, 2003, a congressional subcommittee requested that the
Department of Defense (DOD) provide more detailed information on
the business case that supports the estimated quantities and
costs for an affordable F/A-22 program. Specifically, GAO (1)
identified changes in the F/A-22 program since its inception, (2)
reviewed the status of the development activities, and (3)
examined the sufficiency of business case information provided
for congressional oversight.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-391
ACCNO: A09481
TITLE: Tactical Aircraft: Changing Conditions Drive Need for New
F/A-22 Business Case
DATE: 03/15/2004
SUBJECT: Air Force procurement
Avionics
Computers
Cost analysis
Fighter aircraft
Future budget projections
Military aircraft
Military cost control
Modifications
Operational testing
Performance measures
Procurement planning
Schedule slippages
F/A-22 Aircraft
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GAO-04-391
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Committees
March 2004
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22 Business Case
GAO-04-391
Highlights of GAO-04-391, a report to congressional committees
Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete F/A-22
development, Congress asked GAO to assess the Air Force's F/A-22
development program annually and determine whether the Air Force is
meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. On April 23, 2003, a
congressional subcommittee requested that the Department of Defense (DOD)
provide more detailed information on the business case that supports the
estimated quantities and costs for an affordable F/A-22 program.
Specifically, GAO (1) identified changes in the F/A-22 program since its
inception, (2) reviewed the status of the development activities, and (3)
examined the sufficiency of business case information provided for
congressional oversight.
GAO recommends that DOD complete a new business case that determines the
continued need for the F/A-22 and the number of aircraft required for its
air-to-air and air-toground roles based on capabilities, need,
alternatives, and constraints of future defense spending departmentwide.
GAO also recommends that plans and costs for resolving problems identified
during initial operational testing be provided to the defense committees
prior to the department's full rate production decision. DOD partially
concurred with both recommendations. GAO believes a business case and the
plans and costs of corrective action should be reported to Congress.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-391.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-4841
or lia@gao.gov.
March 2004
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22 Business Case
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to be less detectable to
adversaries, capable of high speeds for long ranges, and able to provide a
pilot with improved awareness of the surrounding situation through
integrated avionics. In addition, the Air Force plans to expand the
F/A-22's ability to engage targets on the ground to provide a robust
capability not originally planned at the start of the program. The Air
Force plans to begin initial operational test and evaluation in March 2004
and to seek full rate production approval in December 2004.
The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it
began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to purchase
the quantities of aircraft that were planned 18 years ago. The Air Force
had originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now estimates it can
only afford 218 aircraft. Second, in order to develop the expanded
air-to-ground attack capability, the Office of Secretary of Defense
estimates that the Air Force will need $11.7 billion in modernization
funding. Lastly, the Air Force has determined that new avionics computer
processors and architecture are needed to support most planned
enhancements, which will further increase program costs and risk.
Further, the development test program continues to experience problems and
risks further delays. The F/A-22's avionics continue to experience
shutdowns and failures. Moreover, the F/A-22 has not met its reliability
requirements and has experienced failures in its computerized maintenance
support system. This has led to aircraft spending more time on the ground
undergoing maintenance.
Due to the risks of future cost increases and schedule delays, a
congressional subcommittee requested that DOD provide business case
information on the F/A-22. However, the information DOD provided did not
address why this aircraft is needed given current and projected threats.
The business case also did not address how many aircraft the Air Force
needs to accomplish its missions, how many the Air Force can afford
considering the full life-cycle costs, whether investments in new
air-to-ground capabilities are needed, and what are the opportunity costs
associated with purchasing any proposed quantities of this aircraft. While
the response stated that the Air Force still plans to buy 277 F/A-22
aircraft, the Air Force estimates that only 218 aircraft are affordable
within congressionally imposed funding limitations. In addition,
significant investment decisions remain and could affect another $40
billion to support this program through full rate production and
implementation of the spiraled improvement efforts.
In light of the uncertainty concerning how many aircraft are needed in
today's environment, the large investments that remain, and unknown
outcomes of planned operational testing, GAO continues to have concerns
regarding the DOD's readiness to make a full rate production decision.
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Significant Changes Have Occurred in the F/A-22 Program During
Nearly Two Decades of Development Remaining Development and Operational
Testing Could Impact F/A-22 Program Outcomes
DOD Did Not Provide Congress Sufficient Business Case Information to
Justify Current Aircraft Quantities or Modernization Investment Plans
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Scope and Methodology
1
2 3
5
10
18 19 20 20 22
Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II GAO Staff Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products
Tables
Table 1: Changes in F/A-22 Program Estimates Since It Started
in 1986 6
Table 2: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22
Program 8
Figures
Figure 1: Status of F/A-22 Avionics Metrics, as of January 2004 12
Figure 2: F/A-22 Flight Test Schedule Changes 16
Abbreviations
CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group
CIP common integrated processors
DOD Department of Defense
MTBAA Mean Time Between Avionics Anomaly
MTBIE Mean Time Between Instability Events
IOT&E initial operational test and evaluation
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United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
March 15, 2004
Congressional Committees
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to be an air superiority
and ground attack aircraft with advanced features to make it less
detectable to adversaries, capable of high speeds for long ranges, and
able to provide a pilot with improved awareness of the surrounding
situation. The ability to engage targets on the ground is being expanded
to provide a robust capability not originally planned at the start of the
program.1 The Air Force plans to begin initial operational test and
evaluation (IOT&E) to demonstrate the aircraft's operational effectiveness
and suitability in March 2004 and to seek full rate production approval in
December 2004.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires us to
assess the Air Force's F/A-22 development program annually and determine
whether the Air Force is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost
goals.2 The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
House Committee on Armed Services, asked us to continue monitoring the
F/A-22 development program during a hearing on April 2, 2003. On April 23,
2003, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, asked the
Department of Defense (DOD) to provide more detailed information on the
business case that supports the estimated quantities and costs for an
affordable F/A-22 program. In response to the concerns and directions of
these various committees, we (1) identified changes in the F/A-22 program
since its inception, (2) reviewed the status of the development
activities, and (3) examined the sufficiency of business case information
provided for congressional oversight.
We performed our work from July 2003 through March 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
1 As a result, in September 2002 the Air Force changed the aircraft's
designation from F-22 to F/A-22, which includes increased emphasis on
acquiring an improved air-to-ground capability.
2 Pub. L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217.
Results in Brief
The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it
began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to purchase
the quantities of aircraft that were planned 18 years ago. The Air Force
had originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now estimates it can
only afford 218 aircraft under the congressionally imposed limit on
production funding. Development costs have grown 127 percent, to $28.7
billion, and the program could incur further cost growth before
development and testing is completed. This reduction in buying power and
increased costs are largely a result of the program's failure to base
acquisition decisions on high levels of knowledge at critical junctures in
the development program.3 Second, the Air Force has decided to add a
robust air-to-ground attack capability not previously envisioned but now
considered necessary to increase the utility of the aircraft. The Office
of Secretary of Defense estimated the Air Force would need as much as
$11.7 billion to develop the expanded capability. Lastly, the Air Force
has determined that new avionics computer processors and architecture are
needed to support some planned enhancements, which will further increase
program costs and risk.
The development test program continues to experience problems and risks
further delays. The F/A-22's advanced avionics system-which allows a pilot
to have better control of information regarding the surrounding
situation-frequently failed, delaying earlier testing, and must now be
proven stable before IOT&E can start. The F/A-22's avionics system
continues to experience shutdowns and failures. Recently, the Air Force
established a new criterion to measure the stability of the avionics
software and hardware and its readiness to begin IOT&E. The new criterion
is more comprehensive but requires fewer hours of operation before a
failure occurs than the original criterion. To date, the program has not
met the new criterion. In addition, the F/A-22 program has not met its
reliability requirements, resulting in aircraft spending more time on the
ground undergoing maintenance. Further, the program has experienced
failures in its computerized maintenance support system, which have
prevented maintenance crews from correctly diagnosing and addressing
problems on the aircraft. As a result of the problems with the development
3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Acquisition
Outcomes Are Possible If DOD Can Apply Lessons from F/A-22 Program,
GAO-03-645T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2003). We testified on the failure
to use these best practice acquisition concepts in the F/A-22 program and
used the F/A-22 program as a case study to show lessons to be learned had
the F/A-22 applied this best practice approach in its development and
procurement activities.
test program, the start of IOT&E has been delayed, and the time to
complete it has been compressed by 4 months. Additional delays in
completing IOT&E could jeopardize the full rate production decision in
December 2004.
Due to significant changes to the program and the risks of future cost
increases and schedule delays, a congressional subcommittee requested that
DOD provide business case information on the F/A-22.4 However, the
information provided by DOD did not address how many aircraft the Air
Force needs to accomplish its missions, how many the Air Force can afford,
and whether investments in new air-to-ground capabilities are needed.
Instead, the information shows that the Air Force still plans to buy 277
F/A-22 aircraft despite estimates that state it can only afford 218
aircraft and the potential for further reduction in buying power from cost
increases in the development program. In the past, reducing the amount of
funds available in the procurement budget has offset development cost
growth. This is a part of DOD's "buy to budget" plan. If the current
congressionally imposed production cap of $36.8 billion is maintained and
the Air Force uses more procurement funds to address higher development
costs, the number of F/A-22 aircraft the Air Force could buy would be
reduced.
We are making recommendations that DOD complete a new business case that
justifies the continued need for the F/A-22 and determines the number of
F/A-22 aircraft needed in its air-to-air and air-to-ground roles based on
capabilities, need, alternatives, and constraints of future defense
spending departmentwide. We also recommend that the results of IOT&E be
provided to the defense committees prior to making the full rate
production decision. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD
stated that it partially concurred with our recommendations.
Background The F/A-22 is planned to be an air superiority and ground
attack aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to
adversaries (stealth characteristics) and capable of high speeds for long
ranges.5 It has
4 The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, requested
the F/A-22 business case information as a result of the April 11, 2003,
hearings.
5 Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the conduct
of operations by land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive
interference by the enemy.
integrated avionics that greatly improve pilots' awareness of the
situation surrounding them. The objectives of the F/A-22 development
program are to (1) design, fabricate, test, and deliver 9 F/A-22
development test aircraft, 2 nonflying structural test aircraft, 6
production representative test aircraft, and 37 flight-qualified engines;
(2) design, fabricate, integrate, and test the avionics; and (3) design,
develop, and test the support and training systems. The F/A-22 is being
developed under contracts with Lockheed Martin Corporation, the prime
contractor (for the aircraft),and Pratt & Whitney Corporation (for the
engine).
Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the
development phase of the F/A-22 program, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation for
both the development and the production.6 Subsequently, the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2002 eliminated the cost limitation for the
development, but it left the cost limit for the production.7 The
production program is now limited to $36.8 billion.8 The current cost
estimate of the development program is $28.7 billion.
Currently, the F/A-22 program is both in development and production.
Development is in its final stages, and production has been ongoing since
fiscal year 1999.
The aircraft's development problems and schedule delays in completing
flight testing have led to congressional concerns. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 prohibited the obligation of $136
million in procurement funds until the Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, submitted to the congressional
defense committees, among other things, a certification that the avionics
software installed on test aircraft can operate at least 5 hours on
average before certain types of avionics anomalies occur. The Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the final
authority in making acquisition decisions in DOD, has also included this
criterion as a requirement for the F/A-22 program before entering IOT&E .
6 Pub. L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217.
7 Pub. L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001), section 213.
8 The cost limitation, before adjustment under the act's provisions, was
$43.4 billon.
Significant Changes Have Occurred in the F/A-22 Program during Nearly Two
Decades of Development
The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it
began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to purchase
the quantities of aircraft that were originally planned 18 years ago. This
reduction in buying power is attributed, in a large part, to increases in
development time and cost due to the program's failure to employ a
knowledge-based acquisition approach to developing the F/A-22. Second, in
September 2002, the Air Force decided to add a more robust air-to-ground
attack capability than previously envisioned but now deemed needed to
increase the utility of the aircraft. This capability will add significant
cost to the program over the next 10 years. Lastly, the Air Force has
determined that new computer processors and architecture are needed to
support some planned enhancements, which will further increase program
costs and risk.
Delays and Higher Costs Have Reduced DOD's Buying Power
Since the F/A-22 acquisition program started in 1986, cost and schedule
estimates have grown significantly, thus contributing to a loss in buying
power. Development costs are now estimated at $28.7 billion, a 127 percent
increase over the 1986 estimates. Planned development cycle time has grown
from 9 years to 19 years, and the initial operational capability date has
slipped over 9 years, from March 1996 to December 2005. These schedule
extensions, delays, and cost increases were major contributors to changes
in the Air Force's initial plan to purchase 750 aircraft. Current Air
Force budget estimates include plans to purchase 277 aircraft. Table 1
shows the changes in the F/A-22 program since its start in 1986 based on
information provided in Selected Acquisition Reports9 over time.
9 Selected Acquisition Reports are standard, comprehensive, summary status
reports of major defense acquisition programs (acquisition category I)
required for periodic submission to Congress. They include key cost,
schedule, and technical information.
Table 1: Changes in F/A-22 Program Estimates Since It Started in 1986
1986-Start of 1991-Start of 2002-Current
engineering available
Selected
demonstration and and manufacturing Acquisition
Report
validation development information
Development cost $12.6 billion $19.5 billion $28.7 billion
Development cycle 9 years 16 years 19 years
time
Development test and Not estimated 51 months 99 months
evaluation
Initial operational March 1996 Not shown in report December 2005
capability
Quantities 750 648 276a
Sources: Selected Acquisition Reports and Air Force documents.
Note: All references to F/A-22 costs in this report are in then-year
dollars in order to maintain consistent reporting with our prior reports
on the F/A-22 aircraft.
aIn fiscal year 2003, the Air Force increased the number of F/A-22
aircraft it planned to buy from 276 to 277.
In our 1988 report, the average unit procurement cost was estimated by the
Air Force to be $69 million.10 Today, after schedule delays and
development problems, the estimated average unit procurement costs have
grown to $153 million-almost a 122 percent increase. The Air Force does
not expect the development program to be completed until 2005 and with
IOT&E still to be completed, the possibility of additional changes and
costs is likely.
As we previously reported,11 the acquisition approach of the F/A-22
program has contributed to cost increases and delays in schedule. Leading
commercial firms that we studied employ an acquisition approach that
evolves a product to its ultimate capabilities on the basis of mature
technologies and available resources. Further, product enhancements are
planned for subsequent development efforts only when technologies are
proven to be mature and other resources are available. Our work has shown
that commercial firms ensure that high levels of knowledge exist at three
critical junctures in a development program. First, a match must be made
between a customer's needs and the available resources- technology,
engineering knowledge, time, and funding-before a new development program
is launched. Second, a product's design must
10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aircraft Development: The Advanced
Tactical Fighter's Costs, Schedule, and Performance Goals, GAO/NSIAD-88-76
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 1988).
11 GAO-03-645T.
demonstrate its ability to meet performance requirements and be stable
about midway through development. Third, the developer must show that the
product can be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets and
is demonstrated to be reliable before production begins.
In contrast, the F-22 acquisition strategy from the outset was to achieve
full capability in a "big bang" approach instead of evolving development
in manageable increments of new capability. By not using an evolutionary
approach, the Air Force took on significant risk and onerous technology
challenges. The three critical technologies that were immature at the
start of the program included low-observable materials, propulsion, and
integrated avionics. Integrated avionics has been a source of major
schedule delays and cost increases in the F/A-22 program. Starting the
program with these immature technologies prevented the program from
knowing cost, schedule, and performance ramifications until late in the
development program, after significant investments had already been made.
Efforts to mature technology cascaded into development, delaying
attainment of design and production maturity. The overall result has been
significant delays and substantially higher investments to buy over 60
percent fewer aircraft.
Additional Investments Needed to Expand F/A-22 Capability
Developing an expanded air-to-ground attack capability for the F/A-22 will
be costly and add risk to the program. The Air Force began development of
the F/A-22 as a replacement for the F-15 air superiority fighter with
primary emphasis on the air-to-air role. It was never intended to have
robust air-to-ground capability. Its need was based on a projection that
the Soviet Union would develop and produce large numbers of advanced
fighter aircraft. The F/A-22 was intended to identify, track, and kill
advanced fighters before it was targeted, giving it the edge and making it
a more lethal and survivable aircraft than an F-15. However, the original
Soviet threat never materialized. To enhance the utility of the F/A-22,
the Air Force plans to develop a robust air-to-ground attack capability to
be able to engage a greater variety of ground targets, such as
surface-to-air missile systems, that have posed a significant threat to
U.S. aircraft in recent years.
The Air Force has a modernization program to improve the capabilities of
the F/A-22 focused largely on a new robust air-to-ground capability. It
has five developmental spirals planned over more than a 10-year period,
with the initial spiral started in 2003. Table 2 shows each spiral as
currently planned. In March 2003, the Office of Secretary of Defense's
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated that the Air Force would
need
$11.7 billion for the planned modernization program. The CAIG estimate
included costs for development, production, and the retrofit of some
aircraft. As of March 2003, the Air Force F/A-22 approved program baseline
did not include estimated costs for the full modernization effort.
Instead, the Air Force estimate included $3.5 billion for modernization
efforts planned through fiscal year 2009.
Table 2: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 Program
Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements
2007 2011 2013 2015
Cost Analysis Improvement Group's estimate through fiscal year 2015
Sources: Air Force and Office of Secretary of Defense.
a
The Global Strike Enhanced includes two developmental spirals to achieve
the planned enhanced capability.
New Computer Architecture and Avionics Processors Needed to Support Expanded
Capability
To support the F/A-22's expanded capability beyond Global Strike Enhanced,
the Air Force has determined that its baseline computer architecture and
critical avionics processors will need to be replaced. Current processors
are old and obsolete, cannot be supported, and do not have sufficient
capacity to meet the increased processing demands required for planned new
air-to-ground capabilities beyond Global Strike Enhanced. As a bridge to
meet this expanded capability, the Air Force plans to modify some avionics
processors and purchase sufficient quantities to support production of the
first 155 F/A-22 aircraft.
The F/A-22 is dependent on its onboard computers and software to perform
its mission. Unlike other fighter aircraft, it has a highly advanced,
integrated avionics system capable of detecting, identifying, and engaging
the enemy at ranges beyond a pilot's vision. The key to the F/A-22
avionics
lies in its fully integrated core architecture and its two central,
networked computers called common integrated processors (CIP). CIPs use
very high-speed integrated circuits to collect, process, and integrate
data and signals from the aircraft's sensors. CIP serves as the "brains"
for the F/A-22's integrated avionics system and is unique to this
aircraft.
The primary processor in CIP is the Intel i960MX microprocessor,12 which
is used strictly for avionics processing. This microprocessor is based on
1990's technology and has a 32-bit processor that operates at speeds of
25mhz. By today's technology standards, the processor is considered
obsolete and cannot support spiral developments beyond the Global Strike
Enhanced. In mid-2003, the manufacturer of the microprocessor informed the
Air Force that it planned to permanently shut down the i960MX production
line by January 2004 because the microprocessor was no longer a viable
product for the company.
As a result, the Air Force decided in November 2003 to replace its
computer architecture and avionics processors to support the F/A-22's
expanded capabilities. In December 2003, the Air Force purchased its last
i960MX microprocessors when it bought 820 of the microprocessors.
According to program officials, this quantity and previously purchased
quantities are sufficient to support production of 155 F/A-22 aircraft.
These officials believe that with some minor upgrades to improve
processing capacity, these processors will be able to support the baseline
aircraft and the developmental spirals-Global Strike Basic and Global
Strike Enhanced. However, the Air Force plans for the remaining production
aircraft to include a new computer architecture and avionics processor
needed to support the final two planned spirals-Global Strike Full and
Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.
At the time of our review, the Air Force believed its best long-term
solution to its avionics architecture and computer-processing shortfalls
was a new, modern, open system architecture. Rather than start a new
development program, the program office plans to leverage two other
ongoing Air Force development or modification programs for this processing
capability: the new architecture being developed for the F-35 and the new
commercial off-the-shelf general-purpose processors designed for newer
versions of the F-16. According to F/A-22 program officials, this new
architecture will be state-of-the-art and will have ample
12 The i960MX microprocessor is a registered trademark of the Intel
Corporation.
processing capacity to accommodate all future air-to-ground capabilities
as currently planned. These officials do not expect the new architecture
to be fully developed and ready for installation in the F/A-22 for at
least 5 to 6 years.
F/A-22 program officials acknowledge that this mass changeover of the
F/A-22 computer architecture and avionics processor will be a
time-consuming and costly effort and will likely create additional program
risks. Air Force cost estimates are not yet available. Nevertheless,
program officials estimate the nonrecurring engineering costs alone could
be at least $300 million. At the time of our review, the Air Force had not
made a decision about retrofitting aircraft equipped with the i960MX
microprocessor. Additional risks are likely because the new processor and
architecture are being developed by other major aircraft programs and will
require extensive integration and operational testing to ensure that the
F/A-22 program does not encounter similar problems that have delayed
integration and testing of the F/A-22's current avionics suite.
The F/A-22 program did not meet key testing goals established for fiscal
year 2003 and required for the aircraft to begin IOT&E testing. The Air
Force's efforts to stabilize avionics software and improve its performance
have not been sufficiently demonstrated, and entrance criterion previously
set for starting IOT&E testing has been changed. In addition, the F/A-22
program is not performing as expected in some other key performance areas,
including reliability and maintenance support. The ongoing problems have
led to a revised test schedule, which has compressed the time to complete
initial operational testing by 4 months, and have increased the potential
for cost increases and delays in the full rate production decision. The
program has made progress in correcting several of the design problems we
identified in our March 2003 report.
Remaining Development and Operational Testing Could Impact F/A-22 Program
Outcomes
Air Force Changed Avionics Performance Criterion to Start Operational
Testing
The Air Force changed the avionics stability metric planned as a criterion
to enter IOT&E from an average of 20 hours between avionics software
failures to a broader measure of an average of 5 hours between avionics
software or hardware failures. Current testing shows the program continues
to have problems meeting the new and old avionics stability metrics.
Because the F/A-22 avionics encountered frequent shutdowns over the last
few years, many test flights were delayed. As a result, the Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center wanted assurances that the
avionics would work before it was willing to start the IOT&E program. It
established a requirement for a 20-hour performance metric that was to be
demonstrated before IOT&E would begin. The metric was Mean Time Between
Instability Events (MTBIE)13 and tracked two distinct types of avionics
software failures:
o Hard failures (type 1) that were the most serious resulting in a
complete avionics system shutdown requiring the need to restart the
avionics system.
o Significant failures (type 2) that were less serious failures but
required the pilot to restart an individual subsystem that failed versus
the complete avionics system.
Using personal computers as an analogy, a type 1 failure would be
equivalent to a failure of one's personal computer that requires it to be
shut down and rebooted, except that the time to restart the F/A-22
avionics system could take substantially longer. A type 2 failure would be
equivalent to a failure in a particular application, such as the word
processing program shutting down. Even with such a failure, other software
applications could still be operated while the word processing software
was restarted. Likewise, in the case of the F/A-22, other applications
would still be operable despite the failure of any single application,
such as a shutdown in the communication, navigation, and identification
system.
In July 2003, the Air Force decided to switch to a different metric-Mean
Time Between Avionics Anomaly (MTBAA)-to measure the performance of the
avionics software for the start of IOT&E. Two main differences between the
new metric and its predecessor are the new metric (1) includes hardware
and some subsystem software failures not previously counted and (2)
requires a failure rate based on an average of 5 hours without
experiencing avionics anomalies, instead of 20 hours. According to Air
Force operational test officials, they adopted this new metric because
they believe it is a better measure of the avionics operational
performance needed to start IOT&E, whereas the previous metric was more
technically focused on software performance, excluding hardware failures.
They also said the 5-hour criterion would provide a minimum amount of
effective operational test time to efficiently conduct
13 MTBIE is the ratio of the total hours the avionics are turned on
divided by the number of countable instability events averaged over
multiple flights. It was derived by conducting dedicated stability
flights, nominally six flights of 2.5 hours duration each.
IOT&E. In turn, Congress included the new metric in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.14 Testing as of January 2004
showed the program had achieved 2.7 hours-54 percent of the requirement.
Once this criterion is achieved, the avionics must still undergo rigorous
operational testing to demonstrate its effectiveness and suitability in a
realistic environment. Figure 1 shows the status of the MTBIE and MTBAA
metrics.
Figure 1: Status of F/A-22 Avionics Metrics, as of January 2004
Note: MTBIE is no longer tracked by the Air Force.
The figure shows that MTBIE, the previous criterion, was demonstrated at
about 67 percent of the requirement. In addition, the type 1 failures,
causing a complete shutdown of the avionics system, have significantly
diminished. They are occurring only about once every 25 hours on average.
This is the result of a substantial effort on the part of the Air Force
and the contractor to identify and fix problems that led to the
instability in the F/A-22 avionics software. Type 2 failures are still
14 Pub. L. 108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003), section 133.
occurring frequently. While less serious when compared to the entire
avionics suite shutting down, type 2 failures become serious if critical
subsystem software shuts down when its function is needed for the success
of the mission or survivability of the aircraft.
In September 2003, the F/A-22 contractor reported a high number of
outstanding avionics Common Problem Reports.15 Of the 231 reports of
problems not resolved, about 25 (or 11 percent) were identified as
stability-related problems. The remaining 206 reports (89 percent) were
the result of avionics performance or functional problems. For example,
the communication, navigation, and identification subsystem accounted for
nearly 36 percent of the total reports. Because the avionics system is
essential to the success of the F/A-22, the integrated avionics still
needs to be demonstrated to meet design specifications and operational
requirements. Reductions in avionics performance could affect the ability
of the F/A-22 to effectively carry out its expected missions.
Reliability Requirements Not Being Met
The F/A-22 program is not meeting its requirements for a reliable aircraft
and it is not using a best practice approach. The Air Force established
reliability requirements to be achieved at the completion of development
and at system maturity.16 As a measure of the system's overall
reliability, the Air Force established a requirement for 1.95-hours mean
time between maintenance by the completion of development, and 3-hours
mean time between maintenance at system maturity. This measure of
reliability represents the average flight time between maintenance
actions. As of October 2003, the Air Force had only been able to
demonstrate a reliability of about 0.5 flying hours between maintenance
actions or about 26 percent of the development requirement and 17 percent
of system maturity requirement. This has led to the development test
aircraft spending more time than planned on the ground undergoing
maintenance.
During 2003, the Air Force identified 68 parts that had a high rate of
failure causing them to be removed or replaced, affecting the F/A-22
system reliability. The contractor has initiated programs to eliminate the
high failure rates experienced by these parts. The canopy has also been
15 Common Problem Reports are used to identify problems within the
aircraft avionics.
16 System maturity is defined by the Air Force as a point when the F/A-22s
have accumulated 100,000 flying hours, expected to occur in 2008 after
most F/A-22s are to be procured.
experiencing failures during testing, allowing it to achieve only about 15
percent of its expected 1,600-hour life. A second manufacturer for
canopies is being developed, but until it has passed qualification
testing, it cannot be used as an alternative source for the high failing
canopies.
Best commercial practices for new product development require reliability
to be demonstrated by the start of production. Our work has shown that
product development engineers from leading commercial firms expect to
achieve reliability requirements before entering production. They told us
reliability is attained through an iterative process of design, test,
analyze, and redesign.17 Commercial firms understand that once a system
enters production, the costs to achieve reliability through this iterative
design change process become significantly more expensive. The F/A-22
aircraft has been in production since fiscal year 1999, and the Air Force
has on contract 52 production aircraft, and an additional 22 aircraft on
long lead contracts representing 27 percent of the planned buy quantity.
With 83 percent of the reliability requirement yet to be achieved through
this iterative design change process, the Air Force can expect to incur
additional development and design change costs. If the Air Force fails to
improve the F/A-22's reliability before fielding the aircraft, the high
failure rates will result in higher operational and support costs to keep
the aircraft available for training or combat use.
Immaturity of Maintenance Support Systems
The F/A-22 is designed to have a computerized and paperless maintenance
system that monitors, diagnoses, identifies, and reports failures to
maintenance crews and that is intended to allow a faster maintenance
turnaround to flight status. The onboard Diagnostics Health and Management
system constantly monitors the aircraft's systems and the performance of
both hardware and software. It collects, analyzes, stores, and reports
failures. Critical failures are reported to the pilot, and all failures
are stored in a portable database for later use by ground maintenance
crews. At the completion of a flight, the database is removed from the
aircraft and is downloaded into a system on the ground, the Integrated
Management Information System, which is a network of computers the
maintainers use to process the maintenance and support information. This
system further analyzes the downloaded information to
17 U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Capturing Design and
Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-02-701
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
determine the problems and match failures with the appropriate digitized
technical order data needed to make the repairs. This information is then
loaded into handheld portable computers that the technicians use to repair
the aircraft.
According to DOD and Air Force test officials, these systems have been
generating false reports of failures, which have caused maintenance staff
to spend more hours than planned replacing items unnecessarily and trying
to identify the actual problems. In addition, the maintenance systems are
not providing all the technical data needed to repair the aircraft, thus
making it more difficult to make repairs. According to the test officials,
they do not have precise data to quantify the extent of the problems, and
they said it has disrupted maintenance activities. A key indication has
been the inability to fly aircraft as planned. We found that between
October 2003 and January 2004 the test force could only fly about 53
percent of the planned test flights and that the maintenance problems were
a key contributor to this poor flying performance.
Air Force officials do not expect the maintenance systems to be fully
matured until December 2005. Consequently, the program office has had to
provide additional funding to the contractor to purchase special test
equipment that will be used to support maintenance requirements during
operational testing. Moreover, because these systems will not be fully
available during the operational testing, it may be difficult to assess
the systems' real performance.
Problems in the Development Program Have Led to Further Delays and Changes
in Operational Testing
Progress in F/A-22 flight testing was slower than expected in 2003, and
start of IOT&E was delayed an additional 7 months due to avionics and
other problems. Realizing the Air Force would not be ready to enter
initial operational testing as previously planned, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense requested the F/A-22 program to establish a new
operational test plan that included measures to ensure the aircraft and
its avionics are ready before entering operational testing. In response,
the Air Force put in place a two-phase operational test program.
o Phase 1, also called an operational assessment, is not the official
start of operational testing. It is intended to assess the F/A-22's
readiness for IOT&E. Started in October 2003, it calls for testing two
F/A-22 aircraft to conduct live air-to-air missile shots, fly one-ship and
two-ship formation operational sorties, and assess the computerized
maintenance system's maturity. It will include some flight tests that are
planned to be repeated in IOT&E if the aircraft configuration changes.
o Phase 2 testing is considered the actual start of IOT&E. To begin this
phase, the Air Force must meet a number of criteria. Perhaps most
importantly, it must demonstrate that the F/A-22 integrated avionics will
be able to operate for sufficient lengths of time, without shutting down.
Other criteria that must be met prior to IOT&E include the availability of
four fully configured F/A-22 test aircraft and one spare aircraft, the
completion of live missile shots, the completion of key aircraft flight
envelope testing (planned speed, altitude, and maneuver boundaries of the
F/A-22), the completion of operational pilot and maintenance training, a
useable system with technical data to fix problems, and the software
upgrades to the maintenance system.
Figure 2 compares the changes in the planned test program since our last
report.
Figure 2: F/A-22 Flight Test Schedule Changes
According to Air Force test officials, results of some phase 1 tests could
be used to satisfy IOT&E requirements if the aircraft and software
configurations do not change for IOT&E testing. This could reduce the
scope of the test effort planned during IOT&E. The Defense Acquisition
Board18 is scheduled to review the F/A-22's readiness for IOT&E in March
2004.
At the present time, the Air Force expects to complete IOT&E in October
2004, before the full rate production decision, now expected in December
2004. The time allotted to complete IOT&E under the new test plan,
however, has been compressed by 4 months, assuming phase 1 testing results
are not permitted to be used for IOT&E. This means the Air Force would
have less time than previously planned to complete the same amount of
testing. If the Air Force continues to experience delays in testing prior
to IOT&E, then the full rate production decision would also have to be
delayed until IOT&E is complete and the Beyond Low Rate Initial Production
Report is delivered to Congress19. There is no consensus within DOD on the
Air Force's ability to meet this October 2004 milestone. The Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of Secretary of Defense, believes
the start of testing will slip, although the Air Force maintains it will
meet its schedule.
Past Design Problems Corrected
The Air Force has corrected design problems discussed in our March 2003
report. To correct the movement or buffeting of the vertical fins in the
tail section of the aircraft, the Air Force designed and implemented
modifications, which strengthen the fin and hinge assemblies. Because of
this problem, the Air Force placed restrictions on flights below 10,000
feet. Testing was done above and below 10,000 feet, and the flight
restrictions were removed. Likewise, the Air Force modified the aircraft
to prevent overheating concerns in the rear portion of the aircraft by
adding thermal protection and strengthened strategic areas in the aft tail
sections. The Air Force also plans to modify later production aircraft
using a new venting approach to resolve the heat problems. We reported
that the Air Force had also experienced separations in the horizontal tail
materials. After additional testing, the Air Force deemed that the
original tails met requirements established for the life of the airframe.
However, the Air
18 The Defense Acquisition Board is DOD's senior-level forum for advising
the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on
critical decisions concerning major defense acquisition programs.
19 10 U.S.C. 2399 provides that a major defense acquisition program may
not proceed beyond low-rate initial production until initial operational
test and evaluation is completed and the defense committees have received
the report of testing results from the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation.
DOD Did Not Provide Congress Sufficient Business Case Information to Justify
Current Aircraft Quantities or Modernization Investment Plans
Force redesigned the tail to reduce producibility costs. Tests will be
performed on the redesigned tail in late 2004.
DOD has not provided Congress with sufficient information to support the
business case for buying and modernizing the F/A-22 program. In our
testimony of April 11, 2003, before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, we stressed that the issue was not whether the F/A-22
should be produced, but rather in what quantities it is needed-as
justified by a business case. We discussed the current and future
environments in which the F/A-22 investment decision would have to be
made, including the need to consider opportunity costs inside and outside
DOD. DOD has planned investments over the next several years, on average
$150 billion a year, to keep legacy systems working while at the same time
modernizing and transforming U.S. national defense capabilities for the
future. The F/A-22 program represents a sizable investment and must
compete with other demands within the defense budget. This competition
requires a knowledge-based approach to justify acquisition investment
decisions and an efficient acquisition process to ensure programs are
implemented within expectations set in associated business cases.
Since the start of the F/A-22 program, acquisition costs have increased,
the aircraft's mission and key capabilities have expanded, fewer
quantities are affordable, and delivery to the user has been delayed. The
Air Force currently estimates the total F/A-22 acquisition program will
cost about $72 billion, excluding all costs estimated to complete the
spiral improvement effort. Including these costs brings the estimated
total investment for the F/A-22 program to about $80 billion. Through
fiscal year 2004, about one-half this investment has been funded.
In light of the changes in the program and investments that remain, the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, asked DOD to provide a
business case justifying the Air Force's planned number of F/A-22s (276 at
that time) as well as how many F/A-22s are affordable. In its response,
DOD did not sufficiently address key business case questions such as how
many F/A-22s are needed, how many are affordable, and if alternatives to
planned investments increasing the F/A-22 air-to-ground capabilities
exist.
Instead, DOD stated it planned to buy 277 F/A-22s based on a "buy to
budget" concept that determines quantities on the availability and
efficient use of funds by the F/A-22 program office. Furthermore,
justification for expanding the capability, for an estimated $8 billion to
$12 billion investment, was not addressed in DOD's response. While ground
targets such as surface-to-air missile systems are acknowledged to be a
significant threat today, the business case did not establish a
justification for this investment or state what alternatives were
considered. For example, the F-35 aircraft is also expected to have an
air-to-ground role as are planned future unmanned combat air vehicles.
These could be viable alternatives to this additional investment in F/A-22
capability.
While the business case information submitted to Congress called for 277
aircraft, DOD stated it could only afford to acquire between 216 and 218
aircraft within the congressionally imposed cap on production
costs-currently at $36.8 billion. DOD expects improvements in
manufacturing efficiencies and other areas will provide it with sufficient
funds to buy additional F/A-22 aircraft. However, this seems to be an
unlikely scenario given the program's history. Under the "buy to budget"
approach, the previous $876 million increase in development costs was
funded by taking funds mostly from production, thus reducing aircraft
quantities by 49. With testing still incomplete and many important
performance areas not yet demonstrated, the possibility for additional
increases in development costs is likely.
Conclusions While DOD and the Air Force are focused on completing IOT&E
and making a decision to go into full rate production, a more basic issue
needs to be addressed. The conditions driving the business case that
spurred the major investment decision to initially develop and buy 750
F-22 aircraft have changed. A revised and comprehensive business case
assessment has not been completed and shared with congressional defense
oversight committees. At the present time, it is uncertain how many
F/A-22s are needed. The program has been in development for about 18
years, and DOD has invested over $40 billion. This investment represents
about onehalf the estimated costs projected for the entire F/A-22 program.
Therefore, DOD must still make investment decisions affecting another $40
billion to support this program through full rate production and
implementation of the spiraled modernization effort. Based on current
design problems and the development efforts that remain, the F/A-22
program's affordability is uncertain. Current conditions suggest the Air
Force cannot afford to buy much more than 218 aircraft within the cost
limitation imposed by Congress.
In light of the uncertainty concerning how many aircraft are needed in
today's environment, the large investments that remain, and the unknown
outcomes of planned initial operational testing, we continue to be
concerned with DOD's readiness to address a December 2004 decision to
enter full rate production. Furthermore, IOT&E, intended to demonstrate
the F/A-22 effectiveness and suitability, has not started and may not be
completed as planned, which may delay the full rate production decision.
With this testing outstanding, the risk is high that additional
development funding will be needed to resolve problems that could result.
Recommendations for Given the sizable investment that remains in the
F/A-22 program, the uncertainties, and the ever changing financial demands
of DOD, Congress
Executive Action and the Secretary of Defense would benefit from a
comprehensive assessment of the number of F/A-22 aircraft needed as well
as assurance that problems identified in initial operational testing will
be identified and resolved. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense take the following two actions:
o Complete a new business case analysis that determines the continued
need for the F/A-22 and that specifically (a) addresses the need for an
expanded air-to-ground capability and an assessment of alternatives, to
include the feasibility of using other assets like the F-35 and unmanned
aerial vehicles planned for the future; (b) justifies the quantity of
F/A-22 aircraft needed to satisfy requirements for air-to-air and
air-to-ground missions; and (c) provides evidence that the planned
quantity is affordable within current budgets and the congressional
funding limitation. The Secretary should provide the results of the
business case analysis to the defense committees before the decision to
start full rate production.
o Before the full rate production decision is made and in conjunction
with the Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production Report, provide the defense
committees a plan that shows how the Air Force will correct and fund any
major problems identified and still open after IOT&E is completed.
Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated
that it partially concurred with our two recommendations. Regarding our
first
and Our Evaluation recommendation on completing a new business case for
the F/A-22, DOD stated that it evaluates the F/A-22 business case elements
as part of the annual budget process. Additionally, DOD's response
acknowledged that this year the department is undertaking a broader set of
reviews under the Joint Capabilities Review process; the F/A-22 will be a
part of this review.
The President's budget submission to Congress will reflect the results of
these review efforts of the F/A-22 business case.
We believe that the various reviews and assessments in the budget process
along with the Joint Capabilities Review process present excellent
opportunities for DOD to conduct a business case analysis. Other
opportunities for completing the business case analysis include the
independent and in-depth study requested by the Office of Management and
Budget for the Comanche and F/A-22 programs. It is important, however,
that the analysis sufficiently address the specific business case elements
included in our recommendation-analysis of continued need, need for
expanded air-to-ground capability, assessment of alternatives,
justification of needed quantities, and evidence that planned quantities
are affordable. In addition, it is important that the outcomes of the
business case analysis are provided to the Congress prior to the full rate
production decision.
Regarding our second recommendation on providing Congress the plans to
resolve outstanding problems after the completion of IOT&E, DOD stated
that the law already requires the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, to submit to Congress a Beyond Low Rate Initial Production
Report that includes the results of operational testing. Since this report
is an independent assessment of test results, the department did not
believe it appropriate to include in it Air Force plans and costs for
corrective actions stemming from operational testing. However, DOD will
present these actions and costs to the Defense Acquisition Board for
decisions on the F/A-22 program that will be included in the President's
budget submission to Congress.
We understand the legal requirements for submitting the Beyond Low Rate
Initial Production Report. We also recognize that this is an independent
report submitted by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. The
intent of our recommendation is not to modify the report itself, but to
ensure corrective actions and resultant costs are identified and reported
in a timely fashion and before the full rate production decision is made.
Because plans and costs could span over several years, such information
may or may not be captured in annual budget submissions. We have modified
our recommendation to clarify our intent.
Scope and Methodology
To determine changes in the F/A-22 program since its inception, we
analyzed cost information from Selected Acquisition Reports and obtained
information from the Air Force on its plans to modernize the F/A-22 to
include enhanced air-to-ground capabilities. We compared prior cost
information with the Air Force's current estimates to complete
development and production of the F/A-22.
To determine the impact of development and testing on program
outcomes, we examined the extent to which the development program is
meeting planned flight test goals for 2003 and the Air Force's planned
entry criterion for starting initial operational testing.
In examining sufficiency of the business case DOD provided to a
congressional oversight committee, we obtained a copy of the business
plan and analyzed the various DOD assumptions and approaches used to
make the assessment conclusions.
In making these determinations, assessments, and identifications, we
required access to current information about test results, performance
estimates, schedule achievements and revisions, costs being
incurred, aircraft modifications, and the program's plans for continued
development and initial production. The Air Force and the contractors
gave us access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on
the matters covered in this report.
In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C.;
the F/A-22 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;
Lockheed-Martin, Marietta, Georgia; the Defense Contract Management
Agency, Marietta, Georgia; the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation
Center, Kirkland Air Force Base, New Mexico; and the Combined Flight
Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Michael J. Hazard at (937) 258-7917
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
Allen Li
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Page 25 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 26 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft
Appendix II: GAO Staff Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments Marvin E. Bonner, Edward Browning, Roger Corrado, Steve
Hunter, Gary Middleton, and Robert Ackley made key contributions to this
report.
Related GAO Products
Best Practices: Better Acquisition Outcomes Are Possible If DOD Can Apply
Lessons from F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-645T. Washington, D.C.: April 11,
2003.
Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-603T. Washington,
D.C.: April 2, 2003.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Reconsider Decision to Increase F/A-22
Production Rates While Development Risks Continue. GAO-03-431. Washington,
D.C.: March 14, 2003.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs to Better Inform Congress about Implications
of Continuing Cost Growth. GAO-03-280. Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2003.
Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates Should Be
Lower to Reduce Risks. GAO-02-298. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2002.
Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22 Production Costs
Within the Congressional Limitation. GAO-01-782. Washington, D.C.: July
16, 2001.
Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need for
Limit on Low-Rate Production. GAO-01-310. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2001.
Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded
Congressional Limitation. GAO/NSIAD-00-178. Washington, D.C.: August 15,
2000.
Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating F-22 Total
Production Costs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2000.
Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year
2001. GAO/OCG-00-8. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2000.
F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are
Avoided. GAO/NSIAD-00-68. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2000.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals.
GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 1999.
Related GAO Products
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Production and RDT&E Programs.
GAO/NSIAD-99-233R. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1999.
Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year
2000. GAO/OCG-99-26. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113. Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 1999.
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