Posthearing Questions Related to the Department of Defense's	 
Management of the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction	 
Program (05-JAN-04, GAO-04-362R).				 
                                                                 
Pursuant to a request by the Chairman and a Member of the	 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and		 
Capabilities, House Committee on Armed Services, GAO responded to
post-hearing questions concerning on DOD's Chemical Agents and	 
Munitions Destruction Program.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-362R					        
    ACCNO:   A09105						        
  TITLE:     Posthearing Questions Related to the Department of       
Defense's Management of the Chemical Agents and Munitions	 
Destruction Program						 
     DATE:   01/05/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Army facilities					 
	     Chemical and biological agents			 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal aid to states				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Property disposal					 
	     Weapons						 
	     Alabama						 
	     DOD Assembled Chemical Weapons			 
	     Assessment Program 				 
                                                                 
	     DOD Chemical Agents and Munitions			 
	     Destruction Program				 
                                                                 
	     DOD Chemical Stockpile Emergency			 
	     Preparedness Program				 
                                                                 

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GAO-04-362R

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

January 5, 2004

The Honorable Jim Saxton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional

Threats and Capabilities Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives

Subject: Posthearing Questions Related to the Department of Defense's
(DOD) Management of the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Program

On October 30, 2003, I testified before your committee at a hearing on
DOD's Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Program.1 This letter
responds to your request that I provide answers to posthearing questions
from you and Congressman Mike Rogers. The questions and responses follow.

Question from Chairman Jim Saxton

1. As noted in both Mr. Hinton's and Mr. Wakefield's statements, the
Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) program is managed separately
from the chemical stockpile destruction program, as directed by Congress,
and maintenance of a separate program contributes to a complex program
management structure. In his statement Mr. Wakefield said that the
Department of Defense is looking at further streamlining the management of
the chemical demilitarization program and now desires to consolidate the
ACWA program manager under the Army's Chemical Materials Agency. How does
the current division of the program structure between the Chemical
Materials Agency and the Project Manager for the Assembled Chemical
Weapons Alternative adversely affect the program and how would
consolidation of these two activities as proposed by Mr. Wakefield improve
the overall management of the program? What legislative action would be
required to make such a change?

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Better Management
Tools Needed to Guide DOD's Stockpile Destruction Program, GAO-04-221T
(Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2003).

Our previous work has shown that the division in the program's structure
between the ACWA program and the chemical stockpile destruction program
has contributed to ineffective coordination and communication, inefficient
efforts, and obscured accountability. For example, in 2000, we reported
that the chemical demilitarization program had a complex structure that
separates management roles, responsibilities, and accountability for
achieving program results that contributed to ineffective coordination and
communication between ACWA and the rest of program.2 In 2002, we also
reported that there were barriers to communicating lessons learned between
ACWA and the rest of the program, resulting in duplication of efforts.3 As
long as this separation exists between ACWA and the rest of the program,
the management structure will remain complex and difficult to manage.

While our previous work has not commented on whether the ACWA program
should be consolidated with the rest of the program, we believe that
consolidating these two programs could result in some improvements in
program management, provided that the consolidated program also develops
and implements an overarching strategy and implementation plan. While
consolidation should provide a number of benefits- such as simplifying the
management structure, reducing duplication of efforts, and improving
coordination and communication-these benefits will be limited if the
program does not successfully develop a roadmap for success.

Finally, as acknowledged by DOD in its statement to the Committee,
consolidating the two programs requires amending existing legislation
mandating independent management of the ACWA program and directing the
program manager for ACWA to manage the chemical demilitarization
activities at Blue Grass and Pueblo Depot. For example, the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 (Pub. L. No. 107-248 (2002)), which
designates the program manager for ACWA to be the manager for Blue Grass
and Pueblo activities, and earlier ACWA legislation must be amended to
reflect the program management changes DOD seeks.

Question from Congressman Mike Rogers

2. To my knowledge, the latest detailed GAO report that was issued
specifically on Chemical Weapons Stockpile Emergency Preparedness in
Alabama was issued in July 1996. At that time, the Army had allocated $46
million of Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP)
funding for Alabama. Today that figure has tripled. Are current summaries
available that assess the current funding and status of CSEPP funding in
Alabama? Additionally, the 1996 report included the impact of federal,
state,

2 U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements
Needed in Program Accountability and Financial Management, GAO/NSIAD-00-80
(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2000). 3 U.S. General Accounting Office,
Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but Could Be
Improved and Expanded, GAO-02-890 (Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2002).

and local management on Alabama's program. Have those findings changed
significantly in 7 years, and if so, how?

The amount of funding provided from the Army to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) for enhancing emergency preparedness for the
communities surrounding the stockpile at Anniston, Alabama has grown
substantially since the $46 million cited in our 1996 report4. In 2001, we
reported the total amount of funding provided to the state of Alabama had
increased to about $108 million-an increase of about $62 million from
1996.5 However, Alabama was still lacking five critical items
(overpressurization, tone alert radios, coordinated plans, CSEPP staffing,
and shelter in place kits) that would require additional funding.
According to FEMA officials, about another $74 million will have been
directly provided to Alabama by the end of fiscal year 2003-for a total of
about $182 million for fiscal years 1989-2003.

In addition to the funding provided directly to Alabama, FEMA has provided
funding for federally managed contracts on behalf of Alabama and to the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for collective protection constuction
projects in Alabama. According to FEMA, it has provided $63.6 million
during fiscal years 1989-2003 for this indirect support which, when added
to the direct funding mentioned above, totals about $246 million. This
funding support has contributed to improvements in the status of community
preparedness in Alabama. As of October 2003, Alabama was reporting that 7
of its 12 performance benchmarks are in compliance, and that the other 5,
while not complete, are either on track for completion or only have minor
problems. However, more funding than what is currently planned for Alabama
may be needed to fully correct these problems. As I mentioned in my
statement to the Committee, while about $41 million in direct funding is
allocated to Alabama for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, FEMA identified
unfunded requirements of about $38 million over the same period.

GAO's work performed since the mid-1990s related to CSEPP managagement
issues have shown that, at the federal level, the Army and FEMA have made
significant progress in correcting management weaknesses, although there
have been setbacks along the way. Since 1996, our work has not
specifically focused on management issues related to the Anniston site,
however, information concerning Anniston was included in our body of CSEPP
work. The following chronicles past GAO work related to management issues:

o  	In 1996, we reported that there was a lack of CSEPP progress in
Alabama because of management weaknesses at the federal level and
inadequate action by state and local agencies. More specifically, we
reported that the Army was slow to achieve progress because: (1)
management roles and responsibilities were fragmented and

4 U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency
Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses,
GAO/NSIAD-96-150 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1996). 5 The $108 million
reflects funding for fiscal years 1989 through 2000. See U.S. General
Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in
Preparing States for Emergencies, GAO-01-850 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13,
2001).

unclear, (2) planning guidance was incomplete and imprecise, (3) budget
processes lacked teamwork, and (4) financial controls were ineffective. In
addition to progress being hampered by management weaknesses at the
federal level, we reported that some state and local actions had
contributed to delays in implementing a number of critical projects, such
as issuing tone radios and conducting demographic studies.

o  	In a 1997 follow-up review that assessed the status of CSEPP in all 10
states, we reported that while the Army and FEMA had acted to improve
program management, the effectiveness of these actions had been limited by
differences regarding their respective roles and responsibilities.6

o  	Subsequently, we reported in 2001 that the Army and FEMA had improved
their joint management of the program by improving working relations with
each other and more clearly defining roles and responsibilities. However,
we reported that they had not been as successful in their working
relations with some states and local communities. With regard to Alabama,
we reported that unresolved issues remained involving overpressurization
projects and coordinated plans. These issues resulted in gaps in emergency
response capabilities and were unresolved due to a lack of agreement
between the Army, FEMA, and local officials.

o  	Lastly, in 2003, we reported that frequent shifts in program
leadership had contributed to confusion among participants in program
areas, including CSEPP, contributing to delays in Alabama.7 Moreover, we
also reported that the Army and some key Alabama stakeholders were not
able to satisfactorily resolve issues such as the adequacy of protection
plans [overpressurization projects] prior to the planned agent operations
start date at Anniston, delaying operations many months. FEMA officials
are now confident that most of the past issues related to Alabama are
largely resolved and that working relations between the Army, FEMA, and
the states have improved.

                                     -----

In responding to these questions, we relied primarily on our past work.
For additional information on our work on DOD's chemical demilitarization
program,

6 U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes
Needed in the Management of the Emergency Preparedness Program,
GAO/NSIAD-97-91 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 1997). 7 U.S. General
Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along with Key
Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction Program,
GAO-03-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2003).

please contact me on (202) 512-4300 or Ray Decker, who directed this work,
on (202) 512-6020.

Sincerely, Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Managing Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management

(350484)
*** End of document. ***