Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure
Protection (28-MAY-04, GAO-04-321).
Computers are crucial to the operations of government and
business. Computers and networks essentially run the critical
infrastructures that are vital to our national defense, economic
security, and public health and safety. Unfortunately, many
computer systems and networks were not designed with security in
mind. As a result, the core of our critical infrastructure is
riddled with vulnerabilities that could enable an attacker to
disrupt operations or cause damage to these infrastructures.
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) involves activities that
enhance the security of our nation's cyber and physical
infrastructure. Defending against attacks on our information
technology infrastructure-- cybersecurity--is a major concern of
both the government and the private sector. Consistent with
guidance provided by the Senate's Fiscal Year 2003 Legislative
Branch Appropriations Report (S. Rpt. 107-209), GAO conducted
this technology assessment on the use of cybersecurity
technologies for CIP in response to a request from congressional
committees. This assessment addresses the following questions:
(1) What are the key cybersecurity requirements in each of the
CIP sectors? (2) What cybersecurity technologies can be applied
to CIP? (3) What are the implementation issues associated with
using cybersecurity technologies for CIP, including policy issues
such as privacy and information sharing?
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-321
ACCNO: A10215
TITLE: Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical
Infrastructure Protection
DATE: 05/28/2004
SUBJECT: Computer crimes
Computer networks
Computer security
Computer software
Counterterrorism
Crime prevention
Information technology
Strategic planning
Terrorism
Homeland security
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GAO-04-321
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
May 2004
TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT
Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection
GAO-04-321
Highlights of GAO-04-321, a report to congressional requesters
Computers are crucial to the operations of government and business.
Computers and networks essentially run the critical infrastructures that
are vital to our national defense, economic security, and public health
and safety. Unfortunately, many computer systems and networks were not
designed with security in mind. As a result, the core of our critical
infrastructure is riddled with vulnerabilities that could enable an
attacker to disrupt operations or cause damage to these infrastructures.
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) involves activities that enhance
the security of our nation's cyber and physical infrastructure. Defending
against attacks on our information technology infrastructure-
cybersecurity-is a major concern of both the government and the private
sector. Consistent with guidance provided by the Senate's Fiscal Year 2003
Legislative Branch Appropriations Report (S. Rpt. 107-209), GAO conducted
this technology assessment on the use of cybersecurity technologies for
CIP in response to a request from congressional committees. This
assessment addresses the following questions: (1) What are the key
cybersecurity requirements in each of the CIP sectors? (2) What
cybersecurity technologies can be applied to CIP? (3) What are the
implementation issues associated with using cybersecurity technologies for
CIP, including policy issues such as privacy and information sharing?
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-321.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Keith Rhodes at (202)
512-6412 or [email protected].
May 2004
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection
Many cybersecurity technologies that can be used to protect critical
infrastructures from cyber attack are currently available, while other
technologies are still being researched and developed. These technologies,
including access control technologies, system integrity technologies,
cryptography, audit and monitoring tools, and configuration management and
assurance technologies, can help to protect information that is being
processed, stored, and transmitted in the networked computer systems that
are prevalent in critical infrastructures.
Although many cybersecurity technologies are available, experts feel that
these technologies are not being purchased or implemented to the fullest
extent. An overall cybersecurity framework can assist in the selection of
technologies for CIP. Such a framework can include (1) determining the
business requirements for security; (2) performing risk assessments; (3)
establishing a security policy; (4) implementing a cybersecurity solution
that includes people, processes, and technologies to mitigate identified
security risks; and (5) continuously monitoring and managing security.
Even with such a framework, other demands often compete with
cybersecurity. For instance, investing in cybersecurity technologies often
needs to make business sense. It is also important to understand the
limitations of some cybersecurity technologies. Cybersecurity technologies
do not work in isolation; they must work within an overall security
process and be used by trained personnel. Despite the availability of
current cybersecurity technologies, there is a demonstrated need for new
technologies. Long-term efforts are needed, such as the development of
standards, research into cybersecurity vulnerabilities and technological
solutions, and the transition of research results into commercially
available products.
There are three broad categories of actions that the federal government
can undertake to increase the use of cybersecurity technologies. First, it
can take steps to help critical infrastructures determine their
cybersecurity needs, such as developing a national CIP plan, assisting
with risk assessments, and enhancing cybersecurity awareness. Second, the
federal government can take actions to protect its own systems, which
could lead others to emulate it or could lead to the development and
availability of more cybersecurity technology products. Third, it can
undertake long-term activities to increase the quality and availability of
cybersecurity technologies in the marketplace.
Ultimately, the responsibility for protecting critical infrastructures
falls on the critical infrastructure owners. However, the federal
government has several options at its disposal to manage and encourage the
increased use of cybersecurity technologies, research and develop new
cybersecurity technologies, and generally improve the cybersecurity
posture of critical infrastructure sectors.
Contents
Letter 1
Technology Assessment Overview 3
Background 5
Results in Brief 7
Chapter 1 Introduction 18
Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Has Evolved since the
Mid-1990's 19
Federal and Private Sector Computer Security Is Affected by
Various Laws 21
Report Overview 22
Chapter 2 Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical
Infrastructure Sectors 23
Threats, Vulnerabilities, Incidents, and the Consequences of
Potential Attacks Are Increasing 23
Critical Infrastructures Rely on Information Technology to Operate 37
Sectors Have Similar Cybersecurity Requirements but the Specifics
Vary 42
Chapter 3 Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards 44
Cybersecurity Technologies 44
Cybersecurity Standards 52
Chapter 4
Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
A Risk-Based Framework for Infrastructure Owners to Implement
Cybersecurity Technologies
Considerations for Implementing Current Cybersecurity
Technologies
Critical Infrastructure Sectors Have Taken Actions to Address
Threats to Their Sectors
Federal Government Actions to Improve Cybersecurity for CIP
58
59
76
86 95
Chapter 5 Summary 121
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 123
External Review Comments 124
Appendix I Technology Assessment Methodology 126
Appendix II Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Policies
Appendix III Cybersecurity Technologies 139
Overview of Network Systems 139
Access Controls 147
System Integrity 170
Cryptography 174
Audit and Monitoring 185
Configuration Management and Assurance 195
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland
Security
Appendix V Comments from the National Science Foundation 209
Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 211
GAO Contacts 211 Acknowledgments 211
Bibliography
Tables
Table 1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors Defined in Federal CIP
Policy 7 Table 2: Common Cybersecurity Technologies 8 Table 3:
Cybersecurity Research That Needs Continuing Attention 10 Table 4: Policy
Options and Examples of Current or Planned
Federal Activities to Improve Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 13
Table 5: Critical Infrastructure Sectors Identified by the Federal
Government 20 Table 6: Threats to Critical Infrastructure 24 Table 7:
Likely Sources of Cyber Attacks According to
Respondents to the CSI/FBI 2003 Computer Crime and
Security Survey 25 Table 8: Weapons for Physically Attacking Critical
Infrastructures 27 Table 9: Types of Cyber Attacks 29 Table 10: Common
Types of Current Cybersecurity Technologies 45 Table 11: Examples of
Cybersecurity Standards 54 Table 12: Estimated Costs of Recent Worm and
Virus Attacks 99 Table 13: Critical Infrastructure Sector-Specific
Agencies 101 Table 14: Typical Research Areas Identified in Research
Agendas 113 Table 15: Sampling of Current Research Topics 114 Table 16:
Sampling of Long-Term Research Areas 119 Table 17: Federal Government
Actions Taken to Develop CIP
Policy 129 Table 18: Critical Infrastructure Sectors Identified by the
National
Strategy for Homeland Security and HSPD-7 137 Table 19: Cybersecurity
Technology Control Categories and Types 147
Figures
Figure 1: Information Security Incidents, 1995-2003 33 Figure 2: Security
Vulnerabilities, 1995-2003 34 Figure 3: An Example of Typical Networked
Systems 39 Figure 4: An Overall Framework for Security 60 Figure 5: Five
Steps in the Risk Management Process 62 Figure 6: Protection, Detection,
and Reaction Are All Essential to
Cybersecurity 67 Figure 7: Technology, People, and Process Are All
Necessary for
Cybersecurity 79 Figure 8: An Example of Typical Networked Systems 140
Figure 9: TCP/IP Four-layer Network Model 143 Figure 10: A Typical
Firewall Protecting Hosts on a Private
Network from the Public Network 150 Figure 11: How a Web Filter Works 157
Figure 12: An Example of Fingerprint Recognition Technology
Built into a Keyboard 162 Figure 13: An Example of Fingerprint Recognition
Technology Built into a Mouse 162 Figure 14: A Desktop Iris Recognition
System 163
Figure 15: Example of a Time-Synchronized Token 166 Figure 16: Example of
a Challenge-Response Token 167 Figure 17: Encryption and Decryption with a
Symmetric Algorithm 175 Figure 18: Encryption and Decryption with a Public
Key Algorithm 176 Figure 19: Creating a Digital Signature 180 Figure 20:
Verifying a Digital Signature 181 Figure 21: Illustration of a Typical VPN
182 Figure 22: Tunneling Establishes a Virtual Connection 184 Figure 23:
Typical Operation of Security Event Correlation Tools 191 Figure 24:
Typical Network Management Architecture 199 Figure 25: Example of a
Vulnerability Scanner Screen 204
Abbreviations
ABA American Bankers Association
AMS Automated Manifest System
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
CERT/CC CERT Coordination Center
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIAO Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
CIDX Chemical Industry Data Exchange
CIP critical infrastructure protection
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPU central processing unit
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DoD Department of Defense
ES-ISAC Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIIC Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure
Committee FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation FIPS Federal
Information Processing Standards FISMA Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 FOIA Freedom of Information Act FS-ISAC Financial
Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center FSSCC Financial Services
Sector Coordinating Council FTP File Transfer Protocol GPS Global
Positioning System
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HSPD-7 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
I3P Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection
IP Internet Protocol
IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
IDS intrusion detection system
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IPS intrusion prevention system
ISAC information sharing and analysis center
ISP Internet service provider
IT information technology
LAN local area network
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NERC North American Electric Reliability Council
NFS Network File System
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NNTP Network News Transfer Protocol
NSA National Security Agency
NSF National Science Foundation
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy
PC personal computer
PDD 63 Presidential Decision Directive 63
PIN personal identification number
PKI public key infrastructure
POP Post Office Protocol
R&D research and development
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RAM random access memory
RFC Request for Comments
ROM read-only memory
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SDLC system development life cycle
SEMATECH Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSL secure sockets layer
ST-ISAC Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis
Center TACACS+ Terminal Access Controller Access System TCP Transmission
Control Protocol TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center UDP User Datagram Protocol
VPN virtual private network WAN wide area network
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
May 28, 2004
Congressional Requesters
Consistent with guidance provided by the Senate's Fiscal Year 2003
Legislative Branch Appropriations Report (Senate Report 107-209), you
asked us to conduct a technology assessment on the use of cybersecurity
technologies for critical infrastructure protection. This report discusses
several current cybersecurity technologies and possible implementations of
these technologies for the protection of critical infrastructure against
cyber attacks. Potential actions to increase the availability and use of
cybersecurity technologies are discussed. Key considerations for the
implementation of these actions by infrastructure owners and the federal
government are also discussed.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and interested
congressional committees. We will provide copies to others on request. In
addition, the report is available on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have questions concerning this report, please contact Keith Rhodes
at (202) 512-6412, Joel Willemssen at (202) 512-6408, or Naba Barkakati,
Senior Level Technologist, at (202) 512-4499. We can also be reached by
e-mail at [email protected], [email protected], and [email protected],
respectively. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Keith A. Rhodes Joel Willemssen
Chief Technologist Managing Director
Director, Center for Information Technology Technology and Engineering
List of Congressional Requesters
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Chairman
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate
The Honorable Adam H. Putnam
Chairman
Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
Technology Assessment Overview
Our nation's critical infrastructures include those assets, systems, and
functions vital to our national security, economic need, or national
public health and safety. Critical infrastructures encompass a number of
sectors, including many basic necessities of our daily lives, such as
food, water, public health, emergency services, energy, transportation,
information technology and telecommunications, banking and finance, and
postal services and shipping. All of these critical infrastructures
increasingly rely on computers and networks for their operations. Many of
the infrastructures' networks are also connected to the public Internet.
While the Internet has been beneficial to both public and private
organizations, the critical infrastructures' increasing reliance on
networked systems and the Internet has increased the risk of cyber attacks
that could harm our nation's infrastructures.
Cybersecurity refers to the defense against attacks on our information
technology infrastructure. Cybersecurity is a major concern of both the
government and the private sector.1 Technologies such as firewalls and
antivirus software can be deployed to help secure critical infrastructures
against cyber attacks in the near term, but additional research can lead
to more secure systems. While there are many challenges to improving
cybersecurity for critical infrastructures, there are potential actions
available to infrastructure owners and the federal government. Since 1997,
we have designated information security as a government-wide high-risk
issue. In January 2003, we expanded this high-risk issue to emphasize the
increased importance of protecting the information systems that support
critical infrastructures.2
This technology assessment focuses on the use of cybersecurity
technologies for critical infrastructure protection (CIP). Consistent with
guidance provided by the Senate's Fiscal Year 2003 Legislative Branch
Appropriations Report (Senate Report 107-209), we began this assessment in
response to a request from the chairman and ranking minority member
1It is important to note that physical security and cybersecurity are
intertwined and both are necessary to achieve overall security. Physical
security typically involves protecting any physical asset-from entire
buildings to computer hardware-from physical attacks, whereas
cybersecurity usually focuses on protecting software and data from attacks
that are electronic in nature and that typically arrive over a data
communication link.
2U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: Protecting Information
Systems Supporting the Federal Government and the Nation's Critical
Infrastructures, GAO-03-121 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003). This report
highlights our key prior findings and recommendations for federal
information security and critical infrastructure protection.
Technology Assessment Overview
of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; the ranking minority
member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation;
and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, House Committee on Government
Reform. The assessment addresses the following questions:
1. What are the key cybersecurity requirements in each of the critical
infrastructure protection sectors?
2. What cybersecurity technologies can be applied to critical
infrastructure protection? What technologies are currently deployed or
currently available but not yet widely deployed for critical
infrastructure protection? What technologies are currently being
researched for cybersecurity? Are there any gaps in cybersecurity
technology that should be better researched and developed to address
critical infrastructure protection?
3. What are the implementation issues associated with using cybersecurity
technologies for critical infrastructure protection, including policy
issues such as privacy and information sharing?
To answer these questions, we began by reviewing previous studies on
cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection, including those from
the National Research Council, the CERT(R) Coordination Center (CERT/CC),
the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P), the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and GAO. We used a
data collection instrument to interview representatives of several
critical infrastructure sectors, as identified in national strategy
documents. We met with officials from the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
directorate to discuss their efforts in organizing and coordinating
critical infrastructure protection activities. In addition, we met with
representatives of the National Science Foundation (NSF), NIST, the
National Security Agency (NSA), the Advanced Research and Development
Activity, the Infosec Research Council, and DHS's Science and Technology
directorate to discuss current and planned federal cybersecurity research
efforts. We also met with representatives from two Department of Energy
national laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, and from Software Engineering Institute's CERT/CC. We
interviewed cybersecurity researchers from academic institutions (Carnegie
Mellon University, Dartmouth College, and the University of California at
Berkeley) and corporate research centers (AT&T Research
Technology Assessment Overview
Laboratories, SRI International, and HP Laboratories). Based on our
initial analysis, we prepared a draft assessment outlining the
cybersecurity challenges in critical infrastructure protection and actions
that could be undertaken by key stakeholders. In October 2003, we convened
a meeting, with the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
to review the preliminary results of our work. Meeting attendees included
representatives from academia, critical infrastructure sectors, and public
policy organizations. We incorporated the feedback from the meeting
attendees into the draft report. We provided our draft assessment report
to DHS and NSF for their review. We also had the draft report reviewed by
selected attendees of the meeting that NAS convened for this work, as well
as by members of other interested organizations.
We conducted our work from May 2003 to February 2004 in the Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area; the San Francisco, California, metropolitan area;
Princeton, New Jersey; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. We performed our work
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Our report describes the cybersecurity requirements of critical
infrastructure sectors and their use of information technology. Currently
available cybersecurity technologies and standards are organized by
control categories. The report then covers cybersecurity implementation
issues. We provide some guidance for infrastructure owners on using a
risk-based framework to implement current cybersecurity technologies. We
also identify specific actions that the federal government could initiate
or continue, along with a policy analysis framework that could guide the
implementation of these actions. Finally, in appendixes, we provide a
summary of federal government's CIP policies and present technical details
of current cybersecurity technologies.
Since the early 1990s, increasing computer interconnectivity-most notably
growth in the use of the Internet-has revolutionized the way that our
government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct
business. While the benefits have been enormous, this widespread
interconnectivity also poses significant risks to the government's and our
nation's computer systems and, more important, to the critical operations
and infrastructures they support. The speed and accessibility that create
the enormous benefits of the computer age, if not properly controlled,
allow unauthorized individuals and organizations to inexpensively
eavesdrop on or interfere with these operations from remote locations, for
mischievous or malicious purposes including fraud or sabotage.
Background
Technology Assessment Overview
CIP involves activities that enhance the security of our nation's cyber
and physical public and private infrastructures that are critical to
national security, national economic security, or national public health
and safety. With about 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructures
owned and operated by the private sector, public-private partnership is
crucial for successful critical infrastructure protection.
Recent terrorist attacks and threats have further underscored the need to
manage and encourage CIP activities. Vulnerabilities are being identified
on a more frequent basis, which, if exploited by identified threats, could
disrupt or disable several of our nation's critical infrastructures.
Through a number of strategy and policy documents, including the recent
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the federal
government has identified several critical infrastructure sectors (see
table 1) and sector-specific agencies that are to work with the sectors to
coordinate CIP activities. The critical infrastructure owners are
ultimately responsible for addressing their own cybersecurity needs, but
several other stakeholders play critical roles in enhancing cybersecurity
for CIP. These include organizations representing sectors, such as sector
coordinators and information sharing and analysis centers (ISAC), the
federal government, and information technology (IT) vendors. Sector
coordinators are individuals or organizations that help and encourage the
entities within their sector to improve cybersecurity.
Technology Assessment Overview
Table 1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors Defined in Federal CIP Policy
Sector Description
Agriculture Includes supply chains for feed and crop production.
Banking and finance Consists of commercial banks, insurance companies,
mutual funds, governmentsponsored enterprises, pension funds, and other
financial institutions that carry out transactions, including clearing and
settlement.
Chemicals and hazardous materials Produces more than 70,000 products
essential to automobiles, pharmaceuticals, food supply, electronics, water
treatment, health, construction, and other necessities.
Defense industrial base Supplies the military with the means to protect
the nation by producing weapons, aircraft, and ships and providing
essential services, including information technology and supply and
maintenance.
Emergency services Includes fire, rescue, emergency medical services, and
law enforcement organizations.
Energy Includes electric power and the refining, storage, and distribution
of oil and natural gas.
Food Covers the infrastructures involved in post-harvest handling of the
food supply, including processing and retail sales.
Government Ensures national security and freedom and administers key
public functions.
Information technology and Provides information processing systems,
processes, and communications systems to telecommunications meet the needs
of businesses and government.
Postal and shipping Includes the U.S. Postal Service and other carriers
that deliver private and commercial letters, packages, and bulk assets.
Public health and healthcare Consists of health departments, clinics, and
hospitals.
Transportation Includes aviation, ships, rail, pipelines, highways,
trucks, buses, and mass transit that are vital to our economy, mobility,
and security.
Drinking water and water treatment Includes about 170,000 public water
systems that rely on reservoirs, dams, wells, systems treatment
facilities, pumping stations, and transmission lines.
Source: GAO analysis based on the President's national strategy documents and
HSPD-7.
Results in Brief
All critical infrastructure owners rely on computers in a networked
environment. Although all infrastructure sectors make use of similar
computer and networking technologies, specific cybersecurity requirements
in each sector depend on many factors, such as the sector's risk
assessments, priorities, applicable government regulations, market forces,
culture, and the state of its IT infrastructure. These factors, in
combination with financial and other factors like costs and benefits, can
affect an infrastructure entity's use of IT as well as its deployment of
cybersecurity technologies.
Cybersecurity There are a number of cybersecurity technologies that can be
used to
Technologies better protect critical infrastructures from cyber attacks,
including access control technologies, system integrity technologies,
cryptography, audit
Technology Assessment Overview
and monitoring tools, and configuration management and assurance
technologies. In each of these categories, many technologies are currently
available, while other technologies are still being researched and
developed. Table 2 summarizes some of the common cybersecurity
technologies, categorized by the type of security control they help to
implement.
Table 2: Common Cybersecurity Technologies
Category Technology What it does
Access control
Firewalls Controls access to and from a network
Boundary or computer.
protection
Monitors Web and messaging
applications for inappropriate
Content management content, including spam,
banned file types, and proprietary
information.
Uses human characteristics, such as
Authentication Biometrics fingerprints, irises, and voices to
establish the
identity of the user.
Establish identity of users through
Smart tokens an integrated circuit chip in a
portable device such
as a smart card or time synchronized
token.
Allow or prevent access to data and
Authorization systems and actions of users based on
User rights and the
privileges established policies of an
organization.
Provides protection against malicious
Antivirus software code, such as viruses, worms, and
System integrity Trojan
horses.
Monitor alterations to files on a
system that are considered critical
Integrity checkers to the
organization.
Uses public key cryptography to
Digital signatures provide (1) assurance that both the
Cryptography and sender and the
recipient of a message or transaction
certificates will be uniquely identified, (2)
assurance that
the data have not been accidentally
or deliberately altered, and (3)
verifiable proof of
the integrity and origin of the data.
Allow organizations or individuals in
two or more physical locations to
Virtual private establish
network connections over a shared or
networks public network, such as the Internet,
with
functionality that is similar to that
of a private network using
cryptography.
Audit and monitoring Intrusion detection systems
Detect inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity on a network or
computer system.
Intrusion prevention systems
Build on intrusion detection systems to detect attacks on a network and
take action to prevent them from being successful.
Security event Monitor and document actions on network devices and analyze
the actions to
correlation tools determine if an attack is ongoing or has occurred.
Enable an organization to determine if ongoing system activities are
operating according to its security policy.
Computer forensics Identify, preserve, extract, and document
computer-based evidence. tools
Technology Assessment Overview
Category Technology What it does
Enable system administrators to engage
in centralized monitoring and
Configuration Policy enforcement enforcement
management and Applications of an organization's security policies.
assurance
Network management Allow for the control and monitoring of networks,
including management of faults, configurations, performance, and security.
Continuity of Provide a complete backup infrastructure to maintain
availability in the event of an operations tools emergency or during
planned maintenance.
Scanners Analyze computers or networks for security vulnerabilities.
Patch management Acquires, tests, and applies multiple patches to one or
more computer systems.
Source: GAO analysis.
Critical infrastructure sectors use all of these types of cybersecurity
technologies to protect their systems. However, the level of use of
technologies varies across sectors and across entities within sectors.
Cybersecurity Research
Despite the availability of current cybersecurity technologies, there is a
demonstrated need for new technologies. Long-term efforts are needed, such
as the development of standards, research into cybersecurity
vulnerabilities and technological solutions for these problems, and the
transition of research results into commercially available products.
While several standards exist for cybersecurity technology in the areas of
protocol security, product-level security, and operational guidelines,
there is still a need to develop standards that could help guide the use
of cybersecurity technologies and processes. There are several research
areas being pursued by the federal government, academia, and the private
sector to develop new or better cybersecurity technologies. We have
identified some of the important cybersecurity research needs shown in
table 3.
Technology Assessment Overview
Table 3: Cybersecurity Research That Needs Continuing Attention
Research area Description
Composing secure systems from insecure components Building complex
heterogeneous systems that maintain security while recovering from
failures
Security for network embedded systems Detect, understand, and respond to
anomalies in large, distributed control networks that are prevalent in
electricity, oil and natural gas, and water sectors.
Security metrics and evaluation Metrics that express the costs, benefits,
and impacts of security controls from multiple perspectives-economic,
organizational, technical, and risk
Socioeconomic impact of security Legal, policy, and economic implications
of cybersecurity technologies and their possible uses, structure and
dynamics of the cybersecurity marketplace, role of standards and best
practices, implications of policies intended to direct responses to cyber
attacks.
Vulnerability identification and analysis Techniques and tools to analyze
code, devices, and systems in dynamic and large-scale environments
Wireless security Device- and protocol-level wireless security,
monitoring wireless networks, and responding to distributed
denial-of-service attacks in wireless networks
Source: GAO analysis.
In addition to the need for cybersecurity research that addresses existing
cybersecurity threats, there is a need for long-term research that
anticipates the dramatic growth in the use of computing and networks in
the coming years. Some of the possible long-term research areas include
tools for ensuring privacy, embedding fault-tolerance in systems,
selfmanaging and self-healing systems, and re-architecting the Internet.
Prior information technology developments have shown that more than 10
years are often required to develop basic research concepts into
commercially available products.
Cybersecurity Framework The use of an overall cybersecurity framework can
assist in the selection of technologies to protect critical infrastructure
against cyber attacks.
Technology Assessment Overview
An overall cybersecurity framework includes:
(1) determining the business requirements for security;
(2) performing risk assessments;
(3) establishing a security policy;
(4) implementing a cybersecurity solution that includes people, process,
and technology to mitigate identified security risks; and
(5) continuously monitoring and managing security.
Risk assessments, which are central to this framework, help organizations
to determine which assets are most at risk and to identify countermeasures
to mitigate those risks. Risk assessment is based on a consideration of
threats and vulnerabilities that could be exploited to inflict damage.
Even with such a framework, there often are competing demands for
cybersecurity investments. For example, for some companies or
infrastructures, mitigating physical risks may be more important than
mitigating cyber risks. Further, investing in cybersecurity technologies
needs to make business sense. For some critical infrastructure owners,
national security and law enforcement needs do not always outweigh the
business needs of the entity. Without legal requirements for
cybersecurity, security officers often need to justify cybersecurity
investments using either strategic or financial measures. Further,
critical infrastructures and their component entities are often dependent
on systems and business functions that are beyond their control, such as
other critical infrastructures and federal and third-party systems.
Several of the currently available cybersecurity technologies could, if
used properly, improve the cybersecurity posture of critical
infrastructures. It is important to bear in mind the limitations of some
cybersecurity technologies and to be aware that their capabilities should
not be overstated. Technologies do not work in isolation. Cybersecurity
solutions make use of people, process, and technology. Cybersecurity
technology must work within an overall security process and be used by
trained personnel. In our prior reviews of federal computer systems, we
found numerous instances of cybersecurity technology being poorly
implemented, which reduced the effectiveness of the technology to protect
Technology Assessment Overview
systems from attack. Best practices and guidelines are available from
organizations such as NIST to assist infrastructure owners in selecting
and implementing cybersecurity technologies. To increase the use of
currently available cybersecurity technologies, various efforts can be
undertaken. These efforts could include improving the cybersecurity
awareness of computer users and administrators, considering security when
developing systems, and enhancing information sharing mechanisms between
the federal government and critical infrastructure sectors, state and
local government, and the public.
Federal Government Actions to Improve Cybersecurity of Critical
Infrastructures
Because about 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is owned
by the private sector, the federal government cannot by itself protect the
critical infrastructures. There are three broad categories of actions that
the federal government can undertake to increase the usage of
cybersecurity technologies. First, the federal government can take steps
to help critical infrastructures determine their cybersecurity needs, and
hence their needs for cybersecurity technology. These actions include
developing a national CIP plan, assisting infrastructure sectors with risk
assessments, providing threat and vulnerability information to sector
entities, enhancing information sharing by critical infrastructures, and
promoting cybersecurity awareness. These activities can help
infrastructure entities determine their needs for cybersecurity
technology. This information can help the federal government to prioritize
its actions and to assess the need to take further action to encourage the
use of cybersecurity technology by critical infrastructure entities.
Because the security needs of critical infrastructure could differ from
the commercial enterprise needs of infrastructure entities, the federal
government could assess the needs for grants, tax incentives, regulations,
or other public policy tools to encourage nonfederal entities to acquire
and implement appropriate cybersecurity technologies.
Second, the federal government can take actions to protect its own
systems, including parts of the critical infrastructure. These actions
could lead others to emulate the federal government or could lead to the
development and availability of more cybersecurity technology products.
Third, the federal government can take long-term actions to increase the
quality and availability of cybersecurity technologies available in the
marketplace. Table 4 highlights many of the federal policy options and
some examples of the current or planned activities undertaken by the
federal government that implement these options.
Technology Assessment Overview
Table 4: Policy Options and Examples of Current or Planned Federal
Activities to Improve Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
Policy option Description Examples of federal activities
Develop a national CIP plan The plan could be used as a framework for
According to HSPD-7, by December 2004, federal CIP activities. The plan
should clearly DHS is to produce a comprehensive and define the roles and
responsibilities of federal and integrated plan for critical
infrastructure nonfederal CIP organizations, define objectives protection
that will outline national goals, milestones, set time frames for
achieving objectives, milestones, and key initiatives. objectives, and
establish performance measures.
Assist infrastructures with risk Provide funding to sectors and sector
entities to
assessments conduct risk assessments so that vulnerabilities, threats,
and mitigation strategies can be identified.
Provide threat and vulnerability Increase the private sector's awareness
of cyber information to critical infrastructures threats and the need for
cybersecurity The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has provided
funding to assist utilities for large drinking water systems in preparing
vulnerability assessments. The Department of Transportation has performed
a vulnerability assessment of the surface transportation sector and of the
sector's reliance on the Global Positioning System. HSPD-7 directs
sector-specific agencies to conduct or facilitate vulnerability
assessments in each sector.
DHS gathers and disseminates information on threats to critical
infrastructures and issues warning products in response to increases in
the threat condition.
technologies by improving the federal government's capabilities to
identify, analyze, and disseminate information about threats to and
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure sectors and their member
entities.
Enhance information sharing by critical infrastructures
Increase the federal government's and the private sector's awareness of
cyber threats and the effective implementation of technology by developing
fully productive information sharing relationships within the federal
government and between the federal government and state and local
governments and the private sector.
The Department of the Treasury has contracted with the Financial Services
ISAC to improve its capabilities so that it can better share information
about threats and response strategies. The InfraGard program provides the
Federal Bureau of Investigation with a means for sharing information
securely with individual members. EPA issued a $2 million grant to the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies to help support the on-going
efforts of the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center, a
state-of-the-art, secure information system that shares upto-date threat
and incident information between the intelligence community and the water
sector.
Promote cybersecurity Ensure that the private The Federal Deposit
awareness sector is aware of the Insurance
cybersecurity services that Corporation has
are provided by the sponsored conferences
federal government and the with the financial
critical infrastructure services sector to
make
sectors. sector members aware
of CIP-related
services provided by
the federal
government and the
private sector.
Technology Assessment Overview
Policy option Description Examples of federal activities
Promote the use of cybersecurity Provide tax incentives or funding to
sector entities HSPD-7 instructs sector-specific agencies
technologies and processes to purchase cybersecurity technology to better
to encourage risk management strategies protect, detect, or react to cyber
attacks. The to protect against and mitigate the effects government could
require the use of particular of attacks against critical infrastructures.
cybersecurity technologies or processes. This could also be accomplished
through regulations. This option requires the development of minimum
standards for cybersecurity technology.
Develop standards and guidelines Develop protocol and product standards
for cybersecurity technology and operational guidelines for the selection,
implementation, and management of cybersecurity technologies. In addition,
guidance could also be provided to critical infrastructure owners on how
to perform risk assessments.
In response to the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of
2002, NIST is leading the development of key information system security
standards and guidelines as part of its FISMA Implementation Project. NIST
and NSA are using the Common Criteria to develop comprehensive security
requirements and specifications for key technologies that will be used by
the federal government. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and
NSA have also prepared implementation guides to help system administrators
to configure their systems in a secure manner.
Secure federal government systems Implement appropriate management,
operational, FISMA requires federal agencies to and technical controls to
secure critical federal provide risk-based information security computer
systems from cyber attacks. Critical protections for their computer
systems. infrastructure owners rely on federal computer The National
Strategy to Secure systems to provide certain services. Cyberspace
identifies the need to secure
government's cyberspace as one of its five priorities.
Procure secure products and services Require sector entities to address
cybersecurity The National Strategy to Secure
for the federal government needs prior to interacting with government
Cyberspace states that the federal computer systems. Impose security
requirements government is identifying ways to improve in federal
procurements of information security in agency contracts and evaluating
technology. the overall procurement process as it relates to security.
Foster cooperation with foreign Because cyber attacks may not originate in
the The National Strategy to Secure
countries regarding cyber attacks United States and could cross several
geopolitical Cyberspace states that the United States boundaries, the
cooperation of foreign countries is will actively foster international
cooperation important to facilitate the tracing of cyber attacks in
investigating and prosecuting cyber and the apprehension of attackers.
crime. HSPD-7 assigns the State
Department this responsibility.
Develop cybersecurity education Teach the importance of cybersecurity and
how to The Department of Justice has a
programs use information technology securely. Increase the Cyberethics for
Kids program that teaches number of trained computer security students in
elementary and middle schools professionals. about the risks of some
online behavior and ways to protect themselves from such behavior. NSF
administers the Federal Cyber Service in universities to increase the
number of cybersecurity professionals.
Technology Assessment Overview
Policy option Description Examples of federal activities
Fund the research and development Provide funding to research and develop
new The Defense Advanced Research Projects
of cybersecurity technology technologies. Agency, DHS, NSF, NIST, and NSA
have ongoing efforts to research and develop new cybersecurity
technologies. CIP policy documents identify the further need to better
prioritize and coordinate research efforts.
Source: GAO analysis.
As table 4 shows, the federal government is already taking several actions
to improve the cybersecurity posture of critical infrastructure sectors.
For example, it has designated sector-specific agencies for each critical
infrastructure sector that are to work with their counterparts in the
private sector to assess sector vulnerabilities and to develop plans to
eliminate those vulnerabilities. It has helped to fund risk assessment
activities in both the water and the surface transportation sectors.
Through agencies such as NIST, DISA, and NSA, the federal government has
published a variety of best practices and guidelines that assist in the
planning, selection, and implementation of cybersecurity technologies.
These guidelines could also prove useful to private sector infrastructure
entities. DHS provides vulnerability and threat information to critical
infrastructures. Agencies, such as the Department of Justice and NSF, have
established educational programs designed to teach students about
cybersecurity. The federal government has also let several grants to
support cybersecurity technology research and development.
Policy Analysis Framework for Federal Actions
When deciding whether to continue or expand existing programs or to create
new programs, it will be important for the federal government to consider
the scope of the problem and the costs and benefits, the implementation
issues, and the consequences of each option. Factual information is needed
on the scope and scale of cyber vulnerabilities and the consequences of
possible cyber attacks on critical infrastructures. The technology issues
surrounding the problem and the structure of the security marketplace have
to be determined. To help determine the proper approach for federal
action, the government will require information from the private sector on
the scope and size of the cybersecurity problem and the actions that the
private sector is already taking to address the problem. Further,
information on critical infrastructure assets, vulnerabilities, and
priorities, which could be gleaned if private sector entities follow the
riskbased framework for security that we have described, is needed from
the private sector.
As with any federal program, it will be important to measure the results
of any federal cybersecurity program. However, the lack of well-defined
Technology Assessment Overview
security standards or benchmarks makes it difficult to measure the benefit
of such a program. Further, what may be appropriate for some sectors may
not be appropriate for others. While all sectors place some value on
protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their
computer systems and data, the relative importance of these objectives
varies among the sectors. Further, because of business or other demands,
the emphasis on cybersecurity issues varies from entity to entity and from
sector to sector.
It is also important to consider the proper role of the federal
government. Sometimes, the best course of action may be to take no action
at all. In some critical infrastructure sectors, private sector responses
may adequately address a problem so that federal involvement is not
required. For example, according to chemical infrastructure sector
officials, during the second quarter of 2003, the Chemical Industry Data
Exchange (CIDX) released its cybersecurity guidance for the Responsible
Care Security Code, cybersecurity guidance for security vulnerability
assessment methodology, and the results of baseline assessments against
the ISO 17799 standard for security management practices. The railroad
sector has conducted a risk assessment that identified and evaluated
threats to and vulnerabilities of the rail system, quantified the risks,
and devised appropriate countermeasures.
Because many organizations are involved in this nation's critical
infrastructure protection, it is important for all levels of government-
federal, state, and local-and the private sector to work cooperatively to
ensure that the most critical cybersecurity issues are addressed. A
national CIP plan that defines the roles and responsibilities of federal
and nonfederal CIP organizations; identifies and prioritizes critical
assets, systems, and functions; and establishes standards and benchmarks
for infrastructure protection could help the federal government to apply
its limited resources where they are most needed. Ultimately, the
protection of critical infrastructures in this country falls on the
critical infrastructure owners. However, as we have described, the federal
government has several options at its disposal to manage and encourage the
increased use of cybersecurity technologies, research and develop new
cybersecurity technologies, and generally improve the cybersecurity
posture of critical infrastructure sectors.
Agency Comments and We provided a draft of this report to the Department
of Homeland Security
External Reviewer and the National Science Foundation for their review.
DHS generally concurred with the report and provided detailed comments,
which we
Comments incorporated as appropriate. NSF said that this is an important
and timely
Technology Assessment Overview
report that provides broad coverage of current and emerging cybersecurity
and infrastructure technologies. We include DHS's and NSF's comments in
appendixes IV and V, respectively, and summarize them in chapter 5.
We also provided a draft of this report to 26 organizations, representing
government, industry, and academia, for their review. We received comments
and suggestions from 15 reviewers. The comments included the clarification
of issues and the highlighting of certain aspects of the assessment that
reviewers considered important. We have incorporated these comments, where
appropriate, in the report. We summarize these comments in chapter 5.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Computers have been crucial to the operations of government and business.
In the early days of computing, computers calculated the designs of the
first strategic weapons and projections of bombing effectiveness.
Businesses used computers to automate business calculations. The role of
computers evolved into record keeping and automating many tasks to the
point that, by now, computers play a role in nearly everything. The advent
of networking made it possible for computers to communicate and become
even more pervasive. Nowadays, our water, food, fuel, lights, heat, home,
work, and vehicles are all supported, if not directly run, by computers
and networks. Essentially, computers and networks run our nation's
critical infrastructures that are vital to national defense, economic
security, and public health and safety.
Unfortunately, many computer systems and networks were not designed with
security in mind. As a result, the core of our critical infrastructure is
riddled with vulnerabilities that seem to require constant patches and
fixes. These vulnerabilities could enable an attacker to disrupt the
operations of or cause damage to critical infrastructures. The potential
exists for causing physical damage to people and property by exploiting
vulnerabilities in computers and networks. The problem is exacerbated by
increasing computer interconnectivity, most notably growth in the use of
the Internet since the 1990s. While the benefits of the Internet have been
enormous, widespread interconnectivity also poses enormous risks to
computer systems and to the critical operations and infrastructures they
support. Reliance on the Internet has created a new avenue for attack on
infrastructures. These attacks are called cyber attacks because they
arrive over the network by means of information packets that traverse
communication links and attack cyber assets-the software and data. We have
seen these cyber attacks in the form of viruses and worms- malicious
software that is designed to propagate from one system to another, either
automatically or by some user action such as opening an email attachment.
Because of the increasing threats of cyber attacks, cybersecurity-the
defense against cyber attacks-is a major concern of the government and the
private sector.
There is a variety of technologies that can be used in support of
cybersecurity. Some technologies, such as firewalls and biometrics, help
to protect computers and networks against attacks, while others, such as
intrusion detection systems and continuity of operations tools, help to
detect and respond to cyber attacks in progress.
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) involves activities that enhance
the security of our nation's cyber and physical public and private
Chapter 1: Introduction
Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Has Evolved since the Mid-1990's
infrastructure that are critical to national security, national economic
security, or national public health and safety. Federal awareness of the
importance of securing our nation's critical infrastructures has continued
to evolve since the mid-1990s. Recent terrorist attacks and threats have
further underscored the need to manage and encourage CIP activities.
Numerous vulnerabilities are being identified more and more frequently
which, if exploited by the increasing number of threats, could disrupt or
disable several of our nation's critical infrastructures. However, with
about 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructures owned and
operated by the private sector, CIP is not an endeavor that the federal
government can undertake alone. Since 1997, we have designated information
security as a government-wide high-risk issue.1 In January 2003, we
expanded this high-risk issue to emphasize the increased importance of
protecting the information systems that support critical infrastructures.2
Since the mid-1990s, the federal government has articulated its approach
to CIP through several reports, orders, directives, laws, and strategy
documents. Appendix II describes the policies in more detail. Within the
federal government, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a number
of responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection, including the
responsibility to (1) develop a comprehensive national CIP plan; (2)
recommend CIP measures in coordination with other federal agencies and in
cooperation with state and local government agencies and authorities, the
private sector, and other entities; and (3) disseminate, as appropriate,
information analyzed by the department both within DHS and to other
federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and private sector
entities. Within DHS, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) directorate serves as the primary point of contact for
CIP activities. Most recently, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
(HSPD-7) established a national policy for federal departments and
agencies to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and key
resources and to protect them from terrorist attack. To ensure the
coverage of critical sectors, HSPD-7 designates sector-specific agencies
for the critical
1This series identifies areas at high risk because of either their greater
vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or major
challenges associated with their economy, efficiency, or effectiveness.
2U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: Protecting Information
Systems Supporting the Federal Government and the Nation's Critical
Infrastructures, GAO-03-121 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).
Chapter 1: Introduction
infrastructure sectors identified in the National Strategy for Homeland
Security (see table 5).
Table 5: Critical Infrastructure Sectors Identified by the Federal Government
Sector Description Sector-specific agencies
Agriculture Provides for the fundamental need for food. The
infrastructure includes supply chains for feed and crop production.
Department of Agriculture Banking and finance Provides the financial
infrastructure of the nation. This sector consists of Department of the Treasury
commercial banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, governmentsponsored
enterprises, pension funds, and other financial institutions that carry
out transactions including clearing and settlement.
Chemicals and hazardous Transforms natural raw materials into commonly
used products benefiting Department of Homeland
materials society's health, safety, and productivity. The chemical
industry Security represents a $450 billion enterprise and produces more
than 70,000 products that are essential to automobiles, pharmaceuticals,
food supply, electronics, water treatment, health, construction and other
necessities.
Defense industrial Supplies the military with the means to Department of
base protect the nation by producing Defense
weapons, aircraft, and ships and
providing essential services, including
information technology and supply and
maintenance.
Saves lives and property from accidents Department of
Emergency services and disaster. This sector Homeland
includes fire, rescue, emergency medical Security
services, and law enforcement
organizations.
Energy Provides the electric power used by all sectors, including
critical Department of Energy infrastructures, and the refining, storage,
and distribution of oil and natural gas. The sector is divided into
electricity and oil and natural gas.
Carries out the post-harvesting of Department of
Food the food supply, including Agriculture and
processing
and retail sales. Department of
Health and
Human Services
Government Ensures national security and Department of
freedom and administers key public Homeland
functions. Security
Provides communications and Department of
Information technology processes to meet the needs of Homeland
and telecommunications businesses and government. Security
Postal and shipping Delivers private and commercial letters, packages,
and bulk assets. The Department of Homeland U.S. Postal Service and other
carriers provide the services of this sector. Security
Public health and Mitigates the risk of disasters and attacks and also
provides recovery Department of Health and healthcare assistance if an
attack occurs. The sector consists of health departments, Human Services
clinics, and hospitals.
Transportation Enables movement of people and assets that are vital to
our economy, Department of Homeland mobility, and security with the use of
aviation, ships, rail, pipelines, Security highways, trucks, buses, and
mass transit.
Drinking water and water Sanitizes the water supply with the use of about
170,000 public water Environmental Protection
treatment systems systems. These systems depend on reservoirs, dams,
wells, treatment Agency facilities, pumping stations, and transmission
lines.
Source: GAO analysis based on the President's national strategy documents
and HSPD-7.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Federal and Private Sector Computer Security Is Affected by Various Laws
Sector-specific agencies are responsible for infrastructure protection
activities in their assigned sectors and are to coordinate and collaborate
with relevant federal agencies, state and local governments, and the
private sector to accomplish these responsibilities. To facilitate private
sector participation, federal CIP policy states that sector-specific
agencies are to support sector-coordinating mechanisms. In addition, the
federal government's CIP approach encourages the voluntary creation of
information sharing and analysis centers (ISAC) that facilitate gathering,
analyzing, and appropriately sanitizing and disseminating information to
and from infrastructure sectors and the federal government through DHS.
Several laws affect the cybersecurity of federal and private sector
entities and could drive the development of cybersecurity-related tools.
These laws include requirements for federal agency information security
programs, funding for security research and grant programs, and
requirements for private sector entities to protect citizens' personal,
financial, and medical information. For example, the Federal Information
Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) requires federal agencies to
provide risk-based information security protections for information
collected or maintained by or on behalf of an agency, as well as
information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor or
other organization on behalf of an agency.3 According to FISMA, agencies
are to identify and provide information security protection commensurate
with the risk and magnitude of the potential harm resulting from the
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction of information. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 required the electronic exchange of
information and mandated protections for the privacy and security of this
information.4 In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act established a new
requirement for protecting the privacy of personal financial information.5
In the area of research funding, the Cyber Security Research and
Development Act authorized funding for computer and network security
3Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Title III, Public
Law 107-347 (Dec. 17, 2002).
4Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Public Law
104-191 (Aug. 21, 1996).
5Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Public Law 106-102 (Nov. 12, 1999).
Chapter 1: Introduction
research and grant programs through NIST and the National Science
Foundation (NSF).6
Report Overview
This technology assessment focuses on three key questions:
1. What are the key cybersecurity requirements in each of the critical
infrastructure protection sectors?
2. What cybersecurity technologies can be applied to critical
infrastructure protection? What technologies are currently deployed or
currently available but not yet widely deployed for critical
infrastructure protection? What technologies are currently being
researched for cybersecurity? Are there any gaps in cybersecurity
technology that should be better researched and developed to address
critical infrastructure protection?
3. What are the implementation issues associated with using cybersecurity
technologies for critical infrastructure protection, including policy
issues such as privacy and information sharing?
To answer these questions, we describe the critical infrastructure
sectors, the efforts currently being taken to improve their cybersecurity
postures, and the challenges they face in implementing cybersecurity
strategies. While critical infrastructure protection must guard against
both physical and cyber threats, we focus our report on approaches to
protect against cyber threats. We describe how several cybersecurity
technologies work and how they can be applied to cybersecurity problems.
We discuss the limitations to some of these technologies. We also describe
ongoing cybersecurity research and some of the key areas that require
further work. We identify challenges to improving cybersecurity and
several options available to the federal government to improve the
cybersecurity posture of critical infrastructure sectors.
6The Cyber Security Research and Development Act of 2002, Public Law
107-305 (Nov. 27, 2002).
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Protecting our nation's critical infrastructures is a formidable
challenge. Numerous threats and vulnerabilities are being identified on a
more frequent basis. If these vulnerabilities can be successfully
exploited by threats, several of our nation's critical infrastructures
could be disrupted or disabled. To assess the need for cybersecurity
technology, it is important to understand the cybersecurity needs of
critical infrastructure sectors by examining the threats that they face as
well as the vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Further, to determine
the information technology (IT) assets that will need to be protected, it
is important to examine the types of computer and networking technologies
that are used in various sectors.
Critical infrastructures can be threatened using both physical and cyber
means. Several organizations and individuals are capable of conducting
such attacks. Historically, attacks on our infrastructures could be
conducted only by a relatively small number of entities. However, with
critical infrastructures' increasing reliance on computers and networks,
more organizations and individuals can cause harm using cyber attacks.
Further, U.S. authorities are becoming increasingly concerned about the
prospect of combined physical and cyber attacks that could have
devastating consequences. Table 6 lists sources of threats that have been
identified by the U.S. intelligence community.
Threats, Vulnerabilities, Incidents, and the Consequences of Potential
Attacks Are Increasing
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Table 6: Threats to Critical Infrastructure
Threat Description
Criminal groups International corporate spies and organized crime
organizations pose a threat to the United States through their ability to
conduct industrial espionage and large-scale monetary theft and to hire or
develop hacker talent.
Hackers Hackers sometimes crack into networks for the thrill of the
challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker community. While remote
cracking once required a fair amount of skill or computer knowledge,
hackers can now download attack scripts from the Internet and launch them
against victim sites. Thus, while attack tools have become more
sophisticated, they have also become easier to use. According to the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the large majority of hackers do not
have the requisite tradecraft to threaten difficult targets such as
critical U.S. networks. Nevertheless, the worldwide population of hackers
poses a relatively high threat of an isolated or brief disruption causing
serious damage.
Hacktivists Hacktivism refers to politically motivated attacks on publicly
accessible Web pages or email servers. These groups and individuals
overload e-mail servers and hack into Web sites to send a political
message. Most international hacktivist groups appear bent on propaganda
rather than damage to critical infrastructures.
Insider threat The disgruntled organization insider is a principal source
of computer crimes. Insiders may not need a great deal of knowledge about
computer intrusions because their knowledge of a victim system often
allows them to gain unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or
to steal system data. The insider threat also includes outsourcing
vendors.
National governments and foreign Several nations are aggressively working
to develop information warfare doctrine,
intelligence services programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities enable
a single entity to have a significant and serious impact by disrupting the
supply, communications, and economic infrastructures that support military
power-impacts that could affect the daily lives of U.S. citizens across
the country. The threat from national cyber warfare programs is unique
because they pose a threat along the entire spectrum of objectives that
might harm U.S. interests. According to the CIA, only government-sponsored
programs are developing capabilities with the prospect of causing
widespread, long-duration damage to U.S. critical infrastructures.
Terrorists Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical
infrastructures to threaten national security, cause mass casualties,
weaken the U.S. economy, and damage public morale and confidence. However,
traditional terrorist adversaries of the United States are less developed
in their computer network capabilities than other adversaries. Terrorists
likely pose a limited cyber threat. The CIA believes terrorists will stay
focused on traditional attack methods, but it anticipates growing cyber
threats as a more technically competent generation enters the ranks.
Virus writers Virus writers are posing an increasingly serious threat.
Several destructive computer viruses and worms have harmed files and hard
drives, including the Melissa Macro Virus, the Explore.Zip worm, the CIH
(Chernobyl) Virus, Nimda, Code Red, Slammer, and Blaster.
Source: GAO analysis based on data from the FBI, CIA, and CERT/CC.
Over the last decade, physical and cyber events, as well as related
analyses by various organizations, have demonstrated the increasing
threats faced by critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. For
example, on February 11, 2003, the National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC)
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
issued an advisory to heighten the awareness of an increase in global
hacking activities as a result of the increasing tensions between the
United States and Iraq. This advisory noted that during a time of
increased international tension, illegal cyber activity often escalates,
such as spamming, Web page defacements, and denial-of-service attacks.
Further, this activity can originate within another country that is party
to the tension, can be state sponsored or encouraged, or can come from
domestic organizations or individuals independently. The advisory also
stated that attacks may have one of several objectives, including
political activism targeting Iraq or those sympathetic to Iraq by
self-described "patriot" hackers, political activism or disruptive attacks
targeting U.S. systems by those opposed to any potential conflict with
Iraq, or even criminal activity masquerading or using the current crisis
to further personal goals.
Respondents to the 2003 Computer Security Institute (CSI) and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Computer Crime and Security Survey
identified independent hackers as the most likely source of cyber attacks,
as shown in table 7.1
Table 7: Likely Sources of Cyber Attacks According to Respondents to the
CSI/FBI 2003 Computer Crime and Security Survey
Potential source Percentage of respondents
Independent hackers 82%
Disgruntled employees 77%
U.S. competitors 40%
Foreign governments 28%
Foreign corporations 25%
Source: 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey.
It is important to consider the threat posed by insiders. According to the
CSI/FBI survey, 45 percent of respondents reported unauthorized access by
insiders, and 80 percent of respondents reported insider abuses of network
access. As shown in table 7, disgruntled employees are believed to be a
likely source of attack by 77 percent of respondents. According to a
National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security
Committee report, insiders include employees, contractors, service
1Computer Security Institute, 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security
Survey (2003).
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
providers, and anyone else with legitimate access to a system.2 Insiders
may have a variety of motives for their actions. For example, insiders may
have views that conflict with those of the organization they are employed
by and may want to impose their beliefs on the organization. Another group
of insiders may just be curious and attempt to access systems they are not
authorized to use. Other insiders are employees who do not intend to cause
any harm to the organization but who unwittingly can cause damage either
through their ignorance, carelessness, or disregard for organizational
policies. Actions such as disabling antivirus software, leaving passwords
on workstations, and installing unauthorized software may open a large
enough vulnerability for a hacker to gain access to a system.
As larger amounts of money are transferred through computer systems, as
more sensitive economic and commercial information is exchanged
electronically, and as the nation's defense and intelligence communities
increasingly rely on commercially available IT, the likelihood increases
that information attacks will threaten vital national interests.
Critical Infrastructure Sectors Face Various Physical Threats
With the coordinated terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center, in
New York City, and the Pentagon, in Washington, D.C., on September 11,
2001, the threat of terrorism rose to the top of the country's national
security and law enforcement agendas. Even before these catastrophic
incidents, attacks against people, property, and infrastructures had
increased concerns about terrorism. The terrorist bombings in 1993 of the
World Trade Center in New York City and in 1995 of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City prompted increased emphasis on the need
to strengthen and coordinate the federal government's ability to
effectively combat terrorism domestically. The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin
nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway system also raised new concerns
about U.S. preparedness to combat terrorist incidents involving weapons of
mass destruction.3 However, as clearly demonstrated by the September 11,
2001 incidents, a terrorist attack would not have to fit the definition of
weapons of mass destruction to result in mass casualties, destruction of
2National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security
Committee, The Insider Threat to U.S. Government Information Systems,
NSTISSAM INFOSEC/1-99 (Fort Meade, MD: July 1999). In 2001, this committee
was redesignated the Committee on National Security Systems.
3A weapon of mass destruction is a chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear agent or weapon.
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
critical infrastructures, economic losses, and disruption of daily life
nationwide.
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities continuously assess both
foreign and domestic terrorist threats to the United States. The U.S.
foreign intelligence community-for example, the CIA, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research-monitors terrorist threats of foreign origin. In
addition, the FBI gathers intelligence and assesses the threat posed by
domestic sources. According to the U.S. intelligence community,
conventional explosives and firearms continue to be terrorists' weapons of
choice. The community also believes that terrorists are less likely to use
weapons of mass destruction, although the possibility that they will use
these weapons may increase over the next decade. Table 8 identifies
weapons that can be used to physically attack critical infrastructure.
Table 8: Weapons for Physically Attacking Critical Infrastructures Weapon
Description
Biological weapons Biological weapons, which release large quantities of
living, disease-causing microorganisms, have extraordinary lethal
potential. Biological weapons are relatively easy to manufacture,
requiring straightforward technical skills, basic equipment, and a seed
stock of pathogenic microorganisms. Biological weapons are especially
dangerous because we may not know immediately that we have been attacked,
allowing an infectious agent time to spread. Moreover, biological agents
can serve as a means of attack against humans as well as livestock and
crops, inflicting casualties as well as economic damage.
Chemical weapons Chemical weapons are extremely lethal and capable of
producing tens of thousands of casualties. Like biological weapons,
chemical weapons are relatively easy to manufacture, using basic
equipment, trained personnel, and precursor materials that often have
legitimate dual uses. As the 1995 Tokyo subway attack revealed, even
sophisticated nerve agents are within the reach of terrorist groups.
Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons have enormous destructive potential.
Terrorists who seek to develop a nuclear weapon must overcome two
formidable challenges. First, acquiring or refining a sufficient quantity
of fissile material is very difficult-though not impossible. Second,
manufacturing a workable weapon requires a very high degree of technical
capability-though terrorists could feasibly assemble the simplest type of
nuclear device. To get around these significant though not insurmountable
challenges, terrorists could seek to steal or purchase a nuclear weapon.
Radiological weapons Radiological weapons, or "dirty bombs," combine
radioactive material with conventional explosives. The individuals and
groups engaged in terrorist activity can cause widespread disruption and
fear, particularly in heavily populated areas.
Conventional means Terrorists, both domestic and international, continue
to use traditional methods of violence and destruction to inflict harm and
spread fear. They have used knives, guns, and bombs to kill the innocent.
They have taken hostages and spread propaganda. Given the low expense,
ready availability of materials, and relatively high chance for successful
execution, terrorists will continue to make use of conventional attacks.
Source: National Strategy for Homeland Security.
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Nevertheless, in February 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence
testified that in his view, terrorist organizations continue to pursue
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.4 He also stated
that although the Al Qaeda leadership is seriously damaged, it, along with
other groups supporting its views, continues to pose a threat to the
United States. In addition, he stated that terrorism directed at U.S.
interests goes beyond religious extremist groups, adding that the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Revolutionary People's
Liberation Party/Front-a Turkish group-have shown a willingness to attack
U.S. targets.
Critical Infrastructure Sectors Face Various Cyber Threats
In addition to posing these physical threats, terrorists and others with
malicious intent, such as transnational criminals and foreign intelligence
services, pose a threat to our nation's computer systems. Government
officials are increasingly concerned about attacks from individuals and
groups with malicious intent, such as crime, terrorism, foreign
intelligence gathering, and acts of war. According to the National
Security Agency (NSA), foreign governments already have or are developing
computer attack capabilities, and potential adversaries are developing a
body of knowledge about U.S. systems and methods to attack these systems.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, warnings of the
potential for terrorist cyber attacks against our critical infrastructures
have also increased. For example, in February 2002, the threat to these
infrastructures was highlighted by the Special Advisor to the President
for Cyberspace Security, during a Senate hearing, when he stated that
although to date none of the traditional terrorists groups, such as al
Qaeda, had used the Internet to launch a known assault on an American
infrastructure, information on water systems was discovered on computers
found in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.5 Also, in February 2002, the
Director of Central Intelligence testified before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on the possibility of cyber warfare attacks by
terrorists.6 He stated that the September 11 attacks demonstrated the
4Testimony of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Feb. 24, 2004).
5Testimony of Richard A. Clarke, Special Advisor to the President for
Cyberspace Security and Chairman of the President's Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board, before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts (Feb.
13, 2002).
6Testimony of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Feb. 6, 2002).
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
nation's dependence on critical infrastructure systems that rely on
electronic and computer networks. Further, he noted that attacks of this
nature would become an increasingly viable option for terrorists as they
and other foreign adversaries become more familiar with these targets and
the technologies required to attack them.
According to the FBI, terrorists, transnational criminals, and
intelligence services are quickly becoming aware of and using tools such
as computer viruses, Trojan horses, worms, logic bombs, and eavesdropping
programs ("sniffers") that can destroy, intercept, degrade the integrity
of, or deny access to data (see table 9).
Table 9: Types of Cyber Attacks
Type of attack Description
Denial of service A method of attack that denies system access to
legitimate users without actually having to compromise the targeted
system. From a single source, the attack overwhelms the target computer
with messages and blocks legitimate traffic. It can prevent one system
from being able to exchange data with other systems or prevent the system
from using the Internet.
Distributed denial of service A variant of the denial-of-service attack
that uses a coordinated attack from a distributed system of computers
rather than a single source. It often makes use of worms to spread to
multiple computers that can then attack the target.
Exploit tools Publicly available and sophisticated tools that intruders
of various skill levels can use to determine vulnerabilities and gain
entry into targeted systems.
Logic bombs A form of sabotage in which a programmer inserts code that
causes the program to perform a destructive action when some triggering
event occurs, such as terminating the programmer's employment.
Sniffer Synonymous with packet sniffer. A program that intercepts routed
data and examines each packet in search of specified information, such as
passwords transmitted in clear text.
Trojan horse A computer program that conceals harmful code. A Trojan
horse usually masquerades as a useful program that a user would wish to
execute.
Virus A program that "infects" computer files, usually executable
programs, by inserting a copy of itself into the file. These copies are
usually executed when the infected file is loaded into memory, allowing
the virus to infect other files. Unlike the computer worm, a virus
requires human involvement (usually unwitting) to propagate.
War-dialing Simple programs that dial consecutive phone numbers looking
for modems.
War-driving A method of gaining entry into wireless computer networks
using a laptop, antennas, and a wireless network adaptor that involves
patrolling locations to gain unauthorized access.
Worms An independent computer program that reproduces by copying itself
from one system to another across a network. Unlike computer viruses,
worms do not require human involvement to propagate.
Source: GAO analysis.
Viruses and worms are commonly used to launch denial-of-service attacks,
which generally flood targeted networks and systems with so much
transmission of data that regular traffic is either slowed or completely
interrupted. Such attacks have been utilized ever since the groundbreaking
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Morris worm, which brought 10 percent of the systems connected to the
Internet to a halt in November 1988. In 2001, the Code Red worm used a
denial-of-service attack to affect millions of computer users by shutting
down Web sites, slowing Internet service, and disrupting business and
government operations.
In the case of insider attacks, the use of these tools may not even be
necessary because of the unfettered access insiders often have to their
computer systems. An example of an insider causing damage to a system
occurred at the U.S. Coast Guard in July 1997. A former U.S. Coast Guard
employee used her programming skills to access the service's nationwide
personnel database and deleted crucial data that caused the computer
system to crash. The crash wiped out almost two weeks' worth of personnel
data used to determine promotions, transfers, assignments, and disability
claim reviews. It took 115 Coast Guard employees working more than 1,800
hours to recover and re-enter the data, at a cost of more than $40,000.
The growing number of known vulnerabilities increases the number of
potential attacks that can be created by the hacker community. As
vulnerabilities are discovered, attackers may attempt to exploit them.
Attacks can be launched against specific targets or widely distributed
through viruses and worms. The risks posed by this increasing and evolving
threat are demonstrated in reports of actual and potential attacks and
disruptions. For example,
o On August 11, 2003, the Blaster worm was launched, and it infected
more than 120,000 computers in its first 36 hours. When the worm was
successfully executed, it could cause the operating system to crash. The
worm affected a wide range of systems and caused slowness and disruptions
in users' Internet services. The worm was programmed to launch a
denial-of-service attack against Microsoft's Windows Update Web site. The
Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration was forced to shut down its computer
systems, and systems in both national and international areas were also
affected.
o According to a preliminary study coordinated by the Cooperative
Association for Internet Data Analysis, on January 25, 2003, the SQL
Slammer worm (also known as "Sapphire") infected more than 90 percent of
vulnerable computers worldwide within 10 minutes of its release on the
Internet. As the study reports, exploiting a known vulnerability for which
a patch had been available since July 2002, Slammer doubled in size every
8.5 seconds and achieved its full
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
scanning rate (55 million scans per second) after about 3 minutes. It
caused considerable harm through network outages and such unforeseen
consequences as canceled airline flights and automated teller machine
failures. Further, the study emphasizes that the effects would likely have
been more severe had Slammer carried a malicious payload, exploited a more
widespread vulnerability, or targeted a more popular service.
o In November 2002, a British computer administrator was indicted on
charges that he accessed and damaged 98 computers in 14 states between
March 2001 and March 2002, causing some $900,000 in damage to the
computers. These networks belonged to the Department of Defense (DoD), the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and private companies. The
indictment alleges that the attacker was able to gain administrative
privileges on military computers and copy password files and delete
critical system files. The attacks rendered the networks of the Earle
Naval Weapons Station in New Jersey and the Military District of
Washington inoperable.
o On October 21, 2002, NIPC reported that all 13 root-name servers that
provide the primary road map for almost all Internet communications were
targeted in a massive distributed denial-of-service attack. Seven of the
servers failed to respond to legitimate network traffic, and two others
failed intermittently during the attack. Because of safeguards, most
Internet users experienced no slowdowns or outages.
o In August 2001, we reported to a subcommittee of the House Government
Reform Committee that the attacks referred to as Code Red, Code Red II,
and SirCam affected millions of computer users, shut down Web sites,
slowed Internet service, and disrupted business and government
operations.7 Then, in September 2001, the Nimda worm appeared, using some
of the most significant attack profile aspects of Code Red II and 1999's
infamous Melissa virus, which allowed it to spread widely in a short
amount of time. Security experts estimate that Code Red, Sircam, and Nimda
have caused billions of dollars in damage.
As the number of individuals with computer skills has increased, more
intrusion, or hacking, tools have become readily available and relatively
7U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Code Red, Code Red
II, and SirCam Attacks Highlight Need for Proactive Measures; GAO-01-1073T
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 29, 2001).
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
easy to use. Frequently, skilled hackers develop exploitation tools and
post them on Internet hacking sites. These tools are then readily
available for others to download, allowing even inexperienced programmers
to create a computer virus or to literally point and click to launch an
attack. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), 30 to 40 new attack tools are posted on the Internet every month.8
Experts also agree that there has been a steady advance in the
sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology. Intruders quickly
develop attacks to exploit vulnerabilities that have been discovered in
products, use these attacks to compromise computers, and share them with
other attackers. In addition, they can combine these attacks with other
forms of technology to develop programs that automatically scan the
network for vulnerable systems, attack them, compromise them, and use them
to spread the attack even further.
Because automated tools now exist, the CERT(R) Coordination Center
(CERT/CC) has noted that attacks that once took weeks or months to
propagate over the Internet now take just hours, or even minutes.9 For
instance, while in July 2001, Code Red achieved an infection rate of over
20,000 systems within 10 minutes, less than a year and a half later, in
January 2003, the Slammer worm successfully attacked at least 75,000
systems, infecting more than 90 percent of vulnerable systems within 10
minutes.
The threat to systems connected to the Internet is illustrated by the
increasing number of computer security incidents reported to CERT/CC. This
number rose from just under 10,000 in 1999 to over 52,000 in 2001, to
about 82,000 in 2002, and to 137,529 in 2003 (see figure 1). However, the
Director of CERT Centers stated that he estimates that as much as 80
percent of actual security incidents go unreported, in most cases because
(1) the organization was unable to recognize that its systems had been
penetrated or there were no indications of penetration or attack, or (2)
the organization was reluctant to report.
8U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Weaknesses Place
Commerce Data and Operations at Serious Risk, GAO-01-751 (Washington D.C.:
Aug. 13, 2001).
9The CERT/CC is a center of Internet security expertise at the Software
Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center
operated by Carnegie Mellon University. CERT and CERT Coordination Center
are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by Carnegie Mellon
University.
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Figure 1: Information Security Incidents, 1995-2003
Incidents 140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year
Source: GAO analysis based on CERT/CC data.
In addition, flaws in software code that could cause a program to
malfunction generally result from programming errors that occur during
software development. The increasing complexity and size of software
programs contribute to the growth in software flaws. For example,
Microsoft Windows 2000 reportedly contains about 35 million lines of code,
compared with about 15 million lines for Windows 95. As reported by NIST,
based on various studies of code inspections, most estimates suggest that
there are as many as 20 flaws per thousand lines of software code. While
most flaws do not create security vulnerabilities,10 the potential for
these errors reflects the difficulty and complexity involved in delivering
trustworthy code.11 By exploiting software vulnerabilities, hackers and
others who spread malicious code can cause significant damage, ranging
from Web site defacement to taking control of entire systems, and thereby
being able to read, modify, or delete sensitive
10A vulnerability is the existence of a flaw or weakness in hardware or
software that can be exploited resulting in a violation of an implicit or
explicit security policy.
11National Institute for Standards and Technology, Procedures for Handling
Security Patches: Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-40 (Gaithersburg, MD: August
2002).
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
information, destroy systems, disrupt operations, or launch attacks
against other organizations' systems.
Between 1995 and 2003, CERT/CC reported 12,946 security vulnerabilities
that resulted from software flaws. Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic
growth in security vulnerabilities over these years.
Figure 2: Security Vulnerabilities, 1995-2003
Vulnerabilities 4,500
Despite the heightened national security and terrorism concerns occasioned
by the September 11, 2001 attacks, it is important to recognize that up to
the present, many of the most costly and disruptive cyber events have not
been caused by malicious cyber attacks, but instead originated with
mundane problems or routine systems mismanagement. For example, according
to ICF Consulting, the cost to the U.S. economy of the August 14, 2003,
blackout has been estimated at between $7 billion and $10 billion dollars.
A joint U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force investigated the causes
of the blackout and issued a report in April 2004.12 This report details a
chain of mishaps, starting with a malfunctioning monitoring and
12U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August
14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and
Recommendations (Apr. 2004).
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000 500 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year
Source: GAO analysis based on CERT/CC data.
Poor Systems Management Can Be Costly and Disruptive
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
control system that was deployed by power grid operators in Ohio.
Environmental factors combined with a higher than normal demand for power
caused a local overload of a type that might normally trigger a brownout
or a brief local blackout. System designers had not anticipated such a
contingency because it involved a series of seemingly unlikely events. But
what is unlikely in small systems may not be so rare in large systems. In
this case, interconnectedness of the power grid permitted the disruption
to spread to other operators in Canada, New York, and elsewhere on the
U.S. East Coast, who could not take remedial actions because of their
inability to understand what was happening.
This single event illustrates many hallmarks of what could be called the
mundane cybersecurity threat:
o inadequate system monitoring and control tools;
o unplanned growth of a large, complex, system with external
interdependencies;
o a combination of seemingly unlikely external factors;
o lack of a well-defined stakeholder responsible for overall robustness;
and
o operator confusion and mistakes.
Mundane cybersecurity threats receive little attention, and yet are
emerging as a serious risk to national economic growth and to the success
of several government and private sector initiatives. These activities
place computer-operated systems into critical roles for the economy, the
government, the military, or nationally important industry sectors. The
systems are growing through an unplanned, organic process of accretion,
without any sort of global plan, and without a well-defined entity with
clear responsibility for security and reliability. The resulting systems
are intrinsically hard to analyze or monitor, so that even if the nation
were to mandate that they be controlled, the science for doing so would
often be lacking.
To make matters worse, today's mundane cybersecurity threat may become
tomorrow's terrorist target. In the wake of the August 2003 blackout, many
experts pointed out that even if terrorism had no role in that particular
incident, terrorists could easily target the power grid with similarly
spectacular results at some future time. Actions taken over an
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
extended period to harden nationally critical infrastructure sectors
against mundane failures may thus be the best preventive measures against
some future terrorist threat targeting those infrastructures. The August
2003 blackout occurred despite more than a decade of government concern
about the growing risk of such instability and despite the existence of
all sorts of power industry groups with responsibility for aspects of
power security. The U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force report
reveals that while such organizations have a valuable role, with the
emergence of an increasingly interconnected power grid, a need has emerged
for a new kind of stakeholder with responsibility for large-scale
stability of the grid.
Growing Concern over Connections between Cyber and Physical Worlds
Since September 11, 2001, the critical link between cyberspace and
physical space has been increasingly recognized. As we have described,
critical infrastructures face an increasing threat of cyber attacks in
addition to physical attacks. In July 2002, NIPC reported that the
potential for compound cyber and physical attacks, referred to as
"swarming attacks," is an emerging threat to our critical infrastructures.
As NIPC reported, the effects of a swarming attack include slowing or
complicating the response to a physical attack. For instance, a cyber
attack that disabled the water supply or the electrical system, in
conjunction with a physical attack, could deny emergency services the
necessary resources to manage the consequences of the physical attack-such
as controlling fires, coordinating actions, and generating light.
Second, there is a general consensus-and increasing concern-among
government officials and experts on control systems about potential cyber
threats to the control systems that govern our critical infrastructures.
In his November 2002 congressional testimony, the Director of the CERT
Centers at Carnegie Mellon University noted that supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems and other forms of networked computer
systems have been used for years to control power grids, gas and oil
distribution pipelines, water treatment and distribution systems,
hydroelectric and flood control dams, oil and chemical refineries, and
other physical systems.13 These control systems are increasingly being
connected to communications links and networks to reduce operational costs
by supporting remote maintenance, remote control, and remote update
functions as well as to enhance performance. These computer
13Testimony of Richard D. Pethia, Director, CERT Centers, Software
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, before the House
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations (Nov. 19, 2002).
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
controlled and network-connected systems are potential targets for
individuals intent on causing massive disruption and physical damage. The
use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies for these systems without
adequate security enhancements can significantly limit available
approaches to protection and may increase the number of potential
attackers. As components of control systems increasingly make critical
decisions that were once made by humans, the potential effect of a cyber
attack becomes more devastating.
According to NIST, cyber attacks on energy production and distribution
systems-including electric, oil, gas, and water treatment systems, as well
as on chemical plants containing potentially hazardous substances-could
endanger public health and safety, damage the environment, and have
serious financial implications, such as loss of production, generation, or
distribution of public utilities; compromise of proprietary information;
or liability issues. When backups for damaged components are not readily
available (e.g., extra-high-voltage transformers for the electric power
grid), such damage could have a long-lasting effect.
Additionally, control system researchers at the Department of Energy's
national laboratories have developed systems that demonstrate the
feasibility of a cyber attack on a control system at an electric power
substation, where high-voltage electricity is transformed for local use.
Using tools that are readily available on the Internet, the researchers
are able to modify output data from field sensors and take control of
programmable logic controllers directly in order to change settings and
create new output. These techniques could enable a hacker to cause an
outage, thus incapacitating the substation.
Entities within each of the critical infrastructure sectors rely on
similar types of information technology to perform both critical and
non-critical functions such as accounting, finance, personnel,
manufacturing, engineering, and logistics that are essential to fulfilling
their missions, such as generating and transmitting electric power,
providing water, making chemicals, transporting goods and people, or
supporting financial transactions.
Critical Infrastructures Rely on Information Technology to Operate
Commercially Available Although some critical infrastructures use
proprietary systems to fulfill Information Technologies their missions,
commercially available off-the-shelf hardware and software Are Widely
Deployed are commonly used across all sectors. Infrastructure sectors use
both
dedicated, private communication links (for example, leased fiber optics)
as well as shared, public communications (such as public switched
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
networks and the Internet), as well as radio and satellite. These products
are typically used in a networked environment to allow groups of
individuals to share data, printers, communications systems, electronic
mail, and other resources. These resources are provided by servers, which
are computers that run specialized software to provide access to a
resource or a part of the network. The network communication links between
servers and devices such as printers and modems can be wired or wireless
(using radio waves).
For the purposes of this assessment, we define a network as an
interconnected collection of computers and networks. A network in a
relatively small geographical area is known as a local area network (LAN).
Most entities have one or more LANs at each of their offices; a LAN can be
as small as two networked PCs, or it may support hundreds of users and
multiple servers. Larger entities also have wide area networks (WAN) that
connect the various LANs the organization has that are dispersed over a
wide geographical location. Devices such as bridges, routers, and switches
move packets (blocks of data packaged with the information necessary for
their delivery) within and between networks, offering different levels of
data-handling capability, depending on the origin and destination of the
packets. Networks use predefined sets of rules known as protocols to
communicate with each other. For example, the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite is the set of protocols used to
communicate over the Internet.14 In a TCP/IP network, each server or
hardware device is assigned an IP address-a unique numeric location based
on the IP addressing scheme. Every computer or device with an IP address
is considered a connection point, or node, of the network. Each node can
run network services such as the World Wide Web, electronic mail, and file
transfer, storage, and retrieval. Each network service uses specific
protocols and is identified by a port number that enables other nodes to
locate and connect to the service. As seen in figure 3, computer servers
and devices are interconnected into networks, which in turn are often
connected to the Internet.
14The Internet refers to the specific interconnected global network of
TCP/IP-based systems that began with the Department of Defense's network
known as ARPANET.
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Figure 3: An Example of Typical Networked Systems
Source: GAO analysis and Microsoft Visio.
Internet services and their underlying network protocols are used in the
operation of infrastructures such as electric power, transportation,
banking, and many more. According to infrastructure sector
representatives, entities within their infrastructures use IP-and
non-IPbased networks, LANs, WANs, the Internet, and other information
technology. Entities also utilize a variety of operating systems and
off-theshelf and proprietary applications. In addition, they use a variety
of communications methods, including satellites, radio, the public
switched network, leased lines, private fiber optics, and wireless
networks. Sector representatives reported the following:
o The banking and finance sector entities use all forms of information
technology-client/server, Internet and non-Internet connected,
proprietary, and mainframe networks. The sector's communications
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
are split between private (dedicated, leased, and private fiber optics)
and public (public switched network, Internet). According to an industry
representative, the banking and finance infrastructure sector cannot
operate in the absence of information technology. The criticality of a
function depends on the business context-in one context, ATMs and online
banking (bill payments) are critical to customers; in another, wholesale
operations are important to support infrastructure operations such as
payroll and personnel. As we discuss later, the most critical systems are
not controlled by the individual financial institutions but are centrally
controlled by government and other entities.
o The chemical sector entities use LANs, WANs, the Internet, other
IPbased networks, wireless networks, and other (non-IP-based) proprietary
networks. According to industry representatives, the business processes
that are most critical to sector performance are manufacturing and
engineering, environmental, health and safety, supply chain and logistics,
financial, and personnel.
o The defense industrial base sector uses all types of information
technology to perform business functions (accounting, finance, payroll)
and operational functions that could instantly affect national security
operations. Two critical areas that rely on information technology are the
supply chain for manufacturing and the IT infrastructure that is owned and
operated by the defense industrial base for DoD.
o Within the energy sector, the electricity industry uses a combination
of information technologies, including LAN, WAN, Internet, wireless
networks, satellite, and radio. According to industry representatives,
information technology is used for a variety of business functions and
operational processes, including control functions and marketing of power
to consumers. Some of these processes, such as payroll, are important to
the entities but not necessarily essential from a CIP perspective.
o Also within the energy sector, the oil and natural gas industry uses a
combination of information technologies, including LAN, WAN, Internet,
virtual private networks, wireless networks, satellite, and radio. In
addition, representatives stated that in the pipeline environment, 80 to
90 percent of the applications purchased from vendors are TCP/IP, UNIX, or
Windows NT-based. The remainder are based on older or proprietary
protocols, such as SNA, DECnet, Appletalk, and IPX. The sector is also
reliant on specialized control
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
systems. The sector is highly dependent on technology for its
communications and operations.
o Within the transportation sector, the rail segment relies on
information technology and modern communications for rail operations and
customer service. Business systems are isolated, physically separated from
the control and dispatching centers. The control and dispatching systems15
are typically the responsibility of railroads' operations
officers, not the chief information officer's staff. Control systems,
i.e., signal systems located in the field (not central office based), are
used to monitor train location. Signaling systems typically use both
private and public networks, wired and wireless. These communications
networks allow the dispatch system to set train routes and provide train
location in return. Wayside sensors are used to monitor such things as
wheel bearing condition and whether rock slides have impeded the track.
o Also within the transportation sector, the freight transportation
industry, which includes trucking, air, rail, and waterborne
transportation, uses general purpose business applications to manage
internal processes and to link them with internal and external entities,
mobile communications and tracking to maintain control over assets, and
the Internet for electronic commerce and to link various systems.
o The telecommunications sector uses all forms of information
technology, including some specialized systems, for business operations
(pay/personnel), infrastructure (providing service to customers), and
operational support (monitoring of telecommunications traffic). In
addition, entities within this sector provide information technology and
IT services to its customers.
Some Infrastructure Entities Utilize Specialized Systems and Technologies
Entities within certain critical infrastructures, such as banking and
finance, transportation, chemical, telecommunications, and energy, use
technologies that provide them with unique capabilities to perform
critical functions. For example, there are centrally and federally
controlled systems that allow entities to complete financial transactions,
expedite
15Dispatching systems provide time slots for trains to enter the rail
network. These systems are critical to the operation of the rail network.
The dispatching process can no longer be performed manually because the
level of operation needed to maintain the flow of the trains, and thus of
the goods, is too high to perform without the computers. The first
priority of dispatching operators is to maintain safety.
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
transportation of goods, monitor the location of their assets and goods,
and provide for safe travel.
Other information technologies provide entities with the means to monitor
or control processes and to monitor the status of assets remotely and
without human intervention. Referred to collectively as control systems,
they are used by many infrastructures and industries (including electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution; oil and gas refining and
pipelines; water treatment and distribution; chemical production and
processing; railroads and mass transit; and manufacturing) to monitor and
control sensitive processes and physical functions. Control system
functions vary from simple to complex; they can be used simply to monitor
processes-for example, the environmental conditions in a small office
building-or to manage most activities in a municipal water system or even
a nuclear power plant.
Sectors Have Similar Cybersecurity Requirements but the Specifics Vary
Because infrastructure sectors make use of similar computer and networking
technologies, they have similar needs for cybersecurity. However, the
level of importance placed on various aspects of cybersecurity varies. For
instance, cybersecurity requirements are often described in terms of the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data and systems.
Confidentiality ensures the preservation of authorized restrictions on the
access and disclosure of information, including means for protecting
personal privacy and proprietary information. Integrity is defined as
guarding against improper modification or destruction of information, and
includes information nonrepudiation and authenticity. Availability means
ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.
We found that sector entities generally share these basic cybersecurity
objectives for their systems and networks, but they vary in the relative
importance they place in these objectives based on the operational area or
function involved. According to sector representatives, the importance
placed on these objectives varies depending on the sector's risk
assessment, priorities, current regulations, market forces, culture, and
history. For example, water industry officials believe that integrity is
the most important of the three requirements, while officials from the
defense industrial base believe that availability is the most important.
In contrast, sector representatives from the chemical industry stated that
the importance of confidentiality, integrity, and availability is relative
to the task being performed. Chemical sector officials stated that if
manufacturing is the task, then integrity is paramount, but if personnel
is the task, then confidentiality is the most important. According to
electric
Chapter 2: Cybersecurity Requirements of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
power infrastructure representatives, the priority depends on the segment
of the business that is referred to-generation, transmission, or
distribution. These officials defined the priority order in the generation
of power as (1) integrity, (2) availability, then (3) confidentiality.
However, in the power-marketing segment of the business, confidentiality
is a high priority because of the requirement to keep bids sealed prior to
sales.
These factors, in combination with financial factors like costs and
benefits, can affect an infrastructure entity's use of IT as well as its
need for and deployment of cybersecurity technologies.
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
Cybersecurity
Technologies
Critical infrastructure owners use current cybersecurity technologies,
such as firewalls and antivirus software, to help protect the information
that is processed, stored, and transmitted in the network systems that are
prevalent in the infrastructures.1 To help infrastructure owners purchase
cybersecurity technologies, standards are available that describe the
operating characteristics and qualities of cybersecurity technology
products. Standards that describe protocols and operating guidelines that
describe how to use technology products are also available.
The following categories of cybersecurity technology products represent
common control elements that help to secure IT systems and networks:
o Access controls restrict the ability of unknown or unauthorized users
to view or use information, hosts, or networks. Access control
technologies can help protect sensitive data and systems. Access controls
include boundary protection, authentication, and authorization
technologies.
o System integrity controls are used to ensure that a system and its
data are not illicitly modified or corrupted by malicious code. Antivirus
software and integrity checkers are two types of technologies that help to
ensure system integrity.
o Cryptography controls include encryption of data during transmission
and when it is stored on a system. Encryption is the process of
transforming ordinary data into a code form so that the information is
accessible only to those who are authorized to have access. Two
applications of cryptography are virtual private networks and digital
signatures and certificates.
o Audit and monitoring controls help administrators to perform
investigations during and after an attack. We describe four types of audit
and monitoring technologies: intrusion detection systems, intrusion
prevention systems, security event correlation tools, and computer
forensics.
1GAO has previously reported on cybersecurity technologies available to
help secure federal computer systems. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
Information Security: Technologies to Secure Federal Systems, GAO-04-467
(Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004).
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
o Configuration management and assurance controls help administrators to
view and change the security settings on their hosts and networks, verify
the correctness of security settings, and maintain operations in a secure
fashion under duress conditions. We discuss five types of configuration
management and assurance technologies: policy enforcement, network
management, continuity of operations, scanners, and patch management.
Table 10 lists some of the currently available cybersecurity technologies,
organized according to these categories of security controls. Appendix III
provides further details on these technologies.
Table 10: Common Types of Current Cybersecurity Technologies
Category Technology What it does Limitations
Access control
Boundary protection Firewalls Control access to and from a network or Some types
of firewalls are vulnerable to
computer. spoofing. More complex firewalls require more time to pass
message traffic through.
Content management Monitors Web and messaging applications for
inappropriate content, including spam, banned file types, and proprietary
information.
Authentication Biometrics Uses human characteristics, such as
fingerprints, irises, and voices, to establish the identity of the user.
Smart tokens Establish identity of users using an integrated circuit chip
in a portable device such as a smart card or time synchronized token.
Authorization User rights and Allow or prevent access to data, privileges
systems, and actions of users based on the established policies of an
organization.
Need to be able to accurately characterize inappropriate content for the
filters to maximize matches and minimize false matches. For Web pages,
filters may be difficult to keep up-to-date because of the growth of
content on the Internet.
Effectiveness is based on the quality of the devices used. Human
characteristics change over time and individuals may need to periodically
update their information.
Tokens can be lost or stolen and hence cannot reliably be bound to a
specific identity when used in isolation from other methods of
authentication.
Can be cumbersome to maintain in large organizations. Need to establish an
effective balance between reducing unauthorized actions and granting
access to resources to those that have a need for them.
System integrity Antivirus Provides protection Because new types of
software against malicious malicious code
code, such as are discovered on a regular
viruses, worms, and basis, virus
Trojan horses. signature updates are
required on a
regular basis. If not
updated, antivirus
software will not be able
to detect new
viruses.
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
Category Technology What it does Limitations
Integrity checkers Monitor alterations to files Does not prevent changes
on a system to the files,
that are considered critical but can provide a record
to the that changes
organization. did occur. Effectiveness
depends on the
accuracy of the baseline.
Cannot always
distinguish between
authorized and
unauthorized changes to
the baseline.
Cryptography Digital signatures and certificates
Uses public key cryptography to provide (1) assurance that both the sender
and the recipient of a message or transaction will be uniquely identified,
(2) assurance that the data have not been accidentally or deliberately
altered, and (3) verifiable proof of the integrity and origin of the data.
Management processes such as ensuring the security of private keys and
being able to establish trust in certificate authorities are instrumental
to the success of this technology.
Virtual private networks Allow organizations or individuals in two
or more physical locations to establish network connections over a shared
or public network, such as the Internet, with functionality similar to
that of a private network.
Does not ensure the security of the hosts on either end of the virtual
private network. Implementation often requires specialized software or
customization of applications.
Audit and monitoring Intrusion detection Detect inappropriate, incorrect,
or systems anomalous activity on a network or computer system.
Intrusion prevention Build on intrusion detection systems to systems
detect attacks on a network and take Effectiveness is limited by capture
of accurate baselines or normal network or system activity. Technology is
prone to false positives and false negatives and is not as effective in
protecting against unknown attacks. Cannot prevent attacks from damaging
the network or host.
Effectiveness is limited by accuracy of the intrusion detection component.
Technology results in reduced throughput through a network.
action to prevent them from being successful.
Security event Monitor and document actions on
correlation tools network devices and analyze the actions to determine if
an attack is ongoing or has occurred. Enable an organization to determine
if ongoing system activities are operating according to its security
policy.
Computer forensics Identity, preserve, extract, and tools document
computer-based evidence.
These tools are limited by their ability to interface with numerous
security products. Because of the reliance on logs, new attacks that are
not reported on logs may go unseen. Proper access controls to log files
are required to maintain their integrity.
Technology has no standards from which to judge the validity of results
produced by these tools and their admissibility as evidence for law
enforcement purposes.
Policy Enable system Effectiveness is based on
Configuration enforcement administrators to security
engage
management and applications in centralized policies. Some
monitoring and applications do not work
assurance enforcement of an on all operating systems.
organization's
security policies.
Network management Allow for the control and monitoring of Must often
work with different vendornetworks, including management of specific
elements to communicate with its faults, configurations, performance, and
network components. security.
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
Category Technology What it does Limitations
Continuity of Provide a complete backup Technologies may be complex to
operations tools infrastructure to maintain the availability manage. of
systems or networks in the event of an emergency or during planned
maintenance.
Scanners Analyze computers or networks This technology can identify
for
security vulnerabilities. vulnerabilities but does not have
the
capability to fix them. Cannot
identify
unknown vulnerabilities.
Patch management Acquires, tests, and Organization still needs to
applies multiple determine
patches to one or more whether patches will negatively
computer affect the
operation of target systems.
systems. Automated
distribution may create a
potential
security exposure.
Source: GAO analysis.
Access Controls
Boundary protection technologies protect a network or a node by
controlling the network traffic at a network boundary-typically the point
where an internal network or a node connects to an external network such
as the Internet. Typical boundary protection technologies include
firewalls and content management tools.
o Firewalls control the network packets that pass between two networks
or a network and a node, and can keep unwanted external data out and
sensitive internal data in. A firewall acts as a protective barrier
because it is the single point through which both incoming and outgoing
communications pass. There are many types of commercially available
firewalls, including packet filters, stateful inspection firewalls,
application proxy gateways, and dedicated proxy servers. Properly
configured firewalls provide a level of protection for critical
infrastructure systems that connect to the Internet and that are
susceptible to cyber attacks from hackers anywhere in the world.
o Content management or filtering technologies can monitor Web, e-mail,
and other messaging applications for inappropriate content, such as spam,
proprietary information, and banned files types. The technologies can also
check for noncompliance with an organization's security policies. These
technologies can help keep illegal material out of an organization's
systems, reduce network traffic from spam,2 and stop some forms of cyber
attacks. In addition, these tools can track
2Spam is electronic junk mail that is unsolicited and usually is
advertising for some product.
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
which users are browsing the Web, when they are doing so, which sites they
are viewing, and the duration of time spent at those sites.
Authentication technologies help to establish the validity of a user's
claimed identity, typically during access to a system or application (for
example, login). Users can be authenticated using mechanisms such as
requiring them to provide something they have (for example, a smart card);
something they alone know (for example, a password or a personal
identification number); or something they are (for example, a biometric).
Cryptography is also often used to provide integrity to the authentication
process.
o Biometrics cover a wide range of technologies that are used to verify
identity by measuring and analyzing human characteristics. Identifying an
individual's physiological characteristic is based on measuring a part of
the body-such as fingertips and eye irises. Biometrics are theoretically
very effective personal identifiers because the characteristics they
measure are thought to be distinct to each person.
o Smart tokens are easily portable devices that contain an embedded
integrated circuit chip capable of storing and processing data. Smart
cards, a type of smart token, contain an embedded microprocessor and can
exchange data with other systems. Other types of smart tokens include
time-synchronized tokens that generate unique values at regular time
intervals and challenge-response tokens that can produce a onetime
password based on prompts from a central server.
Once a user is authenticated, authorization technologies are used to allow
or prevent actions by that user based on predefined rules. Authorization
technologies support the principles of legitimate use, least privilege,
and separation of duties. These technologies help to define and maintain
what actions an authenticated user can perform once granted access to a
system. Operating systems have some built-in authorization features such
as user rights and privileges, groups of users, and permissions for files
and folders. Network devices, such as routers, may have access lists that
can be used to authorize those who can access and perform certain actions
on the device. Access rights and privileges can be used to implement
security policies that determine what a user can do after being allowed
into the system.
System Integrity Antivirus software can help to detect known viruses and
worms and stop them before they cause damage to a system's software or
data.
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
Antivirus software provides protection against viruses and malicious code
such as worms and Trojan horses. Effective antivirus software should
reliably detect and remove viruses and malicious code, in addition to
preventing the unwanted effects and repairing the damage that could
result. There are several different types of antivirus software, including
signature scanning, where the software contains a database of virus
signatures and scans files in a computer system for certain "signature
strings" that are associated with known viruses. Other technologies scan
for lines of computer code that are associated with virus-like behaviors,
or check untrusted code for suspicious behavior before it is permitted to
execute.
Integrity checking tools can detect whether any critical system files have
been changed, thus enabling the system administrator to look for
unauthorized alteration of the system. Integrity checkers examine stored
files or network packets to determine if they have been altered or
changed. These checkers are based on checksums-a simple mathematical
operation that turns an entire file or a message into a number. More
complex hash functions that result in a fixed string of encrypted data are
also used. The integrity checking process begins with the creation of a
baseline, where checksums or hashes for clean data are computed and saved.
Each time the integrity checker is run, it again makes a checksum or hash
computation and compares the result with the stored value.
Cryptography
Encryption technologies can be used on data to (1) hide their information
content, (2) prevent their undetected modification, and (3) prevent their
unauthorized use. When properly implemented, encryption technologies can
provide assurance regarding the confidentiality, integrity, or origin of
information that has been exchanged. It can also provide a method by which
the authenticity of a document can be confirmed.
Several levels of cryptographic technology are currently in use.
Cryptographic modules implement algorithms that form the building blocks
of cryptographic applications. Using these modules, technologies are
available that can be used to encrypt message transmissions so that
eavesdroppers cannot determine the contents of the message. Digital
signature technologies use cryptography to authenticate the sender of a
message. Hash technologies use cryptography to provide assurance to a
message recipient that the contents of the message have not been altered.
Several cryptographic technologies are used to ensure the confidentiality
and integrity of data as it is being transmitted over the network. These
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
technologies include digital certificates, digital signatures, secure
sockets layer (SSL), and virtual private networks (VPN). Many of these
technologies are built into applications that are commonly available on
many computer systems. For example, most Web browsers support SSL for
secure communications between a computer and the Web server.
Digital signatures use public key cryptography to provide authentication,
data integrity, and nonrepudiation for a message or transaction. Just as a
physical signature helps to provide assurance that a letter has been
written by a specific person, a digital signature helps provide assurance
that a message was sent by a particular individual or machine. A digital
certificate is an electronic credential that can help verify the
association between a public key and a specific entity.
Virtual private networks allow organizations or individuals in two or more
physical locations to establish network connections over a shared or
public network, such as the Internet, with functionality similar to that
of a private network. VPNs establish security procedures and protocols
that encrypt communications between the two end points. VPNs encrypt not
only the data but also the originating and receiving network addresses.
Audit and Monitoring
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS)
monitor and analyze events occurring on a system or network and either
alert appropriate personnel or prevent the attack in progress from
continuing. Both technologies can use a pattern matching algorithm or an
anomaly-based algorithm that identifies deviations from normal network or
system behavior in order to detect attacks. While an IDS can only provide
alerts to an administrator that an attack is occurring, an IPS can take
steps to defend against the attack or mitigate its effects.
Security event correlation tools produce audit logs, or lists of actions,
that have occurred from operating systems, firewalls, applications, and
other devices. Depending on the configuration of the logging functions,
critical activities, such as access to administrator functions, are logged
and can be monitored for anomalous activity. During an investigation, the
logs can be examined to determine the method of entry that was used by an
attacker and to ascertain the level of damage that was caused by the
attack. Because of the volume of data involved on some systems and
networks, correlation tools are available to analyze the logs and identify
key information using particular search terms or correlation analysis.
These tools can provide a dynamic picture of ongoing system activities
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
that can be used to confirm that the system is operating in accordance
with the organization's security policies.
Computer forensics tools identify, preserve, extract, and document
computer-based evidence. They can be used to recover files that have been
deleted, encrypted, or damaged. Computer forensics tools are used during
the investigation of a computer crime to determine the perpetrator and the
methods that were used to conduct the attack. There are two main
categories of computer forensics tools: (1) evidence preservation and
collection tools, which prevent the accidental or deliberate modification
of computer-related evidence, and (2) recovery and analysis tools.
Configuration Management and Assurance
Policy enforcement applications help administrators to define and perform
centralized monitoring and enforcement of an organization's security
policies. These tools examine desktop and server configurations that
define authorized access to specified devices, and they compare these
settings against a baseline policy. These applications provide a
centralized way for administrators to use other security technologies,
such as access control and security event and correlation technologies.
Network management provides system administrators with the ability to
control and monitor a computer network from a central location. Network
management systems obtain status data from network components, enable
network managers to make configuration changes, and alert them of
problems. Network management includes management of faults,
configurations, performance, security, and accounting.
To provide continuity of operations, secure backup tools are available
that can restore system data and functionality in the event of a
disruption. Typically these products have been used to address naturally
occurring problems, such as power outages. But these tools are now being
applied to help recover from system problems resulting from malicious
cyber attacks. Technologies are also available to help systems and
networks continue to operate in spite of an ongoing cyber attack. To keep
systems and networks up and running, many procedural and operational
techniques, such as redundant systems and high-availability systems, are
available.
Scanners are common testing and audit tools, used to identify
vulnerabilities in networks and systems as a part of proactive security
testing. A wide variety of scanners is available that can be used to probe
modems, internet ports, databases, wireless access points, Web pages, and
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
Cybersecurity Standards
applications. These tools often incorporate the capability to monitor the
security posture of the networks and systems by testing and auditing the
security configurations of hosts and networks.
Patch management tools automate the otherwise manual process of acquiring,
testing, and applying patches to a computer system. These tools can be
used to identify missing patches on systems, deploy patches, and generate
reports to track the status of a patch across various computers.
Cybersecurity standards can help to provide the basis for the purchase and
sale of security products by defining a set of rules, conditions, or
requirements that must be met by the products. There are three broad
categories of standards that govern cybersecurity technology: (1) protocol
security standards, such as IPSEC and Secure BGP; (2) product security
criteria, such as Common Criteria protection profiles; and (3) operational
guidelines, such as those issued by NIST. Protocol security standards are
interface standards that define points of connection between two devices.
Product standards establish qualities or requirements for a product to
ensure that it will serve its purpose effectively. Operational guidelines
define a process to be followed in order for a security process or system
to perform effectively.
Designers and builders of products can use protocol and product standards
to create and test products to ensure that they meet the criteria set
forth by the standards. Buyers can select standards-compliant technology
with assurance that the technology meets the standards. There is
considerable interest in cybersecurity standards on the part of
governments, industry associations, and the Internet Engineering Task
Force. However, precise definitions are needed to test whether standards
have been met or not. Such precise definitions are often difficult to
articulate for cybersecurity.
Nevertheless, the development and use of a standard can attract a scrutiny
that helps to reduce design flaws and promote security. Additionally, the
existence of standards promotes the availability of detailed technical
information about a technology, which may serve as a basis for determining
where vulnerabilities remain. At the same time, however, an attack against
a specific standard-conforming technology can succeed against all systems
that use the standard. On the other hand, a single countermeasure could
protect all standards-compliant systems. Thus, standards can help as well
as hurt cybersecurity. Overall, standards would be useful in promoting
cybersecurity because they would make it possible
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
for organizations, including the federal government, to purchase
cybersecurity technologies that meet minimum standards.
Technology standards are developed and adopted in a number of ways. First,
there are national and international standards bodies such as the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) and ISO that typically administer and
coordinate voluntary standardization efforts. ANSI is a private, nonprofit
organization that promotes and facilitates voluntary consensus standards
and conformity assessment systems and safeguards their integrity. ISO is a
network of national standards institutes from 148 countries that works in
partnership with international organizations, governments, industry, and
business and consumer representatives to develop technical standards.
Professional organizations such as the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) develop technical standards in their areas of expertise.
For example, there are IEEE standards for networking technologies such as
Ethernet over many different media, including wireless.
A different standards process drives the Internet standards that are
related to protocols, procedures, and conventions that are used in or by
the Internet. Internet standards begin life as a specification written in
the form of a Request for Comments (RFC) document. The RFC undergoes a
period of development, several iterations of review by the Internet
community, and revision based on experience. Then it is adopted as a
standard by the Internet Engineering Steering Group and is published. The
detailed Internet standards process itself is documented as an RFC.3
Government agencies are also involved in developing and promoting
standards. For example, in the federal government, NIST has the mission to
develop and promote measurement, standards, and technology to enhance
productivity, facilitate trade, and improve the quality of life. NIST is
leading the development of key information system security standards and
guidelines as part of its FISMA Implementation Project. This includes the
development of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) that apply
to information systems built or acquired by the civilian agencies in the
federal government. NIST also publishes many special publications on
3Bradner, Scott, The Internet Standards Process-Revision 3, RFC 2026 (Oct.
1996).
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
computer security that provide guidance to federal agencies on many
aspects of computer security.
Table 11 lists examples of current cybersecurity standards, organized by
high-level control categories.
Table 11: Examples of Cybersecurity Standards
Control category Standards
Access controls Boundary Protection
o Network Address Translation (RFC 3022)
o SOCKS Protocol Version 5 (RFC 1928)
Authentication
o IP Security Protocol (IPSEC)
o DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) (RFC 2535)
o SNMPv3 Security (RFC 3414)
o IEEE P1363 PKI standards
o A One-Time Password System (RFC 2289)
o ISO/IEC 7816: Smart Card Security
o ISO 9798-1: Security Techniques-Entity Authentication Mechanism
Authorization
o CCITT X.500 directory standard
System integrity Integrity
o Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 198: The Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) March 2002
o FIPS 180-2: Secure Hash Standard (SHS), (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512)
o ISO 10118-1: Security Techniques-Hash Functions
Non-repudiation-digital signature
o FIPS 186-2: Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
o ANSI X9.31-1998: Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry
o ANSI X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
o ISO 9796: Security Techniques-Digital Signature Scheme Giving Message
Recovery
o ISO 13888-1: Security Techniques-Non-repudiation
o ASTM E2084-00: Standard Specification for Authentication of Healthcare
Information Using Digital Signatures
Cryptography Encryption algorithms
o RSA Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)
o FIPS 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
o FIPS 46-3: Data Encryption Standard (DES)
o ANSI X9.52-1998: Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation
o FIPS 185: Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)-Skipjack
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
Control category Standards
Encrypted transmission
o Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) v3.0
o Transport Layer Security (TLS) v.1 (RFC 2246)
o IP Security Protocol (IPSEC) and IKE (Internet Key Exchange) (RFC 2409)
o Secure Shell (SSH)
o Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) for VPN (RFC 2661)
o IEEE 802.11 and 802.11i (in process)
o Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) Encrypted storage
o OpenPGP Message Format (RFC 2440)
o MIME Security with OpenPGP (RFC 3156) Audit and monitoring Intrusion
detection
o The Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol (IDXP), Internet Draft
System event correlation tools
o ASTM E2147-01: Standard Specification for Audit and Disclosure Logs
for Use in Health Information Systems
Configuration management and Network management
assurance o Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) (RFC 3416)
Source: GAO analysis.
A number of other security standards and guides cover more than one of the
control categories shown in table 11. One good example is ISO 17799, which
is a standard for information security management.4 Some sectors, such as
the health care sector, have their own guides, such as ASTM E1762,
Standard Guide for Electronic Authentication of Health
5
Care Information.
4International Organization for Standardization, Information Technology -
Code of Practice for Information Security Management, ISO 17799 (2000).
ISO 17799 is a widely recognized information security standard and is
described as a "comprehensive set of controls comprising best practices in
information security".
5ASTM International, Standard Guide for Electronic Authentication of
Health Care Information, ASTM E1762 (2003).
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
Another well-known security standard is the Information Technology
Security Evaluation Criteria, also known as the Common Criteria.6 European
and North American governments are moving toward Common Criteria as a
unified set of security criteria. Version 2 of the Common Criteria
attempts to reconcile a number of existing criteria, including the United
States Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, the so-called Orange
Book criteria. Common Criteria has two underlying dimensions: (1) the
protection profiles that capture the security functionality, and (2) the
evaluation assurance level that specifies how much to trust the claims of
the security profile.
Standards such as the Common Criteria are written in general terms because
the criteria must cover a variety of products and technologies. When such
criteria are applied to a specific product, the criteria must be
interpreted, and it is the interpretation that sets the level of security
that the product must meet.
NIST and NSA are undertaking a collaborative effort, the National
Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP), to produce comprehensive
security requirements and security specifications for key technologies
that will be used to build more secure systems for federal agencies. These
security requirements and security specifications will be developed with
significant industry involvement and will employ the Common Criteria.
Protection profiles in key technology areas such as operating systems,
firewalls, smart cards, biometrics devices, database systems, public key
infrastructure (PKI) components, network devices, virtual private
networks, intrusion detection systems, and Web browsers will be the
primary focus of this project.
The NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Web site also
provides information about Common Criteria-validated products, validated
protection profiles, products that are in evaluation, and protection
profiles that are in development.7 For example, some of the
6Common Criteria consists of three ISO standards: ISO 15408-1 Information
Technology- Security Techniques-Evaluation Criteria for IT Security-Part
1: Introduction and General Model (1999); ISO 15408-2 Information
Technology-Security Techniques- Evaluation Criteria for IT Security-Part
2: Security Functional Requirements (1999); and ISO 15408-3 Information
Technology- Security Techniques-Evaluation Criteria for IT Security-Part
3: Security Assurance Requirements (1999).
7Validated product lists are available online at the Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme Web site at
http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/ValidatedProducts.html.
Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Technologies and Standards
validated product types include switches, routers, wireless local area
networks, firewalls, virtual private networks, operating systems,
antivirus software, biometrics, and intrusion detection systems. Validated
U.S. government protection profiles exist for a number of security
technologies such as firewalls, operating systems, smart card tokens, and
intrusion detection systems.
In addition to supporting Common Criteria evaluations of products, NIST
operates the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), which uses
independent, accredited, private sector laboratories, to perform security
testing of cryptographic modules for conformance to FIPS 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, and related federal cryptographic
algorithm standards. A government body validates the results of the CMVP
testing, and evaluation processes to ensure that the security standards
are being applied correctly and consistently.
Unfortunately it takes time and money to evaluate products against the
Common Criteria. There is a shortage of evaluated components, and there is
little or no rigorous methodology for assessing the security of systems
composed of components that have been evaluated using the Common Criteria.
Further, with an ever increasing number of threats emerging, Common
Criteria protection profiles would need to be regularly updated to ensure
that products certified with the criteria remain secure.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Critical infrastructure owners are ultimately responsible for addressing
their cybersecurity needs. However, as we have described, there are
several other stakeholders involved with efforts to enhance cybersecurity.
For some infrastructure sectors, sector coordinators-individuals or
organizations-perform a collective role in helping the entities within
their sector to improve cybersecurity. In addition, federal, state, and
local governments have a stake in ensuring that the interests of national
security and the public good are addressed, and they have a variety of
policy tools that can be used to influence how the nation's critical
infrastructures are protected, including regulations, grants, and
partnerships. In some cases, the federal government plays an important
role in the operations of a critical infrastructure sector. For example,
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic control system is
essential to the operations of the aviation transportation sector. IT
manufacturers, including cybersecurity technology companies, develop and
market the tools used by critical infrastructure owners to conduct their
business and protect their information technology infrastructure from
security risks. All of these parties face various challenges in addressing
the nation's cybersecurity needs. Such challenges range from identifying
cybersecurity problems within an organization to creating business cases
so that specific cybersecurity technologies can be deployed in or
developed for it. Many of these challenges are common to all types of
critical infrastructures while some challenges are unique to specific
sectors. Concomitant with the challenges, there are opportunities for
action by the federal government, critical infrastructure sectors,
individual entities that own critical infrastructures, and technology
manufacturers.
This chapter focuses on two major categories of potential actions for
improving cybersecurity for CIP. First, the implementation of available
cybersecurity technologies and processes could help address critical
infrastructure owners' immediate cybersecurity needs. We present
cybersecurity challenges that are faced by critical infrastructure owners
and suggest approaches and actions that are available to help meet those
challenges, including the use of cybersecurity technology.
Second, we discuss policy options available to the federal government that
can make more cybersecurity technologies available and encourage their use
by infrastructure owners. Several activities have already been undertaken
by the federal government and by critical infrastructure sectors to
improve critical infrastructure protection. To determine whether to
continue or expand current programs or to develop new cybersecurity
programs, it would be useful to examine the effectiveness of these current
activities and assess whether further investment is required.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
A Risk-Based Framework for Infrastructure Owners to Implement
Cybersecurity Technologies
Further, an important common thread in all the opportunities for actions
is the certainty of consequences-both intended and unintended-of any
policy action. Before proposing or implementing any policy action, the
federal government needs to consider these potential consequences, as well
as the costs and benefits of the action.
A basic challenge facing critical infrastructure owners is that they have
to address many different issues that affect their operations. Security
issues, both physical and cyber, are only one element of what affects an
entity's operations. Management's primary concern is the day-to-day
operation, the investments needed for the future, and stakeholder,
stockholder or owner satisfaction with its performance. An overall
security framework can help an entity properly evaluate the importance of
cybersecurity problems within the context of its operations. Security best
practices recommend that a risk assessment methodology be used to make
informed security investment decisions. If an entity has not conducted a
risk assessment, it cannot know the extent of its cybersecurity problem.
Even when it knows the extent of cybersecurity needs, it cannot protect
everything. Further, an entity often needs a business case to invest in
cybersecurity.
On the basis of the results of a risk assessment, infrastructure owners
can implement available cybersecurity technologies to mitigate identified
risks. There are several categories of cybersecurity technologies
available that could be used to better secure critical infrastructure
systems. However, infrastructure owners also need to bear in mind the
limitations of these technologies, as well as the interactions of the
technologies with the security processes and the people using the
technologies.
Using an Overall It is important to think of cybersecurity in an overall
framework (see Framework for figure 4) that includes the following
processes: (1) determining the Cybersecurity business requirements for
security; (2) performing risk assessments;
(3) establishing a security policy; (4) implementing a cybersecurity
solution that includes people, process, and technology to mitigate
identified security risks; and (5) monitoring and managing security
continuously.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Figure 4: An Overall Framework for Security
Source: GAO analysis.
A cybersecurity framework starts with the development of a security policy
based on business requirements and a risk analysis. The business
requirements identify the needs of the enterprise, including cybersecurity
requirements-the computer resources and information that have to be
protected, including any requirements imposed by applicable laws, such as
HIPAA, FISMA, and requirements to protect the privacy of some types of
data. Some risks are external to the entity conducting the risk assessment
and involve considerations beyond the risks that are within the entity's
control.
On the basis of the risk analysis and the business requirements for
cybersecurity, an entity can develop its security policy. Such a security
policy typically addresses high-level objectives such as ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and systems. As we
previously described, we found that sector entities generally share these
basic cybersecurity objectives for their systems and networks, but they
vary in the relative importance they place on these objectives based on
the operational area or function involved.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
These security objectives are achieved by implementing cybersecurity
solutions that make use of people, process, and technology. Because of the
variation in cybersecurity objectives among critical infrastructure
sectors, while the types of IT and cybersecurity technologies are the same
across all sector entities, the details of implementation and the level of
their use differ from one sector to another. In addition to implementing
security solutions, entities need security management that continuously
protects against, detects, and reacts to any security incidents. The
combination of risk analysis, security policy, security solutions, and
security management provides the overall cybersecurity framework and
represents a continuous process. Such an overall security framework can
help an entity to establish a common level of understanding of its
cybersecurity posture and a common basis for the design and implementation
of cybersecurity solutions in it.
Risk Assessments Are Key
to Cybersecurity Planning
Risk analysis or risk assessment is a key component within the overall
framework for cybersecurity. The approach to good security is
fundamentally similar, regardless of the assets being protected. As we
have previously reported, applying risk management principles can provide
a sound foundation for effective security whether the assets are
information, operations, people, or federal facilities.1 A risk management
methodology can provide the basic information that is required to make
decisions on how to protect an entity's information systems. As seen in
figure 5, these principles can be reduced to five basic steps that help to
determine responses to five essential questions:
1U.S. General Accounting Office, National Preparedness: Technologies to
Secure Federal Buildings, GAO-02-687T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2002).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Figure 5: Five Steps in the Risk Management Process
Source: GAO analysis.
What Am I Protecting?
The first step in risk management is to identify the assets that must be
protected and the impact of their potential loss.
Who Are My Adversaries?
The second step is to identify and characterize the threat to these
assets. The intent and capability of an adversary are the principal
criteria for establishing the degree of threat to the identified assets.
How Am I Vulnerable?
Step three involves identifying and characterizing vulnerabilities that
would allow identified threats to be realized. In other words, what
weaknesses would allow a security breach?
What Are My Priorities?
In the fourth step, risk must be assessed and priorities determined for
protecting assets. Risk assessment examines the potential for the loss of
or damage to an asset. Risk levels are established by assessing the impact
of loss or damage, threats to the asset, and vulnerabilities.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
What Can I Do?
The final step is to identify countermeasures to reduce or eliminate
risks. In doing so, the advantages and benefits of these countermeasures
must also be weighed against their disadvantages and costs.
One of the roadblocks to understanding the importance of cybersecurity is
the lack of solid information on the scope and scale of cyber
vulnerabilities and the consequences of cyber attacks. Risk assessment is
a key proactive step that can be used to help an entity decide what to do
to protect its cyber assets from potential attacks. Risk assessment
provides a framework for analyzing alternatives to mitigate risks and
implement countermeasures. Instead of reacting to the latest news of
vulnerabilities in software, critical infrastructure owners can use the
results of risk assessments to proactively take steps to reduce the risks
of cyber attacks. It is important to note that it is not practical or
possible to eliminate all risks. There will always be some level of risk
that cannot be mitigated without unacceptably large expenditures or the
use of overly obtrusive controls.
Risk assessments can be conducted by both sector-wide organizations and
critical infrastructure owners. A sector's risk assessment should be based
on its knowledge of its exposure to various threats, and it should provide
guidance to infrastructure owners on which risks may apply to them. Some
infrastructure sectors have completed risk assessments for their sector.
For example, the rail segment of the transportation infrastructure sector
performed a terrorism risk analysis and related security management plan
that provides recommended actions under various alert levels.
Critical infrastructure owners in each sector also conduct risk
assessments for their own enterprise and develop mitigation approaches
based on available countermeasures. For example, entities within the
electric, banking and finance, and chemical sectors have performed risk
assessments. These infrastructure owners periodically reassess threats and
vulnerabilities after implementing the countermeasures. Thus, risk
assessment is a continuing task for any entity that has responsibility for
protecting critical infrastructures.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
However, while risk assessment is a commonly accepted practice, not all
sector entities employ it. Some entities do not even know which of their
assets need to be protected, while others have not conducted a
vulnerability assessment. Entities in some sectors seem more accustomed
than others to using risk assessments for cybersecurity. For example, the
banking and finance sector routinely performs risk assessments in the
conduct of its business, so its culture seems better suited to taking a
riskbased approach to cybersecurity. In addition, regulations require
banks to be proactive about cybersecurity monitoring and response.
Risk is the combination of two probabilities: (1) the probability that a
threat exists that will locate and exploit a vulnerability and (2) the
probability that the threat will succeed in its attempt. A combination of
the threat, the vulnerability being exploited by the threat, and the
effect of a realized threat can guide entities to mitigate the greatest
security risks. Because infrastructure entities have limited resources, a
risk management approach can help them focus their efforts on those areas
most at risk.
To conduct risk assessments, entities need information about threats and
vulnerabilities. Vulnerability information is documented in a variety of
publicly available sources. Some well-known online resources that identify
and categorize cybersecurity vulnerabilities include the following:
o CERT/CC analyzes vulnerabilities and issues advisories on the most
urgent of problems. For less critical problems, CERT/CC publishes incident
notes and vulnerability notes.2
o Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is a list of standardized
names of vulnerabilities.3 It is common practice to use CVE names to
describe vulnerabilities.
o The ICAT Metabase is a searchable index of information on computer
vulnerabilities, published by NIST.4 The ICAT vulnerability index lists
over 6,200 vulnerabilities, and it provides links to vulnerability
advisories and patch information for each vulnerability.
2The CERT/CC vulnerability notes database can be accessed at
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/.
3Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures is available online at
http://cve.mitre.org/.
4The ICAT Metabase is available online at http://icat.nist.gov/.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
o The SANS Institute publishes the SANS/FBI Top 20 List-a list of the 20
most critical Internet security vulnerabilities that is updated
periodically.5
Sector entities can identify relevant cyber vulnerabilities based on their
understanding of the assets in their system environment. The President's
National Strategy for Homeland Security states that comprehensive
vulnerability assessments of all of our nation's critical infrastructures
are important from a planning perspective because they can enable
authorities to evaluate the potential effects of an attack on a given
sector and then invest accordingly to protect it. Without a vulnerability
assessment, sector entities will not have a comprehensive approach to
determine what parts of their information technology infrastructure
require security investments. While some vulnerabilities may be addressed
in such an ad hoc manner, it will be difficult to know with any certainty
that those vulnerabilities that could cause the greatest harm or are most
likely to be exploited have been addressed.
A more proactive testing approach can also be used to identify system
vulnerabilities. Sector entities can use automated vulnerability scanning
tools that scan a group of hosts or a network for known vulnerable
services. Another approach is to conduct a security test and evaluation.
Such an approach entails the development and execution of a plan to test
the effectiveness of the security controls of IT systems. Penetration
testing can also be employed to test for unknown problems. The objective
of penetration testing is to test systems and networks from the viewpoint
of a threat and identify potential failures in the security control
environment.
Although the general threats to cybersecurity are well known, the specific
threats to each critical infrastructure sector may not be readily apparent
to the entities within the sector. While some sectors have their own
threat assessment capability, other sectors rely on the government to
provide them with information on threats. It is critical to ensure that
appropriate intelligence and other threat information, both cyber and
physical, is received from the intelligence and law enforcement
communities. Since the 1990s, the national security community and the
Congress have identified the need to establish analysis and warning
capabilities to protect against strategic computer attacks on the nation's
critical computerdependent infrastructures. Such capabilities should
address both cyber
5The SANS/FBI Top 20 List is available online at
http://www.sans.org/top20/.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
and physical threats and involve (1) gathering and analyzing information
for the purpose of detecting and reporting otherwise potentially damaging
actions or intentions and (2) implementing a process for warning policy
makers and allowing them time to determine the magnitude of the related
risks.
During a risk assessment, it is important to consider the threat that
insiders pose to critical infrastructures. As we have described, because
of the access that insiders have to an organization's computer systems,
the damage that can be caused by them can be severe. Several steps can be
taken to prevent insiders from causing damage to a system. Placing limits
on access to sensitive systems and information and separating the duties
of employees can minimize the damage that an insider can cause. In
addition, organizations can maintain and review reliable logs that track
user actions. Technologies can also be used that help to secure the
sensitive systems and detect unauthorized access.
Risk assessment also requires an estimate of the consequences of a risk.
This entails estimating what happens to an entity if a threat succeeds in
exploiting a specific vulnerability in its networked information systems.
However, it is difficult to estimate the effect of failures caused by
cyber attacks. For example, attacks on Internet infrastructures such as
the domain name servers can be varied. Corporations that manage their own
internal networks may be totally unaffected by such an attack. Even
widespread outages may not affect some users if they have access to cached
information. There have been many reports highlighting the monetary impact
of cyber attacks, but the basis of those costs are not well understood.
The inability to predict the consequences of cyber attacks complicates the
process of assessing risks.
Protection, Detection, and Reaction Are Integral Security Concepts
Because it is impossible to protect computer systems from all attacks,
countermeasures identified through the risk management process must
support three integral concepts of a holistic security program:
protection, detection, and reaction (see figure 6). Protection provides
countermeasures such as policies, procedures, and technical controls to
defend against attacks on the assets being protected. Detection monitors
for potential breakdowns in the protective measures that could result in
security breaches. Reaction, which often requires human involvement,
responds to detected breaches to thwart attacks before damage can be done.
Because absolute protection from attacks is impossible to achieve, a
security program that does not incorporate detection and reaction is
incomplete.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Figure 6: Protection, Detection, and Reaction Are All Essential to
Cybersecurity
Source: GAO.
There is a variety of cybersecurity technologies available for addressing
protection, detection, and reaction. For example, firewalls can protect a
network from some attacks as well as detect when those attacks are
attempted. However, some aspects of the protection-detection-reaction
triad are difficult to support with current technologies and practices.
For example, because of limitations in the current Internet environment,
the tracking and tracing of cyber attacks is a very difficult task. The
ability to identify the source of an attack could allow for a better
response and potentially contain the damage caused by the attack. Law
enforcement needs this information in order to investigate, collect
evidence, and potentially prosecute the perpetrators of the attack.
One key problem is the untrustworthiness of the source IP address in
Internet data packets. The source IP address is supposed to be the IP
address of the originator of the network message. However, because the
Internet was originally designed to be used by trusted users, no
authentication of the source of messages was built into internet
protocols. It is possible for malicious users to forge the source address
of IP packets to obscure the real source of the attack. Further, IP
addresses may identify only a computer involved in the attack. Because of
the prevalence of
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
publicly available computers and of weak access controls and authorization
policies on private computers, linking a computer to an attack does not
necessarily link the attack to a specific person.
Another key problem is that the Internet crosses administrative and
geopolitical boundaries. Different organizations administer different
parts of the Internet. There is no central administrative authority of the
Internet. While there are common technical standards and protocols that
need to be followed by each administrative domain, there are different
governing structures in each country. Depending on the configuration of
routing tables and network traffic, an IP packet can cross multiple
administrative and geopolitical boundaries as it journeys to its
destination. The tracing of attacks could require cooperation from several
administrative organizations of the Internet to obtain information about
the packets in question. If an organization is uncooperative and law
enforcement has no legal means to ensure its cooperation, it becomes
extremely difficult to trace attacks back to their origin. One of the
problems is that there are no universal laws or agreements as to what
constitutes a cyber attack.
A Business Case Needs to Be Made for Cybersecurity
Best practices for information technology investment recommend that prior
to making any significant project investment, information about the
benefits and costs of the investment should be analyzed and assessed in
detail. It is further recommended that a business case be developed that
identifies the organizational needs for the system and provides a clear
statement of the high-level system goals. The high-level goals address the
system's expected outcomes, such as preventing unauthorized users from
gaining access to a system or detecting and logging security breaches.
Certain performance parameters, such as transaction times or maximum
loads, are also usually specified.
Some critical infrastructure sector representatives told us that it is
difficult for them to address cybersecurity unless it makes business sense
to do so-that is, the investment is cost-beneficial. Typically this means
that investments must generate revenue, save or avoid costs, or increase
productivity. In some cases, IT investments are undertaken for
nonquantitative reasons, such as strategic impact or because such
investments are necessary to protect critical infrastructure important to
national security. While most companies realize that information security
breaches are bad for business, in some cases, information security
managers find it difficult to justify investments in security based only
on the fear of attacks.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
However, security managers face challenges in providing this type of
justification. According to the Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection (I3P), there are insufficient models and a lack of data to
support effective decision making. I3P identified the need for additional
research and development in the area of economic analysis in its
cybersecurity research and development agenda. It states that sound models
to assess the costs and benefits of cybersecurity alternatives need to be
developed, and that methods are required to better predict the
consequences of risk management choices.
Cost-benefit analyses and return-on-investment calculations are the normal
methods used to justify investments. Security technology manufacturers and
managed security service providers, as well as some researchers, have
developed methodologies to perform this type of analysis for security.
Decision makers also lack baseline data on the costs, benefits, and
effects of security controls from an economic and technical perspective.
While it is possible to determine the costs of security, it is difficult
to quantify the value from such investments because good and consistent
security metrics are not available. Without metrics, it is difficult to
assess the effectiveness of different security options. NIST has developed
guidelines on developing security metrics that could be used to help
justify security investments.6 NIST is also developing guidelines for
federal agencies to use to support successful integration of security into
the capital investment planning process.
Other Needs Compete with Cybersecurity for Resources
Organizations have limited resources-people and money-and consequently,
they typically focus on improving cybersecurity only to the extent that
those security needs are necessary to continue their business operations
or are demanded by their customers. As we have described, in order to
maximize the return from these resources, an entity is best served by
taking a risk-based view that considers all the risks that the entity
faces. According to its own prioritization of these risks, the entity may
determine the threat of cyber attacks to be a significant risk that it
must mitigate. At this point, the entity can proceed to implement
countermeasures to
6National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security Metrics Guide
for Information Technology Systems, NIST Special Publication 800-55
(Gaithersburg, MD: July, 2003).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
mitigate the risk of cyber attacks, based on its analysis of the
costeffectiveness of the countermeasures.
On the other hand, an entity may find that the threat of cyber attacks is
not its most significant problem. As we have described, not all threats
that an infrastructure faces are of the cyber variety-many threats are
physical. By using a risk assessment approach, an entity may determine
that the combination of threat, vulnerability, and consequences of
physical risks outweigh those of cyber risks. The entity may then
primarily implement countermeasures to address those risks and pay less
attention to cyber risks.
As we have mentioned, most of the critical infrastructure is owned by the
private sector. Similarly, most manufacturers of cybersecurity technology
are also in the private sector. These organizations balance the competing
needs of their own commercial enterprise, national security, and law
enforcement.
o Commercial enterprise needs. As we have described, investing in
cybersecurity has to make business sense. Typically, this means that
companies need to see some type of value to the investment, through either
increased sales or reduced costs. However, if a company's customers are
not asking for security in its products, it is unlikely that the company
will build security into its offerings. Even without an appreciable
product or service benefit, a company may still be willing to invest in
cybersecurity technologies if doing so will reduce its overall cost
structure. However, without a noticeable benefit in either increased sales
or a reduction in costs, it becomes very difficult for a company to
justify an investment in cybersecurity technology.
o National security needs. The designation of critical infrastructure
includes those systems and assets that are vital to national security,
national economic security, or national public health and safety. However,
because most of the critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the
private sector, the federal government alone cannot ensure the security of
these systems and assets. While it may provide assistance, cultivate
partnerships, and establish regulations, the federal government relies on
the private sector to carry out its critical infrastructure protection
responsibilities.
o Law enforcement needs. As we have described, it is impossible to
achieve 100 percent protection. Therefore, it is necessary to implement
detection and response capabilities into a security program. The needs of
law enforcement are part of these capabilities. The ability to
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
successfully prosecute and convict cyber criminals can also act as a
deterrent to others. However, such cases require that companies cooperate
with law enforcement and be able to provide evidence of criminal behavior.
A working group of law enforcement and industry representatives has issued
guidelines for evidence collection for computer crimes.7
The needs of these three distinct objectives sometimes conflict with one
another. The national security needs could motivate a company to invest in
protection technologies and strategies, such as firewalls and access
control technologies. The law enforcement needs could cause a company to
invest in detection technologies such as intrusion detection systems and
audit and logging technologies. However, investment in cybersecurity
technologies for national security or law enforcement purposes instead of
business reasons can be a tough sell in many companies.
Further, to initiate law enforcement actions against the perpetrator of an
attack, a company must report the attack. The reporting of an attack could
have a negative business effect, and because of that companies may choose
not to report attacks. According to a survey conducted by CSI and the FBI
in 2003, only 30 percent of respondents reported computer security
incidents to law enforcement.8 Seventy percent of respondents reported
that they did not report intrusions to law enforcement because of concerns
about negative publicity. Sixty-one percent were concerned that
competitors would use information about computer attacks to their
advantage.
We found that entities within the different sectors have different
motivations for implementing different levels of cybersecurity. In the
absence of any specific guidance from government or the infrastructure
sector, some infrastructure owners typically focus on what is best for
their own business or mission. To help ensure that national security needs
are met, it may be necessary for the federal government to reduce the
difference between the commercial needs of an entity and the needs of
national security and law enforcement by providing incentives such as
funding for cybersecurity improvements. Some of the potential
7International Association of Chiefs of Police Advisory Committee for
Police Investigative Operations, Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, Technical
Support Working Group, and the United States Secret Service, Best
Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence, Version 2.0.
8CSI. 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
government investments for the public benefit include hardening the
Internet, securing the public health network, and making the power grid
resilient. Government resources, however, are limited, and these
investments need to be prioritized based on the overall criticality of the
infrastructures.
Some Risks Are Beyond the Control of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
Infrastructures Are Interdependent
A vulnerability assessment may find that there are dependencies on systems
or infrastructures beyond the control of an entity. For example, several
sectors are dependent on the electrical grid and the telecommunications
infrastructure. Some sectors are dependent on computer systems that are
operated by other sectors or by the federal government. These
interconnections could lead to the introduction of vulnerabilities, and
they should be accounted for accordingly.
However, because many of these dependencies are beyond the control of the
entity, the options for mitigating these potential vulnerabilities may be
limited. To account for such a failure, one possible option for dependent
entities is to develop a business continuity plan. As part of a risk
management process, a business continuity plan can help an entity to
identify its most critical business processes and the actions it can take
before and during an outage to mitigate potential risks. Depending on the
service provided by the external organization, the criticality of the
business process, and the cost of the mitigation strategies, an entity
could develop an action plan that would allow it to continue business as
usual; operate at some degraded, but minimally acceptable, level; or cease
operations until the outage is corrected.
Critical infrastructures rely on one another to successfully perform their
primary functions. As discussed earlier, understanding these
interdependent relationships is critical to protecting our nation's
economy, security, and public health. The National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace discusses the risks posed by interdependent sectors. It states
that unsecured sectors of the economy can be used to attack other sectors
and that disruptions in one sector may have cascading effects that can
disrupt multiple parts of the nation's critical infrastructure.
For example, the banking and finance infrastructure and the federal
government have raised concerns about the financial services sector's
interdependency with other critical infrastructures, including
telecommunications and energy, and the potential negative impact that
attacks in those sectors could have on its ability to operate. According
to the financial services sector's national strategy, the industry must
take into account the effect of damage from disruptions in other critical
sectors,
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
such as telecommunications, electrical power, and transportation. The
attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the dependence of the
financial services industry on the stability of other sectors'
infrastructures. For example, the industry was negatively affected by
disrupted communications for its broker-dealers, clearing banks, and other
core institutions.9 In addition, other sectors are dependent on the
banking and finance infrastructure. For example, the chemical industry
relies on it for currency management and funding.
The August 2003 electricity blackout demonstrated the effect of the water
infrastructure's dependency on the electric sector. Wastewater treatment
plants in Cleveland, Detroit, New York, and other locations that lacked
backup generation systems discharged millions of gallons of untreated
sewage, and power failures at drinking water plants led to boil-water
advisories in many communities.
According to industry representatives, the chemical sector is dependent on
emergency services, information technology and telecommunications, energy,
transportation, and banking and finance. For example, it is highly
dependent on rail, trucking, and pipeline services for movement of its
products. According to the industry, in 2001, more than 760 million tons
of chemical products were shipped by domestic truck, rail, water, and
other means. In addition, the industry has a strong relationship with
emergency services in communities across the United States in order to
enhance their ability to respond to emergencies. Entities within the
chemical infrastructure are also dependent on each other as suppliers and
customers of each other's products. While the chemical infrastructure is
reliant on other infrastructures, industry representatives identified
several sectors that are dependent on the chemical infrastructure,
including
o agriculture for pesticides, insecticides, and fertilizers;
o emergency services for protective equipment and agents;
o food for packaging;
o information and telecommunications for products that protect memory
chips;
9Banking and Finance Sector, Defending America's Cyberspace: Banking and
Finance
Sector: The National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Assurance,
Version 1.0
(May 13, 2002).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Infrastructures Rely on Federal and Third-Party Systems
o public health for devices that neutralize weapons of mass destruction;
and
o water for water purifiers.
While these examples indicate that the critical infrastructures are
interdependent, the full extent of all the interdependencies is hard to
determine.
Some officials stated that their infrastructures rely on the availability
of centrally controlled or federal systems that are essential to critical
operations. For example, according to an infrastructure representative,
the banking and finance sector relies upon critical systems related to the
clearance and settlement activities for open transactions in the wholesale
financial market, which are performed by a combination of
governmentsponsored services, industry-owned organizations, and private
sector firms. According to an interagency paper on strengthening the U.S.
financial system, the failure of firms that play a significant role in
critical financial markets (defined in the paper as federal funds, foreign
exchange, and commercial paper; U.S. government and agency securities; and
corporate debt and equity securities) to settle their own or their
customers' pending material transactions by the end of the business day
could threaten the stability of financial markets.10
In addition, according to a Transportation Research Board report, the
freight industry has links to government agencies, including manifest
filings, operating authorities and permits, and electronic funds
transfer.11 For example, ocean carriers must post information on imported
cargo on a DHS Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (formerly the U.S.
Customs Service) system-the Automated Manifest System (AMS). According a
shipping industry representative, there is now a requirement to submit
cargo manifests to this system 24 hours before loading in the foreign port
for cargoes destined for the United States. He added that AMS
10In April 2003, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a study titled
Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the
U.S. Financial System to advise financial institutions on steps necessary
to protect the financial system. The practices focus on the appropriate
backup capacity necessary for recovery and resumption of clearance and
settlement for material open transactions in the wholesale financial
market.
11National Research Council, Cybersecurity of Freight Information Systems:
A Scoping Study (Washington, D.C.: 2003).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
and a related system are becoming the preeminent centralized government
data management systems for security prescreening of imported cargoes.
Recently, DHS proposed the mandatory electronic submission of advance
import cargo information to AMS for all transportation modes. DHS also has
proposed that advance information for all export cargoes from the United
States be submitted, for all modes, to the agency's Automated Export
System, to enhance cargo security. According to a shipping industry
official, disabling one or more of these systems could have results at
least as disastrous as those of a physical attack on the maritime
infrastructure by stopping the flow of goods. The importance of the Global
Positioning System (GPS) to the transportation sector has also been
pointed out in multiple reports.12 DoD maintains GPS, which includes 24
satellites and provides high levels of accuracy in determining Earth
positions using triangulation principles and land-based receivers. GPS is
used to track the locations of trailers, trucks, railcars, and other
mobile assets and their contents.
The aviation-related segments of the transportation infrastructure rely on
the availability of the air traffic control system to safely and
efficiently move people and goods. The U.S. civil aviation system
comprises thousands of airports and aircraft and over 12 million flights
each year that carry over 60 million passengers. To carry out its duties,
the FAA has approximately 50,000 employees who oversee federal interests
in the national airspace system, working at more than 5,000 public use
airports. In addition, federal information systems are in use at over
38,000 facilities. These systems are relied on for both passenger and
commercial air transportation. Air traffic control systems are responsible
for overseeing and tracking most air traffic, including both departing and
approaching aircraft. FAA systems provide information to aircraft
regarding weather, routes, terrain, and flight plans. There would be
detrimental effects on the national economy and possibly on passenger
safety if these systems did not function properly.
12NRC, Cybersecurity of Freight Information Systems and the President's
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, Information
Infrastructure Group Report (June 1999).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Considerations for Implementing Current Cybersecurity Technologies
In the near term, critical infrastructure owners face the challenge, based
on risk assessments, of developing and implementing strategies to mitigate
identified risks. Risk mitigation strategies are a matter of trade-offs
among different options, such as adding security to a large number of
products, adding significant security features to a few selected products,
or increasing the ability to identify and quarantine attackers.
As we have described, there are several cybersecurity technologies that
can be used to improve the security posture of critical infrastructure
owners. Organizations can select from and implement available
cybersecurity technologies to mitigate the highest cybersecurity risks.
Best practices recommend that technologies be selected and implemented in
the context of an overall security management process that is designed to
address the identified risk mitigation strategy. Individually, these
technologies address specific cyber vulnerabilities, and in this sense,
each technology is a point solution. The selection of multiple
technologies should be in the context of the overall system and not aimed
solely at specific components of the system.
When implementing cybersecurity technologies, it is important to consider
the effects of the technologies and processes on the entity's business.
The entity has to balance security against the level of service that the
computers and network must provide in order to operate the critical
infrastructure. In other words, a system that is not connected to any
network is safe from cyber attacks, but it may not do anything useful for
the critical infrastructure. If an authentication process takes too long,
users may try to bypass the process or use different ways to conduct their
business. For example, control systems have been cited as being difficult
to secure because their limited computing resources cannot support
security technologies such as encryption without hindering performance.
Further, when selecting and implementing these technologies, it is
important to bear in mind that they are not cure-alls. There are
limitations to some of these technologies. Technology is only part of the
solution. Poorly trained personnel or ineffective security processes can
limit the effectiveness of good technology.
Limitations of It is important to take into consideration the limitations
of cybersecurity Cybersecurity technologies. Security processes must
account for these limitations, and Technologies the people responsible for
using the technology and implementing the
security process need to be aware of these issues.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Some technologies are sold as definitive solutions to cybersecurity
problems. However, specific technologies can help to solve only a limited
number of problems. For instance, firewalls can control the flow of
traffic between networks. However, they cannot protect against threats
from within the network. Antivirus software can help protect against
viruses and worms but cannot protect the confidentiality of data on a
system. A suite of technologies is required to adequately protect most
computer systems.
Further, infrastructure owners need to determine how effective
technologies really are. Because there is a lack of security standards and
metrics, it is difficult for buyers to quantitatively determine the
effectiveness and performance of cybersecurity technologies. For example,
during our review of biometrics, we found instances in which the
performance estimates that vendors provided were far more impressive than
those obtained through independent testing.13
Also, some technologies, such as biometrics and intrusion detection
systems, have to account for exception processing. False matches and false
nonmatches sometimes occur with these types of technologies, and
procedures need to be developed to handle these situations. Exception
processing that is not as good as primary processing could be exploited as
a security hole. For example, for the use of smart card technologies,
administrators would need to consider how to handle users whose cards are
not being recognized. Under what conditions will an administrator allow
access to such a user?
Further, the constraints that some IT environments face in using
cybersecurity technologies need to be considered. For instance, according
to industry experts, the use of existing security technologies, as well as
strong user authentication and patch management practices, generally
cannot be implemented in control systems because control systems operate
in real time, typically are not designed with cybersecurity in mind, and
usually have limited processing capabilities. Existing security
technologies, such as authorization, authentication, encryption, intrusion
detection, and filtering of network traffic and communications require
more bandwidth, processing power, and memory than control system
components typically have. Because controller stations are generally
13GAO-02-687T and U.S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment:
Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
15, 2002).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
designed to do specific tasks, they use low-cost, resource-constrained
microprocessors. In fact, some devices in the electrical industry still
use the Intel 8088 processor, introduced in 1978. Consequently, it is
difficult to install existing security technologies without seriously
degrading the performance of the control system. Further, complex
passwords and other strong password practices are not always used to
prevent unauthorized access to control systems, in part because their use
could hinder a rapid response to safety procedures during an emergency. As
a result, according to industry officials, weak passwords that are easy to
guess, shared, or infrequently changed are reportedly common in control
systems. Sometimes a default password or even no password at all is used.
In addition, although modern control systems are based on standard
operating systems, they are typically customized to support control system
applications. Consequently, vendor-provided software patches are generally
either incompatible or cannot be implemented without compromising service
by shutting down "always-on" systems or affecting interdependent
operations. Although technologies such as robust firewalls and strong
authentication can be employed to better segment control systems from
enterprise networks, research and development could help to address the
application of security technologies to the control systems themselves.
Information security organizations have noted that a gap exists between
current security technologies and needed additional research and
development to secure control systems.
Poor Implementations Can Reduce the Effectiveness of Cybersecurity
Technologies
When implementing technologies, it is important to note that each element
of the technology-people-process triad plays a role in the cybersecurity
of critical infrastructures (see figure 7). Strong processes can often
help to overcome potential vulnerabilities in a security product, while
poor implementation can render good technologies ineffective. Often, human
weaknesses can diminish the effectiveness of technology. A prime example
is the millions of PCs that have unnecessary Internet and networking
services running simply because users are unaware that these services are
running by default and could contain vulnerabilities.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Figure 7: Technology, People, and Process Are All Necessary for
Cybersecurity
Source: GAO.
In our reviews of cybersecurity controls at federal agencies, we have
found several instances where the effectiveness of technology was limited
through improper configuration of the technology or through human errors.
These types of failures can lead to the exploitation of vulnerabilities,
resulting in compromised computers and networks.
For example, the most common access control technology is the use of user
names and passwords. We have found three common implementation problems in
the use of passwords:
o Failure to disable or change default vendor accounts and passwords. In
some cases, these accounts could provide a malicious user with
administrative privileges.
o Easily guessable passwords, such as children's names or birthdays.
Some accounts do not have a password.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
o Storage or transmission of user accounts and passwords with weak or no
encryption.
Another common issue is the failure of system administrators or security
officers to follow procedures:
o Many operating systems and applications provide the capability to log
events and transactions, including security-related items such as changes
to critical files, network connections, and administrator actions.
However, in many cases, we found that logging was not enabled or was not
adequately covering enough events. Once logs are created, someone must
review them to scan for significant or anomalous activities. However, we
have found that logs often are not adequately monitored.
o Patch management, a component of configuration management, is a
process used to help mitigate vulnerabilities on computer systems. We have
found that reported vulnerabilities on systems frequently remain
unpatched. Unpatched systems could allow remote access through a variety
of vulnerabilities. For example, we previously reported that almost a
month before the Blaster worm attack in August 2003, a patch was made
available by Microsoft to address a vulnerability in its Windows
Distributed Component Object Model Remote Procedure Call interface.14
System administrators face challenges in maintaining
current technology inventories, identifying relevant vulnerabilities and
corresponding patches, and testing and distributing the patches.
Problems also arise when computers and network components are poorly
configured. Some examples include the following:
o Key network servers were not adequately configured to restrict access.
As a result, anyone, including contractors, with connectivity into the
agency network could copy or modify files containing sensitive network
information that would allow an intruder to control critical network
resources.
o Poorly configured firewalls and internal hosts allowed anyone on the
Internet to connect and shadow internal user sessions.
14U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Effective Patch
Management is Critical to Mitigating Software Vulnerabilities,
GAO-03-1138T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2003).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
o Poorly configured world-writable file permissions allowed Trojan horse
programs to be installed using a low-level account to gain administrator
privileges.
Poor configuration management has also led to the introduction of
vulnerabilities. For example:
o Unbeknownst to the administrators, server configurations had
unnecessary services running on them. Because the administrators did not
know about these applications, they did not know that patches were
required to address vulnerabilities in those applications.
o Dial-in modems did not require passwords to access the internal agency
network, thereby circumventing the security controls provided by the
firewalls.
o In some instances outdated software versions were exploitable from the
Internet. These could be used by an attacker to bypass firewall controls
and to launch attacks against other computers in the network.
Configuration management is particularly important for organizations that
perform some form of security testing, including the certification and
accreditation of systems. Configuration management involves the
identification of all software and hardware components of a system at a
given point in time and systematically controlling changes to that
configuration. Effective security testing loses its value when there is no
assurance that the system that is being used in the operational
environment is the same system that was successfully tested.
Best Practices and When implementing cybersecurity technologies and
processes, Guidelines Are Available to organizations can avoid making
common implementation mistakes by Select and Implement consulting best
practices and guidance developed by various other
organizations. While federal agencies are required to follow
certainCurrent Technologies security guidelines issued by NIST, private
sector organizations may also benefit from these guidelines.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Recently, NIST published a guide on selecting information technology
security products.15 The guide presents the types of products, product
characteristics, and environment considerations for each of the following
categories of products: identification and authentication, access control,
intrusion detection, firewalls, PKI, malicious code protection,
vulnerability scanners, forensics, and media sanitizing. NIST has also
published a number of other guides on implementing security products.16
For example, it has guides on electronic mail security and wireless
network security, as well as on firewalls and intrusion detection
systems.17
Other federal agencies, such as the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) and NSA have prepared implementation guides to help their
administrators configure their systems in a secure manner.18 Guides exist
for the configuration of operating systems such as Windows, UNIX, and
OS/390.
Some industry groups have also developed best practices and guidelines to
help their member entities implement cybersecurity. For example, the
Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC), a Federal
Communications Commission advisory committee, has developed a number of
best practices to enhance the reliability of the nation's public
communications networks and services.19 These best practices include
homeland security best practices, which in turn include cybersecurity best
practices for the telecommunications sector and Internet services. These
cybersecurity best practices include a wide variety of specific practices,
15National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guide to Selecting
Information Technology Security Products, NIST Special Publication 800-36
(Gaithersburg, MD: Oct. 2003).
16For a list of NIST Special Publications, as these guides are called, see
the NIST Web site at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/.
17National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guidelines on Electronic
Mail Security, NIST Special Publication 800-45 (Gaithersburg, MD: Sept.
2002); Wireless Network Security: 802.11, Bluetooth and Handheld Devices,
NIST Special Publication 800-48 (Gaithersburg, MD: Nov. 2002); Guidelines
on Firewalls and Firewall Policy, NIST Special Publication 800-41
(Gaithersburg, MD: Jan. 2002); and Intrusion Detection Systems, NIST
Special Publication 800-31 (Gaithersburg, MD: Nov. 2001).
18For DISA's security technical implementation guides, see
http://csrc.nist.gov/pcig/cig.html. For NSA's security recommendation
guides, see http://www.nsa.gov/snac/index.html.
19The NRIC best practices are available online at http://www.nric.org/.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
such as disabling unnecessary network-accessible services, using strong
encryption algorithms and keys, and defining a security architecture.
In addition, some sectors have issued guidelines to assist entities within
the sector in improving their security posture. For example, NERC, the
sector coordinator for the electric sector, created Security Guidelines
for the Electricity Sector as a collection of practices for protecting
critical facilities against a range of physical and cyber threats.20 Its
topics include vulnerability and risk assessment, business continuity,
physical and cyber security, and protection of sensitive information. The
cybersecurity subcategories are risk management, access controls,
information technology firewalls, and intrusion detection. In addition,
one segment of the chemical industry has a mandatory security code to
address security issues within the business of chemistry.21 The code's
purpose is to help protect people, property, products, processes,
information, and information systems by enhancing security, including
security against a potential terrorist attack, throughout a company's
activities that are associated with the design, procurement,
manufacturing, marketing, distribution, transportation, customer support,
use, recycling, and disposal of products. This code is intended to help
companies achieve continuous improvement in security performance using a
risk-based approach to identify, assess, and address vulnerabilities;
prevent or mitigate incidents; enhance training and response capabilities;
and maintain and improve relationships with key stakeholders. It requires
each company to implement a risk-based security management that includes
the following 13 management practices:
1. Leadership commitment-senior leadership commitment to continuous
improvement through published policies, provision of sufficient and
qualified resources, and established accountability.
2. Analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences- prioritization
and periodic analysis of potential security threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences, using accepted methodologies.
20North American Electric Reliability Council, Security Guidelines for the
Electricity Sector, Version 1 (Princeton, NJ: June 14, 2002).
21American Chemistry Council, Responsible Care Security Code of Management
Practices (July 1, 2002).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
3. Implementation of security measures-development and implementation of
security measures commensurate with risks, taking into account inherently
safer approaches to process design, engineering and administrative
controls, and prevention and mitigation measures.
4. Information and cybersecurity-recognition that protecting information
and information systems is a critical component of a sound security
management system.
5. Documentation-documentation of security management programs,
processes, and procedures.
6. Training, drills, and guidance-enhancing awareness and capability of
employees, contractors, service providers, value chain partners, and
others, as appropriate.
7. Communications, dialogue, and information exchange- sharing
information on appropriate security issues with stakeholders such as
employees, contractors, communities, customers, suppliers, service
providers, and government officials and agencies, balanced with safeguards
for sensitive information.
8. Response to security threats-evaluation, response, reporting, and
communication of security threats as appropriate.
9. Response to security incidents-evaluation, response, investigation,
reporting, communication, and corrective action for security incidents.
10. Audits-assessing security programs and processes and the
implementation of corrective actions.
11. Third-party verification-third-party verification that, at chemical
operating facilities with potential off-site impacts, companies have
implemented the physical site security measures to which they have
committed.
12. Management of change-evaluation and management of security issues
associated with changes involving people, property, products, processes,
information, or information systems.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
13. Continuous improvement-continuous performance improvement processes
entailing planning, establishment of goals and objectives, monitoring of
progress and performance, analysis of trends and development, and
implementation of corrective actions.
Further, the oil and natural gas segment of the energy infrastructure
sector has security guidelines available that include guidance on
cybersecurity.22 The guidance provides a means to improve the security of
the oil and natural gas industry from cyber terrorism and to effectively
allocate resources. It also endorses the use of ISO/IEC International
Standard 17799 on information security management as a voluntary framework
to protect the industry against cyber terrorism.
Considering Security when Developing Systems
To build security into a system, NIST recommends that security
requirements for a system be considered as early as possible in the system
development life cycle (SDLC).23 According to NIST, security should be
considered as early as the needs determination stage of an IT acquisition
or development. A high-level description of the security controls of the
proposed system should be included as a part of the preliminary
requirements definition for the whole system, which will drive the scoping
of the entire effort. If the system acquisition or development is
approved, NIST describes several additional steps for considering
security, including conducting a risk assessment to derive the security
functional and assurance requirements, testing security controls, and
certifying and accrediting the system security.
Defense in depth is a common design strategy for protecting computers and
networks with a series of defensive mechanisms such that if one mechanism
fails, another will already be in place to thwart an attack. Because there
are so many potential attackers with such a wide variety of attack methods
available, there is no single method for successfully protecting a
computer network. Using a strategy of defense in depth can reduce the risk
of suffering a successful cyber attack.
22American Petroleum Institute, Security Guidelines for the Petroleum
Industry, Second Edition (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2003).
23National Institute of Standards and Technology. Security Considerations
in the Information System Development Life Cycle, NIST Special Publication
800-64 (Gaithersburg, MD: Oct. 2003).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
In addition, the director, CERT Centers, testified before Congress about
the need for "higher quality information technology products with security
mechanisms that are better matched to the knowledge, skills, and abilities
of today's systems managers, administrators, and users."24 He added that
good software engineering practices can dramatically improve the ability
to withstand attacks, and he suggested that the solutions required a
combination of
o systems and software that constrain the execution of imported code,
especially code that comes from unknown or untrusted sources;
o adoption of known, effective software engineering practices that
dramatically reduce the number of flaws in software products; and
o shipment of products with "out of the box" configurations that have
security options turned on rather than configurations that require users
to turn them on.
Critical Infrastructure Sectors Have Taken Actions to Address Threats to
Their Sectors
Federal CIP policy calls for a range of actions intended to improve the
nation's ability to detect and respond to serious computer-based and
physical attacks and establish a partnership between the federal
government and the private sector. It encourages the private sector to
voluntarily take efforts to raise awareness, share information, and
increase the security posture of their physical and cyber assets. Some
infrastructure sectors have taken extensive steps to voluntarily achieve
these suggested activities. Considering the current efforts of critical
infrastructure sectors can help inform legislative decision making on the
need for further government policy making to increase the use of
cybersecurity technologies.
Coordination of Efforts and Increasing Participation in Sector Activities
As previously discussed, federal CIP policy states that sector-specific
agencies are to continue to support sector-coordinating mechanisms. While
some critical infrastructure sectors identified in federal policy have not
formally designated a coordinator, including the postal and shipping,
public health, food, and agriculture sectors, many other critical
infrastructure sectors have established individuals or organizations to
coordinate sector-wide activities and initiatives to improve the overall
24Testimony of Richard D. Pethia, Director, CERT Centers, Software
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, before the House Select
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science,
and Research and Development (June 25, 2003).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
cybersecurity of their sectors. For example, banking and finance,
telecommunications, information technology, transportation, and water
infrastructure sectors and the electricity and oil and natural gas
segments of the energy sector have established sector coordinators. In
some cases, the sector coordinators are industry associations that
represent a large part of the sector. For example, for the electricity
segment of the energy infrastructure sector, the North American Electric
Reliability Council (NERC) serves as the sector coordinator.25 According
to NERC officials, it represents 100 percent of the entities in the
extended regional control area systems, which corresponds to the bulk of
U.S. megawatt electricity generation. Also, in the chemical sector, the
American Chemistry Council has taken the lead to improve security within
the sector.
To ensure the appropriate level of sector participation and build a better
consensus on the objectives of the sector-wide efforts, sector
coordinators or other key organizations have also taken steps to broaden
the involvement of sector entities and relevant trade or industry
associations. For example, the financial services sector coordinator
organized the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council for Critical
Infrastructure Protection/Homeland Security (FSSCC) to "foster and
facilitate the coordination of sector-wide voluntary activities and
initiatives designed to improve Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Homeland Security." It includes major sector associations, professional
institutes, national exchanges, and other broad industry organizations
that, according to the sector coordinator, provide a way to broaden its
membership-potentially reaching more of the approximate 27,000 different
financial services entities.26 In addition, the Chemical Sector
Cybersecurity Program was established to enhance cybersecurity throughout
the chemical sector value chain in order to help protect people, property,
products, processes,
25NERC was formed in 1968 and operates as a voluntary industry
organization charged with ensuring that the bulk electric system in North
America is reliable, adequate, and secure.
26Current members of the FSSCC include: the American Bankers Association;
the American Council of Life Insurers; America's Community Bankers; ASIS
International; the Bank Administration Institute; BITS and the Financial
Services Roundtable; Credit Union National Association; the Consumer
Bankers Association; the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation; Fannie
Mae; FS-ISAC, the Futures Industry Association; Independent Community
Bankers of America; the Investment Company Institute; the Managed Funds
Association; NASD, Inc.; the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.; the National
Association of Federal Credit Unions; the National Automated Clearinghouse
Association; the Securities Industry Association; the Securities Industry
Automation Corporation/New York Stock Exchange; the Bond Market
Association; the Clearing House; the Options Clearing Corporation; and
VISA USA, LLC.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
information and information systems. The Chemical Sector Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Forum consists of senior-level company officials and
staff representatives from trade associations and individual companies
representing key industry segments within the sector, which serves a
critical role in fostering involvement and commitment on the part of
chemical companies across the sector.27 Its objective is to serve as the
communications channel for the more than 2,000 chemical companies that
constitute the associations' collective membership. In addition, according
to an infrastructure sector official, the existing sector coordinators
from the various infrastructure sectors have formed a council as the
Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security to coordinate on
strategic issues.
Collection and Analysis of Incident, Threat, and Vulnerability Information
from Sector Entities
Federal policy recognizes the importance of sharing information about
physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents, and continues
to encourage the development of ISACs as a mechanism for sharing
information. The ISACs recognized by DHS include the following: chemical
industry, electric power, energy, financial services, information
technology, telecommunications, surface transportation, and water. The
ISACs are designed to facilitate information sharing among members by
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on vulnerabilities,
threats, intrusions, and anomalies reported by members, the government, or
other sources, in order to avert or mitigate the impact of these factors.
Some ISACs consider themselves clearinghouses for information within and
among the various sectors. This includes disseminating information
technology security information-such as incident reports and warnings, as
well as ways to prevent or recover from them. Some ISAC operations are
performed completely in-house, while others use contractors to provide
warning and analysis functions or simply forward governmentissued warnings
and alerts. Several provide their members some level of watch services 24
hours a day, 7 days a week. In April 2004, we testified28
about the management and operational structures used by the 15 ISACs,
federal efforts to interact with and support the ISACs, and challenges to
27Ten chemical trade associations came together to form this forum,
including: American Chemistry Council, Compressed Gas Association,
Consumer Specialty Products Association, CropLife America, Dangerous Goods
Advisory Council, Institute of Makers of Explosives, National Association
of Chemical Distributors, Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers
Association, the Chlorine Institute, and the Fertilizer Institute.
28 U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Establishing Effective Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors,
GAO-04-699T (Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2004).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
and successful practices for ISACs' establishment, operation, and
partnership with the federal government.
For example, the Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC) was formed in October
1999 to, among other objectives, facilitate sharing of information and
provide its members with early notification of computer vulnerabilities
and attacks. In 2003, the FS-ISAC broadened its mission to serve all
financial services sector participants. The goal of the FS-ISAC is to
disseminate information on cyber and physical security risks to sector
participants on a timely basis. In December 2003, the next generation
FS-ISAC was implemented; it includes varying levels of participation, from
being a free member to being a premier member ($10,000/year). Available
resources to members include early notification of computer
vulnerabilities and attacks and access to subject-matter expertise and
other relevant information, such as trending analysis for all levels of
management and for first responders to cyber incidents.
Another example is the chemical sector ISAC that the American Chemistry
Council established in April 2002 to provide a secure facility that allows
the sharing of information associated with incidents, threats,
vulnerabilities, resolutions, and solutions. It is operated through the
American Chemistry Council's 24-hour hazardous material emergency
communications center and is linked with DHS's IAIP directorate. According
to chemical infrastructure sector officials, the ISAC capability is still
in its early development stage regarding cybersecurity.
Also, NERC operates the Electricity Sector ISAC (ES-ISAC), which works
with DHS, the Department of Energy, and other entities to help protect the
North American electric system from cyber and physical attacks. It is
NERC's responsibility to gather, disseminate, and interpret
securityrelated information, operating between industry and the government
and among all the sector entities. In addition, the ISAC posts advisories,
alerts, warnings, and the current threat alert levels for the Homeland
Security Advisory System, the Department of Energy, and the electricity
sector.
Further, the railroad industry formed a Surface Transportation ISAC
(ST-ISAC). The ST-ISAC operates a 24 x 7 center that collects, analyzes,
and distributes critical security and threat information from worldwide
resources to protect its members' vital information and IT systems from
attack. ST-ISAC reporting includes daily information provided by
government intelligence, law enforcement, and regulatory agencies. ST-ISAC
services are specifically tailored to meet the security demands of each
one of its members. Currently, the ST-ISAC supports almost 200
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
member entities. ST-ISAC membership consists of more than 90 percent of
the North American freight railroad industry (including Mexico and
Canada), AMTRAK and most public transit providers servicing the major
population centers in the United States, key railroad customers (such as
chemical companies and car manufacturers), and others.
Development of Strategies, Guidance, and Standards for Improving Security
As part of their efforts to improve the security posture of their
respective sectors, sector representatives have developed strategies and
other guidance to drive their sector-wide activities and assist individual
entities. Several sectors, including financial services, electricity, oil
and gas, the rail segment of the transportation sector, information and
telecommunications, water, and chemical, have developed strategies that
outline priorities and efforts for the sector that were part of the
efforts to develop The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. These
strategies address subjects, such as increasing the awareness of senior
officials, encouraging greater participation in sector activities, and
identifying and reducing vulnerabilities. For example, we reported in
January 200329 that financial services industry representatives
collaborated on a Treasurysponsored working group to develop the sector's
National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Assurance, which was issued
in May 2002.30 In addition, one of the five key elements of the chemical
sector's cybersecurity strategy involves the establishment of management
practices, procedures, guidelines, and standards to support overall sector
cybersecurity.
As we have previously described, there have also been efforts in the
energy and chemical sectors to provide greater specificity with regard to
the elements in the strategies and to provide guidance and standards. For
example, in January 2003, the Chemical Industry Data Exchange (CIDX)31
established the Chemical Sector Cybersecurity Practices, Standards, and
Technology Initiative to address two elements of the chemical sector
cybersecurity strategy: (1) establishing sector cybersecurity practices
and standards by working with the American Chemistry Council's Responsible
29U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Efforts of the Financial Services Sector to Address Cyber Threats,
GAO-03-173 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003).
30Banking and Finance Sector, Defending America's Cyberspace.
31CIDX is a trade association and standards body focused on improving the
ease, speed, and cost of transacting business electronically between
chemical companies and their trading partners.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Care Security Code program,32 and (2) accelerating development of improved
security technology and solutions by bringing technology solution
providers to the table with chemical sector information technology and
process control system experts to improve technology security. According
to chemical infrastructure sector officials, during the second quarter of
2003, CIDX released its first work products, including cybersecurity
guidance for the Responsible Care Security Code, cybersecurity guidance
for security vulnerability assessment methodology, and the results of
baseline assessments against the ISO 17799 standard for security
management practices.
The energy infrastructure sector has also taken steps to develop guidance
and standards. For example, NERC has developed minimum security
requirements to govern the exchange of electronic information needed to
support grid reliability and market operations.33 In addition, the oil and
natural gas segment of the energy infrastructure sector has security
guidelines available that include guidance on cybersecurity.34 The
guidance provides a means to improve the security of the oil and gas
industry from cyber terrorism and to effectively allocate resources. It
also endorses the use of ISO/IEC International Standard 17799 on
information security management as a voluntary framework to protect the
industry against cyber terrorism.
Providing Methods for the Infrastructure sectors have recognized the need
to improve the ability of Independent Validation of individual entities to
understand the level of security offered by the Software and Hardware
technology products they use and the risks of using those technologies.
For example, as we reported in January 2003, BITS provides for the
financial services sector through the BITS Product Certification
32The Responsible Care initiative, now in its 14th year, is a
comprehensive management system developed by experts for use throughout
the chemical sector to continuously improve safety performance and
communications and to protect employees, communities, and the environment.
Members of sector associations, such as the American Chemistry Council and
the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, along with other
companies and associations involved in the sector's supply chain,
participate in Responsible Care as partners. As a result, hundreds of
companies are working together to further improve safety and performance
throughout commerce and communities.
33The North American Electric Reliability Council, The North American
Electric Reliability Council's Urgent Action Standard 1200-Cyber Security,
adopted by NERC Board of Trustees August 13, 2003.
34American Petroleum Institute, Security Guidelines for the Petroleum
Industry, Second Edition (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2003).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Program-designed to test products against baseline security criteria-a
vehicle to significantly enhance safety and soundness by improving the
security of technology products and reducing technology risk.35 In
addition, as one of its key elements, the chemical sector cybersecurity
strategy included the acceleration of the development of cost-effective
technology solutions by proactively working with service providers,
government, and academia.
Raising Awareness about An important aspect of improving the cybersecurity
of an entity is raising the Importance of the awareness of senior
executives and others about the risks their entities Cybersecurity face
because of their reliance on IT and the importance of appropriately
protecting those assets and the related information. For example, the
financial services sector's efforts are designed to increase the awareness
of officials within the sector about the importance of cybersecurity. In
addition, the financial services sector's strategy addresses actions to
educate industry executives and information security specialists.
Encouraging the Performance of Vulnerability Assessments
As discussed earlier, the most recent federal CIP policy, HSPD-7, requires
sector-specific agencies to conduct or facilitate vulnerability
assessments of their respective sectors, which is a continued emphasis on
performing such assessments. To address the need for vulnerability
assessments, some sectors have taken steps to perform sector-wide
vulnerability assessments or encourage or require individual entities to
perform vulnerability assessments for their facilities and operations. For
example, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the railroad
industry established five critical action teams, including an information
technology and communications team, to assess both short-term and
long-term security needs. The teams, with assistance from outside experts,
evaluated threats to the rail system, identified vulnerabilities,
quantified risks, and devised appropriate countermeasures. As a result of
the team's efforts, a railroad security plan was developed that identifies
industry action and government support required to enhance the security of
the freight rail industry, including the need to cooperate to meet the
security and redundancy requirements for critical data communications and
train
35BITS is the name of the Technology Group for The Financial Services
Roundtable. As part of its mandate, BITS strives to sustain consumer
confidence and trust by ensuring the safety and security of financial
transactions, and it has several initiatives under way to promote improved
information security within the financial services industry. BITS's and
the Roundtable's membership represents 100 of the largest integrated
financial services institutions providing banking, insurance, and
investment products and services to American consumers and corporate
customers.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
control systems. Further, the chemical sector cybersecurity strategy has
as one of its key elements identifying and reducing infrastructure
vulnerabilities to guard against cyber attacks and speed recovery from
incidents. Also, as one of its current focuses, CIDX has taken steps to
develop a cybersecurity risk management process and framework, participate
in the development of process control standards and technical reports that
provide preliminary security recommendations, and develop requirements for
manufacturing process controls. The financial services sector strategy
also identifies a framework for sector actions that presents efforts
necessary to identify, assess, and respond to sector-wide threats,
including completion of a sector-wide vulnerability assessment.
Some infrastructure entities have also conducted vulnerability
assessments. For example, entities in the chemical sector that are
required to follow the Responsible Care Security Code perform security
vulnerability assessments by prioritizing their sites. Entities are also
to conduct assessments of their value chain and cyber networks. In
addition, according to chemical sector representatives, there are efforts
under way to partner with other institutions, including Sandia National
Laboratories, to develop a more robust cybersecurity vulnerability
assessment methodology. Together with Sandia Laboratories and the Center
for Chemical Processing Safety, CIDX has submitted to DHS a request for
funding to develop a combined cyber and physical vulnerability assessment
methodology for use in site vulnerability assessments. Industry
representatives at the time of our study also stated that 14 chemical
companies had conducted an assessment of their company's performance
against ISO 17799. Also, according to defense industrial base
representatives, individual companies continually perform security
assessments.
Sharing CIP-Related Activity Information across Sectors
Individual sectors share information with other sectors because they use
the same technology and thus face the same security challenges and are
interdependent on each other. For example, to encourage cross-sector
coordination and information sharing, the ISAC Council was formed by
several ISACs to advance the physical and cyber security of the critical
infrastructures of North America by establishing and maintaining a
framework for valuable interaction between and among the ISACs and with
government. Currently, the participating ISACs include Chemical,
Electricity, Energy, Financial Services, Highway, Information Technology,
Public Transit, Surface Transportation, Telecommunications, and Water. In
addition, the Multi-state and Research and Education Networking ISACs are
participants.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
The Council has met with DHS to discuss mutual expectations. According to
one infrastructure sector official, the ISAC Council has resulted in
better communications among the various ISACs, and they have begun to help
each other to establish and maintain a policy for inter-ISAC coordination,
a dialogue with governmental agencies that deal with ISACs, and a
practical data and information-sharing protocol. In February 2004, the
council issued eight white papers to reflect the collective analysis of
its members and to cover a broad set of issues and challenges, including
government/private sector relations, information sharing and analysis,
ISAC analytical efforts, policy and framework for the ISAC community, and
the reach of major ISACs.
Sharing Best Practices
As part of their efforts to share information, sectors have established
methods for individual entities to share best practices across the sector.
For example, NERC has created best practices for protecting critical
facilities against physical and cyber threats. In addition, one of FSSCC's
goals is to identify, develop, and share industry best practices to
maximize sector resiliency. Also within the financial services sector,
BITS actively seeks information security improvements, including issuing a
framework of industry practices and regulatory requirements for managing
technology risk for IT service provider relationships.
Leveraging Existing Efforts
To address CIP issues within their respective sectors, some sectors have
attempted to use existing efforts to enhance the level of awareness and
action and minimize the risk of duplicative efforts. For example, in the
financial services sector, one of the main initiatives of the FSSCC is to
share information on CIP activities that are already being performed by
member associations across the entire sector. For example, the American
Bankers Association (ABA) and BITS have a number of initiatives to improve
the cybersecurity of the sector.36 In addition, according to industry
representatives, the Chemical Sector Cybersecurity Program is leveraging
proven sector initiatives, including chemical trade associations (through
the Chemical Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing Forum), CIDX, and
the Chemical Sector ISAC.
36ABA is an industry group whose membership includes community, savings,
regional, and money center banks; savings associations; trust companies;
and diversified financial holding companies.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Federal Government Actions to Improve Cybersecurity for CIP
As we have described, the federal government has several ongoing
activities designed to improve the cybersecurity posture of critical
infrastructures. There is a variety of ways in which the federal
government could encourage the use of cybersecurity technologies for
critical infrastructure protection. Besides merely continuing the current
programs, the federal government could choose to expand current programs
or develop new programs to assist critical infrastructures. The design of
federal policy will play a vital role in determining success and ensuring
that national goals are met. Key to the national effort will be
determining the appropriate level of funding, so that policies and tools
can be designed and targeted to elicit a prompt, adequate, and sustainable
response while also protecting against federal funds being used to
substitute for spending that would occur anyway.
As with any policy decision, there are a number of factors that should be
considered before selecting an approach. First, the problem needs to be
identified. There is a need for factual information on the scope and scale
of the cyber vulnerabilities and the consequences of possible cyber
attacks on the critical infrastructure. The technology issues surrounding
the problem and the structure of the security marketplace have to be
determined. Although experts agree that cybersecurity is an important
element of critical infrastructure protection, the scope and scale of the
problem and the consequences of cyber attacks are not easily quantifiable.
As we have described, because about 85 percent of the critical
infrastructure is owned by the private sector, the federal government
cannot act alone to protect it. To help determine the proper approach for
federal action, the government will require information from the private
sector on the scope and size of the cybersecurity risks and the actions
that they are already taking to address them. To make informed decisions
on cybersecurity policy, federal policy makers need information on
critical infrastructure assets, vulnerabilities, and priorities from the
private sector, information that could be gleaned if the risk-based
framework for security that we have described is followed.
After the parameters of the problem have been established, possible
private and public responses can be proposed. To interact with the private
sector, the federal government can use a variety of policy options to
motivate or mandate private sector entities to take actions to address
cybersecurity concerns. These options include grants, regulations, tax
incentives, and coordination and partnerships.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Two key considerations in developing a grant program are targeting the
funds to those with the greatest need and striking a balance between
accountability and flexibility. Accountability can be established for
measured results and outcomes that permit greater flexibility in how funds
are used while at the same time ensuring some national oversight. An
example of a grant program would be one where the federal government funds
or subsidizes the purchase of security technology for specific critical
infrastructure sectors or specific groups of vulnerable entities within a
sector. There is precedent for this in the Help America Vote Act of 2002,
which provides funding to states for buying new voting machines.37 Another
example is the Environmental Protection Agency, which reported providing
449 grants to assist large drinking water utilities in developing
vulnerability assessments, emergency response/operating plans, security
enhancement plans and designs, or a combination of these efforts.
In designing regulations, key considerations include determining how to
provide federal protections, guarantees, or benefits while preserving an
appropriate balance between the federal government and state and local
government and between the public and private sectors. In designing a
regulatory approach, one of the challenges is determining who will set the
standards and who will implement or enforce them.
Tax incentives are the result of special exclusions, exemptions,
deductions, credits, deferrals, or tax rates in the federal tax laws.
Unlike grants, tax incentives do not generally permit the same degree of
federal oversight and targeting, and they generally are available to all
potential beneficiaries who satisfy congressionally established criteria.
However, according to some infrastructure sector officials, tax incentives
will not provide adequate motivation to organizations that are already
under financial strain or under bankruptcy protection.
Sometimes the federal government can make change happen in a sector by
requiring that sector to work in a certain way when it interacts with
government systems. An example is the Department of the Treasury directive
that required electronic funds transfer transactions involving federal
systems to use DES encryption. Similarly, to promote adoption of more
secure products and practices, specific sector systems that connect to
government systems could be required to meet specific cybersecurity
provisions. The key is for government and the sector to decide what types
37Help America Vote Act of 2002, Public Law 107-252 (Oct. 29, 2002).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
of cybersecurity requirements to adopt and to understand why these
requirements improve security.
The government owns approximately 15 percent of the critical
infrastructure and is otherwise a major purchaser of information
technology. Consequently, it could affect market behavior through its own
purchases. For instance, government could promulgate procurement rules
specifying that after a certain number of years it will no longer buy PCs
without certain security features built into the hardware and operating
system. For example, currently all cryptography products purchased by the
federal government must be compliant with FIPS 140-2.
Critical infrastructure protection is a complex mission that requires high
levels of interagency, interjurisdictional, and interorganizational
cooperation. Different levels of government-federal, state, and local-as
well as various public, private, and nongovernmental organizations are
involved with CIP. Promoting partnerships among these different
organizations facilitates the maximizing of resources and supports
coordination.
Without appropriate consideration of public policy tools, private sector
participation in sector-related information sharing and other CIP efforts
may not reach its full potential. For example, in January 2003, we
reported on the efforts of the financial services sector to address cyber
threats, including industry efforts to share information and to better
foster and facilitate sector-wide efforts.38 We also reported on the
efforts of federal agencies and regulators to partner with the financial
services industry to protect critical infrastructures and to address
information security. We found that although federal agencies had a number
of efforts ongoing, the Treasury Department, in its role as sector
liaison, had not undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the potential
public policy tools that could be used to encourage the financial services
sector in implementing information sharing and other CIP-related efforts.
Since then, Treasury provided $2 million to help establish the next
generation FS-ISAC and its new capabilities, including improving
information sharing by upgrading the technology supporting the FS-ISAC and
adding information about physical threats to the cyber threat information
it disseminates.
38GAO-03-173.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
In addition, in February 2003, we reported on the mixed progress that the
telecommunications, electricity, information technology, energy, and water
sectors had made in accomplishing the activities suggested by Presidential
Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63).39 We found that the responsible lead
agencies needed to better assess the need for public policy tools to
encourage increased private sector CIP activities and facilitate greater
sharing of intelligence and incident information between the sectors and
the federal government.
Considerations for Federal Action
For each possible policy option, it is necessary to analyze the costs and
benefits, how the policy can be implemented, and the consequences of
action and inaction. Because resources are scarce, decisions on spending
must achieve two overarching goals: to devote the right amount of
resources to cybersecurity and to spend those resources on the right
activities. To achieve the first goal, the benefit of each endeavor must
be carefully weighed, and resources should only be allocated where the
benefit of reducing risk is worth the amount of additional cost.
One of the essential parts of any federal program is the ability to
measure the results from the program. However, the lack of well-defined
security standards or benchmarks makes it difficult to measure the benefit
of a security program. Further, what may be appropriate for some sectors
may not be appropriate for other sectors. For policy options such as
grants, tax incentives, and regulations, there needs to be a way of
defining the actions or the outcomes that are being sought by the federal
government. Instead of requiring a set of actions, it is best to aim for
specific outcomes. A problem with this approach is that sometimes it is
not possible to specify a measurable outcome. In the absence of such
criteria, it will be challenging to define and implement such a federal
program.
For example, to use grants for the purchase of cybersecurity technology or
to impose requirements for government purchases, the government needs to
work with the sectors and the technology vendors to set standards for
cybersecurity products or establish measurable outcomes to be achieved by
the technology. Unfortunately, it is difficult to set product-level
standards that can be evaluated efficiently and without incurring
significant additional cost.
39U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Challenges for Selected Agencies and Industry Sectors, GAO-03-233
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
The federal government has several ongoing cybersecurity programs. For
example, the federal government has previously assisted sectors with
conducting risk assessments, provided threat and vulnerability information
to sectors and their entities, and established education and awareness
programs on cybersecurity. To assist with the costs and benefits
determination of future programs, it would be useful to examine the
effectiveness of existing programs.
One possibility is to measure the costs saved by preventing a cyber
attack. According to The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, surveys
have repeatedly shown that although the likelihood of suffering a severe
cyber attack is difficult to measure, the costs associated with mitigating
and reconstituting after a successful attack are likely to be greater than
the investment in a cybersecurity program to prevent it. Financial losses
resulting from worms and viruses have been significant.
PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that in 2001, hackers, worms, and viruses
caused almost $1.6 trillion in downtime and recovery costs. Table 12 shows
the estimated costs of recent notable computer attacks.
Table 12: Estimated Costs of Recent Worm and Virus Attacks
Incident Date Estimated cost
Melissa 1999 $0.3 billion
I Love You 2000 $8.0 billion
Code Red 2001 $2.6 billion
Slammer 2003 $1.0 billion
Source: Canadian Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Emergency Preparedness.
It is important to consider the proper role of the federal government.
Sometimes, the best course of action may be to take no action at all. The
federal government can take action because a particular activity is best
performed at a national or sub-national level. For example, intelligence
gathering and national defense are best accomplished by the federal
government. On the other hand, while the costs of recovering from cyber
attacks can be high, some have argued that the potential effect of cyber
attacks on national security or public safety is relatively small. It is
argued that many critical infrastructure sectors are more robust and
resilient than generally believed. For example, during the October 2002
distributed denial-of-service attack on the Domain Name Server root
servers, 8 of the 13 servers were forced off-line. However, the attack did
not noticeably degrade Internet performance. Similarly, while thousands of
networks
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
were disabled during the August 2003 northeast blackout, there was no
significant increase in end-to-end delays on the Internet.
In other situations, the federal government may need to take action
because the market will not address the issue in a timely fashion.
Ideally, private sector responses will adequately address a problem. In
some sectors, market forces may be enough to improve cybersecurity
throughout the sector. Some well-organized sectors could also develop
their own rules requiring all member entities to achieve specific
cybersecurity results. For example, the chemical infrastructure sector
established mandatory requirements under its responsible care program. As
previously discussed, the oil and natural gas industry also endorsed
international standards for security management programs. In other cases,
state and local government may be taking action to address the problem.
Regardless of the specific actions taken by the federal government, it is
important for all levels of government-federal, state, and local-and the
private sector to work cooperatively to ensure that the most critical
issues are addressed by the appropriate party.
The Federal Government Is Assisting with Risk Assessments
The federal government has a direct interest in ensuring that the private
sector is adequately protecting critical infrastructures. To assist with
the critical infrastructure risk assessment process, the federal
government provides two primary functions: (1) it provides guidance and
establishes relationships to help conduct risk assessments, and (2) it
provides threat and vulnerability information to sectors and their member
entities.
HSPD-7 and the National Strategy for Homeland Security identified lead
federal agencies, referred to as sector-specific agencies, to work with
their counterparts in the private sector, referred to as sector
coordinators. HSPD-7 called for a range of activities intended to
establish a partnership between the public and private sectors to ensure
the security of our nation's critical infrastructures. The sector-specific
agency and the sector coordinator are to work with each other to address
problems related to CIP for their sector. In particular, HSPD-7 stated
that they are to (1) conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessment of
their sector, and (2) encourage risk management strategies to protect
against and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical
infrastructures and key resources. It also required federal agencies to
establish a system for responding to a significant attack on an
infrastructure while it is under way so that damages can be isolated and
minimized and for rapidly reconstituting minimum required capabilities for
varying levels of successful infrastructure attacks.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
The National Strategy for Homeland Security and HSPD-7 identified 13
industry sectors, expanded from the 8 originally identified in PDD 63, and
lead federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security. The
lead agencies and their corresponding sectors are listed in table 13.
Table 13: Critical Infrastructure Sector-Specific Agencies
Sector-specific agency Sectors
o Agriculture
o Food (meat and poultry)
Environmental Protection Agency
Source: National Strategy for Homeland Security, The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace, and HSPD-7.
For example, as part of its responsibilities as the lead agency for the
banking and finance infrastructure sector, the Department of the Treasury
chairs the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee
(FBIIC), which is responsible for coordinating federal and state
regulatory efforts to improve the reliability and security of U.S.
financial systems. Treasury has taken steps designed to establish better
relationships and methods of communication among regulators, assess
vulnerabilities, and improve communication within the financial services
sector. In addition, federal regulators, such as the Federal Reserve
System and the Securities and Exchange Commission, have taken several
steps to address information security issues, including the consideration
of information security risks in determining the scope of their
examinations of financial
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
institutions and the development of guidance for examining information
security and for protecting against cyber threats.
Further, the federal government can also help fund risk assessment
activities by sectors and their member entities. This support can be
provided directly to infrastructure owners or through their ISACs or
sector coordinators. There is already precedence for such support. For
example, as mentioned earlier, the Environmental Protection Agency
reportedly has provided funding for 449 grants totaling $51 million to
assist utilities for large drinking water systems in preparing
vulnerability assessments, emergency response/operating plans, and
security enhancement plans and designs. In addition, the Department of
Transportation has performed related studies, including a vulnerability
assessment of surface transportation and of the transportation
infrastructure's reliance on the global positioning system.40 The
Department of the Treasury provided $2 million for the next generation
Financial Services ISAC to provide alerting services to a greater number
of sector entities.
Additionally, the federal government could provide guidance to critical
infrastructure owners on how to perform risk assessments. Such guidance
could be in the form of risk assessment templates that cover key elements
such as threat and vulnerability assessments.
The federal government also provides assistance by disseminating threat
and vulnerability information to critical infrastructure sectors. DHS is
responsible for analyzing terrorist threats to the homeland, mapping these
threats to our vulnerabilities, and taking protective action. For example,
DHS administers the Homeland Security Advisory System, including
coordination with other federal agencies to provide specific warning
information and advice to state and local agencies, the private sector,
the public, and other entities about appropriate protective measures and
countermeasures to homeland security threats.
In March 2003, DHS assumed many of the functions of NIPC from the FBI.
DHS's IAIP directorate provides a focal point for gathering and
disseminating information on threats to critical infrastructures and
issues warning products in response to increases in threat condition. The
40John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Vulnerability
Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global
Positioning System, Final Report (Cambridge, MA: Aug. 29, 2001).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Homeland Security Act gives DHS broad statutory authority to access
intelligence information, as well as other information relevant to the
terrorist threat, and to turn this information into useful warnings. For
example, DHS is one of the partner organizations in the multi-agency
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which began operations on May
1, 2003.41 IAIP integrates all-source threat information and analysis that
it receives from TTIC and other agencies with its own vulnerability
assessments to provide tailored threat assessments.
The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, a partnership between
DHS and the private sector, issues a variety of information products
through its National Cyber Alert System. This system distributes three
types of information products: (1) cybersecurity alerts, which are
available for non-technical and technical audiences, provide real-time
information about security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits current
occurring that could require rapid action; (2) cybersecurity bulletins are
targeted at technical audiences and provide biweekly summaries of security
issues, new vulnerabilities, potential effect, patches, and workarounds;
and (3) cybersecurity tips are targeted at non-technical audiences and
provide biweekly information on best computer security practices.
According to IAIP officials, if it is necessary to relay classified
material, secure communication links have been established with each of
the 50 state homeland security offices and some of the ISACs. Once it is
determined that information should be disseminated, it is sent out by
multiple paths. The difficult task is determining the appropriate audience
for the information. The interdependency among the infrastructures is one
reason why it is difficult to determine the appropriate audience.
A National CIP Plan Can The scope of any federal program must account for
the wide breadth of
Help Prioritize Needs critical infrastructure sectors. However, the
assets, functions, and systems within each critical infrastructure sector
are not equally important. For example, the transportation sector is
vital, but not every bridge is critical to the nation as a whole. To
ensure a comprehensive and well-coordinated approach to critical
infrastructure protection across all organizations, we
41The center was formed from elements of the FBI, the CIA, and the
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
have previously reported on the need for a national CIP plan.42 Such a
plan should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of federal and
nonfederal CIP organizations, define objectives and milestones, set time
frames for achieving objectives, and establish performance measures. The
federal government could then use this plan as a framework to help it
determine the appropriate amount and types of federal actions that would
best protect critical infrastructures from attack.
The need for a coordinated plan results from the widely varying operations
of the critical infrastructure sectors and the sheer number of
organizations that are involved in CIP efforts. For example, in 2002, we
reported that at least 50 federal organizations were involved in national
or multinational cyber CIP efforts, including 5 advisory committees; 6
Executive Office of the President organizations; 38 executive branch
organizations associated with departments, agencies, or intelligence
organizations; and 3 other organizations.43 In addition, there are many
state and local government agencies involved in CIP efforts, such as state
regulators, law enforcement agencies, and water authorities, as well as
private sector organizations, such as trade associations, industry groups,
corporations, and information sharing and analysis centers. While each
sector can take a sector-wide look and entities can focus on the details
of the infrastructure they own, the federal government is in a better
position to look across all critical infrastructure sectors and conduct a
risk-based identification of the truly critical infrastructures-assets
whose destruction or incapacitation would have a debilitating impact on
national security, the economy, or public health and safety. Because such
a large number of organizations are involved in CIP efforts, it is
necessary to clarify how these organizations coordinate their activities
with each other.
As we have described, several federal CIP policy documents have identified
the need for such a plan. The National Strategy for Homeland Security
assigns the development of a national infrastructure protection plan to
the Department of Homeland Security. The Homeland Security Act
42U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Serious Weaknesses
Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets at Risk, GAO/AIMD-98-92
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1998); Combating Terrorism: Selected
Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 20, 2001); and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts
Require a More Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for Protecting
Information Systems, GAO-02-474 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
43GAO-02-474.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
of 2002 further assigns this responsibility to the IAIP directorate.44
Most recently, HSPD-7 requires that this plan be developed by December
2004 and states that it should include a strategy to identify, prioritize,
and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure. Nationwide
critical infrastructure risk assessments could enable the federal
government to develop and maintain a prioritized list of key
infrastructures across sectors. Knowing which infrastructures are truly
critical across all sectors can help the government apply limited
resources where they are most needed. This plan is expected to inform
DHS's annual process for planning, programming, and budgeting critical
infrastructure protection activities, including research and development.
However, the development of such a plan is not without its challenges. For
instance, methodologies to prioritize efforts to enhance critical
infrastructure protection are inconsistent. Further, in order to properly
define roles and responsibilities for critical infrastructure
organizations, it is necessary to overcome ineffective communication among
the federal, state, and local governments, which has resulted in untimely,
disparate, and at times conflicting communication.
Increasing the Use of Available Cybersecurity Technologies
Improving Cybersecurity Awareness
While many cybersecurity technologies are available, experts believe that
these technologies are not being purchased or implemented to their fullest
extent. Besides providing funding for the purchase of technology by
critical infrastructure owners, other methods have been suggested to
increase the use of available cybersecurity technologies, including
increasing the security awareness of system administrators and users and
enhancing information sharing so that security vulnerabilities can be
better understood.
As computers are increasingly interconnected and achieve appliance status,
they are no longer strictly the domain of technology-savvy workers.
According to CERT/CC, the expertise of the average system administrator
continues to decline. A larger number of systems that are connected to the
Internet are administered and used by individuals with little or no
security training or expertise. Many experts agree that there is a need to
improve cybersecurity awareness at all user levels, even for business and
home users, because any Internet-connected PC could be used as a launching
pad for denial-of-service attacks. Users often are unaware that their
computers have been compromised and are being used to launch attacks.
44Public Law 107-296, S:201(d)(5).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Even among those who are familiar with cybersecurity technologies such as
firewalls, encryption, and antivirus software, users do not always
implement these security-improving technologies to their fullest extent.
Some say that users often are complacent about possible cyber threats or
do not adequately maintain the security posture of their systems by
implementing security patches on a timely basis. Others say that users
simply cannot keep up with the constant stream of software patches that
are needed to correct defects in software.
The federal government could take the lead in promoting cybersecurity
awareness as it has done in other awareness campaigns such as the campaign
to discourage illicit drug use and the Buckle Up America campaign, which
promotes automobile seat belt use. The federal government can fund the
development of education campaigns that teach the importance of
cybersecurity and how to use information technology securely.
Educational institutions could incorporate cybersecurity and cyberethics
education in primary and secondary school and in colleges. The Department
of Justice has established a Cyberethics for Kids program that teaches
students in elementary and middle schools about the risks of harmful and
illegal behavior online and shows them how to protect themselves from such
behavior. For university students, NSF funds the Federal Cyber Service
program to increase the number of qualified students in the cybersecurity
field and to increase the number of cybersecurity professionals. The
Federal Cyber Service program has two tracks: a Scholarship Track and a
Capacity Building Track. The Scholarship Track provides funding to
colleges and universities to award scholarships in information assurance
and computer security fields. Upon graduation, after their 2-year
scholarships, the scholarship recipients are required to work for a
federal agency for 2 years in fulfillment of their Federal Cyber Service
commitment. The Capacity Building Track provides funds to colleges and
universities for professional development of information assurance faculty
and the development of academic programs.
Some experts also commented that all business managers should learn the
basics of cybersecurity-why it is important to the business and how to
include it in risk analyses. Even if a business does not deal with
life-anddeath systems, managers need to know that cybersecurity helps
protect against industrial espionage that could be used to steal sensitive
information such as business plans, creative ideas, and trade secrets.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Critical infrastructure sectors could conduct their own security awareness
campaigns. For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
has sponsored regional information sessions for the FBIIC and FSSCC to
inform financial services organizations about the importance of a
public-private sector partnership and to raise awareness of the services
available to those organizations that are provided by the federal
government and by the financial services sector.
Some experts have stated that one of the causes of vulnerable computers is
a lack of awareness by users and system administrators in keeping up with
available security patches. To remedy this problem, various tools and
services are available to assist them in identifying vulnerabilities and
their respective patches.
Because it can be difficult to identify vulnerabilities, the use of
multiple sources can help to provide a more comprehensive view. As we have
described, there are several sources of vulnerability information,
including CERT/CC and NIST's ICAT Metabase. ICAT links users to publicly
available vulnerability databases and patch sites, thus enabling them to
find and fix vulnerabilities on their systems. Other organizations, such
as the Last Stage of Delirium Research Group, research security
vulnerabilities and maintain databases of such vulnerabilities. In
addition, mailing lists, such as BugTraq, provide forums for announcing
and discussing vulnerabilities, including information on how to fix them.
Security Focus monitors thousands of products in order to maintain a
vulnerability database and provide security alerts. Finally, vendors such
as Microsoft and Cisco provide software updates on their products,
including notices of known vulnerabilities and their corresponding
patches.
Several services and automated tools are available to assist organizations
in performing their patch management function, including tools designed as
stand-alone patch management systems. In addition, systems management
tools can be used to deploy patches across an organization's network.
Patch management vendors also offer central databases of the latest
patches, incidents, and methods for mitigating risks before a patch can be
deployed or before a patch has been released. Some vendors provide support
for multiple software platforms, such as Microsoft, Solaris, Linux, and
other platforms, while other vendors, such as Microsoft, focus on certain
platforms exclusively.
Enhancing Information Sharing Information sharing is a key element in
developing comprehensive and practical approaches to defending against
cyber attacks that could threaten critical infrastructures. Sharing of
vulnerability or threat
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
information with infrastructure owners facilitates the prevention or
detection of cyber attacks. However, as we have reported in recent years,
establishing the trusted relationships and protocols necessary to support
information sharing can be difficult.45 In addition, the private sector
has expressed concerns about sharing information with the government and
about the difficulty of obtaining security clearances.
Critical infrastructure sectors can benefit from sharing information about
vulnerabilities, threats, and details of cyber attacks among the entities
that make up the sector. Information on threats, vulnerabilities, and
incidents experienced by others can help to identify trends, better
understand the risks they faced, and determine what preventive measures
should be implemented. However, for such information sharing to work, it
is necessary to develop fully productive information-sharing relationships
within the federal government and between the federal government and state
and local governments and the private sector.
Shared information could be used for tactical purposes. Sharing
information on incidents and solutions during an attack can lead to better
responses by all involved in the information-sharing arrangement. Such a
structure could be used to contain and minimize the damage caused by cyber
attacks. Shared information can also have strategic uses. Computer
security experts and researchers can use historical data about attacks to
better understand threats and vulnerabilities and to develop better
technologies that can defend against similar attacks. Further, analysis of
such information can help intelligence and law enforcement organizations
to identify trends in attacks and potentially to identify the perpetrators
of attacks or sources of future attacks.
We have previously reported on federal information sharing practices that
could benefit CIP.46 These practices include:
o establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of federal and
nonfederal entities that may be in a position to provide potentially
useful information and advice on vulnerabilities and incidents;
45U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Sharing: Practices That Can
Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection, GAO-02-24 (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 15, 2001).
46GAO-02-24, 18.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
o developing standards and agreements on how shared information will be
used and protected;
o establishing effective and appropriately secure communications
mechanisms; and
o taking steps to ensure that sensitive information is not
inappropriately disseminated, steps that may require statutory changes.
A number of activities have been undertaken to build relationships between
the federal government and the private sector, such as InfraGard, the
Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security, efforts by the former
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, and efforts by lead agencies to
establish ISACs. For example, the InfraGard Program, which provides the
FBI with a means for sharing information securely with individual
companies, has expanded substantially. Members include representatives
from private industry, other government agencies, state and local law
enforcement, and the academic community. As of March 30, 2004, InfraGard
members totaled over 11,000.
PDD 63 encouraged the voluntary creation of ISACs and suggested some
possible activities. However, their actual design and functions were left
to the private sector, along with their relationships with the federal
government. HSPD-7 continues to encourage the development of
information-sharing mechanisms and does not suggest specific ISAC
activities. As a result, the ISACs have been designed to perform their
missions based on the unique characteristics and needs of their individual
sectors, and although their overall missions are similar, they have
different characteristics. They were created to provide an
information-sharing and analysis capability for members of their
respective infrastructure sectors in order to support efforts to mitigate
risk and provide effective response to adverse events, including cyber,
physical, and natural events.
As previously discussed, Treasury provided $2 million to establish the
next generation FS-ISAC and its new capabilities, including upgrading the
technology supporting it that would benefit Treasury, other financial
regulators, and the private sector. In announcing this contract in
December 2003, Treasury reported that it would:
o Transform FS-ISAC from a technology platform that serves approximately
80 financial institutions to one that serves the entire 30,000 institution
financial sector including banks, credit unions, securities firms,
insurance companies, commodity futures merchants, exchanges, and others.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
o Provide a secure, confidential forum for financial institutions to
share information among one another as they respond in real-time to
particular threats.
o Add information about physical threats to the cyber threat information
that FS-ISAC currently disseminates.
o Include an advance notification service that will notify member
financial institutions of threats. The primary means of notification will
be the Internet. If, however, Internet traffic is disrupted, the
notification will be by other means, including telephone calls and faxes.
o Include over 16 quantitative measures of FS-ISAC's effectiveness that
will enable the leadership of FS-ISAC and Treasury to assess both the
FS-ISAC's performance and the aggregate state of information sharing
within the industry in response to particular threats.
Laws recently enacted by Congress and the administration strengthen
information sharing. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act promotes information
sharing among federal agencies, and numerous terrorism task forces have
been established to coordinate investigations and improve communications
among federal and local law enforcement agencies.47 Moreover, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 includes provisions that restrict federal, state, and
local government use and disclosure of critical infrastructure information
that has been voluntarily submitted to DHS.48 These restrictions include
exemption from disclosure under FOIA, a general limitation on use to CIP
purposes, and limitations on use in civil actions and by state or local
governments. The act also specifies penalties for any federal employee who
improperly discloses any protected critical infrastructure information.
Nonetheless, some in the private sector have expressed concerns about
voluntarily sharing information with one another and with the federal
government. Specifically, concerns have been raised that sector members
could face antitrust violations for sharing information with other
industry partners, have their information subject to the Freedom of
Information Act
47The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act)
(Public Law 107-56, Oct. 26, 2001).
48Public Law 107-296, S:S:211-215.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
(FOIA),49 or face potential liability concerns for information shared in
good faith. For example, the information technology, energy, and water
ISACs do not share their libraries with the federal government because of
concerns that information could be released under FOIA. Officials of the
energy ISAC stated that they had not reported incidents to NIPC because of
FOIA and antitrust concerns.
Developing New Cybersecurity Technology
Continuing Cybersecurity Technology Research
While there is clearly a short-term need for cybersecurity solutions, many
researchers have described this approach as short-sighted. Because new
vulnerabilities are being discovered on an increasingly frequent basis,
many have argued that what is required is a re-engineering of security.
Researchers have argued that there is a need to design secure systems from
the bottom up, because it is difficult to deploy secure systems based on
insecure components. Longer-term efforts, such as research into
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and technological solutions for those
problems and the transition of research results into commercially
available products, are needed.
Research in cybersecurity technology is needed to create a broader range
of choices and more robust tools for building trustworthy networked
computer systems. Research provides a science base and engineering
expertise for building secure systems. Because research takes time to
produce results, it is important to initiate research soon.
The federal government supports cybersecurity research, primarily through
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and NSA, but also
through other Department of Defense and civilian agencies, such as NSF and
DHS. There is also industry-funded research and development in the area of
information security, but that work typically emphasizes development over
research. It is difficult to enumerate all federally funded cybersecurity
research because of problems in understanding how different projects are
accounted for and also because many projects are classified. Additionally,
research in cybersecurity may include system development activities. For
example, some recent research projects involve building network testbeds
to develop and test defenses against cyber attacks. Two recent examples
are the jointly NSF- and DHSfunded Cyber Defense Technology Experimental
Research network, or DETER, at the University of California at Berkeley
and the University of Southern California, and the Department of
Justice-funded Internet-Scale
495 U.S.C. S:552.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Event and Attack Generation Environment at Iowa State University. Such
test bed projects include the cost of the network itself in the project
costs.
Because research is often geared toward producing short-term results and
rapid transition to industry, high-risk theoretical and experimental
investigations are not always encouraged. Many research problems are
difficult, and the focus on short-term results can divert effort from
critical areas.
A number of recent publications provide cybersecurity research agendas
with varying degrees of detail.50 These research agendas have similarities
with one another. While several research agendas have been produced, some
researchers have commented that insufficient action has been taken to
implement them. Table 14 summarizes the typical research topics from a
number of agendas.
50Some of these sources of research agendas include (1) Institute for
Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P), Cyber Security Research and
Development Agenda (Jan. 2003); (2) INFOSEC Research Council, Information
Assurance R&D Strategy: National Needs and Research Programs (July 2,
2002); (3) NSF/OSTP, New Vistas in CIP Research and Development: Secure
Network Embedded Systems, Report of the NSF/OSTP Workshop on Innovative
Information Technologies for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Sept.
1920, 2002); (4) National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
(NSTAC),
Research and Development Exchange Proceedings: Research and Development
Issues to Ensure Trustworthiness in Telecommunications and Information
Systems That Directly or Indirectly Impact National Security and Emergency
Preparedness (Mar. 13-14, 2003); and (5) National Research Council, Trust
in Cyberspace (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999).
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Table 14: Typical Research Areas Identified in Research Agendas
Research area Description
Building secure systems from insecure components Biological metaphors
(autonomic); Intelligent microsystems.
Correction of current vulnerabilities Tools and techniques to help system
administrators fix current vulnerabilities; Human factors in security.
Denial-of-service attacks Identify and deter denial-of-service and
distributed denial-of-service attacks.
Detection, recovery, and survivability Prediction of events;
Reconstitution of system of systems; Autonomic computing; Global network
surveillance and warning (similar to public health surveillance).
Law, policy, and economic issues Market issues; Standards; Tradeoffs
Security engineering tools and techniques Tools and methods for building
more secure systems; Architecture for improved security; Formal methods;
Programming languages that enforce security policy; Generative
programming.
Security metrics Data to support analysis; Metrics and models for
economic analysis, risk analysis, etc.; Technical metrics to measure
strength of security.
Security of foreign and mobile code Ability to confine and encapsulate
code; Tamper-proof software.
Security of network embedded systems Security of real-time control systems
such as SCADA.
Security policy management Maintain a defined risk posture; Protect a
defined security perimeter.
Traceback, forensics, and attribution of attacks Correct attribution and
retribution; Automatic counterattack.
Trust models for data and distributed applications Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
security; Establishing trust in data.
Vulnerability identification and analysis Automated discovery and
analysis of vulnerabilities; Code scanning tools; Device scanning.
Wireless security Device and protocol level wireless security; Monitoring
wireless network; Addressing DDoS attacks in wireless networks.
Source: GAO analysis.
Current research projects at universities and projects funded by several
government agencies cover many of the research areas identified in the
research agendas. Table 15 shows a sampling of some of the current
research topics and is organized by the major control categories.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Table 15: Sampling of Current Research Topics
Control category Research topics
Access controls o Biometric access using facial recognition
o Role-based access control
System integrity o Storage devices that can detect changes to critical
files
o Network interfaces that can throttle worm/virus propagations
o Software analysis for vulnerability detection
o Code integrity verification
o Proof-carrying code
Cryptography o PKI for communications and computational security
o Certification authority with defense against denialof-service attacks
o Quantum cryptography
o Quantum key distribution
Audit and monitoring o High-speed network monitoring for worm/virus
detection
o Emergent behavior detection
o Honeynets to entice and deceive would-be attackers
Configuration management and o Survivable systems assurance o Trusted
computing
o Evaluation and certification of systems
Source: GAO analysis.
Some researchers commented that the research topics are too often narrowly
defined and focus on topics that are most likely to get funded. For
example, research on automating security-related system administration
tasks such as configuring or patching software does not get enough
attention in the funded projects. The push to show results in a relatively
short time causes researchers to avoid taking broad, systemwide views.
Instead research projects look at narrowly scoped parts of a system. This
tends to balkanize research projects and detract from a system-wide look
at security.
Some researchers pointed out that academic research and corporate research
seem to be on different paths. Corporate research tends to focus on
improving existing product lines in the near-term, whereas university
research typically looks at ideas irrespective of their viability as
products. The transition from university research into products can be
timeconsuming and there is no well-defined approach.
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Among some of the areas needing attention, researchers cited developing
ways to measure security and assessing the economic effectiveness of
proposed cybersecurity technologies. Such economic effectiveness studies
can help make the case for specific cybersecurity technologies.
A long-term research objective is to develop systems that are inherently
secure, with security engineered into the system from the start. Contrast
this with current security technologies that are bolted on-added after the
fact. A larger goal than security alone is to design and build survivable
systems. Survivable systems have resiliency so that they can continue to
perform, albeit at a degraded level, even when they are under attack. Such
survivable systems require forethought in design, much as guardrails along
dangerous curves are most effective only when they are built before anyone
drives on the road. Survivability concepts can include the notion of
defense-in-depth with defensive perimeters taken down to the level of
system components such as storage devices and network interface cards and
their associated software modules.
By comparing the identified research needs with the ongoing research, we
arrive at the following research areas as a selection of some of the
important areas that need continuing attention in cybersecurity research
programs:
1. Vulnerability identification and analysis. There is a need for better
methods to determine, throughout a product or system's life cycle
(development, integration, update and maintenance, decommissioning, or
replacement of components), whether exploitable defects have been
introduced or unanticipated security problems have emerged. Research is
needed into techniques and tools to analyze code, devices, and systems in
dynamic and large-scale environments.
2. Composing secure systems from insecure components. Research is needed
to develop approaches for composing complex heterogeneous systems that
maintain security while recovering from failures. New approaches, such as
the use of biological metaphors (autonomic) and intelligent microsystems,
may be explored to create more secure systems.
3. Security metrics and evaluation. Research is needed to define metrics
that express the costs, benefits, and impacts of security controls from
multiple perspectives-economic, organizational, technical, and risk-so
that the effect of security decisions can be better understood. Techniques
are needed for modeling the security-
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
related behavior of systems and predicting the consequences of risk
mitigation approaches.
4. Wireless security. In principle, many of the security concerns for
wireless networks mirror those for the wired world; in practice, solutions
that have been developed for wired networks may not be viable in wireless
environments. Research is needed to make security a fundamental component
of wireless networks, develop the basic science of wireless security,
develop security solutions that can be integrated into the wireless device
itself, investigate the security implications of existing wireless
protocols, integrate security mechanisms across all protocol layers, and
integrate wireless security into larger systems and networks. In
particular, research is needed into security situational awareness
techniques for wireless networks and strategies to address distributed
denial-of-service attacks.
5. Socioeconomic impact of security. Research is needed to determine the
scope and size of the cybersecurity problem and the effect that forces,
such as laws, policy, and technology, have on infrastructure protection.
For any technology, it is necessary to determine the legal, policy, and
economic implications of the technology and its possible uses. Research is
needed to describe the structure and dynamics of the cybersecurity
marketplace. There is a need for research into the role of standards and
best practices in improving cybersecurity posture, the policy and legal
considerations relating to collection and use of data about the
information infrastructures, and the implications of policies that are
intended to direct responses to cyber attacks.
6. Security for network embedded systems. Research is needed on assessing
the security of control systems that are prevalent in electricity, oil,
gas, and water sectors. Security should be integrated into network
embedded systems where previously it has not existed. Models of control
networks can help in predicting the responses of control systems to
changes and anomalies. Techniques are needed to detect, understand, and
respond to anomalies in large, distributed control networks.
Some of these research areas are already receiving attention from the
federal government. For example, NSF has recently announced a new program
to foster cybersecurity research in areas such as trustworthy computing
technology, evaluation and certification methods, efforts to prevent
denial-of-service attacks, and long-term data-archiving technology. The
NSF program also plans to support multidisciplinary research that covers
the social, legal, ethical, and economic compromises that affect the
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Addressing Long-Term Cybersecurity Research Needs
design and operation of secure network systems. The DHS Science and
Technology Directorate is planning or has under way programs in the
following areas: prevention and protection against attacks; monitoring,
attack detection and response; mitigation of effects, remediation of
damage, and recovery; and forensics and attribution. Other DHS research
programs include infrastructure security (network protocols and process
control systems) and foundations for cyber security (economic assessment
activities, large scale data sets for testing).
Universities are also proposing research efforts to develop new science
and technology for improving the cybersecurity of critical
infrastructures. For example, recently teams of researchers from the
University of California at Berkeley, Carnegie Mellon University, Cornell
University, Stanford University, and Vanderbilt University have proposed a
research center called the Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure
Technologies (TRUST) that would focus on designing systems that continue
to work despite attacks or errors. The TRUST proposal presents three broad
research categories-security technology, systems science, and social
science. These categories are further broken down into 11 specific
research areas that include topics such as software and network security,
secure network embedded systems, and economics, public policy, and
societal challenges of security.
As the federal government's research programs consider funding these
cybersecurity research areas, it is important to note that there are many
R&D needs vying for a limited amount of R&D dollars. Federal R&D program
managers face tough choices in deciding where the R&D money should go and
how much is appropriate for critical infrastructure protection. Depending
on the infrastructure sector, it may be better to focus on overall
infrastructure survivability, instead of the cybersecurity aspects alone.
Some experts have suggested that if cybersecurity is deemed important to
national security, it may be appropriate to adopt the R&D model adopted by
DoD, where postulated threat models drive R&D in a progression from basic
research through exploratory development, ending in government-funded
engineering development of products and systems.
In addition to cybersecurity research that addresses existing
cybersecurity threats, there is need for long-term research that
anticipates the dramatic growth in the use of computing and networks. Some
indicators of an upcoming period of dramatic growth include the increasing
use of broadband networking technologies such as cable modems, the
emergence of new wireless communication options, and the emergence of
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
Web Services that enable computers to communicate with one another
directly using Web technologies.
High-speed networks and standards such as Web Services make it easy for an
organization to connect its computers directly to the computers of its
suppliers, but this surge in interconnections may bring a new wave of
cybersecurity threats to a variety of critical business and government
computing systems. Not enough is understood about security and reliability
of these emerging complex systems. The rapid evolution of new styles of
computing creates a pressing need for research into the fundamental
options for securing Web Services and other complex, interconnected
computing systems, and for ensuring that they will be reliable, highly
available, self-managed, and self-repairing after disruption.
New options for connectivity and new wireless communication technologies
also create new potential for undesired intrusion. Existing security
research has focused more on establishing barriers against intrusion, with
less attention to the preservation of personal privacy and the protection
of intellectual property. New technical options are needed to protect
privacy. Yet privacy is a two-edged sword because the same technologies
that can protect private data may also help criminals and terrorists.
Resolving such quandaries will require both technical advances as well as
legal and social advances.
Recently, program managers at DARPA highlighted the Internet itself as
perhaps the most serious security and reliability obstacle present in many
sensitive military and intelligence systems. Increasing numbers of
academic and commercial researchers echo these concerns. The Internet was
created by a very cooperative, mutually trusting research community, and
was designed with file transfers as its primary mission. This is simply
not the appropriate model for applications such as broadband media
transmission, highly available access to mission-critical services, or
applications in which security and privacy are of primary importance.
Although discarding the existing Internet does not make sense, researchers
are suggesting an approach whereby the existing Internet hardware runs
multiple side-by-side networks that might share the same hardware but have
very different properties. However, like the development of the Internet
itself, a substantial research investment would be required to achieve
such new networks.
Table 16 lists some areas in which long-term research will be required.
This research may occur in a diversity of settings, including academic
institutions, government-funded small business innovation research
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
programs, and classified research programs that address the needs of
military and intelligence communities.
Table 16: Sampling of Long-Term Research Areas
Research area Description
Privacy Better tools are needed for ensuring the privacy of sensitive
information such as individual health records and financial records.
Research is needed on the legal basis of privacy in an era of computer
networks, on the emergence of new social patterns disruptive of
traditional property ownership rules, and on technologies to enforce
privacy.
Fault-tolerance Some of the most disruptive cyber attacks start by
provoking some form of failure or overload, causing the targeted system to
degrade or become unresponsive. Technologies for embedding fault-tolerance
into the major commercial platforms, such as Web services, are needed to
greatly reduce the threat of such disruptions.
Scalability As computing systems grow in size, enterprises are beginning
to encounter problems of scale. Research is needed into managing systems
that may include thousands or tens of thousands of machines. Progress in
this area would reduce the cost of operating large systems.
New monitoring capabilities Whereas computing systems of the past were
relatively easy to instrument and monitor, the trend toward Web-based
systems has created a new world in which an application may reside partly
within a data center and partly on client systems spread over the
Internet. New techniques are needed for monitoring such configurations,
for diagnosing problems such as denial-of-service attacks and for reacting
when problems occur.
Self-management Existing computing systems often require human managers in
rough proportion to the size of the system. Technology for self-management
could enable deployment of large numbers of machines without a great deal
of management and control by humans.
Self-healing Technology is lacking for diagnosing the problem and carrying
out an automated repair of systems that are damaged because of mundane
problems or cyber attacks. Technology for building self-healing systems
would be tremendously beneficial in a great variety of settings. This is a
hard problem, because problems build on one another to produce a large
number of symptoms that may vary greatly despite their common root cause.
Rearchitecting the Internet It is time to revisit the core architecture of
the Internet, moving from a "single network for all uses" model to one in
which network connections might be portals to a small number of
side-by-side networks, sharing the same hardware infrastructure but
offering different properties. Development of such a capability will
require many years of research but could ultimately provide better options
for cybersecurity and robustness.
Source: Kenneth Birman, Cornell University.
Developing Approaches to As we have described, there are many promising
cybersecurity research Transition Research into projects ongoing in
universities and government laboratories. For such Commercial Products
research to be useful in improving the security of critical
infrastructures,
the results of the research must make their way into commercial products
Chapter 4: Cybersecurity Implementation Issues
and systems that can then be deployed in the infrastructures. This
transition from research to actual products is not easy, and it takes
time. The National Research Council has found that, for federal IT
research, at least 10 years, and sometimes more than 15 years, elapse
between initial research on a new idea and commercial success.51 The
council found that the relationship between government-funded research and
industry research has been important in transitioning research results
into commercial products.
Some have suggested the possibility of using a model based on
SEMATECH-Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology-that was established by an
act of Congress in 1987, when 14 U.S.-based semiconductor manufacturers
and the U.S. government came together to strengthen the U.S. semiconductor
industry. The consortium focused on solving common manufacturing problems
by leveraging resources and sharing risks. By 1994, it had become clear
that the U.S. semiconductor industry-both device makers and suppliers-had
regained strength and market share; at that time, SEMATECH's board of
directors voted to seek an end to matching federal funding after 1996,
reasoning that the industry had returned to health and should no longer
receive government support. Federal government may need to work with the
computer security industry-the information technology sector-to develop
options for migrating research results into IT products.
51National Research Council. Innovation in Information Technology,
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2003), 11.
Chapter 5: Summary
In this report we described a variety of cybersecurity technologies that
can be used to help secure critical infrastructures from cyber attacks.
Some technologies, such as firewalls and biometrics, can help to better
protect computers and networks against attacks, while others, such as
intrusion detection and continuity of operations tools, help to detect and
respond to cyber attacks while they are in progress. These technologies
can help to protect information that is being processed, stored, and
transmitted in the networked computer systems that are prevalent in
critical infrastructures. Although many cybersecurity technologies are
available, experts feel that these technologies are not being purchased or
implemented to their fullest extent. In addition to the need for a
short-term solution of properly implementing current cybersecurity
technologies, there is also a longerterm need for cybersecurity research
and for transitioning the research results into commercially available
products. On the basis of a number of research agendas and ongoing
cybersecurity research, we found that a number of research areas need
continuing attention. These cybersecurity research areas include
composition of secure systems, security of network embedded systems,
security metrics, socio-economic impact of security, vulnerability
identification and analysis, and wireless security. Federal cybersecurity
research programs are already beginning to address these research areas.
There are many implementation issues associated with using cybersecurity
technologies for critical infrastructure protection. The issues include
using a holistic approach to security, augmenting technology with people
and processes, building security into new information systems, and
considering non-technical options that can improve cybersecurity.
For a holistic approach to security, entities can use an overall security
framework that includes a combination of risk assessments, security
policies, security solutions, and security management, representing a
continuous security process. Even when an entity has conducted a risk
assessment and knows the extent of its cybersecurity needs, it cannot
protect everything. Often, a business case is required to invest in
cybersecurity. The interaction of technology with security processes and
the people using the technology and the limitations of certain
cybersecurity technologies can influence the purchase of technology. When
building new information systems, organizations such as NIST have
recommended that security requirements be considered as early as possible
in the system development life cycle. System designers can use defense in
depth-a strategy that uses a sequence of defensive mechanisms to enhance
security.
Chapter 5: Summary
Because critical infrastructures are so important to national security and
the public good, the federal government has a stake in ensuring that the
nation's critical infrastructures are protected. IT vendors provide the
products, including cybersecurity technologies that entities use in their
infrastructures. There are a number of opportunities for potential action
by all stakeholders-from the entities to the government-in the areas of
risk assessment, cybersecurity awareness, cybersecurity technology
adoption and implementation, information sharing, cybersecurity research
and development, and cybersecurity standards development. The federal
government and other stakeholders already have several ongoing activities
in these areas, which could help improve the cybersecurity posture in
critical infrastructures.
Because the private sector owns most of the critical infrastructures, the
federal government needs to gain insight into the infrastructures'
vulnerabilities and relative priorities. The use of a risk-based framework
for security and the conduct of risk assessments by infrastructure owners
could provide the federal government with the information necessary to
make informed policy decisions.
All federal actions have consequences-both intended and unintended. It
would be irresponsible to propose or implement any action without
examining the potential consequences, including the cost and benefits of
the action. In particular, when discussing any potential action, it is
crucial to carefully consider the following elements of a policy analysis
framework:
o scope and size of the problem,
o market forces at play and their timeliness,
o level of organization of the critical infrastructure sectors and their
ability to set and implement cybersecurity goals,
o costs and benefits of federal action,
o the intended and unintended consequences of federal action, and
o consequences of inaction by the federal government.
Although we focus primarily on federal actions, all levels of government-
federal, state, and local-and the private sector have to work
Chapter 5: Summary
cooperatively to improve the cybersecurity of our nation's critical
computer-dependent infrastructures.
Critical infrastructure owners are ultimately responsible for the
cybersecurity of the infrastructures. They can use a risk-based framework
to select and implement available cybersecurity technologies. The federal
government can consider a number of options to manage and encourage the
increased use of cybersecurity technologies, support research and develop
new cybersecurity technologies, and generally improve the level of
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure sectors.
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security
and the National Science Foundation for their review.
We include DHS's comments in their entirety in appendix IV. We include
NSF's comments in their entirety in appendix V.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Department of Homeland Security
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Homeland
Security stated that it generally concurred with the report. DHS said that
the report effectively discusses many of the important cybersecurity
issues and the report will be of great value to those entrusted with
protecting critical systems and networks.
DHS provided technical comments on the draft, which we incorporated as
appropriate. Specifically, DHS provided more details on its cybersecurity
research and development programs and expressed concerns with our
characterization of the breadth of cybersecurity research that is
necessary. We agree that the cybersecurity research areas that we
highlight in the report do not address all areas that require research
funding. Our intent was to highlight some of the important research topics
based on our review of cybersecurity research agendas and discussions with
cybersecurity researchers. DHS suggested that we remove wireless security
as a research area because funding is limited and there is a significant
level of private sector activity and funding for wireless security. We
consider wireless security an important area and wireless security appears
in some well-known cybersecurity research agendas. Additionally, the list
of research areas is meant to be for both government and private sector.
We agree that federal R&D dollars are limited and not all research areas
may be candidates for federal funding.
Chapter 5: Summary
National Science Foundation
In written comments on a draft of this report, the National Science
Foundation noted that this is an important and timely report that provides
broad coverage of current and emerging cybersecurity and infrastructure
technologies. NSF highlighted its engagement in the intertwined issues of
critical infrastructure protection and computing. NSF went on to state
that cybersecurity improvements may be made through the widespread
deployment of architectures already recognized to be more resistant to
attacks.
Citing new technology discoveries and major information technology shifts
as drivers, NSF emphasized the critical ongoing role of long range
research both for developing newly robust infrastructures and for
achieving security as an inherent property of these infrastructures.
Finally, NSF noted that an essential component of security is the use of
credible deterrents. NSF believes that research in cyber forensics and its
effective use by law enforcement may reduce the overall threat and serve
as a deterrent to would-be attackers.
External Review Comments
We provided a draft of this report to 26 organizations, including
representatives of six critical infrastructure sectors, for their review.
Individuals from these organizations were selected because of their
assistance during the data collection phase of our work or their
attendance at our cybersecurity meeting, convened for us by the National
Academy of Sciences. The reviewers represented government, industry, and
academia. We received comments and suggestions from 15 reviewers. The
comments ranged from clarifying issues to highlighting certain aspects of
the assessment that the reviewers considered important. We have
incorporated these comments, where appropriate, in the report.
Several reviewers commended us for putting together a good report. One
reviewer congratulated us for pulling such challenging material into an
exceptionally coherent and solid document. Another reviewer felt that the
report is very thorough and manages to stay on task given the scope and
complexity of the issues.
Among the detailed comments, one suggestion was to briefly discuss
longterm research that takes into account an anticipated dramatic growth
in the use of computing and networks. We added a section on long-term
research that includes a table with a sampling of research areas. A
reviewer noted that run-of-the-mill poor systems management can be as
serious a threat as a deliberate cyber attack. The reviewer characterized
such poor systems management as a mundane cybersecurity threat. On the
Chapter 5: Summary
basis of that reviewer's suggestion we included a discussion of the
serious consequences of such routine mismanagement.
Another reviewer stated that the report is no longer relevant because
waves of worm/virus attacks in recent months have made the Internet a far
more dangerous place and that any risk management approach would be
problematic. We disagree with this characterization and believe that the
threats to both the Internet and other critical infrastructure networks
continue to be relevant and that risk management remains a logical
approach to addressing the cybersecurity needs of critical
infrastructures.
Comments from the critical infrastructure sectors were generally
favorable. One sector representative commented that the report strikes a
reasonably good balance between analysis and recommendations, and that the
three key questions that provide the overall structure for the report are
relevant and timely. Some sector representatives also provided clarifying
details about information related to their sector. For example, one sector
representative cited a recent government grant to help support that
sector's ISAC. Another sector representative clarified how a segment of
that sector relies on information technology for its operations. We
incorporated the sector-suggested clarifications and changes as
appropriate.
A ndix I Tech logy A
Appendix I: Technology Assessment Methodology
This technology assessment focuses on three key questions:
1. What are the key cybersecurity requirements in each of the critical
infrastructure protection sectors?
2. What cybersecurity technologies can be applied to critical
infrastructure protection? What technologies are currently deployed or
currently available but not yet widely deployed for critical
infrastructure protection? What technologies are currently being
researched for cybersecurity? Are there any gaps in cybersecurity
technology that should be better researched and developed to address
critical infrastructure protection?
3. What are the implementation issues associated with using cybersecurity
technologies for critical infrastructure protection, including policy
issues such as privacy and information sharing?
To identify cybersecurity technologies that can be used for critical
infrastructure protection (CIP), we reviewed relevant cybersecurity
reports and vendor literature. We met with representatives of the National
Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Infosec
Research Council, and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science
and Technology directorate to discuss current and planned federal
cybersecurity research efforts. We also met with representatives from two
Department of Energy national labs, Sandia National Labs and Lawrence
Livermore National Lab, and one Department of Defense center, the CERT
Coordination Center (CERT/CC).1 We interviewed cybersecurity researchers
from academic institutions (Carnegie Mellon University, Dartmouth College,
and the University of California at Berkeley) and corporate research
centers (AT&T Research Labs, SRI International, and HP Labs).
To identify the key cybersecurity requirements in each critical
infrastructure sector, we developed a data collection instrument and used
it to interview sector representatives such as industry groups or
companies within the sector. We used the critical infrastructure sectors
1The CERT/CC is a center of Internet security expertise at the Software
Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center
operated by Carnegie Mellon University. CERT and CERT Coordination Center
are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by Carnegie Mellon
University.
Appendix I: Technology Assessment Methodology
defined in the Administration's national strategy documents.2 We
interviewed representatives from the Banking and Finance, Chemical
Industry and Hazardous Materials, Defense Industrial Base, Energy,
Information and Telecommunications, Transportation, and Water sectors. We
met with officials from DHS's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) directorate to discuss their efforts in organizing and
coordinating CIP activities. We also met with IAIP's National
Communications System (NCS), which operates the information-sharing and
analysis center (ISAC) for the telecommunications sector. We met with the
Coast Guard to discuss its efforts in the maritime transportation sector.
To identify implementation issues, we reviewed previous studies on
security and CIP, including those from the National Research Council,
CERT/CC, the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P),
and NIST. We interviewed critical infrastructure sector representatives to
identify the challenges they face in implementing cybersecurity
technologies. We also relied on previous GAO reports on cybersecurity and
CIP. To examine policy issues, we reviewed current federal statutes and
regulations that govern the protection of computer systems. On the basis
of information that we collected through literature reviews and
interviews, we assessed the effects of several policy options that could
be employed by the federal government.
In October 2003, we convened a meeting, with the assistance of the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), to review the preliminary results of
our work.3 Meeting attendees included representatives from academia,
critical infrastructure sectors, and public policy organizations.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and NSF for their review. We
include their comments in appendixes IV and V, respectively. In addition,
we provided a draft of this report to selected attendees of the meeting
that
2The White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for
Homeland Security,
(Washington, D.C.: July 2002) and The White House, The National Strategy
for The
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,
(Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 2003).
3We have a standing contract with NAS under which NAS provides assistance
in convening groups of experts to provide information and expertise to our
engagements. NAS uses its scientific network to identify participants and
uses its facilities and processes to arrange the meetings. Recording and
using the information in a report is our responsibility.
Appendix I: Technology Assessment Methodology
we convened with NAS for this work and with other interested
organizations.
We conducted our work from May 2003 to February 2004 in the Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area; the San Francisco, California, metropolitan area;
Princeton, New Jersey; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. We performed our work
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection
Policies
Over the years, several working groups have been formed, special reports
written, federal policies issued, and organizations created to address
CIP. Although these steps have raised awareness and spurred activity by
many critical infrastructures and the federal government, the nation still
faces several challenges in CIP. To provide a historical perspective,
table 17 summarizes the key developments in federal CIP policy since 1997.
Four key actions that have shaped the development of the federal
government's CIP policy are
o Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63)
o Homeland Security Act of 2002
o The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
o Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)
Table 17: Federal Government Actions Taken to Develop CIP Policy
Policy action Date Description
Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Oct. 1997 Described the
potentially devastating effects of poor information security
a
Infrastructures
for the nation and recommended measures to achieve a higher level of CIP
that included industry cooperation and information sharing, a national
organizational structure, a revised program of research and development, a
broad program of awareness and education, and a reconsideration of related
laws.
Presidential Decision Directive 63 May 1998 Established CIP as a national
goal and presented a strategy for cooperative efforts by government and
the private sector to protect the physical and cyber-based systems
essential to the minimum operations of the economy and the government.
Established government agencies to coordinate and support CIP efforts.
Identified lead federal agencies to work with coordinators in eight
infrastructure sectors and five special functions.
Encouraged the development of information-sharing and analysis centers.
National Plan for Information Systems Jan. 2000 Provided a vision and
framework for the federal government to prevent,
b
Protection
detect, and respond to attacks on the nation's critical cyber-based
infrastructure and to reduce existing vulnerabilities by complementing and
focusing existing federal computer security and information technology
requirements.
Executive Order 13228 Oct. 2001 Established the Office of Homeland
Security within the Executive Office of the President to develop and
coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to
secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks.
Established the Homeland Security Council to advise and assist the
President with all aspects of homeland security and to ensure coordination
among executive departments and agencies.
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection
Policies
Policy action Date Description
Executive Order 13231 Oct. 2001 Established the President's Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board to coordinate cyber-related federal
efforts and programs associated with protecting our nation's critical
infrastructures and to recommend policies and coordinating programs for
protecting CIP-related information systems.
c
National Strategy for Homeland Security July 2002 Identified the
protection of critical infrastructures and key assets as a critical
mission area for homeland security.
Expanded the number of critical infrastructures to 13 from the 8
identified in PDD 63 and identified lead federal agencies for each.
Homeland Security Act of 2002d Nov. 2002 Created the Department of
Homeland Security and assigned it the following CIP responsibilities: (1)
developing a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources
and critical infrastructures of the United States; (2) recommending
measures to protect the key resources and critical infrastructures of the
United States in coordination with other groups; and (3) disseminating, as
appropriate, information to assist in the deterrence, prevention,
preemption of, or response to terrorist attacks.
e
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace Feb. 2003 Provided the initial
framework for both organizing and prioritizing efforts to protect our
nation's cyberspace.
Provided direction to federal departments and agencies that have roles in
cyberspace security and identified steps that state and local governments,
private companies and organizations, and individual Americans can take to
improve our collective cybersecurity.
The National Strategy for the Physical Feb. 2003 Provided a statement of
national policy to remain committed to protecting
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key
f
Assets
critical infrastructures and key assets from physical attacks.
Built on PDD 63 with its sector-based approach and called for expanding
the capabilities of ISACs.
Outlined three key objectives: (1) identifying and assuring the protection
of the most critical assets, systems, and functions; (2) assuring the
protection of infrastructures that face an imminent threat; and (3)
pursuing collaborative measures and initiatives to assure the protection
of other potential targets.
Executive Order 13286 Feb. 2003 Superseded Executive Order 13231 but
maintained the same national policy statement regarding the protection
against disruption of information systems for critical infrastructures.
Dissolved the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and
eliminated the board's chair, the Special Advisor to the President for
Cyberspace Security.
Designated the National Infrastructure Advisory Council to continue to
provide the President with advice on the security of information systems
for critical infrastructures supporting other sectors of the economy
through the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection
Policies
Policy action Date Description
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 Dec. 2003 Superseded PDD 63
and established a national policy for federal departments and agencies to
identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources and
to protect them from terrorist attack.
Defined roles and responsibilities for the Department of Homeland Security
and sector-specific agencies to work with sectors to coordinate CIP
activities.
Established a CIP Policy Coordinating Committee to advise the Homeland
Security Council on interagency CIP issues.
Source: GAO analysis.
aPresident's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical
Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
1997).
bThe White House, Defending America's Cyberspace: National Plan for
Information Systems Protection: Version 1.0: An Invitation to Dialogue
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2000).
cThe White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for
Homeland Security.
dHomeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002).
eThe White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 2003).
fThe White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.
Presidential Decision In 1998, the President issued PDD 63, which
described a strategy for
cooperative efforts by government and the private sector to protect the
Directive 63 physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum
operations of Established Initial CIP the economy and the government. PDD
63 called for a range of actions
that were intended to improve federal agency security programs, improve
Strategy the nation's ability to detect and respond to serious
computer-based and physical attacks, and establish a partnership between
the government and the private sector. The directive called on the federal
government to serve as a model of how infrastructure assurance is best
achieved, and it designated lead agencies to work with private sector and
government entities. Further, it established CIP as a national goal and
stated that, by the close of 2000, the United States was to have achieved
an initial operating capability to protect the nation's critical
infrastructures from intentional destructive acts and, by 2003, have
developed the ability to protect the nation's critical infrastructures
from intentional destructive attacks.
To accomplish its goals, PDD 63 established and designated organizations
to provide central coordination and support, including
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection
Policies
o the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), an interagency
office housed in the Department of Commerce, which was established to
develop a national plan for CIP based on infrastructure plans that had
been developed by the private sector and federal agencies;
o the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), an organization
within the FBI, which was expanded to address national-level threat
assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation and
response; and
o the National Infrastructure Assurance Council, which was established
to enhance the partnership of the public and private sectors in protecting
our critical infrastructures.1
To ensure the coverage of critical sectors, PDD 63 identified eight
infrastructures: (1) banking and finance; (2) information and
communications; (3) water supply; (4) aviation, highway, mass transit,
pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce; (5) emergency law enforcement;
(6) emergency fire services and continuity of government; (7) electric
power and oil and gas production and storage; and (8) public health
services. It also identified five special functions: (1) law enforcement
and internal security, (2) intelligence, (3) foreign affairs, (4) national
defense, and (5) research and development. For each of the infrastructures
and functions, the directive designated lead federal agencies, referred to
as sector liaisons, to work with their counterparts in the private sector,
referred to as sector coordinators. To facilitate private sector
participation, PDD 63 also encouraged the voluntary creation of ISACs to
serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and appropriately sanitizing
and disseminating information to and from infrastructure sectors and the
federal government through NIPC.
PDD 63 called for a range of activities that were intended to establish a
partnership between the public and private sectors to ensure the security
of our nation's critical infrastructures. Sector liaisons and sector
coordinators were to work together to address problems related to CIP for
each sector. In particular, PDD 63 stated that they were to (1) develop
and implement vulnerability awareness and education programs, and (2)
contribute to a sector National Infrastructure Assurance Plan by
1Executive Order 13231 replaced this council with the National
Infrastructure Advisory Council.
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection
Policies
o assessing the vulnerabilities of the sector to cyber or physical
attacks;
o recommending a plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities;
o proposing a system for identifying and preventing major attacks; and
o developing a plan for alerting, containing, and rebuffing an attack in
progress and then, in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, as appropriate, rapidly reconstituting minimum essential
capabilities in the aftermath of an attack.
PDD 63 also required every federal department and agency to be responsible
for protecting its own critical infrastructures, including both
cyber-based and physical assets. To fulfill this responsibility, PDD 63
called for agencies' chief information officers to be responsible for
information assurance, and it required every agency to appoint a chief
infrastructure assurance officer to be responsible for the protection of
all other aspects of an agency's critical infrastructure. Further, it
required federal agencies to
o develop, implement, and periodically update a plan for protecting its
critical infrastructure;
o determine its minimum essential infrastructure that might be a target
of attack;
o conduct and periodically update vulnerability assessments of its
minimum essential infrastructure;
o develop a recommended remedial plan, based on vulnerability
assessments, that identifies time lines for implementation,
responsibilities, and funding; and
o analyze intergovernmental dependencies and mitigate those
dependencies.
Other PDD 63 requirements for federal agencies included providing
vulnerability awareness and education to sensitize people regarding the
importance of security and training them in security standards,
particularly regarding computer systems; establishing a system for
responding to significant ongoing infrastructure attacks to help isolate
and minimize damage; and establishing a system for rapidly reconstituting
minimum required capabilities for varying levels of successful
infrastructure attacks.
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection
Policies
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 Created the Department of Homeland
Security
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace Provided an Initial Cyber CIP
Framework
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed by the President on November 25,
2002, established the Department of Homeland Security. The act assigned
the department a number of CIP responsibilities, including: (1) developing
a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States; (2) recommending measures to protect
the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in
coordination with other federal agencies and in cooperation with state and
local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other
entities; and (3) disseminating, as appropriate, information analyzed by
the department both within the department and to other federal agencies,
state and local government agencies, and private sector entities to assist
in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to terrorist
attacks.
To help accomplish these functions, the act created the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate within the department
and transferred to it the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of
several existing organizations with CIP responsibilities, including NIPC
(not including the Computer Investigations and Operations Section) and
CIAO.
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is intended to provide an
initial framework for both organizing and prioritizing efforts to protect
our nation's cyberspace. It also provided direction to federal departments
and agencies that have roles in cyberspace security and identified steps
that state and local governments, private companies and organizations, and
individual Americans can take to improve our collective cybersecurity. The
strategy lists the critical infrastructure sectors and the related lead
federal agencies that are identified in the National Strategy for Homeland
Security, which expanded the number of critical infrastructures from the 8
defined in PDD 63 to 13. In addition, the strategy identifies DHS as the
central coordinator for cyberspace efforts. As such, DHS is responsible
for coordinating and working with other federal entities that are involved
in cybersecurity.
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is organized according to five
national priorities, with major actions and initiatives identified for
each.
1. Security Response System-provides a public/private architecture for
analyzing, warning, and managing incidents of national significance,
promoting continuity in government systems and private sector
infrastructures, and increasing information sharing.
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Policies
2. Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program-reduces threats and deters
malicious actions through effective programs to identify and punish
violators, identifies and remediates existing vulnerabilities, develops
new systems with fewer vulnerabilities, and assesses emerging technologies
for vulnerabilities.
3. Awareness Training-emphasizes the promotion of a comprehensive
national awareness program to empower all Americans to secure their own
parts of cyberspace.
4. Securing Government's Cyberspace-protects, improves, and maintains the
federal government's cybersecurity.
5. National Security and International Cyberspace Security
Cooperation-identifies major actions and initiatives to strengthen the
U.S. national security and international cooperation.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 Defined Federal CIP
Responsibilities
In December 2003, the President issued HSPD-7, which established a
national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and
prioritize critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them
from terrorist attack and superseded PDD-63. HSPD-7 defines
responsibilities for DHS, lead federal agencies, or sector-specific
agencies, that are responsible for addressing specific critical
infrastructure sectors, and other departments and agencies. It instructs
federal departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate
the protection of critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, and mitigate
the effects of attacks. To accomplish these tasks, the federal government
is to work with state and local governments and the private sector.
The Secretary of Homeland Security is assigned several responsibilities,
including:
o coordinating the national effort to enhance critical infrastructure
protection;
o identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of critical
infrastructure, emphasizing protection against catastrophic health effects
or mass casualties;
o establishing uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and
methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure protection and risk
management activities within and across sectors; and
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection
Policies
o serving as the focal point for security of cyberspace, including
analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction,
mitigation, and recovery efforts for critical infrastructure information
systems.
To ensure the coverage of critical sectors, HSPD-7 designated
sectorspecific agencies for the critical infrastructure sectors identified
in the National Strategy for Homeland Security (see table 18). These
agencies are responsible for infrastructure protection activities in their
assigned sectors and are to coordinate and collaborate with relevant
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector to
accomplish these responsibilities. Specifically, sector-specific agencies
are to conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector and
encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the
effects of attacks against critical infrastructures. In addition, they are
to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical
infrastructures and facilitate the sharing of information about physical
and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective
measures, and best practices. Sector-specific agencies are to report to
DHS on an annual basis on their activities to meet these responsibilities.
Further, the sectorspecific agencies are to continue to encourage the
development of information-sharing and analysis mechanisms and to support
sectorcoordinating mechanisms.
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Policies
Table 18: Critical Infrastructure Sectors Identified by the National
Strategy for Homeland Security and HSPD-7
Sector Description Sector-specific agencies
Agriculture Provides for the fundamental need for food. The
infrastructure includes supply chains for feed and crop production.
Department of Agriculture Banking and finance Provides the financial
infrastructure of the nation. This sector consists of Department of the Treasury
commercial banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, governmentsponsored
enterprises, pension funds, and other financial institutions that carry
out transactions including clearing and settlement.
Chemicals and hazardous Transforms natural raw materials into commonly
used products benefiting Department of Homeland
materials society's health, safety, and productivity. The chemical
industry Security represents a $450 billion enterprise and produces more
than 70,000 products that are essential to automobiles, pharmaceuticals,
food supply, electronics, water treatment, health, construction and other
necessities.
Supplies the military with the Department of
Defense industrial base means to protect the nation by Defense
producing
weapons, aircraft, and ships and
providing essential services,
including
information technology and supply
and maintenance.
Saves lives and property from
accidents and disaster. This Department of
Emergency services sector Homeland
includes fire, rescue, emergency
medical services, and law Security
enforcement
organizations.
Provides the electric power used
by all sectors, including Department of
Energy critical Energy
infrastructures, and the
refining, storage, and
distribution of oil and gas.
The sector is divided into
electricity and oil and natural
gas.
Carries out the post-harvesting
Food of the food supply, including Department of
processing Agriculture and
and retail sales. Department of
Health and
Human Services
Ensures national security and
Government freedom and administers key Department of
public Homeland
functions. Security
Provides communications and Department of
Information technology processes to meet the needs of Homeland
and telecommunications businesses and government. Security
Postal and shipping Delivers private and commercial letters, packages,
and bulk assets. The Department of Homeland U.S. Postal Service and other
carriers provide the services of this sector. Security
Public health and Mitigates the risk of disasters and attacks and also
provides recovery Department of Health and healthcare assistance if an
attack occurs. The sector consists of health departments, Human Services
clinics, and hospitals.
Transportation Enables movement of people and assets that are vital to
our economy, Department of Homeland mobility, and security with the use of
aviation, ships, rail, pipelines, Security highways, trucks, buses, and
mass transit.
Drinking water and water Sanitizes the water supply with the use of about
170,000 public water Environmental Protection
treatment systems systems. These systems depend on reservoirs, dams,
wells, treatment Agency facilities, pumping stations, and transmission
lines.
Source: GAO analysis based on the President's National Strategy documents
and HSPD-7.
By December 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security also is to produce a
comprehensive and integrated national plan for critical infrastructure and
key resources protection that will outline national goals, objectives,
milestones, and key initiatives. If appropriate, the plan is also to
include:
Appendix II: Summary of Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection
Policies
o a strategy to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of
critical infrastructures, including an approach for how DHS will
coordinate with other federal agencies, state and local governments, the
private sector, foreign countries, and international organizations;
o a summary of activities to define and prioritize, reduce the
vulnerability of, and coordinate the protection of critical
infrastructures;
o a summary of initiatives for sharing critical infrastructure
information and for providing threat warning data to state and local
governments and the private sector; and
o coordination and integration with other federal emergency management
and preparedness activities, such as the National Response Plan.
To support information-sharing efforts, HSPD-7 instructs the Secretary of
Homeland Security to establish appropriate systems, mechanisms, and
procedures to share homeland security information on threats and
vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures with other federal agencies,
state and local governments, and the private sector in a timely manner.
HSPD-7 establishes a CIP Policy Coordinating Committee, which will advise
the Homeland Security Council on interagency policy related to physical
and cyber infrastructure protection. The Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) will coordinate interagency research and development to
enhance CIP activities. In coordination with OSTP, DHS is to prepare an
annual federal research and development plan to support critical
infrastructure protection activities. To better understand the potential
effects of attacks on the critical infrastructure, DHS is to develop
models on the potential implications of attacks on critical
infrastructures, focusing on densely populated areas. Further, DHS is to
develop a national indications and warnings architecture for
infrastructure protection that will facilitate (1) an understanding of
baseline infrastructure operations; (2) the identification of indicators
and precursors to an attack; and (3) surge capacity for detecting and
analyzing potential attack patterns.
Consistent with PDD 63, HSPD-7 requires all federal departments and
agencies to be responsible for protecting their own internal critical
infrastructure. These agencies are to develop plans for the protection of
their physical and cyber critical infrastructures and to provide them to
the Office of Management and Budget for approval by July 2004. These plans
are to address identification, prioritization, protection, and contingency
planning, including the recovery and reconstitution of essential
capabilities.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Overview of Network Computer systems are most visible in the information
technology (IT) that organizations use in their data, voice, and video
centers and that workers
Systems use on their desks and for remote access. Computers, in many
different forms, are also embedded in many systems that run
infrastructures in sectors ranging from electric power systems to medical,
police, fire, and rescue systems. Infrastructures use interconnected
computer systems extensively. These networks of computer systems consist
of host computers that are connected by communication links, which can be
wired or wireless. We use the term host to refer to a computer of any
form-a mainframe, a server, or a desktop personal computer (PC), as well
as other, less obvious computers, such as a router or a real-time
process-control computer. Hosts store information and run software,
typically an operating system and one or more application programs. The
term network refers to the data communication links and the network
elements such as routers, hubs, and switches that enable the hosts to
communicate with each other. The network systems infrastructure can be
viewed as an interconnected collection of hosts and networks, as
illustrated in figure 8.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Figure 8: An Example of Typical Networked Systems
Source: GAO analysis and Microsoft Visio.
As figure 8 shows, computer systems are interconnected by networks, which,
in turn, are often connected to the Internet-the worldwide collection of
networks, operated by some 10,000 Internet Service Providers (ISP). Most
organizations have one or more local area networks (LANs) at each of their
offices. Larger organizations also have wide area networks (WANs) that
connect the organization's various offices in different geographical
locations.
There Are Different Types The hosts in these network systems can be
grouped into four main types of Hosts according to their typical usage:
o Mainframes are large computers that are capable of supporting
thousands of simultaneous users. Although historically they have been
associated with centralized computing, today's mainframes can be used
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
in networks to serve distributed users and smaller servers. Hitachi and
IBM are examples of mainframe computer manufacturers.
o Mid-range systems are powerful computers that often are used in
corporate settings as servers or single-user computers. Mid-range system
manufacturers include Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Sun Microsystems.
o Personal computers are small, relatively inexpensive computers that
are designed for a single user. Although they vary in speed and
performance, PCs use microprocessors and have self-contained data storage
devices. PC manufacturers include Apple, Dell, Gateway, Hewlett-Packard,
and IBM.
o Embedded systems are specialized computer systems that are part of a
larger system or machine. Typically, an embedded system is housed on a
single microprocessor board with the programs stored in readonly memory.
Virtually all appliances that have a digital interface-for example,
watches, microwaves, video cassette recorders (VCR), digital video disk
(DVD) players, and cars-utilize embedded systems.
Whether it is a large mainframe computer or a desktop PC, each host has
three basic components: (1) a central processing unit (CPU), which
performs the instructions that are contained in a computer program; (2)
random access memory (RAM), which stores computer programs and information
while the CPU is processing them; and (3) permanent storage media, such as
hard disk, read-only memory (ROM), or CD-ROM, which serves as the
permanent storage space for computer programs and data. In addition to
these basic components-CPU, memory, and permanent storage-a host typically
has other devices attached to it. These devices can range from the network
interface that connects the computer to the network to user input/output
devices such as keyboards, monitors, and printers.
Hosts Run Operating Systems and Applications
Each host computer typically runs an operating system. The operating
system is a special collection of computer programs that has two primary
purposes. First, operating systems provide the interface between
application programs and the CPU and other hardware components. Second,
operating systems load and run other programs. All operating systems
include one or more command processors that allow users to type commands
and perform tasks like running a program or printing a file. Most
operating systems also include a graphical user interface that enables the
user to perform most tasks by clicking on-screen icons. Some examples of
operating systems are Microsoft Windows, Unix, Linux, OS/390, z/OS, and
Mac OS.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Some embedded systems include an operating system, but many are so
specialized that the entire logic can be implemented as a single program.
Embedded systems are widely used in many critical infrastructures.
Computer application programs make use of the capabilities that the
operating system provides. For example, computer programs read and write
files by using built-in capabilities of the operating system.
Operating systems include some built-in security features like user names,
passwords, and permissions, to perform specific tasks, such as running
certain applications or accessing specific information such as a file or a
database.
Networks Use Protocols
Networks use a predefined set of rules known as protocols to communicate
with each other. For example, the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) suite is the protocol of choice on the Internet. A
network protocol refers to a detailed process the sender and receiver
agree upon for exchanging data.
TCP/IP networking can best be explained and understood in terms of a model
with four layers, where each layer is responsible for performing a
particular task. The layered model describes the flow of data between the
physical connection to the network and the end-user application. Figure 9
shows the four-layer network model for TCP/IP.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Figure 9: TCP/IP Four-layer Network Model
SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol), FTP (File Transfer
Protocol), HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) (Web),
Application Telnet, DNS (Domain Name System), and RTP/RTCP
(Real-Time Transport Protocol/Real-Time Control
Protocol) (audio and video streams)
Transport TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), UDP (User Datagram
Protocol)
Network IP (Internet Protocol)
Physical
Source: GAO.
In this four-layer model, information always moves from one layer to the
next. For example, when an application sends data to another application,
the data go through the layers in this order: Application->Transport
->Network->Physical. At the receiving end, the data go up from
Physical->Network->Transport->Application.
Each layer has its own set of protocols for handling and formatting the
data. The way in which data are sent on a network is similar to the way in
which letters are sent through the postal service. For example, a typical
protocol involved in sending a letter would be a preferred sequence of
data for a task such as addressing an envelope (first the name; then the
street address; and then city, state, and zip or other postal code).
Similarly, a protocol in the network layer of TCP/IP might be to prepare a
packet for transmission from one network to another. There would be some
information in that packet identifying the network where the packet
originated as well as the destination network. Software that implements
the TCP/IP protocols is typically included as part of the operating
system.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Each of the four layers performs a specialized function:
o Application layer: Applications such as e-mail readers and Web
browsers interface with the application layer to transmit data over TCP/IP
networks. There are application-level protocols such as Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) and Post Office Protocol (POP) for email; Hyper
Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) for the Web; File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
for file transfers; and Real-Time Transport Protocol/Real-Time Control
Protocol (RTP/RTCP) for delivery of audio and video streams.
Application-level protocols also have a port number that can be thought of
as an identifier for a specific application. For example, port 80 is
associated with HTTP or a Web server.
o Transport layer: This layer breaks large messages into data packets
for transmission and reassembles them at the destination. The two most
important protocols in this layer are Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). TCP guarantees delivery of data; UDP
just sends the data without ensuring that it actually reaches its
destination.
o Network layer: This layer is responsible for getting data packets from
one network to another. If the networks are far apart, the data packets
are routed from one network to the next until they reach their
destination. The primary protocol in this layer is the Internet Protocol
(IP).
o Physical layer: This layer consists of the physical networking
hardware (such as an Ethernet card or Token Ring card) that carries the
data packets in a network.
The benefit of the layered model is that each layer takes care of only its
specific task, leaving the rest to the other layers. The layers can mix
and match-TCP/IP networks can work over any type of physical network
medium, from Ethernet to radio waves (in a wireless network). In addition,
each layer can be implemented in different modules. For example, typically
the transport and network layers already exist as part of the operating
system, and any application can make use of these layers.
TCP/IP Networks Use IP TCP/IP networks such as the Internet comprise many
networks as well as Addresses to Identify many hosts on each network. Each
host in a TCP/IP network is identified Networks and Hosts by its IP
address. Because TCP/IP deals with internetworking-
interconnecting many networks-the IP address is a network address that
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
identifies the network on which the host is located and a host address
that identifies the specific computer on that network. The IP address is a
4-byte (32-bit) value. The convention is to write each byte as a decimal
value and to put a dot (.) after each number. For example, a typical IP
address might be 192.168.0.1. This way of writing IP addresses is known as
dotteddecimal or dotted-quad notation. In decimal notation, a byte (which
is made up of 8 bits) can have a value between 0 and 255. Thus a valid IP
addresses can use only the numbers between 0 and 255 in the dotteddecimal
notation. The numbers 0 and 255 in the network or host address part of the
IP address have special meanings.
Internet Services Use Well-Known Port Numbers
The TCP/IP protocol suite has become the de facto communications standard
of the Internet because many standard services are available on all
systems that support TCP/IP. These services make the Internet useful by
enabling the transfer of mail, news, and Web pages. A well-known port is
associated with each of these services. A transport layer protocol, such
as TCP, uses this port to locate a service on any system. A server
process-a computer program running on a system-implements each service.
These services include
o DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) is used to dynamically
configure TCP/IP network parameters on a computer. DHCP is primarily used
to assign dynamic IP addresses and other networking information such as
name server, default gateway, and domain names that are needed to
configure TCP/IP networks. The DHCP server listens on port 67.
o FTP (File Transfer Protocol) enables the transfer of files between
computers over the Internet. FTP uses two ports-data is transferred on
port 20, while control information is exchanged on port 21.
o HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) is a recent protocol for sending
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) documents from one system to another.
HTTP is the underlying protocol of the Web. By default, the Web server and
client communicate on port 80.
o NFS (Network File System) is for sharing files among computers. NFS
uses Sun's Remote Procedure Call (RPC) facility, which exchanges
information through port 111.
o NNTP (Network News Transfer Protocol) is for distribution of news
articles in a store-and-forward fashion across the Internet. NNTP uses
port 119.
o SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) is for exchanging e-mail messages
between systems. SMTP uses port 25 for information exchange.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
o Telnet enables a user on one system to log into a remote system on the
Internet (the user must provide a valid user ID and password to log into
the remote system). Telnet uses port 23 by default.
o SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) is used to manage all types
of network devices on the Internet. Like FTP, SNMP uses two ports: 161 and
162.
Current Cybersecurity Technologies
There are several technologies that can be used by critical infrastructure
owners to enhance their cybersecurity postures.1 While several
classifications of cybersecurity technologies are available, we present a
taxonomy based on controls. Security controls are the management,
operational, and technical safeguards that are used to protect a system
and its information. Table 19 lists the five control categories and
control types that support these categories. Several different
technologies are available that provide functionality in support of these
control categories and types. Some technologies can support more than one
control type. Some of these technologies are implemented on hosts and
network elements as "add-on" functionality. Other cybersecurity
technologies are sold as integrated hardware and software platforms.
1GAO has previously reported on cybersecurity technologies available to
help secure federal computer systems. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
Information Security: Technologies to Secure Federal Systems, GAO-04-467
(Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004).
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Table 19: Cybersecurity Technology Control Categories and Types
Control category Control type
Access controls
o Boundary protection o Firewalls
o Content management
o Authentication o Biometrics
o Smart tokens
o Authorization o User rights and privileges
System integrity o Antivirus software
o File integrity checkers
Cryptography o Digital signatures and certificates
o Virtual private networks
Audit and monitoring o Intrusion detection systems
o Intrusion prevention systems
o Security event correlation tools
o Computer forensics tools
Configuration management and assurance o Policy enforcement applications
o Network management
o Continuity of operations
o Scanners
o Patch management
Source: GAO analysis.
Access Controls
Access control technologies ensure that only authorized users or systems
can access and use computers, networks, and the information stored on
these systems and help to protect sensitive data and systems. Access
control simplifies network security by reducing the number of paths that
attackers might use to penetrate system or network defenses. Access
control includes three different control types: boundary protection,
authentication, and authorization.
Boundary protection technologies demark a logical or physical boundary
between protected information and systems and unknown users. Boundary
protection technologies can be used to protect a network (for example,
firewalls) or a single computer (for example, personal firewalls).
Generally, these technologies prevent access to the network or computer by
external unauthorized users. Another type of boundary protection
technology, content management, can also be used to restrict the ability
of
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
authorized system or network users to access systems or networks beyond
the system or network boundary.
Authentication technologies associate a user with a particular identity.
People are authenticated by three basic means: by something they know,
something they have, or something they are. People and systems regularly
use these means to identify people in everyday life. For example, members
of a community routinely recognize one another by how they look or how
their voices sound-by something they are. Automated teller machines
recognize customers because they present a bank card-something they
have-and they enter a personal identification number (PIN)-something they
know. Using a key to enter a locked building is another example of using
something you have. More secure systems may combine two of more of these
approaches.
While the use of passwords is an example of authentication based on
something users know, there are several technologies based on something
users have. Security tokens can be used to authenticate a user. User
information can be coded onto a token using magnetic media (for example,
bank cards) or optical media (for example, compact disk-like media).
Several smart token technologies containing an integrated circuit chip
that can store and process data are also available. Biometric technologies
automate the identification of people using one or more of their distinct
physical or behavioral characteristics-authentication based on something
that users are. The use of security tokens or biometrics requires the
installation of the appropriate readers at network and computer access
points.
Once a user is authenticated, authorization technologies are used to allow
or prevent actions by that user according to predefined rules. Users could
be granted access to data on the system or to perform certain actions on
the system. Authorization technologies support the principles of
legitimate use, least privilege, and separation of duties. Access control
could be based on user identity, role, group membership, or other
information known to the system.
Most operating systems and some applications provide some authentication
and authorization functionality. For example, user identification (ID)
codes and passwords are the most commonly used authentication technology.
System administrators can assign users rights and privileges to
applications and data files based on user IDs. Some operating systems
allow for the grouping of users to simplify the
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
administration of groups of users who require the same levels of access to
files and applications.
Boundary Protection: Firewalls
What the technology does
Firewalls are network devices or systems running special software that
control the flow of network traffic between networks or between a host and
a network. A firewall is set up as the single point through which
communications must pass. This enables the firewall to act as a protective
barrier between the protected network and any external networks. Any
information leaving the internal network can be forced to pass through a
firewall as it leaves the network or host. Incoming data can enter only
through the firewall.
Firewalls are typically deployed where a corporate network connects to the
Internet. However, firewalls can also be used internally, to guard areas
of an organization against unauthorized internal access. For example, many
corporate networks use firewalls to restrict access to internal networks
that perform sensitive functions, such as accounting or personnel.
Personal computer users can also use firewalls, called personal firewalls,
to protect their computers from unauthorized access over a network. Such
personal firewalls are relatively inexpensive software programs that can
be installed on personal computers to filter all network traffic and allow
only authorized communications. Essentially, a firewall can be likened to
a protective fence that keeps unwanted external data out and sensitive
internal data in (see figure 10).
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
Source: GAO analysis and Microsoft Visio.
Typically, a firewall is a network device or host with two or more network
interfaces - one connected to the protected internal network and the other
connected to unprotected networks, such as the Internet. The firewall runs
software that examines the network packets arriving at its network
interfaces and takes appropriate action based on a set of rules. The idea
is to define these rules so that they allow only authorized network
traffic to flow between the two interfaces. Configuring the firewall
involves setting up the rules properly. A configuration strategy is to
reject all network traffic and then enable only a limited set of network
packets to go through the firewall. The authorized network traffic would
include the connections necessary to perform functions such as visiting
Web sites and receiving electronic mail.
NIST describes eight kinds of firewall platforms: packet filter firewalls,
stateful inspection firewalls, application proxy gateway firewalls,
dedicated proxy firewalls, hybrid firewall technologies, network address
translation, host-based firewalls, and personal firewalls/personal
firewall appliances.2
Packet filter firewalls are routing devices that include access control
functionality for system addresses and communication sessions. The access
control functionality of a packet filter firewall is governed by a set of
rules that allows or blocks network packets based on a number of their
characteristics, including the source and destination addresses, the
2National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guidelines for Firewalls
and Firewall Policy, NIST Special Publication 800-41, (Gaithersburg, MD:
Jan. 2002).
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
network protocol, and the source and destination port numbers. Packet
filter firewalls are usually placed at the outermost boundary with an
untrusted network, and they form the first line of defense. An example of
a packet-filter firewall is a network router that employs filter rules to
screen network traffic.
Stateful inspection firewalls keep track of network connections that are
used by network applications to reliably transfer data. When an
application uses a network connection to create a session with a remote
host system, a port is also opened on the originating system. This port
receives network traffic from the destination system. For successful
connections, packet filter firewalls must permit inbound packets from the
destination system. Opening up many ports to incoming traffic creates a
risk of intrusion by unauthorized users, who may employ a variety of
techniques to abuse the expected conventions of network protocols such as
TCP. Stateful inspection firewalls solve this problem by creating a
directory of outbound network connections, along with each session's
corresponding client port. This "state table" is then used to validate any
inbound traffic. The stateful inspection solution is more secure than a
packet filter because it tracks client ports individually rather than
opening all inbound ports for external access.
Application proxy gateway firewalls provide additional protection by
inserting the firewall as an intermediary between internal applications
that attempt to communicate with external servers such as a Web server.
For example, a Web proxy receives requests for external Web pages from
inside the firewall and relays them to the exterior Web server as though
the firewall was the requesting Web client. The external Web server
responds to the firewall and the firewall forwards the response to the
inside client as though the firewall was the Web server. No direct network
connection is ever made from the inside client host to the external Web
server.
Dedicated proxy servers are typically deployed behind traditional firewall
platforms. In typical use, a main firewall might accept inbound network
traffic, determine which application is being targeted, and then hand off
the traffic to the appropriate proxy server (for example, an e-mail proxy
server). The proxy server typically would perform filtering or logging
operations on the traffic and then forward it to internal systems. A proxy
server could also accept outbound traffic directly from internal systems,
filter or log the traffic, and then pass it to the firewall for outbound
delivery. Many organizations enable the caching of frequently used Web
pages on the proxy server, thereby reducing firewall traffic. In
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
addition to authentication and logging functionality, dedicated proxy
servers are useful for Web and electronic mail content scanning.
Hybrid firewall technologies are firewall products that incorporate
functionality from several different types of firewall platforms. For
example, many vendors of packet filter firewalls or stateful inspection
packet filter firewalls have implemented basic application-proxy
functionality to offset some of the weaknesses associated with their
firewall platform. In most cases, these vendors implement application
proxies to provide improved logging of network traffic and stronger user
authentication. Nearly all major firewall vendors have introduced multiple
firewall functions into their products in some manner; therefore it is not
always a simple matter to decide which specific firewall product is the
most suitable for a given application or enterprise infrastructure.
Selection of a hybrid firewall product should be based on the supported
feature sets that an enterprise needs.
Network address translation (NAT) technology is an effective tool for
"hiding" the network addresses of an internal network behind a firewall
environment. In essence, NAT allows an organization to deploy a network
addressing plan of its choosing behind a firewall while still maintaining
the ability to connect to external systems through the firewall. Network
address translation is accomplished by one of three methods: static,
hiding, and port. In static NAT, each internal system on the private
network has a corresponding external, routable IP address associated with
it. This particular technique is seldom used because unique IP addresses
are in short supply. With hiding NAT, all systems behind a firewall share
the same external, routable IP address, while the internal systems use
private IP addresses. Thus, with a hiding NAT system, a number of systems
behind a firewall will still appear to be a single system. With port
address translation, it is possible to place hosts behind a firewall
system and still make them selectively accessible to external users.
Host-based firewalls are firewall software components that are available
in some operating systems or as add-ons. Because a network-based firewall
cannot fully protect internal servers, host-based firewalls can be used to
secure individual hosts.
Personal firewalls and personal firewall appliances are used to secure PCs
at home or remote locations. These firewalls are important because many
personnel telecommute or work at home and access sensitive data. Home
users dialing an ISP may potentially have limited firewall protection
available to them because the ISP has to accommodate
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
many different security policies. Therefore, personal firewalls have been
developed to provide protection for remote systems and to perform many of
the same functions as larger firewalls. These products are typically
implemented in one of two configurations. The first configuration is a
personal firewall, which is installed on the system it is meant to
protect; personal firewalls usually do not offer protection to other
systems or resources. Likewise, personal firewalls do not typically
provide controls over network traffic that is traversing a computer
network-they protect only the computer system on which they are installed.
The second configuration is a personal firewall appliance. In most cases,
personal firewall appliances are designed to protect small networks such
as networks that might be found in home offices. These appliances usually
run on specialized hardware and integrate some other form of network
infrastructure components in addition to the firewall itself, including
the following: cable or digital subscriber line broadband modem with
network routing, network hub, network switch, DHCP server, SNMP agent, and
application-proxy agents. In terms of deployment strategies, personal
firewalls and personal firewall appliances normally address connectivity
concerns associated with telecommuters or branch offices. However, some
organizations employ these devices on their organizational intranets,
practicing a layered defense strategy.
Centrally managed distributed firewalls are centrally controlled but
locally enforced. A security administrator- not the end users-defines and
maintains security policies. This places the responsibility and capability
of defining security policies in the hands of a security professional who
can properly lock down the target systems. A centrally managed system is
scalable because it is unnecessary to administer each system separately. A
properly executed distributed firewall system includes exception logging.
More advanced systems include the capability to enforce the appropriate
policy, which is enforced depending on the location of the firewall.
Centrally managed distributed firewalls can be either software- or
hardware-based firewalls. Centrally managed distributed software firewalls
are similar in function and features to hostbased or personal firewalls,
but the security policies are centrally defined and managed. Centrally
managed distributed hardware firewalls combine the filtering capability of
a firewall with the connectivity capability of a traditional connection.
Effectiveness of the technology When properly configured, all firewalls
can protect a network or a PC from unauthorized access through the
network. Although firewalls afford protection of certain resources within
an organization, there are some threats that firewalls cannot protect
against: connections that bypass the
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
firewall, new threats that have not yet been identified, and viruses that
have been injected into the internal network. It is important to consider
these shortcomings in addition to the firewall itself in order to counter
these additional threats and provide a comprehensive security solution.
Each type of firewall platform has its own strengths and weaknesses.
Packet filter firewalls have two main strengths: speed and flexibility.
Packet filter firewalls can be used to secure nearly any type of network
communication or protocol. This versatility allows packet filter firewalls
to be deployed into nearly any enterprise network infrastructure. Packet
filter firewalls have several weaknesses: They cannot prevent attacks that
exploit application-specific vulnerabilities or functions; they can log
only a minimal amount of information, such as source address, destination
address, and traffic type; they do not support user authentication; and
they are vulnerable to attacks and exploits that take advantage of flaws
within the TCP/IP protocol, such as IP address spoofing.3
Stateful inspection firewalls share the strengths and weaknesses of packet
filter firewalls, but because of the state table implementation, they are
generally considered to be more secure than packet filter firewalls.
Stateful inspection firewalls can accommodate other network protocols in
the same manner as packet filters do, but stateful inspection technology
is relevant only to the TCP/IP protocol.
Application-proxy gateway firewalls have numerous advantages over packet
filter firewalls and stateful inspection firewalls. First,
applicationproxy gateway firewalls are able to examine the entire network
packet rather than only the network addresses and ports. This enables
these firewalls to provide more extensive logging capabilities than packet
filters or stateful inspection firewalls. Another advantage is that
applicationproxy gateway firewalls can authenticate users directly, while
packet filter firewalls and stateful inspection firewalls normally
authenticate users based on the network address of the system (i.e.,
source, destination, and type). Given that network addresses can be easily
spoofed, the authentication capabilities inherent in application-proxy
gateway architecture are superior to those found in packet filter or
stateful inspection firewalls. The advanced functionality of
application-proxy gateway firewalls also results in several disadvantages
when compared
3IP address spoofing involves altering the address information in network
packets in order to make packets appear to come from a trusted IP address.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
with packet filter or stateful inspection firewalls. First, because of the
"full packet awareness" found in application-proxy gateways, the firewall
is forced to spend significant time reading and interpreting each packet.
Therefore, application proxy gateway firewalls are generally not well
suited to high-bandwidth or real-time applications. To reduce the load on
the firewall, a dedicated proxy server can be used to secure less
timesensitive services, such as e-mail and most Web traffic. Another
disadvantage is that application proxy gateway firewalls are often limited
in terms of support for new network applications and protocols. An
individual, application-specific proxy agent is required for each type of
network traffic that needs to go through the firewall. Most vendors of
application-proxy gateways provide generic proxy agents to support
undefined network protocols or applications. However, those generic agents
tend to negate many of the strengths of the application-proxy gateway
architecture, and they simply allow traffic to "tunnel" through the
firewall.
Dedicated proxy servers allow an organization to enforce user
authentication requirements and other filtering and logging of any traffic
that goes through the proxy server. This means that an organization can
restrict outbound traffic to certain locations, examine all outbound
e-mail for viruses, or restrict internal users from writing to the
organization's Web server. Because most security problems originate from
within an organization, proxy servers can assist in foiling internally
based attacks or malicious behavior.
In terms of strengths and weaknesses, each type of NAT-static, hiding, or
port-is applicable in certain situations; the variable is the amount of
design flexibility offered by each type. Static NAT offers the most
flexibility, but it is not always practical because of the shortage of IP
addresses. Hiding NAT technology is seldom used because port address
translation offers additional features. Port address translation is often
the most convenient and secure solution.
Host-based firewall packages typically provide access-control capability
for restricting traffic to and from servers that run on the host, and
logging is usually available. A disadvantage of host-based firewalls is
that they must be administered separately, and maintaining security
becomes more difficult as the number of configured devices increases.
Centrally managed distributed software firewalls have the benefit of
unified corporate oversight of firewall implementation on individual
machines. However, they remain vulnerable to attacks on the host
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
operating system from the networks, as well as to intentional or
unintentional tampering by users logging in to the system that is being
protected. Centrally managed distributed hardware firewalls filter the
data on the firewall hardware rather than the host system. This can make
the distributed hardware firewall system less vulnerable than
software-based distributed firewalls. Hardware distributed firewalls can
be designed to be unaffected by local or network attacks via the host
operating systems. Performance and throughput of a hardware firewall
system are generally better than they are for software systems.
Boundary Protection: Content Management
What the technology does
Content filters monitor Web and messaging applications for inappropriate
content, spam, intellectual property breach, non-compliance with an
organization's security policies, and banned file types.4 The filters can
help to keep illegal material out of an organization's systems, reduce
network traffic from spam, and stop various forms of cyber attacks. They
can also keep track of which users are browsing the Web, when, where, and
for how long.
There are three main types of content filters: (1) Web filters, which
screen and exclude from access or availability Web pages that are deemed
objectionable or non-business related; (2) messaging filters, which screen
messaging applications such as e-mail, instant messaging, short message
service, and peer-to-peer service for spam or other objectionable
content;5 and (3) Web integrity filters, which ensure the integrity of an
entity's Web pages.
4Spam is electronic junk mail that is unsolicited and usually is
advertising for some product. An intellectual property breach can include
client information, trade secrets, ongoing research, and other such
information that has been released without authorization.
5Short message service is the transmission of short text messages to and
from a mobile phone, fax machine or IP address. Messages must be no longer
than 160 alphanumeric characters and contain no images or graphics. On the
Internet, peer-to-peer (referred to as P2P) networks allow computer users
to share files from one another's hard drives. Napster, Gnutella, and
Kazaa are examples of this kind of peer-to-peer software.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
Source: GAO analysis and Microsoft Visio.
Web filters screen and block objectionable Web pages by (1) intercepting a
user's request to view a Web page, (2) determining that the requested page
contains objectionable content, and (3) prohibiting the user from
accessing that Web page (see figure 11). Web filters can observe and
respond to requests in two main ways. One method, pass-through technology,
requires the Web filtration software to be integrated with other network
devices such as proxies or gateways. This ensures that all requests pass
through the Web filter to be accepted or denied. Another method of
handling requests, known as pass-by technology, requires the Web
filtration software to be installed on a stand-alone server and placed on
the network of machines that it is to filter. The Web filter then receives
all of the traffic that exists on the network, but it does not prevent the
network traffic from reaching its intended destination. If a request is
made for a restricted Web page, the Web filter will display an error
message stating that the user's access to the Web page was denied. The
user's connection with the Web site is then closed to prevent the Web
server from sending additional information to the user's computer. Web
filters also vary in their methods of determining if a requested Web page
contains objectionable material:
o Site classification technology compares the requested Web site against
a database of Web pages that are considered objectionable.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Typically, vendors provide a basic database of objectionable Web pages as
part of the Web filter software, which may then be modified by an
administrator. Vendors often provide subscription services so customers'
databases can be automatically updated with new sites that were found to
be objectionable. The database consists primarily of a list of Web site
addresses, typically categorized into groups such as gambling, adult
material, and sports. An administrator can then decide which sites should
be blocked, based on the category they fall into. If the requested Web
site is on the list of objectionable Web sites, the Web filter will
display a message informing the user that he or she has been denied access
to the Web page.
o Content classification uses artificial intelligence in conjunction
with site classification techniques to maintain an updated database.
Before a user can view a Web site, the Web filter examines the textual
content of the Web page, the source code, and metatags.6 Questionable
content is identified by the presence of key words or phrases or by a
combination of key word frequency and level of obscenity of the words. Web
sites found to be objectionable, based on the content, can then be added
into the database of objectionable sites, and the user would not be
allowed to view them. Web sites do not have to be blocked for an entire
organization, but can be blocked based on IP address ranges, host names,
or other criteria.
Messaging filters operate similarly to Web filters, and can examine the
content of a message to filter out spam, offensive language, or
recreational e-mails that lower the productivity of workers. Messaging
filters also block messages based on the types of file attachments and the
senders of emails, as determined by an organization's policy. Files are
excluded based on their file extensions, or the last part of their name,
which indicates the file type. The file might be excluded to limit the
trafficking of illicit material, stop viruses from entering the network,
limit intellectual property breaches, or carry out other such functions
intended to increase the security of an organization. File extensions that
are typically excluded are MP3 (music files), JPG (graphic files), MPEG
(video files), and EXE (typically used for executable files), among
others.
6The source code is the text of a program while it is still in its
programming language. The Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) metatag is used
to describe the contents of a Web page
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Effectiveness of the technology
A Web integrity filter ensures the integrity of the content of a Web page.
If a Web server is attacked or becomes inaccessible to users, the Web
integrity filter attempts to keep unauthorized information from being
released to the public, and only the original content would still go out.
The content filter is a separate device on the network, located between
the Web server and the router or firewall. The device contains a
collection of digital signatures of authorized Web content that is known
to be legitimate. When a request is made to the Web server, each object's7
digital signature is compared with the digital signature that the device
had previously collected. If the digital signatures do not match, the page
is considered to be unauthorized and it is immediately replaced with a
secure archived copy of the original pages, and the software notifies the
appropriate personnel via phone, e-mail or pager.
Content filters have significant rates of both erroneously accepting
objectionable sites and of blocking sites that are not objectionable. If
implemented correctly, filtering can reduce the volume of unsolicited and
undesired e-mails. However, it is not completely accurate, and legitimate
messages might get blocked. Also, some content filters do not work with
all operating systems.
While pass-through technology can be effective at stopping specified
traffic, there are several disadvantages to using it. First, because the
requests for Web sites are actually stopped at the gateway while the
filtering product analyzes the request against its rules, a certain amount
of latency can result, especially during periods of high traffic volume.8
Second, pass-through products might be considered a single point of
failure: If the product fails, so might Internet connectivity. Third,
because pass-through devices are dependent on another network device, if
an entity changes firewalls or proxy servers, it might have to purchase a
new content filter product as well. Pass-by technology can also be
effective at stopping specified traffic. Because traffic does not have to
be screened before it goes through, the pass-by technology does not cause
latency. Also, because pass-by products do not require integration with
other network devices, a change in a firewall or proxy would not result in
a need to change the content filtering product. However, a disadvantage of
the
7An object can be an HTML page, a graphic file, a music file, and so
forth.
8Latency is the amount of time it takes a packet to travel from source to
destination. Together, latency and bandwidth define the speed and capacity
of a network.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
pass-by solution is that a separate server must be dedicated to performing
the monitoring and filtering functions.
Site classification is effective at keeping users from accessing sites
that have been determined to have objectionable content. However, because
of the size and growth of the Internet, this technology faces difficulties
in keeping a full and accurate list of objectionable sites, and the cost
of subscriptions for updates can be very expensive. Content classification
can assist in classifying new sites without the cost of subscribing to an
update service, but this method has its drawbacks as well. First, Web
sites that are predominantly graphical in nature may not contain enough
key words for the program to categorize the site. Second, there are some
topics that are so ambiguous that it is very difficult to classify them by
their content. Third, users may circumvent the filtered lists by using
proxy sites.
Authentication: Biometrics What the technology does
How the technology works
The term biometrics covers a wide range of technologies that are used to
verify identity by measuring and analyzing human characteristics.
Biometric technologies are authentication techniques that rely on
measuring and analyzing physiological or behavioral characteristics.
Identifying an individual's physiological characteristic involves
measuring a part of the body, such as fingertips or eye irises;
identifying behavioral characteristics involves data derived from actions,
such as speech.
Biometrics are theoretically very effective personal identifiers because
the characteristics they measure are thought to be distinct to each
person. Unlike conventional identification methods that use something you
have (for example, a smart card), or something you know (for example, a
password), these characteristics are integral to something you are.
Because they are tightly bound to an individual, they are more reliable,
cannot be forgotten, and are less easily lost, stolen, or guessed.
Although biometric technologies vary in complexity, capabilities, and
performance, they all share several elements. Biometric identification
systems are essentially pattern recognition systems. They use acquisition
devices such as cameras and scanning devices to capture images,
recordings, or measurements of an individual's characteristics, and they
use computer hardware and software to extract, encode, store, and compare
these characteristics. Because the process is automated, biometric
decision making is generally very fast, in most cases taking only
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
a few seconds in real time. The different types of biometric technologies
measure different characteristics. However, they all involve a similar
process, which can be divided into two distinct stages: (1) enrollment and
(2) verification or identification.
Enrollment stage. Acquisition devices such as cameras and scanners are
used to capture images, recordings, or measurements of an individual's
characteristics, and computer hardware and software are used to extract,
encode, store, and compare these characteristics. In the enrollment stage,
the captured samples are averaged and processed to generate a unique
digital representation of the characteristic, called a reference template,
which is stored for future comparisons. It is impossible to recreate the
sample, such as a fingerprint, from the template. Templates can be stored
centrally on a computer database, within the device itself, or on a smart
card.
Verification or identification stage. Depending on the application,
biometric technologies can be used in one of two modes: verification or
identification. Verification is used to verify a person's identity,
answering the question "Is this person who she claims to be?"
Identification is used to establish a person's identity, comparing the
individual's biometric with all stored biometric records to answer the
question "Who is this person?"
Current biometric technologies that are used to protect computer systems
from unauthorized access include fingerprint recognition, iris
recognition, and speaker recognition. These technologies are used by some
entities to replace passwords as a way to authenticate individuals who are
attempting to access computers and networks
Fingerprint recognition technology extracts features from impressions that
are made by the distinctive ridges on the fingertips. An image of the
fingerprint is captured by a scanner, enhanced, and converted into a
template. Various styles of fingerprint scanners are commercially
available. The scanner can be built into the computer or into the mouse or
the keyboard that are attached to the computer, or it can be a hardware
device that is used only for capturing fingerprints (see figures 12 and
13).
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Source: Key Tronic Corporation.
Source: Siemens PSE TechLab.
Iris recognition technology is based on the distinctly colored ring
surrounding the pupil of the eye. Made from elastic connective tissue, the
iris is a very rich source of biometric data, having approximately 266
distinct characteristics. Iris recognition systems use a small,
highquality camera to capture a black-and-white, high-resolution image of
the iris. The boundaries of the iris are defined and a coordinate system
is established over the iris before visible characteristics are converted
into a template (see figure 14).
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Source: Matsushita Electric Corporation of America.
Speaker recognition technology uses the distinctive characteristics in the
sound of people's voices as a biometric identifier. These differences
result from a combination of physiological differences in the shape of
vocal tracts and learned speaking habits. Speaker recognition systems
capture samples of a person's speech by having him or her speak into a
microphone or telephone a number of times. Some systems require that a
predefined phrase, such as a name or a sequence of numbers, be used for
enrollment. This phrase is converted from analog to digital format, and
the distinctive vocal characteristics, such as pitch, cadence, and tone,
are extracted to create a template.
Effectiveness of the technology The quality of templates is critical in
the overall success of a biometric system. Minute changes in positioning,
distance, pressure, environment, and other factors influence the
generation of a template. For example, in a speaker recognition system,
performance can be affected by background noise, the use of different
capture devices for enrollment and verification,
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
speaking softly, and poor placement of the capture device. In addition,
because biometric features can change over time, people may have to
reenroll to update their reference templates.
Furthermore, not all people can use biometric technologies. For example,
the capturing of fingerprints for about 2 to 5 percent of people is not
possible because the fingerprints are dirty or have become dry or worn
from age, extensive manual labor, or exposure to corrosive chemicals.
People who are mute cannot use speaker recognition systems, and people
lacking fingers or eyes from congenital disease, surgery, or injury cannot
use fingerprint or iris recognition systems.
The effectiveness of biometric technologies is affected by the quality of
the capture device. For example, some fingerprint recognition scanners can
be prone to error if there is a buildup of dirt, grime, or oil-producing
leftover fingerprints from previous users, which are known as latent
prints. Severe latent prints can cause the superimposition of two sets of
prints and degrade the capturing of the image. Similarly, the performance
of speaker recognition systems improves with higher-quality input devices.
Tests have shown that certain capture devices can be tricked into
accepting forgeries. Fingerprint scanners have been tricked into accepting
latent prints that were reactivated by simply breathing on the sensor or
by placing a water-filled plastic bag on the sensor's surface. It is
possible to reconstruct and authenticate latent fingerprints by dusting
the sensor's surface with commercially available graphite powder and
lifting the fingerprint with adhesive tape. A vulnerability of speaker
authentication is that the voice can be easily recorded and therefore
duplicated. However, some speaker verification systems provide safeguards
against the use of a recorded voice to trick the system. For these
systems, the electronic properties of a recording device, particularly the
playback speaker, will change the acoustics to such a degree that the
recorded voice sample will not match a stored voiceprint of a live voice.
Authentication: Smart Tokens
What the technology does A smart token is an easily portable device that
contains an embedded integrated circuit chip that is capable of both
storing and processing data. Most smart tokens are used instead of static
user IDs and passwords to provide a stronger and more convenient means for
users to identify and authenticate themselves to computers and networks.
When it is used for
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
this function, a smart token is an example of authentication based on
something a user possesses (for example, the token itself). Although
authentication to some computer systems is based solely on the possession
of a token, typical smart token implementations also require a user to
provide something he or she knows (for example, a password) in order to
successfully utilize the smart token.
In general, smart tokens can be classified according to physical
characteristics, interfaces, and protocols used. These classifications are
not mutually exclusive.
1. Physical characteristics. Smart tokens can be divided into two
physical groups: smart cards and other tokens. A smart card looks like a
credit card but includes an embedded microprocessor. Smart tokens that are
not smart cards can look like calculators, keys, or other small objects.
2. Interfaces. Smart tokens have either a human or an electronic
interface. Smart tokens that look like calculators usually have a human
interface, which allows humans to communicate with the device. Other smart
tokens, including smart cards, have an electronic interface that can only
be understood by special readers and writers. Two physical interfaces for
smart cards have been standardized through the International Organization
for Standardization, resulting in two types of smart cards. The first
type, known as contact cards, works by inserting the card in a smart card
reader, while the second type, known as contactless cards, uses radio
frequency signals and the card needs only to be passed within close
proximity to a card terminal to transmit information. Smart cards can be
configured to include both contact and contactless capabilities, but
because standards for the two technologies are very different, two
separate interfaces would be needed.
3. Protocols. Smart tokens use three main methods for authentication,
based on different protocols. The first method, static password exchange,
requires users to first authenticate themselves to a token before the
token can then authenticate the user to the computer. The other two
methods are known as time-synchronized and challengeresponse, and are
based on cryptography. These methods generate a one-time password, which
is a password or pass code that can be used only once, for a brief
interval, and then is no longer valid. If it is intercepted in any way,
the password has such a limited life span that it quickly becomes invalid.
The next time the same user attempts to
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
access a system, he or she must enter a new one-time password that is
generated by the security token.
Time-synchronized tokens generate a unique value that changes at regular
intervals (for example, once a minute). A central server keeps track of
the token-generated passwords in order to compare the input against the
expected value. To log onto a system, users enter a one-time password that
consists of their personal PIN followed by the unique value generated by
their token. The PIN helps the central server to identify the user and the
password value that should be entered. If the number entered by the user
and the one generated by the server are the same, the user will be granted
access to the system. Figure 15 shows an example of a time-synchronized
token.
Source: RSA Security Inc.
Challenge-response tokens utilize a central server to generate a challenge
(such as a random string of numbers), which a user would then enter into
the token. The token then calculates a response that serves as a one-time
numeric password that is entered into the system. If the response from the
user is the same as the response expected by the server, the user will be
granted access to the system. In some implementations, the user must enter
a PIN before the server will generate a challenge. Figure 16 illustrates
an example of a challenge-response token.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Effectiveness of the technology
Source: (c) 2004 Secure Computing Corporation.
Universal Serial Bus (USB) tokens are slender tokens with USB connectors
that plug into PCs' USB ports. The token has an integrated chip that
offers the same storage and processing power as smart cards. USB tokens
can be used to securely store a user's private keys and, optionally, to
securely perform cryptographic processing. A USB token can also securely
store many user names and passwords, with the benefit of portability and
additional security of off-PC storage.
If they are implemented correctly, smart tokens can help create a secure
authentication environment. Onetime passwords eliminate the problem of
electronic monitoring or "password sniffing" and tokens that require the
use of a PIN help to reduce the risk of forgery.
However, smart tokens do not necessarily verify a person; they only
confirm that a person has the token. Because tokens can be lost or stolen,
an attacker could obtain a token and attempt to determine the user's PIN
or password. If an older algorithm is used to formulate a onetime
password, it is possible that modern computers could crack the algorithm
used to formulate the random numbers generated by a token. For these
reasons, these technologies are generally not considered acceptable as
stand-alone systems to protect extremely sensitive data, and additional
controls-such as biometric identification-may be required. As a result,
smart token systems are considered more effective when combined with other
methods of authentication.
In addition, at times the token could become unavailable to the user. For
example, tokens can be broken, their batteries eventually discharge, and
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
users could simply forget to bring tokens to work. For these reasons,
organizations need to have an effective policy on how legitimate users can
access systems without a token. If the policy is weak or poorly
implemented, the security of the authentication system is weakened.
A problem that can arise with time-synchronized tokens is that the token
and the central authentication server can get out of sync. If the token's
clock drifts significantly ahead of or behind the server's clock, the
authentication server may be vulnerable to a cryptographic attack.
Authorization: User Rights and Privileges
What the technology does
How the technology works
User rights and privileges grant or deny access to a protected resource,
whether it is a network, system, an individual computer, a program, or a
file. These technologies authorize appropriate actions for users and
prevent unauthorized access to data and systems. Typically, user rights
and privileges are capabilities that are built into an operating system.
For example, most operating systems include the concept of read, write, or
read-and-write privileges for files and the capability to assign these
privileges to users or groups of users.
Mainframe-based access control software controls users' entry to the
system, their access to data on the system, and the level of usage
available to them with programs and other logical resources that are on
the system. Administrators can use these software tools to perform many
access control functions-including identifying system users and
authorizing user access to protected resources-while also ensuring
individual accountability and logging unauthorized attempts at gaining
access to the system protected resources.
Additionally, some communication protocols can be used to control dialup
access into networks. Protocols that provide these services include
Terminal Access Controller Access System (TACACS+), which centrally
manages multiple connections to a single user, a network, or a subnetwork,
and interconnected networks, and Remote Authentication Dial-In User
Service (RADIUS), which provides central authentication, authorization,
and logging.
Mainframe-based access control software uses algorithms to determine
whether to grant a user access to specific files, programs, or other
defined resources (such as a printer queue or disk space to run a
program). These
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
algorithms are typically customized by a security administrator and result
in access rules that are either user-or resource-based. User-based rules
can be created to specify access for individuals or for groups. When
access is requested, the software first identifies and authenticates the
user, then determines what resource the user is requesting access to, and
then refers to the access rules before permitting the user to gain access
to protected system resources. Access is denied to unauthorized users, and
any authorized or unauthorized attempt to gain access can be logged.
Technologies that use resource-based rules assign a security
classification to both users and data files in the form of security levels
and categories. The levels and categories of a user and a resource are
compared to determine whether the user has sufficient privileges to access
a file or other resource.
The TACACS+ protocol allows a separate access server to independently
provide the services of authentication, authorization, and accounting. The
authentication service allows a user to use the same user name and
password for multiple servers, which may employ different communication
protocols: TACACS+ forwards the user's user name and password information
to a centralized database that also has the TACACS+ protocol. This
database then compares the login information to determine whether to grant
or deny access to the user.
RADIUS is implemented in a client/server network architecture, where a
centralized server using the RADIUS protocol maintains a database of all
user authentication and network service access information for several
client computers that also use the RADIUS protocol. When a user logs on to
the network via a RADIUS client, the user's password is encrypted and sent
to the RADIUS server along with the user name. If the user name and
password are correct, the server sends an acknowledgement message that
includes information on the user's network system and service
requirements. If the login process conditions are met, the user is
authenticated and is given access to the requested network services.
Effectiveness of the technology An operating system's built-in user rights
and privileges can be effective when used with a well-defined security
policy that guides who can access which resources.
A key component to implementing adequate access controls is ensuring that
appropriate user rights and privileges have been assigned. If any one user
has too many rights or has rights to a few key functions, the organization
can be susceptible to fraud. Limiting user rights and
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
System Integrity
privileges ensures that users have only the access they need to perform
their duties, that very sensitive resources are limited to a few
individuals, and that employees are restricted from performing
incompatible functions or functions that are beyond their
responsibilities. Excluding roles and user rights reduce the possibility
of fraudulent acts against the organization.
System integrity technologies are used to ensure that a system and its
data are not illicitly modified or corrupted by malicious code. Malicious
code includes viruses, Trojan horses, and worms. A virus is a program that
infects computer files, usually executable programs, by inserting a copy
of itself into the file. These copies are usually executed when a user
takes some action, such as opening an infected e-mail attachment or
executing a downloaded file that includes the virus. When executed, the
virus can infect other files. Unlike a computer worm, a virus requires
human involvement (usually unwitting) to propagate. A Trojan horse is a
computer program that conceals harmful code. A Trojan horse usually
masquerades as a useful program that a user would wish to execute. A worm
is an independent computer program that reproduces by copying itself from
one system to another. Unlike a computer virus, a worm does not require
human involvement to propagate.
Antivirus software and integrity checkers are two types of technologies
that help to protect against malicious code attacks. Antivirus software
can be installed on computers to detect either incoming malicious code or
malicious code that is already resident on the system and to repair files
that have been damaged by the code. Integrity checkers are usually applied
to critical files or groups of files on a computer system. These programs
typically take a snapshot of the files of interest and periodically
compare the files with the snapshot to ensure that no unauthorized changes
have been made.
Antivirus Software What the technology does
Antivirus software provides protection against viruses and malicious code,
such as worms and Trojan horses, by detecting and removing the malicious
code and by preventing unwanted effects and repairing damage that may have
resulted. Antivirus software uses a variety of techniques- such as
signature scanners, activity blockers, and heuristic scanners-to protect
computer systems against potentially harmful viruses, worms, and Trojan
horses.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
Effectiveness of the technology
Antivirus software products can use a combination of the following
technologies:
Signature scanners can identify known malicious code. Scanners search for
"signature strings" or use algorithmic detection methods to identify known
code. They rely on a significant amount of prior knowledge about the
malicious code. Therefore, it is critical that the signature information
for scanners be current. Most scanners can be configured to automatically
update their signature information from a designated source, typically on
a weekly basis; scanners can also be forced to update their signatures on
demand.
Activity (or behavior) blockers contain a list of rules that a legitimate
program must follow. If the program breaks one of the rules, the activity
blockers alert the users. The idea is that untrusted code is first checked
for improper behavior. If none is found, the code can be run in a
restricted environment, where dynamic checks are performed on each
potentially dangerous action before it is permitted to take effect. By
adding multiple layers of reviews and checks to the execution process,
behavior blockers can prevent malicious code from performing undesirable
actions.
Heuristic scanners work to protect against known viruses and are also able
to detect unknown viruses. Heuristic scanners can be classified as either
static or dynamic. Static heuristic scanners use virus signatures, much
like standard signature scanners, but instead of scanning for specific
viruses, they scan for lines of code that are associated with viruslike
behaviors. These scanners are often supplemented by additional programs
that search for more complex, viruslike behavior patterns. Dynamic
heuristic scanners identify suspicious files and load them into a
simulated computer system to emulate their execution. This allows the
scanner to determine if the file is infected.
Signature scanners require frequent updates to keep their databases of
virus signatures current. This updating is necessary to safeguard computer
systems against new strains of viruses. When they are properly updated,
scanners effectively combat known viruses. However, they are less
effective against viruses that change their code each time they infect
another computer system.
Activity blockers are generally ineffective against many viruses,
including macro viruses that make use of the programming features of
common applications such as spreadsheets and word processors. Macro
viruses
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
constitute the majority of today's viruses and are encoded within a
document as macros-sequences of commands or keyboard strokes that can be
stored and then recalled with a single command or keystroke. The macro
generally modifies a commonly used function (for example, opening or
saving a file) to initiate the effect of the virus. Activity blockers are
generally more successful against Trojan horses and worms than they are
against viruses.
Heuristic scanners have the primary advantage of being able to detect
unknown viruses. Static heuristic scanners, when supplemented with
additional programs that can detect behaviors associated with more complex
viruses. Dynamic heuristic scanners consume more time and system resources
than static heuristic scanners.
File Integrity Checkers What the technology does
File integrity checkers are software programs that monitor alterations to
files that are considered critical to either the organization or the
operation of the computer (including changes to the data in the file,
permissions, last use, and deletion). Because both authorized and
unauthorized activities alter files, file integrity checkers are designed
for use with critical files that are not expected to change under normal
operating conditions.
File integrity checkers are valuable tools with multiple uses, including
o Intrusion detection. File integrity checkers can help detect system
compromises because successful intruders commonly modify system files to
provide themselves with a way back into the system (backdoor), hide the
attack, and hide their identity.
o Administration. Some file integrity checkers have the ability to
collect and centralize information from multiple hosts, an ability that
assists system administrators in large network environments.
o Policy enforcement. System administrators can use file integrity
checkers as a policy enforcement tool to check whether users or other
administrators have made changes that should not have been made or of
which the system administrator was not notified.
o Identification of hardware or software failure. Integrity checkers
might also notice a failing disk. File integrity checkers can also be used
to determine if an application had changed files because of design faults.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
Effectiveness of the technology
o Forensic analysis. If a system were compromised, a "snapshot" of the
system could be taken, which would assist forensic activities and in
prosecuting offenders.
Integrity checkers identify modifications to critical files by comparing
the state of a file system against a trusted state, or a baseline.9 The
baseline is set to reflect the system's state when it has not been
modified in any unauthorized way. First, critical files are encrypted
through a one-way hash function, making it nearly impossible to derive the
original data from the string.10 The hash function results in a fixed
string of digits, which are stored in a database along with other
attributes of the files. The database of the original state of critical
files is considered the baseline. To be effective, a baseline should be
established immediately after the operating system is installed, before an
attacker would have the ability to modify the file system.
After a baseline is created, the integrity checker can then compare the
current file system against the baseline. Each critical file's hash is
compared with the its baseline value. Differences between the hashes
indicate that the file has been modified. The user can then determine if
the change would have been unauthorized. If so, the user can take action,
for example, assessing the damage and restoring the file or system to a
good known state.
The effectiveness of file integrity checkers depends on the accuracy of
the baseline. Comparisons against a corrupted baseline would result in
inaccuracy in identifying modified files. The baseline database should be
updated whenever significant changes are made to the system. Care must be
taken to ensure that a baseline is not taken of a compromised system.
Also, although they monitor modifications to files, integrity checkers do
not prevent changes from occurring. An administrator will notice that the
change has occurred only after the integrity checker has been run. Because
of the amount of time it can take to check a file system and the
9The file system is one of the most important parts of an operating
system; and it stores and manages user data on disk drives and ensures
that data read from storage are identical to the data that were originally
written. In addition to storing user data in files, the file system
creates and manages metadata-information about how, when, and by whom a
particular set of data was collected and how the data are formatted.
10A less secure method uses checksums instead of a hash function.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Cryptography
system resources that requires, these tools are typically run at regularly
scheduled intervals.
In addition, integrity checkers may generate false alarms when authorized
changes are made to monitored files. Not only can investigating false
alarms be time-consuming, it could also lead a system administrator to be
unwilling to investigate future alarms. As a result, unauthorized changes
could go unnoticed.
Cryptography is used to secure transactions by providing ways to assure
data confidentiality (assurance that the information will be protected
from unauthorized access), data integrity (assurance that data have not
been accidentally or deliberately altered), authentication of message
originator, electronic certification of data, and nonrepudiation (proof of
the integrity and origin of the data that can be verified by a third
party). Accordingly, cryptography has had, and will continue to have, an
important role in protecting information both within a computer system and
when information is sent over the Internet and other unprotected
communications channels. Encryption is the process of transforming
ordinary data (commonly referred to as plaintext) into code form
(ciphertext) using a special value known as a key and a mathematical
process called an algorithm. Cryptographic algorithms are designed to
produce ciphertext that is unintelligible to unauthorized users.
Decryption of ciphertext is possible only with use of the proper key.
A basic premise in cryptography is that good systems depend only on the
secrecy of the key used to perform the operations and not on the secrecy
of the algorithm. The algorithms used to perform most cryptographic
operations over the Internet are well known. However, because the keys
used by these algorithms are kept secret, the process is considered
secure.
Cryptographic techniques can be divided into two basic types: secret key
cryptography and public key cryptography. Each type has its strengths and
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
weaknesses and systems that utilize both forms are used to take advantage
of the strengths of a given type.11
o Secret key or symmetric cryptography employs algorithms in which the
key that is used to encrypt the original plaintext message can be
calculated from the key that is used to decrypt the ciphertext message,
and vice versa. With most symmetric algorithms, the encryption key and the
decryption key are the same, and the security of this method rests upon
the difficulty of guessing the key. In order to communicate securely, the
sender and the receiver must agree on a key and keep the key secret from
others. Figure 17 depicts encryption and decryption using a symmetric
algorithm. Common symmetric key algorithms include Triple Digital
Encryption Standard (3DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
Source: GAO analysis and Corel Galley.
Public key or asymmetric cryptography employs algorithms designed so that
the key that is used to encrypt the original plaintext message cannot be
calculated from the key that is used to decrypt the ciphertext message.
These two keys complement each other in such a way that when one key is
used for encryption, only the other key can decrypt the ciphertext. One of
these keys is kept private and is known as the private key, while the
11For additional information on how cryptography works and some of the
issues associated with this technology see U.S. General Accounting Office,
Information Security: Advances and Remaining Challenges to Adoption of
Public Key Infrastructure Technology, GAO-01-277 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
26, 2001), and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Information Security: Status of Federal Public Key Infrastructure
Activities at Major Federal Departments and Agencies, GAO-04-157
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2003).
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
other key is widely publicized and is referred to as the public key.
Figure 18 depicts one application of encryption and decryption using a
public key algorithm. In this process, the public key is used by others to
encrypt a plaintext message, but only a specific person with the
corresponding private key can decrypt the ciphertext. For example, if
fictional character Bob gives his public key to fictional character Alice,
only Bob has the private key that can decrypt a message that Alice has
encrypted with his public key. Public key algorithms can also be used in
an inverse process, whereby the private key is used to encrypt a message
and the public key is made freely available. In this process, those who
decrypt the message using the corresponding public key can be confident
that the message came from a specific person. For example, if Alice
decrypts a message that was encrypted with Bob's private key, she has
assurance that the message came from Bob. The most popular public key
algorithm is RSA, named for its creators-Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman.
Source: GAO analysis and Corel Galley.
Key-based encryption fails if the plaintext or the key are not kept secret
from unauthorized users. Such failures often occur not from a weakness in
the technology itself, but rather as a result of poor security policies or
practices or malicious insiders.
Secret key cryptography has significant limitations that can make it
impractical as a stand-alone solution for securing electronic
transactions, especially among large communities of users that may have no
pre-established relationships. The most significant limitation is that
some means must be devised to securely distribute and manage the keys that
are at the heart of the system; such a means is commonly referred to as
key management. When many transacting parties are involved, key
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
management may create immense logistical problems and delays. Furthermore,
in order to minimize the damage that could be caused by a compromised key,
the keys may need to be short-lived and therefore frequently changed,
adding to the logistical complexity.
Public key cryptography can address many of the limitations of secret key
cryptography regarding key management. There is no need to establish a
secure channel or physical delivery services to distribute keys. However,
public key cryptography has its own challenges, involving the methods of
ensuring that the links between the users and their public keys are
initially valid and are constantly maintained. For example, it is
impractical and unrealistic to expect that each user will have previously
established relationships with all of the other potential users in order
to obtain their public keys. Digital certificates (discussed further in
this appendix) are one solution to this problem. Furthermore, although a
sender can provide confidentiality for a message by encrypting it with the
recipient's publicly available encryption key using public key algorithms
for large messages, this is computationally time-consuming and could make
the whole process unreasonably slow.12
Instead, it can be better to combine secret and public key cryptography to
provide more efficient and effective means by which a sender can encrypt a
document so that only the intended recipient can decrypt it. In this case,
the sender of a message would generate a onetime secret encryption key
(called a session key) and use it to encrypt the body of her message and
then encrypt this session key using the recipient's public key. The
encrypted message and the encrypted session key necessary to decrypt the
message would then be sent to recipient. Because the recipient has the
information necessary to decrypt the session key, the sender of a message
has reasonable assurance in a properly administered system that only the
recipient would be able to successfully decrypt the message.
Cryptographic modules implement algorithms that form the building blocks
of cryptographic applications. Using a cryptographic system with
cryptographic modules that have been approved by an accredited
cryptographic certification laboratory (for example, the NIST
Cryptographic Module Validation Program) can help provide assurance
12Most public key cryptographic methods can be used for both encryption
and digital signatures. However, certain public key methods-most notably
the Digital Signature Algorithm-cannot be used for encryption, but only
for digital signatures.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
that the system will be effective. However, designing, building, and
effectively implementing full-featured cryptographic solutions will remain
a difficult challenge because it is more than just "installing the
technology." Encryption technology is effective only if it is an integral
part of an effectively enforced information security policy that includes
good key management practices. For example, current public key products
and implementations suffer from significant interoperability problems,
which make it difficult for officials to make decisions about how to
develop a public key infrastructure (PKI) that can be used to perform such
functions as encrypting data and providing data integrity.13
Cryptographic solutions will continue to be used by systems to help
provide the basic data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication of
message originator, electronic certification of data, and nonrepudiation.
Technologies that use cryptographic algorithms can be used to encrypt
message transmissions so that eavesdroppers cannot determine the contents
of the message. Hash technologies use cryptography to provide assurance to
a message recipient that the contents of the message have not been
altered. For example, operating systems use cryptography to protect
passwords. Protocols such as IP Security protocol (IPSec) and Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) use cryptographic technologies for confidential
communications. SHA and MD5 are examples of hash technology
implementations. Digital signature technologies use cryptography to
authenticate the sender of a message. Virtual private networks (VPN) use
cryptography to establish a secure communications link across unprotected
networks.
Digital Signatures and Certificates
What the technology does
Properly implemented digital signatures use public key cryptography to
provide authentication, data integrity, and nonrepudiation for a message
or transaction. Just as a physical signature provides assurance that a
letter has been written by a specific person, a digital signature confirms
the
13A PKI is a system of hardware, software, policies, and people that can
provide a set of information assurances (identification and
authentication, confidentiality, data integrity, and nonrepudiation) that
are important in conducting electronic transactions. For more information
on PKI, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Advances
and Remaining Challenges to Adoption of Public Key Infrastructure
Technology, GAO-01-277 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2001).
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
identity of a message's sender. Digital signatures are often used in
conjunction with a digital certificate. A digital certificate is an
electronic credential that guarantees the association between a public key
and a specific entity. The most common use of digital certificates is to
verify that a user sending a message is who he or she claims to be and to
provide the receiver with a means to encode a reply. Certificates can be
issued to computer equipment and processes as well as to individuals. For
example, companies that do business over the Internet can obtain digital
certificates for their computer servers. These certificates are used to
authenticate the servers to potential customers, who can then rely on the
servers to support the secure exchange of encrypted information, such as
passwords and credit card numbers.
The creation of a digital signature can be divided into a two-step process
based on public key cryptography, as illustrated in figure 19. As
previously noted, for performance reasons, public key cryptography is not
used to encrypt large amounts of data. Therefore, the first step involves
reducing the amount of data that need to be encrypted. This is typically
accomplished by using a cryptographic hash algorithm, which condenses the
data into a message digest.14 Then the message digest is encrypted, using
the sender's private signing key to create a digital signature. Because
the message digest will be different for each signature, each signature
will also be unique; if a good hash algorithm is used, it is
computationally infeasible to find another message that will generate the
same message digest.
14A hash algorithm compresses the bits of a message to a fixed size.
Because any change in the message or the algorithm results in a different
value, it is not possible to reverse this process and arrive at the
original information.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Source: National Institute of Standards Technology and Corel Galley.
For example, if Bob wishes to digitally sign an electronic document, he
can use his private key to encrypt the message digest of the document. His
public key is freely available, so anyone with access to his public key
can decrypt the document. Although this seems backward because anyone can
read what is encrypted, the fact that Bob's private key is held only by
Bob provides the proof that Bob's digital signature is valid.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Source: National Institute of Standards Technology and Corel Galley.
Alice (or anyone else wishing to verify the document) can compute the
message digest of the document and decrypt the signature using Bob's
public key (see figure 20). Assuming that the message digests match, Alice
then has three kinds of security assurance. First, the digital signature
ensures that Bob actually signed the document (authentication). Second, it
ensures that Bob in fact sent the message (nonrepudiation). And third,
because the message digest would have changed if anything in the message
had been modified, Alice knows that no one tampered with the contents of
the document after Bob signed it (data integrity). Of course, this assumes
that (1) Bob has sole control over his private signing key and (2) Alice
is sure that the public key she used to validate Bob's messages really
belongs to Bob.
Digital certificates address this need to link an individual to his or her
public key. A digital certificate is created by placing the individual's
name, the individual's public key, and certain other identifying
information in a small electronic document that is stored in a directory
or other database. Directories may be publicly available repositories kept
on servers that act like telephone books in which users can look up
others' public keys. The digital certificate itself is created by a
trusted third party called a certification authority, which digitally
signs the certificate, thus providing assurance that the public key
contained in the certificate does indeed belong to the individual named in
the certificate. Certification authorities are a main component of a PKI,
which uses cryptographic techniques to generate and manage digital
certificates.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Effectiveness of the technology
Within an organization, separate key pairs are necessary to support both
encryption and digital signatures, and a user's private encryption key
should normally be copied to a safe backup location. This provides the
organization with the ability to access encrypted data if the user's
original private encryption key becomes inaccessible. For example, the
organization would have an interest in decrypting data should the private
key be destroyed or lost or if the user were fired, incapacitated, or
deceased. However, copies of the private keys used for digital signatures
should never be made, because they could fall into the wrong hands and be
used to forge the owner's signatures.
By linking an individual to his or her public key, digital certificates
help to provide assurance that digital signatures are used effectively.
However, digital certificates are only as secure as the public key
infrastructure that they are based on. For example, if an unauthorized
user is able to obtain a private key, the digital certificate could then
be compromised. In addition, users of certificates are dependent on
certification authorities to verify the digital certificates. If a valid
certification authority is not used, or a certification authority makes a
mistake or is the victim of a cyber attack, a digital certificate may be
ineffective.
Virtual Private Networks Figure 21: Illustration of a Typical VPN
Source: GAO analysis and Microsoft Visio.
What the technology does A VPN is a private network that is maintained
across a shared or public network, such as the Internet, by means of
specialized security procedures. VPNs allow organizations or individuals
to connect a network between two or more physical locations (for example,
field offices to organization headquarters) without incurring the costs of
purchasing or
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
leasing dedicated telephone lines or frame relay circuits15 (see figure
21). Through measures like authentication and data encryption,
cryptographic VPNs can establish a secure virtual connection between
physical locations.
VPNs can be implemented through hardware, existing firewalls, and
standalone software applications. To a user, VPNs appear no different than
traditional networks and can be used normally whether the user is dialing
in from home or accessing a field office from headquarters. VPNs are
typically used in intranets and extranets and in remote access
connections.
o Intranets are interlinked private networks within an enterprise that
allow information and computer resources to be shared throughout an
organization. Some organizations have sensitive data on a LAN that is
physically disconnected from the rest of the organization's intranet. This
lack of connectivity may cause data on the LAN to be inaccessible to
users. A VPN can be used to allow the sensitive LAN to be physically
connected to the intranet, but separated by a VPN server. Only authorized
users would be able to establish a VPN connection with the server to gain
access to the sensitive LAN, and all communications across the VPN could
be encrypted for data confidentiality.
o Remote access VPNs simplify the process of remote access, allowing
off-site users to connect, via the Internet, to a VPN server at the
organization's headquarters. Digital subscriber line or cable modem
services allow remote VPN users to access the organization's network at
speeds comparable to those attained with on-site access.
A VPN works by using shared public networks while maintaining privacy
through security procedures and protocols that encrypt communications
between two end points. To provide an additional level of security, a VPN
can encrypt not only the data, but also the originating and receiving
network addresses. There are two main VPN technologies, which differ in
their methods of encrypting data for secure transmission over Internet
connections. The first method is based on "tunneling" protocols that
encrypt packets at the sending end and decrypt them at the receiving end.
This process is commonly referred to as encapsulation, because the
original, unsecured packet is placed within another packet that has been
secured by encryption. The encapsulated packets are then sent through a
15Frame relay is a packet-switching protocol for connecting devices on a
WAN.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
"tunnel" that cannot be traveled by data that have not been properly
encrypted. Figure 22 is a depiction of tunneling.
Effectiveness of the technology
Source: GAO analysis and Microsoft Visio.
A commonly used tunneling protocol is IPSec.16 IPSec VPNs connect hosts to
entire private networks, encrypt IP packets, and ensure that the packets
are not deleted, added to, or tampered with during transmission. Because
they are based on the IP protocol, IPSec VPNs can secure any IP traffic
and can be configured to support any IP-based application.
In addition to using tunneling protocols, VPNs can also use the SSL
protocol, which uses a limited form of public key cryptography. SSL VPNs
connect users to services and applications inside private networks , but
they secure only the applications' services or data. SSL is a feature of
commonly available commercial Web browsers (such as Microsoft's Internet
Explorer and America Online's Netscape Navigator), and SSL VPNs use
standard browsers instead of the specialized client software that is
required by IPSec VPNs.
VPNs can be a cost-effective way to secure transmitted data across public
networks. However, the cost of implementing IPSec VPNs includes the
installation and configuration of specialized software that is required on
every client computer. SSL VPNs use standard Web browsers, eliminating
16Other tunneling protocols include Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
(PPTP) and Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP).
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
the need for client administration, but the SSL protocol often requires
that applications be customized.
In addition, VPNs are only as secure as the computers that are connected
to them. Because of the interconnected environment, any unsecured client
computer could be used to launch an attack on the network. In particular,
VPNs may be susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, message replay
attacks, and denial-of-service attacks.17
Audit and Monitoring
Audit and monitoring technologies can help security administrators to
routinely assess computer security, perform investigations during and
after an attack, and even recognize an ongoing attack.
We describe four types of audit and monitoring technologies: intrusion
detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, security event
correlation tools, and computer forensics. Intrusion detection and
intrusion prevention systems monitor and analyze events occurring on a
system or network and either alert appropriate personnel or prevent an
attack from proceeding. Audit logs are produced by many operating systems
and software applications. Depending on the configuration of the logging
functions, critical activities-such as access to administrator
functions-are logged and can be monitored for anomalous activity. Security
event correlation tools can help to detect security events and examine
logs to determine the method of entry that was used by an attacker and to
ascertain the extent of damage that was caused by the attack. Because of
the volume of data collected on some systems and networks, these tools can
help to consolidate the logs and to identify key information using
correlation analysis. Computer forensics involves the identification,
preservation, extraction, and documentation of computerbased evidence.
Computer forensics tools are used during the investigation of a computer
crime to identify the perpetrator and the methods used to conduct the
attack.
17A man-in-the-middle attack is one in which the attacker intercepts
messages in a public key exchange and then retransmits them, substituting
his or her own public key for the requested one, so that the two original
parties still appear to be communicating with each other directly. A
message replay attack is one in which an attacker eavesdrops, obtains a
copy of an encrypted message, and then re-uses the message at a later time
in an attempt to trick the cryptographic protocol. A denial-of-service
attack is one in which an attack from a single source overwhelms a target
computer with messages, denying access to legitimate users without
actually having to compromise the targeted computer.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Intrusion Detection Systems
What the technology does
How the technology works
An intrusion detection system (IDS) detects inappropriate, incorrect, or
anomalous activity that is aimed at disrupting the confidentiality,
availability, or integrity of a protected network and its computer
systems. An IDS collects information on a network, analyzes the
information on the basis of a preconfigured rule set, and then responds to
the analysis.
A special type of IDS, known as a honeypot, acts as a decoy server or
system that gathers information about an attacker or intruder-such as the
method of intrusion and the vulnerabilities exploited-in order to improve
security methods. To attract attackers, honeypots appear to contain
important data, but instead contain false information. A honeypot can be
set up to alert a system administrator of an attack via e-mail or pager,
allowing the administrator to ensure that the honeypot is not used as a
springboard for future attacks.
There are three common types of IDS, classified by the source of
information they use to detect intrusion: network-based, host-based, and
application-based.
Network-based IDSs detect attacks by capturing and analyzing network
packets. When placed in a network segment, one network-based IDS can
monitor the network traffic that affects multiple hosts that are connected
to that network segment. Network-based IDSs often consist of a set of
single-purpose sensors or hosts, placed at various points in a network.
These units monitor network traffic, performing local analysis of that
traffic and reporting attacks to a central management console. Because
these sensors are limited to running the IDS application only, they can
more easily be secured against attacks. Many of these sensors are designed
to run in "stealth" mode, making it more difficult for an attacker to
detect their presence and location.
Host-based IDSs collect information from within an individual computer
system and use that information to detect intrusions. Host-based IDSs can
determine exactly which processes and user accounts are involved in a
particular attack on the system. Furthermore, unlike network-based IDSs,
host-based IDSs can more readily "see" the intended outcome of an
attempted attack, because they can directly access and monitor the data
files and system processes that are usually targeted by attacks.
Host-based IDSs normally use two types of information sources: operating
system
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
audit trails and system logs. Operating system audit trails are usually
generated at the innermost level of the operating system; therefore these
trails are more detailed and better protected than system logs. Some
hostbased IDSs are designed to support a centralized IDS management and
reporting infrastructure that can allow a single management console to
track many hosts. Others generate messages in formats that are compatible
with a network management system.
Application-based IDSs are a special subset of host-based IDSs that
analyze the events occurring within a specific software application. The
most common information sources used by application-based IDSs are the
application's transaction log files. Because they directly interface with
the application and use application-specific knowledge, application-based
IDSs can detect the actions of authorized users who are attempting to
exceed their authorization. This is because such problems are more likely
to appear in the interaction among the user, the data, and the
application.
These IDSs are characterized by four primary qualities: source of
information, method of analysis, timing, and response.
IDSs have two primary methods of performing analysis. Signature-based
(sometimes referred to as knowledge-based, or pattern-based) analysis
relies on previous known attacks to detect an attack that is occurring.
The IDS analyzes system activity, looking for events that match a
predefined pattern of events that describes known attacks. If the analysis
of data reveals that an attack is ongoing or a vulnerability is being
exploited, an alarm is generated. Anomaly-based (also referred to as
behavior-based) analysis compares the current operation of a system or
network against a valid or accepted system behavior. An anomaly-based IDS
creates a baseline of normal (valid or accepted) behavior through various
collection methods. If the current behavior of the system is not within
the normal boundaries of behavior, then it would be interpreted by the IDS
as an attack.
IDSs can use either an interval-based or real-time timing method. The
interval-based timing method analyzes the data on a predetermined
schedule. This method allows an IDS to collect a large amount of data. The
real-time method analyzes and responds to the data as they come in,
allowing administrators to respond in real time to attacks.
IDSs can respond to possible attacks using either an active or a passive
response strategy. An active response IDS is referred to as an intrusion
prevention system (IPS). A passive-response IDS will typically generate an
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Effectiveness of the technology
alarm for an administrator. The alarm may appear on the administrator's
screen and provide the administrator with information such as the type of
attack, the location of the attack, the threat level, how it should be
responded to, and possibly whether the attack is successful. A passive
response IDS relies on a human to take action in response to the alert.
IDSs cannot instantaneously detect, report, or respond to an attack when
there is a heavy network or processing load. Therefore, IDSs are
vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; a malicious individual could send
large amounts of information through a network to overwhelm the IDS,
allowing the individual to launch another attack that would then go
unnoticed by the IDS. IDSs rely on available attack information, and they
are not as effective when protecting against unknown attacks, newly
published attacks, or variants of existing attacks. In addition, IDSs are
not always able to automatically investigate attacks without human
involvement.
The effectiveness of an IDS can be somewhat determined by the number of
false positives and false negatives that it generates. A false positive
occurs when the IDS alerts that there is an attack occurring, when in fact
there is no attack. A false negative occurs when the IDS fails to alert
that an attack is occurring. Overall, with anomaly-based IDSs, false
positives are numerous because of the unpredictable behaviors of users and
networks. Administrators must devote a fair amount of time to regularly
reviewing the IDS logs and to fine-tuning the IDS to limit the number of
false alarms. If excessive false alarms occur, future alarms are
increasingly likely to be ignored. Sometimes the IDS may be disabled for
the sake of convenience. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by
slowly changing the accepted operation of the system or network recognized
by the IDS, allowing for a larger attack to occur at a future time. The
attacker could accomplish this by affecting the baseline as it is being
created or by later slowly attacking the system so that the baseline moves
to a new threshold of accepted behavior. Also, if an anomaly-based IDS is
used while an attack is occurring, the normal behavior accepted by the IDS
will include behaviors that are characteristic of an attack. Anomaly-based
IDSs also take a varying amount of time to compute the valid or accepted
behavior, so that for a period of time the IDS will not be an effective
method of detecting attacks.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Intrusion Prevention Systems
What the technology does
How the technology works
Effectiveness of the technology
As we have described, intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) are IDSs with an
active response strategy. This means that IPSs not only can detect an
intrusive activity, they also can attempt to stop the activity-ideally
before it reaches its targets. Intrusion prevention is much more valuable
than intrusion detection, because intrusion detection simply observes
events without making any effort to stop them. IPSs often combine the best
of firewall, intrusion detection, antivirus, and vulnerability assessment
technologies. Their focus, however, is on the prevention of detected
attacks that might exploit an existing vulnerability in the protected
network or host system.
Like IDSs, IPSs are either network-based or host-based. They perform IDS
functions and when they detect an intrusion, take action such as blocking
the network traffic to prevent the attack from progressing. Network-based
IPSs may simply monitor the network traffic or they may actually be "in
line", which means that activity must pass through them. For example, an
IPS that includes a network-based IDS that is integrated with a firewall
and a host-based IDS that integrates the detection and prevention
functionalities into the kernel of the operating system. Network-based
IPSs thoroughly inspect data traffic, typically using specialized hardware
to compensate for the processing overhead that inspection consumes.
IPSs actively respond to possible attacks by collecting additional
information, changing the current environment, and taking action against
the intruder. One of their common responses is to adjust firewall rules to
block the offending network traffic. If an IPS responds to an attack by
taking action against the intruder (commonly referred to as attack-back or
strike-back), it may initiate a launch of attacks against the attacker. In
another aggressive response, called "trace back," the IPS attempts to find
the source of the attack.
Intrusion prevention systems are the logical evolution of intrusion
detection systems. Instead of dealing with the constant warning alarms of
IDSs, IPSs can prevent attacks by blocking suspicious network traffic. A
key value of some IPSs is their ability to "learn" what constitutes
acceptable behavior and to halt activity that is not based on rules that
were generated during the learning, or profiling, stage.
Network-based IPSs offer in-line monitoring of data streams throughout the
network and provide the capability to prevent intrusion attempts.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Host-based IPSs allow systems and applications to be configured
individually, preventing attacks against the operating system or
applications. These IPSs are suitable measures to help guard unpatched and
exploitable systems against attacks, but they require substantial user
administration.
Unfortunately, IPSs are susceptible to errors in detecting intrusions. If
the detection of incidents is not accurate, then an IPS may block
legitimate activities that are incorrectly classified as malicious. Any
organization that wants to utilize intrusion prevention should pay
particular attention to detection accuracy when selecting a product.
Users of IPSs also face the challenge of maintaining a database of recent
attack signatures so that systems can be guarded against recent attack
strategies. Furthermore, IPSs cause bottlenecks in network traffic,
reducing throughput across the network.
Security Event Correlation Tools
What the technology does
Security event correlation tools collect logs, or lists of actions that
have occurred, from operating systems, firewalls, applications, IDSs and
other network devices. Then the correlation tools analyze the logs in real
time, discern whether an attack has occurred, and respond to a security
incident.
Review and analysis of logs can provide a dynamic picture of ongoing
system activities that can be used to verify that the system is operating
according to the organization's policies. Analyzing a single device's logs
is insufficient to gain a full understand of all system activity, but the
size, number, and difficulty of reading through every tool's log files is
a daunting task for an administrator. Security event correlation tools
address the need for an administrator to investigate an attack in a
realtime setting, through analysis and correlation of all the different
IDS, firewall, and server logs. Automated audit tools provide a means to
significantly reduce the required review time, and they will print reports
(predefined and customized) that summarize the log contents from a set of
specific activities (see figure 23).
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
Source: GAO and Corel Draw.
.
Security event correlation tools first consolidate the log files from
various sources, such as operating systems, firewalls, applications, IDSs,
antivirus programs, servers, and virtual private networks. Often, the logs
from the various sources come in a variety of proprietary formats that
make comparisons difficult. As part of the consolidation process, security
event correlation tools normalize the logs into a standard format-for
example, Extensible Markup Language (commonly referred to as XML).18 After
the normalization process, unnecessary data can be eliminated in order to
decrease the chance of errors.
The normalized logs are then compared (or correlated) to determine whether
attacks have occurred. A variety of correlation methods can be used,
including sophisticated pattern-based analysis, which can identify similar
activity on various logs that have originated from an attack. For example,
an IDS might not raise a flag if a single port was being scanned. However,
if that port was being scanned on multiple systems, that activity might
indicate an attack. By consolidating the logs from the various IDSs,
correlation tools may detect this type of attack. A second method of
18XML is a flexible, nonproprietary set of standards for tagging
information so that it can be transmitted over a network such as the
Internet and readily interpreted by disparate computer systems.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
analysis is called anomaly detection. In this method, a baseline of normal
user activity is taken, and logged activities are compared against this
baseline. Abnormal activity can then be interpreted as potentially
indicating an attack. Another correlation method considers the
significance of the logged event, which can be calculated as the
probability that the attack would have succeeded.
If an attack is detected, the tools can then respond either passively or
actively. A passive response means that no action is taken by the tool to
stop the threat directly. For example, notifications can be sent to system
administrators via pagers or e-mail, incidents can be logged, and IP
addresses can be added to intruder or asset watch lists. An active
response is an automated action taken by the tool to mitigate the risk.
For example, one active response is to block the attack through interfaces
with firewalls or routers.
Correlation tools are limited in their ability to interface with numerous
security products; they may not be able to collect and correlate logs from
certain products. In addition, these tools rely on the sufficiency and
accuracy of the logs, and they cannot detect attacks that have bypassed
the various security devices such as the firewall and IDS. If an attacker
were able to compromise the logs, then the security event correlation tool
could be analyzing false information. Encryption and authentication to
ensure the security and integrity of the data may mitigate this risk.
Effectiveness of the technology
Computer Forensics Tools What the technology does
Computer forensics tools are used to identify, preserve, extract, and
document computer-based evidence. They can identify passwords, logons, and
other information in files that have been deleted, encrypted, or damaged.
During the investigation of a computer crime, these tools are used to
determine the perpetrator and the methods used to conduct the attack.
There are two main categories of computer forensics tools: (1) evidence
preservation and collection tools, which prevent the accidental or
deliberate modification of computer-related evidence and create a logical
or physical copy of the original evidence, and (2) recovery and analysis
tools, which provide data recovery and discovery functions. A few
commercially available computer forensic products incorporate features of
both categories and claim to provide a complete suite of forensic tools.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
Evidence Preservation and Collection Tools
Write protection and disk imaging software are used to preserve and copy
computer evidence while preserving its integrity.
There are several techniques that are used by write protection software,
which prevent or disable a user's attempts to modify data (or perform the
"write" operation) on a computer's hard drive or other computer media. In
one method, the write protection software attempts to gain exclusive
access to the media through mechanisms specific to the operating system.
If exclusive access can be gained, all other software applications will be
prevented from accessing and modifying the locked media. Another method
utilizes a separate software component that is installed as part of the
operating system and is loaded when the operating system starts (and
before any other application can execute).
Disk imaging is a process that attempts to copy every bit of data from one
physical computer medium to another, similar medium. This type of
duplication is known as a physical disk copy, and it involves copying all
data, including files, file names, and data that are not associated with a
file. Disk imaging tools may also perform varying degrees of integrity
checking to verify that all data have been copied without error or
alteration. The most common technique used to verify data integrity is a
digital signature or a checksum algorithm.
Analysis Tools
These tools can recover deleted files by taking advantage of a common
technique that is typically employed by commercial operating systems. When
a user deletes a file from a computer medium (such as a floppy disk or
hard drive), many operating systems do not destroy the data contained in
the files. Instead, the space occupied by the deleted file is marked as
available, or unallocated, so it can be reused as new files are created.
The unallocated data contained in those deleted files may still remain on
the medium. Analysis tools that recover unallocated data examine a
specific structure and organization of information (called a file system)
as it is stored on computer media. Because common operating systems
maintain data in unique file systems that vary greatly, these analysis
tools are typically designed for a specific file system.
Other analysis tools examine text files to identify the occurrence and
frequency of specific words or patterns. They can generate a word index by
creating a database of every word or delimited string that is contained
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Effectiveness of the technology
within a single file, a collection of files, or an entire medium. They can
also search multiple files or entire media for the occurrence of specified
strings or words, as well as performing advanced searches using Boolean
expressions.19 Some tools have the capability to perform fuzzy logic
searches, which search for derivatives of a word, related words, and
misspelled words. For example, when searching for files containing the
word "bomb", files that contain "bombed", "explosive", or "bommb" may also
be considered as matches.
Other analysis tools identify files by their type or individual identity,
a method that can reduce the volume of data that an investigator must
analyze. File type identification is based on a file signature-a unique
sequence of values stored within a file that may be as short as 2
characters or longer than 12 characters. The longer the sequence, the
greater the uniqueness of the signature and the less likely it is a file
that will be mislabeled. Individual file identification is also
signature-based, but the method calculates a signature over an entire file
or data unit. One approach utilizes a representation that is both
efficient in storage requirements and reliable in terms of its uniqueness,
such as hashing algorithms.
There are many different automated tools that are routinely used by law
enforcement organizations to assist in the investigation of crimes
involving computers. These tools are employed to generate critical
evidence that is used in criminal cases. However, there are no standards
or recognized tests by which to judge the validity of the results produced
by these tools. Computer forensic tools must meet the same standards that
are applied to all forensic sciences, including formal testable theories,
peer-reviewed methodologies and tools, and replicable empirical research.
Failing to apply standards may result in contaminating or losing critical
evidence. It is important to obtain legal advice and consult with law
enforcement officials before undertaking any forensic activities in
situations where criminal or civil investigation or litigation is a
potential outcome.
19In Boolean searches, an "and" operator between two words or other values
(for example, "pear AND apple") means one is searching for documents
containing both of the words or values, not just one of them. An "or"
operator between two words or other values (for example, "pear OR apple")
means one is searching for documents containing either of the words.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Configuration Management and Assurance
Configuration management and assurance technologies help security
administrators to view and change the security settings on their hosts and
networks, verify the correctness of the security settings, and maintain
operations in a secure fashion under duress. Technologies that assist
configuration management and assurance include policy enforcement tools,
network management, continuity of operations tools, scanners for testing
and auditing security, and patch management.
Policy enforcement tools help administrators define and ensure compliance
with a set of security rules and configurations, such as a password
policy, access to systems and files, and desktop and server
configurations. Management and administration tools are used to maintain
networks and systems. These tools incorporate functions that facilitate
central monitoring of the security posture of networks and systems.
Network management tools obtain status data from network components, make
configuration changes, and alert network managers of problems.
To provide continuity of operations, there are secure backup tools that
can restore system functionality and data in the event of a disruption.
These products are used to account for naturally occurring problems, such
as power outages, and are now also being applied to help address problems
resulting from malicious cyber attacks. Tools are also available to help
systems and networks to continue to perform during an ongoing attack.
Scanners are common testing and audit tools that are used to identify
vulnerabilities in networks and systems. As part of proactive security
testing, scanners are available that can be used to probe modems, Internet
ports, databases, wireless access points, and Web pages and applications.
These tools often incorporate the capability to monitor the security
posture of the networks and systems by testing and auditing their security
configurations.
Patch management tools help system administrators with the process of
acquiring, testing, and applying fixes to operating systems and
applications. Software vendors typically provide these fixes to correct
known vulnerabilities in their software.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Policy Enforcement Applications
What the technology does
How the technology works
Policy enforcement technologies allow system administrators to perform
centralized monitoring of compliance with an organization's security
policies.20 These tools examine desktop and server configurations that
define authorized access to specified devices and compare these settings
against a baseline policy. They typically provide multilevel reports on
computer configurations, and some products have the capability to fix
various identified problems. They also provide a centralized way for
administrators to use other security technologies, such as access control
and security event and correlation tools.
Policy enforcement tools generally have four main functions:
Policy definition. These tools have the functionality to help establish
baseline policy settings. Policies can include features like minimum
password requirements and user and group rights to specific applications.
Some products include policy templates that can be customized and
distributed to users for review and signatures.
Compliance checking. After a security policy has been defined, these tools
can compare current system configurations with the baseline settings.
Compliance can be monitored across multiple administrative domains and
operating systems from a central management console. For example,
compliance checking could include testing for a particular setting in
multiple systems' configuration files, checking the audit configuration on
a subset of computers, or checking that console passwords fit the policies
of the organization (for example, using the correct length of characters
in a password, using alphanumeric characters, and periodically changing
passwords). The tools often allow customized checks to be defined.
Reporting. Basic reporting templates are generally included with these
tools, such as templates for configurations, user accounts, access
controls, and software patch levels. In addition, users can customize
reports and create ad hoc queries for specific information on particular
computers.
20Policy is defined as a set of configurations and access controls that
affect the overall security stance of a user, group, device, or
application.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
These reports can consolidate information, such as which users have not
recently logged on to a system and which computers are running unpatched
applications. The reports can be tailored differently for security
personnel and management.
Remediation. Some policy enforcement tools allow problems that have been
discovered to be proactively fixed. For example, if the latest security
software patch has not been installed for a particular application, some
tools automatically download patches from a vendor's Web site and either
alert an administrator or install the patches directly onto the system.
Policy enforcement software can provide for centralized monitoring,
control, and enforcement. However, the software's effectiveness is largely
governed by the security policies of the organization. These tools can
only assist in monitoring and enforcing those policies that organizations
choose to implement. As such, they can be only as good as the policies
that the organization defines. In addition, some policy enforcement tools
do not work on all operating systems, and installation and configuration
can be arduous.
Effectiveness of the technology
Network Management What the technology does
Network management is the ability to control and monitor a computer
network from a central location. Network management systems consist of
software programs and dedicated computer hardware that view the entire
network as a unified architecture in order to obtain status data from
network components, make configuration changes, and alert network managers
to problems. The International Organization for Standardization defines a
conceptual model for describing the five key functional areas of network
management (and the main functions of network management systems):
o Fault management identifies problems in nodes, the network, and the
network's operation to determine their causes and to take remedial action.
o Configuration management monitors network configuration information so
that the effects of specific hardware and software can be managed and
tracked.
o Accounting management measures network utilization of individual users
or groups to provide billing information, regulate users or groups, and
help keep network performance at an acceptable level.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
How the technology works
o Performance management measures various aspects of network
performance, including gathering and analyzing statistical system data so
that performance may be maintained at an acceptable level.
o Security management controls access to network resources by limiting
access to network resources and providing notification of security
breaches and attempts, so that information cannot be obtained without
authorization.
A network management system typically consists of managed devices (the
network hosts); software agents, which communicate information about the
managed devices; a network management application, which gathers and
processes information from agents; and a network management station, which
allows an operator to view a graphical representation of the network,
control managed devices on the network, and program the network management
application. Figure 24 is an example of a typical network management
architecture.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Sources: Corel Draw and Microsoft Visio.
The network management station receives and processes events from network
elements and acts as the main console for network operations. The network
management station displays a graphical network map that highlights the
operational states of critical network devices such as routers and
switches. Each network device is represented by a graphical element on the
management station's console, and different colors are used to represent
the current operational status of network devices, based on status
notifications sent by the devices. These notifications (usually called
events) are placed in a log file.
The functionality of network management software (network management
applications and agents) depends on the particular network management
protocol that the software is based on. Most systems use open protocols.
However, some network management software is based upon vendorspecific
proprietary protocols. The two most common network management protocols
are the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Common Management
Information Protocol (CMIP). SNMP is
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Effectiveness of the technology
widely used in most LAN environments. CMIP is used in telecommunication
environments, where networks tend to be large and complex.
Network management systems can be quite expensive and they are often
complex. The complexity is primarily in the network management protocols
and data structures that are associated with the network management
information. Also, these systems require personnel with the specialized
training to effectively configure, maintain and operate the network
management system.
Many network management systems cannot support network devices that use
vendor-specific protocols.
Continuity of Operations Tools
What the technology does
How the technology works
Continuity of operations tools provide a complete backup infrastructure to
keep the enterprise's data resources online and available at multiple
locations in case of an emergency or planned maintenance, such as system
or software upgrading. They maintain operational continuity of the storage
devices and host and database levels. Continuity-of-operations tools
include high-availability systems, which link two or more computers
together to provide continuous access to data through systems redundancy
(known as clustering); journaling file systems, which maintain specific
information about data to avoid file system errors and corruption;
load-balancing technology, which distributes traffic efficiently among
network servers so that no individual server is overburdened; and
Redundant Array of Independent Disk (RAID) technology, which allows two or
more hard drives to work in concert for increased fault tolerance21 and
performance.
High-availability systems use clustering, which refers to two or more
servers set up in such a way that if an application running on one server
fails then it can be automatically restarted or recovered on another
server. This is referred to as fail over from one server or node in the
cluster to another. High-availability systems utilize fail over operations
to automatically switch to a standby database, server, or network if the
21Fault tolerance is the ability of a system to respond gracefully to an
unexpected hardware or software failure.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
primary system fails or is temporarily shut down for servicing. Some
highavailability systems can also perform remote backups, remote mutual
takeovers, concurrent access operations, and remote system recoveries.
These functions are described below:
o In a remote backup, a remote geographic site is designated as the hot
backup site that is live and ready to take over the current workload. This
backup site includes hardware, system and application software, and
application data and files. In the event of a failure, the failed site's
application workload automatically moves to the remote hot backup site.
o In a remote mutual takeover, geographically separated system sites are
to be designated as hot backups for each other. Should either site
experience a failure, the other acts as a hot backup and automatically
takes over the designated application workload of the failed site. Two
different workloads running at two different sites are protected.
o In concurrent access, systems at both sites are concurrently updating
the same database.
o In remote system recovery, data can be resynchronized and a failed
system that has been restored to operation can be reintegrated with the
remote hot backup. In a process known as file mirroring, the failed system
is updated with current application data and files that were processed by
the backup system after the failed system ceased operations. Upon
completing restoration of an up-to-date data and file mirror, the
high-availability system will resume synchronized system operations,
including the mirroring of real-time data and files between the system
sites. This can occur while the remote backup is in use.
A journaling file system ensures that the data on a disk has been restored
to its pre-failure configuration. It also recovers unsaved data and stores
them in their intended locations (had the computer not failed), making the
journaling file system an important feature for mission-critical
applications. A journaling file system transaction treats a sequence of
changes as a single operation and tracks changes to file system metadata
and user data. The transaction guarantees that either all or none of the
file system updates are done.
For example, the process of creating a new file modifies several metadata
values. Before the file system makes those changes, it creates a
transaction to record the intended changes. Once the transaction has been
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Effectiveness of the technology
recorded on disk, the file system modifies the metadata and the
transaction is stored on the journaling file system. In the event of a
system failure, the file system is restored to a consistent state by
repeating the transactions listed in the journal. Rather than examining
all metadata, the file system inspects only those portions of the metadata
that have recently changed.
Load-balancing technology distributes processing and communications
activity evenly across a computer network by transferring the tasks from
heavily loaded processors to the lightly loaded ones. Load-balancing
decisions are based on three policies: an information policy, which
specifies the amount of load information made available; a transfer
policy, which specifies the current workload of the host and the size of
the job; and a placement policy, which specifies proper allocation of
processes to the different computer processors.
RAID systems provide large amounts of storage by making the data on many
smalls disks readily available to file servers, host computers, or the
network as a single unit (known as an array). The design of the array of
disks is an important determinant of performance and data availability in
a RAID system. In addition to the array of multiple disks, RAID systems
include a controller-an intelligent electronic device that routes, buffers
and manages data flow between the host computer and the network array of
disks. RAID controllers can organize data on the disks in several ways in
order to optimize the performance and reliability of the system for
different types of applications. RAID can also be implemented in software.
The continuity-of-operations technologies can help an organization
increase the availability of its mission-critical applications. Some of
the technologies such as RAID and journaling file system increase the
ability of a single server to survive a number of failures. For many
businesses, the combination of RAID, journaling file system, and redundant
power supply can provide adequate protection against disruptions.
Organizations that cannot tolerate an application outage of more than a
few minutes may deploy a high-availability system that uses clustering.
Clustering has a proven track record as a good solution for increasing
application availability. However, clustering is expensive because it
requires additional hardware and clustering software, and is more complex
to manage than a single system.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Scanners
What the technology does
How the technology works
Scanners help identify a network's or a system's security vulnerabilities.
There are a variety of scanning tools, including port scanners,
vulnerability scanners, and modem scanners.22
Port scanners are used to map networks and identify the services running
on each host by detecting open TCP and UDP ports. Vulnerability scanners
are used to identify vulnerabilities on computer hosts and networks and
make use of the results generated by a port scanner. The tools have
reporting features to list the vulnerabilities they identified and may
provide instructions on how to reduce or eliminate the vulnerability. Many
scanners are now equipped to automatically fix selected vulnerabilities.
Modem scanners, also known as war dialers, are programs that identify
phone numbers that can successfully make a connection with a computer
modem. Unauthorized modems provide a means to bypass most or all of the
security measures in place to stop unauthorized users from accessing a
network-such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems.
Port scanners use methods known as ping sweeps and port scans to map
networks and identify services in use. Ping sweeps are considered the most
basic technique for scanning a network. A ping sweep determines which
range of IP addresses map to computers that are turned on by sending
communication requests (known as Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
ECHO requests) to multiple IP addresses. If a computer at a target address
is turned on, it will return a specific ICMP ECHO reply. In port scanning,
the scanner sends a message to a specific port on a target computer and
waits for a response. The responses to a scan can allow the scanner to
determine (1) which ports are open, and (2) the operating system the
computer is running (certain port scans only work on certain operating
systems). The type of message sent and the information the scanner
receives can distinguish the various types of port scans.
Vulnerability scanners are software applications that can be used to
identify vulnerabilities on computer hosts and networks. Host-based
scanners must be installed on each host to be tested, and they typically
require administrative-level access to operate. Network-based scanners
22Other scanning tools include database scanners, Web application
scanners, and wireless packet analyzers.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
operate on an organization's network and identify vulnerabilities on
multiple computers. Whether host-based or network-based, vulnerability
scanners automatically identify a host's operating system and active
applications; they then compare these with the scanner's database of known
vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scanners employ large databases of known
vulnerabilities to identify vulnerabilities that are associated with
commonly used operating systems and applications. When a match is found,
the scanner will alert the operator to a possible vulnerability. Figure 25
shows a sample screen from a vulnerability scanner.
Sources: GAO and Corel Draw.
Modem scanners are software programs that automatically dial a defined
range of phone numbers and track successful connections in a database.
Some modem scanners can also identify the particular operating system
running on the computer, and they may be configured to attempt to gain
access to the system by running through a predetermined list of common
user names and passwords.
Effectiveness of the technology Port-scanning applications have the
capability to scan a large number of hosts, but they do not directly
identify known vulnerabilities. However,
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
some vulnerability scanners can make use of a port scanner's output to
target specific network hosts for vulnerability scanning. Vulnerability
scanners can identify the vulnerabilities and suggest how to fix them, but
they may not themselves have the capability to fix all identified
vulnerabilities. They have been known to generate false positives (i.e.,
detecting a vulnerability that does not exist) and false negatives (i.e.,
not detecting a vulnerability that exists). While false positives are
irrelevant warnings that can be ignored, false negatives can result in
overlooking critical security vulnerabilities. Also, their effectiveness
is linked to the quality of the database of known vulnerabilities; if the
database is not up to date, vulnerability scanners might not identify
newly discovered vulnerabilities.
Patch Management What the technology does
How the technology works
Patch management tools automate the otherwise manual process of acquiring,
testing, and applying patches to multiple computer systems.23 These tools
can either be stand-alone patch management products or the patch component
of systems management products. Patch management tools are used to
identify missing patches on each system, deploy patches to a single or
multiple computers, and generate reports to track the status of a patch
across a number of computers. Some tools offer customized features,
including automated inventorying and immediate notification of new
patches. While patch management tools primarily support the Windows
operating system, they are expanding to support multiple platforms.
Patch management tools have various system requirements, such as specific
applications, servers, and service pack levels, depending on the tool
selected. Patch management tools can be either scanner-based (nonagent) or
agent-based. Agent-based tools place small programs, or agents, on each
computer. The agents periodically poll a patch database-a server on a
network-for new updates and apply the patches pushed out by the
administrator. This architecture allows for either the client or the
server to initiate communications, which means that individual computers
can either query the patch database or allow the server to perform a scan
to
23A patch is an upgrade designed to fix a serious flaw (that is, a
vulnerability) in a piece of software and is typically developed and
distributed as a replacement for or an insertion in compiled code.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Effectiveness of the technology
determine their configuration status. Some patch management vendors have
contractual agreements with software vendors to receive prenotification of
vulnerabilities and related patches before they are publicly released.
These patch management vendors test the patch before it is made available
at a designated location (for example, a server), where they can be
automatically downloaded for deployment. The agents will then install the
patches for systems meeting the patch requirements.
Scanner-based tools scan the computers on a network according to provided
criteria, such as domain or IP range, to determine their configurations.
The server initiates communication with the client by logging in and
querying each machine as a domain or local administrator. Patches are
downloaded from the vendor's Web site and stored at a designated location
to be installed to the target machine.
Most tools also have built-in knowledge repositories that compare the
systems' established versions against lists that contain the latest
vulnerabilities and notifications of fixes. They also have the capability
to make recommendations on which patches to deploy on what machines.
Additionally, these tools can analyze whether the relevant patch has been
deployed to all affected systems. Many tools can also prioritize patch
deployment and dependencies on each system. This capability can allow for
logical groupings of target machines in order to streamline the patch
installation process.
While patch management tools can automate patch delivery, it is still
necessary to determine if a particular patch is appropriate to apply. In
addition, patches may need to be tested against the organization's
specific systems configurations. The complexity of the organization's
enterprise architecture determines the difficulty of this task. Also, some
of these tools are not consistently accurate and will incorrectly report
that a patch is missing when it was actually installed (that is, a false
negative) or report that patches have been installed on unpatched systems
(that is, a false positive). Furthermore, the automated distribution of
patches may be a potential security exposure because patches are a
potential entry point into an organization's infrastructure.
Agent-based products can reduce network traffic because the processing and
analysis are offloaded to the target system and are not done on the
network. In this kind of implementation, the work is performed at the
client, which offloads the processing and analysis to the individual
computers and saves the data until it needs to report to the central
server.
Appendix III: Cybersecurity Technologies
Agent-based products, however, require more maintenance, deployment, and
labor costs because of their distributed architecture. Additionally, the
task of installing agents on each machine requires more work on the
frontend. Agent-based tools are better suited for larger networks because
they can typically provide a real-time network view.
Scanner-based tools are easier and faster to deploy and do not present
distributive management concerns. However, they can significantly increase
network traffic because tests and communications travel over the network
whenever a scan is requested. Additionally, computers not connected to the
network at the time scans are performed are not accounted for. As such,
scanner-based tools are recommended for smaller, static networks.
Appendix IV: Comments from the
Department of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the National Science Foundation
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts
Acknowledgments
Keith Rhodes (202) 512-6412; [email protected].
Joel Willemssen (202) 512-6408; [email protected].
Robert Dacey (202) 512-3317; [email protected].
Naba Barkakati (202) 512-4499; [email protected].
Additional staff who made contributions to this report are Scott Borre,
Lon Chin, Joanne Fiorino, Michael Gilmore, Richard Hung, Elizabeth
Johnston, Christopher Kovach, Anjalique Lawrence, Stephanie Lee, Laura
Nielsen, David Noone, Tracy Pierson, and Harold Podell.
We gratefully acknowledge the time and assistance of the following people
who reviewed a draft of this report: Ken Birman, Cornell University; Earl
Boebert, Sandia National Laboratories; Stephen Crocker, Shinkuro, Inc.;
John Davis, Infosec Research Council; Lars Kjaer, World Shipping Council;
Noel Matchett, Information Security Incorporated; and Dan Murray,
American Transportation Research Institute. We also gratefully
acknowledge the time and assistance provided by officials from the
following infrastructure sectors: chemical, defense industrial base,
energy,
information technology, transportation, and water.
We also appreciate the contributions provided by the following
organizations during our meeting on the use of cybersecurity technologies
for critical infrastructure protection: American Transportation Research
Institute; AT&T Labs Research; Bank of America; Carnegie Mellon
University; Cornell University; Dartmouth College; Information Security
Incorporated; Ivan Walks and Associates; Johns Hopkins Center for
Civilian Biodefense Studies; RAND Corporation; Sandia National
Laboratories; Shinkuro, Inc.; University of California at Davis;
Washington
State University; Wildman Harrold Allen and Dixon; and the World
Shipping Council.
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