    Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing
    Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed (26-FEB-04,
    GAO-04-254).

    In August 2000, the Defense Department's (DOD) Director,
    Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), made 50 recommendations
    on a test program for a system to defeat long-range ballistic
    missile threats against the United States. DOD's Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA) plans to begin fielding the system by September
    2004. GAO examined (1) how MDA addressed DOT&E's recommendations
    and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of the system to be
    fielded by September 2004. GAO issued a classified report on this
    subject in June 2003. This unclassified, updated version reflects
    changes in MDA's test schedule.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-254
        ACCNO:   A09333
      TITLE:     Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing
    Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed
         DATE:   02/26/2004
      SUBJECT:   Benchmark testing
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Developmental testing
    	     National defense operations
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Ballistic missiles
    	     National preparedness
    	     Aegis AN/SPY-1 Radar
    	     Cobra Dane Radar
    	     Integrated Flight Test

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    GAO-04-254

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

                           Report to Congressional Requesters

    February 2004

    MISSILE DEFENSE

     Actions Being Taken to Address Testing Recommendations, but Updated Assessment
                                         Needed

    GAO-04-254

    Highlights of GAO-04-254, a report to Congressional Requesters

    In August 2000, the Defense Department `s (DOD) Director, Operational Test
    and Evaluation (DOT&E), made 50 recommendations on a test program for a
    system to defeat long-range ballistic missile threats against the United
    States. DOD's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to begin fielding the
    system by September 2004.

    GAO examined (1) how MDA addressed DOT&E's recommendations and (2) what is
    known about the effectiveness of the system to be fielded by September
    2004. GAO issued a classified report on this subject in June 2003. This
    unclassified, updated version reflects changes in MDA's test schedule.

    GAO recommends DOT&E report on the status of MDA's responses to its
    recommendations and advise MDA how to modify the test program to address
    long-standing concerns. DOD agreed with these recommendations, while
    noting there have been many changes in its test program and its
    acquisition strategy and structure since DOT&E's August 2000 report. GAO
    revised the report to reflect the latest, approved test program but
    believes most DOT&E recommendations remain relevant given the significant
    technical challenges and uncertainties facing MDA.

    February 2004

    MISSILE DEFENSE:

    Actions Being Taken to Address Testing Recommendations, but Updated Assessment
    Needed

    MDA is addressing most of DOT&E's recommendations on flight testing but
    will not complete many actions before September 2004. For example, DOT&E
    recommended removing flight test range limitations by adding more
    intercept regions and launch locations to add greater realism to its
    tests. MDA is expanding the test range infrastructure to add five
    intercept regions and target and interceptor launches out of new
    locations. By September 2004, one of the regions will be tested.

    MDA is generally not addressing DOT&E's proposals on ground testing. For
    example, although MDA had begun upgrading a ground facility to provide a
    realistic testing environment for the interceptor, MDA deferred testing at
    the facility to fund other priorities. Finally, MDA is addressing DOT&E's
    recommendations on discrimination--the system's ability to find an enemy
    warhead among decoys--by funding analysis programs.

    Predictions of how well the system will defeat long-range ballistic
    missiles are based on limited data. No component of the system to be
    fielded by September 2004 has been flight-tested in its deployed
    configuration. Significant uncertainties surround the capability to be
    fielded by September: MDA will not demonstrate in flight tests a critical
    radar called Cobra Dane before that date or conduct a system-level
    demonstration, and has yet to test its three-stage boosters as part of a
    planned intercept.

    GMD Interceptor

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-254.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    the link above. For more information, contact Bob Levin at (202) 512-4841
    or levinr@gao.gov.

    Contents

    Letter

    Results in Brief
    Missile Defense Agency Actions Taken or Planned to Address

    DOT&E Recommendations
    Characterization of Initial Defensive Capability
    Conclusions
    Recommendations for Executive Action
    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    1 3

    5 14 18 18 19

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

    Abbreviations

    BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
    BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System
    CHOP Countermeasures Hands-On Program
    DOD Department of Defense
    DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
    DRR Deployment Readiness Review
    EKV Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
    FY fiscal year
    GMD Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    GPS Global Positioning System
    HWIL Hardware in the Loop
    IFICS In-Flight Interceptor Communications System
    IFT Integrated Flight Test
    IOC Initial Operational Capability
    LFT&E Live Fire Test and Evaluation
    LIDS Lead System Integrator (LSI) Integrated Distributed Simulation
    MDA Missile Defense Agency
    NMD National Missile Defense
    NSPD National Security Presidential Directive
    OPINE Operations in the Nuclear Environment
    ORD Operational Requirements Document
    UEWR Upgraded Early Warning Radar

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    February 26, 2004

    The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Ranking Minority Member Committee on
    Government Reform House of Representatives

    The Honorable John F. Tierney House of Representatives

    The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) within the Department of Defense (DOD) is
    developing and testing components of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) element, which is intended to defeat long-range ballistic missile
    threats in the midcourse phase of flight.1 When deployed, GMD will include
    (1) space-and ground-based sensors to provide early warning and tracking
    of missile launches; (2) ground- and sea-based radars to identify and
    refine the tracks of threatening missiles (called reentry vehicles) and
    associated objects; (3) ground-based interceptors, each consisting of a
    three-stage booster and kill vehicle, to destroy enemy missiles through
    "hit-to-kill" impacts outside the atmosphere; and (4) fire control nodes
    for battle management and execution of the GMD mission.

    In August 2000, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),
    submitted a report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics for consideration at DOD's deployment readiness
    review for the National Missile Defense system.2 The purpose of the report
    was to provide an independent assessment of the system's potential
    operational effectiveness and suitability. Based on its assessment of the
    system at that time and the adequacy of testing in the context of

    1 The midcourse phase of flight refers to that portion of a ballistic
    missile's trajectory between the boost phase and reentry phase when the
    warheads and decoys travel on ballistic trajectories above the atmosphere.

    2 DOT&E is responsible for providing independent oversight of testing of
    major DOD acquisition programs to ensure that operational test and
    evaluation of major defense programs is adequate for verifying operational
    effectiveness and suitability for combat use. The Director is the
    principal operational test and evaluation official within DOD and advises
    the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology and Logistics on operational test and evaluation. The Director
    also provides advice to responsible officials on developmental testing.

    deployment, it stated that test results supported a decision to continue
    development but not deployment. In the report, DOT&E stated that the
    current test program required augmentation and probably significant
    funding increases to demonstrate an operationally effective system for
    deployment. The report included a list of 50 detailed recommendations
    regarding the test program. In September 2000, the President decided to
    defer the deployment decision to the next administration, and MDA (then
    named the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization) continued with
    development of the system.

    In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense refocused the ballistic missile
    defense program into a broad-based research and development effort managed
    by MDA. The new program follows a "capability-based approach" and aims at
    developing layered defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of flight.
    According to MDA, such an approach adds flexibility to the acquisition
    process by permitting the development and testing of mature technologies
    for the quick delivery of some capability. The new approach also allows
    DOD to evolve and demonstrate additional improvements in missile defense
    systems before committing to procurement and operations. To this end, MDA
    is following a "block" approach, which defines, develops, produces or
    acquires, and fields operational capability in incremental blocks. Each
    block is designed to build capability into the system by introducing new
    or improved technology. The first block- Block 2004-in this approach to
    offer a defensive capability builds upon MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense
    System (BMDS) Test Bed for conducting more realistic testing of ballistic
    missile defense elements, of which GMD is the centerpiece.

    In December 2002, the President directed DOD to begin fielding components
    of the ballistic missile defense system for operational use by 2004. That
    is, in addition to focusing resources on the development of the BMDS Test
    Bed for developmental testing of missile defense elements, he instructed
    MDA to build in an initial defensive capability that would protect the
    United States against long-range missile attacks. The Secretary of Defense
    stated that "...it would be a very preliminary, modest capability." DOD
    decided to begin fielding an initial capability by September 2004.

    Because of the significance of recommendations made by DOT&E during DOD's
    deployment readiness review and the decision by the President to deploy an
    initial defensive capability, you asked us to examine (1) the actions
    taken or planned by MDA that address the recommendations made by DOT&E,
    and (2) what is known about the effectiveness and limitations

    Results in Brief

    of the initial defensive capability to defeat long-range ballistic
    missiles in the September 2004 time frame. The scope and methodology for
    our review is included in appendix I.

    We provided you with a classified report on this subject in June 2003.
    This is an unclassified version of that report, which has also been
    updated as of December 2003 to reflect changes in the GMD test program. In
    preparing this unclassified version, we removed details on some of our
    findings after an extensive declassification process. These details can be
    found in the classified version of the report. The current version has
    been reviewed by the DOD and approved for public release.

    Of the recommendations listed in the August 2000 DOT&E report-which we
    grouped under flight testing, ground testing, target discrimination, and
    programmatics categories-MDA is taking actions that, over time, address
    most of the flight testing recommendations but, by contrast, substantially
    fewer of the remaining recommendations. Specifically,

    o  	MDA is addressing most of the DOT&E's recommendations on flight
    testing but will not complete many actions before September 2004. For
    example, DOT&E recommended the removal of flight test range limitations by
    adding more intercept regions and launch locations to achieve new
    intercept geometries, higher closing velocities, and longer ranges flown
    by the interceptor. MDA is expanding the test range infrastructure through
    the development of the Test Bed to add five intercept regions and target
    and interceptor launches out of new locations. By September 2004, MDA will
    have tested in one of the five new intercept regions. Other DOT&E
    recommendations on enhanced realism and the elimination of artificialities
    in flight tests are being acted upon by MDA, but full realization will
    take time to complete.

    o  	MDA is generally not addressing DOT&E's recommendations on ground
    testing. For example, although MDA had taken steps to proceed with the
    design and construction of a hardware-in-the-loop laboratory at the Arnold
    Engineering Development Center in Tennessee, comprehensive testing of the
    kill vehicle in this facility has been deferred beyond Block 2004 because
    of funding constraints. However, lethality testing for GMD engagements on
    the ground has been enhanced with investments in the Hypersonic Upgrade
    Program facility at Holloman Air Force Base.

    o  	MDA is generally addressing DOT&E's recommendations on
    discrimination-the system's ability to identify the true reentry vehicle
    from among decoys and associated objects. MDA has substantially increased
    the scope of work being done in discrimination, but MDA's flight tests
    planned through September 2007 are not designed to address the

    challenge posed by the certain countermeasures that DOT&E identified as
    simple for an enemy to implement. MDA maintains that the complexity and
    challenge of target suites used in integrated flight tests will increase
    as the discrimination capability is incrementally proven.

    The predicted effectiveness of the initial defensive capability to defeat
    long-range ballistic missiles is currently based on a limited set of
    flight-test data. For example, none of the components of the initial
    defensive capability to be fielded in September 2004-interceptors, fire
    control nodes for battle management and execution, upgraded radars, and
    forward-deployed Aegis radars on Navy cruisers and destroyers-has been
    flight-tested in its deployed configuration. As such, current predictions
    of effectiveness are based on analysis and simulations of expected
    performance of constituent components. The most significant uncertainties
    surrounding the capability to be fielded in September 2004 are (1) MDA
    does not plan to demonstrate capabilities of a critical radar for use with
    the GMD element, called Cobra Dane, in flight tests before that date; (2)
    MDA has yet to test both three-stage boosters as part of an attempted
    intercept; and (3) MDA does not plan to conduct a system-level
    demonstration of the initial defensive capability in flight testing before
    September 2004. Furthermore, a notable limitation of system effectiveness
    is the inability of system radars to perform rigorous target
    discrimination. The Cobra Dane radar and the upgraded early warning radar
    in California can perform rudimentary target discrimination, but the kill
    vehicle itself must perform final target selection during the endgame.

    The recommendations in this report also appeared in our classified June
    2003 report. We have made these recommendations to provide decision makers
    DOT&E's assessment of MDA's actions related to concerns raised by DOT&E's
    August 2000 report. In commenting on a draft of our June 2003 report, DOD
    agreed with our recommendations. The department raised concerns, however,
    that the GMD test program as described in this report is no longer current
    and the program strategy and structure have changed since DOT&E submitted
    its report. While the GMD test program has, indeed, been in a constant
    state of flux, thus complicating our analysis, our report presents the
    latest, approved test program information provided to us by MDA. Also,
    despite alterations to the acquisition strategy and structure of the
    ballistic missile defense system, we believe most of the DOT&E
    recommendations are still relevant because the technical challenges and
    uncertainty with developing, testing, and fielding effective defensive
    capabilities, as identified in the August 2000 DOT&E report, remain
    significant.

    Missile Defense Agency Actions Taken or Planned to Address DOT&E
    Recommendations

    The August 2000 DOT&E report summarized the progress, up to that date, of
    the National Missile Defense program and the adequacy of testing in the
    context of a deployment decision.3 At the time, the development program
    revolved around a series of ground and flight tests and was to have
    culminated in an initial operational capability by the end of fiscal year
    2005. Formal test documentation called for a total of 16 integrated flight
    tests (system-level intercept attempts) through 2004 with three additional
    flight tests during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation during the
    2005 fiscal year. DOT&E's principal finding was that ground and flight
    tests completed up to that time did not provide results of sufficient
    fidelity to support a deployment decision. Indeed, when the deployment
    readiness review was held, there had been two failed intercepts out of
    three attempts. Furthermore, as stated in the DOT&E report, ground testing
    was not adequate to yield credible estimates of GMD system performance.
    DOT&E indicated that the current test program required augmentation and
    probably significant funding increases to demonstrate an operationally
    effective system for deployment. Accordingly, the report included a list
    of detailed recommendations for enhancing the test program.

    DOT&E made 50 specific, interrelated recommendations, which we organized
    into the following four overarching categories: Flight Testing, Ground
    Testing, Target Discrimination,4 and Programmatics. Although DOT&E
    categorized discrimination-related recommendations under the
    flight-testing and ground-testing categories, we created a separate
    category because discrimination was of principal concern to DOT&E at the
    time. DOD classified the full text of the recommendations. A detailed
    assessment indicating whether actions have been initiated by MDA and what
    their timing is relative to the September 2004 initial defensive
    capability date can be found in our June 2003 classified report on this
    subject. A summary of MDA actions to address the DOT&E recommendations is
    provided below.

    DOT&E Recommendations Integrated flight tests of the GMD element are
    demonstrations of system on Flight Testing performance during which an
    interceptor is launched to engage and intercept a target reentry vehicle
    (mock warhead) above the atmosphere.

    3 The National Missile Defense program is now referred to as the
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, terminology we use from this
    point on.

    4 Target discrimination is the identification of the true reentry vehicle
    from among decoys and associated objects.

                                 Flight Test Complexity

    Many recommendations (20 of 50) in the DOT&E report pertain to aspects of
    integrated flight testing, such as deficiencies in flight-test complexity,
    operational realism, and artificialities. DOT&E's concerns with the
    composition of target suites in flight tests for testing discrimination
    are discussed separately in the discrimination section of this report.
    DOT&E reported that increasing the scope of flight testing was essential
    to stress the limits of system design and to keep pace with system
    development.

    MDA is taking actions that address many of the shortcomings in flight
    testing DOT&E identified in its August 2000 report. Indeed, the
    development of the BMDS Test Bed-the agency's key instrument for enhancing
    the existing test infrastructure to provide more realistic testing-should
    go far in addressing these DOT&E recommendations over the long term.
    Currently, flight tests are limited to target launches out of Vandenberg
    Air Force Base, California, and interceptor launches out of Kwajalein
    Missile Range in the western Pacific.5 For enhancing the capabilities of
    integrated flight testing, the test bed adds an interceptor launch site at
    Vandenberg Air Force Base; target launch facilities at Kodiak Launch
    Complex, Alaska; a GMD fire control node at Fort Greely, Alaska; an
    upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air Force Base, California; upgraded
    communication links among test bed components; and test infrastructure to
    support five additional intercept regions. The ship-based Aegis AN/SPY-1
    radar is also available as a forward-deployed asset for early target
    tracking. In addition, the design and construction of a sea-based X-band
    radar, which would be positioned on a mobile platform in the Pacific, has
    been funded by MDA and is scheduled to be available for test bed
    utilization in late 2005. Other components of the BMDS Test Bed such as
    the Cobra Dane radar in Shemya, Alaska, and interceptors at Fort Greely
    will not actively participate in integrated flight tests at least through
    September 2007.

    Several August 2000 DOT&E recommendations call for integrated flight
    testing with Category B engagements6 and scenarios with multiple
    threatening reentry vehicles, both of which are expected to be common

    5 Kwajalein Missile Range is now referred to as Reagan Test Site,
    terminology we use from this point on.

    6 The GMD system is designed to launch interceptors under one of three
    "categories" of operation: (A) when a threat reentry vehicle has been
    tracked and discriminated by groundbased radars; (B) when ground-based
    radars have a track of the threat complex but discrimination is either
    incomplete or unavailable; or (C) when space-based sensors provide an
    early track of the boosting missile.

    during operational missions. In addition, the recommendations call for
    integrated flight testing to be performed under increasingly difficult
    conditions and to be made more challenging through, for example, testing
    under various solar and weather conditions. Our analysis of the GMD test
    program as it pertains to flight test complexity, based on the March 2003
    Developmental Master Test Plan for the GMD element and related program
    documentation, is summarized below.

    o  	Flight Test Complexity-Actions Taken or Planned. The GMD test plan
    calls for Category B engagements beginning with Integrated Flight Test 15
    (IFT-15), scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004.
    Furthermore, it indicates that Category B engagements would be a common
    occurrence of flight testing, because the weapon task plan7 would be
    generated from Beale or Aegis radar data. According to MDA officials,
    however, the decision to conduct future flight tests under Category B
    engagements is currently under review; the resolution will depend on the
    individual flight test scenario and the maturity of battle management
    assets. The GMD Developmental Master Test Plan also shows that an
    integrated flight test (designated IFT-22/23) in which two interceptors
    are launched against two attacking reentry vehicles (multiple simultaneous
    engagements) will be carried out in fiscal year 2007.

    o  Flight Test Complexity-Actions Not Taken or Planned. Although

    previous flight tests have been conducted under limited adverse conditions
    (light rain), flight tests to assess the actual effects of severe weather
    on system performance are not currently planned. According to the program
    office, the verification of system performance in adverse weather will be
    achieved through modeling and simulation grounded in technical
    measurements and flight test data. Furthermore, a nighttime engagement was
    attempted during IFT-10 (December 2002), but the failure of the kill
    vehicle to separate from the surrogate booster precluded collection of any
    applicable data.

    The recommendations on operational realism reflect limitations of the
    current test range. Currently, intercept tests are constrained to a single
    corridor and intercept region-target launches out of Vandenberg Air Force
    Base and interceptor launches out of the Reagan Test Site. As a result,
    flight-test engagement conditions are limited to those with low closing
    velocities and short interceptor fly-out ranges. DOT&E called for

                                  Operational Realism

    7 A weapon task plan consists of pre-launch instructions for generating an
    interceptor flyout solution that places it on an intercept path with the
    target. Such a plan is required before an interceptor is launched.

    an expansion of engagement conditions and suggested adding more intercept
    regions and launch locations to achieve new intercept geometries, higher
    closing velocities, and longer ranges flown by the interceptor during
    flight testing.

    o  	Operational Realism-Actions Taken or Planned. The expansion of the
    test range in the Pacific with the development of the BMDS Test Bed will
    have a significant impact on achieving operational realism in integrated
    flight tests. The Block 2004 Test Bed adds five intercept regions, target
    launches out of Kodiak Launch Complex, and interceptor launches out of
    Vandenberg Air Force Base. The combination allows for flight tests with
    new intercept geometries, additional crossing angles, higher closing
    velocities, and longer ranges flown by the interceptor. For example,
    IFT-15 (fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004) will be conducted with a
    target launch out of Kodiak, and IFT-17 (fourth quarter of fiscal year
    2005) will be the first test with an interceptor launched from Vandenberg.

    o  Operational Realism-Caveats. The principal caveat to the associated

                                    Artificialities

    MDA actions addressing operational realism is timing. By September 2004,
    one of the five new intercept regions, north of Reagan Test Site, will
    have been exercised. The remaining new intercept regions will not be
    exercised until after September 2004. For example, the two intercept
    regions off the west coast of the United States will be used in IFT-17
    (fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005) and IFT-18 (fourth quarter of fiscal
    year 2005), respectively. A fourth intercept point will be exercised in
    IFT-21 (third quarter of fiscal year 2006). Finally, the fifth intercept
    point will be exercised as part of the multiple simultaneous engagement to
    be conducted in fiscal year 2007.

    The DOT&E recommendations on flight test artificialities-such as the
    removal of surrogates (test range assets emulating operational assets)-
    also reflect limitations of the current test range. The most artificial
    surrogate noted in the August 2000 DOT&E Report was the placement of a
    C-band transponder8 on the target reentry vehicle. The transponder was
    essential for the execution of flight tests, because in conjunction with
    the test range radar (designated FPQ-149), there were no other
    non-artificial options available to track the reentry vehicle with
    sufficient accuracy for

    8 MDA defines a transponder as a "receiver-transmitter that will generate
    a reply signal under proper interrogation." The missile defense community
    also refers to the transponder as the "C-band beacon."

    9 FPQ-14 is a C-band test-range radar located in Oahu, Hawaii.

                              Elimination of Flight Tests

    executing the mission. DOT&E argued that this artificiality be phased out
    and, in general, recommended the system utilized in integrated flight
    tests be as functional and representative as possible.

    o  	Artificialities-Actions Taken or Planned. Use of the
    transponder/FPQ-14 radar combination as a surrogate radar for midcourse
    tracking is planned to be phased out. Indeed, IFT-15 (fourth quarter of
    fiscal year 2004) would be the first test that does not use this surrogate
    for mission execution. Rather, in integrated flight tests IFT-15 and
    beyond, midcourse tracking of the target suite would be achieved through
    the use of the Beale upgraded early warning radar or, pending ongoing
    analysis by GMD, the Aegis SPY-1 radar. The eventual use of the sea-based
    X-band radar beginning in late 2005 can also be used for midcourse
    tracking. The removal of other surrogates is under way. For example, the
    short-range surrogate interceptor booster, which has been used in all
    flight tests to date, is scheduled to be replaced with two more
    operationally representative boosters beginning with IFT-14 (third quarter
    of fiscal year 2004).

    o  	Artificialities-Actions Not Taken or Planned. The MDA is not currently
    considering conducting flight tests under unrehearsed and unscripted
    conditions.

    Overall, the current DOT&E has looked favorably on MDA's actions that
    address its recommendations, because the GMD test infrastructure is being
    significantly enhanced to allow for more flight test complexity,
    operational realism, and artificialities. We noted, however, that since
    DOT&E's August 2000 assessment, MDA has reduced the extent of the flight
    test program, as follows:

    o  	Integrated Flight Tests-Number of Cancellations. During the initial
    planning phases of the revised test program, MDA considered conducting
    four intercept attempts per year. But after considerable planning and
    contract evaluations, MDA limited the flight test program to no more than
    three intercept attempts per year because of overlapping test objectives
    and funding constraints. Significantly, the previous GMD test program at
    the time of the deployment readiness review called for a total of 19
    integrated flight tests to be carried out through fiscal year 2005. The
    current test program, however, now has a total of 12 integrated flight
    tests through fiscal year 2005-because of the cancellation of IFT-11, 12,
    and 16, and the conversion of IFT-13 to booster tests (IFT-13A and 13B).
    To date, 8 of the 12 have been completed under largely the same test
    conditions that were critically assessed by DOT&E. In short, only two
    flight tests under improved test conditions with more representative
    hardware are planned

          to be conducted before September 2004, the time at which the initial

    defensive capability is scheduled to become available.  o  Operational
    Testing-No Longer Required. The previous GMD test program also called for
    operational testing-Initial Operational Test and Evaluation-by the
    military services. Operational testing is a statutory requirement for
    DOT&E to independently determine operational effectiveness and suitability
    of a deployed system for use by the warfighter. MDA does not plan to
    operationally test the Block 2004 GMD element before it is available for
    initial defensive operations. The September 2004 fielding is not connected
    with a full-rate production decision that would clearly trigger statutory
    operational testing requirements. Nonetheless, the Combined Test Force, a
    group of users and developers, plans tests to incorporate both
    developmental and operational test requirements in the test program.

    DOT&E'S Recommendations on Ground Testing

    Hardware-in-the-Loop Testing

    The 13 ground testing recommendations formulated by DOT&E in its August
    2000 report are focused concerns encompassing four areas: (1) realistic
    testing of kill vehicle functions in a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HWIL)
    facility,10 (2) ground-based lethality testing, (3) development of the
    system-level simulation known as the Lead System Integrator Integration
    Distributed Simulation (LIDS), and (4) Operations in a Nuclear Environment
    (OPINE) testing of kill vehicle components. In general, DOT&E's
    recommendations on ground testing are not being addressed.

    A number of the August 2000 DOT&E ground testing recommendations pertain
    to the hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle built by Raytheon.
    For example, a test article is placed in an evacuated chamber to simulate
    an exoatmospheric environment, and infrared radiation of a simulated
    target scene is projected onto the kill vehicle's sensors. DOT&E
    recommended "that an innovative new approach needs to be taken towards
    hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, so that potential design
    problems or discrimination challenges can be wrung out on the ground in
    lieu of expensive flight tests." DOT&E stated that, in order to verify
    kill vehicle performance, kill vehicle testing should be executed using
    actual unit hardware in a hardware-in-the-loop facility capable of
    providing a realistic space environment and threat scene. MDA had taken
    steps to proceed with the design and construction of a
    hardware-in-the-loop laboratory at the Arnold Engineering Development
    Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee. Although an initial test capability had been

    10 Hardware-in-the-loop testing is the high fidelity ground testing of a
    test article in a realistic yet simulated environment.

    Lethality Testing

    LIDS

    planned for the 2004 time frame, testing at the Arnold Engineering
    facility has been deferred beyond Block 2004 based on Test Bed funding
    constraints. In response to a draft of this report, MDA stated that future
    investments and test events at this facility are subject to MDA internal
    management trade-offs among the numerous priorities associated with the
    whole missile defense program portfolio.

    DOT&E made recommendations in its August 2000 report for improving GMD
    lethality testing-testing aimed at assessing a kill vehicle's
    effectiveness in destroying a reentry vehicle. Current test plans call for
    an approach whereby ground-based experiments are conducted to collect data
    to anchor simulations, which in turn are used to assess lethality
    performance. Indeed, GMD expects to anchor such simulations from data
    derived from improved "sled testing," which uses full-scale targets in the
    newly developed Holloman Air Force Base Hypersonic Upgrade Program
    facility. However, there are no plans to conduct intercept flight tests of
    the interceptor's ability to destroy threat representative targets that
    fulfill the Live Fire Test and Evaluation requirements. Rather, hit point
    information is collected from actual intercept tests, which, in turn, is
    used as input to simulations to determine whether the impact was lethal.

    Another area of ground testing recommendations identified in the August
    2000 DOT&E report concerned the development and use of system-level
    digital simulations. During the time of the deployment readiness review,
    the prime contractor's principal tool for assessing system performance
    over a broad range of scenarios was the end-to-end digital simulation
    known as LIDS. Because the development of the simulation was behind
    schedule and unavailable to support analyses of overall system
    performance, DOT&E reported that results obtained from it should not be
    used in making a deployment decision. DOT&E recommended that LIDS
    capability be "evolved to a fully validated, high-fidelity simulation." In
    addition, DOT&E recommended that LIDS be made flexible enough to permit
    independent use by test agencies. MDA disagrees with the recommendations
    pertaining to LIDS. MDA views LIDS as one of many tools to analyze
    performance aspects of the GMD element and does not believe that LIDS
    needs to be developed to the level expected by DOT&E. According to the
    agency, a baseline of models and simulations are available that are
    intended to collectively support the entire range of analysis required to
    verify the capabilities of the GMD elements. Furthermore, MDA asserts the
    evolution of LIDS from Software Build 4 to its current Software Build
    6.1.0 has improved the flexibility of the system to allow for sensitivity
    analyses by government users. According to MDA,

    extensive analysis using LIDS has been conducted at the Joint National
    Integration Center at Shriever Air Force Base, Colorado.

    OPINE Testing 	Finally, the remaining ground testing recommendations
    identified in the August 2000 DOT&E report focus on OPINE testing, which
    refers to the operation of individual GMD components in environments
    induced by nuclear explosions. Details can be found in the classified
    version of this report.

    DOT&E Recommendations Target discrimination is a critical function of a
    missile defense engagement

    on Target Discrimination 	that requires the successful execution of a
    sequence of functions, including target detection, target tracking,
    estimations of physical characteristics of tracked objects, and data
    fusion. DOT&E had two overarching concerns with the operational testing of
    the discrimination function:

    o  	Capability against diverse threats. Fundamentally, successful target
    discrimination requires that the defense be able to anticipate many
    characteristics of the threat. DOT&E, therefore, was concerned that
    discrimination algorithms may not be sufficiently robust to handle
    unanticipated threat scenes.

    o  	The quality and quantity of information known prior to testing. DOT&E
    was concerned that every physical property of target objects is known with
    unrealistic accuracy in advance of flight tests.

    Twelve of 50 recommendations in the August 2000 DOT&E report pertain to
    the testing of the discrimination function. Specifically, DOT&E
    recommended adding challenging yet unsophisticated countermeasures to the
    target suites of integrated flight tests. DOT&E also recommended
    integrating countermeasures developed by the Countermeasures Hands-On
    Program11 (CHOP) into target suites of integrated flight tests. Finally,
    DOT&E recommended executing flight test events-either intercept attempts
    or risk reduction flights-that have a "pop quiz" component with respect to
    radar discrimination. Operationally, this type of flight test is

    11 The CHOP program, based at the U.S. Air Force Phillips Laboratory at
    Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, is an MDA-funded program chartered
    to develop, build, and test countermeasures using only technology
    available to emerging missile states. The program involves young
    scientists, engineers, and military officers who are not specifically
    trained in missile defense or countermeasures and are given access only to
    the open literature and commercial off-the-shelf technology.

    more representative of a true tactical engagement, because the exact
    composition and type of countermeasures flown in an actual engagement are
    generally unknown. Details can be found in the classified version of this
    report.

    Relative to the previous test program, MDA has substantially increased the
    scope of work being done in discrimination. MDA is pursuing a block
    approach that incrementally builds to a system-level discrimination
    architecture that incorporates a network of sensors. The idea is to
    observe the target suite throughout its trajectory using an array of
    ground- and space-based sensors and to combine individual observations to
    formulate a "discrimination solution." MDA is also investing resources to
    study the discrimination problem and, for example, is moving forward with
    flight test events focused on radar discrimination and large analysis
    programs.

    MDA has plans to conduct four Radar Certification Flights through fiscal
    year 2006. These are non-intercept flight tests for comprehensively
    characterizing the discrimination capability of the X-band radar and to
    support the development of upgraded early warning radars. Furthermore,
    these tests are expected to have a "pop quiz" component to examine radar
    discrimination. MDA has not yet scheduled "pop quiz" testing in relation
    to kill vehicle's capability to perform target discrimination.

    MDA initiated and continues to fund analysis programs for investigating
    promising technical concepts to improve its capabilities against enemy
    countermeasures. For example, one such program, Project Hercules, is
    focused on the development and testing of discrimination algorithms and
    draws on academic, government, and industry expertise. Details can be
    found in the classified version of this report.

    Despite MDA's increased scope of work in the discrimination area, as
    described above, the agency's specific actions pertaining to integrated
    flight testing only partially address the August 2000 DOT&E
    recommendations. No intercept flight tests of the current test plan, which
    goes through IFT-26 (fiscal year 2007), are planned to address the
    challenge posed by an enemy's use of unsophisticated but more challenging
    countermeasures. Rather, agency officials told us that the technical
    challenges posed by such countermeasures are being analyzed and may be
    inserted into the flight test program at a later time.

    DOT&E Recommendations on Programmatics

    Characterization of Initial Defensive Capability

    The remaining five recommendations from the August 2000 DOT&E report
    pertain to concerns on programmatic issues, namely, adequacy of spares in
    flight testing, and performance requirements. MDA has not provided for
    adequate target or interceptor backups (hot spares) during flight tests.
    MDA officials stated that additional target and interceptor spares can be
    costly, but they are considering the issue. Even if implemented, MDA's
    actions that address the recommendations on spares would not have a
    significant impact on the actual conduct of flight tests but would reduce
    schedule risk.

    When DOT&E made its recommendations in August 2000, the GMD element was
    being developed according to operational requirements. However, MDA is now
    following a fundamentally new acquisition strategy-one that is
    capability-based with no formal operational requirements developed by the
    services. Hence, MDA has no plans to reexamine the reliability
    requirements. Nonetheless, the current test program is addressing certain
    performance issues raised by DOT&E. For example, the GMD program office is
    tracking the prime contractor's progress in meeting target discrimination
    goals.

    Under the new acquisition strategy outlined by the Secretary of Defense in
    his January 2002 memorandum, the ballistic missile defense program has
    been refocused into a broad-based research and development effort managed
    by MDA. The new program aims at developing layered defenses to intercept
    missiles in all phases of flight and, if directed, to use developmental
    prototypes and test assets to provide an early operational capability.
    And, as stated above, system development is not subject to the formal
    operational requirements developed by the Services.

    On December 16, 2002, the President directed DOD to begin fielding the
    first increment of the multi-element ballistic missile defense system in
    2004. The Secretary of Defense stated the next day that "...it would be a
    very preliminary, modest capability." The initial defensive capability for
    defending the United States against long-range missiles would be based on
    the GMD element of the Test Bed and augmented with more interceptors and
    external sensors, as follows:

    o  	GMD Element as part of the BMDS. The principal components of the GMD
    element for defensive operations include a total of up to 10 interceptors
    sited at Fort Greely (6) and Vandenberg Air Force Base (4); GMD fire
    control nodes at Fort Greely and Schriever Air Force Base for battle
    management and execution; an upgraded Cobra Dane radar at

    Eareckson Air Station; and an upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air
    Force Base.

    o  	External Sensors. Existing sensors external to the GMD element would
    also be available for defensive operations, including Defense Support
    Program satellites for early warning of missile launches, and three
    forward-deployed Aegis AN/SPY-1 radars on existing Navy destroyers for
    early midcourse tracking.

    The above assets comprise the initial configuration, which is scheduled
    for fielding by the end of September 2004. The agency's near-term
    intention is to grow this capability by adding 10 interceptors at Fort
    Greely, a sea-based X-band radar, and an upgraded early warning radar at
    Fylingdales, England,12 by the end of 2005.

    Uncertainties of the Initial Defensive Capability

    MDA is moving forward, as directed by the President, with the fielding of
    an initial defensive capability by the end of the 2004 fiscal year to
    protect the United States from long-range missiles. MDA cannot at this
    time formulate a credible assessment of system-level effectiveness,
    because critical components like the Cobra Dane radar and interceptor
    boosters have yet to be developed and tested in a flight test environment,
    and no initial defensive capability is available for a system-level
    demonstration and evaluation.

    o  	Cobra Dane Radar. The capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar will not be
    demonstrated in flight testing before September 2004. It is an L-band
    phased array radar located at Eareckson Air Station in Shemya, Alaska, at
    the western end of the Aleutian chain. Its close proximity to Russia
    allows it to perform its primary mission of collecting data on
    intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine launched ballistic
    missile test launches to the Kamchatka impact area. Since the Cobra Dane
    radar is currently being used in a surveillance mode, it does not require
    real time communications and data processing capabilities. After planned
    software and hardware upgrades to be completed in fiscal year 2004, it
    will have the additional mission to perform real-time acquisition and
    tracking, functions critical for ballistic missile defense.

    o  	Interceptor Boosters. In July 1998, the GMD prime contractor (Boeing)
    began developing a new three-stage booster for its ground-based
    interceptor from commercial off-the-shelf components. The contractor

    12 The upgrading of the Thule early warning radar located in Greenland
    will not be part of the Block 2004 Test Bed; it has been deferred to Block
    2006.

    encountered difficulty, and by the time the booster was flight tested in
    August 2001, it was already about 18 months behind schedule. Subsequently,
    to reduce risk, MDA altered its strategy for acquiring a new booster for
    the GMD interceptor. Development of the original booster was transferred
    to Lockheed Martin, and MDA authorized the GMD prime contractor to develop
    a second source for the booster by awarding a subcontract to Orbital
    Sciences Corporation. Both contractors are developing boosters for use in
    the September 2004 initial defensive capability. The first demonstration
    of an operational booster in an attempted intercept is scheduled for the
    third quarter of fiscal year 2004.

    o  	System-Level Testing. A system-level demonstration of the initial
    defensive capability will not be conducted prior to September 2004. To
    date, integrated flight tests have demonstrated basic functionality of a
    representative ballistic missile defense system using surrogate and
    prototype components, and have shown success in intercepting a mock
    reentry vehicle in a developmental test environment. The first flight test
    consisting of components closest to the configuration of the September
    2004 initial defensive capability is IFT-14, which is currently scheduled
    for the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. The test will incorporate Block
    2004 prototypes of the interceptor booster and kill vehicle of the
    configuration intended for operational use beginning in September 2004. In
    addition, the first tactical build of the battle management software will
    be utilized in IFT-14. However, interceptors will not be launched out of
    Fort Greeley in IFT-14 and IFT-15 (the remaining integrated flight tests
    to be conducted before September 2004).

    In commenting on a draft of this report, MDA stated that while it cannot
    address all technical concerns for the initial fielding, it has added the
    following activities:

    o  Enhanced producibility, quality, and reliability efforts.

    o  	Increased operational focus in the developmental program, e.g.,
    military utility and effectiveness assessments.

    o  	Expanded command and control, battle management, and operator
    integration in BMDS testing to support fielding of initial defensive
    capabilities in 2004.

    MDA also stated that the results of these program decisions are intended
    to provide a comprehensive program that demonstrates operational
    effectiveness and military utility against credible threats in an
    operational environment.

    Effectiveness of September 2004 and December 2005 Initial Defensive
    Capability

    System effectiveness is characterized in terms of the following four
    performance metrics: (1) defended area, (2) launch area denied, (3)
    probability of engagement success, and (4) raid size breakpoint. Defended
    area is the portion of the United States protected against long-range
    missile attacks and, as a metric, is usually reported relative to a single
    threat country or region; launch area denied simply refers to the
    collection of threat countries from which the United States is protected.
    The probability of engagement success is the probability that all
    attacking warheads are destroyed, derived from the probabilities
    associated with missile defense functions like detection, discrimination,
    and hit-to-kill. Finally, raid size breakpoint is the maximum number of
    warheads the system can realistically defeat in a single engagement. This
    metric is highly dependent on interceptor inventory.

    A detailed discussion of GMD's expected effectiveness is presented in the
    classified June 2003 version of this report.

    Other Factors Affecting System Performance

    A notable limitation of the effectiveness of the September 2004 initial
    defensive capability-and possibly the December 2005 capability- pertains
    to the inability of system radars to perform target discrimination.
    Neither the Cobra Dane radar nor the upgraded early warning radar at Beale
    is capable of performing rigorous discrimination, a function achievable
    only by the X-band radar. Rather, both radars will utilize common "target
    classification" software that enables them to classify objects as
    threatening or non-threatening. For example, debris would be classified as
    non-threatening, but objects like deployment buses and decoy replicas
    would be classified as threatening. Accordingly, the system would have to
    rely solely on the kill vehicle for a final target selection.

    The assessment of kill vehicle discrimination is, therefore, critical for
    understanding the capability of the deployed system, a point made in the
    DOT&E report. Appropriately, the GMD prime contractor tracks the
    discrimination capability of the kill vehicle as a technical performance
    measure. The prime contractor's December 2002 assessment rated the kill
    vehicle discrimination performance as meeting expectations based on
    analysis and simulation.

    Lastly, measures of system suitability like availability and
    vulnerability- which complement system effectiveness-are important for
    characterizing the initial defensive capability as a whole. MDA is aiming
    for full-time operations but faces risks in achieving this goal. Details
    on system

    Conclusions

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    availability and vulnerability are provided in our June 2003 classified
    report.

    Since DOT&E issued its August 2000 report, DOD has altered its approach to
    the acquisition of missile defense systems to one that follows a
    "capability-based" strategy. The new approach allows MDA to evolve and
    demonstrate additional improvements in missile defense systems before
    committing to procurement and operations. MDA's test program for all
    missile defense elements, such as GMD, was also reoriented to focus on the
    development and use of the BMDS Test Bed. Over time, the Test Bed should
    facilitate testing that address many of DOT&E's recommendations,
    especially those pertaining to flight test realism, complexity, and
    artificialities. However, most of the agency's actions with respect to
    DOT&E's ground testing recommendations, namely, those pertaining to
    comprehensive hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle have been
    deferred. In addition, MDA is proceeding slowly with the flight testing
    against certain countermeasures, which DOT&E noted are simple for an enemy
    to implement. These unresolved concerns in the test program warrant
    attention by DOT&E and the test community in general. Given the importance
    of ground testing and discrimination testing for understanding system
    effectiveness, decision makers in the Congress and Office of the Secretary
    of Defense would benefit from having information on the agency's progress
    in these matters as they consider investments in developing the ballistic
    missile defense system. As an independent office that reviews DOD's weapon
    system testing and the office that made the recommendations discussed in
    this report, DOT&E would be in a good position to provide such information
    to decision makers.

    As a means of providing decision makers with critical information when
    investments in missile defense are considered, we recommend that DOT&E
    report periodically, as it deems appropriate, on the status of MDA's
    actions taken or planned in response to the August 2000 recommendations.
    In its review, DOT&E should include information and recommendations, as
    warranted, on MDA's progress and planning (1) to improve
    hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, (2) to test kill vehicle
    components in nuclear environments, and (3) to test the GMD element's
    capability to defeat likely and simple near-term countermeasures during
    integrated flight tests. In the report, DOT&E can advise the Director,
    MDA, on how the test program could be modified to accommodate DOT&E's
    long-standing concerns.

    Agency Comments
    and Our Evaluation

    In commenting on a classified draft version of this report, DOD agreed
    with our recommendations. (See app. II for a reprinted version of DOD's
    comments.) However, DOD conveyed the following concerns:

    o  The GMD test program as described in this report is no longer current.

    o  	It is difficult to reconcile the dated terms of reference of the
    original DOT&E recommendations with the current program strategy and
    structure.

    o  	The inherent robustness of the envisioned layered BMD System relative
    to midcourse countermeasures is overlooked.

    While the GMD test program has, indeed, been in a constant state of flux,
    thus complicating our analysis, our report presents the latest, approved
    test program information provided to us by MDA.

    Despite alterations to the acquisition strategy and structure of the
    ballistic missile defense system and its constituent elements, like GMD,
    we believe most of the DOT&E recommendations are still relevant because
    the technical challenges and uncertainty with developing, testing, and
    fielding effective defensive capabilities, as identified in the August
    2000 DOT&E report, remain significant. For example, the DOT&E report
    issued in February 2003, FY02 Assessment of the Missile Defense Agency
    Ballistic Missile Defense System, continued to highlight the need for a
    comprehensive hardware-in-the-loop capability to test the kill vehicle
    under the stress of real physical phenomena and to test the kill vehicle's
    discrimination capability. We do recognize that a number of
    recommendations for which no actions are currently planned, such as those
    recommendations dealing with flight testing during Initial Operational
    Test and Evaluation, are a direct result of MDA's new acquisition
    approach.

    The department is correct in stating that we did not address the
    capability of the envisioned ballistic missile defense system as a whole
    in defeating midcourse countermeasures. However, we do note that a
    system-level discrimination architecture would use a network of ground-and
    spacebased sensors to formulate a "discrimination solution." Also, given
    the early stages of development of the envisioned layered system,
    including boost-phase intercept, the value of this strategy has not been
    demonstrated.

    Although the department agreed that DOT&E should report periodically on
    the status of MDA's actions to address the August 2000 DOT&E
    recommendations, it did not believe additional reporting is required to

    track their resolution. The department pointed out that our recommendation
    grants DOT&E discretionary reporting authority where mandatory reporting
    already exists. We believe, however, the recommendation is worded
    appropriately. Existing statutory reporting requirements for DOT&E on the
    adequacy and sufficiency of the missile defense test program do not
    require that the August 2000 DOT&E recommendations be specifically
    addressed. We worded the recommendation to highlight the areas we believe
    DOT&E should address-hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle,
    testing of kill vehicle components in nuclear environments, and testing
    the GMD element's capability to defeat likely and simple near-term
    countermeasures-and to give DOT&E the discretion to address our
    recommendation in the manner it deems appropriate. To present its
    assessment, DOT&E could use existing or new reporting vehicles.

    Finally, department comments pertaining to MDA actions on ground testing
    are addressed in the body of this report.

    As arranged with your staff, unless you publicly announce its contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
    its issue date. At that time, we plan to provide copies of this report to
    interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the
    Director, Missile Defense Agency. We will make copies available to others
    upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
    the
    GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report were
    Randy Zounes, Stan Lipscomb, Tana Davis, and Bill Graveline.

    R. E. Levin
    Director
    Acquisition and Sourcing Management

                           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    In examining the actions taken or planned by the MDA in response to the
    DOT&E recommendations, we analyzed pertinent test documents, studies, and
    reports. These include the (1) GMD Element Developmental Master Test Plan
    (March 2003); (2) GMD System Element Reviews; (3) MDA "immersion day"
    briefing; (4) MDA written responses to our questions about MDA actions in
    response to the DOT&E recommendations; (5) Secretary of Defense January
    2002 Memorandum on Missile Defense Program Direction; and (6) Independent
    Review Team (Welch panel) Reports. In addition, MDA officials briefed us
    on GMD's program status and efforts to defeat enemy countermeasures. We
    also reviewed available documentation on the schedule and purpose of the
    Test Bed. These documents included studies on the enhanced test program
    restructure, fiscal year 2003 budget justifications, and the request for
    the contract proposal for the Block 2004 Test Bed.

    To assess the effectiveness and limitations of the initial defensive
    capability, we relied on the following MDA documentation: (1) GMD System
    Element Review (January 2003); (2) BMDS Block 2004 Statement of Goals; and
    (3) National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-23), the President's
    directive to begin fielding an initial capability. We also identified
    uncertainties-based on the level of testing achieved to date-of the
    potential capabilities of individual elements of the initial defensive
    capability, such as the radars and interceptor boosters, as well as radar
    capabilities to perform the discrimination function.

    We conducted our work primarily at the MDA, located in Arlington,
    Virginia, and the GMD Joint Program Office, located in Arlington,
    Virginia, and Huntsville, Alabama.

    We conducted our audit work for the June 2003 classified report, upon
    which this unclassified version is based, from October 2001 to March 2003
    in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
    However, reported dates of GMD flight test events given in this
    unclassified version have been updated with the latest (December 2003) GMD
    test schedules.

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

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