Depot Maintenance: Army Needs Plan to Implement Depot Maintenance
Report's Recommendations (08-JAN-04, GAO-04-220).		 
                                                                 
Each year, the U.S. Army spends about $3 billion on depot-level  
maintenance and repair work for weapons systems and other	 
equipment. However, because its data gathering and reporting	 
processes have been limited, the Army historically has been	 
unable to fully identify how much depotlevel maintenance takes	 
place outside its five public depots. As a result, it has not	 
been able to determine with precision how well it was meeting	 
statutory requirements to limit contracted depot-level		 
maintenance work to 50 percent of the program budget. In the	 
House report on the Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization Act,  
Congress directed the Army to report on the proliferation of	 
depot-level maintenance work at nondepot facilities and asked GAO
to review that report. GAO examined the extent to which (1) the  
Army's report identifies the amount of depot-level maintenance	 
work done outside public depots; (2) the Army can account for its
depot-level maintenance workload, as required by statute; and (3)
the corrective actions in the report are likely to address the	 
proliferation issue and enhance the Army's reporting.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-220 					        
    ACCNO:   A09053						        
  TITLE:     Depot Maintenance: Army Needs Plan to Implement Depot    
Maintenance Report's Recommendations				 
     DATE:   01/08/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Army facilities					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Equipment maintenance				 
	     Maintenance costs					 
	     Private sector					 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Work measurement					 
	     Army procurement					 
	     Noncompliance					 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Underreporting					 

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GAO-04-220

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Committees

January 2004

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

    Army Needs Plan to Implement Depot Maintenance Report's Recommendations

GAO-04-220

Highlights of GAO-04-220, a report to Senate and House Armed Services
Committees

Each year, the U.S. Army spends about $3 billion on depot-level
maintenance and repair work for weapons systems and other equipment.
However, because its data gathering and reporting processes have been
limited, the Army historically has been unable to fully identify how much
depotlevel maintenance takes place outside its five public depots. As a
result, it has not been able to determine with precision how well it was
meeting statutory requirements to limit contracted depot-level maintenance
work to 50 percent of the program budget. In the House report on the
Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed the Army to
report on the proliferation of depot-level maintenance work at nondepot
facilities and asked GAO to review that report. GAO examined the extent to
which (1) the Army's report identifies the amount of depot-level
maintenance work done outside public depots; (2) the Army can account for
its depot-level maintenance workload, as required by statute; and (3) the
corrective actions in the report are likely to address the proliferation
issue and enhance the Army's reporting.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army develop an action plan to
implement the recommendations in the Army's 2003 maintenance proliferation
report. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-220.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202)
512-8412 or [email protected].

January 2004

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Army Needs Plan to Implement Depot Maintenance Report's Recommendations

The Army's proliferation report, issued in September 2003, did not fully
identify the extent of depot-level maintenance work performed outside the
Army's public depots. The report estimated that the Army underreported its
fiscal year 2001 $2.7 billion depot-level maintenance program by $188.6
million but indicated that this was a rough estimate and that further
analysis is needed. It attributed this underreporting largely to work
performed in two categories-work that met the criteria for depot-level
maintenance work but was not reported as such and work at nondepot field
facilities that involved depot-level maintenance tasks. GAO's prior
reviews also identified these categories as key contributors to
underreporting. While the report noted that the Army has an extensive
maintenance infrastructure with redundant capabilities, it did not address
the extent of this redundancy.

The lack of complete information on the extent of depot-level maintenance
workloads limits the Army's ability to fully account for this work in the
Department of Defense's (DOD) annual report to Congress on the allocation
of public- and private-sector depot-level maintenance spending. The 2003
proliferation report identified key Army limitations, including
inconsistencies in applying the congressionally mandated definition of
"depot maintenance," weaknesses in its management information systems, and
the failure to follow established policies and procedures for authorizing
depot-level maintenance work at nondepot facilities. GAO's current
analysis and prior work confirmed that these limitations make it difficult
for the Army to fully account for its maintenance workload as it moves
closer to the 50 percent ceiling for work performed by contractors. GAO's
most recent report on the Army's 50-50 reporting for fiscal year 2002
showed that, after adjustments for known underreporting, the percentage of
private-sector work increased to 49 percent.

If implemented, the 29 recommendations in the 2003 report could enhance
the Army's ability to report on its 50-50 data and to evaluate the
proliferation of depot-level maintenance work at nondepot facilities. The
recommendations, which are consistent with those that GAO has previously
made, are focused on key problem areas, such as the need for an improved
understanding about the 50-50 rule and for compliance with reporting
policies and procedures. Efforts have been undertaken to address some of
the problem areas. However, the Army has not yet developed an action plan
that identifies priorities, time frames, roles and responsibilities,
evaluation criteria, and resources for managing the implementation of the
recommendations. Until the Army does this, it will be difficult to assess
to what extent the Army is likely to meet its desired objectives. While
improvements should be accomplished, the complexity and vastness of the
Army's maintenance system and continuing questions about such issues as
the definition of "depot maintenance" and changing maintenance strategies
could continue to present challenges in fully recording all maintenance
work that should be captured.

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Army's 2003 Proliferation Report Did Not Fully Identify Depot-

Level Maintenance Performed outside Public Depots Army Cannot Provide
Congress with a Complete Accounting of Its Depot-Level Maintenance Work
Army Needs Action Plan to Address Proliferation and Reporting

Issues Conclusions Recommendation Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      2 4

                                       9

14

19 26 27 27

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II Army Maintenance Sites

Appendix III Army Report's Issues and Recommendations

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products

  Tables

Table 1: Categories in Which Depot-Level Maintenance Work Was Not
Identified in Fiscal Year 2001 10 Table 2: Capacity and Capability
Information on 17 Sites That GAO Visited 32

  Figures

Figure 1: Army Maintenance Structure 6 Figure 2: Various Army Maintenance
Facilities 12

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office

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separately.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

January 8, 2004

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Each year the Department of Defense (DOD) submits a report to Congress
showing that billions of dollars have been spent on depot maintenance and
repairs for Army weapons systems and support equipment.1 In recent
years, depot-level maintenance and repair work has expanded from the
traditional fixed-location public depots to numerous nondepot repair
facilities in the field. This shifting of depot-level maintenance workload
to
field facilities has contributed to uncertainty about the magnitude of
depot-level maintenance capabilities and the distribution of work between
public and private facilities. In October 1999, we reported on the Army's
first congressionally directed report on the proliferation of depot-level
maintenance activities at nondepot facilities, noting that the Army faced
a number of continuing challenges in attempting to address the
fragmentation of depot-level maintenance work and the proliferation of
depot-level maintenance facilities. We noted that the Army's report did
not

1According to 10 U.S.C. 2460, depot maintenance workloads include (1)
materiel maintenance and repair requiring the overhaul, upgrading, or
rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or subassemblies and (2) testing and
reclamation of equipment as necessary, regardless of the source of funds
or the location where the work is performed. 10 U.S.C. 2466 requires
annual reports of public- and private-sector expenditures for depot
maintenance services and stipulates that no more than 50 percent of annual
depot maintenance funding provided for military departments and defense
agencies can be used for work accomplished by contractors. These reports
are generally referred to as "50-50 reports."

sufficiently identify the extent of depot-level maintenance work performed
at nondepot facilities.2

In the House Armed Services Committee's report on the fiscal year 2001
defense authorization act,3 Congress directed the Secretary of the Army to
provide a report that identifies the proliferation of depot-level
maintenance performed outside of the five public depots. The Army formally
submitted its report in September 2003. The committee's report also
requested that we provide a review of the Army's report, including an
assessment of the Army's ability to comply with 10 U.S.C. 2466, which
governs the distribution of depot-level maintenance funds between public
and private facilities. Our review addresses the extent to which (1) the
Army's report identifies the amount of depot-level maintenance work
performed outside the public depots, (2) the Army can account for its
depot-level maintenance workload as required by 10 U.S.C. 2466, and (3)
the corrective actions in the Army report are likely to address the
proliferation of depot-level maintenance activities and enhance the
accuracy and completeness of 50-50 reporting.

To address these objectives, we drew largely from the body of work we have
done in the past on the Army's depot-level maintenance issues. In
addition, we interviewed officials at Army headquarters, Army major
commands, and maintenance facilities at selected field installations to
gain a better understanding of the implications of the Army report's
findings and recommendations. A detailed description of our scope and
methodology is included in appendix I.

The Army's 2003 report does not fully identify the extent of depot-level
maintenance work performed at nondepot facilities and, thus, is not fully
responsive to the mandate's requirement that the Army identify the
proliferation of these types of facilities. The report's identification of
proliferation was limited to an estimated $188.6 million that the Army
might have underreported in its $2.7 billion depot-level maintenance
program for fiscal year 2001. This amount was said to be a preliminary
rough estimate that needed further validation and, in our view, is not
fully

  Results in Brief

2See U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: Army Report
Provides Incomplete Assessment of Depot-Type Capabilities, GAO/NSIAD-00-20
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 1999).

3House Report 106-616 (May 12, 2000).

indicative of all the depot-level maintenance work being done at nondepot
facilities. The report indicated that this underreporting was largely due
to the performance of depot-level maintenance tasks by nondepot facilities
in such areas as (1) programs that did not identify depot-level
maintenance work tasks but met the criteria for depot-level maintenance
work and (2) field-level maintenance involving depot-level tasks. From our
prior work and current analysis, we agree that these two areas are major
contributors to the Army's underreporting of its depot-level maintenance
work. Although the report pointed out that the Army has an extensive
maintenance infrastructure with redundant capabilities and capacities, it
did not provide any information on the extent of this redundancy or the
types of maintenance facilities that could be consolidated. Otherwise, the
Army's report was consistent with our findings in recent years and our
work for this engagement.

The lack of complete information on the extent of depot-level maintenance
work performed in nondepot facilities limits the accuracy and completeness
of DOD's annual report to Congress on the allocation of depot-level
maintenance funds between the public and private sectors. In our analysis
of the Army's 50-50 reporting, we have said that underreporting depot work
at nondepot facilities is one of the limitations affecting the Army's
ability to fully account for its depot-level maintenance work. Consistent
with our prior work in this area, the Army's report identified several key
factors affecting the Army's ability to precisely capture and report its
depot-level maintenance data at nondepot facilities. These factors include
(1) the inconsistent application of the congressionally mandated
definition of "depot maintenance" and related guidance, (2) weaknesses in
management information systems for collecting and reporting workload data,
and (3) the failure to follow established policies and procedures for
authorizing depot-level work at field-level facilities and outsourcing
depot-level maintenance workloads. Our current analysis and our prior work
identify these factors as underlying causes affecting the Army's
determination that it has complied with the 50-50 depot-funding
requirement. While neither the Army nor we can precisely quantify the
extent of depot-level maintenance work that should have been included in
the 50-50 analysis, this information is key for the Army to effectively
manage its depot-level maintenance program and for ensuring the accurate
and complete reporting of where depot-level maintenance is being performed
as required by the 50-50 legislation. Such data become even more
significant as the Army moves closer to the ceiling permitted for work
performed by contractors. For example, the Army's depot-level maintenance
data for fiscal year 2002 indicated that funding in the private sector for
depot-level maintenance was below the 50 percent

limit. However, our adjustments for known errors in reporting increased
the percentage of private-sector work to 49 percent from the 46.5 percent
reported by the Army. An increase of more than 1 percent in the use of the
private sector to perform more depot-level maintenance in the future could
cause the Army to exceed its statutory limitation and thereby be required
to seek a national security waiver and notify Congress as provided for in
10 U.S.C. 2466.

If fully implemented, the recommendations in the Army's report could
improve the identification of additional depot-level maintenance work in
nondepot facilities, resulting in improving the accuracy and completeness
of the 50-50 reporting. The Army's proliferation report generally
addressed key problem areas, and the recommendations were consistent with
recommendations we have made in the past. Efforts have been undertaken to
address some of the problem areas; however, no action plan to manage the
implementation has been developed. Evaluating the success of the proposed
29 recommendations will be difficult until the Army develops an action
plan with priorities, time frames, responsible organizations, and
evaluation criteria, and until the resources required have been
identified. At the same time, while improvements should be accomplished,
the complexity and vastness of the Army's maintenance system and
continuing questions about such issues as the definition of "depot
maintenance" and changing maintenance strategies could continue to present
challenges in fully recording all depot-level maintenance work that should
be captured.

In this report, we are recommending that the Army establish a plan to
manage the implementation of the recommendations in the depot
proliferation report. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD
concurred with our recommendation, noting that the Army is establishing an
integrated product team to develop an action plan. The response stated
that some of the recommendations in the Army's report would require
modification.

Background 	The Army uses maintenance capabilities in both the public and
private sectors to maintain, overhaul, and repair its military weapons
systems, such as missiles, combat vehicles, tactical vehicles, aircraft,
and communication and electronic equipment. The level at which maintenance
work is performed depends largely on authorized capability, worker skills,
and predefined work requirements. Legislative requirementswhich
play an important role in managing the allocation of depot-level
maintenance workmandate that DOD provide Congress with annual
reports on the

distribution of funding for depot-level maintenance workloads in the
public and private sectors.

The Army assigns maintenance work to four categories-unit support, direct
support, general support, and depot-level support.4 Unit and direct
support workloads, which are limited to routine or recurring requirements,
such as oil changes and the removal and replacement of components, are
performed at military units in field locations and funded by direct
appropriations for operations and maintenance.

General support, which consists of the repair and overhaul of parts and
assemblies and some end items such as trucks, is generally performed at
fixed (nonmobile) industrial facilities located on Army posts, camps, and
stations, and it is funded by direct appropriations for operations and
maintenance.5 Military personnel, government-employed civilians, or
contractor employees may perform this maintenance.

Depot-level support, which includes the overhaul; upgrading; and
rebuilding of parts, assemblies, and subassemblies; and testing and
reclamation of equipment, is the most intensive category of maintenance
and requires the highest level of skilled workers and more sophisticated
test and plant equipment. It traditionally has been performed by (1)
government-employed civilians working at government-owned industrial
facilities under the command and control of the Army Materiel Command
(currently five public depots) or (2) contractor personnel working in
contractor owned and operated facilities performing work specified by Army
Materiel Command-managed maintenance contracts. The Army's five
government-operated maintenance depots6 are managed within the Army
Working Capital Fund.7 Contract depot-level maintenance work is not
managed under the working capital fund.

4The Army's maintenance structure for aircraft and components has only
three categories: unit, intermediate, and depot.

5One key exception is the cost of military personnel involved in this
category of work, which is accounted for in a separate, centrally managed,
Military Personnel appropriations account.

6The five public depots are located at Anniston, Ala.; Corpus Christi,
Tex.; Chambersburg, Pa.; Texarkana, Tex.; and Tobyhanna, Pa.

7Using working capital funds, organizations sell goods and services to
customers on the basis of rates designed to recoup the full cost of
operations.

Figure 1: Army Maintenance Structure

The Army has two categories of depot-level maintenance activities:

o  	Activities that have been designated and organized by design and
purpose to primarily perform depot-level maintenance and repair tasks.
These activities would include the Army Materiel Command's public depots;
the Army's forward deployed maintenance depots; and contractor depots,
primarily located at both the national and installation levels.

o  	Activities below the depot level that have been granted approval to
perform specific depot-level tasks through a special or one-time
authorization or that have been designated as a source of repair. These
activities include Army National Guard Readiness Sustainment Maintenance
Sites and Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depots, Army Reserve
Installation Materiel Maintenance Activities, and Army Forces Command
Contract Maintenance Facilities. These activities are primarily located at
the installation level, and the work may be done by either government or
contractor personnel.

Operations of the Army depots are guided by legislative requirements that
divide the amount of depot work between the public and private sectors and
add specificity to how such work is to be defined. For example, 10 U.S.C.
2464 provides for a government owned and operated core logistics
capability that is sufficient to ensure an effective and timely response
to a mobilization or other national emergency. Also, 10 U.S.C. 2466
generally prohibits the use of more than 50 percent of the funds made
available in a fiscal year for depot-level maintenance and repair by
nonfederal personnel.

In addition, 10 U.S.C. 2460 defines depot-level maintenance to encompass
material maintenance or repair requiring the overhaul, upgrading, or
rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or subassemblies and the testing and
reclamation of equipment, regardless of the source of funds for the
maintenance or repair or the location where maintenance or repair work is
performed. Depot-level maintenance also encompasses software maintenance,
interim contractor support,8 and contractor logistics support9 to the
extent that work performed in these areas is depot-level maintenance. The
statute excludes from depot-level maintenance the nuclear refueling of an
aircraft carrier, the procurement of major modifications or upgrades of
weapons systems that are designed to improve program performance, and the
procurement of parts for safety modifications, although the term "depot
maintenance" does cover the installation of parts for safety
modifications. Congress has made changes to various depot-level
maintenance requirements over the years. For example, the 1998 Defense
Authorization Act established a statutory definition of depot-level
maintenance and repair and increased DOD's authority to use its
depot-level maintenance funds for the private sector's performance of the
work from 40 to 50 percent.10

On the basis of statutory language defining depot-level maintenance, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense issues annual guidance to the military
departments for reporting their public-private workload allocations. The

8Interim contractor support is designed to be an interim arrangement in
which a contractor provides depot-level maintenance (and sometimes other
logistics support) as part of the acquisition strategy for new systems.

9Contractor logistics support is designed to be a lifetime support concept
in which a contractor provides most or all elements of logistics support,
including depot-level maintenance.

10Pub. L. No. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997) sections 355 and 357.

military departments also issue internal instructions to manage the data
collection and reporting process tailored to their individual
organizations and operating environments.

As we have reported in recent years in examining DOD's compliance with its
so-called "50-50 requirement" under 10 U.S.C. 2466, all of the military
departments have continuing data errors and inconsistencies in reporting
and problems in documenting and independently validating their annual
reports. We also have recognized the limitations of their financial
systems, operations, and controls, as well as their continuing inability
to capture and report the full costs of depot-level maintenance programs.
Some of our most recent reports on depot-level maintenance issues are
listed in the Related GAO Products section of this report.

We previously reported that the Army had not sufficiently identified the
extent of depot-level maintenance work performed at nondepot facilities in
its April 14, 1999, report to the House Committee on Armed Services on
depot proliferation.11 While the Army's report indicated that 40 staff
years of depot-level maintenance work was performed outside of the formal
depot system by nondepot maintenance providers operating under specialized
repair authorities, it also recognized that the figure was likely
understated for a variety of reasons to include limitations in systems and
procedures to fully quantify such work. We agreed. We also noted that in
July 1999 the Army designated its Army Materiel Command as its National
Maintenance Manager with responsibility for overseeing the Army's
logistics and maintenance support programs and managing maintenance
facilities. In doing so, we noted then that while the Army recognized that
it needed to modify and standardize Army data systems to fully account for
depot-level maintenance work at all locations, it had not established
clear action plans, milestones, and funding requirements for doing so.

Our September 2003 report on DOD's compliance with the 50-50 requirement
found that the Army's latest reporting on depot-level workloads for fiscal
years 2001 and 2002 had utilized a new, more centralized financial system
to collect 50-50 data that corrected some of the transcription errors we
had found the previous year but that we continued to find errors,
omissions, and inconsistencies in its data.12

11See GAO/NSIAD-00-20.

12See U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: DOD's 50-50
Reporting Should Be Streamlined, GAO-03-1023 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5,
2003).

  Army's 2003 Proliferation Report Did Not Fully Identify Depot-Level
  Maintenance Performed outside Public Depots

Moreover, we reported that, as in prior years, the Army underreported
public- and private-sector depot-level maintenance work at field locations
as it continues unfinished efforts to consolidate maintenance activities
and better control the proliferation of depot-level tasks at nondepot
facilities.

Although the mandate directed the Army to identify the proliferation of
depot-level maintenance performed outside the public depots, the Army's
report on depot-level maintenance proliferation did not fully identify the
extent of depot-level maintenance work performed at nondepot facilities.
Instead, the report estimated that depot-level maintenance work valued at
$188.6 million for fiscal year 2001 was not included in the Army's
depotlevel maintenance data and that further validation of this amount was
needed. While this estimate may not be fully indicative of depot-level
maintenance work being performed outside the public depots, it indicates
underreporting in this area that is consistent with the observations we
have made in our prior work. Although the report recognized that the Army
has redundant capabilities and capacities, it did not provide any
information on the extent of this redundancy or the extent of maintenance
activities that could be consolidated. We also have previously reported
the existence of this problem.13

    Estimate of Work outside Depots Is Incomplete

While the Army's report provided an estimate of depot-level maintenance
work that was not appropriately identified as such in fiscal year 2001, it
acknowledged that the amount was incomplete and needed further validation.
The report listed seven specific areas where depot-level maintenance work
performed by nondepot facilities was not identified and estimated this
amounted to be $188.6 million. As illustrated by table 1, most of the
unidentified amount occurred in field-level facilities that perform
depot-level maintenance tasks. According to the report, two categories of
work accounted for about 75 percent of the $188.6 million. These were
facilities that performed field-level maintenance under the National
Maintenance Program14 with embedded depot tasks and those

13See GAO/NSIAD-00-20.

14The National Maintenance Program is the Army's ongoing action to
establish a fully integrated national maintenance requirements process
that includes all depot-level maintenance requirements, regardless of the
location of the work in a field facility or a maintenance depot.

under One-Time Repair authorizations.15 The report pointed out that some
of the unidentified depot-level maintenance work resulted from a
misunderstanding between the Army Materiel Command and its subordinate
commands over which organization would report this type of work.

Table 1: Categories in Which Depot-Level Maintenance Work Was Not
Identified in Fiscal Year 2001

                 Category of work not identified Amount Percent

1. The overhaul, upgrading, and rebuilding of equipment that met the
definition of depot-level maintenance. $3.3

2. Reimbursable depot support at the installation level. 22.4 11.9

3. Maintenance covered by warranty associated with the purchase price of
equipment. 4.0

4. Field-level maintenance under the National Maintenance Program with
embedded depot-level tasks. 75.9 40.2

5. Contract support at a public depot. 10.4

6. Maintenance tasks performed under Specialized Repair Authority. 7.6

7. Maintenance tasks performed under One-Time Repair authorization at
field-level facilities. 65.0 34.5

                               Total $188.6 100.0

Source: U.S. Army's 2003 Proliferation Report.

The report's identification of unidentified depot-level maintenance work
performed by nondepot facilities is consistent with our prior reviews of
the Army's annual 50-50 data. For example, in our most recent report, we
identified work categories such as unreported one-time repair actions and
unreported work by commands that did not receive Army reporting guidance,
which contributed to the Army's inability to fully account for its
depot-level maintenance work in 2002.16 We noted that, as in past years,
the Army did not fully identify public- and private-sector depot-level
maintenance work at field locations as it continued unfinished efforts to
consolidate maintenance activities and better control the proliferation of
depot-level tasks at nondepot locations. While neither we nor the Army can
precisely identify the amount of depot-level maintenance work being

15One-Time Repair actions are depot repairs that are accomplished at
nondepot locations following an organization's request and approval to do
this work on a limited basis.

16See GAO-03-1023.

performed in nondepot maintenance facilities, our prior work and the
Army's latest report suggest that the $188.6 million estimate should not
be construed as fully representing the amount of depot-level maintenance
work performed at nondepot facilities.

    Army Has an Extensive Maintenance Infrastructure, but Capacity for Depot
    Maintenance Activities at Nondepot Locations Has Not Been Fully Addressed

The Army's proliferation report pointed out that the Army's maintenance
infrastructure has redundant capabilities and capacities that could be
consolidated and streamlined to be more cost-effective. While the active
Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve operate extensive maintenance
facilities, some of which have the capability and capacity to perform
depot-level maintenance work, the report did not provide any data to
quantify the extent of redundancy or identify any possible candidates for
consolidation. It did suggest that the Army further study the issue for
opportunities to streamline its current expansive depot-level maintenance
infrastructure. Moreover, the Army's full implementation of its National
Maintenance Programanother report recommendationis also
intended to address streamlining the Army's maintenance infrastructure.

While we did not attempt to identify the full extent of this maintenance
infrastructure as part of this review, our analysis supports the Army
report's contention that the Army has extensive nondepot facilities, some
of which have the capability and capacity for depot-level maintenance
tasks and are performing depot-level maintenance work. At the Army sites
we visited, we observed maintenance activities involved with all levels of
maintenance for ground and aviation systems. Similar to the Army's public
depots, these activities occupied large facilities that included machine
shops, automobile and heavy-equipment repair shops, paint and body shops,
and sandblasting areas. The pictures in figure 2 show some contrast and
similarities in maintenance facilities at depot and nondepot locations.

                 Figure 2: Various Army Maintenance Facilities

Some of the activities had the capability and capacity for depot-level
maintenance activities and were performing depot-level maintenance work.
For example, the Readiness Business Center at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, has
been authorized to perform depot-level maintenance tasks to repair
components for tactical wheeled vehicles, radios, and helicopters. Of the
total $27.1 million maintenance work performed by the Business Center in
fiscal year 2002, about $4.5 million, or about 17 percent, was identified
as depot-level maintenance. Also maintenance officials at several
facilities at Fort Riley, Kansasthree of them operated by the
National Guard, one by the Fort Riley Directorate of Logistics, one by the
Forces Command, and one by the Army Reserveestimated that their
maintenance work for fiscal year 2002 totaled about $58.5 million. The
National Guard performed about $35 million worth of depot-level
maintenance in fiscal year 2002 and expects this workload to significantly
increase. More details on the Army's maintenance infrastructure are
provided in appendix II.

We have previously reported on the Army's proliferation of facilities that
perform depot-level maintenance work and the lack of a strategic plan for
depots to guide its decisions on this issue. In an October 1999 report, we
pointed out that the Army's April 1999 study of the proliferation of
depot-level maintenance activities at nondepot facilities did not
sufficiently identify the extent of this type work.17 We also highlighted
that the Army's study, citing inadequate data on the subject of
proliferation, did not make any recommendations for consolidating
depot-level maintenance facilities. We noted that a key challenge that the
Army faced was determining and overseeing the amount of depot-level
maintenance capabilities controlled by major commands in the active Army
and the Army National Guard. For various reasons, these commands were
reluctant to reduce their present capability for performing depot-level
maintenance workloads. For example, Reserve and National Guard Bureau
officials said that having local maintenance facilities capable of
performing some depot-level tasks was a readiness issue in that such
facilities allowed their units more rapid turnaround time on equipment
requiring this type of repair.

In July 2003 we reported that work performed in the Army's public depots
had declined by 36 percent from fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year 2002,

17See GAO/NSIAD-00-20.

  Army Cannot Provide Congress with a Complete Accounting of Its Depot-Level
  Maintenance Work

while the total depot-level maintenance program grew.18 We pointed out
that future workload projections indicated further decline but that the
full impact of the Iraq conflict on future depot-level workload was
largely unknown. Among the host of factors that contributed to this
decline were (1) DOD's policy for greater reliance on the private sector
for depot-level support of new weapons systems and major upgrades and (2)
its increased reliance on the use of regional repair activities and
private-sector contractors for work that might otherwise be done in the
depots. We noted that neither DOD nor the Army had a comprehensive and
current depot-level maintenance strategic plan, which was an essential
aspect of ensuring future depot efficiency and viability.

Without complete information on the extent of depot-level maintenance work
performed in nondepot facilities, DOD's annual report to Congress cannot
fully account for the allocation of depot-level maintenance funds between
the public and private sectors. In our analysis of DOD's 50-50 reporting,
we have said that underreporting depot work in nondepot facilities is one
of the limitations affecting the Army's ability to fully account for its
depot-level maintenance work. Consistent with our work in this area, the
Army's report on proliferation identifies a number of factors that
preclude the Army from fully capturing and reporting its depot-level
maintenance data at nondepot facilities. These factors include (1)
inconsistent application of the congressionally mandated definition of
"depot maintenance" and related guidance, (2) weaknesses in the management
information systems for collecting and reporting data, and (3) the failure
to follow established policies and procedures for authorizing depot-level
work at field-level facilities and outsourcing work. Our current analysis
and our prior work identify these factors as underlying causes affecting
the Army's determination that it has complied with the 50-50 rule.
Furthermore, these limitations will become more significant as the Army
approaches the statutory ceiling on the performance of depot-level
maintenance work by contract.

18See U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: Key Unresolved
Issues Affect the Army Depot System's Viability, GAO-03-682 (Washington,
D.C.: July 7, 2003).

    Underreported Depot-Level Work Performed by Nondepot Maintenance Facilities
    Affects Accuracy of 50-50 Report

Inconsistent Application of Depot-Level Maintenance Definition and 50-50
Guidance

We have reported in the past that by not having complete information on
the amount of depot-level maintenance work being performed in nondepot
facilities, DOD cannot provide Congress with an accurate and complete
report regarding the allocation of depot-level maintenance between the
public and private sectors as required by 10 U.S.C. 2466. For example, our
September 2003 report stated that our prior 50-50 reports have documented
continuing problems and shortcomings in accurately and consistently
reporting depot-level maintenance accomplished by both public- and
private-sector sources at nondepot locations.19 For example, one-time
depot repair actions at unit-level facilities went unreported. Other
nondepot work was not reported because some commands did not receive 50-50
instructions and others misapplied the guidance. Contractors performed
some of this work, and military or civilian government employees performed
some of it. While neither the Army nor we know the extent of unreported
work nor the amount performed by public- and private-sector employees, the
impact effectively limits the accuracy and completeness of DOD's report to
Congress on the allocation of depot-level maintenance funds between the
public and private sectors. Additionally, as discussed below, both the
Army and we have identified three key factors inhibiting the Army's
ability to accurately and completely report depot-level maintenance work
performed at nondepot facilities.

A key factor inhibiting the Army's ability to accurately and completely
identify all depot-level maintenance work performed in nondepot facilities
in DOD's 50-50 report is that Army military activities inconsistently
apply the congressionally mandated definition of "depot maintenance." The
Army's proliferation report concluded that the congressionally mandated
definition of depot-level maintenance is not widely known below the major
command headquarters. In addition, the definition is open to
interpretation, and the reporting guidance is not always well defined.

At most of the commands and installations we visited, maintenance
officials said that, in determining whether a maintenance task is
depot-level maintenance, they follow the guidance found in the Army's
Maintenance Allocation Charts; technical manuals; and source,
maintainability, and recovery codes for reparable components rather than
apply the congressionally mandated definition. They expressed concerns
that the congressional definition is not always consistent with this
guidance, is too broad, and is subject to too much interpretation over

19See GAO-03-1023.

what maintenance tasks should be counted as depot-level tasks. For
example, officials at the National Guard Bureau said that applying the
definition to repair work performed by direct support and general support
activities caused uncertainty in that the bureau considered most of the
work at these levels to be nondepot-level work and to identify what work
should be considered depot-level work required subjective decisions.
Officials at the Reserve Command said that, while only maintenance work
defined by the Army's technical manuals as depot-level work should be
reported as such, under the expanded definition of depot-level
maintenance, some work defined as below depot-level could involve
depot-level tasks such as changing and swapping out engines and
transmissions for wheeled vehicles. Officials at the installation
maintenance sites we visited made similar comments.

In commenting on the proliferation report, the Army Materiel Command said
that the application of the definition of depot-level maintenance
contributed to the report's findings that depot-level maintenance tasks at
nondepot facilities were being underreported. The command added that tasks
performed by these facilities were not distinguished as depot-level tasks
in the Army guidance but, in the aggregate, these tasks may be equivalent
to depot-level maintenance. Finally, the command said that the Army could
only approximate the extent of work performed at nondepot facilities
because it currently does not have a system to precisely capture
information on maintenance work for DOD's 50-50 report.

In prior reports, we have concluded that the Army had not revised its
maintenance policies and technical manuals to reflect the expanded
definition of depot-level maintenance and, as a result, any attempt to
estimate its extent at local facilities would be misleading.20 We also
recently reported that some Army commands did not receive 50-50
instructions and that others misapplied the guidance.21 The Army's 2003
report indicates that the Army will have to make these changes in its
maintenance policies and technical manuals. For example, in recognizing
that the Army had not yet incorporated the expanded definition into its
policies and procedures for 50-50 reporting, the Army's report suggested
that the Army (1) provide more explicit guidance for 50-50 reporting to
help ensure that its commands better understood reporting requirements and
(2) develop an easy-to-use reference guide to help the commands

20See GAO/NSIAD-00-20. 21See GAO-03-1023.

Army's Management Information Systems Are Inadequate

better determine what maintenance work should be included in the 50-50
report.

Inadequate Army management information systems are a second key factor
inhibiting the Army's ability to fully capture depot-level maintenance
work performed in nondepot facilities. The Army's problems with its
management information systems are longstanding. In a December 2000
report, the Army Logistics Transformation Agency concluded that the Army's
maintenance environment was characterized by many "stovepipe" information
systems and application programs that are predominately fed data manually
by maintainers and operators. It also concluded that a wide range of
maintenance-related information does not exist, is not adequate, or is not
accessible. In our prior reviews, we also have reported weaknesses in the
Army's management information system. For example, in our 1999 report, we
concluded that deficiencies in management information systems contributed
to the Army's inability to develop accurate and consistent estimates of
its depot-level maintenance work.22 In our September 2003 report on DOD's
compliance with the 50-50 requirement, we found that the Army's latest
reporting on depot-level workloads for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 had
utilized a new, more centralized financial system to collect 50-50 data.23
This new system helped correct some of the transcription errors we had
found the previous year, but we continued to find errors, omissions, and
inconsistencies in the Army's data.

The Army's proliferation report concluded that current management
information systems for capturing depot-level maintenance work at the
installation level are inadequate for collecting and reporting 50-50 data.
According to the report, the systems cannot, among other things, (1)
archive the data in a readily accessible manner or (2) allow for the
separate counting of multiple maintenance actions associated with a single
work order. (A work order may include three different levels of
maintenance, including depot-level maintenance, but only one maintenance
code can be assigned to the order.) Also the report pointed out that
collecting and reporting depot-level maintenance work outside the Army's
five public depots was a convoluted and manual process.

22See GAO/NSIAD-00-20. 23See GAO-03-1023.

Policies and Procedures for Authorizing Work Are Not Always Being Followed

Another factor inhibiting the accuracy and completeness of the 50-50
report is that policies and procedures for authorizing depot-level work in
nondepot facilities are not always followed. The Army's proliferation
report made the same conclusion and identified several areas where
reporting officials did not believe that maintenance facilities were
following policies and procedures for authorizing and reporting depotlevel
maintenance work. For example, the report noted that maintenance
facilities at the installation level were undertaking depot-level
maintenance work without having higher command authorization and that some
authorized one-time repairs were not being reported. The report also
concluded that some weapons systems managers were not following current
DOD and Army guidance in determining sources for providing depot-level
maintenance support.

In a prior report related to DOD's process for determining depot-level
maintenance repair strategies for its new weapons systems and major
upgrades, we noted that many weapons systems managers, including those in
the Army, were not following existing guidance regarding such tasks as
adequately performing required cost comparisons between public and private
facilities and coordinating maintenance support decisions between
acquisition and logistics officials.24 We noted that service officials
attributed these problems, in large part, to weaknesses in guidance, which
they believed was inadequate, unclear, and sometimes contradictory.

    Limitations More Significant for Future Assessment of 50-50 Compliance

As the Army moves closer to the statutory ceiling for the funding for
depot-level maintenance work performed in the private sector, the
limitations in the Army's ability to precisely capture its depot-level
maintenance work will become more significant. For fiscal year 2002, the
Army's reported data ($2.7 billion for the total program) indicated that
its funding in the private sector for depot-level maintenance remained
below the 50-percent limit. However, our adjustments for known errors in
reporting for that year increased the percentage of private-sector work to
49 percent from the 46.5 percent reported by the Army.25 An increase of
more than 1 percent in the use of the private sector to perform more
depot-level maintenance in the future, could cause the Army to exceed its

24See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD
Shifting More Workload for New Weapon Systems to the Private Sector,
GAO/NSIAD-98-8 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 31, 1998).

25See GAO-03-1023.

statutory limitation. Consequently, the Army would be required to seek a
national security waiver and notify Congress as provided for in 10 U.S.C.
2466(b).26

With regard to estimates of future compliance, the Army's report noted
that the Army might exceed the 50 percent ceiling for contractor support
by fiscal year 2006. More recently, an official from the Army Materiel
Command said that, for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the Army experienced a
3 to 5 percent increase in its contract requirements for depot-level
maintenance because increased operational requirements made the public
depots unable to meet the total demand for depot-level maintenance work.
She pointed out that, if this trend were to continue, the Army might have
to seek a waiver from the Secretary of Defense, possibly as early as
fiscal year 2004, to exceed the 50 percent limitation for work performed
by the private sector. Another official at the Army Materiel Command said
that the Army's depot-level maintenance work in 2004 might increase by
about $2.5 billion because of operational requirements for Army equipment
deployed in the Middle East. He also said that, in an effort to keep up
with maintenance demands, the Army's five public depots have used
extensive overtime, added second work shifts, hired temporary employees,
and allowed some retirees to return to work. In his view, the public
depots could not meet the demands of the increased maintenance work and
the Army would have to use more contractors.

The Army report's recommendations are focused on key problem areas and are
consistent with recommendations we have made in the past. If fully
implemented, the recommendations in the Army's proliferation report could
improve the identification of additional depot-level maintenance work in
nondepot facilities, and the accuracy and completeness of 50-50 reporting.
Efforts have been undertaken to address some of the problem areas;
however, no action plan to manage the implementation has been developed.
Evaluating the success of the proposed 29 recommendations will be
difficult until the Army develops an action plan with priorities, time
frames, responsible organizations, evaluation criteria, and the resources
required to implement these recommendations. If actions are not
implemented in a timely way, the Army will not likely have the

  Army Needs Action Plan to Address Proliferation and Reporting Issues

2610 U.S.C. 2466(b) provides that the Secretary of Defense may waive the
50 percent limitation if the Secretary determines that a waiver is
necessary for reasons of national security and notifies Congress regarding
the reasons for the waiver.

comprehensive information that it needs in the near term to comply with
the 50-50 reporting requirements or to effectively manage the existing
excess maintenance capabilities and infrastructure. On the other hand, the
extent of improvements likely to be achieved in the long term is
uncertain, given previous delays and the significant challenges that the
Army faces in instituting solutions to ensure the consistent application
of 50-50 reporting criteria.

    Recommendations Are Focused on Key Problem Areas

The Army report's recommendations present an array of corrective measures
that are focused on four key areas in which the Army could better evaluate
the proliferation of depot-level maintenance facilities and manage its
depot-level maintenance program. Appendix III lists the 29
recommendations. Basically, the key areas represent a need for the
following:

o  	Improved communication and emphasis for the 50-50 requirement. The 14
recommendations in this area address improving the 50-50 process. They
include conducting annual 50-50 workshops, issuing clear guidance for
50-50 reporting, publicizing information about the depot-level maintenance
program in professional publications, ensuring that compliance with the
50-50 rule becomes a priority, and developing an easy-to-use reference
guide to help reporting activities better identify depot-level maintenance
work that should be reported.

o  	Improved management information systems. The three recommendations in
this area address continuing efforts to develop a single integrated
management information system capable of capturing and reporting
depot-level maintenance work at nondepot facilities.

o  	Enhanced compliance with policies and procedures for depot-level
maintenance operations. The nine recommendations in this area address
revising policies to ensure consistency in compliance with all applicable
legislation, regulations, and policies; developing a policy requiring the
acquisition of access to system technical data for use by government or
other contract maintenance activities; and developing and implementing a
plan for documenting baseline data to compare contractor and public depot
support costs.

o  	Develop the National Maintenance Program and consolidate maintenance
activities. The three recommendations in this area address efforts to
develop the National Maintenance Program and to conduct further analyses
to identify opportunities for consolidating depot-level maintenance
facilities.

Of the Army proliferation report's 29 recommendations to improve the
identification and reporting of depot-level maintenance data, 3 were
specifically directed toward managing the proliferation of depot-level
maintenance at nondepot facilities. One of the recommendations identified
the need for additional study and identification.

    Recommendations Consistent with Our Prior Work

The proliferation report's recommendations are consistent with our prior
recommendations regarding the Army's proliferation of depot-level
maintenance facilities and the 50-50 reporting process. For example, in
September 2003, we recommended that the 50-50 reporting guidance be
appropriately disseminated to reporting organizations and individuals and
that staff be properly trained in a timely way to apply the guidance.27 In
October 1999, we recommended that the Army address the following
challenges:28

o  	Improving its management information systems. Our recommendation was
that the Army identify requisite action items, time frames, and funding
requirements for improving the Army's information management systems to
fully identify the magnitude and cost-effectiveness of depot-level
maintenance work at various locations within the Army.

o  	Finding opportunities to consolidate maintenance activities. We
recommended that the Army establish (1) clear time frames and action plans
for assessing requirements for the various types of depot-level
maintenance facilities and (2) plans for achieving necessary
consolidations and reductions of excess capabilities.

o  	Enhancing the National Maintenance Program. We recommended that the
Army incorporate the depot-level maintenance capabilities of both active
and reserve components under the National Maintenance Program and assign
the national maintenance manager with requisite responsibility and
authority for depot-level maintenance capabilities in active and reserve
facilities.

27See GAO-03-1023. 28See GAO/NSIAD-00-20.

While we made these recommendations 4 years ago, they continue to be
essential to addressing the problems of the proliferation of depot-level
maintenance facilities and inaccuracies in 50-50 reporting.

    Although Some Efforts Are Ongoing, Action Plan Not Yet Developed to Ensure
    Implementation of Recommendations in a Timely Manner

The Army's 2003 report noted that the Army had taken numerous steps since
1999 to improve its management of the proliferation of depot-level
maintenance facilities and its 50-50 data. However, the report pointed out
that the Army needed to implement the report's recommendations before it
can claim with complete confidence that it is meeting the 50-50
requirement. Headquarters officials responsible for the report told us
that the Army maintenance organizations concurred with the report's
recommendations. The Army has already begun implementing some of its
report's recommendations such as holding annual workshops and revising its
guidance to include the congressional definition of depot-level
maintenance. However, it has not yet developed an overall action plan for
managing the implementation of all of the recommendations and, in
particular, for setting priorities for the more-critical recommendations.

As the report indicates, corrective actions are essential to improving the
Army's ability to better manage the proliferation of maintenance
facilities and capture data for 50-50 reporting. Some of the critical
recommendations, such as the need to identify opportunities for
consolidating depot-level maintenance facilities, set up a single
integrated management information system capable of capturing all
depot-level maintenance data, and develop a National Maintenance Program
to better manage depot-level maintenance work have been in process for
several years. Thus, the identification of specific actions would appear
necessary to help the Army accomplish the implementation of these
recommendations more timely. A plan would include (1) the Army's priority
for implementing the recommendations, (2) the Army organizations
accountable for implementation, (3) the specific time frames for
accomplishment, (4) whether the benefits of accomplishment support the
cost of implementation, (5) the funding required and the source of funds,
and (6) the criteria to determine the effectiveness of the recommendations
once they are implemented.

Officials at the Army Communications-Electronics Command said that
streamlining maintenance facilities is a good idea, but they do not have
the tools that would enable the command to fully implement the
proliferation report's recommendations in this area. They said that
updating Army Regulation 750-1 (Army Materiel Maintenance Policy) and
conducting 50-50 workshops were a step in the right direction, but that
both actions

need to be more comprehensive in educating field-level personnel on policy
and requirements. For example, they pointed out that just reiterating the
congressional definition of depot-level maintenance in Army Regulation
750-1 did little to add clarity to the definition. Additionally, the last
two workshops were spent largely on training for the Depot Maintenance
Operations Planning System, a new system to be used by all Army major
commands and acquisition managers to capture and report annual 50-50
workload data. According to these personnel, this system appears extremely
complex and training should be aimed at those who are actually responsible
for reporting maintenance data. Officials at the National Guard Bureau
generally disagreed that the Army report's recommendations will ensure
accurate 50-50 reporting-especially in view of the apparent disconnect
between the recommendations and the Army's maintenance transformation
process, and the Army's plans for moving to two-level maintenance.29

Army Communications-Electronics Command officials also suggested that, for
timely and effective implementation, the Army establish a working group of
representatives with subject matter expertise from all levels within the
Army to oversee the implementation. Officials at Army headquarters who
were responsible for the report told us that they did not yet have a
formal action plan established. They said they were planning to establish
a working group in December 2003 to review the recommendations and
determine what actions needed to be taken.

    Long-term Improvements in 50-50 Reporting May Remain Problematic

As previously discussed the Army has taken steps to improve its
management of the proliferation of depot-level maintenance facilities
and its 50-50 reporting. The Army's 2003 report and our analysis
indicate that some of the key actions related to improving the Army's
long-standing issues in effectively identifying the proliferation of
depot-level maintenance facilities and improving its 50-50 reporting
have been in process for several years. The magnitude of long-term
improvements likely to be realized remains uncertain, given prior delays
in
instituting solutions and the inconsistent understanding and application
of
50-50 reporting criteria.

29The Army plans to reduce the size of its logistics infrastructure by
combining the current levels of maintenance into two levels: field-level,
which will be "repair and return to user," and sustainment-level, which
will be "repair and return to supply."

During our review, we observed that several actions related to the
recommendations had been under way for a number of years but that
completion dates had slipped and funding had become uncertain. For
example, the recommendation that the Army continue efforts to establish a
fully integrated national maintenance requirements determination process
that includes all depot-level maintenance requirements refers to a program
known as the National Maintenance Program. The Army initiated the program
in July 1999 and planned to implement it by fiscal year 2004. However,
full implementation has slipped to fiscal year 2006. Additionally,
required funding to complete the program is uncertain. Army Materiel
Command officials said that the program's goal is to centrally coordinate
and control depot-level maintenance work by developing standards for items
being repaired at qualified repair sources. They said that (1) the program
is helping to better identify and manage facilities that perform
depot-level maintenance outside the public depots; (2) the number of
maintenance facilities in the program has declined from 60 in fiscal year
2000 to 45 in fiscal year 2003, and these are expected to further decline
to 25 in fiscal year 2005 as the Army decides which facilities will be
qualified to perform depot-level maintenance work; and (3) the command was
working with other commands to reduce the number of nondepot maintenance
facilities.

Full implementation of the National Maintenance Program appears to be a
key initiative in addressing the proliferation of depot-level maintenance
facilities. At the same time, our analysis indicates that, although the
concept of the National Maintenance Program could help improve future
annual reporting and eliminate some of the current fragmented and
duplicative depot-level maintenance workload assignments, it is too early
to assess the program's full impact. The extent to which the program can
resolve all the problems related to the proliferation and inaccurate and
incomplete identification of depot-level maintenance work performed in
nondepot facilities is unclear. The Army's 2003 report noted that the
Army's schedule for completing the implementation of the National
Maintenance Program has slipped to fiscal year 2006. During our review, we
noted that, as of October 2003, the Army had completed standards for only
737about 18 percentof the 4,148 candidates for the
program. While an estimated development cost of about $120 million has
already been spent, the Army is a long way from having the required
standards that are needed for the program. An Army Materiel Command
official said that the Army was not planning to provide any additional
funding for the further development of these standards.

In a prior report, we observed that, while the program is intended to
consolidate and distribute overhaul work for components returned to the
supply system, the evolving management framework will continue to allow
local maintenance facilities to repair items returned directly to using
organizations-maintenance-to-maintenance transactions that could meet the
statutory definition of depot-level maintenance.30 Additionally, the
program did not include some other depot-level maintenance work. For
example, it does not address the allocation of depot-level maintenance
requirements for overhauling, rebuilding, or upgrading major end items
such as tactical wheeled vehicles that are currently being overhauled in
field-level maintenance facilities or by contracts managed by field-level
organizations even though this work meets the statutory definition of
depot-level maintenance work.

With regard to resolving deficiencies in management information systems,
it is uncertain when the required changes that will be capable of
capturing and reporting depot-level maintenance workloads performed in
nondepot facilities will be operational. In October 2003, the Army began
testing the transition of its database for Specialized Repair Authority
and One-Time Repair authorizations into an automated system referred to as
the Joint Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistic Support system.31 The
Army's 2003 report described this as an interim initiative to capture and
report on maintenance work performed under these two types of
authorizations. While this initiative will automate the capturing of this
work, it will not identify all depot-level maintenance work that may be
performed in fieldlevel facilities. For example, it will not capture
depot-level maintenance actions performed on equipment that will be
returned directly to the user without going through the Army's supply
system. A single integrated management information system is hoped for
when the Army's evolving Logistics Modernization Program is fully
implemented. Testing at the first site, the Tobyhanna Army Depot, is
ongoing, but problems have occurred. Earlier estimates of completion are
about 18 to 24 months, but some

30See GAO/NSIAD-00-20.

31The Joint Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistic Support system is a
multiservice program for developing the infrastructure to logistically
support weapons systems throughout their life cycle.

Conclusions

delays are expected.32 Additionally, to what extent it will resolve all
the deficiencies in the current systems is uncertain.

We believe that the Army's implementation of our prior recommendations, as
well as the recommendations made in the Army's proliferation report, are
essential to providing the Army with more precise information for crucial
decisions in the area of the Army's depot-level maintenance
infrastructure. Their timely and effective implementation depends largely
on the necessary emphasis from senior Army leadership. If actions are not
implemented in a timely manner, the Army will unlikely have the
comprehensive information that it needs to determine the extent of
proliferation and effectively manage its excess capabilities and the
infrastructure it has-key data needed for complying with the existing
reporting statute, identifying excess infrastructure and making
appropriate consolidations, and making appropriate decisions for an
additional round of base realignments and closures that has been
authorized for 2005.

The Army has not yet developed a plan for implementing the recommendations
in the Army proliferation report. We believe it is essential that the Army
have such a plan to help ensure the timely and effective implementation of
the recommendations. Such a plan would include evaluating the priority for
implementation and identifying the time frame for implementing the
recommendations, the responsible organizations, and the criteria for
measuring the desired results.

While improvements should be accomplished, the complexity and vastness of
the Army's maintenance system and continuing questions about such issues
as the definition of depot-level maintenance and changing maintenance
strategies could continue to present challenges in fully recording all
depot-level maintenance work.

32In July 2002, the Army changed the name of this program from the
Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program to the Logistics Modernization
Program. This is a new information system that is intended to help manage
the Army's supply, maintenance, and transportation functions. Beginning in
July 2003, the Logistics Modernization Program will replace many of the
Army's old logistics information systems.

Recommendation

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

To ensure the timely and effective implementation of the recommendations
in the Army's 2003 proliferation report to help the Army improve its
management of maintenance operations, including the proliferation of
depot-level maintenance facilities, and more precisely capture and report
depot-level maintenance data, we recommend that the Secretary of the
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a specific plan to
manage the implementation of the 29 recommendations identified in the 2003
proliferation report. The plan should include the priority and time frames
for implementation, the responsible organizations for implementing the
plan, and the criteria for measuring success.

The Department of Defense provided written comments (see app. IV) on a
draft of this report. In commenting on the draft, the Office of the Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness concurred
with our recommendation that the Army establish a plan to manage the
implementation of the 29 recommendations identified in the 2003 depot
maintenance proliferation report. The Department noted that the Army is in
the process of establishing an integrated product team to develop an
action plan to address the 29 recommendations to include reevaluating the
validity and modifying the recommendations where appropriate. The
Department also stated that the Army expects to have an action plan in
place no later than March 31, 2004. The Department's response noted
specifically that the recommendation contained in the Army's report
related to the designation of core work needs to be revised. We recognize
that some adjustment to the recommendations may be necessary as the
implementation plan is developed. Whether some recommendations require
modification for implementation is not as significant for the Army as is
the need for timely action and follow through to address the issues
identified in the Army's depot maintenance proliferation report.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have questions regarding this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-8412 or [email protected] or Julia Denman, Assistant
Director, at (202) 512-4290 or [email protected]. Other major contributors
to this report were Nancy Benco, Wayne Gilliam, and Bobby Worrell.

Barry W. Holman Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To answer the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services mandate
contained in Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001, we reviewed the Army's Fiscal Year 2002 Study of the
Proliferation of Depot Maintenance-Type Activities Phase II Report, dated
July 31, 2003. We interviewed Army officials and analyzed pertinent
information regarding that report at (1) Army Headquarters in the
Washington, D.C., area; (2) Headquarters, Army Materiel Command in
Alexandra, Virginia; (3) three subordinate commands-the Army Aviation and
Missile Command, Huntsville, Alabama; Communications-Electronics Command,
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command,
Warren, Michigan; (4) Headquarters, National Guard Bureau, Arlington,
Virginia; (5) Headquarters, Army Forces Command, Atlanta, Georgia; and (6)
Headquarters, Army Reserve Command, Atlanta, Georgia. Also, we interviewed
managers and reviewed pertinent information regarding maintenance
facilities located at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort
Riley, Kansas; and Fort Rucker, Alabama. We made extensive use of our
prior work related to Army depot-level maintenance.

To determine the extent to which the Army's report identified the total
amount of depot-level maintenance work performed at nondepot facilities,
we examined the requirements of section 2466 of title 10, U.S. Code, and
Army regulatory provisions for 50-50 reporting. We analyzed the report's
scope and methodology, findings, and disclosure of the amount it
identified and compared these data with our prior work done on the Army's
annual 50-50 reporting process. We interviewed the study group manager,
Army officials, and maintenance managers about the nature of maintenance
work performed by nondepot facilities and about whether it was being
reported as required. Because the Army has no central database or readily
available data, we did not attempt to determine the Army's universe of
facilities that perform depot-level maintenance.

To answer whether the Army can accurately account for its depot-level
maintenance workloads and the key issues that preclude accurate reporting,
we examined the report's findings to determine what areas were identified
as contributing problems. We used our prior work on the Army's depot-level
maintenance program to correlate, compare, and test the consistency of the
identified problems with the ones we had previously reported. We
interviewed the study group manager, Army officials, and maintenance
personnel about the relevancy of the findings and the application to the
Army's depot-level maintenance operations.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To answer whether the corrective actions identified in the Army's report
are likely to address the proliferation issue and enhance the Army's
reporting, we examined the recommendations to determine how effectively
they were linked to the identified problems. We also compared the
recommendations with those that we had previously made to test for
consistency. Finally, we discussed the relevancy of the recommendations
with the study group manager, Army officials, and maintenance
representatives.

We conducted our analysis of the Army's report from July through October
2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                      Appendix II: Army Maintenance Sites

The Army operates a number of maintenance facilities and has an extensive
infrastructure for the maintenance of its military weapons systems and
support equipment. For example, as we reported in April 2003, the Army
employs about 10,000 personnel at its five public depots to overhaul,
repair, and upgrade its ground and air combat systems, subsystems, and
assemblies.1 The Army also has a vast number of other maintenance
facilities operated by U.S. government-employed civilians and contractors.
For example, we reported in October 1999 that the Army had another 102
maintenance facilities that were potential providers of depot-level
maintenance services within the continental United States-28 active Army,
2 Army Reserve, and 72 Army National Guard.2

In addition, the Army operates maintenance activities that provide
maintenance below the depot level. For example, as of August 2003, the
Forces Command reported that it had maintenance facilities at 10
installations that provide direct support for vehicle maintenance; the
Army reserve had about 160 maintenance facilities located throughout the
United States that perform unit, direct, and general maintenance support;
the National Guard had additional maintenance facilities performing unit
and direct support maintenance; and Army installations had a number of
maintenance facilities that perform various levels of maintenance.

We visited 17 of the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard
maintenance sites. These 17 sites performed maintenance work valued at
more than $500 million during fiscal year 2002; employed more than 4,700
military, civilian, and contractor personnel; and occupied facilities with
more than 2 million square feet. Table 2 provides summary capacity and
capability information about the sites.

1See U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved
Strategic Planning Needed to Help Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian
Workforce, GAO-03-472 (Apr. 30, 2003).

2See GAO/NSIAD-00-20.

                      Appendix II: Army Maintenance Sites

Table 2: Capacity and Capability Information on 17 Sites That GAO Visited

                              Dollars in millions

                                                         Capability to Fiscal 
                                                                         year 
                                 Government Facility         Fiscal year 2002 
                                 and        size in        perform depot 2002 
                                                                        depot 
                                 contractor                       maintenance 
    Installation   Organization       staff square feet           maintenance 
                                                                  maintenance 
                    Readiness                                                 
Fort Campbell,    Business           308     195,249       $27.1 Yes $4.5a
      Kentucky        Center                            
                  Forces Command        188       8,000          10.0 No None 
                  CMF                                   
                  National Guard         19      14,675            .9 No None 
                  UTES                                  
    Fort McCoy,    Reserve IMMA         202     140,000           4.9 Yes .7b 
     Wisconsin     Reserve ECS          113     198,656           1.8 No None 
                  National Guard         31      92,000           .5 Yes .05b 
                  MATES                                 
    Fort Riley,        DOL              112     255,000         12.4 Yes 2.4c 
       Kansas     Forces Command         71      53,716           2.1 No None 
                  CMF                                   
                  National Guard        142      88,612       14.1 Yes        
                  RSMS                                  
                  National Guard         90      75,070        20.9 Yes 20.9d 
                  ATEAM                                 
                  National Guard         89     123,000           6.7 Yes .6b 
                  MATES                                 
                   Reserve ECS           78      14,040           2.3 No None 
    Fort Rucker,       ACLC           3,217     732,224       418.5 Yes 16.8e 
      Alabama          DEL               22       3,000           2.5 No None 
                      ATSCOM             52      41,000        2.4 Yes        
                  National Guard         14      16,664           1.5 No None 
                  UTES                                  
                   Reserve ECS           15       4,000            .5 No None 

Sources: Fort Campbell, Kentucky: Readiness Business Center, Forces
Command CMF, National Guard UTES; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin: Reserve IMMA,
Reserve ECS, National Guard MATES;
Fort Riley, Kansas: Forces Command CMF, National Guard RSMS, National
Guard ATEAM, National Guard MATES, Reserve ECS; and Fort Rucker, Alabama:
ACLC, DEL, ATSC, National Guard UTES,
Reserve ECS.

aData represent National Maintenance Program and Specialized Repair
Authority.

bData represent National Maintenance Program.

cData include National Maintenance Program and One-Time Repairs.

dData include Specialized Repair Authority.

eData include National Maintenance Program, Specialized Repair Authority,
and One-Time Repairs.

Legend

ACLC (Aviation Center Logistics Command)This organization, which
reports to the Aviation and Missile Command, performs all levels of
aviation maintenance in support of Fort Rucker's flighttraining program. A
contractor performs this maintenance work.

ATSCOM (Air Traffic Services Command), a newly formed organization,
provides worldwide direct, general, and limited depot-level maintenance
for air traffic control systems. The maintenance data reported represents
two components-F Company of the 58th Aviation Regiment and the Air Traffic
Control Activity.

Appendix II: Army Maintenance Sites

CSMS (Combined Support Maintenance Shop)Army National Guard
facilities that provide direct support and general support levels of
maintenance for National Guard surface equipment (trucks, tanks, etc.).

DEL (Directorate of Engineering and Logistics)A Fort Rucker
organization that performs organizational support, direct support, and
general support for vehicles, construction equipment, and fire-fighting
equipment. A contractor performs this maintenance work.

DOL (Directorate of Logistics)Fort Riley organization that
performs general support maintenance for tanks, trucks, construction
equipment, small arms, etc. It also provides limited organizational and
aviation intermediate maintenance. A contractor performs this maintenance
work.

Forces Command CMF (Forces Command Contractor Maintenance
Facility)These maintenance facilities report to Forces Command and
perform organizational and direct support maintenance on items such as
trucks, trailers, tracked vehicles, vans, and generators. Contractors
perform the maintenance work.

National Guard ATEAM (Advanced Turbine Engine Army
Maintenance)This Army National Guard facility rebuilds M1A1 tank
engines. Its work, which is considered depot-level maintenance, is limited
to National Guard assets.

National Guard MATES (Maneuver Area Training Equipment Site)Army
National Guard maintenance facilities that provide unit, direct support,
and general support maintenance for assigned equipment. These sites are
established to preposition selected items of equipment and are located at
or near a training area.

National Guard RSMS (Readiness Sustainment Maintenance Site)This
National Guard facility at Fort Riley rebuilds 5-ton cargo trucks and
trailers. Its work, which is considered depot-level maintenance, is
generally limited to National Guard assets. Employees of the state of
Kansas perform the work.

National Guard UTES (Unit Training and Equipment Site)A National
Guard facility that stores and performs organizational maintenance on
tracked and wheeled vehicles for National Guard units within a specific
geographic area.

Readiness Business CenterA Fort Campbell organization that
performs general support maintenance for wheeled vehicles and intermediate
and limited depot-level maintenance for helicopters. Contractors perform
the maintenance work.

Reserve ECS (Equipment Concentration Site)Army Reserve facilities
that store and maintain selected equipment for Army Reserve units in a
specific geographic area. The maintenance work is performed by both
government and contractor employees.

Reserve IMMA (Army Reserve Installation Materiel Maintenance
Activity)The facility provides organizational, direct, and general
support maintenance for tactical vehicles-High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles, trucks, trailers-for Army Reserve units located at or
near Fort McCoy. For the most part, contractor employees perform the
maintenance work.

Appendix III: Army Report's Issues and Recommendations

The Army's Fiscal Year 2002 Study of the Proliferation of Depot
Maintenance-Type Activities identified 7 issues and made 29
recommendations for the following improvements to enhance the Army's
ability to (1) evaluate the proliferation of nondepot facilities that
perform depot-level maintenance and (2) identify and report on its 50-50
data. These recommendations were consistent with our prior
recommendations-noted in referenced GAO products.

Issue 1: Title 10 Definition of Depot Maintenance and 50-50 Reporting
Policy Guidance

Recommendations:

o  	Post the new Army Regulation 750-1 as soon as possible to the Army
Publications Agency Web site. Posting the regulation will contribute to
the education of Army activities on the congressional definition of "depot
maintenance" and the 50-50 reporting process.

o  	Continue to conduct annual 50-50 workshops and issue clear guidance
regarding depot maintenance policies to major commands, program executive
officers, and program managers.

o  	Use Headquarters, Department of the Army, senior-level maintenance
boards to communicate depot maintenance policies.

o  	Publish depot maintenance information articles in professional
publications.

[See also GAO-03-1023; U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance:
Key Unresolved Issues Affect the Army Depot System's Viability, GAO-03-682
(Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003); and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Depot Maintenance: Change in Reporting Practices and Requirements Could
Enhance Congressional Oversight, GAO-03-16 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 18,
2002).]

Issue 2: Accuracy of Army's Current 50-50 Reports

Recommendations

o  	The Army Deputy Chief of Staff (G-4) should ensure that compliance
with the 50-50 rule becomes an Army priority and that command emphasis is
applied to correct all reporting problems.

o  Army G-4 should submit an amended 50-50 report for fiscal year 2002.

Appendix III: Army Report's Issues and Recommendations

o  	Army G-4 should include all Army major commands, program executive
offices, and separate commands in the 50-50 reporting process.

[See also GAO-03-1023; U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance:
Workload Allocation Reporting Improved, but Lingering Problems Remain,
GAO/NSIAD-99-154 (Washington, D.C.: July 13, 1999); and U.S. General
Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: Management Attention Required to
Further Improve Workload Allocation Data, GAO-02-95 (Washington D.C.: Nov.
9, 2001).]

Issue 3: Specialized Repair Authority and One-Time Repair Workload
Reporting Requirements

Recommendations

o  	Army G-4 should provide applicable major commands with immediate and
specific guidance to reinforce compliance with current Specialized Repair
Authority and One-Time Repair policies. Strong emphasis should be placed
on collecting One-Time Repair data for 50-50 reporting purposes.

o  	Current policy and procedures regarding the approval and tracking of
One-Time Repair should be expanded in Army Regulation 750-1.

o  	Major commands should appoint an installation or local Specialized
Repair Authority coordinator to ensure that (1) all major command
facilities at an installation are provided the most current information on
Specialized Repair Authority and One-Time Repair policies and (2) the
appropriate Specialized Repair Authority and One-Time Repair production
data are submitted properly through the installation or local regional
major command Specialized Repair Authority coordinator to the major
command headquarters. Similarly, the National Guard Bureau should appoint
Specialized Repair Authority coordinators for each state, territory, and
the District of Columbia.

o  	Army G-4, in coordination with the Army Materiel Command (AMC), should
direct the Aviation and Missile Command to terminate the existing Aviation
Repair Authority process and immediately comply with all Headquarters,
Department of Army, Specialized Repair Authority policies.

[See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: Change in
Reporting Practices and Requirements Could Enhance Congressional
Oversight, GAO-03-16 (Washington D.C.: Oct. 18, 2002).]

Appendix III: Army Report's Issues and Recommendations

Issue 4: Army G-4 Guidance Regarding Depot Maintenance Reporting
Procedures

Recommendations

o  	Army G-4 should revise the 50-50 standard operating procedures to
provide the major commands, program executive officers, and program
managers with more explicit guidance regarding those 50-50 reporting
requirements that are still causing confusion,

o  	Army G-4 should coordinate with major commands, program executive
officers, and program managers to ensure that the standard operating
procedure revisions are clearly understood and that the 50-50 standard
operating procedures address the upgrade and modification programs.

o  	Army G-4 should develop a "decision tree" (an easy-to-use reference
guide) to better distinguish between those programs that should be and
should not be reported.

[See also GAO-02-95 and GAO/NSIAD-99-154.]

Issue 5: Impact of National Maintenance Program on 50-50 Reporting
Processes Below Public Depot Level

Recommendations

o  	AMC should continue efforts to establish a fully integrated national
maintenance requirements determination process that includes all depot
maintenance requirements.

o  	The Army should complete the implementation of the National
Maintenance Program by fiscal year 2006 as currently planned.

o  	The Army should conduct further analyses to identify opportunities for
consolidating depot-level maintenance activities.

[See also GAO/NSIAD-00-20.]

Issue 6: Management Information System Requirements for Improving Current
Methods of Capturing and Reporting 50-50 Data

Recommendations

o  	The Army should develop an integrated management information system
capable of capturing and reporting depot maintenance workloads below the
organic depot level. AMC should consider

Appendix III: Army Report's Issues and Recommendations

replacing the interim Specialized Repair Authority business
systemthe combined Joint Computer-Aided Logistics Support
System/Logistics Integrated Database/Army Electronic Product Support
Systemswith a single integrated Specialized Repair Authority
tracking and workload system through the development of the Logistics
Modernization Program and as the various major command feeder systems are
either replaced or consolidated by way of the development of the Global
Combat Support System-Army.

o  	Army G-4 should query AMC's Logistics Integrated Database monthly to
ensure that major command activities are using the new Department of the
Army Pamphlet 738-750 maintenance codes for inputting workload data into
automated systems to account for Specialized Repair Authority and One-Time
Repair tasks embedded in maintenance workloads at the installation level.

o  	Army G-4 should continue to support AMC's efforts to develop a
Maintenance Contract Database under the National Maintenance Program.

[See also GAO-02-95 and GAO/NSIAD-00-20.]

Issue 7: DOD and Army Policies Affecting Army's Ability to Manage the

Proliferation of Depot Maintenance Activities

Recommendations

o  	New weapons systems should be designated as core or non-core up front
in the system's life cycle at Milestone C (Production and Deployment). The
system's Logistics Support Plan should be revised accordingly on the basis
of core depot assessment and presented at Milestone C for approval.

o  	The Army should adopt a new core depot assessment process for weapons
systems that have not yet undergone core determination analyses.

o  	The Army should continue to revise/replace flawed Department of the
Army policies that apply to the Depot Source of Repair (DSOR) decision
process. The primary objectives of this effort should be the consistent
compliance of all applicable legislation, regulations, and policies, and
to ensure that the organic depots are not excluded from the DSOR decision
process.

Appendix III: Army Report's Issues and Recommendations

o  	The Army should audit/review program executive officer, program
manager, and AMC activities to ensure that they are following guidance on
core logistics requirements, weapons system support strategies, and the
DSOR decision process in accordance with the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology [ASA (ALT)] memorandum
dated January 9, 2003, entitled Depot Considerations in Acquisition.

o  	The ASA (ALT) should develop an Army acquisition policy that requires
program executive officers and program managers to acquire access to
system technical data owned by the original equipment manufacturer for use
by appropriate organic or contractor maintenance facilities during the
performance of system logistical support.

o  	The ASA (ALT), Army G-4, and AMC should establish a partnership with
an approved memorandum of agreement to integrate acquisition weapons
system requirements with traditional end item and secondary item overhaul
requirements to (1) assist AMC in maximizing the capabilities of the five
organic depots to meet core requirements and (2) seek a renewed commitment
from all parties that the depots will not be excluded from the DSOR
process without the required analyses being conducted.

o  	Army G-4, ASA (ALT), and AMC should work closely together to develop
and implement a plan for documenting baseline data to compare contractor
costs with organic support costs.

o  	Army G-4, ASA (ALT), AMC, and AMC's major subordinate commands should
work closely with Headquarters, Department of the Army ASA (ALT) staff to
market the depots with the program executive officers and program managers
at every opportunity.

o  	Army G-4, ASA (ALT), and AMC should work closely together to explore
future opportunities to expand the number of public/private partnerships
as part of the Army's overall industrial base strategy.

[See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions
Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO-02-105
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001) and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for New Weapon
Systems to the Private Sector, GAO/NSIAD-98-8 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31,
1998).]

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products

Depot Maintenance: DOD's 50-50 Reporting Should Be Streamlined.
GAO-03-1023. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2003.

Depot Maintenance: Key Unresolved Issues Affect the Army Depot System's
Viability. GAO-03-682. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003.

Department of Defense: Status of Financial Management Weaknesses and
Progress Toward Reform. GAO-03-931T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2003.

Depot Maintenance: Change in Reporting Practices and Requirements Could
Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO-03-16. Washington D.C.: October 18,
2002.

Depot Maintenance: Management Attention Needed to Further Improve Workload
Allocation Data. GAO-02-95. Washington D.C.: November 9, 2001.

Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the
Public Depot System. GAO-02-105. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.

Defense Maintenance: Sustaining Readiness Support Capabilities Requires a
Comprehensive Plan. GAO-01-533T. Washington, D.C.; March 23, 2001.

Depot Maintenance: Key Financial Issues for Consolidations at Pearl Harbor
and Elsewhere Are Still Unresolved. GAO-01-19. Washington, D.C.: January
22, 2001.

Depot Maintenance: Action Needed to Avoid Exceeding Ceiling on Contract
Workloads. GAO/NSIAD-00-193. Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2000.

Depot Maintenance: Air Force Waiver to 10 U.S.C. 2466. GAO/NSIAD-00-152R.
Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2000.

Depot Maintenance: Air Force Faces Challenges in Managing to 50-50
Ceiling. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-112. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2000.

Depot Maintenance: Future Year Estimates of Public and Private Workloads
Are Likely to Change. GAO/NSIAD-00-69. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2000.

Related GAO Products

Depot Maintenance: Army Report Provides Incomplete Assessment of
Depot-Type Capabilities. GAO/NSIAD-00-20. Washington, D.C.: October 15,
1999.

Depot Maintenance: Status of the Navy's Pearl Harbor Project.
GAO/NSIAD-99-199. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 1999.

Depot Maintenance: Workload Allocation Reporting Improved, but Lingering
Problems Remain. GAO/NSIAD-99-154. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 1999.

Navy Ship Maintenance: Allocation of Ship Maintenance Work in the Norfolk,
Virginia, Area. GAO/NSIAD-99-54. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 1999.

Defense Depot Maintenance: Public and Private Sector Workload Distribution
Reporting Can Be Further Improved. GAO/NSIAD-98-175. Washington, D.C.:
July 23, 1998.

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for New Weapon
Systems to the Private Sector. GAO/NSIAD-98-8. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
1998.

Defense Depot Maintenance: Information on Public and Private Sector
Workload Allocations. GAO/NSIAD-98-41. Washington, D.C.: January 20, 1998.

Defense Depot Maintenance: Uncertainties and Challenges DOD Faces in
Restructuring Its Depot Maintenance Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-112.
Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997. Also, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-111. Washington, D.C.:
March 18, 1997.

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD's Policy Report Leaves Future Role of Depot
System Uncertain. GAO/NSIAD-96-165. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1996.

Defense Depot Maintenance: More Comprehensive and Consistent Workload Data
Needed for Decisionmakers. GAO/NSIAD-96-166. Washington, D.C.: May 21,
1996.

Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the
Public-Private Mix. GAO/T-NSIAD-96-148. Washington, D.C.:

Related GAO Products

April 17, 1996. Also, GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146. Washington, D.C.: April 16,
1996.

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Allocating Workload Between the Public and
Private Sectors. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-161. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 1994.

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