Weapons Of Mass Destruction: Defense Threat Reduction Agency	 
Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can  
Be Improved (13-FEB-04, GAO-04-330).				 
                                                                 
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department
of Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats	 
posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the September  
11, 2001, attacks, the visibility of DTRA's role has increased as
federal agencies and military commanders have looked to the	 
agency for additional support and advice. GAO was asked to report
on DTRA's (1) mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill	 
this mission; (2) relationship with other government entities,	 
specifically the Department of Energy and the Department of	 
Homeland Security (DHS); and (3) process that it uses to	 
prioritize resources and assess progress toward organizational	 
goals.								 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-330 					        
    ACCNO:   A09238						        
  TITLE:     Weapons Of Mass Destruction: Defense Threat Reduction    
Agency Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but Performance	 
Reporting Can Be Improved					 
     DATE:   02/13/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Weapons						 
	     Chemical warfare					 
	     Biological warfare 				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     National preparedness				 
	     National defense operations			 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Russia						 

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GAO-04-330

United States General Accounting Office

GAO	Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities,

                    Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

February 2004

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

     Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but
                     Performance Reporting Can Be Improved

                                       a

GAO-04-330

Highlights of GAO-04-330, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of
Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the
visibility of DTRA's role has increased as federal agencies and military
commanders have looked to the agency for additional support and advice.

GAO was asked to report on DTRA's (1) mission and the efforts it
undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) relationship with other government
entities, specifically the Department of Energy and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS); and (3) process that it uses to prioritize
resources and assess progress toward organizational goals.

GAO recommends that the Director of DTRA improve the agency's annual
performance report by comparing the agency's actual performance against
planned goals and, where appropriate, explain why goals were not met and
the agency's plan to address these unmet goals in the future.

DTRA agreed with the GAO recommendation that it improve its annual
performance report. DTRA stated that it is refining its performance report
methodology to better address the linkage of reported performance to
planned goals and future efforts.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-330.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202)
512-8979.

February 2004

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but
Performance Reporting Can Be Improved

Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat of
WMD. DTRA addresses WMD threats through four core functions: threat
control, threat reduction, combat support, and technology development. The
agency supports the implementation of arms control treaties by conducting
inspections in other countries and by supporting inspections of U.S.
facilities, reduces the threat of WMD by eliminating and securing weapons
and materials in the former Soviet Union, supports military commanders by
providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD, and develops
technologies that support efforts to address the WMD threat.

DTRA also uses its specialized capabilities and services in various ways
to support other government efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA has a
formal relationship with Energy to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. DTRA's relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS
relationship and may change as the relationship between DOD and DHS
evolves.

The agency uses a strategic planning process modeled on the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to prioritize its resources and
assess progress toward its organizational goals. DTRA's planning process
identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives by which to
measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to assess progress.
DTRA's planning process is influenced by funding, most of which is
appropriated for specific programs. GAO found that the performance report
resulting from its internal review summarized DTRA's accomplishments and
activities but did not compare them with established goals and objectives
nor explain the actions needed to achieve or modify these unmet goals as
called for under GPRA.

DTRA's Four Core Functions to Address WMD Threats

Sources: GAO and DTRA.

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
DTRA's Mission Is to Address All Aspects of the WMD Threat
DTRA Works with Other Government Agencies
DTRA's Planning Process Establishes Priorities and Summarizes

Progress, but Achievements Are Not Reported against Goals Conclusions
Recommendations Agency Comments and Our Evaluation Scope and Methodology

                                                                   1 2 3 8 15

18 24 24 24 24

  Appendix

         Appendix I: Comments from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
  Related                  
    GAO                 29 
  Products                 
           GAO Products    
           Covering the 29 
           CTR Program     
             Table 1:      
              DTRA's       
            Budget and     
Tables   Personnel    4 
                                     Figure 1:      Figure 3:      Figure     
             Table 2:                  DTRA            DTRA          4:    
           DTRA Role in              Locations      Activities     DTRA's  
               Nine     10 Figures   Figure 2:         That    9  Funding  21
           Treaties and            Establishment     Address      Profile, 
            Agreements              of DTRA and     the Threat     Fiscal  
                                    Significant  5    of WMD        Year   
                                      Changes    6                  2004   
           Figure 5:       
           GPRA            
           Performance     
           Reporting       
           Requirements    
           Compared        
           with DTRA's     
               2002     23 
           Performance     
              Report       

Contents

Abbreviations

ASCO Advanced Systems Concepts Office
CBDP Chemical and Biological Defense Program
CMAT Consequence Management Advisory Team
CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
NWC Nuclear Weapons Council
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

A

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548

February 13, 2004

The Honorable Pat Roberts

Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Committee on
Armed Services United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of
Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). With a fiscal year 2004 budget request of more
than $2.3 billion, the agency has a broad range of responsibilities,
including the support of combat commanders in defending against nuclear,
chemical, and biological threats on the battlefield and monitoring
international arms control treaties. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks
on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington,
D.C., and the anthrax attack in Washington, D.C., federal agencies and
military commanders have increasingly looked to DTRA for support and
advice.

Because of the increased visibility of this agency's role within DOD and
in relation to other federal agencies, particularly the Departments of
Energy and Homeland Security (DHS), you asked us to report on DTRA's (1)
mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2)
relationship with other government entities, specifically Energy and DHS;
and (3) process that it uses to prioritize resources and assess progress
toward organizational goals.

To meet these objectives, we reviewed DTRA's 2000, 2001, and 2003
strategic plans and interviewed its Director. We reviewed supporting
documentation, including budget documents, historical records, program and
project plans, and assessments. We also interviewed senior officials from
each of DTRA's core functions and other DTRA officials and contractors
associated with specific programs. We met with officials from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their assessments of DTRA and the
agency's relationships with other government entities. In addition, we
interviewed officials from Energy to discuss its interaction with DTRA,
including the management of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Results in Brief	Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to
address the threat of WMD. DTRA program documents show that its mission is
carried out through four core functions-(1) threat control, (2) threat
reduction, (3) combat support, and (4) technology development. First, the
agency works to control the threat of WMD by verifying other countries'
compliance with arms control treaties and by meeting U.S. obligations to
support inspections of U.S. facilities. For example, DTRA personnel
inspect Russian facilities to ensure compliance with treaties limiting WMD
delivery systems and provide support for Russian inspections of similar
U.S. facilities. Second, DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD by
eliminating and securing weapons and materials through the Cooperative
Threat Reduction program in the former Soviet Union. Third, DTRA works to
support military commanders by providing technical and analytical support
regarding WMD. For example, DTRA provides commanders with information on
the vulnerabilities of their forces and installations to a WMD attack.
Finally, the agency develops technologies that support efforts to address
the WMD threat. For example, the agency develops computer programs that
model the effects of WMD releases, specialized weapons for use against WMD
targets, and sensors to detect the presence of WMD materials.

DTRA's specialized capabilities and services are also used to support
civilian agencies' efforts to address WMD threats, particularly the
efforts of Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration, resulting from legislation
requiring DOD and Energy to share responsibility for maintaining the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile. The Nuclear Weapons Council, to which DTRA
provides staffing and expertise, manages this responsibility, which
includes the production, inventorying, and dismantlement of all nuclear
weapons. DTRA works with Energy on several other programs, including
securing nuclear materials in Russia. However, as we reported in March
2003, these efforts face several coordination issues.1 DTRA also works
with DHS on a variety of programs, such as the International
Counterproliferation Program. DTRA's relationship with DHS may change as
the relationship between DOD and DHS evolves. DTRA also works with and
supports other federal entities, state and local governments, and
governments with which

1U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional
Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security
at Russian Sites,

GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003).

the United States has bilateral agreements. For example, DTRA provides
training for emergency personnel responding to WMD incidents and assesses
the vulnerability of personnel and facilities to WMD threats.

DTRA uses a strategic planning process to prioritize resources and assess
progress toward its organizational goals; however, its performance report
does not document the extent to which the agency's accomplishments and
activities may or may not have met these goals. DTRA's strategic planning
process incorporates elements of the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993; the agency's process identifies long-term goals, establishes
short-term objectives by which to measure progress in meeting goals, and
collects data to assess progress. The resources prioritized through this
process consist of personnel and funds for the agency's use, funds for the
congressionally directed Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program administered by DTRA. Both the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense assess
DTRA's performance biennially, and their most recent reviews concluded
that, in general, DTRA supports the requirements of the operating military
forces by providing useful products and services. For example, the 2001
assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff commended DTRA's focus on
supporting military commanders. In 2002, DTRA completed an internal
self-assessment that resulted in the 2002 performance report. While DTRA
management quarterly tracks the agency's progress against its goals, the
2002 performance report summarizes the agency's accomplishments and
activities but does not compare these accomplishments and activities with
the established goals and objectives, nor does it explain why performance
goals may not have been met. For example, it discusses the number and
types of vulnerability assessments conducted in 2002 without discussing
how many were planned.

We are recommending that DTRA improve its annual performance report by
comparing its actual performance against planned goals and, where
appropriate, explain why goals were not met and how these unmet goals will
be addressed in the future.

Background	In the early 1990s, DOD officials recognized that the
proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials that could be
used to develop WMD was a growing threat. A series of terrorist attacks
highlighted by the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Tokyo's subway
system heightened concerns about U.S. vulnerability to a terrorist attack
involving WMD.

Senior DOD leaders, supported by a Defense Science Board study, concluded
that DOD was not properly organized to focus on nonproliferation and
counterproliferation.

On October 1, 1998, DTRA was established, with a budget of approximately
$1.7 billion and almost 2,000 military and civilian personnel, to address
all aspects of the WMD threat. The agency reports to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy providing input into several of DTRA's
programs. Additionally, DTRA responds to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff pertaining to the agency's support of military commanders. Table
1 provides data on DTRA's budget and personnel since the agency's
inception. DTRA's budget has increased by over $650 million (about 40
percent) since its establishment, of which over $450 million was due to
increases in the funding of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program
(CBDP). Total personnel at DTRA also have increased.

                      Table 1: DTRA's Budget and Personnel

                              Dollars in millions

                                  Fiscal Year

Budget and personnel     1999   2000     2001     2002     2003   
           DTRA         $1,044.7 $1,122.5 $1,175.4 $1,291.2 $1,359.2 $1,253.9 
           CBDP            642.0  762.5    874.6   1,118.2  1,070.7   1,104.7 
       Total budget     $1,686.7 $1,885.0 $2,050.0 $2,409.4 $2,429.9 $2,358.6 
    Civilian personnel       881      917      957      972      875    1,022 
    Military personnel       941      970      872      866      771 
     Total personnel       1,822  1,887    1,829    1,838    1,646      1,910 

Source: DTRA.

Note: Fiscal years 1999 to 2003 data are actual figures, and fiscal year
2004 data are based on personnel authorizations and program budget
decisions.

DTRA is currently headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; maintains test
facilities in the United States; maintains a Defense Nuclear Weapons
School in New Mexico; and maintains permanent staff at other locations,
including Germany, Japan, and the Russian Federation, as seen in figure 1.
DTRA also maintains liaison officers at several locations, including the
combatant commanders' headquarters, the National Guard Bureau, and the
Pentagon.

with all treaty requirements. Throughout the 1990s, the agency's
responsibilities were expanded as new treaties were ratified, and, in
2000, the agency was asked to support the United Nation's mission to
monitor and eliminate WMD in Iraq.2

            Figure 2: Establishment of DTRA and Significant Changes

Source: GAO.

2In the early 1990s, the On-Site Inspection Agency was asked to support
the earlier United Nation's efforts in Iraq.

The two additional programs included in DTRA's formation dealt extensively
with the threats posed by WMD and related materials. The Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) program implemented a congressionally mandated
program to assist the nations of the former Soviet Union in securing and
eliminating their WMD stockpiles. We have undertaken several reviews of
the DTRA-managed CTR program. A list of our reports concerning the CTR
program appears at the end of this report. In addition, CBDP was
established in 1994 to consolidate, coordinate, and integrate the chemical
and biological defense requirements of all the services into a single DOD
program. DTRA was given the responsibility to administer the distribution
of program funds, but the agency did not directly manage the program.

To integrate these components, DTRA began a strategic planning process in
January 1999 and published its first strategic plan in March 2000. DTRA
used the principles of the Government Performance and Result Act of 1993
(GPRA) to guide its planning process. The act calls for agencies to
develop long-term strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual
assessment reports. Also in 2000, DTRA realigned itself around four core
functions (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) combat support
(support to military forces), and (4) technology development. Among these
core functions, DTRA officials have stressed combat support as its first
priority.

Three major changes have occurred in the agency's responsibilities, as
illustrated in figure 2. First, in August 2001, responsibility for the
export license review process shifted from DTRA to the reestablished
Defense Technology Security Administration. According to senior officials,
the export license review process did not integrate well with other DTRA
functions and was more appropriately placed under the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. Second, in March 2003, DTRA was assigned the mission
to support the elimination of WMD materials found in Iraq. Third, in April
2003, DTRA was given the responsibility for managing the CBDP's science
and technology program rather than just overseeing the funds disbursement.

  DTRA's Mission Is to Address All Aspects of the WMD Threat

DTRA carries out its mission to address the threat posed by WMD through
four core functions: (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) combat
support, and (4) technology development.3 First, the agency controls the
threat of WMD through inspections of Russian facilities to ensure
compliance with treaties limiting WMD, as well as supporting inspections
of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors. Second, DTRA works to reduce the
WMD threat by securing and eliminating WMD materials, such as destroying
aircraft and missiles, through the CTR program in the former Soviet Union.
Third, DTRA supports military commanders by providing technical and
analytical support regarding WMD threats on the battlefield and U.S.
installations. Finally, DTRA develops technologies to assist in its threat
control and reduction efforts and in the support of military operations,
such as developing weapons and sensor technologies to destroy or detect
WMD and related materials. Figure 3 provides examples of DTRA activities
in each of these areas.

3WMD, once defined by DOD as nuclear, biological and chemical, now
includes radiological and high explosives as well.

            Figure 3: DTRA Activities That Address the Threat of WMD

                             Sources: GAO and DTRA.

    Threat Control Focuses on Inspection and Treaty Activities

DTRA implements U.S. responsibilities established under four arms control
treaties dealing with WMD and other treaties and agreements. DTRA conducts
on-site inspections at other nations' WMD facilities and supports on-site
inspections of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors. These inspections
are carried out in accordance with agreements between the U.S. and other
governments. The agency provides inspectors, transportation, and linguists
in support of inspection efforts, and also provides visa and passport
support for visiting inspection teams. Table 2 shows nine treaties and
agreements and DTRA's role in each.

               Table 2: DTRA Role in Nine Treaties and Agreements

Treaty/Agreement Objective of treaty/agreement DTRA role

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 	Mandates substantial reductions in the
number of Conducts U.S. inspections of signatory facilities to U.S. and
former Soviet Union strategic ballistic ensure compliance; monitors
missile production missiles, heavy bombers, submarines, and the facility
operations in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, nuclear warheads attributed to
those delivery and Belarus; and provides escorts to teams systems.
inspecting U.S. facilities.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Requires the U.S. and former Soviet Union to
Provides inspectors to observe and measure all

Forces Treaty 	eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise vehicles
exiting the Votkinsk missile manufacturing missiles with ranges between
500 and 5,500 plant and supports Russian inspections of U.S. kilometers,
their support structure, and facilities. equipment.

Chemical Weapons Convention	Prohibits the development, production,
Provides escorts for international teams inspecting acquisition,
stockpiling, transfer, or use of U.S. facilities, including DOD and
commercial chemical weapons; obligates parties to destroy industry sites.
their chemical weapons and production facilities.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty 	Prohibits nuclear tests having a yield
exceeding Provides monitors for Russian tests and escorts 150 kilotons
(equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). for Russian teams monitoring U.S.
tests.

Plutonium Production Reactor Mandates the monitoring of the shutdown of
U.S. Conducts on-site monitoring of Russian shutdown Agreement and Russian
production reactors and Russia's reactors in Seversk, Ozersk, and
Zheleznogorsk

reprocessed plutonium oxide.	and plutonium oxide facilities at Seversk and
Zheleznogorsk and provides escorts to Russian teams monitoring shutdown of
U.S. reactors.

Conventional Armed Forces in Limits five types of conventional weapons:
tanks, Conducts on-site inspections and provides escorts Europe Treaty
armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack for inspections of U.S.
facilities.

helicopters, and combat aircraft.

Vienna Document 1999 of the Limits the number of military exercises
permitted Provides personnel for inspections and evaluations Negotiations
on Confidence and by signatories and requires signatories to give of other
signatories and provides escorts and Security Building Measures prior
notice of large-scale military activities. liaison officers for
inspections and evaluations of

U.S. facilities.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Treaty/Agreement Objective of treaty/agreement DTRA role

General Framework Agreement Outlines peace agreement that implements a
Represents the United States on international for Peace in Bosnia and
series of verification measures similar to those inspection teams that
inspect facilities of the Herzegovina (Dayton Accords) under the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signatories.

Treaty and the Vienna Documents and imposes

limits on various types of offensive arms.

Open Skies Treaty	Promotes openness and transparency in military Provides
inspectors and flight monitors during activities through reciprocal,
unarmed observation mission and training activities, conducts preflight
flights. inspections of U.S. and foreign observation aircraft

sensor equipment, and operates imaging sensors during U.S. observation
flights.

                             Sources: GAO and DTRA.

    Threat Reduction Has Focused on the WMD Threat in the Former Soviet Union

DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD primarily through its activities
with the CTR program, which assists the states of the former Soviet Union
to (1) destroy WMD in the former Soviet Union, (2) safely store and
transport weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) reduce the
risk of the WMD proliferation. Our previous reviews of the CTR program
have found that it has faced two critical challenges: the Russian
government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs, and
Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key nuclear
and biological sites (see the list of prior GAO reports at the end of this
report). In addition to the CTR program, DTRA was recently tasked to
secure and destroy any WMD or related materials that might be found in
Iraq.

The CTR program has removed nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and
Belarus inherited from the former Soviet Union, and the United States
continues to work with Russia and other former Soviet states in WMD
elimination programs. According to agency documents, the CTR program had,
as of October 31, 2003, overseen the destruction of 520 of 1,473
intercontinental ballistic missiles, 451 of 831 missile silos, 122 of 205
strategic bombers, and 27 of 48 strategic missile submarines that the
United States and former Soviet Union agreed to destroy. WMD destruction
programs continue with CTR overseeing projects to eliminate missile fuel
and launcher equipment. DTRA personnel have also supervised the securing
of chemical weapons and are overseeing the construction of a chemical
weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, Russia.

DTRA also assists with the storing and transporting of WMD materials as
part of the CTR program. For example, DTRA is overseeing the

construction of a facility that will be used to securely store nuclear
materials from weapons at Mayak, Russia. This project, however, has
suffered from both a lack of committed Russian funding and access to the
site. As a result, the project, once scheduled to begin accepting nuclear
materials for storage in 1998, will not begin to do so until 2004.
Additionally, DTRA works through the CTR program to enhance the security
and safety of biological pathogens located at research centers in the
former Soviet Union, such as at Novosibirsk and Obolensk. However, lack of
Russian cooperation has affected DTRA's ability to access other suspected
biological facilities, and, after 4 years of effort, DOD has made little
progress in addressing security concerns at the 49 biological sites where
Russia and the United States have collaborative programs.

DTRA works to prevent the spread of WMD through continuing contacts with
former Soviet Union military personnel and providing expertise and
equipment to the countries of the former Soviet Union to enhance border
security. According to agency documents, in fiscal year 2002, the CTR
program sponsored 423 contacts with former Soviet Union military personnel
in support of various efforts to halt the spread of WMD.

In March 2003, DTRA was also assigned the responsibility of destroying any
WMD materials found in Iraq. Agency personnel accompanied combat forces
into Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, DTRA teams were
involved in searching the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center to recover,
inventory, and safeguard several tons of non-weapons-grade uranium and
other radiological materials. DTRA personnel remain in Iraq and continue
to support efforts to search for WMD and WMD-related materials. If WMD are
found, DTRA personnel would have the responsibility for securing and
eliminating them.

    DTRA Supports U.S. Military Forces in Addressing WMD Threats

DTRA provides a wide variety of support to military commanders in their
efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA provides liaison officers to assist
military commanders in their planning and conduct of military operations.
For example, DTRA personnel assisted military commanders during the recent
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq by providing information on the
appropriate weapons to use on suspected WMD storage sites, how to counter
the effects of WMD that might be used on coalition forces, and how to
secure and dispose of any WMD or WMD-related materials that might be
found. DTRA also developed a handbook used by troops in Iraq for how to
recognize and handle WMD and WMD-related materials. In addition, these
efforts are supported by DTRA's operations center, which responds to

WMD-related requests for expertise, computer modeling of potential events,
and support for training exercises.

DTRA teams evaluate the security of personnel and facilities worldwide and
assess the survivability of specific infrastructure crucial to maintaining
command and control of U.S. forces. According to agency documents, DTRA
evaluates 80 to 100 DOD installations per year through Joint Staff
Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, which are broad in scope and focus
on the overall safety and security of personnel. For example, agency teams
assess physical security plans, review architectural and structural
drawings, and perform analyses of potential blast effects to recommend
procedural, structural, or other enhancements to reduce vulnerabilities.
These assessments were instituted in the aftermath of (1) the Khobar
Towers bombing in 19964 and (2) the publication of a subsequent DOD report
in 1997 that determined there were no published standards for securing
personnel and facilities. In addition, DTRA conducts Balanced
Survivability Assessments to evaluate specific U.S. and allied
infrastructure crucial in maintaining command and control of all U.S.
forces. These assessments evaluate the ability of power, heating,
computer, and communications systems to continue functioning in the event
of a WMD attack, accident or natural disaster, technological failure, or
sabotage. According to agency officials, DTRA teams conduct an average of
8 Balanced Survivability Assessments per year, but that number rose
temporarily to 30 to meet additional requirements.

DTRA provides additional support to military commanders through the
Defense Nuclear Weapons School and Consequence Management Advisory Teams
(CMAT). DTRA operates the Defense Nuclear Weapons School in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, to train military and civilian personnel in various aspects of
WMD. The school originally focused on training military personnel in the
aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons and their effects. The school now includes
other areas of the WMD threat, such as addressing the civil and military
responses to radiological, chemical, and biological attacks or accidents
and preventing the spread of WMD. Additionally, DTRA maintains and deploys
teams to deal with the effects of WMD use. The agency has CMATs whose
purpose is to mitigate the effects of WMD use or accidents. CMATs also
work with military and civilian authorities by

4In June 1996, 19 U.S. Air Force personnel were killed when terrorists
detonated a truck bomb near a fence in the American military section of
Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia, damaging the Khobar Towers housing
facilities.

conducting training exercises that simulate the effects of WMD use or
accidents in the United States and overseas.

    DTRA Works to Develop Technologies to Address the WMD Threat

To assist in WMD threat control activities, DTRA has developed
technologies that detect WMD. For example, the agency has been developing
sensors to help countries of the former Soviet Union prevent smuggling of
WMD or WMD-related materials across borders. DTRA has also developed
computer-tracking systems to help member countries comply with the
reporting obligations stated in treaties and other agreements. The agency
also works to develop ways to protect military equipment and personnel
from WMD effects and manages and operates various technology testing
facilities, such as facilities that simulate the effects of
electromagnetic energy or radiation on military equipment in the event a
nuclear weapon is detonated. Additionally, DTRA has also developed
software to model nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks or accidents.

DTRA does not have its own laboratories. Rather, the agency uses existing
institutions, such as the service laboratories (Departments of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force), and national laboratories as well as academic
institutions. For example, in response to the military requirement for a
specialized weapon to bomb caves and tunnels in Afghanistan, DTRA
organized a team that employed products and expertise from the Navy, Air
Force, Energy, and industry, which allowed DTRA to develop, test, and
deploy a weapon that could be used to attack cave and tunnel targets. DTRA
has also worked to develop specialized incendiary devices that would
destroy WMD material held in a storage facility.

To support DTRA's efforts to address the WMD threat, the agency's Advanced
Systems Concepts Office (ASCO) works to address ways to identify,
anticipate, and address technology gaps to improve agency capabilities.
For example, ASCO personnel with scientific expertise work to analyze the
potential threat to military forces of pathogens such as bubonic plague,
E. coli, and Ebola. DTRA also has overseen a project to test the ability
of military facilities to protect against and recover from the
consequences of chemical and biological attacks. From 2001 to 2003, DTRA
and other military personnel undertook a series of exercises, technology
demonstrations, and assessments at the U.S. Air Force base at Osan, Korea,
to determine different ways to defend military forces and facilities
against chemical and biological attacks.

  DTRA Works with Other Government Agencies

As the DOD agency responsible for addressing all aspects of WMD threats,
DTRA possesses specialized capabilities and services that can assist
civilian entities, including Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal
relationship with Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
that coordinates and supports legislatively mandated joint DOD-Energy
responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA also works
with NNSA to secure nuclear materials in Russia. DTRA works with DHS
offices on programs related to WMD issues, such as the International
Counterproliferation Program and crisis response exercises. DTRA's
interface with DHS is through DOD's newly established Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. DTRA's relationship
with DHS may be subject to change as the broader DOD-DHS relationship
evolves. In addition to its relations with NNSA and DHS, DTRA also works
with and supports other federal agencies, state and local governments, and
governments with which the United States has bilateral agreements.

    DTRA Works on Many Programs with the Department of Energy

DTRA works closely with Energy's NNSA5 in matters pertaining to the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile. This relationship has its roots in the 1946
Atomic Energy Act,6 which establishes joint DOD and NNSA responsibility
for the U.S. nuclear weapons program, including ensuring the safety,
security, and control of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. These
activities are conducted through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), the
senior-level body dedicated to these activities. DTRA plays an active role
in all activities of the NWC, from participating as an observer on the NWC
to membership on its subordinate bodies. In addition, both DTRA and NNSA
are responsible for providing the working staff for the NWC. DTRA also
works with NNSA on various nuclear weapons issues associated with the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program, such as nuclear

5In 2001, NNSA was established as a semiautonomous agency within Energy
that is responsible for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and associated
nonproliferation activities. NNSA includes all atomic energy defense
activities, specifically those parts of Energy formerly known as Defense
Programs, Nonproliferation and National Security, Fissile Materials
Disposition, and Naval Reactors, as well as the national weapons
laboratories and other plants and facilities that constitute the nuclear
weapons complex.

6Responsibility for the management of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile
was originally established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

surviviability, nuclear surety,7 and nuclear weapons effects. According to
both DTRA and NNSA officials, coordination between DTRA and NNSA on
activities related to these issues takes place at various levels, such as
serving on committees and working groups, cooperating on research, and
participating on various ad hoc working groups. For example, DTRA and NNSA
are currently engaged in a joint study to understand nuclear weapons
effects and develop simulation techniques to address survivability of U.S.
weapons systems in nuclear environments.

DTRA also works with Energy to implement various agreements, research
projects, and training and exercises. According to DOD documents, DTRA
works with Energy on a variety of agreements related to nuclear weapons,
including the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, the Plutonium
Disposition Agreement, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.8 In addition,
DTRA works with Energy laboratories on joint research projects, working
groups, and field tests. For example, DTRA is currently working with the
laboratories on the development of DOD's unconventional nuclear warfare
defense program, which is developing tools for detecting an
unconventionally delivered nuclear or radiological weapon. DTRA and Energy
work on programs to secure nuclear warheads in Russia, but, as we reported
in March 2003, these efforts face several coordination issues, such as
deciding which agency will secure sites identified in both of their plans
and coordinating the type of equipment used and guard force training.9

    DTRA's Relationship with DHS Is Dependent on the Broader DOD-DHS
    Relationship

DTRA worked and continues to work with several government entities that
are now part of DHS. For example, DTRA works with the U.S. Customs Service
on the congressionally mandated International Counterproliferation
Program, which is designed to prevent the illicit movement of WMD
material, technology, and expertise. As the executive agent, DTRA
implements this program in cooperation with the U.S. Customs Service and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. DTRA works

7DOD defines "surety" as material, personnel, and procedures that
contribute to the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons.

8The Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement and the Plutonium Disposition
Agreement are agreements between the United States and Russia that are
designed to prevent the accumulation of excessive stocks of plutonium by
both eliminating the reactors that produce plutonium and reducing existing
stocks of plutonium.

9GAO-03-482.

with these two agencies to develop courses and training exercises that
provide training and equipment to customs, border guards, and law
enforcement personnel in 25 countries of the former Soviet Union, the
Baltic region, and Eastern Europe.

DTRA also works with DHS on joint exercises and interagency working
groups. For example, DTRA, DHS, and Energy recently sponsored and
participated in a joint atmospheric dispersion study in Oklahoma City.
According to documentation, the study conducted a series of experiments to
evaluate current outdoor atmospheric dispersion models and to advance the
knowledge of the dispersion of contaminants in urban environments and
building interiors. In addition, DTRA participates with DHS entities in
interagency working groups that address issues of homeland security and
preparedness.

According to DTRA officials, the agency is working to share information
and experiences with DHS for homeland security applications. For example,
DTRA has shared with DHS information regarding its experience on
demonstrations conducted as part of the unconventional nuclear warfare
defense program. In addition, DTRA has also shared with DHS the WMD crisis
decision guides that it developed for DOD. These guides provide response
plans for various WMD scenarios. According to DTRA officials, DHS used the
response plans for WMD scenarios that are outlined in these crisis
decision guides to develop its own WMD response plans.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was recently established as
the focal point for DOD's interaction with DHS and the interagency
community for homeland security issues. This newly established office is
responsible for ensuring internal coordination of DOD policy direction and
for coordinating activities with DHS. Therefore, the coordination of all
new activities, programs, and assistance related to the threat of WMD that
involve DTRA and DHS is the responsibility of this office. DTRA's
relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS relationship and
therefore may change. The new relationship between DOD and DHS itself is
still evolving because the roles and responsibilities of the two
departments are still under development.

DTRA's Expertise Is Shared DTRA has provided various capabilities and
services, such as vulnerability

with Civilian Entities	assessments and first-responder training programs
to civilian government entities. DTRA's capabilities for conducting
vulnerability assessments are

used to perform vulnerability assessments of civilian facilities and
personnel. After the events of September 11, 2001, DTRA was called upon to
complete vulnerability assessments of several federal buildings, such as
the U.S. Capitol Building and U.S. Supreme Court, as well as vulnerability
assessments of commercial U.S. ports. DTRA shares its capabilities and
expertise by providing training programs to civilian entities. For
example, the agency provides training to the National Guard for performing
vulnerability assessment of infrastructure. DTRA also provides WMD and
first-responder awareness training to state and local government entities.

In addition, DTRA provides informational support-ranging from modeling to
subject matter expertise-to civilian government entities and bilateral
partners through the services of its operations center. For example, the
operations center modeled the potential spread of contamination resulting
from a chemical spill of a derailed train by using the agency's software
for chemical weapon attack models. Finally, DTRA's expertise is also
shared with governments with which the United States has bilateral
agreements. For example, according to senior DTRA officials, the WMD
handbooks developed by DTRA were provided to allied forces supporting U.S.
efforts in Iraq, and DTRA has conducted vulnerability assessments for
allies. Finally, DTRA is also involved in interagency programs that
address issues related to WMD threats. For example, DTRA supports the
integration of the DOD Technical Support Working Group that conducts a
national interagency response and development program for combating
terrorism. Participants in this program include DOD, Energy, State, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration.

  DTRA's Planning Process Establishes Priorities and Summarizes Progress, but
  Achievements Are Not Reported against Goals

DTRA uses a strategic planning process, guided by the principles of GPRA,
to prioritize its resources and assess its progress. It has developed
strategic plans identifying long-term goals and short-term objectives by
which it measures progress in meeting its goals. These objectives are
affected by funding that comes from several appropriations, some of which
must be spent on specific activities, such as the funding for the CTR
program. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense assess DTRA every 2 years. In 2002, DTRA completed its first
internal self-assessment, which it intends to do annually. We found that
the performance report resulting from the self-assessment summarized the
agency's accomplishments and activities but did not assess its progress
against established annual performance goals.

    Strategic Planning Process Establishes Agency's Priorities

DTRA has incorporated GPRA principles in its planning process. Under GPRA,
agencies should prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the general
direction for their efforts. These plans should include comprehensive
mission statements, general and outcome-related goals, descriptions of how
those goals will be achieved, identification of external factors that
could affect progress, and a description of how performance will be
evaluated. Agencies should then prepare annual performance plans that
establish connections between the long-term goals in the strategic plans
with the day-to-day activities of program managers and staff. These plans
should include measurable goals and objectives to be achieved by a program
activity, descriptions of the resources needed to meet these goals, and a
description of the methods used to verify and validate measured values.
Finally, GPRA requires that the agency report annually on the extent to
which it is meeting its goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify
those goals that were not met.

DTRA's current strategic plan, issued in 2003, contains most of the
elements in a strategic plan developed using GPRA standards. This plan
lays out the agency's five goals, which serve as the basis of its
individual units' annual performance plans: (1) deter the use and reduce
the impact of WMD, (2) reduce the present threat, (3) prepare for future
threats, (4) conduct the right programs in the best manner, and (5)
develop people and enable them to succeed. These long-term goals are
further broken down into four or five objectives, each with 6 to 17
measurable tasks under each objective. These tasks have projected
completion dates and identify the DTRA unit responsible for the specific
task. For example, under the goal "deter the use and reduce the impact of
WMD" is the objective "support the nuclear force." A measurable task under
this objective is to work with Energy to develop support plans for
potential resumption of underground nuclear weapons effects testing. The
technology development unit in DTRA is expected to complete this task by
the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2004. The strategic plan does not discuss
external factors that could affect goal achievement, but it does have a
discussion of how performance will be measured externally, by other DOD
components, and internally through an annual performance report.

Each unit within DTRA develops its own annual performance plan that
identifies the activities to be completed each year with available
funding. These plans do not use the same format, but they all include
goals, performance measures by which to measure achievement of those
goals, and a link to the strategic plan to show how they support the
long-term goals of the agency. DTRA's leadership discusses each unit's
plan to

validate the prioritization of resources and establish the unit's
priorities. DTRA's annual performance plan consists of these units' plans
and detailed budget annexes. DOD guidance now requires DTRA to submit a
consolidated annual performance plan to the DOD comptroller to facilitate
DOD's GPRA reporting. DTRA is in the process of making the unit plans more
consistent for fiscal year 2004.

    DTRA's Planning Is Influenced by Its Funding

Most of DTRA's funding is appropriated only for specific programs over
which it has various levels of control. First, it administers the funding
for CBDP. Second, it receives money that Congress provides solely for the
CTR program that DTRA is in charge of managing with congressional
direction. Third, it receives funding that it can spend according to its
own priorities, while meeting certain mission requirements, such as treaty
implementation work. Fourth, it receives reimbursements from other federal
entities for some activities, such as vulnerability assessments conducted
for non-DOD agencies.10 Figure 4 shows the funding profile for DTRA in
fiscal year 2004.

10The specific reimbursement arrangements vary by activity and agency.

               Figure 4: DTRA's Funding Profile, Fiscal Year 2004

                       Source: GAO analysis of DTRA data.

Note: Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

As shown in figure 4, DTRA's administration of CBDP includes funds that it
uses, distributes, and manages. DTRA uses a portion of the CBDP funds for
large-scale technology demonstration projects, such as a project that
focused on restoring operations at bases attacked by chemical or
biological agents. The agency distributes a large portion of the CBDP
funds to others for various purposes, such as procuring chemical suits for
the military forces. Recently, in April 2003, DTRA was given the
responsibility for managing the CBDP's Science and Technology projects,
which are conducted by various laboratories and research institutes
throughout the country.

DTRA Undergoes External DTRA undergoes two DOD reviews-the Biennial
Defense Review and Internal Reviews, but commissioned by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Combat Reporting on Internal Support Agency
Review conducted for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. These reviews focus on how well DTRA meets its customers' Review
Could Be Improved requirements as a combat support agency. Overall, these
two reviews have

concluded that DTRA supports the requirements of the operating military
forces and provides useful products and services.

The most recent biennial review was issued December 2002. DTRA was
assessed on its combat support, technology development, and threat
reduction and control efforts. DTRA's efforts at threat reduction and
control received high satisfaction ratings from the customers surveyed.
The agency received acceptable satisfaction ratings in combat support but
had below average ratings in the area of technology development.

In 2001, the Combat Support Agency Review Team conducted an assessment of
DTRA's responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the
event of war or threat to national security. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is required by law to conduct assessments of all combat
support agencies every 2 years. The review team went to the commands
supported by DTRA and conducted extensive interviewing and fieldwork
regarding the support provided by DTRA. In the 2001 assessment, DTRA was
commended for significant improvements in customer orientation and combat
support focus. DTRA was found to be ready to support the requirements of
the operating forces. A major finding in the assessment concerned DTRA's
ongoing work on decontamination standards for airbases and strategic air
and sealift assets. The study acknowledged that DTRA was supporting the
development of these standards, but, as DOD's center of WMD expertise, it
needs to provide commanders with the best possible information currently
available, rather than wait until all studies have been completed. A
Combat Support Agency Review Team official stated that DTRA has addressed
the findings of the 2001 assessment, and that the 2003 assessment was
delayed by operations in Iraq but should be released in early 2004.

As part of the GPRA process, DTRA produced its first annual performance
assessment in 2002. GPRA requires that agencies report on the extent to
which they are meeting their annual performance goals and the actions
needed to achieve or modify the goals that have not been met. DTRA's
performance report did not compare the agency's achievements to its goals,
discuss the areas where DTRA fell short of its goals, or discuss DTRA's
plans to address goals that it did not achieve. For example, in the threat
control area, the agency discussed the number of missions conducted and
the equipment provided under the International Counterproliferation
Program without stating the program's goals. In the threat reduction area,
the report discussed the number of weapons systems eliminated in the
former Soviet Union and other achievements, such as

implementing security measures over chemical stockpiles at two sites,
again, without discussing the goals of the program. In the area of combat
support, the report discussed the number of vulnerability and
survivability assessments, training exercises of all types, and number of
training courses provided, but does not discuss how many of each were
planned. Finally, in the technology development area, the report discussed
several technologies developed or under development but does not discuss
the agency's plans for the year. See figure 5 for a comparison of what is
expected in an annual performance report and what DTRA's report contained.

Figure 5: GPRA Performance Reporting Requirements Compared with DTRA's
2002 Performance Report

                             Model      
            Performance                         
                 report     performance       DTRA's performance report
               measures          report 
                                        Threat   Threat   Combat  Technology  
                                        control reduction support development 
                Provide                                           
                 annual                                           
           achievements                                           
          Compare                                                 
          achievements                                            
          to goals                                                
          Explain goals                                           
                not met                                           
               Describe                                           
          plans to meet                                           
            unmet goals                                           
                                  Using 
                        information and 
                         comparisons to 
                                improve 
                            performance 

Data provided No data provided Source: GAO.

Although this information is not in DTRA's performance report, we found
that DTRA leadership meets quarterly to assess progress in meeting each
unit's goals and discuss activities that are not on track. Further, DTRA
leadership discusses what needs to be done to get on track and whether
goals are unrealistic or not within its control. For example, according to
agency officials, they have in the past transferred funding from CTR

programs that were having problems into successful CTR programs to prevent
those funds from being lost because congressionally provided funds must be
spent within a certain time frame.

Conclusions	When DTRA was established in 1998, it modeled its strategic
planning process on GPRA to prioritize resources and assess progress
toward its organizational goals. Although DTRA officials do measure
progress against these goals in quarterly reviews, the agency's
performance report does not capture the findings from these reviews. The
performance report does not compare accomplishments and activities with
established goals and objectives, nor does it explain what actions are
needed to achieve or modify goals that are not met. Providing this
information would allow decision makers outside of DTRA to have better
information regarding DTRA's performance.

Recommendations	We recommend that the Director of DTRA improve the
agency's annual performance report by comparing the agency's actual
performance against planned goals and, where appropriate, explaining why
the goals were not met and the agency's plan for addressing these unmet
goals in the future.

  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DTRA provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
reproduced in appendix I. In these comments, DTRA concurred with our
recommendation to improve DTRA's annual performance report by including a
comparison of the agency's actual performance against planned goals and,
where appropriate, explain why goals were not met, and the agency's plan
for addressing these unmet goals in the future. DTRA stated that it is
refining its performance report methodology to better address the linkage
of reported performance to planned goals and future efforts. DTRA also
separately provided technical comments that we discussed with relevant
officials and included in the text of the report where appropriate.

Scope and 	To report on DTRA's mission and the efforts it undertakes to
fulfill that mission, we reviewed agency documentation. Specifically, we
reviewed

Methodology	historical documents, including documentation of interviews of
the DOD senior officials responsible for the creation of DTRA, and other
agency mission documentation. We relied on our prior work that reviewed
specific

DTRA projects. In addition, we interviewed DTRA officials, including the
agency's Director, senior leadership from each of DTRA's units responsible
for the agency's mission, other DTRA staff, and DTRA contractor personnel.
Finally, we attended a 3-day DTRA liaison officer training class to learn
how DTRA trains its liaison officers about the variety of capabilities and
services it can offer to military forces in the field. We did not assess
the effectiveness of DTRA's programs.

To discuss DTRA's relationship with other government entities, we reviewed
the agency's documentation of programs and activities that it undertakes
with other government entities. We reviewed documents provided by DTRA and
NNSA staff regarding NWC responsibilities. In addition, we interviewed
DTRA, DOD, Energy, and NNSA officials about DTRA's coordination with
Energy and NNSA. We relied on documentation and discussions with DOD
officials regarding the nature of DTRA's relationship with DHS. We also
relied upon our previous audits reviewing DHS and DOD to ascertain the
nature of the relationship.

To determine how DTRA prioritizes its resources to meet its mission
objectives, we reviewed DTRA's 2000, 2001, and 2003 strategic plans. We
reviewed supporting documentation, including budget documents, program and
project plans, and internal and external assessments of DTRA.
Specifically, we compared DTRA's strategic plan, each unit's annual
performance plans for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and documentation on the
units' ongoing assessments of their activities with what we have reported
should be found in GPRA-based documents. We met with DTRA officials to
discuss the agency's planning and review process and with officials from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their assessments of
DTRA.

We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review from
April 2003 to December 2003 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency. We will also make copies available to others

upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Key contributors to this report were F. James
Shafer, Hynek Kalkus, Monica Brym, Tim Wilson, Etana Finkler, Lynn
Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, and Ernie Jackson.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph A. Christoff, Director International Affairs and Trade

Appendix I

Comments from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Appendix I
Comments from the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency

Related GAO Products

  GAO Products Covering the CTR Program

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-1008R.
Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-627R.
Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites.

GAO-03-482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and
Nonproliferation Programs in Russia. GAO-03-526T. Washington, D.C.: March
5, 2003.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-341R.
Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO02-426.
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance,
but Procedural Limitations Remain. GAO-01-694. Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2001.

Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits,
Poses New Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-138. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian
Scientists Taxed by Russia. GAO/NSIAD-00-154R. Washington, D.C.: April 28,
2000.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for
Assistance Were Late and Incomplete. GAO/NSIAD-00-40. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce the Threats from the
Former Soviet Union. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119. Washington, D.C.: March 6,
2000.

Related GAO Products

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost
More, Achieve Less Than Planned. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: April
13, 1999.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Review of DOD's June 1997 Report on
Assistance Provided. GAO/NSIAD-97-218. Washington, D.C.: September 5,
1997.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in the
Former Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-97-101. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 1997.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat
Assistance Has Improved. GAO/NSIAD-97-84. Washington, D.C.: February 27,
1997.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program. GAO/NSIAD-96-222. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 1996.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States
Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-96-118.
Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1996.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Material Controls in Newly Independent States. GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89.
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction
Assistance Can Be Improved. GAO/NSIAD-95-191. Washington, D.C.: September
29, 1995.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former Soviet
Union-An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1995.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former Soviet
Union. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994.

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics
Secure and Destroy Weapons. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-5. Washington, D.C.: March 9,
1993.

Related GAO Products

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S.
Dismantlement Assistance. GAO/NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
1993.

Russian Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Implementation of the Soviet Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act of 1991. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-47. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 1992.

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