Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative
Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but
Issues Remain for Future Brigades (12-DEC-03, GAO-04-188).
The Army continues to transform units, known as Stryker brigades,
into lighter, rapidly deployable, and more capable forces.
Because Stryker brigades are an entirely new design, the fiscal
year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act required the Army to
conduct an evaluation of the design, to include deployment of the
brigade and execution of combat missions across the full spectrum
of potential threats. The act also required the Secretary of
Defense to certify that the evaluation results indicate the
design is both operationally effective and suitable. As one in a
series of reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the
evaluation to assess (1) whether the Army and the Secretary of
Defense met legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated
both the operational effectiveness and suitability of the
brigade's design, (3) what the brigade's performance was during
the evaluation, and (4) how the Army plans to mitigate issues
identified during the evaluation.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-188
ACCNO: A09010
TITLE: Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative
Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but
Issues Remain for Future Brigades
DATE: 12/12/2003
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Defense operations
Evaluation criteria
Internal controls
Military operations
Performance measures
Strategic planning
C-130 Aircraft
C-17 Aircraft
DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
DOD Stryker Brigade
Globemaster Aircraft
Hercules Aircraft
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GAO-04-188
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Committees
December 2003
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design
Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades
GAO-04-188
Highlights of GAO-04-188, a report to congressional committees
The Army continues to transform units, known as Stryker brigades, into
lighter, rapidly deployable, and more capable forces. Because Stryker
brigades are an entirely new design, the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
Authorization Act required the Army to conduct an evaluation of the
design, to include deployment of the brigade and execution of combat
missions across the full spectrum of potential threats. The act also
required the Secretary of Defense to certify that the evaluation results
indicate the design is both operationally effective and suitable.
As one in a series of reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the
evaluation to assess (1) whether the Army and the Secretary of Defense met
legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated both the operational
effectiveness and suitability of the brigade's design, (3) what the
brigade's performance was during the evaluation, and (4) how the Army
plans to mitigate issues identified during the evaluation.
GAO recommends that OSD direct the Army to complete all mitigation efforts
and apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the brigade design to future
Stryker brigades. In commenting on a draft of this report, OSD concurred
with the recommendations.
December 2003
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design
Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades
The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met the
legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan for conducting an operational
evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; obtained the plan's approval from
the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; and
from April through May 2003, the brigade deployed to the evaluation sites
and conducted combat missions across the full spectrum of potential
threats-from major theater of war to security and stability operations. In
September 2003, OSD certified to Congress that the brigade design is both
operationally effective and suitable. The Army has deployed the first
Stryker brigade to Iraq.
The Army developed an evaluation plan and established a control cell that
used independent evaluators to monitor and collect data on the brigade's
performance. The cell compiled and analyzed the data and submitted a
report to the I Corps commander, who declared the design as operationally
effective and operationally suitable. The commander noted that performance
difficulties were due to an accelerated fielding schedule and inadequate
training time. The U.S. Forces Command endorsed the report.
GAO determined, based on its observations and analyses, that the brigade's
performance showed strengths and weaknesses. The brigade could perform as
designed but did not consistently demonstrate its capabilities. The
brigade's strengths were its ability to conduct combat missions, including
deployment using different transportation modes and the ability to use the
Stryker vehicle's speed and agility. The weaknesses related to staff
planning, digital system usage, sustainment, and executing company-level
combat missions. Contractors were also used ineffectively. GAO concluded
that the primary cause of the weaknesses was insufficient training
proficiency.
The Army is implementing a plan to mitigate most operational evaluation
issues. The Army concluded that the issues were largely training related,
although some were related to design or equipment. The brigade, in
preparation for deployment to Iraq, conducted additional training to
address the issues the Army and GAO identified. The brigade's training
performance indicates that these issues are being mitigated. The Army is
addressing the training and equipment issues for the first Stryker
brigade; however, it has deferred some critical issues that have
implications for future brigades.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-188.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
512-8365 or [email protected].
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the
Stryker Brigade
Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter
Experts to Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade's
Design
Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses
during the Operational Evaluation
Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational
Evaluation Issues, but Deferred Issues Have Implications for
Future Brigades
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments
1
2 5
6
8
11
32 34 35 35
Appendix I Provisions from Public Law 107-107 Concerning Limitations on
Army Transformation Actions
Appendix II Scope and Methodology
Appendix III Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and Operational
Capabilities by Critical Tasks
Appendix IV Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical Tasks
Appendix V Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities
Compared to Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks 44
Appendix VI
Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and
Key Operational Capabilities 46
Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Defense
Related GAO Products
Figures
Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the Southern
California Logistics Airfield 13 Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130
Aircraft at the National Training Center 14 Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a
Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles,
Louisiana 15 Figure 4: Road March 16 Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward
Landing Strip 17 Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at
Geronimo Forward Landing Strip 18 Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded
Terrain at the Joint
Readiness Training Center 20 Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon 21 Figure 9:
Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center 26 Figure 10:
Alternate Supply Point at the National Training Center 28
Abbreviations
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below OSD Office of the
Secretary of Defense
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separately.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
December 12, 2003
Congressional Committees
During fiscal year 2003, the Army continued to transform its force to one
that is lighter, more rapidly deployable, and able to effectively operate
in various environments and across the full spectrum of threats from
smallscale contingencies to a major theater of war. Two of six planned
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are currently undergoing the Army's initial
transformation efforts-one brigade, which has been deployed to Iraq, and
another brigade, which is co-located at Fort Lewis, Washington. The
brigades are an entirely new organizational design, and questions have
arisen regarding their combat effectiveness. In the fiscal year 2002
National Defense Authorization Act,1 Congress required
o the Secretary of the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of the
brigade that includes deployment of the brigade to the evaluation site and
brigade execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential
threats and operational scenarios;
o the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of
Defense to approve the operational evaluation plan; and
o the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on the
operational evaluation.
The statute further limited deployment of the brigade and procurement of
vehicles beyond the third brigade until 30 days after the Secretary of
Defense submits the report and certifies that the results of the
operational evaluation indicate that the design for the Stryker Brigade
Combat Team is operationally effective2 and operationally suitable.3 (See
appendix I for the
1 Section 113, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P.
L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001).
2 Operational effectiveness is determined by the brigade's ability to
successfully accomplish full spectrum missions as well as, or better than,
current forces. This requires the capability to achieve decisive action
through close combat, centered primarily on dismounted infantry assault.
3 Operational suitability is determined if the brigade's design supports
the tasking of the brigade to the type of missions and environments that
the brigade's concept document indicates is appropriate for it. This
requires organizing and equipping the force to provide high strategic,
operational, and tactical mobility.
statutory provisions concerning these limitations on Army transformation
actions.)
On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored and
assessed the Army's efforts to conduct an operational evaluation of the
first Stryker Brigade Combat Team - the Third Brigade of the Second
Infantry Division - as required by the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
Authorization Act. Our objectives were to assess (1) whether the Army and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met legislative requirements,
(2) how the Army evaluated both the operational effectiveness and the
operational suitability of the brigade's design, (3) what the brigade's
performance was during the operational evaluation, and (4) how the Army
plans to mitigate issues identified during the operational evaluation.
In our assessment of the Army's Stryker brigade operational evaluation, we
reviewed the Army's operational evaluation plan and its associated
execution plan, and we observed the exercises held at the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness
Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We observed the deployment of the
Stryker brigade, as well as execution of certain combat missions. Upon
completion of the operational evaluation and the Army's compilation of its
data sources, we reviewed and analyzed the Army's database that consisted
primarily of evaluator comments to assess the brigade's performance. (See
appendix II for the full text of the scope and methodology.) We are
providing this report, another in a planned series related to Army
transformation, to you because of your committees' oversight
responsibility. Related GAO products concerning transformation are listed
at the end of this report.
The Army and OSD met the legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002
National Defense Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan and
conducted an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; it
obtained the plan's approval from the Department of Defense Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation;4 and OSD submitted a report to Congress
and certified the results of the operational evaluation. The Army
conducted a deployment to the operational evaluation site from Fort
4 The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal advisor
to the Secretary of Defense concerning operational testing, including
assessments of operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability
of the items tested.
Results in Brief
Lewis, Washington, to the National Training Center and onto the Joint
Readiness Training Center; these deployments incorporated various methods,
including rail, sea, air, and ground movements. The Army's operational
evaluation, held from April 1, 2003, through May 28, 2003, included the
conduct of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats,
to include scenarios in a major theater war environment as well as
security and stability operations. Finally, on September 17, 2003, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense certified that the operational evaluation's
results indicated that the initial Stryker brigade's design is
operationally effective and operationally suitable.
The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational
parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities. The
organizational parameters and operational characteristics were the
essential elements in assessing both the operational effectiveness and the
operational suitability of the first Stryker brigade's design. In doing
so, the Army established a control cell that developed a data collection
plan, analyzed the results, and wrote an operational evaluation report.
The Army used independent evaluators trained in Stryker brigade doctrine
to monitor and observe the brigade's performance. The evaluators provided
subjective commentary as to how the brigade performed in accordance with
key organizational parameters and key operational characteristics. The
data were compiled and analyzed, and a report was submitted to the I Corps
commander. The I Corps commander assessed the report's findings and
determined that the brigade's design is operationally both effective and
suitable, but noted that the brigade had experienced difficulties in
demonstrating some of the key operational capabilities. The difficulties
were primarily attributed to an accelerated fielding schedule and a lack
of adequate training time. The Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command,
endorsed the report's findings.
Based on our observation of events and analysis of the data collected in
accordance with the Army's plan, the brigade demonstrated that it could
perform as designed, but it did not consistently demonstrate its
capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. The strengths were
illustrated by the brigade's ability to deploy using different
transportation systems and the individual unit's ability to take advantage
of the speed, agility, and maneuverability of the Stryker vehicle. With
regard to weaknesses, the brigade had difficulties in (1) mastering staff
operations, which reduced the ability of the brigade to use all of its
assets as intended; (2) using its digital systems, which resulted in
inconsistent and incomplete maintenance of a common operating picture; (3)
conducting supply operations, which challenged the brigade to sustain
itself; and (4)
executing company-level combat missions, which reduced its overall combat
power. Additionally, contractors were used ineffectively because units
used them improperly or did not provide the support necessary to ensure
their effective use in providing maintenance support to the brigade. Our
analysis of the data concluded that insufficient training proficiency was
the primary cause of these weaknesses, thus inhibiting the brigade from
achieving a full demonstration of its capabilities.
The Army has developed a plan that when fully implemented will mitigate
most issues identified in the operational evaluation, and the plan
addresses the weaknesses we identified from our analysis of the evaluation
results. However, the plan does not fully address design and equipment
issues that have implications for future brigades. The Army's immediate
focus in implementing the plan was to resolve issues relating to training
and equipment that affected the brigade's ability to deploy to Iraq and
defer the remaining issues for future consideration, some of which have
implications for the future brigades. To mitigate the training issues and
to prepare for deployment to Iraq, I Corps developed and implemented
training events, including a command post exercise to train the staff and
a brigade field training exercise that emphasized platoon and company unit
operations. Observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness Training Center
observed the brigade's performance during these events, provided feedback,
and conducted informal after-action reviews focusing on lessons learned
from Operation Iraqi Freedom. After the training, the brigade commander
and senior Army officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation
told us that they had no reservations regarding the brigade's proficiency
or ability to deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq. However, one
design issue that has not been completely addressed that has implications
for the current and future brigades involves the current vehicle of the
reconnaissance squadron operations officer- it is not as mobile or as
survivable as the Stryker vehicle used by the reconnaissance squadron
commander. The mitigation plan includes a short-term solution for the
initial brigade of shifting a Stryker from elsewhere for the operations
officer but no long-term solution. Regarding equipment, one equipment
issue involved the fact that not all Stryker vehicles have the digital
system called Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). This
system increases a commander's ability to position troops and conduct
combat operations. The issue is that only onehalf of the Stryker vehicles
in each infantry platoon currently have the FBCB2 system. The mitigation
plan calls for procuring a sufficient number of FBCB2 systems for the
initial Stryker brigade, but the plan does not address if FBCB2s will be
procured to equip all Stryker vehicles in the future brigades. All
identified issues - training, design, and equipment -
and the related mitigation efforts provide valuable lessons learned for
future brigades.
We are recommending that, to assist the Stryker brigade's transformation
efforts, the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues not
addressed prior to deploying the brigade and apply, as applicable,
adjustments made to the training, equipment, and design of the brigade to
future Stryker brigades.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the department concurred with our
recommendations.
Background
The Army continues to transform its forces toward its goal to be more
strategically responsive and to dominate across the full spectrum of
military operations - from small-scale contingencies to a major theater
war. The transformation efforts, which began in 1999, attempted to balance
lethality, mobility, and survivability with the capabilities required for
responsiveness, deployability, sustainability, and a reduced in-theater
footprint. The Army chose an armored wheeled vehicle, designated as the
Stryker, as its primary combat platform and began to transform six
existing brigades to Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The Third Brigade of
the Second Infantry Division was selected as the initial Stryker Brigade
Combat Team.
According to the Army, the core qualities of the new brigade design are
high mobility at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; an
ability to achieve decisive action through the use of dismounted infantry
that is supported by organic direct and indirect fire platforms; and an
enhanced situational understanding of the battlefield. As an early-entry
force, the brigade is expected to have sufficient built-in combat power to
conduct immediate combat operations upon arrival in theater if required.
Also, the brigade was designed to accept additional forces that can expand
the core tasks and functions that already reside within the brigade or
that execute tasks that do not reside within the brigade (e.g., adding
armor, field artillery, air defense, additional engineers, or aviation).
The brigade was also designed to adopt a new training regimen that allows
a faster deployment to any type of contingency; in contrast, current Army
units receive an alert for a mission, train for the mission-specific
requirements, and then deploy.
Congress has supported the Army's transformation efforts, but since the
Stryker brigade is an entirely new design, members of the Senate and House
Committees on Armed Services agreed that the Army must conduct an
evaluation that indicated that the brigade's design is operationally
effective and operationally suitable. The requirement for an operational
evaluation was formalized in the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
Authorization Act. For the evaluation, the Army modified an existing
training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk,
Louisiana, and added a data collection apparatus, a deployment schedule,
and an additional training event at the National Training Center at Fort
Irwin, California. The Army uses training exercises at the Joint Readiness
Training Center and the National Training Center to increase the combat
proficiency of its units and to identify training deficiencies that need
to be addressed. The training exercises are conducted under stressful
conditions against an opposing force emulating combat scenarios
anticipated in war. By Army regulation, training deficiencies identified
during the rotations and subsequent retraining are not indicators of unit
failure. The Army conducted the evaluation from April through May 2003.
The Army and OSD met the requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National
Defense Authorization Act to, respectively, plan and conduct an
operational evaluation of the Stryker brigade and certify the evaluation
results. The Army met the requirements by (1) obtaining approval of the
evaluation plan by the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation, (2) deploying the brigade to the evaluation site, and (3)
conducting combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats.
The act also made additional vehicle procurement and brigade deployment
contingent upon a certification that the brigade's design is operationally
effective and operationally suitable. OSD has provided the certification
to Congress.
The Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
approved the Army's operational evaluation plan on March 28, 2003. The
Army's primary objective was to comply with the legislation by assessing
the initial Stryker brigade's design for operational effectiveness and
operational suitability according to the unit's organizational and
operational concept and its current modified table of organization and
The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the Stryker Brigade
equipment. A secondary objective was to conduct a readiness assessment5 of
the unit's ability to conduct combat operations according to Army
doctrine.
The Army deployed to the operational evaluation site when it conducted a
multimodal movement from Fort Lewis to the National Training Center, Fort
Irwin, and onto the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The
operational evaluation was held from April 1, 2003, through May 28, 2003.
To accomplish these strategic and operational moves, the Army used various
methods, including rail, sea, air, and ground movements. Due to current
world military operations and the limited number of available aircraft,
the Army was restricted from moving the entire brigade combat team by air.
During the operational evaluation, the brigade conducted combat missions
across the full spectrum of potential threats. The evaluation's scope
included the brigade field training exercise at the National Training
Center and a certification exercise during a Joint Readiness Training
Center rotation. The evaluation was constructed so that the brigade
conducted a series of combat missions against an opposing force in both
major theater of war and small-scale contingency environments. For
example, the scenario at the National Training Center was optimized for
the higher end of combat where the brigade conducted operations against
mechanized forces. At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the brigade's
mission was optimized for small-scale contingencies where the brigade
conducted operations in noncontiguous areas and in complex urban terrain.
Throughout the operational evaluation's events, the brigade was augmented
with aviation, military police, and armor.
On August 19, 2003, the Acting Secretary of the Army forwarded a
memorandum requesting that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress the
operational evaluation report prepared by the Army following the
evaluation and certify that the results of the evaluation indicate that
the Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division's design is operationally
effective and operationally suitable. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on
September 17, 2003, certified to Congress that the results of the
operational evaluation indicated the design for the initial Stryker
brigade
5 The readiness assessment was based on the evaluation of the mission
training plan and the associated critical tasks. These tasks were
evaluated as Go/No Go based on defined standards.
Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter Experts to
Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade's Design
is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The Army has
deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq.
The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational
parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities. The
Army also established an Operational Evaluation Control Cell (Control
Cell) to coordinate the assessment activities and used subject matter
experts and observers as independent evaluators to assess the operational
effectiveness and suitability of the brigade.
According to the Army, the key organizational parameters and operational
capabilities were the essential elements in assessing the brigade's design
for operational effectiveness and operational suitability. The mission
training plans provided the tasks, conditions, and standards to assess
operational readiness as defined by the key operational capabilities. The
eight key organizational parameters are
o achieve balance between capabilities for strategic responsiveness and
requirements for battle-space dominance,
o balanced full spectrum utility,6
o reduced sustainment requirements,
o minimize the brigade's personnel and logistical footprint,
o commonality of vehicular platforms,
o reach-back,
o embedded unit-based capabilities, and
o internetted combined arms to company-team level.
The nine key operational capabilities are
o mobility,
o dismounted assault and the close fight,
o enhanced situational understanding and information superiority,
o holistic force protection and survivability,
o lethality,
o force effectiveness,
o reach/reach-back,
o joint/multinational/interagency interoperability, and
o full spectrum flexibility and augmentation.
6 This refers to the brigade's capability in the full spectrum of combat.
See appendix III.
The key organizational parameters and operational capabilities are defined
by the brigade's organizational and operational concept document of June
7
2000.
The evaluation linked these key characteristics to the brigade's six
critical training requirements and then to the brigade's mission training
plans. Army planners had determined that for an effective operational
evaluation, the events must focus on 10 specific brigade level tasks
extracted from the brigade mission training plans. Appendixes III, IV, and
V illustrate the evaluation's integration of key organizational parameters
and operational capabilities, mission training plans, and critical
training requirements. (See appendix VI for the definition of key
organizational parameters and operational capabilities.)
The Army established a Control Cell to manage the activities needed to
conduct the evaluation. Participants included individuals from the I Corps
staff, the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command's Brigade Coordination Cell,
the Army Test and Evaluation Command,8 and a team of contractors. The
Control Cell developed an execution plan and provided it to the Department
of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation for review.
During development of the operational evaluation execution plan, the
Department of the Army provided additional guidance to Forces Command and
directed that the evaluation also assess the ability of the Stryker
brigade to receive logistical support from echelon above brigade support
elements. Initially, the Army had planned to informally assess this
capability. However, after we recommended to the Secretary of Defense9
that external logistics support be an element of the evaluation, the Army
included this in its execution plan. To address these concerns, the
Control Cell's execution plan included an evaluation of the echelon above
brigade
7 The organizational and operational concept document provides a detailed
framework for the definition of fundamental operational precepts,
capabilities, and organizational constructs. The concept document is the
basis for the development of mission training plans, training strategies
and support packages, evaluation plans, and field manuals.
8 The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army's independent
operational test activity and is responsible for overall management of the
Army test and evaluation programs.
9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of
External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally
Mandated Review of the Army's Operational Evaluation Plan, GAO-03-484R
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).
support elements, including the logistics concepts such as contractor
support, reach-back, and configured loads. Real-world events limited the
number of assets available to allow for continuous aerial resupply, so the
Control Cell compensated by using limited aerial resupply and, when
aircraft were not available, used notional aerial resupply that included
the use of time delays to replicate transport time. For both types of
resupply, the echelon above brigade elements would distribute supplies in
configured loads to the Stryker brigade for disbursement.
Prior to the conduct of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell
instructed and certified subject matter experts10 from proponent schools
and observer-controllers from the training centers as primary data
collectors. The instruction familiarized the data collectors on the
Stryker brigade organization, capabilities and doctrine, and the combat
training centers' rules of engagement and safety guidelines. Officials
from the Army's Test and Evaluation Command provided instruction on data
collection procedures and use of data collection tools such as personal
digital assistants. Additionally, the Control Cell formed a team composed
of members of the Training and Doctrine Command's Brigade Coordination
Cell that also collected data throughout the operational evaluation.
Data collected for the operational evaluation included observations and
comments from subject matter experts, observer-controllers, and team
members from the Brigade Coordination Cell. These observations and
comments occurred while the data collectors observed the brigade's
performance during the various combat missions. Additional data sources
included after-action reviews, surveys, and key personnel interviews. The
Army's Operational Test Command also retrieved digital instrumentation
data. All of these data sources were retrieved every 24 hours and
validated by officials of the Army's Operational Test Command and the
Control Cell. The Control Cell established a review group to authenticate
the data and develop initial insights based on observations that emerged
as the events progressed.
Upon completion of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell analyzed
all the data sources and submitted a report of its findings to the I Corps
10 Subject matter experts are usually commissioned officers and
noncommissioned officers who have extensive experience with the studied
equipment, recent unit experience, and a background as a trainer or in
training development.
commander. The I Corps commander concluded that the brigade had met or
adequately met each of the requirements associated with the key
organizational parameters and key operational capabilities. The Army
defined "adequately met" as the brigade's design was operationally
effective and operationally suitable but had some deficiencies, or issues.
The report was submitted to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command,
who endorsed the report's findings. Although the I Corps commander
assessed the brigade's design as operationally both effective and
suitable, the operational evaluation report noted that the Stryker brigade
experienced difficulties in demonstrating some of the key operational
capabilities, which were primarily attributed to an accelerated fielding
schedule and a lack of adequate training time.
Based on our observations of the brigade's performance at the two combat
training centers and our analysis of data collected during the evaluation,
the brigade performed as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its
capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. In certain areas,
the Stryker brigade demonstrated its strengths, including both the ability
to conduct strategic and operational deployments and to maneuver about the
battlefield using the Stryker vehicle. The operational evaluation also
demonstrated weaknesses in the areas of staff planning, usage of digital
systems, sustainment of the brigade, and established company-level combat
procedures. Civilian contractors were also used ineffectively to support
the units. Our analysis indicated that the Stryker brigade's training
proficiency was the primary cause of these weaknesses.
Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses during the
Operational Evaluation
Stryker Brigade Demonstrated That It Is Deployable
Our observations and analysis of the data indicated that the Stryker
brigade demonstrated the ability to conduct strategic and tactical
deployments using different transportation systems such as rail, ground,
and various sea vessels and aircraft. Upon arrival at each destination,
the brigade showed the ability to reassemble into a combat configuration
in a timely manner. Once reconfigured, units of the Stryker brigade also
demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate combat operations. It should
be noted, however, that while the tactical deployment of the Stryker
vehicle by C-130 aircraft was demonstrated, the Army has yet to
demonstrate under various environmental conditions, such as air
temperature and airfield altitude, just how far Stryker vehicles can be
tactically deployed by C-130 aircraft.
The brigade used commercial air, rail, and ground transportation to move
personnel and equipment from Fort Lewis to Fort Irwin. While at the
National Training Center, we observed the brigade conduct a tactical
movement by moving a Stryker infantry company with its personnel,
supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via C-130 aircraft from Southern
California Logistics Airfield to an austere desert airfield on Fort Irwin
about 70 miles away. (Figure 1 shows a Stryker vehicle being loaded at the
Southern California Logistics Airfield, and figure 2 shows the Stryker
exiting from a C-130 aircraft at the National Training Center.) Upon
landing, the infantry company unloaded the vehicles from the aircraft,
reconfigured them for combat missions, and moved onward to a staging area.
All Stryker variants could reconfigure into combat capable modes within
their designated time standard, except the medical variant. Based on our
observation of the event, we agree with the Army that the insufficient
crew size was the reason why the medical variant, with its extra external
boxes, could not be reconfigured within the time standard. However, if the
brigade had trained to reconfigure the Stryker variants, this situation
would have been apparent and should not have occurred.
Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the Southern California
Logistics Airfield
Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training Center
The Stryker brigade demonstrated strategic movement when it deployed
brigade elements by rail, sealift, and C-17 aircraft from the National
Training Center to a staging area located at Chennault Industrial Airpark,
located in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Two battalion equipment sets moved by
Fast Sealift Ship from San Diego, California, to Lake Charles Seaport,
while a third battalion's equipment, including all current Stryker
variants, moved by C-17 aircraft from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to a staging
area at the England Air Park in Alexandria, Louisiana. (Figure 3 shows a
Stryker being unloaded from a Fast Sealift Ship.) Elements of the Stryker
brigade that unloaded at the Lake Charles Seaport moved to the Chennault
Industrial Airpark and then conducted a road march to the Joint Readiness
Training Center to begin combat operations. We observed the staging area
as the
brigade assembled and prepared for its road movement to the training
center. Figure 4 shows the road march to the training center.
Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles, Louisiana
Figure 4: Road March
Tactical deployment was demonstrated when C-17 aircraft transported an
infantry company from Lake Charles to Geronimo forward landing strip, an
austere dirt airfield at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The C-17
aircraft landed at the forward landing strip, and the infantry company
demonstrated the ability to quickly unload its vehicles and personnel by
moving to the tactical assembly area in about 10 minutes. (Figure 5 shows
a C-17 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) A Stryker infantry
company also demonstrated the ability to travel into combat operations in
a C-130 aircraft. (Figure 6 shows the loading of an infantry company and
its vehicles onto C-130 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) The
Stryker infantry company-consisting of 21 Strykers and 5 other trucks and
trailers; 188 soldiers; and 3 days of food, water, ammunition, and fuel to
support the company-traveled from Geronimo to Essler airfield using 7
C-130s flying 25 sorties over a distance of about 100 miles. Upon landing
at the Essler airfield, the company moved to a tactical assembly area and
onward to conduct a combat operation.
Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward Landing Strip
Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at Geronimo Forward
Landing Strip
Stryker Brigade The Stryker vehicle demonstrated speed, agility, and
extensive Demonstrated Its Ability to maneuverability during the execution
of the brigade's combat missions Quickly Maneuver about during the
operational evaluation. Because of its maneuverability, the the
Battlefield Stryker vehicle allowed individual units to react and move
around the
battlefield much more quickly than light and mechanized infantry units,
allowing individual units to accomplish tasks in minutes compared to
hours. When used properly, the Stryker vehicle enabled the brigade to
outmaneuver and overpower opposing forces. The performance of the Stryker
brigade at both training centers indicated that with its vehicles, it
could move faster as compared to both conventional and/or nonmotorized
infantry as well as infantry units equipped with the Bradley fighting
vehicle.
At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Stryker vehicle performed well
in urban areas and in wooded terrain. (Figure 7 shows the Stryker
maneuvering in wooded terrain.) The speed of the vehicle enabled the
infantry companies to quickly arrive in urban areas, giving them the
ability to surprise the enemy and overcome urban objectives. The attack on
the "town" of Shugart-Gordon illustrated that the Stryker was able to move
quickly using a route that included very restrictive terrain. (Figure 8
shows the town of Shugart-Gordon.) The Stryker easily moved through the
rough terrain and made it to the objective, giving the company commander
the ability to rapidly transport soldiers during the assault. The speed of
the Stryker allowed one particular company to arrive at the objective
early and surprise the enemy. In another instance, the capabilities of the
vehicle allowed Stryker units to rapidly pursue and decisively engage
unconventional forces that were more mobile than U.S. Army light infantry
units. The Stryker vehicles' speed allowed the infantry units to fix and
destroy the enemy, despite the enemy's efforts to leave the battlefield.
Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded Terrain at the Joint Readiness Training
Center
Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon
At the National Training Center, the Stryker vehicle demonstrated its
ability to accelerate quickly and maneuver over the desert terrain to
deliver infantry personnel to their objective. Our analysis shows that the
Stryker vehicle moved more quickly and much quieter than the opposing
forces' vehicles, giving the brigade a substantial tactical advantage over
the enemy. When operating in extremely rugged and steep terrain, the
Stryker did lose some of its mobility advantage and had difficulty in
maneuvering as quickly as the opposing forces' vehicles. Despite the loss
of this advantage, the Stryker vehicle was nonetheless mobile enough to
allow a company to quickly reposition and destroy a platoon of guerrilla
forces running through rough terrain. The Stryker's speed enabled the
infantry unit to quickly move into its attack position after changes in
the battlefield. Because of this speed, the vehicle potentially provides a
commander more time to react since less time is spent moving from one
location to another.
Brigade's Staff Performance Was Inconsistent
On the basis of our analysis of the data, as a collective organization,
the brigade staff11 was unable to consistently perform in accordance with
Army doctrine, hindering the ability of the Stryker brigade to first fully
see and then understand the battle space. Staff processes, both the
integration of the entire staff and those internal to specific sections,
affected the ability of the brigade to produce and execute synchronized
plans. The Stryker brigade did display the ability to integrate and
collect information, but not consistently. The observer-controllers
generally identified training time as the primary cause for the
weaknesses.
Army doctrine prescribes a manner in which staffs should develop battle
plans. This military decision-making process requires incorporation of all
staff elements in a collective effort to synchronize all of the brigade's
assets. Although the brigade staff gained experience and improved by going
through the process over the course of the evaluation, they did not
consistently integrate all of the staff sections and key subsections,
including information operations, fire support, and intelligence. Because
all of these assets were not incorporated into the planning process, the
brigade had difficulty in using its capabilities according to doctrine.
The Stryker brigade displayed the ability to integrate information from
multiple sources. However, managing the flow of the information and
disseminating it throughout the brigade was difficult. For example, the
brigade Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron
provided more information than the brigade staff could process. Because
the staff's proficiency level to manage the information was low, the
ability to analyze and present a common operational picture was reduced.
11 Brigade and battalion staffs are generally organized into sections.
These sections are numbered S-1 through S-6 and represent functions such
as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil affairs, and
signal operations.
The staff's performance affected all units within the brigade. Commanders
were not given well-developed planning products, including an accurate
initial picture of the enemy and the enemy's anticipated actions, as well
as tools that enabled the application of all of the brigade's organic
combat capability. Although they were still able to conduct combat
missions, the brigade did not perform to the best of its capabilities.
Synchronization of the brigade's intelligence collection effort was
inconsistent. Unlike traditional Army units, the Stryker brigade has a
very robust intelligence collection capability that includes unique tools
such as unmanned aerial vehicles; nonlethal effects capabilities such as
civil affairs, psychological operations, and legal personnel; and a
Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron. Because the
efforts were not synchronized, intelligence collection assets were not
consistently used in an efficient manner, resulting in areas not being
observed or other areas receiving redundant coverage. Also, the
reconnaissance squadron sometimes operated independently of the brigade's
guidance, resulting in a failure to obtain needed information.
Using the Digital Systems Proved Difficult for the Brigade
The operational evaluation demonstrated that the brigade had not mastered
the use of its digital systems. The proper use and employment of the
various digital systems increase the commanders' ability to position
troops and conduct combat operations. However, our analysis shows that a
combination of either not using established procedures or not having
established procedures, as well as a lack of familiarity with the systems,
prevented full exploitation of the systems' capabilities.
During the evaluation, a lack of familiarity with the systems and a lack
of standardized procedures contributed to the brigade's inability to fully
maximize the capabilities of its digital systems. Brigade leaders and
staff struggled with acquiring data and interpreting it in a timely
manner. If the staff had properly used the various digital systems, the
commanders' ability to position troops and conduct combat operations would
have been increased.
Digital systems were not available for all elements of the brigade,
including augmenting units. Not all staff sections and subsections
possessed the FBCB2 system,12 hindering staff planning operations. At the
platoon level, only the platoon leader and platoon sergeant Stryker
vehicles are equipped with the FBCB2 system. Further, when infantry
personnel dismount, they have no direct digital connectivity to the FBCB2
system. As a result, the non-FBCB2-equipped Stryker vehicles and
dismounted infantry did not possess the same level of situational
awareness that Stryker vehicles equipped with the FBCB2 system did.
Additionally, augmenting units such as armor and aviation did not arrive
with the FBCB2 system, so the brigade attached a liaison element equipped
with the system. Because the augmenting units did not have the system, the
Stryker brigade had to provide analog control measures so that the
augmenting unit would know the brigade's plan.
The FBCB2 system was not consistently updated to provide a current view of
the battle space. Although the FBCB2 system automatically tracks the
location of vehicles equipped with the system, enemy positions and the
location of friendly dismounted infantry must be entered manually. While
this capability exists, updating this information was not consistently
done.
The brigade did not consistently use predesignated formats in the FBCB2
system, affecting the information flow into other systems. To communicate
with the Army Battle Command System, the FBCB2 system has a predesignated
message format. Units found these formats cumbersome and opted instead to
use either analog means or the free-text feature in the system. Not using
the predesignated format made updating the other systems inefficient,
because operators had to transfer information from the free text into the
Army Battle Command System. Additionally, because free text did not
automatically update the information in the other systems, the view of the
battle space was inaccurate.
Not using the information available in the FBCB2 system was also an issue.
For example, there were several instances where individual Stryker
vehicles and an entire Stryker unit conducted movement through a minefield
that had been entered into the system. These movements either delayed
combat operations or resulted in casualties. Another example was movement
of unit vehicles down a route that was congested. The system
12 FBCB2 is a digitized system that uses sophisticated information
technology that allows Stryker brigade personnel to achieve superior
battlefield information enabling them to engage the enemy long before
coming into contact.
provided the unit information that the route was congested; yet the driver
ignored the information and moved down the route.
Sustaining the Brigade Was Challenging
During the evaluation, the brigade experienced difficulties in conducting
supply operations because components within the brigade did not or were
unable to follow the established procedures. Support to the Stryker
brigade is distribution based, meaning that instead of keeping supplies on
hand, the brigade is designed to receive a near-continuous flow of
anticipated supplies through the supply chain. The areas of the supply
chain assessed were the organic sustainment provided by the brigade
support battalion and the external logistics support provided by the
echelon above brigade. Because these two support areas are linked, supply
requests from the brigade impact the ability of the echelon above brigade
elements to provide the necessary anticipatory logistics. Conversely,
incorrect supplies sent from the echelon above brigade elements to the
brigade affected the ability of the brigade to distribute supplies to its
units. When units made proper requests, the process worked correctly.
However, the inability to make proper requests affected the ability of the
entire supply chain to provide support to the brigade.
Difficulties in maintaining a flow of supplies began at the individual
unit level and affected the entire logistics flow. We determined through
our analysis of the observer-controller comments that units had difficulty
adapting to the just-in-time system. Commanders were uncomfortable
maintaining supplies below 50 percent of their full operational
requirement and, during those situations, often placed emergency resupply
requests to the brigade support battalion. Units also had difficulty using
the digital systems to request resupply because they lacked familiarity
with the systems, connectivity issues impeded performance, or reporting
formats did not adequately address their logistics needs. While the units
were able, at times, to adopt work-around solutions, the effect was a
disruption of the intended flow of supplies.
The brigade support battalion struggled to perform its dual function of
acting as a conduit for its requests and the distribution point for
supplies between the echelon above brigade support structure and the
brigade. One difficulty faced by the support battalion was the need to
reconfigure supplies received from the echelon above brigade support
structure. Unit supply requests did not adequately reflect its needs;
therefore, the anticipatory loads sent from the echelon above brigade
support structure did not contain the correct supplies in the correct
amounts and configurations. As a result, the brigade support battalion had
to
reconfigure the supplies it had available as well as those that it had
received. Supply distribution occurred as available, as opposed to a set
schedule, resulting in the support battalion having insufficient
transportation assets to deliver all needed supplies in a timely manner.
Figure 9 shows the brigade support battalion at the National Training
Center.
Figure 9: Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center
The brigade also had difficulty providing supplies to units when the
support battalion was moving to a new location. The evaluation showed that
when stationary, the support battalion successfully established alternate
supply points for brigade units. (Figure 10 shows an example of an
alternate supply point at the National Training Center.) However, when the
support battalion moved, the brigade did not adequately provide for
alternate distribution points. Had this issue been addressed, the brigade
would have had the ability to adequately supply its units during the
support battalion's relocation.
Stryker Companies Had Although Stryker companies were able to exercise and
achieve some Problems Executing degree of success conducting combat
operations at both training centers, Combat Missions many of their
capabilities were not consistently used. Areas of concern
included tracking dismounted infantry, performance of antitank systems,
and challenges linking fire support elements to the artillery battalion.
Our analysis of the data showed that limited training time and a lack of
standard operating procedures contributed to the companies' inability to
consistently use their combat capabilities. Placing more emphasis on the
planning and rehearsal of operations, as well as developing and practicing
internal tactics, techniques, and procedures, could mitigate these
deficiencies.
Tracking dismounted infantry was an area of concern. Dismounted infantry
squads do not carry digital systems, so units can only maintain awareness
of dismounted infantry locations by entering reports from analog systems
into digital systems. Uncertainty about the location of dismounts hindered
the ability of companies to use their mortars, reducing the overall
application of their combat power. Despite the inability to track
dismounts noted in observer-controller comments, one unit at the National
Training Center was able to rapidly update the location of dismounts into
the digital systems by using a process it had developed, indicating that
this issue can be corrected.
Performance of antitank systems had mixed results. At the National
Training Center, observer-controller comments were overwhelmingly
supportive of the Javelin system, noting how it provided the dismounted
infantry the capability to destroy armored forces. However, at the same
time, observer-controllers at both training centers expressed concerns
that the brigade antitank company and the organic mobile gun system
platoon, consisting of a substitute Stryker antitank system, were not
positioned properly to optimize their capability. The cause for this was
attributed to a lack of situational understanding.
Fire support elements, the link between infantry units and the field
artillery battalion, also faced challenges in requesting and delivering
brigade-level indirect fires. At both training centers, brigade units were
not using their digital capabilities. Instead of using the digitized
artillery command, control, and communication system, fire supporters were
using radios and plain text messages on the FBCB2 system to call for
fires, which required soldiers at the receiving end of the request to
enter the information manually and increased the time to deliver fires.
Observercontrollers at both training centers identified contributing
factors such as a lack of a detailed digital standard operating procedure
for fire supporters and the lack of familiarity and experience with the
digitized artillery command and control system.
Contractors Were Not Always Used Effectively
Although in most instances contractor contributions were positive, our
analysis identified instances where the contractors were used
ineffectively because units used them improperly or did not provide the
support necessary to ensure their effective use.
Unit personnel perform regularly scheduled routine maintenance on their
vehicles and equipment systems according to Army standardized maintenance
manuals and unit operating procedures. However, the Stryker brigade
requires a significant use of contractors to maintain and repair the
unit's newest systems, such as the Stryker vehicles and their remote
weapon systems, and the digitized FBCB2 system. Use of contractors to
maintain and repair the Army's newest systems is not unique to the Stryker
brigade. For example, we previously reported that the 4th Infantry
Division deployed to Iraq with around 60 contractors to support the
division's digitized equipment.13 Within the Stryker brigade, contractors
are placed in combat repair teams and generally co-located with the
individual battalions and in sections within the brigade support battalion
with the primary mission of maintaining specific systems according to the
support contract awarded. The brigade is to provide the contractors with
necessary support, including rations, water, and equipment items such as
night vision goggles and protective clothing.
During the evaluation, contractors assigned to the battalion combat repair
teams responded quickly to maintenance issues. These personnel were
commended for their ability to quickly fix damaged Stryker vehicles and
for reducing the amount of time a vehicle was unavailable to the unit for
combat operations. As a result of the contractors' responsiveness, some
units relaxed their emphasis on unit-level maintenance and became overly
dependent on the contractors. In analyzing the data, we found instances
where contractors were used ineffectively. For example, we found that some
units bypassed standard Army maintenance procedures and requested
contractor support to conduct maintenance that should have been conducted
by the unit's organic maintenance personnel.
We also noted that transporting the contractors to support the
reconnaissance squadron proved difficult because the squadron was spread
across the battlefield and was responsible for the largest
13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Operations: Contractors
Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed
in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003).
operational area. The brigade placed contractors in combat repair teams
that were, in turn, attached to the individual battalions. The battalions
are responsible for the contractors' security, logistics, and
transportation. The location of the combat repair teams on the battlefield
determines the ability of the contractors to get quickly to where they are
needed.
Also, contractors could not be used in some instances because the brigade
did not provide the contractors with night vision goggles, impeding their
ability to move to units during periods of limited visibility.
Additionally, protective clothing and equipment for the contractors were
not provided, which precluded the contractors from performing their
responsibilities after chemical attacks. The mitigation plan addresses
those issues relating to not using contractors effectively.
Insufficient Training Proficiency Primary Reason for Operational Evaluation
Weaknesses
Our analysis of the data collected during the operational evaluation
indicated that the brigade's training proficiency was insufficient to
fully demonstrate the brigade's entire capabilities across the full
spectrum of combat missions. The comments from the observer-controllers
and subject matter experts confirmed this conclusion because their
comments generally identified training as a major contributor to the
identified weaknesses. Moreover, the Army's final operational evaluation
report identified training as a limitation of the operational evaluation.
The brigade had never trained as a brigade-sized unit until it reached the
National Training Center and only three of six battalions had undergone an
external evaluation prior to the rotation. According to the Army, the
Stryker brigade needed 15 weeks of unit training after receiving its last
vehicles and this did not occur. In fact, the brigade was still receiving
Stryker variants at the end of the National Training Center exercise.
In May 2002,14 we reported that Fort Lewis training officials would have
preferred a full 6 months to train after receiving most of the new Stryker
vehicles. This also did not occur. Most brigades in the Army begin
training for their deployment to a combat training center, such as the
National Training Center, 4 to 6 months ahead of time. We also reported
that the need to train Stryker brigade soldiers in digital systems was
posing a challenge because the brigade's design requires digitization to
maintain the
14 U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army Actions
Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams,
GAO-02-442 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2002).
Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational Evaluation Issues,
but Deferred Issues Have Implications for Future Brigades
critical situational awareness capability. These systems use sophisticated
technology that allows the soldiers to achieve superior battlefield
information enabling them to engage the enemy long before coming into
contact. Our analysis of the operational evaluation concludes that 1 year
later, the brigade still had not mastered the use of its digital systems.
The Army is implementing a risk management plan to mitigate most issues
identified in the operational evaluation, which generally correspond with
the weaknesses we identified. The Army concluded that the issues were
largely training related, but it also identified a few as design or
equipment related. Although the Army developed, and is implementing, a
plan that will mitigate most of the identified issues, the Army's
immediate focus was to resolve those training and equipment issues that
affected the brigade's ability to deploy to Iraq. It deferred for future
consideration the remaining issues and decisions that have implications
for the future brigades.
Based on its analysis of the operational evaluation report, the Army first
developed a matrix that assigned a risk level to issues and determined
whether issues would preclude the Stryker brigade from a scheduled
deployment or could be addressed in the future. It then developed a
mitigation plan to address all issues identified.
To mitigate the identified training issues and to prepare for the
brigade's deployment to Iraq, I Corps developed and implemented an 8-week
modular predeployment training event that included a command post exercise
to train the staff and a brigade field training exercise that emphasized
platoon and company operations. The training addressed four general issues
identified from the operational evaluation:
o Army Battle Command System interoperability and connectivity,
o staff operations and synchronization,
o application of doctrine in unit operations, and
o subordinate unit specific training.
Furthermore, the command post and field training post exercises were to
ensure that the brigade
o was proficient in stability and support operation tasks as specified
by the combatant commander,
o validated the interoperability of newly fielded systems and equipment,
o validated the integration of newly assigned soldiers and leaders and
attached units such as the assigned aviation task force,
o exercised the staff planning and battle command process using the
digital and communications systems to refine the staff planning process,
o exercised distributed logistics in a complex environment, and
o exercised force protection and accountability of contractors on the
battlefield.
To help the brigade achieve the training objectives, U.S. Forces Command
provided observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness Training Center to
provide feedback and conduct informal after-action reviews focused on
lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. A senior training center
official stated that 40 to 50 percent of the observer-controllers had
participated in the operational evaluation segment held at the Joint
Readiness Training Center. During the command post exercise, the
observer-controllers viewed the planning and execution of the brigade and
battalion staffs, and during the field training exercise, they viewed the
conduct of assigned company-level combat missions.
After completing the training, the brigade commander assessed the brigade
as fully trained to perform its combat tasks. The brigade commander
concluded the brigade was
o completely retrained on those issues identified from the operational
evaluation with a focus on applicability to planned missions in Iraq and
o fully prepared to deploy.
After the training events were completed, we discussed the brigade's level
of training and readiness with the brigade commander and senior Army
officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation. All reported no
reservations regarding the proficiency of the brigade and its ability to
deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq. One senior training official
opined that the Stryker brigade is as well trained as any unit he has
observed and that the unit can operate in any threat environment.
Moreover, the issues the Army identified in its risk management matrix and
exercised during its predeployment training addressed the weaknesses we
identified in our observations and analysis of the operational evaluation.
The brigade's performance indicates that the issues and weaknesses are
being mitigated.
However, the Army is not fully addressing the potential brigade design and
the brigade equipment issues identified from the operational evaluation,
which were not included in the predeployment training, although the issues
have implications for future brigades. According to the Army staff,
the issues that were nondeployment related are still under consideration.
One identified design issue that has both deployment and long-term
implications was associated with the mobility and survivability of the
reconnaissance squadron operations officer. Currently, this staff
officer's mobile command post is a High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle.
The operational evaluation concluded that the operations officer could not
sustain the mobility pace of the reconnaissance commander and the
commander's Stryker vehicle. The evaluation also concluded that the threat
requires armored protection for this key individual. The short-term
solution is to consider providing a Stryker vehicle to the operations
officer from brigade maintenance spares or other sources, such as another
unit in the brigade. The mitigation plan includes no long-term solution,
including purchasing additional Strykers. This issue is being considered
through normal Army processes to determine a long-term solution that may
affect requirements for future brigades.
An equipment issue that is not addressed in the mitigation plan, but has
implications for future brigades, is that not all Stryker vehicles are
equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. Only two of
the four Stryker vehicles in each platoon are currently equipped with the
FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The operational evaluation
concluded that all infantry platoon Stryker vehicles need to be equipped
with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The Army had
previously recognized the need because the brigade's modified table of
organization and equipment currently authorizes the equipment. However,
the Army's mitigation plan calls for procuring sufficient sets for only
the initial Stryker brigade; it does not address plans for the follow-on
brigades.
Conclusions The operational evaluation provided the Army its first
opportunity to exercise and evaluate the capabilities of the Stryker
brigade as a whole. By completing the evaluation and certifying the
design, the Army and OSD met the requirements of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002. However, as the results of the
operational evaluation illustrated, issues with the brigade's training,
design, and equipment exist. The training issues arose because operating
with a new unit design requires time to develop skills, which the
accelerated fielding schedule did not allow. In preparation for deployment
to Iraq, the Army mitigated most of these training issues, but it deferred
resolution of some design and equipment issues and their respective
decisions for future consideration. It is important that all issues be
resolved, including those that affect future brigades, such as provision
of Stryker vehicles for reconnaissance
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments
squadron operations officers and procurement of FBCB2 systems and other
digitized equipment for the infantry platoons' Stryker vehicles. Passing
on lessons learned from the operational evaluation provides the Army the
opportunity to ease the transformation process for future Stryker brigades
by ensuring that the units have the proper training and all necessary
equipment. As we have stated previously, taking action now to address such
issues and passing on the remedies learned could enhance the chances that
future brigade formations will be accomplished smoothly.
To assist the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams' transformation efforts, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army
to
o develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues
not addressed prior to deploying the brigade and
o apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the training, design, and
equipment of the brigade to future Stryker brigades.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
concurred with our recommendations and outlined actions the Army is taking
in implementing them.
In responding to our recommendation that the Army develop a plan to
complete mitigation efforts on those issues not addressed prior to
deploying the brigade, the department stated that the Army has developed
and is executing plans for the various issues identified in the
operational evaluation and that once the armor installation is completed
in November-December 2003 in Kuwait, the Army will have completed all of
the mitigation efforts identified in our report.
With regard to our recommendation that adjustments made to the training,
design, and equipment of the first brigade are applied, as applicable, to
future brigades, the department concurred that adjustments were necessary
and would be applied to future Stryker brigades. The department stated the
Army had created a Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division deployment
team, comprised of representatives from across the Army, and that its
scope included material requirements for the First Brigade, Twenty-Fifth
Infantry Division (the Army's next Stryker brigade) and future Stryker
brigades. Regarding proposed changes to the Stryker brigade's structure,
the Army is reviewing possible design changes through its Documentation
Assistance and Review Team to determine the
appropriate solution. The department states that the Army will use this
same process regarding issues identified from Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
department also commented that the Army designated Fort Lewis, Washington,
as the Army's Center of Excellence responsible for concept development,
lessons learned, and the source for technical and tactical expertise for
future Stryker brigades and to assist the Army in distributing lessons
learned from the Stryker brigades.
Appendix VII contains the full text of the department's comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Acting Secretary of the Army, and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512
8365. Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Leo B.
Sullivan, Robert Ackley, Timothy A. Burke, M. Jane Hunt, and Jim Melton.
William M. Solis
Director
Defense Capabilities
and Management
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107107 Concerning Limitations on Army
Transformation Actions
Public Law 107-107-Dec. 28, 2001
SEC. 113. LIMITATIONS ON ACQUISITION OF INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLES AND
DEPLOYMENT OF INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.
(h) OPERATIONAL EVALUATION - (1) The Secretary of the Army shall conduct
an operational evaluation of the initial interim brigade combat team. The
evaluation shall include deployment of the team to the evaluation site and
team execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential
threats and operational scenarios.
(2) The operational evaluation under paragraph (1) may not be conducted
until the plan for such evaluation is approved by the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense.
(i) LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OF INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLES AND DEPLOYMENT
OF IBCTs. - (1) The actions described in paragraph (2) may not be taken
until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Secretary of
Defense -
(A) submits to Congress a report on the operational evaluation carried out
under subsection (h); and
(B) certifies to Congress that the results of that operational evaluation
indicate that the design for the interim brigade combat team is
operationally effective and operationally suitable.
(2) The limitation in paragraph (1) applies to the following actions:
(A) Procurement of interim armored vehicles in addition to those necessary
for equipping the first three interim brigade combat teams.
(B) Deployment of any interim brigade combat team outside the United
States.
(3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the applicability of paragraph (1)
to a deployment described in paragraph (2)(B) if the Secretary -
(A) determines that the deployment is in the national security interests
of the United States; and
Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107107 Concerning Limitations on
Army Transformation Actions
(B) submits to Congress, in writing, a notification of the waiver together
with a discussion of the reasons for the waiver.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Army's conduct of the Stryker brigade's
operational evaluation met the legislative requirements, we focused our
efforts on understanding the operational evaluation plan and its
implementation. We obtained and analyzed the Army's operational evaluation
plan and its associated execution plan. We interviewed officials and
analysts involved in both the design and evaluation of the plan from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense; Office of the Secretary of the Army;
Headquarters, Department of the Army; Army Forces Command; Army Training
and Doctrine Command; Army Test and Evaluation Command; and I Corps, Fort
Lewis. We held discussions with the Commanders of the Operations Groups at
the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center to
discuss their perspective regarding the operational evaluation.
To determine how the Army conducted the operational evaluation, we used
information from the Army's operational evaluation plan and execution plan
and monitored the conduct of the operational evaluation. We reviewed the
training procedures and attended the training sessions for the data
collectors and subject matter experts administering the training events at
the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. We
also reviewed the data collection, transfer, and validation processes. We
attended nightly briefings that were provided to the I Corps leadership
from officials of each of the two training centers. We observed various
training activities such as an attack at the National Training Center and
the tactical movements by ground and air deployments at the Joint
Readiness Training Center, as well as other events such as the commander's
combined arms rehearsal prior to the brigade moving to the training site
at the Joint Readiness Training Center.
To assess the brigade's performance during the operational evaluation, we
evaluated information from the Army's data collectors and from our visits
to the two training centers to observe training events. For the deployment
portion of the evaluation, we observed various deployment events including
the loading and unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-130 aircraft at the
National Training Center; the brigade staging area at Lake Charles,
Louisiana; and the unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-17 aircraft at the
Joint Readiness Training Center. We also observed the loading of a Stryker
company's personnel, vehicles, and supplies into C-130 aircraft as the
personnel conducted intratheater movement to a different training area at
the Joint Readiness Training Center. Because of their doctrinal expertise
and the fact that they provide feedback to all Army units that go through
the training centers, we monitored transmissions and attended meetings
held by observer-controllers and operations officials at both training
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
centers. During these meetings, discussions were held regarding the
performance of the brigade and any difficulties the brigade was
experiencing. To gain perspective on the Army's analytical process, we
attended and participated in scheduled insight meetings that discussed the
training events and observations that occurred over the previous 24 hours.
We also discussed the evaluation events with officials from the Army's
Test and Evaluation Command, as well as representatives from the
Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the
Institute for Defense Analysis.
We obtained and analyzed the database that the Army used to draw its
conclusions. Using the database, we determined that the most direct
commentary on the Stryker brigade's performance of its individual key
operating capabilities came from observer-controller comments. We reviewed
the comments as grouped by the individual operational capabilities and,
after identifying the most salient issues, developed seven themes that
incorporated all nine of the key operating capabilities. These themes are
ability of the Stryker brigade to deploy, mobility of the Stryker vehicle,
brigade and battalion staff performance, use of digital systems,
employment of the new sustainment concept, execution of combat missions,
and contractor support.
Regarding the Army's actions to mitigate the identified operational
evaluation training deficiencies, we reviewed the training methodology
developed to overcome the deficiencies and held a discussion with senior
Army officials regarding the brigade's operational readiness. We did not
observe the activities conducted during the command post exercise or the
field training exercise. However, we discussed the results of the
exercises with senior Army officials.
Our review was performed from October 2002 to October 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government audit standards.
Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and Operational
Capabilities by Critical Tasks
Deploy/ Conduct Conduct Simultaneous Redeploy Battle Distributed Offense &
Area Sustain the Protect by Air Command Defensive Operations Presence
Brigade the Force
Key Organizational Parameters
Balance between Strategic X X X X X X
Responsiveness and Battle Space
Dominance
Balanced Full Spectrum Utility X X X X X X
Reduced Sustainment Requirements X X X X X
Minimize Personnel and Logistical X X X X X
Footprint
Commonality of Vehicular Capabilities X X X X X
Reach-back X X X X X X
Embedded Unit-based Capabilities X X X X X X
Internetted Combined Arms to Company X X X X X
Team Level
Key Operational Capabilities
Mobility X X X X X X
Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight X X X X X
Enhanced Situational Understanding X X X X X X
and Information Superiority
Holistic Force Protection and X X X X X
Survivability
Lethality X X X X X
Force Effectiveness X X X X X
Reach-back X X X X X X
Joint/Multinational/Interagency/Inter-X X X X X X
operability
Full Spectrum Flexibility and X X X X X
Augmentation
Source: U.S. Army.
X = annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Critical Training
Task List (CTTL).
Appendix IV: Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical Tasks
Deploy/ Conduct Conduct Simultaneous Redeploy Battle Distributed Offense &
Area Sustain the Protect Mission Training Plan Tasks by Air Command
Defensive Operations Presence Brigade the Force
Establish a Digital Command Post X X X X X X
Conduct Urban Operations X X X X X
Conduct a Tactical Road March X X X X X
Conduct an Attack X X X X X
Conduct a Defense X X X X X
Conduct Area Security Operations X X X X X
Plan Intelligence, Surveillance, and X X X X X
Reconnaissance Operations
Conduct Command and Control of X X X X X X
Operations
Sustain the Force X X X X X X
Conduct Strategic Deployment X X X X
Source: U.S. Army.
X = annotates central tasks represented by the 10 essential mission
training plan tasks.
Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities Compared to Essential
Mission Training Plan Tasks
1 2 3 4
Conduct a Establish a Digital Conduct Urban Tactical Road Conduct an Key
Organizational Parameters Command Post Operations March Attack
Balance Between Strategic Responsiveness and X
Battlespace Dominance
Balanced Full Spectrum Utility X X X
Reduced Sustainment Requirements X X
Minimize Personnel and Logistical Footprint
Commonality of Vehicular Platforms
Reach-back X X
Embedded Unit-Based Capabilities X X X X
Internetted Combined Arms to Company-Team Level X X X
Key Operational Capabilities
Mobility X X X
Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight X X
Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information X X X X
Superiority
Holistic Force Protection and Survivability X X X
Lethality X X
Force Effectiveness X X X
Reach-back X X X
Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability X X
Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation X X X
Source: U.S. Army.
X= annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Mission Training Plan
Essential task.
Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities Compared to
Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks
5 6 7 8 9 10
Plan Intelligence, Survey, and Conduct Conduct a Conduct Area
Reconnaissance Command and Sustain Conduct Strategic Defense Security
Operations Operations Control Operations the Force Deployment
X
X X X X
X X
X
X
X X
X X X
X X
X X X X
X
X X X X
X X X X
X X X
X X X X X
X X X X
X
X X X X X
Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key Operational
Capabilities
The Stryker brigade's organizational and operational concept document
defines the unit's essential organizational characteristics, or
parameters, that the brigade was evaluated against. The document also
defines the unit's essential operational characteristics, or capabilities,
that the brigade was evaluated against.
The eight key organizational parameters are defined below.
o Achieve Balance Between Capabilities for Strategic Responsiveness and
Requirements for Battle-Space Dominance: The organization must balance
deployability, sustainability, and its in-theater personnel footprint
against its combat requirement for lethality, mobility, and survivability.
The Stryker Brigade Combat Team must approach the deployability standards
of a light brigade while arriving with the punch and staying power
approaching that of a mechanized formation.
o Balanced Full Spectrum Utility: The Stryker brigade is deliberately
optimized for early entry small-scale contingencies, but it also is
required to be prepared to participate as a "guarantor combat force" in
stability and support operations to permit peacekeeping and stability
forces to carry out their missions in a secure environment. Similarly, the
Stryker brigade must be prepared to fight as a component within a division
or corps structure in a major theater of war.
o Reduced Sustainment Requirements: The Stryker brigade must have
sustainment requirements well below that of a heavy force.
o Minimize Brigade's Personnel and Logistical Footprint: There is an
imperative for expanding the combat elements and reducing the support
capabilities. Strategic deployability and demand reduction must be
enhanced, while maintaining a robust combat capability.
o Commonality of Vehicular Platforms: A common platform for combat,
combat support, and combat service support echelons enables deployability,
demand reduction, and sustainment efficiency. Common platforms must also
be highly mobile and capable of intratheater deployment by C-130 aircraft.
o Reach-back: To enable the Stryker brigade to maintain a deployable
structure with a minimized logistics footprint, it must be able to
reachback and access those functions that can be accomplished by
higherechelon or out-of-theater organizations. It is both an
organizational and operational principle.
Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key
Operational Capabilities
o Embedded Unit-Based Capabilities: Military intelligence, signal,
engineer, antitank, artillery, and combat service support elements have
been tailored specifically to the unique requirements of the unit's
mission set. For the Stryker brigade, analysis demonstrates that mission
capabilities are best enhanced if they are embedded within the unit's
organic organization. Attaching divisional elements to a Stryker brigade
unnecessarily enlarges the brigade's deployment requirements and theater
footprint and introduces different vehicle types and equipment sets into
the structure, violating the principle of commonality and increasing
sustainment and infrastructure requirements.
o Internetted Combined Arms to Company-Team Level: An operational
analysis for the Stryker brigade indicates that, within the environment of
complex/urban terrain, force effectiveness is best enhanced and the
requirement for responsive mutual support is best satisfied through
internetted combined arms to company-team level, i.e., to a degree beyond
traditional practice.
The nine key operational capabilities are defined below.
o Mobility:
o Strategic - Organized, equipped, and configured to support a goal of
deploying the brigade in 96 hours from first wheels up. (Ninety-six hours
was originally a requirement.)
o Operational - Capable of intratheater lift by ground/sea or by U.S.
Air Force family of tactical aircraft. (Concept document specifies C-130
aircraft.)
o Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight: Achieves tactical decision by
means of combined arms at the company/team level focused on dismounted
assault, supported by direct fires, and on the integration of mortars,
artillery, mobility support, and joint fires/effects.
o Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information Superiority: This
is the fundamental force enabler across all Stryker brigade battlefield
operating systems and the foundation of risk mitigation with respect to
brigade vulnerabilities, particularly the lack of armor protection.
o Holistic Force Protection and Survivability: Overall, the Stryker
brigade must meet force protection challenges through the holistic
application of a variety of capabilities, including early warning;
situational understanding; avoidance of surprise; deception; rapid
Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key
Operational Capabilities
mobility; signature control; nontemplateable operations; avoidances of
enemy fires; mutual support; use of cover and concealment; and
implementation of innovative tactic, techniques, and procedures.
o Lethality: The Stryker brigade possesses a robust array of direct and
indirect fire systems to shape the battle space and achieve decision in
the close fight inherent within complex and urban terrain, greater than
current light brigades.
o Force Effectiveness: Although the Stryker brigade must have the
capability to achieve/maintain information superiority, it will not always
enjoy combat platform superiority. The Stryker brigade will offset the
platform limitations of its medium-weight platforms through the holistic
integration of all other capabilities, particularly the internetted
actions of the combined arms company teams.
o Reach/Reach-back: The capability of the Stryker brigade to exploit a
multitude of nonorganic resources to accomplish its assigned missions. The
Stryker brigade executes reach-back on a routine, deliberate basis as a
combat power and sustainment multiplier in five primary areas: fires and
effects, intelligence and information, planning and analysis, force
protection, and sustainment.
o Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability: The Stryker brigade
will benefit from exploiting the knowledge and capabilities residing
within multinational forces; U.S. interagency organizations operating in
the theater; and other international, local, nongovernmental, and private
organizations involved in the crisis, conflict, or instability.
o Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation: The Stryker brigade will
have the requisite capabilities to achieve decision in conjunction with
the joint fight in low-end contingencies such as current operations in the
Balkans. If conditions escalate, requiring additional capabilities that do
not reside within the Stryker brigade, it will receive augmentation. The
Stryker brigade may participate in major theater of war operations as a
subordinate element within a division. Again, adjustments to the task
organization, including augmentation, will be required in a major theater
of war environment.
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 49 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 50 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation
Related GAO Products
Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army
Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry
Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated
Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.
Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should Be
Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's
Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2003.
Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2002.
Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its
Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. Washington, D.C.:
November 16, 2001.
Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges.
GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.
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