Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and 	 
Strengthen Security Programs (20-NOV-03, GAO-04-285T).		 
                                                                 
Commercial aviation has been a long-standing target for 	 
terrorists. Since the tragic attacts of September 11, 2001,	 
substantial changes have been made to enhance security--including
the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
and the federalization of the passenger screener workforce.	 
However, despite these changes, vulnerabilities in aviation	 
security continue to exist. Accordingly, GAO was asked to	 
describe TSA's efforts to (1) measure the effectiveness of its	 
aviation security initiatives, (2) strengthen its passenger	 
screening program, and (3) address additional challenges in	 
further enhancing aviation security.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-285T					        
    ACCNO:   A08908						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and  
Strengthen Security Programs					 
     DATE:   11/20/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Airport security					 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Data collection					 
	     Human resources training				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Personnel evaluation				 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     Civil aviation					 
	     FAA Threat Image Projection System 		 
	     TSA Computer-Assisted Passenger			 
	     Prescreening System				 
                                                                 
	     TSA Performance Management Information		 
	     System						 
                                                                 

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GAO-04-285T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST Thursday, November 20,
2003

AVIATION SECURITY

       Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen Security Programs

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice

GAO-04-285T

Highlights of GAO-04-285T, a report to the Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives

Commercial aviation has been a long-standing target for terrorists. Since
the tragic attacts of September 11, 2001, substantial changes have been
made to enhance security-including the creation of the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and the federalization of the passenger
screener workforce. However, despite these changes, vulnerabilities in
aviation security continue to exist. Accordingly, GAO was asked to
describe TSA's efforts to (1) measure the effectiveness of its aviation
security initiatives, (2) strengthen its passenger screening program, and
(3) address additional challenges in further enhancing aviation security.

In prior reports and testimonies, GAO has made numerous recommendations to
strengthen aviation security. We also have ongoing reviews assessing many
of the issues addressed in this testimony and will issue separate reports
on these areas at a later date.

November 2003

AVIATION SECURITY

Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen Security Programs

TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation
security, but has collected limited information on the effectiveness of
these initiatives in protecting commercial aircraft. Our recent work on
passenger screening found that little testing or other data exist that
measure the performance of screeners in detecting threat objects. However,
TSA is taking steps to collect additional data, including developing a
5-year performance plan detailing numerous performance measures, as well
as fielding the Threat Image Projection system and increasing screener
testing.

In addition to collecting performance data, TSA could further strengthen
passenger screening by fully deploying recurrent and supervisory training
programs, determining the appropriate levels of screeners at the nation's
airports, and improving oversight of the contract screener pilot program.
Although TSA has developed and deployed basic and remedial training
programs, it has not fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory
training programs. In addition, TSA acknowledged that its initial staffing
efforts created imbalances at the nation's airports, and that it has taken
limited action to assess the performance of the pilot airports using
private, versus federal, screeners. TSA is undertaking a number of actions
to address these concerns, including strengthening its training program
and awarding contracts to assess its staffing model and the performance of
the contract pilot airports.

TSA faces a number of other challenges as it continues to enhance aviation
security. Significant challenges include implementing the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), as well as
strengthening baggage screening, airport perimeter and access controls,
and air cargo and general aviation security. In implementing CAPPS II, TSA
must ensure it addresses concerns surrounding travelers' privacy rights,
the accuracy of databases used by CAPPS II, and obtaining international
cooperation needed for the system to be fully operational. Additional
challenges include integrating explosive detection systems into airport's
in-line baggage handling systems, identifying cost-effective perimeter
security technologies, effectively targeting air cargo for screening, and
improving security at general aviation airports. Further, TSA faces
challenges in funding increased aviation security measures and ensuring
that these costs are controlled.

Security Screeners Checking Passengers with a Hand-Held Metal Detector

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-285T.

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Cathleen A.
Berrick at (202) 512-8777 or Source: FAA.
[email protected].

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing to discuss our
recent work on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts
to assess its performance and strengthen its security programs, to include
passenger screening. Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task- with
hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and tens of thousands of
flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of baggage and
cargo. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, billions of dollars have
been spent, and a wide variety of programs and initiatives have been
implemented to enhance aviation security. However, recent reviews and
covert testing conducted by GAO and the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Inspector General, as well as recent media reports, indicate
that weaknesses and vulnerabilities in commercial aviation continue to
exist. For example, the incident involving a college student who placed
box cutters, clay resembling plastic explosives, and bleach on commercial
aircraft show that aviation security can still be compromised.

My testimony today highlights three key areas that TSA must focus on to
enhance aviation security. These areas include (1) measuring the
effectiveness of TSA's aviation security initiatives that have already
been implemented, (2) strengthening its passenger screening program, and
(3) addressing key programmatic and management challenges to further
enhance aviation security. My testimony is based on our prior work,
reviews of TSA documentation, and interviews with TSA officials.

In summary:

Although TSA has implemented numerous programs and initiatives to enhance
aviation security, it has collected limited information on the
effectiveness of these programs and initiatives. Our recent work on TSA's
passenger screening program showed that although TSA has made enhancements
in passenger screening, it has collected limited data on screeners'
ability to detect threat objects. The Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA), which was established with the primary goal of strengthening
aviation security, requires that TSA establish acceptable levels of
performance for security initiatives and develop annual performance plans
and reports to measure and document the effectiveness of those
initiatives.1 Although TSA has developed an annual performance

1P.L. 107-71.

plan and report as required by ATSA, to date these tools have focused on
TSA's progress in meeting deadlines to implement programs and initiatives
mandated by ATSA rather than on the effectiveness of these programs and
initiatives. TSA has recognized that it has collected limited performance
data on its security initiatives, and is taking steps to collect
additional data, including developing a 5-year performance plan, and
increasing passenger screener testing.

Our recent work on TSA's passenger screening program showed that the
program can be strengthened in the areas of training, staffing, and the
contract screener pilot program.2 Although TSA has developed and deployed
basic and remedial training programs, it has not fully developed or
deployed recurrent or supervisory training programs to ensure that
screeners are effectively trained and supervised. In addition, TSA has
acknowledged that its initial screener staffing levels created imbalances
at the nation's airports-a situation that it is attempting to address. TSA
also has not yet determined how to evaluate and measure the performance of
its contract screening pilot program. Since we issued our preliminary
report on TSA's passenger screening program in September 2003, TSA has
taken a number of actions to address these concerns, including enhancing
its recurrent and supervisory training programs, and awarding a contract
to assess the contract screening pilot program. However, TSA has
recognized that assessing the performance of the pilot airports will be
difficult because of a lack of performance data.

TSA faces a number of other challenges as it continues to address threats
to our nation's aviation system. Significant challenges include
implementing various aviation security programs, such as the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System3 (CAPPS II), and
addressing broader security concerns related to the security of air cargo
and general aviation.4 TSA also faces challenges in managing the costs of
aviation security and in strategically managing its workforce of about
60,000 people, most of whom are deployed at airports to detect weapons and
explosives. TSA has been addressing these and other challenges through a

2ATSA required TSA to implement a pilot program using contract screeners
at five commercial airports. The purpose of the 2-year pilot program is to
determine the feasibility of using private screening companies rather than
federal screeners.

3CAPPS II is a system intended to perform a risk assessment of all airline
passengers to identify those requiring additional security attention.

4General aviation consists of all civil aircraft and excludes commercial
and military aircraft.

Background

variety of efforts. We have work in progress that is examining TSA's
efforts in addressing many of these challenges.

The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a
longstanding concern. As demonstrated by the 1988 bombing of a U.S.
airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the 1995 plot to blow up 12 U.S.
aircraft in the Pacific region discovered by Philippine authorities, U.S.
commercial aircraft have long been a target for terrorist attacks. Over
the years, numerous initiatives have been undertaken to improve aviation
security. However, as we and others have documented in numerous reports
and studies, weaknesses continue to exist. It was because of these
weaknesses that terrorists were able to hijack four commercial aircraft on
September 11, 2001, with tragic results.

In an effort to strengthen the security of commercial aviation, the
President signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) on November 19, 2001. ATSA created TSA as an agency within the
Department of Transportation with the responsibility for securing all
modes of transportation, including aviation. ATSA mandated specific
improvements to aviation security and established deadlines for completing
many of these initiatives. Consequently, TSA's main focus during its first
year of operation was on meeting these deadlines, particularly
federalizing the screener workforce at commercial airports nationwide by
November 19, 2002, while at the same time establishing a new federal
organization from the ground up. On March 1, 2003, pursuant to the
Homeland Security Act, TSA was transferred from the Department of
Transportation to the new Department of Homeland Security.5

Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside with TSA. One
of the most substantial of these is passenger screening. Passenger
screening involves the use of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive
trace detection machines, and physical searches to examine passengers and
their baggage to identify threat objects. Passenger screening has
historically been an area of concern. As we reported in 1987, and again in
2000, passenger screeners who conducted these examinations have had
difficultly in detecting weapons and other dangerous objects. At the time
we issued these reports, air carriers were responsible for performing
passenger screening. With the passage of ATSA, this responsibility has

5P.L. 107-296.

  Limited Information Exists on the Effectiveness of Aviation Security
  Initiatives

now become the responsibility of TSA. TSA is also responsible for ensuring
the security of air cargo, limiting access to restricted areas of airports
to authorized personnel, securing airport perimeters, and conducting
background checks for airport personnel, among other responsibilities.

TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation
security, but it has collected limited information on the effectiveness of
these initiatives, particularly its passenger screening program. ATSA
requires that TSA establish acceptable levels of performance and develop
annual performance plans and reports to measure and document the
effectiveness of its security initiatives.6 Although TSA has developed
these performance tools as required by ATSA, the tools currently focus on
TSA's progress toward meeting ATSA deadlines, rather than on the
effectiveness of its programs and initiatives. Although TSA has collected
limited data on the effectiveness of its initiatives, it is taking several
steps to collect objective data to assess its performance.

Evaluation of Program Effectiveness

Although there are a number of methods that TSA can use to measure the
effectiveness of its passenger screening program, none are being fully
utilized. As we reported in September 2003,7 the primary source of
information collected on screeners' ability to detect threat objects is
covert testing conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program
Review. However, TSA does not consider the results of these covert tests
as a measure of performance, but rather a "snapshot" of a screener's
ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in time and as a
systemwide performance indicator. At the time we issued our report, the
Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review had conducted 733 covert
tests of

6An annual performance plan is to provide the direct linkage between the
strategic goals outlined in the agency's strategic plan and the day-to-day
activities of managers and staff. Additionally, annual performance plans
are to include performance goals for an agency's program activities as
listed in the budget, a summary of the necessary resources that will be
used to measure performance, and a discussion of how the performance
information will be verified. An annual performance report is to review
and discuss an agency's performance compared with the performance goals it
established in its annual performance plan.

7U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary
Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003).

passenger screeners at 92 airports. As a result, only a small percentage
of TSA's passenger screeners had been subject to a covert test.

In addition to conducting covert tests at screening checkpoints, TSA
conducts tests to determine whether the current Computer-Assisted
Passenger Screening System is working as designed; threat objects are
detected during the screening of checked baggage; and access to restricted
areas of the airport is limited only to authorized personnel.8 While the
Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review has conducted about 2,000
access tests, it has conducted only 168 Computer-Assisted Passenger
Screening System and checked baggage tests. Based on an anticipated
increase in staff from about 100 in fiscal year 2003 to 200 in fiscal year
2004, the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review plans to conduct
twice as many covert tests next year.9

Another key source of data on screener performance in detecting threat
objects is the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system, which places images
of threat objects on the X-ray screen during actual operations and records
whether screeners identify the threat object.10 The Federal Aviation
Administration began deploying TIP in late 1999 to continually measure
screener performance and to train screeners in becoming more adept at
detecting hard-to-spot threat objects. However, TIP was shut down
immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks because of
concerns that it would result in screening delays and panic, as screeners
might have thought that they were actually viewing a threat object.
Although TSA officials recognized that TIP is a key tool in measuring,
maintaining, and enhancing screener performance, they only recently began
reactivating TIP on a wide-scale basis because of competing

8The original Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System is a
stand-alone application residing in an air carrier's reservation system
that analyzes certain behavioral patterns to score and calculate each
passenger's need for additional screening.

9Currently, the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review has 7 team
leaders assigned full-time to covert testing, and plans to have a total of
14 full-time team leaders by the end of fiscal year 2004. The team leaders
draw from the remaining staff within the office, such as auditors and
analysts, to perform the testing. According to TSA officials, overall, 95
percent of the staff in the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review
participates in covert testing as a collateral responsibility.

10TIP is designed to test screeners' detection capabilities by projecting
threat images, including guns and explosives, into bags as they are
screened. Screeners are responsible for positively identifying the threat
image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, TIP
identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then records the
screener's performance in a database that could be analyzed for
performance trends.

priorities, a lack of training, and a lack of resources needed to deploy
TIP activation teams. As TIP becomes operational at each airport, TSA
headquarters and federal security directors11 will have the capability to
query and analyze performance data in a number of ways, including by
individual screeners, checkpoints, terminals, and airports. TIP is
expected to be fully deployed and operational by April 2004.

When fully deployed, the annual screener recertification test results will
provide another source of data on screener performance. ATSA requires that
TSA collect performance information on each screener through conducting an
annual proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to meet all
qualifications and standards required to perform the screening function.
Although TSA began deploying federal screeners to airports in April 2002,
TSA only recently began implementing the annual recertification program
and does not expect to complete testing at all airports until March 2004.
The recertification testing is comprised of three components: (1) image
recognition; (2) knowledge of standard operating procedures; and (3)
practical demonstration of skills, to be administered by a contractor. TSA
officials consider 28,000 screeners as having completed the first two
components because they successfully passed competency tests TSA
administered at many airports as part of a screener workforce reduction
effort. However, these competency tests did not include the third
component of TSA's planned annual screener recertification program-the
practical demonstration of skills. TSA officials awarded a contract for
this component of the annual proficiency reviews in September 2003.

TSA's Performance Management Information System for passenger and baggage
screening operations is also designed to collect performance data, but
currently it contains limited information on screener performance in
detecting threat objects. The Performance Management Information System
collects a wide variety of metrics on workload, staffing, and equipment
and is used to identify some performance indicators, such as the level of
absenteeism, the average time for equipment repairs, and the status of
TSA's efforts to meet goals for 100 percent electronic baggage
screening.12 However, the system does not contain any performance metrics
related to the effectiveness of passenger screening. TSA is

11Federal security directors oversee security at each of the nation's
commercial airports.

12The Performance Management Information System also contains metrics on
human resources, sizing, checkpoint, feedback, and incidents.

planning to integrate performance information from various systems into
the Performance Management Information System to assist the agency in
making strategic decisions. TSA further plans to continuously enhance the
system as it learns what data are needed to best manage the agency. In
addition to making improvements to the Performance Management Information
System, TSA is currently developing performance indexes for both
individual screeners and the screening system as a whole. The screener
performance index will be based on data such as the results of training
and recertification tests, and the index for the screening system will be
based on information such as TIP results. TSA has not yet fully
established its methodology for developing the indexes, but it expects to
have them developed by the end of fiscal year 2004.

Performance Evaluation Tools under Development

TSA has recognized the need to strengthen the assessment of its
performance, and it has initiated efforts to develop and implement
strategic and performance plans to clarify goals, establish performance
measures, and evaluate the performance of its security initiatives.
Strategic plans are the starting point for an agency's planning and
performance measurement efforts. Strategic plans include a comprehensive
mission statement based on the agency's statutory requirements, a set of
outcome-related strategic goals, and a description of how the agency
intends to achieve these goals. The Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA)13 establishes a framework for strategic plans that requires
agencies to:

o  	clearly establish results-oriented performance goals in strategic and
annual performance plans for which they will be held accountable,

o  measure progress toward achieving those goals,

o  	determine the strategies and resources needed to effectively
accomplish the goals,

13The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 shifts the focus of
government operations from process to results by establishing a foundation
for examining agency mission, performance goals and objectives, and
results. Under the act, agencies are to prepare 5-year strategic plans
that set the general direction for their efforts, and annual performance
plans that establish connections between the long-term strategic goals
outlined in the strategic plans and the day-to-day activities of managers
and staff. Finally, the act requires that each agency report annually on
the extent to which it is meeting its annual performance goals and the
actions needed to achieve or modify those goals that have not been met.

o  	use performance information to make programmatic decisions necessary
to improve performance, and

o  formally communicate results in performance reports.

Although the Department of Homeland Security plans to issue one strategic
plan for the department, it plans to incorporate strategic planning
efforts from each of its component agencies. TSA recently completed a
draft of its input into the Department of Homeland Security's strategic
plan. TSA officials stated that the draft is designed to ensure their
security initiatives are aligned with the agency's goals and objectives
and that these initiatives represent the most efficient use of their
resources. TSA officials submitted the draft plan to stakeholders in
September 2003 for their review and comment. The Department of Homeland
Security plans to issue its strategic plan by the end of the year.14

In addition to developing a strategic plan, TSA is developing a
performance plan to help it evaluate the current effectiveness and levels
of improvement in its programs, based on established performance measures.
TSA submitted to the Congress a short-term performance plan in May 2003,
as required by ATSA, that included performance goals and objectives. The
plan also included an initial set of 32 performance measures, including
the percentage of bags screened by explosive detection systems and the
percentage of screeners in compliance with training standards. However,
these measures were primarily output-based (measuring whether specific
activities were achieved) and did not measure the effectiveness of TSA's
security initiatives. TSA officials acknowledge that the goals and
measures included in the report were narrowly focused and that in moving
forward additional performancebased measures are needed.

14TSA is also developing a National Transportation Security System Plan, a
draft of which is currently under review within TSA. TSA plans to promote
consistent and mutually supporting intermodal planning in cooperation with
administrators and in collaboration with key stakeholders from all modes
of transportation. TSA designed the plan for use by agencies, owners, and
operators of the transportation system to guide them as they develop their
individual security plans. Accordingly, the National Transportation System
Security Plan will include national modal plans to capture and tailor
transportation security requirements for each mode of transportation, with
particular emphasis on intermodal connections. Each modal plan will focus
on security for people (workforce and passengers), cargo (baggage and
shipments), infrastructure (vehicles, facilities, and right of ways), and
response preparedness.

In addition to developing a short-term performance plan, ATSA also
requires that TSA develop a 5-year performance plan and annual performance
report, including an evaluation of the extent to which its goals and
objectives were met. TSA is currently developing performance goals and
measures as part of its annual planning process and will collect baseline
data throughout fiscal year 2004 to serve as a foundation for its
performance targets. TSA also plans to increase its focus on measuring the
effectiveness of various aspects of the aviation security system in its
5-year performance plan. According to TSA's current draft strategic plan,
which outlines its overall goals and strategies for fiscal years 2003
through 2008, its efforts to measure the effectiveness of the aviation
security system will include:

o  	random and scheduled reviews of the efficiency and effectiveness of
security processes;

o  	oversight of compliance with security standards and approved programs
through a combination of inspections, testing, interviews, and record
reviews-to include TIP;

o  	measurement of performance against standards to ensure expected
standards are met to drive process improvements; and

o  	collection and communication of performance data using a
state-of-the-art data collection and reporting system.

In our January 2003 report on TSA's actions and plans to build a
resultsoriented culture, we recommended next steps that TSA should take to
strengthen its strategic planning efforts.15 These steps include
establishing security performance goals and measures for all modes of
transportation that involves stakeholders, and applying practices that
have been shown to provide useful information in agency performance plans.
We also identified practices that TSA can apply to ensure the usefulness
of its required 5-year performance plan to TSA managers, the Congress, and
other decision makers or interested parties. Table 1 outlines the
practices we identified for TSA.

15U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security Administration:
Actions and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003).

Table 1: Summary of Opportunities to Help Ensure Useful Annual Plans and Applied
                                   Practices

Opportunities to help ensure useful annual plans Applied practices

Articulate a results orientation 1. �Create a set of performance
goals and measures that addresses important dimensions of program
performance and balances competing priorities.

2. �Use intermediate goals and measures to show progress or
contribution to intended results.

3. Include explanatory information on the goals and measures.

4. Develop performance goals to address mission-critical management
problems.

5. Show baseline and trend data for past performance.

6. Identify projected target levels of performance for multiyear goals.

7. Link the goals of component organizations to departmental strategic
goals.

Coordinate cross-cutting programs

Show how strategies will be used to achieve goals

8. Identify programs that contribute to the same or similar results.

9. �Set complementary performance goals to show how differing
program strategies are mutually reinforcing and establish common or
complementary performance measures, as appropriate.

10. Describe-briefly or refer to a separate document-planned coordination
strategies.

11. Link strategies and programs to specific performance goals and
describe how they will contribute to the achievement of those goals.

12. Describe strategies to leverage or mitigate the effects of external
factors on the accomplishment of performance goals.

13. Discuss strategies to resolve mission-critical management problems.

14. Discuss-briefly or refer to a separate plan-plans to ensure that
missioncritical processes and information systems function properly and
are secure.

Show performance consequences of budget and 15. Show how budgetary
resources relate to the achievement of performance other resource
decisions goals.

16. Discuss-briefly and refer to the agency capital plan-how proposed
capital assets (specifically information technology investments) will
contribute to achieving performance goals.

17. Discuss-briefly or refer to a separate plan-how the agency will use
its human capital.

Build the capacity to gather and use performance 18. Identify internal and
external sources of data. information 19. Describe efforts to verify and
validate performance data.

20. Identify actions to compensate for unavailable or low-quality data.

21. Discuss implications of data limitations for assessing performance.

Source: GAO.

TSA agreed with our recommendations and plans to incorporate these
principles into its 5-year performance plan and annual performance report.
TSA plans to complete its 5-year performance plan and annual performance
report by February 2004, as required by GPRA.

The Congress has also recognized the need for TSA to measure the
effectiveness of its security initiatives and, as part of the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) reauthorization act-Vision 100: Century of
Aviation Reauthorization Act-is currently considering a provision that
would require the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to
conduct a study of the effectiveness of the aviation security system.

  Challenges in Strengthening TSA's Passenger Screening Program

In addition to collecting performance data on the effectiveness of its
passenger screening program, TSA can strengthen other areas of the program
to help improve screeners' ability to detect threat objects. In our
September 2003 report that discussed our preliminary observations on TSA's
passenger screening program, we noted that TSA can strengthen recurrent
and supervisory training, staffing of screeners, and oversight of its
contract screener pilot program. Since that report was issued, TSA has
identified a number of actions it has taken or plans to take to address
these concerns. We will be reviewing TSA's efforts to address these
challenges as part of our ongoing review of this program.

Recurrent and Supervisory Training Programs Not Fully Developed

In fulfilling its passenger screening mandate, TSA must ensure that
screeners are adequately trained and sufficiently skilled in identifying
threat or dangerous objects at screening checkpoints. To help accomplish
this, TSA has developed and deployed basic and remedial screener training
programs. Basic screener training consists of 40 hours of classroom
instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training that screeners must
successfully complete prior to making independent screening decisions.
Additionally, TSA requires remedial training for any screener who fails an
operational test and prohibits screeners from performing the screening
function related to the test they failed until they successfully complete
remedial training. TSA screening supervisors may also require remedial
training for screeners they observe needing strengthening of their skills.

Although TSA has deployed basic and remedial training programs, it has not
fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory training programs to
ensure that screeners are effectively trained and supervised. Recurrent
training-the ongoing training of screeners on a frequent basis-is critical
in maintaining and enhancing screener skills. Although TSA has not fully
developed a recurrent training program, it is in the process of deploying
six recurrent training modules and is pilot testing an Online Learning
Management System for recurrent training comprised of about 360
components. TSA officials said that budget limitations had

delayed implementation of the recurrent training modules and the online
learning system.

Similarly, TSA has not fully developed or deployed a supervisory training
program, even though it describes its screening supervisors as the key to
a strong defense in detecting threat objects. However, TSA is taking steps
in developing such a program, including working with the U.S. Department
of Agriculture's Graduate School to tailor its off-the-shelf supervisory
course to meet the specific training needs of TSA's screening supervisors.
TSA reported that it is sending supervisors to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture off-the-shelf supervisory course until the customized course
is fielded in 2004. TSA also plans to establish a technical supervisor
training component for recurrent training.

TSA Continues to Work to Identify Appropriate Staffing Levels at Airports

To conduct passenger and baggage screening functions at the nation's
airports, TSA hired about 56,000 screeners. Initially, screener staff
levels for all airports was developed by TSA headquarters without active
input from the agency's federal security directors who are responsible for
overseeing security at each of the nation's commercial airports. This has
led to staffing imbalances, and concern by federal security directors that
they had limited authority to respond to airport-specific staffing needs,
such as reacting to fluctuations in daily and seasonal passenger flow. TSA
officials acknowledged that their initial staffing efforts created
imbalances in the screener workforce, and reported that as they work to
further reduce the screener workforce,16 they will solicit input from the
Federal Security Directors as well as airport and air carrier officials.
TSA has also taken steps such as authorizing the hiring of part-time
screeners at over 200 airports-the first of whom began working in
September 2003.

16TSA's screener workforce totaled 55,600 on March 31, 2003. The agency
cut 3,000 positions for a screener workforce of 52,600 by June 1, 2003. An
additional 3,000 positions were cut for a workforce of 49,600 full-time
equivalents (FTE) by September 30, 2003, the end of the fiscal year. TSA
officials predicted that the screener staffing level will be down to
45,000 by the end of fiscal year 2004. Beginning with the enactment of the
2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Public Law 107-206
(August 2, 2002), and in subsequent appropriations acts, there have been
restrictions on TSA impacting staffing levels. The current fiscal year
2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Public Law
108-90, contains a provision requiring that none of the funds in the act
be used to recruit or hire personnel into TSA, which would cause the
agency to exceed a screener staffing level of 45,000 full-time
equivalents.

To better address airport-specific staffing needs and accomplish workforce
reduction goals, TSA developed its current screener staffing levels using
a computer-based modeling process that took into account the number of
screening checkpoints and lanes at an airport; originating passengers; the
number of airport workers requiring screening; projected air carrier
service increases and decreases during the year; and hours needed to
accommodate screener training, leave, and breaks. TSA recently hired an
outside consultant to conduct a study of screener staffing levels at
various airports. TSA officials stated that they will continue to review
the staffing allocation process through the modeling efforts to assess air
carrier and airport growth patterns, and adjustments will be made as
appropriate. We will continue to review TSA's staffing efforts as part of
our ongoing review.

                 Assessment of Contract Screening Pilot Program

Consistent with ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract
screeners at five commercial airports. The purpose of the 2-year pilot
program is to determine the feasibility of using private screening
companies rather than federal screeners. TSA initially required private
screening companies to adhere to all of the procedures and protocols used
by federal screeners. As a result, these airports had limited flexibility
in running screening operations. However, TSA recently provided the
contractors with some flexibility, such as allowing them to determine and
maintain their own staffing levels and to make independent hiring
decisions. ATSA gives all airport operators the option of applying to
change from using federal screeners to using private screeners beginning
in November 2004.

TSA has not yet determined how to evaluate and measure the performance of
the pilot program airports or determine the feasibility of using contract
screening companies. TSA recently awarded a contract to BearingPoint,
Inc., to compare the performance of pilot screening with federal
screening, including the overall strengths and weaknesses of both systems,
and determine the reasons for any differences.17 The evaluation is
scheduled to be completed by March 31, 2004.18 TSA has acknowledged that
designing

17According to the August 8, 2003, request for quotation for the
evaluation of the contract screening pilot program, BearingPoint must
include informed performance comparisons, both quantitative and
qualitative, of private versus federal screeners overall and within
different sizes and categories of airports.

18Based on the time frames established in the request for quotation,
BearingPoint, Inc. is required to develop a project plan and evaluation
model no later than December 12, 2003.

an effective evaluation of the screeners at the pilot airports will be
challenging because key operational areas, including training, assessment,
compensation, and equipment, have to a large extent been held constant
across all airports, and therefore are not within the control of the
private screening companies.19 In its request for proposal for the pilot
airport evaluation, TSA identified several data sources for the
evaluation, including the Performance Management Information System and
the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review's covert testing of
passenger screeners. However, as we recently reported, data from these
systems in measuring the effectiveness of screening operations is limited.
As a result, it will be a challenge for TSA to effectively compare the
performance of the contract pilot airports with that of airports using
federal screeners.

In conjunction with this evaluation, TSA will need to plan for the
possible transition of airports from a federal system to a private
screening company. Numerous airport operators have expressed an interest
in obtaining more information to assist in their decision regarding using
private screeners. Specifically, airport operators stated that they would
like to determine who would bear responsibility for funding the screening
contract, airport liability in the event of an incident linked to a
screener failure, how well the current pilot program airports are
performing, performance standards to which contract screeners would be
held, and TSA's role in overseeing contracted screening. If airports are
permitted to opt out of using federal screeners, this could have a
significant impact on TSA's role in overseeing the screening function as
well as the number of federal screeners needed.

In addition to the challenges it faces in conducting its passenger
screening program and assessing program effectiveness, TSA faces a number
of other programmatic and management challenges in strengthening aviation
security. These challenges include implementing the new Computer-Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System; strengthening baggage screening, airport
perimeter and access controls, air cargo, and general aviation security;
managing the costs of aviation security initiatives; and managing human
capital. TSA has been addressing these challenges through a variety of
efforts. We have work in progress that is examining

  TSA Faces Additional Programmatic and Management Challenges

19TSA's request for proposal for the pilot program evaluation notes that
there are a significant number of operational and managerial elements at
the discretion of the private screening companies that should be
considered in the evaluation, including supervision, overhead, materials,
recruiting, and scheduling.

TSA's efforts in most of these areas, and we will be reporting on TSA's
progress in the future.

Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II)

TSA is developing a new Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System,
or CAPPS II. This system is intended to replace the current
Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening program, which was developed in the
mid-1990s by the Federal Aviation Administration to enable air carriers to
identify passengers requiring additional security attention. The current
system is maintained as a part of the airlines' reservation systems and,
operating under federal guidelines, uses a number of behavioral
characteristics to select passengers for additional screening.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a number of
weaknesses in the current prescreening program were exposed. For example,
although the characteristics used to identify passengers for additional
screening are classified, several have become public knowledge through the
press or on the Internet. Although enhancements have been made to address
some of these weaknesses, the behavioral traits used in the system may not
reflect current intelligence information. It is also difficult to quickly
modify the system to respond to real-time changes in threats.
Additionally, because the current system operates independently within
each air carrier reservation system, changes to each air carrier's system
to modify the prescreening system can be costly and timeconsuming.

In contrast, CAPPS II is planned to be a government-run program that will
provide real-time risk assessment for all airline passengers. Unlike the
current system, TSA is designing CAPPS II to identify and compare personal
information with commercially available data to confirm a passenger's
identity. The system will then run the identifying information against
government databases and generate a "risk" score for the passenger. The
risk score will determine the level of screening that the passenger will
undergo before boarding. TSA currently estimates that initial
implementation of CAPPS II will occur during the fall of 2004, with full
implementation expected by the fall of 2005.

TSA faces a number of challenges that could impede its ability to
implement CAPPS II. Among the most significant are the following:

o  	concerns about travelers' privacy rights and the safeguards
established to protect passenger data;

o  	the accuracy of the databases being used by the CAPPS II system and
whether inaccuracies could generate a high number of false positives and
erroneously prevent or delay passengers from boarding their flights;

o  the length of time that data will be retained by TSA;

o  	the availability of a redress process through which passengers could
get erroneous information corrected;

o  	concerns that identify theft, in which someone steals relevant data
and impersonates another individual to obtain that person's low risk
score, may not be detected and thereby negate the security benefits of the
system; and

o  	obtaining the international cooperation needed for CAPPS II to be
fully effective, as some countries consider the passenger information
required by CAPPS II as a potential violation of their privacy laws.

We are currently assessing these and other challenges in the development
and implementation of the CAPPS II system and expect to issue a final
report on our work in early 2004.

Checked Baggage Screening

Checked baggage represents a significant security concern, as explosive
devices in baggage can, and have, been placed in aircraft holds. ATSA
required screening of all checked baggage on commercial aircraft by
December 31, 2002, using explosive detection systems to electronically
scan baggage for explosives. According to TSA, electronic screening can be
accomplished by bulk explosives detection systems (EDS)20 or explosives
trace detection (ETD) systems.21 However, TSA faced challenges in meeting
the mandated implementation date. First, the production capabilities of
EDS manufacturers were insufficient to produce the number of units needed.
Additionally, according to TSA, it was not possible to undertake all of
the airport modifications necessary to accommodate the EDS equipment in
each airport's baggage-handling area.

20Explosives detection systems use probing radiation to examine objects
inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of threat
explosives. EDS equipment operates in an automated mode.

21Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of
explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs,
which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive
materials.

In order to ensure that all checked baggage is screened, TSA established a
program that uses alternative measures, including explosives-sniffing
dogs, positive passenger bag match,22 and physical hand searches at
airports where sufficient EDS or ETD technology was not available. Section
425 of the Homeland Security Act allowed the Under Secretary for
Transportation Security to grant airports unable to meet the December 31,
2002, 100 percent screening deadline an extension until December 31, 2003.
Although TSA has made progress in implementing EDS technology at more
airports, it has reported that it will not meet the revised mandate for
100 percent electronic screening of all checked baggage. Specifically, as
of October 2003, TSA reported that it will not meet the deadline for
electronic screening by December 31, 2003, at five airports. Airport
representatives with whom we spoke expressed concern that there has not
been enough time to produce, install, and integrate all of the systems
required to meet the deadline.

In addition to fielding the EDS systems at airports, difficulties exist in
integrating these systems into airport baggage-handling systems. For those
airports that have installed EDS equipment, many have been located in
airport lobbies as stand-alone systems. The chief drawback of stand-alone
systems is that because of their size and weight there is a limit to the
number of units that can be placed in airport lobbies, and numerous
screeners are required to handle the checked bags because each bag must be
physically conveyed to the EDS machines and then moved back to the
conveyor system for transport to the baggage-handling room in the air
terminal. Some airports are in the process of integrating the EDS
equipment inline with the conveyor belts that transport baggage from the
ticket counter to the baggage-handling area. However, the reconfiguring of
airports for in-line checked baggage screening can be extensive and
costly.23 TSA has reported that in-line EDS equipment installation costs
range from $1 million to $3 million per piece of equipment. In February
2003, we identified letters of intent24 as a funding option that has been

22Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of screening
checked baggage, which requires that the passenger be on the same aircraft
as the checked baggage.

23In-line screening involves incorporating EDS machines into airport
baggage handling systems to improve throughput of baggage and to
streamline airport operations.

24A letter of intent represents a nonbinding commitment from an agency to
provide multiyear funding to an entity beyond the current authorization
period. Thus, that letter allows an airport to proceed with a project
without waiting for future federal funds because the airport and investors
know that allowable costs are likely to be reimbursed.

successfully used to leverage private sources of funding.25 TSA has since
written letters of intent covering seven airports promising multiyear
financial support totaling over $770 million for in-line integration of
EDS equipment.26 Further, TSA officials have stated that they have
identified 25 to 35 airports as candidates for further letters of intent
pending Congressional authorization of funding. We are examining TSA's
baggage screening program, including its issuance of letters of intent, in
an ongoing assignment.

Perimeter and Access Controls

Prior to September 2001, work performed by GAO and others highlighted the
vulnerabilities in controls for limiting access to secure airport areas.
In one report, we noted that GAO special agents were able to use
fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure
areas, bypass security checkpoints, and walk unescorted to aircraft
departure gates.27 The agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding
passes, could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects
onto aircraft. Concerns over the adequacy of the vetting process for
airport workers who have unescorted access to secure airport areas have
also arisen, in part as a result of federal agency airport security sweeps
that uncovered hundreds of instances in which airport workers lied about
their criminal history, or immigration status, or provided false or
inaccurate Social Security numbers on their application for security
clearances to obtain employment.

ATSA contains provisions to improve perimeter access security at the
nation's airports and strengthen background checks for employees working
in secure airport areas, and TSA has made some progress in this area. For
example, federal mandates were issued to strengthen airport perimeter
security by limiting the number of airport access points, and

25U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May
Not Be Sufficient to Cover Airports' Planned Capital Development,
GAO-03-497T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2003).

26The seven airports include Denver International Airport, Las Vegas
McCarran International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, Ontario
International Airport, Seattle/Tacoma International Airport, Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport, and Boston Logan International Airport. The
purpose is to help defray the costs of installing permanent explosive
detection systems that are integrated with airports' checked baggage
conveyor systems.

27U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies
and Airports, GAO/T-OSI-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000).

they require random screening of individuals, vehicles, and property
before entry at the remaining perimeter access points. Further, TSA made
criminal history checks mandatory for employees with access to secure or
sterile airport areas. To date, criminal history checks have been
conducted on approximately 1 million of these employees. TSA also has
plans to develop a pilot airport security program and is reviewing
security technologies in the areas of biometrics access control
identification systems (i.e., fingerprints or iris scans),
anti-piggybacking technologies (to prevent more than one employee from
entering a secure area at a time), and video monitoring systems for
perimeter security. TSA solicited commercial airport participation in the
program. It is currently reviewing information from interested airports
and plans to select 20 airports for the program.

Although progress has been made, challenges remain with perimeter security
and access controls at commercial airports. Specifically, ATSA contains
numerous requirements for strengthening perimeter security and access
controls, some of which contained deadlines, which TSA is working to meet.
In addition, a significant concern is the possibility of terrorists using
shoulder-fired portable missiles from locations near the airport. We
reported in June 2003 that airport operators have increased their patrols
of airport perimeters since September 2001, but industry officials stated
that they do not have enough resources to completely protect against
missile attacks.28 A number of technologies could be used to secure and
monitor airport perimeters, including barriers, motion sensors, and
closed-circuit television. Airport representatives have cautioned that as
security enhancements are made to airport perimeters, it will be important
for TSA to coordinate with the Federal Aviation Administration and the
airport operators to ensure that any enhancements do not pose safety risks
for aircraft. To further examine these threats and challenges, we have
ongoing work assessing TSA's progress in meeting ATSA provisions related
to improving perimeter security, access controls, and background checks
for airport employees and other individuals with access to secure areas of
the airport, as well as the nature and extent of the threat from
shoulder-fired missiles.

28U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal Action
Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.:
June 30, 2003).

Air Cargo Security

As we and the Department of Transportation's Inspector General have
reported, vulnerabilities exist in ensuring the security of cargo carried
aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. TSA has reported that
an estimated 12.5 million tons of cargo are transported each year-9.7
million tons on all-cargo planes and 2.8 million tons on passenger planes.
Potential security risks are associated with the transport of air cargo-
including the introduction of undetected explosive and incendiary devices
in cargo placed aboard aircraft. To reduce these risks, ATSA requires that
all cargo carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft be screened and
that TSA have a system in place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect,
or otherwise ensure the security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. Despite
these requirements, it has been reported that less than 5 percent of cargo
placed on passenger airplanes is physically screened.29 TSA's primary
approach to ensuring air cargo security and safety is to ensure compliance
with the "known shipper" program-which allows shippers that have
established business histories with air carriers or freight forwarders to
ship cargo on planes. However, we and the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General have identified weaknesses in the known shipper program
and in TSA's procedures for approving freight forwarders, such as possible
tampering with freight at various handoff points before it is loaded into
an aircraft.30

Since September 2001, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance cargo
security, such as implementing a database of known shippers in October
2002. The database is the first phase in developing a cargo profiling
system similar to the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System.
However, in December 2002, we reported that additional operational and
technological measures, such as checking the identity of individuals
making cargo deliveries, have the potential to improve air cargo security
in the near term.31 We further reported that TSA lacks a comprehensive
plan with long-term goals and performance targets for cargo security, time
frames for completing security improvements, and risk-based criteria for
prioritizing actions to achieve those goals. Accordingly, we recommended
that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for air cargo security that
incorporates a risk management approach, includes

29Congressional Research Service, Air Cargo Security, September 11, 2003.

30U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and
Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).

31U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Progress since
September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead, GAO-03-1150T (Washington,
D.C.: September 9, 2003).

a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for completing actions.
TSA agreed with this recommendation and expects to develop such a plan by
the end of 2003. It will be important that this plan include a timetable
for implementation to help ensure that vulnerabilities in this area are
reduced.

                           General Aviation Security

Since September 2001, TSA has taken limited action to improve general
aviation security, leaving general aviation far more open and potentially
vulnerable than commercial aviation. General aviation is vulnerable
because general aviation pilots and passengers are not screened before
takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes are not screened at
any point. General aviation includes more than 200,000 privately owned
airplanes, which are located in every state at more than 19,000
airports.32 More than 550 of these airports also provide commercial
service. In the last 5 years, about 70 aircraft have been stolen from
general aviation airports, indicating a potential weakness that could be
exploited by terrorists. This vulnerability was demonstrated in January
2002, when a teenage flight student stole and crashed a single-engine
airplane into a Tampa, Florida skyscraper. Moreover, general aviation
aircraft could be used in other types of terrorist acts. It was reported
that the September 11th hijackers researched the use of crop dusters to
spread biological or chemical agents.

We reported in September 2003 that TSA had chartered a working group on
general aviation within the existing Aviation Security Advisory
Committee.33 The working group consists of industry stakeholders and is
designed to identify and recommend actions to close potential security
gaps in general aviation. On October 1, 2003, the working group issued a
report that included a number of recommendations for general aviation
airport operators' voluntary use in evaluating airports' security
requirements. These recommendations are both broad in scope and generic in
their application, with the intent that every general aviation airport and
landing facility operators may use them to evaluate that facility's
physical security, procedures, infrastructure, and resources. TSA is
taking some additional action to strengthen security at general aviation
airports, including developing a risk-based self-assessment tool for
general

32 Of the 19,000 general aviation airports, 5,400 are publicly owned. TSA
is currently focusing its efforts on these publicly owned airports. TSA is
still unclear about its role in inspecting privately owned general
aviation airports.

33GAO-03-1150T.

aviation airports to use in identifying security concerns. We have ongoing
work that is examining general aviation security in further detail.

                           Aviation Security Funding

TSA faces two key funding and accountability challenges in securing the
commercial aviation system: (1) paying for increased aviation security,
and (2) ensuring that these costs are controlled. These challenges are
particularly critical due to the government incurring large and increasing
deficits. The rapid rise in needed funding for aviation security
enhancements further exacerbates budget challenges. The costs associated
with aviation security are huge. The Department of Homeland Security
appropriation includes $3.7 billion for aviation security for fiscal year
2004. The passenger and baggage screening functions alone account for most
of this funding, with about $1.8 billion appropriated for passenger
screening and $1.3 billion for baggage screening. ATSA created passenger
and air carrier security fees to pay for the costs of aviation security,
but the fees have not generated enough money to do so. The Department of
Transportation's Inspector General reported that the security fees are
estimated to generate only about $1.7 billion during fiscal year 2004.

A major funding challenge is paying for the purchase and installation of
the remaining explosives detection systems, including integration into
airport baggage-handling systems. Integrating the equipment with the
baggage-handling systems is expected to be costly because it will require
major facility modifications. For example, modifications needed to
integrate the equipment at Boston's Logan International Airport are
estimated to cost $146 million. Modifications for Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport are estimated to cost $193 million. According to TSA
and the Department of Transportation's Inspector General, the cost of
integrating the equipment nationwide could be $3 billion.

A key question that must be addressed is how to pay for these installation
costs. The Federal Aviation Administration's Airport Improvement Program
(AIP) and passenger facility charges have been eligible sources for
funding this work.34 During fiscal year 2002, AIP grant funds totaling
$561 million were used for terminal modifications to enhance security.
However, using these funds for security reduced the funding available for

34The Airport Improvement Program trust fund is used to fund capital
improvements to airports, including some security enhancements, such as
terminal modifications to accommodate explosive detection equipment.

other airport development and rehabilitation projects. To provide
financial assistance to airports for security-related capital investments,
such as the installation of explosives detection equipment, proposed
aviation reauthorization legislation would establish an aviation security
capital fund that would authorize $2 billion over the next 4 years.

In February 2003, we identified letters of intent as a funding option that
has been successfully used to leverage private sources of funding.35 TSA
has since signed letters of intent covering seven airports-Boston Logan,
Dallas/Fort Worth, Denver, Los Angeles, McCarran (Las Vegas), Ontario
(California), and Seattle/Tacoma international airports. Under the
agreements, TSA will pay 75 percent of the cost of integrating the
explosives detection equipment into the baggage-handling systems. The
payments will stretch out over 3 to 4 years. TSA officials have identified
more airports that would be candidates for similar agreements.

Another challenge is ensuring continued investment in transportation
research and development. For fiscal year 2003, TSA was appropriated about
$110 million for research and development, of which $75 million was
designated for the next-generation explosives detection systems. However,
TSA proposed to reprogram $61.2 million of these funds to be used for
other purposes, leaving about $12.7 million to be spent on research and
development in that year. This proposed reprogramming could limit TSA's
ability to sustain and strengthen aviation security by continuing to
invest in research and development for more effective equipment to screen
passengers, their carry-on and checked baggage, and cargo. In ongoing
work, we are examining the nature and scope of research and development
work by TSA and the Department of Homeland Security, including their
strategy for accelerating the development of transportation security
technologies.

Human Capital As it organizes itself to protect the nation's
transportation system, TSA

Management 	faces the challenge of strategically managing its workforce of
about 60,000 people-more than 80 percent of whom are passenger and baggage
screeners. Additionally, over the next several years, TSA faces the
challenge of sizing and managing this workforce as efficiency is improved
with new security-enhancing technologies, processes, and procedures. For
example, as explosives detection systems are integrated with baggage

35GAO-03-497T.

handling systems, the use of more labor-intensive screening methods, such
as trace detection techniques and manual bag searches, can be reduced.
Other planned security enhancements, such as CAPPS II and a registered
traveler program, also have the potential to make screening more
efficient. Further, if airports opt out of the federal screener program
and use their own or contract employees to provide screening instead of
TSA screeners, a significant impact on TSA staffing could occur.

To assist agencies in managing their human capital more strategically, we
have developed a model that identifies cornerstones and related critical
success factors that agencies should apply and steps they can take.36 Our
model is designed to help agency leaders effectively lead and manage their
people and integrate human capital considerations into daily decision
making and the program results they seek to achieve. In January 2003, we
reported that TSA was addressing some critical human capital success
factors by using a wide range of tools available for hiring, and beginning
to link individual performance to organizational goals.37 However,
concerns remain about the size and training of that workforce, the
adequacy of the initial background checks for screeners, and TSA's
progress in setting up a performance management system. TSA is currently
developing a human capital strategy, which it expects to be completed by
the end of this year.

TSA has proposed cutting the screener workforce by an additional 3,000
during fiscal year 2004. This planned reduction has raised concerns about
passenger delays at airports and has led TSA to begin hiring part-time
screeners to make more flexible and efficient use of its workforce. In
addition, TSA used an abbreviated background check process to hire and
deploy enough screeners to meet ATSA's screening deadlines during 2002.
After obtaining additional background information, TSA terminated the
employment of some of these screeners. TSA reported 1,208 terminations as
of May 31, 2003, that it ascribed to a variety of reasons, including
criminal offenses and failures to pass alcohol and drug tests.
Furthermore, the national media have reported allegations of operational
and management control problems that emerged with the expansion of the
Federal Air Marshal Service, including inadequate background checks and
training, uneven scheduling, and inadequate policies and procedures. We

36 U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).

37 U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington, D.C.: January
2003).

reported in January 2003 that TSA had taken the initial steps in
establishing a performance management system linked to organizational
goals. Such a system will be critical for TSA to motivate and manage
staff, ensure the quality of screeners' performance, and, ultimately,
restore public confidence in air travel. In ongoing work, we are examining
the effectiveness of TSA's efforts to train, equip, and supervise
passenger screeners, and we are assessing the effects of expansion on the
Federal Air Marshal Service.38

TSA faces many challenges in strengthening its passenger screening and
other security programs. To best address these challenges, it needs the
information and tools necessary to ensure that its efforts are effective,
are appropriately focused, and are achieving expected results. Without
knowledge on the effectiveness of its programs, TSA and the public have
little assurance regarding the level of security provided, and whether TSA
is using its resources to maximize security benefits. As TSA implements
new security initiatives and addresses associated challenges, measuring
program effectiveness will help it best focus on the areas of greatest
need. We are encouraged that TSA is undertaking efforts to develop the
information and tools needed to measure its performance.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have.

                                   Concluding

                                  Observations

Contact Information 	For further information on this testimony, please
contact Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include Mike Bollinger, Lisa Brown, Jack
Schulze, and Maria Strudwick.

38 The Federal Air Marshal Service has been transferred out of TSA and
into the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.

Related GAO Products

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and
Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2003.

Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges
Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security
Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.

Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot
Certification Process. GAO-03-248NI. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003.
(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
Cargo System. GAO-03-286NI. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. (NOT FOR
PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.

Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by
Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods. GAO-03-30C. Washington, D.C.: December
3, 2002

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation
Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-03-971T. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002.

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots.
GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.

Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection
Equipment. GAO-02-713C. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002. (CLASSIFIED)

Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation's Air
Transportation System. GAO-01-1164T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001.
(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

Aviation Security: Information on the Nation's Air Transportation System
Vulnerabilities. GAO-01-1174T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001. (NOT
FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2001.

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:
September 21, 2001.

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2001.

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
Security Improvements. GAO-01-1069R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
Security Improvements. GAO-01-1068R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
(RESTRICTED)

FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing Weaknesses.
GAO-01-171. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2000.

Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in
Carriage of Weapons Regulations. GAO/RCED-00-181. Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 2000.

FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses That
Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-330. Washington, D.C.:
September 27, 2000.

FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other
Continuing Weaknesses. GAO/AIMD-00-252. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2000.

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners'
Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000.

Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems Detecting
Dangerous Objects. GAO/RCED-00-159. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2000. (NOT
FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO-OSI-00-10.
Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000.

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