Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing	 
Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional 
Actions Needed (19-NOV-03, GAO-04-242). 			 
                                                                 
To help strengthen aviation security after the September 11,	 
2001, terrorist attacks, the Congress expanded the size and	 
mission of the Federal Air Marshal Service (the Service) and	 
located the Service within the newly created Transportation	 
Security Administration (TSA). Between November 2001 and July 1, 
2002, the Service grew from fewer than 50 air marshals to	 
thousands, and its mission expanded to include the protection of 
domestic as well as international flights. In March 2003, the	 
Service, with TSA, merged into the new Department of Homeland	 
Security (DHS); and in November 2003, it was transferred from TSA
and merged into DHS's Bureau of Immigration and Customs 	 
Enforcement (ICE). GAO looked at operational and management	 
control issues that emerged during the rapid expansion of the	 
Service, specifically addressing its (1) background check	 
procedures and training; (2) management information, policies,	 
and procedures; and (3) challenges likely to result from its	 
mergers into DHS and ICE.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-242 					        
    ACCNO:   A08878						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is	      
Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but 
Additional Actions Needed					 
     DATE:   11/19/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Airline industry					 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     Human resources training				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Labor force					 
	     Law enforcement agencies				 
	     Law enforcement personnel				 
	     Physical security					 
	     Security clearances				 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Policies and procedures				 

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GAO-04-242

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Requesters

November 2003

AVIATION SECURITY

Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and
                    Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed

GAO-04-242

Highlights of GAO-04-242, a report to congressional requesters

To help strengthen aviation security after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, the Congress expanded the size and mission of the
Federal Air Marshal Service (the Service) and located the Service within
the newly created Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Between
November 2001 and July 1, 2002, the Service grew from fewer than 50 air
marshals to thousands, and its mission expanded to include the protection
of domestic as well as international flights. In March 2003, the Service,
with TSA, merged into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and
in November 2003, it was transferred from TSA and merged into DHS's Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GAO looked at operational
and management control issues that emerged during the rapid expansion of
the Service, specifically addressing its (1) background check procedures
and training; (2) management information, policies, and procedures; and
(3) challenges likely to result from its mergers into DHS and ICE.

GAO is making recommendations designed to improve the Service's data on
flight duty and information on separations. DHS agreed with GAO's
recommendations and expressed a commitment to continuous improvement as
the Service moves forward.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-242.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham at
(202) 512-2834 or [email protected].

November 2003

AVIATION SECURITY

Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and
Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed

To deploy its expanded workforce by July 1, 2002, a deadline set by the
Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Service used expedited procedures
to obtain interim secret security clearances for air marshal candidates
and provided abbreviated training for them. These procedures allowed
candidates with interim clearances to work until they received their final
top-secret clearances. Because of a governmentwide demand for clearances,
nearly a quarter of the active air marshals had not received their
top-secret clearances as of July 2003; but by October 2003, only about 3
percent were awaiting their top-secret clearances. To train its expanded
workforce before the Deputy Secretary's deployment deadline, the Service
incrementally revised and abbreviated its curriculum.

The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and
procedures to support its expanded workforce and mission, but it has not
yet completed this major effort. For example, it replaced a manual system
for scheduling flight duty with an automated system, but it has not yet
developed an automated means to monitor the effectiveness of its
scheduling controls designed to prevent air marshals' fatigue. In
addition, it has gathered and used information on potential security
incidents and on air marshals' reasons for separation from the Service to
improve its operations and workforce management. However, some of this
information is not clear or detailed enough to facilitate follow-up.
Finally, the Service has implemented policies needed to support its
expansion.

The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting
from its mergers into DHS and ICE, including changes to its roles,
responsibilities, and training and to its procedures for coordinating with
TSA's security organizations, as well as administrative changes. GAO's
recent work on mergers and organizational transformations proposes several
key practices-set implementation goals, establish a communication
strategy, and involve employees to obtain their ideas-and associated
implementation steps that could help the Service implement such changes.

Training Air Marshal Candidates to Shoot from a Seated Position

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Expediting Background Checks and Training Enabled the Service

to Meet the Deputy Secretary's Deployment Deadline Management Information,
Policies, and Procedures Have Not Kept Pace with Expanded Operations Key
Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help Address Merger

Implementation Challenges Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments

                                       1

                                      3 5

                                       7

13

24 28 28 29

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II 	Demographic Profile of the Federal Air Marshal Service

Appendix III 	Locations of the Federal Air Marshal Service's 21 Field
Offices and Training Facility

Appendix IV 	Events Affecting the Federal Air Marshal Service, September
2001 through October 2002

Appendix V 	Mission-Related Incidents Reported by Federal Air Marshals, by
Broad Categories, September 15, 2001 - September 16, 2003 39

  Appendix VI 	Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
  Organizational Transformations 40

  Appendix VII Contacts and Acknowledgments 41

GAO Contacts 41 Acknowledgments 41

  Figures

Figure 1: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Gender, by Percentage,
as of August 2003. 35 Figure 2: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by
Age, by Percentage, as of August 2003. 35 Figure 3: Federal Air Marshal
Service Workforce by Race, by Percentage, as of August 2003. 36

Abbreviations

DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOT Department of Transportation
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
IG Inspector General
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
LEAP law enforcement availability pay
OPM Office of Personnel Management
PDA personal digital assistants
TSA Transportation Security Administration

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

November 19, 2003

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

Emerging Threats and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable Diane E. Watson
House of Representatives

Within 10 months of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
United States, the number of federal air marshals grew from fewer than 50
to thousands;1 and within 2 years, the Federal Air Marshal Service (the
Service) underwent three organizational transfers. More specifically, the
Congress, through a provision of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, enacted on November 19, 2001,2 authorized a dramatic expansion of
the Service's mission and workforce and transferred authority over the
Service from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Under this legislation, the
Service's mission grew from preventing hijackings on international flights
to protecting passengers, crews, and aircraft from terrorist activities on
both domestic and international flights. Additionally, the Deputy
Secretary
of Transportation set a goal of hiring, training, and deploying thousands
of
new air marshals by July 1, 2002. After the passage of the Homeland
Security Act, the Service moved with TSA from the Department of
Transportation (DOT) to the newly created Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003. Finally, in September 2003, the Secretary
of Homeland Security announced that the Service would be transferred
from TSA to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
another law enforcement agency within the new department. Following
this transfer, which was supposed to take place on November 2, 2003, the
Secretary said that the Bureau's three law enforcement workforces-air
marshals, immigration agents, and customs agents-would be cross
trained to create a "surge capacity" for responding to security threats.

1The exact number of federal air marshals is classified. 2Public Law
107-71, November 19, 2001.

The rapid expansion of the Service led to a number of operational and
management control issues, which surfaced in national media reports of
allegations that the Service conducted inadequate background checks on
newly hired air marshals, slashed its training program to expedite the air
marshals' deployment, and failed to meet the needs of its air marshal
workforce. For example, the Service allegedly over- or underscheduled air
marshals for flight duty and reneged on promises of transfers to
alternative locations, thereby creating dissatisfaction with the Service
that, according to some reports, led to a flood of air marshal
resignations.

Within the context of these allegations, our objective was to look at
operational and management control issues related to the Service's
expansion. We also considered implications of the Service's organizational
realignment. Specifically, as agreed with your offices, we addressed the
following questions:

o  	What procedures for obtaining background checks and providing training
did the Service use to expedite the deployment of its expanded workforce
to meet the Deputy Secretary's July 2002 deadline?

o  	To what extent has the Service developed management information and
policies and procedures to support its expanded mission and workforce?

o  	What challenges is the Service likely to face as a result of its
recent mergers into DHS and ICE?

To answer these questions, we analyzed program data; interviewed Service
and TSA officials; and reviewed documentation from the Service and TSA on
background checks and training; scheduling, mission incidents, employee
misconduct, and separations; and reviewed several workforce policies and
procedures. We also visited several facilities to look at the Service's
operational and management control practices and documents, including the
Federal Air Marshal training facility and Human Resource Center in New
Jersey, the Federal Air Marshal headquarters office in Virginia, the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in New Mexico, and the Federal Air
Marshal field office in Texas. To guide our assessment of the Service's
training, management information, and policies and procedures, we reviewed
key GAO documents on internal controls and human capital management. These
include our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
(GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, November 1999), Internal Control Management and
Evaluation Tool (GAO-01-1008G, August 2001), Human Capital: A Guide for
Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal
Government (GAO-03-893G, July

  Results in Brief

2003), and Model of Strategic Human Capital Management (GAO-02-373SP,
March 2002). In addition, we used our report, Results-Oriented Cultures:
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations
(GAO-03-669, July 2003), to provide a framework for evaluating the
Service's challenges in merging into DHS. We also reviewed a March 2003
report by the DOT Inspector General (IG), which evaluated the Service's
selection and hiring process, training program, and scheduling process.
Finally, we discussed the governmentwide background investigation process
with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Our analysis of the
operational and management control issues related to the Service's
expansion focuses primarily on the period from November 2001 through
September 2003, when the Service was part of TSA; our assessment of the
challenges related to the Service's mergers is, in part, prospective. We
conducted our review from September 2002 through October 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
appendix I for a more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.

The Service used expedited procedures for obtaining background checks and
abbreviated the training for air marshals so that it could deploy its
expanded workforce by the Deputy Secretary's July 2002 deadline. Under the
expedited background check procedures, which other federal agencies also
often use, candidates who pass preliminary background checks are able,
within about 24 hours, to obtain interim secret security clearances that
allow them to work until their full background checks are completed.
Thousands of candidates underwent preliminary background checks, and the
majority of them obtained interim security clearances. Obtaining final
top-secret clearances has taken longer-sometimes up to a year-and as of
July 2003, nearly a quarter of the active air marshals were still
operating under interim clearances. By October 2003, about 3 percent of
active air marshals were still awaiting their top-secret clearances. OPM
attributed the delays to the governmentwide demand for security clearances
after September 11, 2001. To deploy the necessary number of air marshal
candidates by the Deputy Secretary's deadline, the Service identified the
skills critical for initial deployment and incrementally revised and
abbreviated its training curriculum between October 2001 and July 2002.
Then, to ensure that all newly hired air marshals were provided with
training in advanced skills, the Service established an additional 4-week
course and required all candidates hired after October 2001 to complete
the training by mid-2004. It is unclear how the Service's transfer to the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement will affect this
requirement.

The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and
procedures to support its expanded mission and workforce, but it has not
yet completed this major effort. For example, it has replaced the manual
system that it formerly used to schedule fewer than 50 air marshals for
flight duty with an automated system that it can use to schedule thousands
of air marshals on thousands of flights; however, it has not yet developed
an automated means to monitor the effectiveness of controls designed to
prevent overscheduling so that air marshals do not become fatigued.
Preventing fatigue is important because, if air marshals are not alert,
their ability to carry out their mission may be diminished. The Service
has made effective use of some management information-by, for example,
establishing a liaison with the airlines after air marshals' mission
reports indicated problems with coordination and communication. However,
supervisors' summaries of air marshals' reasons for separating-as of July
2003, about 10 percent of newly hired marshals had separated-are not
detailed enough for management to identify and respond to specific
problems, such as dissatisfaction with the Service's transfer policy. The
Service initially lacked a means of obtaining input from its employees for
use in improving its operations and management, but it has started to
implement such processes. Finally, the Service has implemented policies
and procedures needed to support its expansion from a single office with a
budget of about $4.4 million in fiscal year 2001 to an organization with
21 field offices and a budget of $545 million in fiscal year 2003. For
example, it implemented a policy on transfers between field offices and
issued a written dress code policy. We are recommending that the Service
automate the comparison of actual hours worked with scheduled hours to
monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls and develop improved
information on air marshals' reasons for separation. The Department of
Homeland Security agreed that information on actual hours worked should be
automated and acknowledged a need to improve the quality of the
information the Service collects from departing air marshals.

The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting
from its mergers into the new Department of Homeland Security in March
2003 and into the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in
November 2003. While the new department, within the context of guidance
from the Congress and the administration, is primarily responsible for
determining what changes will occur, the Service is responsible for
implementing them. At this time, changes are likely in the roles,
responsibilities, and training of air marshals, assuming that the
Secretary of Homeland Security's plan to cross-train the Bureau's three
law enforcement workforces is implemented so that each group can perform
the others' responsibilities. Developing procedures for coordinating with

Background

TSA will also be important to help ensure a comprehensive, unified
approach to aviation security, now that the Service is separated
organizationally from the other groups with aviation security functions in
TSA. Finally, changes will be needed to resolve differences in the pay
systems and compensation of air marshals, immigration agents, and customs
agents. Our recent work on mergers and organizational transformations
proposes several key practices-setting implementation goals and a time
line to build momentum and show progress from day one, establishing a
communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related
progress, and involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their
ownership for the transformation-and associated implementation steps that
can assist the Service as it addresses the challenges in merging into the
department and the Bureau. In an earlier report, we recommended these and
other key practices to the department.3

FAA's Federal Air Marshal program expanded the Sky Marshal program, which
was established as part of the Customs Service in the 1970s to deter
hijackings to and from Cuba. Shortly after TWA Flight 847 was hijacked in
Athens, Greece, in June 1985, then President Ronald Reagan called for an
expansion of the Sky Marshal program. On August 8, 1985, the Congress
enacted the International Security and Development Cooperation Act,4 which
established the statutory basis for the program within DOT, which further
delegated the responsibility to FAA.5 Since then, the Federal Air Marshal
program has provided specially trained, armed teams of civil aviation
security specialists for deployment worldwide on antihijacking missions.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the President and the
Congress decided to rapidly expand the Service. On September 17, 2001, FAA
began to develop a plan to recruit federal air marshals in unprecedented
numbers. Accordingly, FAA designed a process and put together a team of
specialists, incorporating resources from its Human Resource Management,
Aviation Medical, Civil Aviation Security, and Federal Air Marshal
Training organizations to implement the recruitment

3U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Management Challenges
Facing Federal Leadership, GAO-03-260 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002).

4Public Law 99-83, August 8, 1985.

549 C.F.R. Sec. 1.47(p)(1).

process. The process was designed to ensure that each air marshal
candidate met the medical entry standards, passed DOT's drug-testing
program, and was preliminarily judged suitable to obtain a top-secret
clearance, which is required for permanent employment with the Service. As
part of the assessment, each candidate was required to participate in a
security interview with an investigator from FAA, OPM, or the U.S.
Investigative Services (an OPM contractor6), as well as interviews with
representatives of FAA's Office of Human Resource Management and the
Service. In October 2001, FAA implemented this recruitment process, and
the Deputy Secretary of Transportation also set July 1, 2002, as the
deadline for recruiting, hiring, and training enough federal air marshals
to provide coverage on flights that posed high security risks. In November
2001, after the Aviation and Transportation Security Act was passed, TSA
assumed FAA's responsibilities for aviation security and supported FAA's
recruitment effort through July 2002.

Between October 2001 and July 2002, TSA received nearly 200,000
applications for federal air marshal positions. Thousands of applicants
were assessed for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full
background investigations for top-secret clearances. Other federal
agencies also made law enforcement officers available to augment the
Service until TSA could hire, train, and deploy the first few classes of
new air marshals. See appendix II for a demographic profile of the
Service's expanded workforce.

With expansion, the Service's annual budget grew from $4.4 million for
fiscal year 2001 to $545 million for fiscal year 2003. Currently, the
Service operates a headquarters office in Virginia, 21 field offices, and
a specialized air marshal training and human resource facility in Atlantic
City, New Jersey. Basic law enforcement training takes place at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico. See
appendix III for a map of these facilities and appendix IV for a time line
of the major organizational events affecting the Service since September
11, 2001.

DHS brings together some 23 federal agencies comprising over 100
organizations, including the Federal Air Marshal Service, in what the
department describes as the most significant transformation of the U.S.

6OPM contracts primarily with U.S. Investigative Services to check the
applicants' personal records and often to conduct face-to-face interview
with friends, colleagues, and family.

government since the merger in 1947 of the various branches of the armed
forces into the Department of Defense. DHS is divided into five
directorates, one of which, Border and Transportation Security, includes
both TSA and ICE. Among other organizations, ICE includes a portion of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service, now called the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services; the U.S. Customs Service now called
Customs and Border Protection; and, as of November 2, 2003, the Federal
Air Marshal Service.

  Expediting Background Checks and Training Enabled the Service to Meet the
  Deputy Secretary's Deployment Deadline

To expedite the deployment of thousands of air marshals, the Service
obtained preliminary background checks and provided abbreviated training
before deploying air marshal candidates on flights. As a result, the
Service was able to meet the Deputy Secretary's deployment deadline and
carry out its mission.

    Initial Deployment Was Swift, but Completion of Final Background
    Investigations Has Been Slow

To deploy its expanded workforce as quickly as possible between October
2001 and June 2002, the Service followed the same expedited background
check procedures that federal agencies have used since 1995, when
Executive Order 12968 authorized the temporary use of interim security
clearances.7 Under these procedures, candidates who require security
clearances and pass preliminary background checks may, within about 24
hours, obtain interim security clearances that allow them to work until
their full background checks have been completed and they obtain their
final clearances. A preliminary background check consists of an interview
with a security specialist; a review of an applicant's responses to a
standard questionnaire for national security positions; a criminal history
check, based on fingerprints and a review of biographical data from

7Executive Order 12968, dated August 2, 1995, authorizes agencies to grant
employees temporary eligibility for access to classified information while
the initial investigation is under way. When such eligibility is granted,
the initial investigation shall be expedited.

National Crime Information Center files;8 and credit reports. An interim
security clearance may be revoked at any time if unfavorable information
is identified during an investigation.

Between October 2001 and July 2002, thousands of candidates were assessed
for employment, and TSA, through OPM, initiated full background
investigations for top-secret clearances. According to TSA management, the
majority of the candidates passed the preliminary background checks and
obtained interim security clearances that allowed them to work while their
full background checks were being completed. Less than a quarter of the
candidates did not pass the preliminary checks because of bankruptcy, bad
credit, or other problems. TSA placed these candidates on a
"pending/ready" list and did not allow them to work as air marshals, but
it pursued full background investigations for them because many of the
issues identified during preliminary background checks are minor and are
favorably resolved during full background investigations. Full background
checks for thousands of candidates identified a small number as
unsuitable. In June 2003, the Service placed 80 air marshal candidates on
administrative leave while TSA resolved issues that surfaced during full
background investigations. By August 2003, 47 of these candidates had
received their top-secret clearances and have since been returned to
flight status. Of the 33 remaining candidates, 19 have been denied
clearances, and the Service is taking steps to terminate their employment;
4 have been approved for, but have not yet received, topsecret clearances;
7 have resigned; and the remaining 3 are awaiting TSA's approval of their
top-secret clearances. The Service said it has continued to identify some
candidates as unsuitable, and as of October 2003, 14 air marshals were on
administrative leave because of issues that surfaced during full
background checks. When definitive information for each of these cases is
obtained, the Service said, the air marshal would be returned to flight
status or steps would be taken to terminate the air marshal's employment.

During our review, we found that the background investigations used to
grant top-secret clearances for air marshals were not being expedited as

8The National Crime Information Center is a computerized index of criminal
justice information (i.e., information on criminal record histories,
fugitives, stolen properties, missing persons) located at Federal Bureau
of Investigation's (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services Division in
Clarksburg, West Virginia. It is available to federal, state, and local
law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies 24 hours a day, 365
days a year.

requested. According to TSA, an expedited background investigation costs
$3,195 and should be completed within 75 days, whereas a regular
background check costs $2,700 and should be completed within 120 days.
Consequently, for every 1,000 background investigations, the Service paid
a premium of about $495,000. TSA paid the expedited fees to OPM up front,
as required,9 but as of July 2003, about 23 percent of the air marshals
were still operating under interim security clearances.10 Some candidates
had been awaiting final clearances for up to a year. The Service told us
in April 2003 that it had, on numerous occasions, raised concerns about
the delays in processing final security clearances but had met with little
success. Additionally, the Service said that its efforts to reclaim the
difference in cost were unsuccessful. DHS said that TSA's Credentialing
Office had taken steps since June 2003 to ensure that every active air
marshal was operating under a top-secret clearance; and as of October
2003, about 3 percent of the active air marshals were operating under
interim security clearances.

According to OPM, the primary reason for these clearance-processing delays
is that the agency has received an unprecedented number of requests for
background investigations governmentwide since September 2001.11 For
fiscal year 2002, OPM's data indicated that the average processing time
for 75-day expedited background checks was 96 days. OPM said that the
expedited requests received higher-priority processing than the regular
(120-day) background checks, resulting in faster turnaround for services
related to the expedited requests. OPM added that its contractor charges
premiums for expedited requests because the costs for these requests are
higher. Consequently, according to OPM, no price adjustments are made when
overall deadlines are missed.

While the Service is not responsible for the delays in completing air
marshals' full background investigations, we found that it could have

9OPM bills an agency for the full amount of an investigation at the time
the investigation is scheduled.

10TSA's Credentialing Program Office is responsible for adjudicating the
results of air marshals' background investigations. This function was
formerly under TSA's Office of Security.

11In his statement on June 3, 2003, before the Subcommittee on Homeland
Security, House Committee on Appropriations, the Associate Director for
Human Resources Products and Services, said that OPM was working to
increase its capacity to provide background investigations for all federal
customers and had streamlined its internal processes to make as much use
as possible of automated systems.

provided OPM with information for scheduling the investigations more
efficiently. As candidates applied for positions between October 2001 and
June 2002 and their preliminary background checks were completed, the
Service offered conditional employment to some of the candidates and, as
discussed, placed others on a "pending/ready" list. However, the Service
did not make this information available to OPM. As a result, some
potential employees received their top-secret clearances ahead of other
candidates who were being trained or deployed on flights.12 We brought
this issue to the attention of the Service in March 2003; and in May, the
Service sent OPM a list of candidates and asked OPM to give highest
priority to investigations of those who were already deployed on flights.
In addition, the Service has asked OPM to schedule the investigations for
senior managers first and then to schedule investigations for other
applicants on a first-in, first-out basis. On May 28, 2003, the Service
also detailed a liaison from its Office of Field Operations to assist
TSA's Office of Security in setting priorities for reviewing and
adjudicating the backlog of background investigations.

    Changes to the Training Curriculum Helped Expedite Deployment

To deploy the requisite number of air marshals by the Deputy Secretary's
July 2002 deadline, the Service revised and abbreviated its training
program. From October 2001 through July 2002, it modified the air marshal
curriculum incrementally, eventually reducing the original 14-week program
to about 5 weeks for candidates without prior law enforcement experience
and about 1 week for candidates with such experience. The revised
curriculum was designed to provide candidates with the basic law
enforcement knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform their
duties as air marshals, including knowledge of the Service's rules and
regulations, physical skills, and basic and advanced marksmanship. The
curriculum no longer included certain elements of the original training
program, such as driving skills and cockpit familiarization, because these
were not deemed critical for air marshals to perform their duties. The
curriculum also eliminated a 1-week's visit to an airline and some
instruction in the Service's policies and procedures, which was to be
provided on the job. Moreover, although the curriculum retained
instruction in both basic and advanced marksmanship, air marshal
candidates no longer had to pass an advanced marksmanship test to

12OPM told us in March that it had not received a prioritized list of
clearances from the Service, but noted that it had occasionally received
requests to expedite or check the status of particular investigations or
to discontinue investigations that were no longer needed.

qualify for employment. Candidates were still required to pass a basic
test13 with a minimum score of 255 out of a possible 300-the highest
qualification standard for any federal law enforcement agency, according
to the Service.

To provide all the newly hired air marshals with needed skills, beyond the
basic abilities the Service determined were critical for immediate
deployment, the Service instituted a new 4-week advanced training course
in October 2002. All air marshals hired from October 2001 through July
2002, regardless of their previous law enforcement experience, were
required to complete the course by January 2004. This course includes some
elements, such as emergency evacuation and flight simulator training, that
the Service did not include in the 5-week course because, although it
considered the elements important for air marshals to carry out their
mission, it did not consider them critical for immediate deployment. In
addition, the course provides further training in advanced marksmanship
skills. Air marshals hired after August 2002 attend this advanced training
course after completing their basic training. The Service has developed a
centralized tracking system to ensure that all air marshals take this
course.

Although the Service is now providing additional marksmanship training,
its decision not to restore the advanced marksmanship test14 as a
qualification standard for employment has proved controversial. Passing
this test would require candidates to demonstrate their speed and accuracy
in a confined environment similar to the environment on board an aircraft.
The DOT IG's report suggested that the Service needed to adopt a firearms
qualification standard that was more stringent and comprehensive than the
basic firearms qualifying test. The Service disagreed, emphasizing that
its minimum score is the most stringent in federal law enforcement and
adding that its 4-week course provides further training in advanced
firearms skills. Our review of the Service's documentation confirmed that
instruction in advanced marksmanship is a critical part of this training,
even though passing this element is no longer a condition of employment.

In August 2003, the Service reported that proposed cutbacks in its
training funds would require it to extend the date for all air marshals
hired from

13The federal law enforcement Practical Pistol Course (PPC). 14The
Aircraft Tactical Pistol Course (ATPC).

October 2001 through July 2002 to complete the 4-week advanced course from
January 2004 to mid-2004. According to DHS, the Service's transfer to ICE
will not adversely affect either the funding for air marshals' training or
the schedule for newly hired air marshals to complete the 4-week training
course, since a total of $626.4 million is being transferred from TSA to
ICE. While this funding exceeds the $545 million that the Service received
for fiscal year 2003, it is not clear how much of the funding will be
allocated for training. Given the importance of training to ensure that
air marshals are prepared to carry out their mission, we believe that
maintaining adequate funding for training should remain a priority.
Additionally, should reductions in the funding for training be required,
our recent work on strategic training and development efforts provides
alternatives that an agency can consider to across-the-board cuts-such as
evaluating training needs, setting training priorities, developing
alternative training requirement scenarios, and determining how much
funding each of these scenarios would require.15 Our work further suggests
that it is important for agencies to ensure that their training and
development efforts are cost effective, given the anticipated benefits and
to incorporate measures that can be used to demonstrate contributions that
training and development programs make to improve results. These
principles are applicable at all times, but especially when funds are
limited. Determining whether air marshals with prior law enforcement
experience have the same training needs as those without such experience
could help set cost-effective training priorities.

We found that a cornerstone of human capital management is the ability to
successfully acquire, develop, and retain talent. Investing in and
enhancing the value of employees through training and development is a
crucial part of addressing this challenge. This investment can include not
only formal and on-the-job-training but also other opportunities, such as
rotational assignments. Our work further specifies that agencies should
link their training curriculum to the competencies needed for them to
accomplish their mission. The Service has begun developing a formal
training curriculum beyond the basic and advanced training courses
described above. This curriculum requires air marshals to participate in 5
days of recurrent training each quarter that, in addition to the quarterly
weapons qualification, includes training in advanced firearms, operational
tactics,

15U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing
Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government,
GAO-03-893G (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).

  Management Information, Policies, and Procedures Have Not Kept Pace with
  Expanded Operations

defensive tactics, surveillance detection, emergency medicine, physical
fitness, and legal and administrative elements. Additionally, the Service
is developing rotational assignments for air marshals that allow them to
participate in law enforcement task forces, as well as fill a variety of
operational and training positions in headquarters and the field. The
Service recognizes that such opportunities can not only enhance
professional development but also help to prevent problems such as boredom
and burnout. According to the Secretary of Homeland Security, one of the
advantages of the Service's transfer to ICE is that it will enhance air
marshals' professional development opportunities.

As the Service grew from a small, centralized organization to an
organization with 21 field offices and thousands of employees, its need
for information, policies, and procedures to manage its expanded workforce
and operations also grew. The Service collects several types of
information that it can use to continually improve its operations and
oversight and, in some instances, it has used the information to do so. In
other instances, however, the Service lacks sufficiently detailed
information for effective monitoring and oversight. The new, decentralized
organization has also required new or written policies and procedures to
cover new situations and ensure that the same guidance is available to air
marshals in all locations. According to DHS, it recognized that the
Service would need to revise its existing policies16 or draft new ones,
and it has been working to do so since March 2002. Nonetheless, its
policydevelopment efforts sometimes responded to problems, rather than
anticipating and preventing them. DHS told us that it is committed to
proactively addressing policy issues and developing procedures.

    Management Information Is Not Sufficiently Detailed or Comprehensive for
    Effective Monitoring and Oversight

The Service collects information on air marshals' work schedules and other
issues, including potential security incidents documented in reports filed
by air marshals after completing their missions, allegations of misconduct
by air marshals, and reasons provided by air marshals for leaving the
Service. Such information can be useful to managers in monitoring mission
operations and retention. According to our Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government,17 the information should

16Before being transfered to TSA in March 2002, the Service continued to
follow standard operating procedures designed for a small organization
with one facility.

17U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

Automated System Improved Scheduling, but More Information Is Needed for
Monitoring

be recorded and communicated to management and others within the agency
who need it, and it should be provided in a form and within a time frame
that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. For example, one
way to do this would be to ensure that pertinent information is captured
in sufficient detail to help management identify specific actions that
need to be taken. Moreover, according to our human capital model, a
fact-based, performance-oriented approach to human capital management is a
critical success factor for maximizing the value of human capital. In
addition, high-performing organizations use data to determine key
performance objectives and goals, which enable them to evaluate the
success of their human capital approaches. For example, obtaining employee
input and suggestions can provide management with firsthand knowledge of
the organization's operations, which management can use to ensure ongoing
effectiveness and continuous improvement. The Service has analyzed and
made effective use of its mission reports and conduct data, but other
management information that it currently collects is not sufficiently well
defined or detailed for monitoring and managing the workforce. Although
the Service initially had no systematic means of obtaining regular input
from its employees, it has recently put processes in place to solicit air
marshals' opinions and suggestions. In addition, the Service is
participating in an Office of Management and Budget program assessment
project. As part of this effort, DHS said it has identified annual and
long-term performance measures and related performance outcome targets to
evaluate the Service's organizational effectiveness along key strategic
goals and objectives. Through this project and other strategic planning
initiatives, DHS says it expects to systematically measure and analyze the
Service's organizational performance along human capital, mission
scheduling, professional development, and quality of work-life dimensions.

When the Service was first directed to expand its mission and operations,
it was using a manual system to schedule air marshals for flight duty.
This system was quickly overwhelmed as the number of air marshals and
flights grew, leading to the concern that air marshals were being
scheduled inconsistently for flight duty. The Service acknowledged that
during this period, some air marshals were overworked while others were
underutilized. In June 2002, the Service replaced the manual system with
an automated system, which, according to Service officials, improved the
agency's ability to schedule and deploy its workforce.

While the automated system expanded the Service's scheduling capability,
it did not provide the Service with all of the information it needed for
effective monitoring. For example, it did not initially break down data on

air marshals' use of leave into enough categories for the Service to
assess whether some air marshals were abusing sick leave in order to get a
day off. Specifically, an article in USA Today reported that about 1,250
air marshals called in sick over an 18-day period. Eventually, the Service
determined that the article was based on a report generated by the
automated scheduling system that overrepresented the number of air
marshals who were on sick leave. Although the report was labeled "Sick
Leave," it included data on all air marshals who were unavailable for
flight duty, not only for sickness but also for other reasons such as
administrative leave, and it listed each day of unavailability for flight
duty as a separate incident, although the same air marshal might have been
unavailable for several days in a row for the same reason.

In analyzing data from the scheduling system, we found that because the
system reported all leave charges-sick, administrative, military, or
other-as sick leave, the Service could not distinguish air marshals who
were unavailable to fly because they were out sick from air marshals who
were unavailable to fly because of injuries but were available for light
field office duty. For example, an air marshal with an injured ankle might
not be able to fly, but could perform administrative work in the field
office. The Service has since modified the scheduling system to obtain
better information on the type of leave-sick, military, or administrative-
charged by air marshals who are unavailable to fly. The DOT IG also
investigated cases concerning sick leave abuse and likewise found that it
was based on a misunderstanding of the report's contents stemming from the
report's label.

Although the automated scheduling system provides information for managers
to monitor how many hours air marshals are scheduled for work, automated
information is not available for comparing the number of hours actually
worked with the number of hours initially scheduled. These numbers can
differ when flights are delayed or cancelled because of bad weather or
mechanical problems. Information on these differences is important for
Service managers to consider because of their implications for both the
Service's mission and air marshals' quality of life. For example, if air
marshals work too many hours, they may become too tired to concentrate on
their mission, or if they spend too much time away from home, they may
become dissatisfied with their jobs.

Information on the number of hours flown will also be important for the
Service to carry out a new long-term study, initiated by the Director in
the summer of 2002, on the medical and physiological effects of flying. To
date, the Service, in collaboration with FAA's Civil Aviation Medical

Institute and the Air Force, has identified a methodology and objectives
for the study and completed a literature review to identify trends,
possible risks, and other pertinent information. As part of the study, the
Service plans to collect and analyze data from recurrent air marshal
physical examinations and to compare these data with physiological data
from the Civil Aviation Medical Institute. Although the Service is still
awaiting funding approval to conduct the physical examinations and develop
the database, Service officials plan to begin both efforts in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2004. The study team has also developed a training
course on human physiology as it relates to the aviation environment. The
Service expects this course to be available early in fiscal year 2004.

On the basis of some early findings from the study team's literature
search, the Service set limits in its automated flight-scheduling system
to address mission, quality-of-life, and health concerns. The system
limits scheduled "duty time" to 10 hours a day or 50 hours a week.18 Our
analysis of schedules from the automated system for 37 weeks found that
about 92 percent of the schedules were consistent with these controls.19
The Service added that further guidance has been developed that results in
scheduling air marshals to fly an average of 4.2 hours per day, 18 days
per month. Thus, air marshals should fly about 75 hours per month, which
the Service said was within the aviation and military standards for
pilots-90 and 100 hours per month, respectively. As part of implementing
this guidance, the Service is conducting a detailed analysis of individual
flight schedules to determine if the goals are being met. The Service
reported on the basis of this analysis that, as of September 2003,
scheduled flight time averaged 76.5 hours per month. The Service's
analysis, however, focuses on flight schedules and not on actual hours
worked by the air marshals. Information on the hours air marshals actually
work is not available for automated comparison with the hours they are
scheduled to work because the actual work hours are recorded manually on
time and attendance sheets and are not transferred to the automated
system. Without an automated way to compare actual hours worked with
scheduled hours, the

18According to an analysis done by the Service, air marshals spend an
average of 4 hours and 25 minutes per workday in flight and use the
remainder of the workday to prepare for flights or layovers. Air marshals
must be at the airport 1.5 hours before their first flight and stay there
15 minutes after arrival. The combination of flight time and the
aforementioned 1.5 hours and 15 minutes is referred to as "duty time."

19The remaining 8 percent, Service officials explained, could be due to
inconsistencies that resulted when the Service overrode the controls to
meet mission needs-to, for example, provide sufficient coverage for Super
Bowl weekend.

The Service Has Used Mission Reports to Improve Operations, but Some
Coordination Issues Remain

Service lacks a tool needed to determine if the automated
flight-scheduling system is meeting its objectives related to mission,
quality-of life, and health concerns. DHS agreed that the information on
actual hours should be automated and said that the Service intended to
incorporate this capability via personal digital assistants (PDA) issued
to all air marshals.

Between September 2001 and September 2003, air marshals submitted reports
of almost 2,100 incidents that occurred during their missions. A little
over 40 percent of these mission reports describe passengers that
exhibited suspicious behavior to the air marshals. About 18 percent of the
reports discuss disagreements or conflicts between air marshals and
airline or airport personnel over airport or airline procedures. The
remaining mission reports cover a wide variety of incidents that the
Service grouped into 17 other categories, as shown in appendix V.

The Service has taken some action to follow up on the air marshals'
mission reports, but it has not addressed all of the issues the reports
raise. For example, the Service established a liaison with the airlines in
response to reports of disagreements and conflicts with the airlines.
According to an official with the Air Transport Association,20 this action
has improved relations between the air marshals and the airlines.
Nevertheless, some coordination and communication issues remain. In
October 2002, for instance, the Service purchased PDAs for distribution to
all air marshals. Service officials told us that before making the
purchase, they contacted FAA about obtaining approval to use the feature
that would allow the air marshals to communicate with one another aboard
aircraft. In August 2002, FAA advised the Service that it planned to
approve this PDA feature for use by air marshals during flight. However,
FAA's approval was never finalized, and the airlines have not allowed the
air marshals to use the PDAs for this purpose because of concerns about
interference with flight control or navigational signals. According to
Service officials, air marshals have stopped using their PDAs'
communication feature in flight until FAA approves its use, and the
Service continues to work with FAA to obtain such approval. The Service
reports that air marshals continue to use other features of the PDAs, such
as their cell phone, pager, e-mail, surveillance, and photo-display
capabilities.

20The Air Transport Association is a trade association for 22 major U.S.
airlines and five foreign carriers.

The Service Has Used Reports of Misconduct to Improve Management Controls

Information on Air Marshals' Reasons for Leaving the Service Is Not
Detailed Enough to Target Retention Efforts

Between October 2001 and July 2003, the Service collected data on almost
600 reports of misconduct by air marshals, which it classified into over
40 categories. Among the categories with large numbers of reported cases
were "insubordination or failure to follow orders," "loss of government
property," and "abuse of government credit cards." According to Service
officials, they have used the misconduct database to identify issues such
as abuse of government credit cards and cell phones that need to be
investigated.21 For example, during the Service's rapid expansion,
management noted an unacceptable number of unauthorized charges and late
payments associated with air marshals' use of the government-issued travel
card. Further investigation revealed that the process of claiming
reimbursement for travel was slow and burdensome and there were
misunderstandings about what charges were proper. After corrective action,
the delinquency rate dropped dramatically. Similarly, an analysis of the
misconduct data indicated that a number of air marshals were accused of
being abusive to airline personnel during the boarding process. A detailed
review of the data pointed to differences in the Service's and the
airlines procedures for boarding aircraft. Subsequently, the Service
negotiated a mutually agreeable solution with the airlines to resolve
these differences. In these instances, the Service used misconduct reports
to effectively refine its management controls.

The Service maintains data on the number of air marshals who leave the
Service and categorizes their reason for leaving.22 However, these data
are not detailed enough for management to identify and follow up on issues
that could affect retention. Retention is important both to ensure the
continued deployment of experienced personnel who can carry out the
Service's security mission and to avoid the costs to recruit, train, and
deploy new personnel, which, according to the Service, total about $40,275
per person.

Our analysis of the Service's data on separations indicates that from
September 2001 through July 2003, about 10 percent of the thousands of
newly hired air marshals left the Service. However, during August 2002,
when the media reported a "flood" of resignations from the Service, our

21Generally, Service staff members in headquarters investigate reports of
misconduct, but for more serious cases, the Service has been coordinating
its investigations with TSA's Office of Internal Affairs.

22The Service selects and records one predominant reason for an air
marshal's separation from the Service, although the air marshals may have
cited more than one reason.

analysis indicated that slightly more than 4 percent of the newly hired
air marshals had left.23 We found that the most frequently recorded
reasons for air marshals separating from the Service were to take other
jobs and personal reasons.24 Such reasons are not detailed enough for
management to identify and target issues that may hinder retention.

To gain greater insight into the reasons for separation, we examined the
Service's documentation for 95 selected cases.25 For 37 of these cases,
the departing air marshals cited multiple reasons for leaving the Service.
For example, one departing air marshal cited personal reasons and going
back to his previous job. Even with this additional information, we could
not identify management issues that might have led to the separations
because the reasons documented by the Service were too general and vague.

The Service's method of collecting data on air marshals' reasons for
separation may be responsible, in part, for the generality and vagueness
of the information. Specifically, the Service uses either an open-ended
exit interview with the air marshal's first-line supervisor, the air
marshal's resignation letter, or both to collect the data.26 The
supervisor conducts and writes up the exit interview and an administrative
official in the field forwards the interview write-up, resignation letter,
or both to human resource officials in Service headquarters. A human
resource specialist then reviews the documentation and determines which of
the reasons cited is the primary reason for the separation. This method of
collecting information has several limitations. First, the open-ended exit
interview may not prompt responses that go beyond generalities, such as
taking another job or personal reasons, to determine whether management
issues, such as problems in transferring to a duty station closer to home
or burdensome work schedules, contributed to the air marshal's
resignation.

23Because TSA was a newly created agency without a workforce history
(including, for example, information on deaths, retirements, transfers,
and resignations), we were unable to meaningfully compare attrition data
for the Service to other federal agencies during this period. Therefore we
are not making a value judgment on the meaning of the number of persons
leaving the Service or their rate of departure. However, these data are
relevant to the resources that have to be expended to maintain a specified
number of marshals in the Service.

24A small number of air marshals left because they could not pass
training.

25The details of our selection process are provided in appendix I.

26This documentation included an exit information form that the Service
began using in 2002 to gather data from separating air marshals.

The Service Initially Lacked, but Has Recently Begun to Implement,
Processes for Obtaining Employee Input

Second, using the first-line supervisor to conduct the interview may
discourage detailed responses, either because the air marshal may not want
to reveal his or her concerns or reasons or because the supervisor may not
want to report specific issues. Finally, using a human resource specialist
to determine the primary reason for a separation means that the reason is
filtered through another party rather than provided directly by the air
marshal who is resigning. Our work on human capital has determined that
feedback from exit interviews can guide workplaceplanning efforts. If
these exit interviews are constructed to collect valid and reliable data,
they allow managers to spotlight areas for attention, such as employee
retention.

According to the DOT report, air marshals interviewed by the IG's office
were concerned about the way the air marshal program was being managed,
which contributed to low morale in the Service. The air marshals the IG
interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the Service's work schedules,
aircraft boarding procedures, and dress code policy.27

During the early stages of its expansion, the Service did not have
processes or mechanisms in place to gather input and suggestions from its
employees. Such processes and mechanisms would not only allow the Service
to monitor air marshals' concerns about management issues, as the DOT IG's
report also noted, but it would also provide the Service with its
employees' firsthand knowledge and insights that it could use to improve
operations and policies. According to our work on human capital, leaders
at agencies with effective human capital management seek out the views of
employees at all levels and communication flows up, down, and across the
organization, facilitating continuous improvement. Tools commonly used for
obtaining employee input include employee satisfaction surveys, employee
advisory councils, and employee focus groups.

Recently, the Service began putting processes and mechanisms in place to
gather input from its employees. The Service reports that all field
offices have methods, such as advisory committees, for air marshals to ask
questions or express concerns to senior field office management.
Additionally, question and answer sessions are held when the Director,
Deputy Director, or Assistant Director visits a field office and during
the

27As discussed in appendix I, the DOT IG's sample results cannot be
projected to the universe of the Service's air marshal workforce.

basic and advanced training classes. To obtain further employee input, the
Service participated in an ombudsman program that TSA sponsors to improve
its operations and customer service. According to the Service, it is also
developing a lessons learned and best practices intranet site that will
allow substantive communication on issues of interest and concern to all
air marshals.

    Developing and Implementing Policies and Procedures for an Expanded
    Organization Took Time and Created Some Confusion

Policy on Transfers Was Not Implemented until May 2003

Policies and procedures that were designed to support a small, centralized
Service were not designed for and could not accommodate the needs of a
vastly expanded and decentralized workforce. According to our Standards
for Internal Control in the Federal Government,28 internal control should
provide for an assessment of the risks an agency faces from both external
and internal sources. For example, when an agency expands its operations
to new geographic areas, it needs to give special attention to the risks
that the expansion presents. In attempting to hire, train, and deploy its
new workforce by the Deputy Secretary's deadline and establish a new field
organization to support its new domestic mission, the Service had little
time to systematically assess the risks of expansion and ensure that its
policies and procedures were appropriate and adequate. Efforts to develop
new policies or modify existing ones to accommodate new circumstances took
time, and during the transition, some air marshals voiced concerns to the
media. Delays in hiring supervisors and the discretion they were given in
interpreting policies may have contributed to air marshals' confusion.

Before its expansion, the Service was a centralized organization with one
office and fewer than 50 air marshals. Because there were no field
offices, the Service had no policy on transfers between field locations.
The vacancy announcement used during the hiring process stated that field
offices would be located in various major metropolitan areas, and a
Service official stated that air marshal applicants were allowed to
express their preferences for particular field locations. According to a
media report, air marshals alleged that transfers to their preferred
locations were promised but that those promises were not kept. Our review
of a recruiting video and other documents related to the hiring process
did not find any evidence that transfers were promised; however, the
recruiting video indicated that opportunities for transfer existed.
Service officials said that no transfers were promised and that as the
Service hired air marshals and implemented its new field office structure,
it assigned the

28GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

Unwritten Policy on Dress Created Confusion

newly hired marshals to the 21 field offices as needed. Service officials
later added that except in hardship cases, the air marshals were expected
to remain in the originally assigned field offices for 3 to 5 years. The
DOT IG also investigated this issue and interviewed air marshals who
alleged that promises of transfers made during the hiring process were not
kept, but the IG did not determine whether there was a legitimate basis
for the air marshals' concerns.

By June 2002, the Service had received over 500 applications for
transfers. Until a policy was issued, the Service tried to respond to the
air marshals' requests and to address quality-of-life issues by developing
guidance that provided for transferring any air marshal (1) who owned a
home within 100 miles of an established field office and (2) whose
immediate family resided in that location-provided that both of these
conditions existed before the air marshal's employment with the Service.
While the Service communicated this guidance orally to field managers,
some air marshals were reportedly confused about why their requests for
transfers were denied.

In January 2003, the Service postponed further action on transfer
requests, officials said, until applicable policies-on hardship and
transfers-were finalized. On May 29, 2003, the Service implemented a
hardship transfer policy that established processes and criteria for
approving transfer requests when an air marshal or an immediate family
member incurs a medical or child-custody hardship. In developing the
policy, the Service said it looked into other law enforcement agencies'
transfer programs to identify best practices.

During the early months of the Service's expansion, air marshals expressed
confusion and dissatisfaction to the media about policies covering their
attire. At that time, the Service had no written dress code policy.
Instead, according to Service officials, the agency carried over an
unwritten FAA policy that air marshals should dress appropriately for
their missions and the air marshal in charge of a mission should determine
what attire was appropriate for that mission. According to the Service,
some airline personnel complained to the Service that marshals were not
dressed to blend in with other passengers in the location of the air
marshals' assigned seats. The Service said that the lack of a written
policy might have created confusion for some newly hired air marshals
whose initial training did not cover the Service's policy on dress and
whose field office supervisors had discretion in interpreting the policy.
In May 2002, the Service issued a policy that directed air marshals to
dress so as to present a professional image and blend into their
environment. The

Air Marshals Expressed Concern about Reasons for Changes in Workweek
Policy

Service believes that this policy enables air marshals to perform their
duties without drawing undue attention to themselves. For example, an air
marshal might wear a business suit on a morning flight to New York and a
sports shirt on an afternoon flight to Orlando. To explain and ensure
consistent application of the policy, the Director of the Service
discussed this policy with supervisors and staff during his visits to many
field offices and to the Service's training center.

Air marshals also discussed concerns about the Service's workweek policy
with the media. Some air marshals complained that they had been promised
4-day workweeks to compensate for the rigors of travel but were being
required to work 5-day workweeks. Other air marshals reported being
confused about the reasons for the change from a 4-day to a 5-day workweek
and questioned whether this change was necessary.

According to Service officials, the change in workweek policy occurred on
July 1, 2002, when the Director of the Service brought the air marshals
into compliance with the requirements of law enforcement availability pay
(LEAP), a pay premium for unscheduled duty equaling 25 percent of a law
enforcement officer's base salary. Under this pay computation method, air
marshals are required to average 10 hours of overtime per week. LEAP
became applicable to the Service with the passage of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act on November 19, 2001, but the Service
initially continued to compute air marshals' schedules according to the
method it had previously used, called the "first forty" method. Under this
method, the first 40 hours worked in a week constituted the basic
workweek, and 4-day and even 3-day workweeks were allowed if air marshals
accrued 40 hours within that time. However, Service officials determined,
in consultation with TSA's legal department and human resources office,
that a change to a 5-day workweek was necessary for the Service to comply
with LEAP. Accordingly, the Director ordered a 5-day basic workweek,
effective July 1, 2002.

The DOT IG reported that over 85 percent of the air marshals its staff
interviewed expressed concern about working 5 consecutive 10-hour mission
days (with 2 consecutive off-duty days), saying that it resulted in
fatigue and illness.29 Service officials acknowledged that working 10-hour

29Between November 2002 and February 2003, 112 air marshals were
interviewed. However, because of the methodology employed, the results are
anecdotal and may not reflect the views or experiences of all Service
employees.

  Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help Address Merger Implementation
  Challenges

days can create fatigue,30 but said that such days are routine in the law
enforcement community. Service officials also maintained that fatigue can
be managed by applying scheduling controls and monitoring air marshals'
schedules. However, as noted, the Service lacks the data to ensure that
air marshals' actual work hours are consistent with the scheduling
controls.

The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting
from its mergers into DHS in March 2003 and into ICE in November 2003.
While changes in the size of its workforce could eventually occur in light
of the many recent improvements to aviation security and federal budget
constraints, the plans announced to date point to changes in the roles,
responsibilities, and training of ICE's workforces; the Service's
coordination with TSA and other organizations; and administrative matters.
DHS reported looking forward to the opportunities accompanying the
Service's pending merger into ICE. Our recent work on mergers and
organizational transformations proposes several key practices and
implementation steps that could assist the Service and other departmental
organizations as they face these challenges.

    The Service Is Likely to Face Challenges in Implementing Changes

One challenge for the Service will be to implement any changes in the size
or in the roles and responsibilities of its workforce that the department
determines are warranted after the Service is transferred to ICE. The
right size of a security organization's workforce appears to depend, among
other things, on the nature and scope of the terrorist threat and on the
totality of measures in place to protect against that threat. When the
Service was first directed to expand, there were fewer protective measures
in place than there are today. Over the past 2 years, an entire "system of
systems" has been established for aviation security alone. This system
includes not only the expanded Federal Air Marshal Service, but also about
50,000 federal security screeners in the nation's airports, 158 airport
security directors, explosives detection equipment for passengers and
baggage, requirements for performing background checks on about 1 million
airline and airport employees, reinforced cockpit doors on all passenger
aircraft, and authorization for pilots to carry guns in the airplane
cockpit. Now, as the department assesses the nation's homeland security
risks, considers the constraints on federal resources, and sets

30As previously discussed, the 10-hour workday includes the time that air
marshals are required to be in the airport before and after a flight as
well as the time they spend in flight.

priorities, it will need to determine its appropriate size. It has already
begun to make changes in the federal security screener workforce by
reducing the total number of full-time screeners by 6,000 in fiscal year
2003 and by planning a further reduction of 3,000 full-time screeners in
fiscal year 2004 together with the hiring of part-time screeners to meet
daily and seasonal periods of higher demand.

In announcing the Service's merger into ICE, the Secretary of Homeland
Security did not propose a change in the size of the Service's or of ICE's
other two law enforcement workforces, but his statement pointed to an
expansion of their roles and responsibilities that would give the
department greater flexibility to adjust its law enforcement resources
according to varying threats. Through cross-training, the Secretary said,
thousands more law enforcement agents would be available for deployment on
flights, providing a surge capacity during times of increased aviation
security threats. At the same time, air marshals may be assigned to other
law enforcement duties, as threat information dictates.

This planned expansion of the roles and responsibilities of air marshals,
immigration agents, and customs agents will pose training challenges for
ICE and its component organizations. According to the Secretary's
announcement, the training will be centralized, which could eventually
produce some cost efficiencies, but initially a needs assessment will have
to be conducted to identify each law enforcement workforce's additional
training requirements. Cross-training requirements and curriculums will
also have to be established and approved. Finally, each component
organization will have to coordinate the new training requirements with
its other mission requirements and schedule its officers for the
cross-training.

The Service is also likely to face coordination challenges following its
transfer from TSA to ICE. In part, the transfer is designed to improve
coordination by unifying DHS's law enforcement functions, but it also
divides aviation security responsibilities that, for about 2 years, were
under TSA. According to the Secretary, the transfer will facilitate the
coordination and sharing of law enforcement information, thereby enhancing
aviation security. However, TSA has raised questions about how air
marshals' flights will be scheduled, and the TSA Administrator has
expressed a desire to influence the scheduling. Immigration agents have
reportedly also wondered how ICE would juggle air marshal deployments with
the bureau's current investigative work.

Finally, the Service's transfer to ICE poses administrative challenges for
the three component organizations. For example, the planned changes in

the roles and responsibilities of the federal law enforcement officers
could have implications for their performance evaluations and
compensation. Currently, the three groups of law enforcement officers are
under different pay systems and are compensated at different rates.
Efforts are under way to resolve these challenges.

    Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help the Service Address
    Potential Merger Challenges

On the basis of our work on mergers and organizational transformations, we
identified nine key practices and 21 implementation steps that could
assist DHS in successfully merging the roles, responsibilities, and
cultures of the Service and the department's other component
organizations.31 While these practices will ultimately be important to a
successful merger and we have previously recommended them for the
department,32 there are three, we believe, that are particularly
applicable to the Service, given the concerns about communication and
other allegations reported in the media. These three practices emphasize
communicating with employees and obtaining and using their feedback to
promote continuous improvement. See appendix VI for a complete listing of
the practices and implementations steps.

One key practice in a merger or transformation is to set implementation
goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress from day one.
These goals and the time line are essential to pinpoint performance
shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections. Research indicates
that people are at the heart of successful mergers and transformations.
Thus, seeking and monitoring employee attitudes and taking appropriate
follow-up actions is an implementation step that supports this practice.
Our work suggests that obtaining employee input through pulse surveys,
focus groups, or confidential hotlines can serve as a quick check of how
employees are feeling about large-scale changes and the new organization.
As discussed in this report, the Service did not initially have such tools
in place-in large part because of the enormous demands it faced in
recruiting, training, and deploying thousands of air marshals by the
Deputy Secretary's deadline-and it was not monitoring employee attitudes.
Furthermore, although monitoring provides good information, it is also
important for agency management not only to listen to employees' concerns
but also to take action. By not taking appropriate follow-up

31Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).

32GAO-03-260.

actions, negative attitudes may translate into actions such as employee
departures-or, as was the case with the Service, complaints to the media.
Identifying cultural features of merging organizations is another
important step in setting implementation goals. Cultural similarities
between the Service and the other organizations within ICE could
facilitate the Service's merger into ICE. As the Director of the Service
and others have noted, air marshals, immigration agents, and customs
agents are all law enforcement officers and share a common culture.
Moreover, as a spokesperson for ICE pointed out, many air marshals came to
the Service from Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service;
and some other agents served as air marshals temporarily after September
11.

Establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and
report related progress is another key practice in implementing a merger
or transformation. According to our work on transformations and mergers,
communication is most effective when it occurs early, clearly, and often
and when it is downward, upward, and lateral. Organizations have found
that a key implementation step is to communicate information early and
often to build trust among employees as well as an understanding of the
purpose of planned changes. As the Service found when modifying its
workweek policy to implement LEAP premium pay, the absence of ongoing
communication can confuse employees. Two-way communication is also part of
this strategy, facilitating a two-way honest exchange with, and allowing
for feedback from, employees, customers, and stakeholders. Once this
solicited employee feedback is received, it is important to consider and
use it to make appropriate changes when implementing a merger or
transformation.

Involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership is a
third key practice for a successful transformation or merger. Employee
involvement strengthens the transformation process by including frontline
perspectives and experiences. A key implementation step in this practice
is incorporating employee feedback into new policies and procedures. After
obtaining sufficient input from key players, the organization needs to
develop clear, documented, and transparent policies and procedures. Not
having such policies and procedures was an impediment to the Service as it
expanded, creating confusion about issues such as transfers and dress
codes. DHS said that it fully recognizes the value and importance of
communicating with employees and of obtaining and using their feedback to
promote continuous improvement. It further noted that as the Service
merges into ICE, it is committed to involving employees to obtain their
opinions and gain their ownership.

Conclusions

The rapid expansion of the Service's mission and workforce posed
significant challenges, many of which the Service has begun to address. In
the 2 years that have elapsed since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
the Service has deployed thousands of new air marshals on thousands of
domestic and international flights. During this time, the Service has also
established a decentralized organization and begun to integrate its
operations with those of a new department. While these accomplishments
initially came at some cost, as evidenced by air marshals' concerns with
the Service's management, the Service has taken steps to provide advanced
training, improve scheduling, obtain and use more detailed management
information, develop and communicate policies and procedures, and obtain
and respond to employee feedback.

Continuing these efforts will be important for the Service as it moves
forward. Developing and analyzing information on the hours air marshals
actually work is key to ensuring that the Service's scheduling controls
are operating as intended. Flying for too many hours can cause fatigue,
potentially diminishing air marshals' alertness and reducing their
effectiveness. Capturing detailed, firsthand information on air marshals'
reasons for separation is critical to developing cost-effective strategies
for promoting retention and would also allow the Service to identify and
analyze the root causes of issues and to address vulnerabilities through
changes to its policies, procedures, and training. While retention has not
been an issue to date, the cost of recruiting, training, and deploying air
marshals is too high to risk separations that could be avoided through
better understanding of and attention to air marshals' concerns.

Recommendations for 	We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation

Executive Action 	Security to support the Service's continued commitment
to developing into a high-performing organization by taking the following
actions to improve management information and to implement key practices
that contribute to successful mergers and organizational transformations:

o  	Develop an automated method to compare actual hours worked with
scheduled hours so that the Service can monitor the effectiveness of its
scheduling controls and support its planned long-term study of the effects
of flying on air marshals and their aviation security mission.

o  	Seek and monitor employee attitudes by obtaining detailed, firsthand
information on air marshals' reasons for separation, using such means as
confidential, structured exit surveys, that will allow management to

  Agency Comments

analyze and address issues that could affect retention and take
appropriate follow-up actions, such as improving training, career
development opportunities, and communication.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. DHS
agreed with our report's information and recommendations and said it
welcomes our proposals for practices that it believes will ultimately
maximize its ability to protect the American public, contribute to the
protection of the nation's critical infrastructure, and preserve the
viability of the aviation industry. DHS also expressed a commitment to
continuous improvement as it moves forward, including actions designed to
build on the accomplishments the Service has already achieved in expanding
its mission and workforce since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. According to DHS, the Service has ongoing activities in several
areas, such as continuing to address policy issues and develop procedures
and establishing field office mechanisms and groups to discuss employee
issues and concerns. We included this information in the final report.

Additionally, DHS identified references in the draft report to
"overscheduling" of air marshals, with an explicit suggestion that such
"overscheduling" was among air marshals' reasons for separating from the
Service. We revised the report to avoid this implication, since we had not
intended to suggest that air marshals were being overscheduled. Our intent
was to point out that without an automated method to compare actual hours
worked with scheduled hours, the Service would not readily be able to
monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls. We also agreed with
DHS that there were no data in the Service's separation information to
suggest that "overscheduling" was among air marshals' reasons for leaving
the Service, and we modified the report accordingly. DHS agreed with our
recommendation to automate air marshals' time and attendance data to
facilitate comparisons of actual hours worked with scheduled hours and
said that the Service was taking steps to implement the recommendation.
DHS also agreed that there was a need to improve the quality of the
Service's separation information.

In its comments, DHS also emphasized its belief that the Service's merger
with ICE would have a number of significant benefits, particularly from
cross-training personnel. DHS noted that after cross-training, the air
marshals, as well as personnel in the other ICE components, would have far
more law enforcement capability and could supplement each other's
functions during times of heightened threat. Additionally, DHS said that
the aviation system would benefit from the concentration and

coordination of DHS law enforcement personnel under the direction of a
single Assistant Secretary. We discuss these changes in our report by
examining them in the context of issues that may arise as the Service
merges with other agencies. In addition, we discuss key practices and
implementation steps that could be useful in dealing with the changes. We
note, however, that it is too early to assess any possible benefits or
repercussions of the changes.

Finally, DHS provided technical clarifications to the report, which we
incorporated into the report as appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 5 days after
the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government
Reform, other interested congressional committees, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Undersecretary for Border and Transportation
Security, the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration,
and the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. This report is also available on GAO's home page at
http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact Carol Anderson-Guthrie or me at (202) 512-2834 if you have
any questions about the report. Key contributors to this report are listed
in appendix VII.

Gerald L. Dillingham Director, Civil Aviation Issues

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To address each of our study objectives and research questions, we
reviewed and analyzed data and documentation provided by the Federal Air
Marshal Service (The Service) on background checks and training;
scheduling, mission incidents, employee misconduct, and separation; and
several workforce policies and procedures. We also interviewed officials
responsible for implementing and operating the Service. Additionally, we
used our Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government,
Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool,1 Human Capital: A Guide
for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal
Government,2 and Model of Strategic Human Capital Management,3 to help
assess the Service's training, management information, and policies and
procedures. We also reviewed an audit report by the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Inspector General (IG) on the Federal Air Marshal
program.4 To guide our examination of the Service's future challenges, we
used our Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational

5

Transformations.

To compare the background check procedures for the newly hired air
marshals with those used before September 2001, we obtained and reviewed
Service documents that described the process and procedures used to apply
for a top-secret clearance, as well as for an interim secret clearance
waiver. We interviewed officials at the Service's Human Resource Center in
New Jersey who were knowledgeable about the process and were coordinating
the Service's requirements with the responsible Security Management
Offices at both the Federal Aviation

1GAO issues standards for internal control in the federal government as
required by the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982. See 31
U.S.C. 3512(c). GAO first issued the standards in 1983. GAO revised the
standards and reissued them as Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
These standards provide the overall framework for establishing and
maintaining internal control and for identifying and addressing major
performance challenges and areas at greatest risk for fraud, waste, and
abuse, and mismanagement. GAO issued its Internal Control Management and
Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001) to assist
agencies in maintaining or implementing effective internal control and,
when needed, to help determine what, where, and how improvements can be
implemented.

2GAO-03-893G.

3GAO-02-373SP.

4SC-2003-029.

5GAO-03-669.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
We also analyzed data provided by the Office of Personnel Management's
(OPM) Investigative Service and had discussions with OPM personnel on the
number of clearances processed and the procedures that are used.

To determine what changes were made in the training curriculum for the
newly hired air marshals, we analyzed documents related to the air marshal
training curriculum. In order to identify the curriculum in place before
the changes were made, we interviewed air marshals who had been with the
Service before September 2001. To understand the Service's curriculum from
September 2001 through July 2003, we evaluated class schedules, training
materials, and training data that tracked the completion of coursework and
firearms qualification training. We visited the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico and the Service's training center
in New Jersey, where we interviewed officials responsible for overseeing
the air marshal training program. In addition, we interviewed
representatives of the Air Line Pilots Association, the Air Transport
Association, and current and former air marshals.

To determine what management information and policies and procedures the
Service had developed to support its expanded mission and workforce, we
examined the Service's automated scheduling system and management
information on mission incidents, reported misconduct, and reasons for
separation. We analyzed the automated scheduling system data to determine
if the current system controls were operating as expected. Additionally,
to determine the extent of sick leave use and to address allegations of
excessive use, we analyzed the "sick calls" generated from the scheduling
system between July and October 2002. We also reviewed and discussed with
Service management its policies and procedures for air marshals' transfers
between offices, dress code requirements, and work schedules.

To determine how many newly hired air marshals have left the Service and
why, we used agency data on the number of air marshals on board, hired,
and separated each month; supervisory memorandums summarizing exit
interviews; resignation letters; personnel action forms; and the Service's
summary database on separations. Using the summary database, we determined
the number of air marshals who separated, by reason, and calculated the
percentage of total employees that separated for a specific reason. We
discussed the process for collecting these data with agency officials
responsible for maintaining the Service's personnel data from the
Service's Human Resource Center in New Jersey. The Service provided

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

information on the processing and maintenance of its data and on the
relationships among its data systems. When we had concerns about the
consistency and validity of the data, we asked agency officials to address
each concern. On the basis of the information provided by the agency and
our review, we determined that the required data elements were adequate
for the purpose of this work.

To gain a basic understanding of the issues surrounding staff decisions to
leave the Service, we reviewed the agency's separation data. For each
departed staff, these data capture only one predominant reason (for
leaving). To supplement this analysis, we selected 95 cases (36 percent of
264 separation cases) that had some form of documentation, had occurred at
various times between January 2002 and March 2003, and had originated at
various field offices. For each selected case, we reviewed any available
resignation letters, exit interviews, and forms documenting personnel
actions. This approach allowed us to conduct a limited quality check of
the Service's data and determine whether reasons outside of those reported
by the Service provided a broader view of air marshals' reasons for
leaving the Service.

To get a better understanding of the types of misconduct that air marshals
have been charged with, we reviewed the electronic spreadsheets that the
Service uses to track the status of each case of reported misconduct. The
spreadsheets included cases reported between October 2001 and July 2003.
We sorted the cases of misconduct by category to determine if a particular
category was prevalent. We also spoke with Service management about the
adjudication of alleged misconduct and the issues related to the
completeness and definition of misconduct measures.

To determine the types and frequency of the mission reports submitted by
air marshals, we analyzed the database maintained by the Federal Air
Marshals' Mission Operations Control Center. This database contained
approximately 1,600 incidents that were reported by air marshals between
September 11, 2001, and September 16, 2003. We then sorted the incidents
into broad categories, including mission-related incidents and incidents
that occurred between air marshals and airport or airline personnel. We
also received information on the Service's use and dissemination of the
incident data from the Special Agent in Charge of Field Operations.

We reviewed the DOT IG's report on the Federal Air Marshal program as an
additional source of information about the Service. This report evaluated
various aspects of the Service, including its selection and hiring process
and its procedures for properly training and fully qualifying air

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

marshals to respond to incidents aboard aircraft. For one aspect of the
report, the IG interviewed 112 air marshals in a one-on-one format at
their field office duty stations. The air marshals were not selected for
interview using structured or random selection methods. Information
obtained through these interviews highlights employee concerns with the
Service but is anecdotal and therefore cannot be projected to the universe
of the Service's air marshal workforce.

Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the Federal Air Marshal Service

Figure 1: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Gender, by Percentage,
as of August 2003

Figure 2: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Age, by Percentage, as
of August 2003

Appendix II: Demographic Profile of the Federal Air Marshal Service

Figure 3: Federal Air Marshal Service Workforce by Race, by Percentage, as
of August 2003

Appendix III: Locations of the Federal Air Marshal Service's 21 Field Offices
and Training Facility

Appendix IV: Events Affecting the Federal Air Marshal Service, September 2001
through October 2002

            aThe exact number of federal air marshals is classified.

Appendix V: Mission-Related Incidents Reported by Federal Air Marshals, by Broad
Categories, September 15, 2001 - September 16, 2003

       Incident category Number of incidents reported Percentage of total

Suspicious person 444

Suspicious activities by person 394

                    Issues with airport or airline personnel

o  Assigned seating and/or boarding procedures 159

o  Screening and/or escort procedures 106

o  Check-in procedures 59

o  Flight crew briefings 57

Subtotal: (Issues with airport or airline personnel) 381

Suspect items or objects 164

Third-party information reported to air marshal 129

Undercover status compromised 113

Disruptive/disorderly person 73

Security breeches 49

Medical problems 35

Arrest/detainment by or at request of air marshal 28

Interference with flight crew by passenger 20

Verbal threats or threatening behavior 19

         Use of nonlethal force by an air marshal           16            0.8 
                         Searches                           12            0.5 
               Equipment retrieval/turn-in                   7            0.3 
      Tampering with aircraft or aircraft equipment          4            0.2 
           Discharge of an air marshal firearm               3            0.2 
                     To be determined                        2             .1 
                      Not applicable                         1            0.1 
                          Other                             189             9 
                          Total                            2,083          100 

Source: Federal Air Marshal Incident Reports Database, September 15, 2001,
through September 16, 2003.

Notes: Total includes some incidents counted more than once, because
multiple codes for a reportable incident might have been reported (e.g., a
suspicious person incident might also have been reported as a drunk and
disorderly incident). The information above represents the major
categories of information on incidents that air marshals report to the
Service's Operations Center.

Appendix VI: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and
Organizational Transformations

Practice Implementation step

Ensure top leadership drives the  o  Define and articulate a succinct and
transformation. compelling reason for change.

o  	Balance continued delivery of services with merger and transformation
activities.

Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the
transformation.

o  	Adopt leading practices for resultsoriented strategic planning and
reporting.

                      Focus on a key set of principles and

o  Embed core values in every aspect of the

priorities at the outset of the transformation.

                   organization to reinforce the new culture.

Set implementation goals and a  o  Make public implementation goals and

timeline to build momentum and show timeline.

progress from day one.  o  	Seek and monitor employee attitudes and take
appropriate follow-up actions.

o  	Identify cultural features of merging organizations to increase
understanding of former work environments.

o  Attract and retain key talent.

o  	Establish an organizationwide knowledge and skills inventory to allow
knowledge exchange among merging organizations.

Dedicate an implementation team to  o  Establish networks to support
manage the transformation process. implementation team.

o  Select high-performing team members.

Use the performance management  o  Adopt leading practices to implement

system to define the responsibility and effective performance management
assure accountability for change. systems with adequate safeguards.

Establish a communication strategy to  o  Communicate early and often to
build
create shared expectations and report trust.
related progress.  o  Ensure consistency of message.

o  Encourage two-way communication.

o  	Provide information to meet specific needs of employees.

Involve employees to obtain their ideas  o  Use employee teams.

and gain ownership for the  o  Involve employees in planning and
transformation. sharing performance information.

o  	Incorporate employee feedback into new policies and procedures.

o  	Delegate authority to appropriate organizational levels.

Build a world-class organization.  o  	Adopt leading practices to build a
worldclass organization.

Source: GAO-03-699.

Appendix VII: Contacts and Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts 	Gerald Dillingham, (202) 512-2834 Carol Anderson-Guthrie,
(214) 777-5739

Acknowledgments 	In addition to those named above, Bess Eisenstadt, David
Hooper, Kevin Jackson, Maren McAvoy, Minette Richardson, Laura Shumway,
Rick Smith, Gladys Toro, and Alwynne Wilber made key contributions to this
report.

(540078)

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