Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That 
Its Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information	 
(03-MAR-04, GAO-04-332).					 
                                                                 
Department of Defense (DOD) contractors perform numerous services
that require access to classified information. With access comes 
the possibility of compromise, particularly as foreign entities  
increasingly seek U.S. military technologies. To ensure the	 
protection of classified information, the National Industrial	 
Security Program (NISP) establishes requirements that contractors
must meet. In administering the NISP for DOD and 24 other	 
government agencies, DOD's Defense Security Service (DSS)	 
monitors whether 11,000- plus contractor facilities' security	 
programs meet NISP requirements. In response to a Senate report  
accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal	 
Year 2004, GAO assessed DSS's oversight and examined DSS's	 
actions after possible compromises of classified information.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-332 					        
    ACCNO:   A09394						        
  TITLE:     Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate	      
Assurances That Its Oversight Ensures the Protection of 	 
Classified Information						 
     DATE:   03/03/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Classified defense information			 
	     Department of Defense contractors			 
	     Information disclosure				 
	     Information resources management			 
	     Security classification (government		 
	     documents) 					 
                                                                 
	     Security clearances				 
	     Facility security					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     DOD National Industrial Security Program		 

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GAO-04-332

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Report to the Committee on Armed

                             Services, U.S. Senate

March 2004

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its Oversight Ensures the Protection
                           of Classified Information

GAO-04-332

Highlights of GAO-04-332, a report to the Senate Committee on Armed
Services

Department of Defense (DOD) contractors perform numerous services that
require access to classified information. With access comes the
possibility of compromise, particularly as foreign entities increasingly
seek U.S. military technologies. To ensure the protection of classified
information, the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) establishes
requirements that contractors must meet. In administering the NISP for DOD
and 24 other government agencies, DOD's Defense Security Service (DSS)
monitors whether 11,000plus contractor facilities' security programs meet
NISP requirements.

In response to a Senate report accompanying the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, GAO assessed DSS's oversight and
examined DSS's actions after possible compromises of classified
information.

GAO recommends that DSS improve its oversight of contractors. GAO also
recommends that DSS take steps to ensure that determinations for possible
information compromises be properly made and that government agencies be
quickly notified when their classified information has been lost or
compromised. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-332.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine Schinasi at (202)
512-4841 or [email protected].

March 2004

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its Oversight Ensures the Protection
of Classified Information

DSS cannot provide adequate assurances to government agencies that its
oversight of contractor facilities reduces the risk of information
compromise. DSS is unable to provide this assurance because its
performance goals and measures do not relate directly to the protection of
classified information. While DSS maintains files on contractor
facilities' security programs and their security violations, it does not
analyze this information. Further, the manner in which this information is
maintained- geographically dispersed paper-based files-does not lend
itself to analysis. By not analyzing information on security violations
and how well classified information is being protected across all
facilities, DSS cannot identify systemic vulnerabilities and make
corrective changes to reduce the risk of information compromise.

When a contractor facility reports a violation and the possible compromise
of classified information, DSS does not always follow established
procedures. After receiving a report of a possible information compromise,
DSS is required to determine whether compromise occurred and to notify the
affected government agency so it can assess any damage and take actions to
mitigate the effects of the suspected compromise, compromise, or loss.
However, DSS failed to make determinations in many of the 93 violations
GAO reviewed and made inappropriate determinations in others:

o  	In 39 of the 93 violations, DSS made no determinations regarding
compromise.

o  	For 30 of the remaining 54 violations, DSS's determinations were not
consistent with established criteria.

As a result, government agencies are not being kept informed of possible
compromises of their information.

In addition, weeks or months can pass before government agencies are
notified by DSS of possible information compromises because of
difficulties in identifying the affected agencies. In 11 out of 16
instances GAO reviewed, it took DSS more than 30 days to notify the
affected agency that its information had been lost or compromised. DSS
relies on contractor facilities to identify the affected government
agencies, but some facilities cannot readily provide DSS with this
information because they are subcontractors that have to obtain the
identity of the government agency from the prime contractors. In one case,
5 months passed before a subcontractor facility could provide DSS with the
identity of the government agency whose information was suspected of being
compromised. Such delays limit the government agencies' opportunity to
assess and mitigate any damage from loss or compromise.

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
DSS Does Not Evaluate the Effectiveness of Its Oversight
DSS Does Not Always Comply with NISP Requirements after a

Possible Compromise of Information Conclusions Recommendations for
Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 1

2 4 6

10 15 16 17

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

  Table

Table 1: Criteria for DSS's Compromise Determinations

  Figures

Figure 1: DSS's Determinations for 93 Reported Violations 12 Figure 2:
Amount of Time DSS Took to Notify Government Customers of Compromise
Determinations in 16 Cases 14

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
DSS Defense Security Service
GAO General Accounting Office
NISP National Industrial Security Program
NISPOM National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

March 3, 2004

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

Contractors for the Department of Defense (DOD) perform a multitude of
services, ranging from designing advanced weapons used by U.S. forces
around the world to providing translation services for prisoner
interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Because a large portion of their
work is vital to national security, contractors often require access to
classified information. However, with contractor access comes the
possibility that classified information will be compromised and national
security will be harmed. Over the last several years, there have been
several reported incidents of contractors handling classified information
carelessly, losing it, and even providing it to unauthorized persons.
These
incidents have occurred at a time when foreign entities are increasing
their
attempts to obtain information from U.S. industry on militarily critical
technologies, such as encryption devices or target recognition components
for missiles. Further, the risk of compromise has grown with the increased
use of the Internet to transfer information almost anywhere in the world.

Given the risk of information compromise, contractors are required to
have security programs that provide DOD and other agencies with
assurances that classified information will be appropriately safeguarded.
The National Industrial Security Program (NISP) establishes requirements
that contractors' programs must meet and a process for ensuring that
contractors adhere to the requirements. DOD's Defense Security Service
(DSS) administers the NISP on behalf of DOD and 24 other federal
agencies. DSS grants clearances to contractor facilities so they can
access
and, in some cases, store classified information. DSS then monitors over
11,000 facilities' security programs to ensure that they meet NISP

  Results in Brief

requirements and to assure government customers1 that their classified
information is appropriately safeguarded.

In a report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004, the Senate Committee on Armed Services directed us to review
the NISP and DOD's oversight of contractors' programs to protect sensitive
information and technology. In response, we assessed (1) DSS's oversight
of contractor facilities' implementation of the NISP and (2) DSS's
adherence to required procedures after a security violation and possible
compromise of classified information.2 Details on the scope and
methodology of our review can be found in appendix I.

DSS cannot provide adequate assurances to government customers that its
oversight of contractors reduces the risk of classified information being
compromised. DSS cannot provide this assurance because its performance
measures do not enable it to evaluate whether its oversight ensures the
protection of classified information. Instead of focusing on the overall
results of its oversight, DSS measures performance in terms of processes,
such as the number of security reviews completed on time. DSS also
evaluates the completeness of reports on security reviews conducted at
contractor facilities, but does not evaluate its performance in terms of
the results of these reviews and how well contractors are protecting
classified information. DSS does not analyze the information it maintains
on contractors' protection of classified information nor does the manner
in which DSS maintains this information lend itself to such analysis. This
lack of analysis limits DSS's ability to detect trends in the protection
of classified information across facilities, to determine sources of
security vulnerabilities, and to identify those contractors with the
greatest risk of compromise. Therefore, DSS cannot determine where
systemic vulnerabilities exist and make corrective changes to reduce the
risk of information compromise.

1Throughout this report, "government customer" refers to the government
contracting activity within a federal agency that awarded a contract
requiring access to classified information.

2As agreed with committee staff, our review was limited to DSS's oversight
of contractor facilities' protection of Confidential, Secret, and Top
Secret information as defined in Executive Order no. 12958, as amended,
and did not include DSS's oversight of special access programs at
contractor facilities. Special access programs are established to provide
protection for particularly sensitive classified information beyond that
normally required for Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential information.

DSS has not always followed required procedures when contractors have
reported security violations and possible compromises of classified
information. After receiving a report of possible information compromise,
DSS is required to determine whether compromise occurred and notify the
affected government customer so it can assess the extent of damage and
take actions to minimize the effects of suspected compromise, compromise,
or loss. However, for 39 of the 93 reported violations we reviewed,3 DSS
made no determinations. For 30 of the remaining 54 violations, DSS's
determinations were not consistent with the established criteria. As a
result, government customers have not been kept informed of possible
compromises of their information and DOD and other agencies cannot be sure
that appropriate actions have been taken. In addition, DSS has frequently
been unable to quickly notify government customers about a suspected
compromise, compromise, or loss because of difficulties in identifying the
affected customers. For 11 of the 16 instances we identified in which DSS
notified the government customer of a violation, DSS's notification took
more than 30 days. Some contractors could not readily provide DSS with
information on the government customers because they were subcontractors
that had to obtain the government customers' identification from prime
contractors. In one case, a subcontractor took 5 months to identify the
government customer so DSS could notify the affected customer that its
information was suspected of being compromised.

In this report, we are making three recommendations to DOD to improve the
oversight of contractors. We make four additional recommendations to DOD
to ensure that appropriate determinations are made regarding possible
information compromises and that government customers are quickly notified
of such situations. We also make a recommendation to improve contractors'
understanding of violation-reporting requirements. In commenting on a
draft of this report, DOD agreed to implement these recommendations.
However, DOD disagreed with our conclusions that DSS cannot provide
adequate assurances that its oversight of contractors ensures the
protection of classified information and that there are weaknesses in
DSS's processes related to possible information compromises.

3The 93 violations we reviewed were reported by the 13 facilities selected
for our case study. The selected facilities reported the 93 violations
between January 1, 2001, and the time of our file reviews at DSS offices
throughout the country. As explained in appendix I, the 13 facilities were
selected on the basis of size, clearance level, and geographic location.

Background

Industrial security integrates information, personnel, and physical
security to protect classified information entrusted to contractors. The
goal is to ensure that contractors' security programs detect and deter
espionage and counter the threat posed by adversaries seeking classified
information. According to DSS, attempts by foreign agents to obtain
information from contractors have increased over the last several years
and are expected to increase further. The NISP is the governmentwide
program to assure federal agencies that contractors adequately protect
classified information. The NISP was established by executive order in
19934 to replace industrial security programs operated by various federal
agencies. Under the national program, contractor facilities must be
cleared prior to accessing classified information and must implement
certain safeguards to maintain their clearance. DOD is responsible for
clearing facilities and monitoring contractors' protection of classified
information.5 DOD, with concurrence from the Department of Energy, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, and Central Intelligence Agency, issued the
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) in 1995.6
The NISPOM prescribes the requirements, restrictions, and safeguards that
contractors are to follow to prevent the unauthorized disclosure-or
compromise-of classified information.

DSS administers the NISP on behalf of DOD and 24 other agencies through
its Industrial Security Program.7 DSS's Industrial Security Program, which

4Executive Order no. 12829, signed January 6, 1993, established the NISP
for the protection of information classified under Executive Order no.
12958, as amended.

5Under Executive Order no. 12829, the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Secretary of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission retain
authority over access to information under their respective programs. As
such, they may monitor contractor facilities with access to such
information or assign some of that responsibility to DOD.

6The NISPOM (DOD 5220.22-M) was subsequently amended in 1997 and 2000.

7DOD has entered into agreements with the following 24 departments and
agencies for the purpose of providing industrial security services: the
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Health and Human
Services; Homeland Security, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State,
Transportation, and the Treasury; Environmental Protection Agency; Federal
Reserve System; General Accounting Office; General Services
Administration; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; Small Business Administration; U.S. Agency for
International Development; National Science Foundation; U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency; U.S. Information Agency; U.S. International Trade
Commission; and U.S. Trade Representative.

is one of DSS's three core mission areas,8 oversees more than 11,000
contractor facilities to assure U.S. government customers that their
classified information is protected. By clearing a facility, DSS has
determined that the contractor facility is eligible to access classified
information at the same or lower classification level as the clearance
granted-Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret. Under the NISP, a facility is
a grouping of buildings related by function and location that form an
operating entity. Facilities include manufacturing plants, laboratories,
offices, and universities. They range in size from small offices that are
owned and operated by one person to huge manufacturing complexes that are
one of many owned by a large corporation. According to DSS, about half of
the cleared facilities have been approved by DSS to store classified
information on site, while the other facilities access classified
information at a government site or at another facility approved for
storage.

DSS's industrial security representatives serve as the primary points of
contact with cleared facilities and are responsible for ensuring that
contractors have security programs that comply with the NISPOM. The 240
industrial security representatives are assigned to 23 field offices
spread throughout the country, where field office chiefs supervise their
work. Representatives' oversight involves educating facility personnel on
security requirements, accrediting information systems that process
classified information, approving classified storage containers, and
assisting contractors with security violation investigations. DSS
representatives also conduct periodic security reviews to assess whether
contractor facilities are adhering to NISPOM requirements and to identify
actual and potential security vulnerabilities. Security reviews are
scheduled annually for facilities that store classified information and
every 18 months for facilities that do not have classified information on
site. In overseeing and assisting contractors, the representatives are to
follow the procedures contained in the Industrial Security Operating
Manual, which DSS issued to guide its personnel in administering the NISP.
For example, the manual specifies how representatives should conduct
security reviews to evaluate the quality of a facility's security program
and how contractor facilities' reports of security violations should be
handled.

8DSS's other core mission areas are the Personnel Security Investigations
Program and the Security Education, Training, and Awareness Program.
However, the Personnel Security Investigations Program will be transferred
to the Office of Personnel Management under the authority provided in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub.

L. No. 108-136, S: 906).

  DSS Does Not Evaluate the Effectiveness of Its Oversight

DSS relies on performance goals and measures that do not provide it a
basis for assuring government customers that its oversight of contractor
facilities mitigates the risk of information compromise. Instead of
focusing on the overall results of its oversight and the protection of
classified information, DSS evaluates its performance in terms of
indicators, such as the number of security reviews completed on time.
Further, while industrial security representatives maintain paper files on
the quality of contractor security programs and the types of security
violations that result in compromises of classified information, DSS does
not analyze this information, and the manner in which it is maintained
does not lend itself to such analysis. Without this analysis, DSS is
limited in its ability to detect trends in the protection of classified
information across facilities, to determine sources of security
vulnerabilities, and to identify those facilities with the greatest risk
of compromise.

    DSS's Performance Goals and Measures Do Not Indicate If Mission Is Being
    Achieved

Although DSS has reported that it has met or exceeded many of its
performance goals, DSS has no basis for determining whether it is
fulfilling its overall industrial security mission. DSS's industrial
security mission, as stated in its current Fiscal Year 2000-2005 strategic
plan, is to (1) ensure that all contractor facilities overseen by DSS
properly protect classified information in their possession and (2) assure
government customers that facilities are eligible to receive classified
information and have systems in place to protect the classified
information. However, DSS currently does not have performance goals and
measures that would indicate whether DSS is fulfilling this mission.

DSS assesses its industrial security program based on the:

o  percentage of security reviews completed,

o  	percentage of security reviews that covered all pertinent areas of
contractors' security programs,

o  	length of time needed to clear contractor facilities for access to
classified information, and

o  	length of time needed to clear contractor personnel for access to
classified information.9

9DSS will only process an application for a personnel clearance if the
facility at which the employee works has been cleared.

Such indicators are important. For example, according to DSS officials,
the indicator pertaining to the completion of security reviews provides
government customers assurances that industrial security representatives
are monitoring their contractors. The timeliness of clearances also
matters because the facility and its personnel cannot access classified
information in support of a government contract until DSS has cleared
them. For each of the indicators, DSS established specific performance
goals. While DSS did not meet all of its goals related to the timeliness
of contractor facility and personnel clearances, it met or exceeded the
goals related to security reviews. For example, DSS's goal is to conduct
annual security reviews of 98 percent of the facilities that store
classified information on site. In fiscal year 2002, the most recent year
for which data are available, DSS reported meeting this goal.

DSS also reported that it exceeded the goal of having 75 percent of its
security reviews cover all pertinent areas within contractor facilities'
security programs. Based on a review of selected security review reports,
DSS determined that 86 percent of its security reviews conducted in fiscal
year 2002 covered all pertinent areas and accurately reflected the
contractor facilities' overall security posture. However, DSS measured its
achievement of this goal based on field office chiefs' selection and
review of about 550 of the approximately 9,000 reports completed by
industrial security representatives. This review does not focus on the
quality of the facilities' security programs or the representatives'
review of those programs. Instead, it is used to determine the
completeness of the reports.

These current goals and measures alone do not enable DSS to determine
whether its oversight is effectively ensuring that contractors protect
classified information. There are no goals related to how well facilities
are protecting classified information, which would provide an indication
as to whether DSS is achieving its mission. For example, while DSS
evaluates the completeness of security review reports submitted by
industrial security representatives, it does not evaluate its performance
in terms of the ratings10 and number of findings11 that result from
security reviews. Nor

10After a security review, an industrial security representative is to
rate that facility's security program in terms of how well it meets NISPOM
requirements and ensures the protection of classified information. There
are currently four rating categories-ranging from unable to safeguard
classified information to exceeding the basic requirements of the NISPOM.

11DSS defines a finding as the failure to comply with the NISPOM. Findings
are either administrative or serious. Findings are deemed serious if they
could lead to the loss or compromise of classified information.

does DSS evaluate its performance in terms of the frequency of security
violations and information compromises occurring at contractor facilities.
By not assessing its performance based on factors such as facility
compliance with NISPOM requirements, DSS cannot determine whether its
oversight efforts are contributing to an increase or decrease in
facilities' compliance and the protection of classified information.

    DSS's Lack of Analysis Limits Its Ability to Determine If Its Oversight
    Reduces the Risk of Information Compromise

DSS maintains records on how well contractor facilities protect classified
information but does not analyze these records. There are no programwide
analyses of violations reported by facilities or results of DSS's reviews
of facilities. Further, the manner in which DSS maintains records on
facilities' security programs-geographically dispersed paper-based files-
does not lend itself to analysis. Industrial security representatives
maintain a file folder on each facility they oversee. According to DSS
officials, the information contained in these file folders represents the
official record on each contractor facility. The folders are the primary
means for documenting information on facilities' security programs and
representatives' interactions with those facilities. The folders contain,
in paper copy form, information such as the facility's clearance level,
identity of the facility owner, results of the last two security reviews,
and facility's reports on security violations.12 Folders are kept with
their respective industrial security representatives throughout the
country.

An analysis of the types of security violations reported by facilities,
their causes, or corrective actions taken would require a manual review of
each file folder. According to DSS officials, DSS has not conducted such
an analysis in recent years nor has it made any other attempt to identify
the most common violations of the NISPOM or their causes. As a result, DSS
does not know whether certain types of violations are increasing or

12In addition to the file folders, DSS has a Facilities Database that
contains information on facilities' security programs. However, industrial
security representatives are not required to document all oversight
activities in the database nor has DSS assessed the database's
reliability. The database is primarily used to assign facilities to
representatives and track the number of security reviews completed. DSS
also analyzes information on attempts to collect information from U.S.
industry to determine the threat posed by foreign agents. Information on
these attempts, such as the types of information sought, methods used to
attempt access, and countries targeting the information, is entered into a
database maintained by DSS's Counterintelligence Office. The office uses
this database to identify trends in foreign information collection
efforts, which are reported in the annual "Technology Collection Trends in
the U.S. Defense Industry" report and disseminated to industrial security
representatives and contractor facility security officials.

decreasing or why such changes may be occurring. For example, DSS
officials told us that anecdotal evidence indicates that there are an
increasing number of security violations involving unsecured e-mail
transmission of classified information. However, DSS has no basis for
knowing what percentage of facilities have had such violations or how
significant any increase has been.

By not analyzing the information contained in the file folders, DSS is
unable to identify patterns of security violations across all facilities
based on factors such as the type of work conducted at the facility, the
facility's government customer, or the facility's corporate affiliation.
Officials at several contractor facilities informed us that their security
procedures are developed and managed at the corporate level and,
therefore, all facilities owned by the corporation follow the same
procedures. As a result, security problems at one facility may indicate a
more general, corporatewide vulnerability. For example, an industrial
security representative attributed a series of violations at a facility
owned by a large corporation to that facility's inadequate security
education program. However, facility security officials told us that their
education program was developed at the corporate level, rather than by
that facility. Because DSS does not track violations and their causes
across facilities, there was no way to readily determine whether use of
the corporate security education program resulted in violations at other
facilities.

DSS recently created a new database to track the number of security
violations reported by facilities.13 Industrial security representatives
are required to enter into the database which facility reported the
violation, which field office is responsible for the facility, and the
industrial security representative's determination regarding whether
information was compromised. According to DSS officials, DSS will use the
new database to calculate the number of security violations nationwide and
by region and to track the amount of time representatives take to make a
determination after receiving facilities' violation reports. However,
because of the limited data it will contain, the database cannot be used
to identify common types and causes of security violations reported by
facilities.

13This Web-based database, which is known as the Industrial Security
Reporting System, became operational in July 2003.

DSS also does not analyze information on the quality of facility security
programs, such as ratings and the number and types of findings from DSS's
security reviews. While DSS officials expressed interest in eventually
analyzing security review ratings and findings, they told us the new
database currently lacks this capability. DSS has not manually reviewed
the file folders and analyzed security review ratings to determine, for
example, whether the number of facilities meeting NISPOM requirements is
increasing or if security programs for facilities owned by one corporation
have consistently lower ratings than those owned by another corporation.
DSS also has not analyzed the security review findings to identify the
number and most common types of findings. As a result, DSS cannot identify
patterns of security review findings across all cleared facilities on the
basis of the type of work they perform, their size, or corporate
ownership.

  DSS Does Not Always Comply with NISP Requirements after a Possible Compromise
  of Information

Industrial security representatives often failed to determine whether
security violations by facilities resulted in the loss, compromise, or
suspected compromise of classified information or made determinations that
were not in accordance with approved criteria. Such determinations are
important because if classified information is lost, compromised, or
suspected of being compromised, the affected government customer must be
notified so it can evaluate the extent of damage to national security and
take steps to mitigate that damage. Even when representatives made an
appropriate determination, they often took several weeks and even months
to notify the government customer because of difficulties in identifying
the customer. As a result, the customer's opportunity to take necessary
corrective action was delayed.

    Industrial Security Representatives Failed to Make Appropriate
    Determinations for Many Reported Security Violations

The NISPOM requires a facility to investigate all security violations. If
classified information is suspected of being compromised or lost, the
facility must provide its DSS industrial security representative with
information on the circumstances of the incident and corrective actions
taken to prevent future occurrences. The industrial security
representative is to then review this information and, using the criteria
specified in DSS's Industrial Security Operating Manual, make one of four
final determinations: no compromise, suspected compromise, compromise, or
loss. Table 1 outlines the criteria for each determination.

Table 1: Criteria for DSS's Compromise Determinations

No compromise This conclusion is reserved for inquiries in which
classified information

Suspected To reach this conclusion, the industrial security representative
must be compromise able to identify the classified information involved
and, usually, the

may have been vulnerable to compromise but the circumstances of the
situation led the industrial security representative to reasonably
conclude that either no unauthorized individual had access to the
information, or that, based on the facts of the inquiry, the possibility
of access was extremely remote.

unauthorized individual(s) who may have gained access to the information.
In this case, proving that there was unauthorized access to the
information may not be possible, but the facts in the case lead the
industrial security representative to reasonably conclude that
unauthorized access probably occurred. For example, the storage of
classified information in an unlocked desk drawer of an unlocked office or
open space for several months in a facility where an unauthorized person
had or was likely to have had access should be considered a suspected
compromise.

Compromise 	An unauthorized disclosure of classified information. To reach
the conclusion that material was compromised, the industrial security
representative must be able to identify the classified information
involved and the unauthorized individual(s) to whom the information was
disclosed.

Loss 	Classified information is presumed lost if the material cannot be
located within a reasonable time or if the material is out of the
custodian's control, including transmission of the information by an
unsecured communication method to which an unauthorized person reasonably
could have had access (e.g., Internet, telephone, unsecured facsimile).

Source: Industrial Security Operating Manual.

If a determination other than no compromise is made, the Industrial
Security Operating Manual directs the representative to inform the
government customer about the violation so a damage assessment can be
conducted. However, as shown in figure 1, for 39 of the 93 security
violations that we reviewed, industrial security representatives made no
determinations regarding the compromise or loss of classified
information.14 For example, in two cases where the same facility reported
the improper transmission of classified information via e-mail, DSS made
no determinations even though the facility reported the possibility of
compromise in both cases. In eight cases at another facility, employees

14Of the 39 violations, 7 were reported to DSS in 2001, 13 in 2002, and 19
in 2003. The 2003 violations were reported to DSS at least 2 months prior
to our review of how DSS responded to these violations.

repeatedly failed to secure a safe room to ensure the protection of
classified information. DSS made no determinations in any of the eight
cases. In the absence of a determination, the industrial security
representatives did not notify the government customers of these
violations. The government customers, unaware of the violations, could not
take steps to assess and mitigate any damage that may have resulted.

Figure 1: DSS's Determinations for 93 Reported Violations

Note: Of the 24 cases where DSS made consistent determinations, it
determined no compromise in 10 cases, loss of information in 9 cases,
compromise of information in 3 cases, and suspected compromise in 2 cases.

For 54 of the 93 violations we reviewed, representatives made
determinations regarding the compromise or loss of information, but the
majority were not consistent with the criteria contained in DSS's
Industrial Security Operating Manual. As figure 1 further illustrates,
representatives made 24 determinations regarding compromise or loss that
were consistent with the criteria contained in the manual. However,
representatives made 30 inappropriate determinations, such as "compromise
cannot be precluded" or "compromise cannot be determined." Neither of
these is consistent with the determinations in the manual-no compromise,
suspected compromise, compromise, or loss. For example, in nine cases, the
same facility reported that classified material was left unsecured, and
the facility did not rule out compromise. In each of these cases, the
industrial security representative did not rule

out compromise but used an alternative determination. Senior DSS officials
informed us that industrial security representatives should not make
determinations other than the four established in the Industrial Security
Operating Manual because the four have specific meanings based on accepted
criteria. By not following the manual, representatives have introduced
variability in their determinations and, therefore, their decisions of
whether to notify the government customer of a violation.

Among the 30 reported violations for which inappropriate determinations
were made, industrial security representatives notified the affected
government customers in 5 cases so the customers could assess and mitigate
any resulting damage. These cases included three violations involving
classified material that was left unsecured at the same facility. For the
remaining 25 reported violations, the customers were not made aware of the
violations even when the violations were similar to those reported to
other customers.

The failure of representatives to always make determinations consistent
with the Industrial Security Operating Manual is at least partially
attributable to inadequate oversight. The Standards and Quality Branch is
the unit within DSS responsible for ensuring that industrial security
representatives properly administer the NISP. Branch officials regularly
test and review field office chiefs and representatives on NISP
requirements, particularly those related to granting clearances and
conducting security reviews. According to DSS officials, the results of
these tests and reviews are used to design training courses that address
weaknesses in job skills. However, the Standards and Quality Branch does
not test or review how representatives respond to reported violations and
make determinations regarding compromise. As a result, DSS does not know
the extent to which representatives understand and are consistently
applying Industrial Security Operating Manual requirements related to
violations and, therefore, cannot make necessary revisions to training and
guidance.

In addition, field office chiefs are responsible for supervising and
ensuring the quality of industrial security representatives' day-to-day
oversight of contractors. However, there is no specific requirement in the
Industrial Security Operating Manual for field office chiefs to review
their industrial security representatives' determinations regarding
reported security violations. We found no evidence that chiefs reviewed
the cases in which the representatives either did not make determinations
or made determinations that were inconsistent with the manual. Further,
chiefs may not fully understand the manual's criteria for determinations.
For

example, one field office chief we met with tracked the industrial
security representatives' processing of reported security violations by
using a categorization sheet containing the inappropriate determination
"compromise not precluded."

    DSS Is Not Always Able to Quickly Notify Government Customers about
    Violations

While the Industrial Security Operating Manual does not specify a time
requirement for notifying government customers when classified information
has been lost or compromised, DSS is frequently unable to notify customers
quickly because of difficulties in identifying the affected customers. DSS
notified government customers regarding 16 of the 54 reported violations
for which representatives made determinations. Figure 2 shows that for 11
of these 16 violations, DSS did not notify the customer for more than 30
days after the contractor reported that information was lost, compromised,
or suspected of being compromised. In one case, 5 months passed before an
industrial security representative was able to notify a government
customer that its information was suspected of being compromised. This
delay was a result of the facility's inability to readily determine which
government customer was affected by the compromise.

Figure 2: Amount of Time DSS Took to Notify Government Customers of
Compromise Determinations in 16 Cases

When a loss, compromise, or suspected compromise has been determined, the
industrial security representative generally relies on the facility to
identify the affected government customer. However, when the facility is
operating as a subcontractor, it may not be aware of the government
customer's identity. In such instances, the subcontractor may have to work
with the prime contractor to identify the government customer to provide
the industrial security representative with this information. In one case
we reviewed, a subcontractor made repeated attempts over a 5-

month period to obtain the affected government customer's identity from
the prime contractor. In another case, an official with a subcontractor
facility informed us that it was extremely difficult and time-consuming
for him to identify the affected government customer, which took
approximately 2 months. Such delays limit the government customer's
opportunity to assess the extent of potential damage to national security.

    Representatives Often Do Not Notify Facilities of Their Determinations Even
    Though It May Be Useful to Do So

Conclusions

While the Industrial Security Operating Manual requires industrial
security representatives to notify government customers of loss or
compromise determinations, there is no requirement for representatives to
inform facilities of their final determinations. However, senior DSS
officials told us that they expect representatives to provide facilities
with their final determinations. They explained that this helps facility
officials understand what constitutes loss, compromise, or suspected
compromise. Contractor security officials at one facility confirmed this
by telling us that receiving determinations enables them to better
understand which violations must be reported to DSS. Yet, industrial
security representatives provided facilities with determinations for only
34 of the 93 reported violations we reviewed, and 18 of the 34 were
inappropriate determinations. As a result of both inappropriate
determinations and determinations not being provided by DSS, facility
officials may misunderstand what constitutes a violation that must be
reported to DSS and whether they have taken appropriate actions to contain
any possible compromise and prevent future incidents.

By granting contractors access to classified information, the government
has entrusted them with protecting national security. Ensuring that
contractors safeguard classified information is DSS's mission, yet DSS
cannot provide adequate assurances that it is fulfilling this mission.
Through its oversight, DSS cannot prevent every incident of information
compromise, but unless DSS knows whether its oversight minimizes the risk
of information compromise, it does not have an informed basis for managing
its oversight. By not evaluating the information it maintains on how well
contractors protect classified information, DSS may not realize where the
risks and systemic vulnerabilities exist. Further, DSS has no basis for
adjusting its resources to address emerging security weaknesses, such as
the electronic transmission of classified information. Although DSS's
inability to assess its performance as well as evaluate and make changes
to its oversight does not necessarily mean that contractors are not
fulfilling their responsibilities under the NISP, the effectiveness of
DSS's oversight is diminished and the assurances it provides to government

  Recommendations for Executive Action

customers regarding the protection of their information cannot be relied
on.

Likewise, by not making appropriate determinations regarding compromise or
loss, DSS does not always notify government customers that their
information has been lost or compromised, thereby, limiting corrective
actions and possibly increasing the damage to national security.
Inappropriate determinations may also confuse contractors' understanding
of the reporting requirements and result in contractors not reporting
incidents that should be reported.

To enable DSS to evaluate whether its oversight reduces the risk of
information compromise, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Director, Defense Security Service, to take the following three
actions:

o  	establish results-oriented performance goals and measures that would
enable DSS to assess the extent to which it is achieving its industrial
security mission,

o  	identify the information that needs to be analyzed to detect systemic
vulnerabilities and identify trends regarding how contractor facilities
protect classified information, and

o  	regularly analyze that information to make informed management
decisions about the use of resources for its oversight activities and make
any needed changes to those activities or procedures to reduce the risk of
information compromise.

In carrying out these actions, DSS will need to evaluate alternatives for
creating a new system or further developing an existing system to record
and analyze standard information on how well contractors protect
classified information.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of DSS
to take the following four actions to ensure that appropriate
determinations are made regarding possible information compromises and
that government customers are notified of such situations in a timely
manner:

o  	evaluate industrial security representatives and field office chiefs'
understanding of the criteria for making determinations regarding the
compromise of classified information and revise training and guidance for
representatives and chiefs based on the results of that evaluation,

o  	revise Industrial Security Operating Manual requirements to emphasize
the need to apply the established determinations regarding the compromise
or loss of classified information,

o  	explore the effects of establishing specific time-based criteria in
the Industrial Security Operating Manual for representatives to make
determinations and notify government customers, and

o  	establish mechanisms that create accountability for knowing the
identity of government customers so that industrial security
representatives can readily notify those customers of any loss or
compromise. This could be accomplished by requiring representatives to
maintain such information in their file folders or ensuring that
contractors, particularly when they are subcontractors, know the identity
of their government customers before an incident resulting in compromise
or loss occurs.

Additionally, to improve contractors' understanding of which security
violations must be reported to DSS, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Director of DSS to revise the Industrial Security
Operating Manual to require industrial security representatives to inform
facilities of the official determinations regarding the loss or compromise
of classified information.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations. However, DOD stated that the report's conclusion- that
DSS cannot provide adequate assurances that its oversight ensures the
protection of classified information by contractors-is not supported
because we did not evaluate how well contractors protect classified
information. While agreeing that its performance measures are not
resultsoriented, DOD stated that DSS is able to provide assurances
regarding the protection of classified information through its security
reviews. For 99 percent of security reviews, according to DOD, contractors
were found to be satisfactorily protecting classified information.
Additionally, DOD indicated that the problems we identified with security
violations and possible information compromises were purely
administrative. DOD stated it assumes that DSS's current processes for
handling security violations and possible information compromises did not
leave classified information at risk.

While contractors are ultimately responsible for protecting the classified
information entrusted to them, DSS is charged with ensuring that
contractors fulfill this obligation. Our review focused on how effectively
DSS's oversight ensures that contractors protect classified information.
As

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

explained in our report, DSS does not assess the effectiveness of its
oversight based on how well contractors are protecting information from
compromise nor does it analyze data to identify systemic vulnerabilities
in contractors' protection of classified information. Therefore, DSS
cannot provide adequate assurances that its oversight ensures the
protection of classified information. DSS is also hindered in its ability
to identify and implement corrective changes to reduce the risk of
information compromises resulting from security violations. In its
comments, DOD stated that DSS does not have the ability to identify and
analyze trends regarding how contractors protect classified information
because it lacks the information technology infrastructure to conduct such
analyses.

We are uncertain of the basis for DOD's statement that 99 percent of the
facilities received satisfactory security review ratings because DSS
officials told us during the course of our review that they do not track
the facilities' ratings. Also, by focusing only on security review
ratings, DOD is overlooking other indicators-such as security review
findings and incidents of possible compromise-that could enable DSS to
improve its oversight. Further, the rating may not be an adequate measure
of effectiveness. First, an industrial security representative can rate a
facility's security program as satisfactory even if the facility does not
fully comply with the NISPOM and its failure to do so could logically lead
to information compromise. Second, because DSS does not track information
on security review ratings and violations, it cannot establish whether
there is a correlation between a facility's rating and the frequency and
seriousness of that facility's violations and information compromises.
Finally, as we noted in our report, DSS's security review quality metric
is based not on the quality of reviews, but rather on the completeness of
industrial security representatives' reports. Also, the manner in which
field office chiefs select reports for the quality review is not
statistically valid and, therefore, DSS cannot draw conclusions about the
quality of security review reports nationwide based on that quality
review.

The problems we identified with DSS's response to security violations and
possible information compromises go beyond administrative processing. Our
findings focus on whether DSS has fulfilled its oversight
responsibilities. As DOD noted in its comments, DSS is responsible for
determining whether a violation has resulted in compromise, ensuring that
the contractor took corrective action, and notifying the government
customer. Yet, as discussed in our report, industrial security
representatives failed, in 39 of the 93 security violations we reviewed,
to determine whether the violations resulted in the loss, compromise, or
suspected compromise of classified information. For an additional 30

violations, representatives made inappropriate determinations, which
created variability in their decisions on whether to notify the government
customer of a violation. Absent a determination consistent with the
Industrial Security Operating Manual, one cannot draw conclusions on
whether the contractor conducted an adequate inquiry into the violation
and took corrective action to prevent its recurrence. Therefore, we cannot
agree with DOD's assumption that weaknesses in DSS's handling of security
violations did not leave classified material at risk. DOD's comments are
reprinted in appendix II, along with our evaluation of them.

We are also sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Defense Security
Service; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available
at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Key contributors to this report are listed
in
appendix III.

Katherine V. Schinasi
Managing Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the Defense Security Service's (DSS) oversight of contractors'
implementation of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), we
reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and guidance on
industrial security, including the National Industrial Security Program
Operating Manual, as well as DSS policies, procedures, and guidance for
overseeing contractor facilities. We also assessed DSS's performance goals
and measures contained in its strategic plan and annual report against our
reports related to the Government Performance and Results Act1 and
internal controls.2 We discussed the development of DSS goals, objectives,
and performance metrics with DSS officials. To become more familiar with
the roles and responsibilities of DSS staff, particularly as they relate
to maintaining information on facility security programs, we reviewed
DSS's training materials, the Industrial Security Operating Manual, and
selected facility file folders. We also discussed with DSS officials at
headquarters and field locations how they use the information in the
facility file folders to manage the industrial security program and
oversee contractor facilities.

To assess adherence to required procedures by DSS after a security
violation and possible compromise of classified information, we used a
case study approach. Using DSS's Facilities Database, we selected cases
from all facilities participating in the NISP as of March 2003. We
reviewed the data and identified facilities that reported to DSS security
violations since January 1, 2001, and selected 13 cleared facilities that
varied according to size, clearance level, and geographic location. For
those 13 facilities, we reviewed DSS's official facility file folders and
identified 93 reported violations. For those violations, we examined DSS's
actions to determine whether industrial security representatives and field
office chiefs handled these reports in accordance with the Industrial
Security Operating Manual. We also spoke with representatives and chiefs
regarding the actions they take after receiving violation reports. We
analyzed the information in DSS's files on the 13 facilities and their
violations to identify the determinations made by industrial security
representatives, how frequently government customers were contacted, and
the timeliness of government customer notification. In addition, we
visited the facilities selected for our case study and interviewed those

1See U.S. General Accounting Office, The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide
to Assessing Agency Annual Performance Plans, GAO/GGD-10.1.20 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 1, 1998).

2See U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

facilities' security officials to obtain clarification and additional
information about the reported security violations and actions taken by
DSS. Because we did not take a statistical sample of facilities, the
results from our analyses cannot be generalized. We also did not assess
the reliability of the Facilities Database as a whole. However, we
confirmed that the data used to select the 13 cases, specifically the
facility size and clearance level, were consistent with the information in
the facility files we reviewed.

We performed our review from March 2003 through January 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Note: GAO's comments supplementing those in the report's text appear at
the end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

                                 See comment 2.

                                 See comment 3.

                                 See comment 4.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

                                 See comment 5.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

                                 See comment 6.

              Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

  GAO's Comments

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter
dated February 12, 2004.

1. Our report recognizes that contractors are responsible for protecting
classified information entrusted to them. However, the focus of the report
is how well DSS is fulfilling its mission to ensure that contractors are
protecting classified information. We clearly state that DSS's inability
to assess whether it is fulfilling its mission does not necessarily mean
that contractors are not protecting the classified information entrusted
to them.

2. We are uncertain of how DOD determined that 99 percent of cleared
contractors were awarded satisfactory ratings nor do we know what time
period this percentage covers and whether it has varied over time.
However, for DSS to effectively manage its oversight, it needs to
regularly analyze data and examine trends regarding the protection of
classified information over time instead of producing the data to fulfill
a one-time information request.

3. The results of our case studies can and do indicate serious weaknesses
in how DSS oversees contractor facilities even though they cannot be
generalized because, as discussed in appendix I, we did not take a
statistical sample.

4. Our report identifies shortcomings in DSS's ability to evaluate whether
it is fulfilling its mission, make informed management decisions, and
ensure that industrial security representatives properly resolve security
violations and possible information compromises. Our report offers
specific recommendations for improvement, all of which DOD agreed to
implement.

5. It is unclear from DOD's comments what other measures DSS relies on to
determine success in accomplishing its mission. Our review assessed the
goals and measures established by DSS and found that they do not provide a
basis for determining whether DSS is fulfilling its mission.

6. Maintaining the prime contract numbers for all tiers of contracts in a
new information management system may not be sufficient to ensure that
government customers are readily notified of a loss or compromise. In at
least two cases we reviewed, industrial security representatives informed
subcontractor facility officials that, in addition to the prime contract
number, the name and complete address of the government customer and

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

a point of contact needed to be provided before DSS could process the
violation. In one case, an official at a subcontractor facility informed
the representative that such information was not readily available on the
DD Form 254, which is designed to provide a contractor with the security
requirements and classification guidance needed for the performance of a
classified contract.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Thomas J. Denomme, 202-512-4841

Acknowledgments 	In addition to the individual named above, Johana R.
Ayers; Ronald T. Bell, Jr.; Lily J. Chin; Brendan S. Culley; Ian A.
Ferguson; Kenneth E. Patton; and Eric E. Petersen made key contributions
to this report.

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