    Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative
    Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but
    Issues Remain for Future Brigades (12-DEC-03, GAO-04-188).

    The Army continues to transform units, known as Stryker brigades,
    into lighter, rapidly deployable, and more capable forces.
    Because Stryker brigades are an entirely new design, the fiscal
    year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act required the Army to
    conduct an evaluation of the design, to include deployment of the
    brigade and execution of combat missions across the full spectrum
    of potential threats. The act also required the Secretary of
    Defense to certify that the evaluation results indicate the
    design is both operationally effective and suitable. As one in a
    series of reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the
    evaluation to assess (1) whether the Army and the Secretary of
    Defense met legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated
    both the operational effectiveness and suitability of the
    brigade's design, (3) what the brigade's performance was during
    the evaluation, and (4) how the Army plans to mitigate issues
    identified during the evaluation.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-188
        ACCNO:   A09010
      TITLE:     Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative
    Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but
    Issues Remain for Future Brigades
         DATE:   12/12/2003
      SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities
    	     Defense operations
    	     Evaluation criteria
    	     Internal controls
    	     Military operations
    	     Performance measures
    	     Strategic planning
    	     C-130 Aircraft
    	     C-17 Aircraft
    	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
    	     DOD Stryker Brigade
    	     Globemaster Aircraft
    	     Hercules Aircraft

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    GAO-04-188

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

                           Report to Congressional Committees

    December 2003

    MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

     The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design
                   Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades

    GAO-04-188

    Highlights of GAO-04-188, a report to congressional committees

    The Army continues to transform units, known as Stryker brigades, into
    lighter, rapidly deployable, and more capable forces. Because Stryker
    brigades are an entirely new design, the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
    Authorization Act required the Army to conduct an evaluation of the
    design, to include deployment of the brigade and execution of combat
    missions across the full spectrum of potential threats. The act also
    required the Secretary of Defense to certify that the evaluation results
    indicate the design is both operationally effective and suitable.

    As one in a series of reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the
    evaluation to assess (1) whether the Army and the Secretary of Defense met
    legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated both the operational
    effectiveness and suitability of the brigade's design, (3) what the
    brigade's performance was during the evaluation, and (4) how the Army
    plans to mitigate issues identified during the evaluation.

    GAO recommends that OSD direct the Army to complete all mitigation efforts
    and apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the brigade design to future
    Stryker brigades. In commenting on a draft of this report, OSD concurred
    with the recommendations.

    December 2003

    MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

    The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design
    Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades

    The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met the
    legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
    Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan for conducting an operational
    evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; obtained the plan's approval from
    the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; and
    from April through May 2003, the brigade deployed to the evaluation sites
    and conducted combat missions across the full spectrum of potential
    threats-from major theater of war to security and stability operations. In
    September 2003, OSD certified to Congress that the brigade design is both
    operationally effective and suitable. The Army has deployed the first
    Stryker brigade to Iraq.

    The Army developed an evaluation plan and established a control cell that
    used independent evaluators to monitor and collect data on the brigade's
    performance. The cell compiled and analyzed the data and submitted a
    report to the I Corps commander, who declared the design as operationally
    effective and operationally suitable. The commander noted that performance
    difficulties were due to an accelerated fielding schedule and inadequate
    training time. The U.S. Forces Command endorsed the report.

    GAO determined, based on its observations and analyses, that the brigade's
    performance showed strengths and weaknesses. The brigade could perform as
    designed but did not consistently demonstrate its capabilities. The
    brigade's strengths were its ability to conduct combat missions, including
    deployment using different transportation modes and the ability to use the
    Stryker vehicle's speed and agility. The weaknesses related to staff
    planning, digital system usage, sustainment, and executing company-level
    combat missions. Contractors were also used ineffectively. GAO concluded
    that the primary cause of the weaknesses was insufficient training
    proficiency.

    The Army is implementing a plan to mitigate most operational evaluation
    issues. The Army concluded that the issues were largely training related,
    although some were related to design or equipment. The brigade, in
    preparation for deployment to Iraq, conducted additional training to
    address the issues the Army and GAO identified. The brigade's training
    performance indicates that these issues are being mitigated. The Army is
    addressing the training and equipment issues for the first Stryker
    brigade; however, it has deferred some critical issues that have
    implications for future brigades.

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-188.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
    512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the

    Stryker Brigade

    Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter
    Experts to Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade's
    Design

    Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses
    during the Operational Evaluation

    Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational
    Evaluation Issues, but Deferred Issues Have Implications for
    Future Brigades

    Conclusions
    Recommendations for Executive Action
    Agency Comments

                                           1

                                          2 5

                                           6

                                           8

    11

    32 34 35 35

    Appendix I 	Provisions from Public Law 107-107 Concerning Limitations on
    Army Transformation Actions

    Appendix II Scope and Methodology

    Appendix III 	Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and Operational
    Capabilities by Critical Tasks

    Appendix IV 	Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical Tasks

      Appendix V 	Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities
      Compared to Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks 44

      Appendix VI

    Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and
    Key Operational Capabilities 46

    Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Defense

    Related GAO Products

      Figures

    Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the Southern
    California Logistics Airfield 13 Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130
    Aircraft at the National Training Center 14 Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a
    Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles,

    Louisiana 15 Figure 4: Road March 16 Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward
    Landing Strip 17 Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at

    Geronimo Forward Landing Strip 18 Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded
    Terrain at the Joint

    Readiness Training Center 20 Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon 21 Figure 9:
    Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center 26 Figure 10:
    Alternate Supply Point at the National Training Center 28

    Abbreviations

    FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below OSD Office of the
    Secretary of Defense

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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    separately.

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    December 12, 2003

    Congressional Committees

    During fiscal year 2003, the Army continued to transform its force to one
    that is lighter, more rapidly deployable, and able to effectively operate
    in various environments and across the full spectrum of threats from
    smallscale contingencies to a major theater of war. Two of six planned
    Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are currently undergoing the Army's initial
    transformation efforts-one brigade, which has been deployed to Iraq, and
    another brigade, which is co-located at Fort Lewis, Washington. The
    brigades are an entirely new organizational design, and questions have
    arisen regarding their combat effectiveness. In the fiscal year 2002
    National Defense Authorization Act,1 Congress required

    o  	the Secretary of the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of the
    brigade that includes deployment of the brigade to the evaluation site and
    brigade execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential
    threats and operational scenarios;

    o  	the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of
    Defense to approve the operational evaluation plan; and

    o  	the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on the
    operational evaluation.

    The statute further limited deployment of the brigade and procurement of
    vehicles beyond the third brigade until 30 days after the Secretary of
    Defense submits the report and certifies that the results of the
    operational evaluation indicate that the design for the Stryker Brigade
    Combat Team is operationally effective2 and operationally suitable.3 (See
    appendix I for the

    1 Section 113, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P.
    L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001).

    2 Operational effectiveness is determined by the brigade's ability to
    successfully accomplish full spectrum missions as well as, or better than,
    current forces. This requires the capability to achieve decisive action
    through close combat, centered primarily on dismounted infantry assault.

    3 Operational suitability is determined if the brigade's design supports
    the tasking of the brigade to the type of missions and environments that
    the brigade's concept document indicates is appropriate for it. This
    requires organizing and equipping the force to provide high strategic,
    operational, and tactical mobility.

    statutory provisions concerning these limitations on Army transformation
    actions.)

    On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored and
    assessed the Army's efforts to conduct an operational evaluation of the
    first Stryker Brigade Combat Team - the Third Brigade of the Second
    Infantry Division - as required by the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
    Authorization Act. Our objectives were to assess (1) whether the Army and
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met legislative requirements,
    (2) how the Army evaluated both the operational effectiveness and the
    operational suitability of the brigade's design, (3) what the brigade's
    performance was during the operational evaluation, and (4) how the Army
    plans to mitigate issues identified during the operational evaluation.

    In our assessment of the Army's Stryker brigade operational evaluation, we
    reviewed the Army's operational evaluation plan and its associated
    execution plan, and we observed the exercises held at the National
    Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness
    Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We observed the deployment of the
    Stryker brigade, as well as execution of certain combat missions. Upon
    completion of the operational evaluation and the Army's compilation of its
    data sources, we reviewed and analyzed the Army's database that consisted
    primarily of evaluator comments to assess the brigade's performance. (See
    appendix II for the full text of the scope and methodology.) We are
    providing this report, another in a planned series related to Army
    transformation, to you because of your committees' oversight
    responsibility. Related GAO products concerning transformation are listed
    at the end of this report.

    The Army and OSD met the legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002
    National Defense Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan and
    conducted an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; it
    obtained the plan's approval from the Department of Defense Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation;4 and OSD submitted a report to Congress
    and certified the results of the operational evaluation. The Army
    conducted a deployment to the operational evaluation site from Fort

    4 The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal advisor
    to the Secretary of Defense concerning operational testing, including
    assessments of operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability
    of the items tested.

      Results in Brief

    Lewis, Washington, to the National Training Center and onto the Joint
    Readiness Training Center; these deployments incorporated various methods,
    including rail, sea, air, and ground movements. The Army's operational
    evaluation, held from April 1, 2003, through May 28, 2003, included the
    conduct of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats,
    to include scenarios in a major theater war environment as well as
    security and stability operations. Finally, on September 17, 2003, the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense certified that the operational evaluation's
    results indicated that the initial Stryker brigade's design is
    operationally effective and operationally suitable.

    The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational
    parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities. The
    organizational parameters and operational characteristics were the
    essential elements in assessing both the operational effectiveness and the
    operational suitability of the first Stryker brigade's design. In doing
    so, the Army established a control cell that developed a data collection
    plan, analyzed the results, and wrote an operational evaluation report.
    The Army used independent evaluators trained in Stryker brigade doctrine
    to monitor and observe the brigade's performance. The evaluators provided
    subjective commentary as to how the brigade performed in accordance with
    key organizational parameters and key operational characteristics. The
    data were compiled and analyzed, and a report was submitted to the I Corps
    commander. The I Corps commander assessed the report's findings and
    determined that the brigade's design is operationally both effective and
    suitable, but noted that the brigade had experienced difficulties in
    demonstrating some of the key operational capabilities. The difficulties
    were primarily attributed to an accelerated fielding schedule and a lack
    of adequate training time. The Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command,
    endorsed the report's findings.

    Based on our observation of events and analysis of the data collected in
    accordance with the Army's plan, the brigade demonstrated that it could
    perform as designed, but it did not consistently demonstrate its
    capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. The strengths were
    illustrated by the brigade's ability to deploy using different
    transportation systems and the individual unit's ability to take advantage
    of the speed, agility, and maneuverability of the Stryker vehicle. With
    regard to weaknesses, the brigade had difficulties in (1) mastering staff
    operations, which reduced the ability of the brigade to use all of its
    assets as intended; (2) using its digital systems, which resulted in
    inconsistent and incomplete maintenance of a common operating picture; (3)
    conducting supply operations, which challenged the brigade to sustain
    itself; and (4)

    executing company-level combat missions, which reduced its overall combat
    power. Additionally, contractors were used ineffectively because units
    used them improperly or did not provide the support necessary to ensure
    their effective use in providing maintenance support to the brigade. Our
    analysis of the data concluded that insufficient training proficiency was
    the primary cause of these weaknesses, thus inhibiting the brigade from
    achieving a full demonstration of its capabilities.

    The Army has developed a plan that when fully implemented will mitigate
    most issues identified in the operational evaluation, and the plan
    addresses the weaknesses we identified from our analysis of the evaluation
    results. However, the plan does not fully address design and equipment
    issues that have implications for future brigades. The Army's immediate
    focus in implementing the plan was to resolve issues relating to training
    and equipment that affected the brigade's ability to deploy to Iraq and
    defer the remaining issues for future consideration, some of which have
    implications for the future brigades. To mitigate the training issues and
    to prepare for deployment to Iraq, I Corps developed and implemented
    training events, including a command post exercise to train the staff and
    a brigade field training exercise that emphasized platoon and company unit
    operations. Observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness Training Center
    observed the brigade's performance during these events, provided feedback,
    and conducted informal after-action reviews focusing on lessons learned
    from Operation Iraqi Freedom. After the training, the brigade commander
    and senior Army officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation
    told us that they had no reservations regarding the brigade's proficiency
    or ability to deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq. However, one
    design issue that has not been completely addressed that has implications
    for the current and future brigades involves the current vehicle of the
    reconnaissance squadron operations officer- it is not as mobile or as
    survivable as the Stryker vehicle used by the reconnaissance squadron
    commander. The mitigation plan includes a short-term solution for the
    initial brigade of shifting a Stryker from elsewhere for the operations
    officer but no long-term solution. Regarding equipment, one equipment
    issue involved the fact that not all Stryker vehicles have the digital
    system called Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). This
    system increases a commander's ability to position troops and conduct
    combat operations. The issue is that only onehalf of the Stryker vehicles
    in each infantry platoon currently have the FBCB2 system. The mitigation
    plan calls for procuring a sufficient number of FBCB2 systems for the
    initial Stryker brigade, but the plan does not address if FBCB2s will be
    procured to equip all Stryker vehicles in the future brigades. All
    identified issues - training, design, and equipment -

    and the related mitigation efforts provide valuable lessons learned for
    future brigades.

    We are recommending that, to assist the Stryker brigade's transformation
    efforts, the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
    develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues not
    addressed prior to deploying the brigade and apply, as applicable,
    adjustments made to the training, equipment, and design of the brigade to
    future Stryker brigades.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the department concurred with our
    recommendations.

                                       Background

    The Army continues to transform its forces toward its goal to be more
    strategically responsive and to dominate across the full spectrum of
    military operations - from small-scale contingencies to a major theater
    war. The transformation efforts, which began in 1999, attempted to balance
    lethality, mobility, and survivability with the capabilities required for
    responsiveness, deployability, sustainability, and a reduced in-theater
    footprint. The Army chose an armored wheeled vehicle, designated as the
    Stryker, as its primary combat platform and began to transform six
    existing brigades to Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The Third Brigade of
    the Second Infantry Division was selected as the initial Stryker Brigade
    Combat Team.

    According to the Army, the core qualities of the new brigade design are
    high mobility at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; an
    ability to achieve decisive action through the use of dismounted infantry
    that is supported by organic direct and indirect fire platforms; and an
    enhanced situational understanding of the battlefield. As an early-entry
    force, the brigade is expected to have sufficient built-in combat power to
    conduct immediate combat operations upon arrival in theater if required.
    Also, the brigade was designed to accept additional forces that can expand
    the core tasks and functions that already reside within the brigade or
    that execute tasks that do not reside within the brigade (e.g., adding
    armor, field artillery, air defense, additional engineers, or aviation).
    The brigade was also designed to adopt a new training regimen that allows
    a faster deployment to any type of contingency; in contrast, current Army
    units receive an alert for a mission, train for the mission-specific
    requirements, and then deploy.

    Congress has supported the Army's transformation efforts, but since the
    Stryker brigade is an entirely new design, members of the Senate and House
    Committees on Armed Services agreed that the Army must conduct an
    evaluation that indicated that the brigade's design is operationally
    effective and operationally suitable. The requirement for an operational
    evaluation was formalized in the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
    Authorization Act. For the evaluation, the Army modified an existing
    training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk,
    Louisiana, and added a data collection apparatus, a deployment schedule,
    and an additional training event at the National Training Center at Fort
    Irwin, California. The Army uses training exercises at the Joint Readiness
    Training Center and the National Training Center to increase the combat
    proficiency of its units and to identify training deficiencies that need
    to be addressed. The training exercises are conducted under stressful
    conditions against an opposing force emulating combat scenarios
    anticipated in war. By Army regulation, training deficiencies identified
    during the rotations and subsequent retraining are not indicators of unit
    failure. The Army conducted the evaluation from April through May 2003.

    The Army and OSD met the requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National
    Defense Authorization Act to, respectively, plan and conduct an
    operational evaluation of the Stryker brigade and certify the evaluation
    results. The Army met the requirements by (1) obtaining approval of the
    evaluation plan by the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test
    and Evaluation, (2) deploying the brigade to the evaluation site, and (3)
    conducting combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats.
    The act also made additional vehicle procurement and brigade deployment
    contingent upon a certification that the brigade's design is operationally
    effective and operationally suitable. OSD has provided the certification
    to Congress.

    The Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
    approved the Army's operational evaluation plan on March 28, 2003. The
    Army's primary objective was to comply with the legislation by assessing
    the initial Stryker brigade's design for operational effectiveness and
    operational suitability according to the unit's organizational and
    operational concept and its current modified table of organization and

      The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the Stryker Brigade

    equipment. A secondary objective was to conduct a readiness assessment5 of
    the unit's ability to conduct combat operations according to Army
    doctrine.

    The Army deployed to the operational evaluation site when it conducted a
    multimodal movement from Fort Lewis to the National Training Center, Fort
    Irwin, and onto the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The
    operational evaluation was held from April 1, 2003, through May 28, 2003.
    To accomplish these strategic and operational moves, the Army used various
    methods, including rail, sea, air, and ground movements. Due to current
    world military operations and the limited number of available aircraft,
    the Army was restricted from moving the entire brigade combat team by air.

    During the operational evaluation, the brigade conducted combat missions
    across the full spectrum of potential threats. The evaluation's scope
    included the brigade field training exercise at the National Training
    Center and a certification exercise during a Joint Readiness Training
    Center rotation. The evaluation was constructed so that the brigade
    conducted a series of combat missions against an opposing force in both
    major theater of war and small-scale contingency environments. For
    example, the scenario at the National Training Center was optimized for
    the higher end of combat where the brigade conducted operations against
    mechanized forces. At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the brigade's
    mission was optimized for small-scale contingencies where the brigade
    conducted operations in noncontiguous areas and in complex urban terrain.
    Throughout the operational evaluation's events, the brigade was augmented
    with aviation, military police, and armor.

    On August 19, 2003, the Acting Secretary of the Army forwarded a
    memorandum requesting that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress the
    operational evaluation report prepared by the Army following the
    evaluation and certify that the results of the evaluation indicate that
    the Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division's design is operationally
    effective and operationally suitable. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on
    September 17, 2003, certified to Congress that the results of the
    operational evaluation indicated the design for the initial Stryker
    brigade

    5 The readiness assessment was based on the evaluation of the mission
    training plan and the associated critical tasks. These tasks were
    evaluated as Go/No Go based on defined standards.

      Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter Experts to
      Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade's Design

    is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The Army has
    deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq.

    The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational
    parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities. The
    Army also established an Operational Evaluation Control Cell (Control
    Cell) to coordinate the assessment activities and used subject matter
    experts and observers as independent evaluators to assess the operational
    effectiveness and suitability of the brigade.

    According to the Army, the key organizational parameters and operational
    capabilities were the essential elements in assessing the brigade's design
    for operational effectiveness and operational suitability. The mission
    training plans provided the tasks, conditions, and standards to assess
    operational readiness as defined by the key operational capabilities. The
    eight key organizational parameters are

    o  	achieve balance between capabilities for strategic responsiveness and
    requirements for battle-space dominance,

    o  balanced full spectrum utility,6

    o  reduced sustainment requirements,

    o  minimize the brigade's personnel and logistical footprint,

    o  commonality of vehicular platforms,

    o  reach-back,

    o  embedded unit-based capabilities, and

    o  internetted combined arms to company-team level.

    The nine key operational capabilities are

    o  mobility,

    o  dismounted assault and the close fight,

    o  enhanced situational understanding and information superiority,

    o  holistic force protection and survivability,

    o  lethality,

    o  force effectiveness,

    o  reach/reach-back,

    o  joint/multinational/interagency interoperability, and

    o  full spectrum flexibility and augmentation.

    6 This refers to the brigade's capability in the full spectrum of combat.
    See appendix III.

    The key organizational parameters and operational capabilities are defined
    by the brigade's organizational and operational concept document of June

    7

    2000.

    The evaluation linked these key characteristics to the brigade's six
    critical training requirements and then to the brigade's mission training
    plans. Army planners had determined that for an effective operational
    evaluation, the events must focus on 10 specific brigade level tasks
    extracted from the brigade mission training plans. Appendixes III, IV, and
    V illustrate the evaluation's integration of key organizational parameters
    and operational capabilities, mission training plans, and critical
    training requirements. (See appendix VI for the definition of key
    organizational parameters and operational capabilities.)

    The Army established a Control Cell to manage the activities needed to
    conduct the evaluation. Participants included individuals from the I Corps
    staff, the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command's Brigade Coordination Cell,
    the Army Test and Evaluation Command,8 and a team of contractors. The
    Control Cell developed an execution plan and provided it to the Department
    of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation for review.

    During development of the operational evaluation execution plan, the
    Department of the Army provided additional guidance to Forces Command and
    directed that the evaluation also assess the ability of the Stryker
    brigade to receive logistical support from echelon above brigade support
    elements. Initially, the Army had planned to informally assess this
    capability. However, after we recommended to the Secretary of Defense9
    that external logistics support be an element of the evaluation, the Army
    included this in its execution plan. To address these concerns, the
    Control Cell's execution plan included an evaluation of the echelon above
    brigade

    7 The organizational and operational concept document provides a detailed
    framework for the definition of fundamental operational precepts,
    capabilities, and organizational constructs. The concept document is the
    basis for the development of mission training plans, training strategies
    and support packages, evaluation plans, and field manuals.

    8 The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army's independent
    operational test activity and is responsible for overall management of the
    Army test and evaluation programs.

    9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of
    External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally
    Mandated Review of the Army's Operational Evaluation Plan, GAO-03-484R
    (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).

    support elements, including the logistics concepts such as contractor
    support, reach-back, and configured loads. Real-world events limited the
    number of assets available to allow for continuous aerial resupply, so the
    Control Cell compensated by using limited aerial resupply and, when
    aircraft were not available, used notional aerial resupply that included
    the use of time delays to replicate transport time. For both types of
    resupply, the echelon above brigade elements would distribute supplies in
    configured loads to the Stryker brigade for disbursement.

    Prior to the conduct of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell
    instructed and certified subject matter experts10 from proponent schools
    and observer-controllers from the training centers as primary data
    collectors. The instruction familiarized the data collectors on the
    Stryker brigade organization, capabilities and doctrine, and the combat
    training centers' rules of engagement and safety guidelines. Officials
    from the Army's Test and Evaluation Command provided instruction on data
    collection procedures and use of data collection tools such as personal
    digital assistants. Additionally, the Control Cell formed a team composed
    of members of the Training and Doctrine Command's Brigade Coordination
    Cell that also collected data throughout the operational evaluation.

    Data collected for the operational evaluation included observations and
    comments from subject matter experts, observer-controllers, and team
    members from the Brigade Coordination Cell. These observations and
    comments occurred while the data collectors observed the brigade's
    performance during the various combat missions. Additional data sources
    included after-action reviews, surveys, and key personnel interviews. The
    Army's Operational Test Command also retrieved digital instrumentation
    data. All of these data sources were retrieved every 24 hours and
    validated by officials of the Army's Operational Test Command and the
    Control Cell. The Control Cell established a review group to authenticate
    the data and develop initial insights based on observations that emerged
    as the events progressed.

    Upon completion of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell analyzed
    all the data sources and submitted a report of its findings to the I Corps

    10 Subject matter experts are usually commissioned officers and
    noncommissioned officers who have extensive experience with the studied
    equipment, recent unit experience, and a background as a trainer or in
    training development.

    commander. The I Corps commander concluded that the brigade had met or
    adequately met each of the requirements associated with the key
    organizational parameters and key operational capabilities. The Army
    defined "adequately met" as the brigade's design was operationally
    effective and operationally suitable but had some deficiencies, or issues.
    The report was submitted to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command,
    who endorsed the report's findings. Although the I Corps commander
    assessed the brigade's design as operationally both effective and
    suitable, the operational evaluation report noted that the Stryker brigade
    experienced difficulties in demonstrating some of the key operational
    capabilities, which were primarily attributed to an accelerated fielding
    schedule and a lack of adequate training time.

    Based on our observations of the brigade's performance at the two combat
    training centers and our analysis of data collected during the evaluation,
    the brigade performed as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its
    capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. In certain areas,
    the Stryker brigade demonstrated its strengths, including both the ability
    to conduct strategic and operational deployments and to maneuver about the
    battlefield using the Stryker vehicle. The operational evaluation also
    demonstrated weaknesses in the areas of staff planning, usage of digital
    systems, sustainment of the brigade, and established company-level combat
    procedures. Civilian contractors were also used ineffectively to support
    the units. Our analysis indicated that the Stryker brigade's training
    proficiency was the primary cause of these weaknesses.

      Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses during the
      Operational Evaluation

        Stryker Brigade Demonstrated That It Is Deployable

    Our observations and analysis of the data indicated that the Stryker
    brigade demonstrated the ability to conduct strategic and tactical
    deployments using different transportation systems such as rail, ground,
    and various sea vessels and aircraft. Upon arrival at each destination,
    the brigade showed the ability to reassemble into a combat configuration
    in a timely manner. Once reconfigured, units of the Stryker brigade also
    demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate combat operations. It should
    be noted, however, that while the tactical deployment of the Stryker
    vehicle by C-130 aircraft was demonstrated, the Army has yet to
    demonstrate under various environmental conditions, such as air
    temperature and airfield altitude, just how far Stryker vehicles can be
    tactically deployed by C-130 aircraft.

    The brigade used commercial air, rail, and ground transportation to move
    personnel and equipment from Fort Lewis to Fort Irwin. While at the
    National Training Center, we observed the brigade conduct a tactical
    movement by moving a Stryker infantry company with its personnel,
    supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via C-130 aircraft from Southern
    California Logistics Airfield to an austere desert airfield on Fort Irwin
    about 70 miles away. (Figure 1 shows a Stryker vehicle being loaded at the
    Southern California Logistics Airfield, and figure 2 shows the Stryker
    exiting from a C-130 aircraft at the National Training Center.) Upon
    landing, the infantry company unloaded the vehicles from the aircraft,
    reconfigured them for combat missions, and moved onward to a staging area.
    All Stryker variants could reconfigure into combat capable modes within
    their designated time standard, except the medical variant. Based on our
    observation of the event, we agree with the Army that the insufficient
    crew size was the reason why the medical variant, with its extra external
    boxes, could not be reconfigured within the time standard. However, if the
    brigade had trained to reconfigure the Stryker variants, this situation
    would have been apparent and should not have occurred.

     Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the Southern California
                                   Logistics Airfield

    Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training Center

    The Stryker brigade demonstrated strategic movement when it deployed
    brigade elements by rail, sealift, and C-17 aircraft from the National
    Training Center to a staging area located at Chennault Industrial Airpark,
    located in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Two battalion equipment sets moved by
    Fast Sealift Ship from San Diego, California, to Lake Charles Seaport,
    while a third battalion's equipment, including all current Stryker
    variants, moved by C-17 aircraft from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to a staging
    area at the England Air Park in Alexandria, Louisiana. (Figure 3 shows a
    Stryker being unloaded from a Fast Sealift Ship.) Elements of the Stryker
    brigade that unloaded at the Lake Charles Seaport moved to the Chennault
    Industrial Airpark and then conducted a road march to the Joint Readiness
    Training Center to begin combat operations. We observed the staging area
    as the

    brigade assembled and prepared for its road movement to the training
    center. Figure 4 shows the road march to the training center.

        Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles, Louisiana

    Figure 4: Road March

    Tactical deployment was demonstrated when C-17 aircraft transported an
    infantry company from Lake Charles to Geronimo forward landing strip, an
    austere dirt airfield at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The C-17
    aircraft landed at the forward landing strip, and the infantry company
    demonstrated the ability to quickly unload its vehicles and personnel by
    moving to the tactical assembly area in about 10 minutes. (Figure 5 shows
    a C-17 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) A Stryker infantry
    company also demonstrated the ability to travel into combat operations in

    a C-130 aircraft. (Figure 6 shows the loading of an infantry company and
    its vehicles onto C-130 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) The
    Stryker infantry company-consisting of 21 Strykers and 5 other trucks and
    trailers; 188 soldiers; and 3 days of food, water, ammunition, and fuel to
    support the company-traveled from Geronimo to Essler airfield using 7
    C-130s flying 25 sorties over a distance of about 100 miles. Upon landing
    at the Essler airfield, the company moved to a tactical assembly area and
    onward to conduct a combat operation.

                    Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward Landing Strip

    Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at Geronimo Forward
    Landing Strip

    Stryker Brigade The Stryker vehicle demonstrated speed, agility, and
    extensive Demonstrated Its Ability to maneuverability during the execution
    of the brigade's combat missions Quickly Maneuver about during the
    operational evaluation. Because of its maneuverability, the the
    Battlefield Stryker vehicle allowed individual units to react and move
    around the

    battlefield much more quickly than light and mechanized infantry units,

    allowing individual units to accomplish tasks in minutes compared to

    hours. When used properly, the Stryker vehicle enabled the brigade to
    outmaneuver and overpower opposing forces. The performance of the Stryker
    brigade at both training centers indicated that with its vehicles, it
    could move faster as compared to both conventional and/or nonmotorized
    infantry as well as infantry units equipped with the Bradley fighting
    vehicle.

    At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Stryker vehicle performed well
    in urban areas and in wooded terrain. (Figure 7 shows the Stryker
    maneuvering in wooded terrain.) The speed of the vehicle enabled the
    infantry companies to quickly arrive in urban areas, giving them the
    ability to surprise the enemy and overcome urban objectives. The attack on
    the "town" of Shugart-Gordon illustrated that the Stryker was able to move
    quickly using a route that included very restrictive terrain. (Figure 8
    shows the town of Shugart-Gordon.) The Stryker easily moved through the
    rough terrain and made it to the objective, giving the company commander
    the ability to rapidly transport soldiers during the assault. The speed of
    the Stryker allowed one particular company to arrive at the objective
    early and surprise the enemy. In another instance, the capabilities of the
    vehicle allowed Stryker units to rapidly pursue and decisively engage
    unconventional forces that were more mobile than U.S. Army light infantry
    units. The Stryker vehicles' speed allowed the infantry units to fix and
    destroy the enemy, despite the enemy's efforts to leave the battlefield.

    Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded Terrain at the Joint Readiness Training
                                         Center

    Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon

    At the National Training Center, the Stryker vehicle demonstrated its
    ability to accelerate quickly and maneuver over the desert terrain to
    deliver infantry personnel to their objective. Our analysis shows that the
    Stryker vehicle moved more quickly and much quieter than the opposing
    forces' vehicles, giving the brigade a substantial tactical advantage over
    the enemy. When operating in extremely rugged and steep terrain, the
    Stryker did lose some of its mobility advantage and had difficulty in
    maneuvering as quickly as the opposing forces' vehicles. Despite the loss

    of this advantage, the Stryker vehicle was nonetheless mobile enough to
    allow a company to quickly reposition and destroy a platoon of guerrilla
    forces running through rough terrain. The Stryker's speed enabled the
    infantry unit to quickly move into its attack position after changes in
    the battlefield. Because of this speed, the vehicle potentially provides a
    commander more time to react since less time is spent moving from one
    location to another.

        Brigade's Staff Performance Was Inconsistent

    On the basis of our analysis of the data, as a collective organization,
    the brigade staff11 was unable to consistently perform in accordance with
    Army doctrine, hindering the ability of the Stryker brigade to first fully
    see and then understand the battle space. Staff processes, both the
    integration of the entire staff and those internal to specific sections,
    affected the ability of the brigade to produce and execute synchronized
    plans. The Stryker brigade did display the ability to integrate and
    collect information, but not consistently. The observer-controllers
    generally identified training time as the primary cause for the
    weaknesses.

    Army doctrine prescribes a manner in which staffs should develop battle
    plans. This military decision-making process requires incorporation of all
    staff elements in a collective effort to synchronize all of the brigade's
    assets. Although the brigade staff gained experience and improved by going
    through the process over the course of the evaluation, they did not
    consistently integrate all of the staff sections and key subsections,
    including information operations, fire support, and intelligence. Because
    all of these assets were not incorporated into the planning process, the
    brigade had difficulty in using its capabilities according to doctrine.

    The Stryker brigade displayed the ability to integrate information from
    multiple sources. However, managing the flow of the information and
    disseminating it throughout the brigade was difficult. For example, the
    brigade Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron
    provided more information than the brigade staff could process. Because
    the staff's proficiency level to manage the information was low, the
    ability to analyze and present a common operational picture was reduced.

    11 Brigade and battalion staffs are generally organized into sections.
    These sections are numbered S-1 through S-6 and represent functions such
    as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil affairs, and
    signal operations.

    The staff's performance affected all units within the brigade. Commanders
    were not given well-developed planning products, including an accurate
    initial picture of the enemy and the enemy's anticipated actions, as well
    as tools that enabled the application of all of the brigade's organic
    combat capability. Although they were still able to conduct combat
    missions, the brigade did not perform to the best of its capabilities.

    Synchronization of the brigade's intelligence collection effort was
    inconsistent. Unlike traditional Army units, the Stryker brigade has a
    very robust intelligence collection capability that includes unique tools
    such as unmanned aerial vehicles; nonlethal effects capabilities such as
    civil affairs, psychological operations, and legal personnel; and a
    Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron. Because the
    efforts were not synchronized, intelligence collection assets were not
    consistently used in an efficient manner, resulting in areas not being
    observed or other areas receiving redundant coverage. Also, the
    reconnaissance squadron sometimes operated independently of the brigade's
    guidance, resulting in a failure to obtain needed information.

        Using the Digital Systems Proved Difficult for the Brigade

    The operational evaluation demonstrated that the brigade had not mastered
    the use of its digital systems. The proper use and employment of the
    various digital systems increase the commanders' ability to position
    troops and conduct combat operations. However, our analysis shows that a
    combination of either not using established procedures or not having
    established procedures, as well as a lack of familiarity with the systems,
    prevented full exploitation of the systems' capabilities.

    During the evaluation, a lack of familiarity with the systems and a lack
    of standardized procedures contributed to the brigade's inability to fully
    maximize the capabilities of its digital systems. Brigade leaders and
    staff struggled with acquiring data and interpreting it in a timely
    manner. If the staff had properly used the various digital systems, the
    commanders' ability to position troops and conduct combat operations would
    have been increased.

    Digital systems were not available for all elements of the brigade,
    including augmenting units. Not all staff sections and subsections

    possessed the FBCB2 system,12 hindering staff planning operations. At the
    platoon level, only the platoon leader and platoon sergeant Stryker
    vehicles are equipped with the FBCB2 system. Further, when infantry
    personnel dismount, they have no direct digital connectivity to the FBCB2
    system. As a result, the non-FBCB2-equipped Stryker vehicles and
    dismounted infantry did not possess the same level of situational
    awareness that Stryker vehicles equipped with the FBCB2 system did.
    Additionally, augmenting units such as armor and aviation did not arrive
    with the FBCB2 system, so the brigade attached a liaison element equipped
    with the system. Because the augmenting units did not have the system, the
    Stryker brigade had to provide analog control measures so that the
    augmenting unit would know the brigade's plan.

    The FBCB2 system was not consistently updated to provide a current view of
    the battle space. Although the FBCB2 system automatically tracks the
    location of vehicles equipped with the system, enemy positions and the
    location of friendly dismounted infantry must be entered manually. While
    this capability exists, updating this information was not consistently
    done.

    The brigade did not consistently use predesignated formats in the FBCB2
    system, affecting the information flow into other systems. To communicate
    with the Army Battle Command System, the FBCB2 system has a predesignated
    message format. Units found these formats cumbersome and opted instead to
    use either analog means or the free-text feature in the system. Not using
    the predesignated format made updating the other systems inefficient,
    because operators had to transfer information from the free text into the
    Army Battle Command System. Additionally, because free text did not
    automatically update the information in the other systems, the view of the
    battle space was inaccurate.

    Not using the information available in the FBCB2 system was also an issue.
    For example, there were several instances where individual Stryker
    vehicles and an entire Stryker unit conducted movement through a minefield
    that had been entered into the system. These movements either delayed
    combat operations or resulted in casualties. Another example was movement
    of unit vehicles down a route that was congested. The system

    12 FBCB2 is a digitized system that uses sophisticated information
    technology that allows Stryker brigade personnel to achieve superior
    battlefield information enabling them to engage the enemy long before
    coming into contact.

    provided the unit information that the route was congested; yet the driver
    ignored the information and moved down the route.

        Sustaining the Brigade Was Challenging

    During the evaluation, the brigade experienced difficulties in conducting
    supply operations because components within the brigade did not or were
    unable to follow the established procedures. Support to the Stryker
    brigade is distribution based, meaning that instead of keeping supplies on
    hand, the brigade is designed to receive a near-continuous flow of
    anticipated supplies through the supply chain. The areas of the supply
    chain assessed were the organic sustainment provided by the brigade
    support battalion and the external logistics support provided by the
    echelon above brigade. Because these two support areas are linked, supply
    requests from the brigade impact the ability of the echelon above brigade
    elements to provide the necessary anticipatory logistics. Conversely,
    incorrect supplies sent from the echelon above brigade elements to the
    brigade affected the ability of the brigade to distribute supplies to its
    units. When units made proper requests, the process worked correctly.
    However, the inability to make proper requests affected the ability of the
    entire supply chain to provide support to the brigade.

    Difficulties in maintaining a flow of supplies began at the individual
    unit level and affected the entire logistics flow. We determined through
    our analysis of the observer-controller comments that units had difficulty
    adapting to the just-in-time system. Commanders were uncomfortable
    maintaining supplies below 50 percent of their full operational
    requirement and, during those situations, often placed emergency resupply
    requests to the brigade support battalion. Units also had difficulty using
    the digital systems to request resupply because they lacked familiarity
    with the systems, connectivity issues impeded performance, or reporting
    formats did not adequately address their logistics needs. While the units
    were able, at times, to adopt work-around solutions, the effect was a
    disruption of the intended flow of supplies.

    The brigade support battalion struggled to perform its dual function of
    acting as a conduit for its requests and the distribution point for
    supplies between the echelon above brigade support structure and the
    brigade. One difficulty faced by the support battalion was the need to
    reconfigure supplies received from the echelon above brigade support
    structure. Unit supply requests did not adequately reflect its needs;
    therefore, the anticipatory loads sent from the echelon above brigade
    support structure did not contain the correct supplies in the correct
    amounts and configurations. As a result, the brigade support battalion had
    to

    reconfigure the supplies it had available as well as those that it had
    received. Supply distribution occurred as available, as opposed to a set
    schedule, resulting in the support battalion having insufficient
    transportation assets to deliver all needed supplies in a timely manner.
    Figure 9 shows the brigade support battalion at the National Training
    Center.

          Figure 9: Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center

    The brigade also had difficulty providing supplies to units when the
    support battalion was moving to a new location. The evaluation showed that
    when stationary, the support battalion successfully established alternate
    supply points for brigade units. (Figure 10 shows an example of an
    alternate supply point at the National Training Center.) However, when the
    support battalion moved, the brigade did not adequately provide for
    alternate distribution points. Had this issue been addressed, the brigade
    would have had the ability to adequately supply its units during the
    support battalion's relocation.

    Stryker Companies Had Although Stryker companies were able to exercise and
    achieve some Problems Executing degree of success conducting combat
    operations at both training centers, Combat Missions many of their
    capabilities were not consistently used. Areas of concern

    included tracking dismounted infantry, performance of antitank systems,
    and challenges linking fire support elements to the artillery battalion.
    Our analysis of the data showed that limited training time and a lack of
    standard operating procedures contributed to the companies' inability to

    consistently use their combat capabilities. Placing more emphasis on the
    planning and rehearsal of operations, as well as developing and practicing
    internal tactics, techniques, and procedures, could mitigate these
    deficiencies.

    Tracking dismounted infantry was an area of concern. Dismounted infantry
    squads do not carry digital systems, so units can only maintain awareness
    of dismounted infantry locations by entering reports from analog systems
    into digital systems. Uncertainty about the location of dismounts hindered
    the ability of companies to use their mortars, reducing the overall
    application of their combat power. Despite the inability to track
    dismounts noted in observer-controller comments, one unit at the National
    Training Center was able to rapidly update the location of dismounts into
    the digital systems by using a process it had developed, indicating that
    this issue can be corrected.

    Performance of antitank systems had mixed results. At the National
    Training Center, observer-controller comments were overwhelmingly
    supportive of the Javelin system, noting how it provided the dismounted
    infantry the capability to destroy armored forces. However, at the same
    time, observer-controllers at both training centers expressed concerns
    that the brigade antitank company and the organic mobile gun system
    platoon, consisting of a substitute Stryker antitank system, were not
    positioned properly to optimize their capability. The cause for this was
    attributed to a lack of situational understanding.

    Fire support elements, the link between infantry units and the field
    artillery battalion, also faced challenges in requesting and delivering
    brigade-level indirect fires. At both training centers, brigade units were
    not using their digital capabilities. Instead of using the digitized
    artillery command, control, and communication system, fire supporters were
    using radios and plain text messages on the FBCB2 system to call for
    fires, which required soldiers at the receiving end of the request to
    enter the information manually and increased the time to deliver fires.
    Observercontrollers at both training centers identified contributing
    factors such as a lack of a detailed digital standard operating procedure
    for fire supporters and the lack of familiarity and experience with the
    digitized artillery command and control system.

        Contractors Were Not Always Used Effectively

    Although in most instances contractor contributions were positive, our
    analysis identified instances where the contractors were used
    ineffectively because units used them improperly or did not provide the
    support necessary to ensure their effective use.

    Unit personnel perform regularly scheduled routine maintenance on their
    vehicles and equipment systems according to Army standardized maintenance
    manuals and unit operating procedures. However, the Stryker brigade
    requires a significant use of contractors to maintain and repair the
    unit's newest systems, such as the Stryker vehicles and their remote
    weapon systems, and the digitized FBCB2 system. Use of contractors to
    maintain and repair the Army's newest systems is not unique to the Stryker
    brigade. For example, we previously reported that the 4th Infantry
    Division deployed to Iraq with around 60 contractors to support the
    division's digitized equipment.13 Within the Stryker brigade, contractors
    are placed in combat repair teams and generally co-located with the
    individual battalions and in sections within the brigade support battalion
    with the primary mission of maintaining specific systems according to the
    support contract awarded. The brigade is to provide the contractors with
    necessary support, including rations, water, and equipment items such as
    night vision goggles and protective clothing.

    During the evaluation, contractors assigned to the battalion combat repair
    teams responded quickly to maintenance issues. These personnel were
    commended for their ability to quickly fix damaged Stryker vehicles and
    for reducing the amount of time a vehicle was unavailable to the unit for
    combat operations. As a result of the contractors' responsiveness, some
    units relaxed their emphasis on unit-level maintenance and became overly
    dependent on the contractors. In analyzing the data, we found instances
    where contractors were used ineffectively. For example, we found that some
    units bypassed standard Army maintenance procedures and requested
    contractor support to conduct maintenance that should have been conducted
    by the unit's organic maintenance personnel.

    We also noted that transporting the contractors to support the
    reconnaissance squadron proved difficult because the squadron was spread
    across the battlefield and was responsible for the largest

    13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Operations: Contractors
    Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed
    in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003).

    operational area. The brigade placed contractors in combat repair teams
    that were, in turn, attached to the individual battalions. The battalions
    are responsible for the contractors' security, logistics, and
    transportation. The location of the combat repair teams on the battlefield
    determines the ability of the contractors to get quickly to where they are
    needed.

    Also, contractors could not be used in some instances because the brigade
    did not provide the contractors with night vision goggles, impeding their
    ability to move to units during periods of limited visibility.
    Additionally, protective clothing and equipment for the contractors were
    not provided, which precluded the contractors from performing their
    responsibilities after chemical attacks. The mitigation plan addresses
    those issues relating to not using contractors effectively.

        Insufficient Training Proficiency Primary Reason for Operational Evaluation
        Weaknesses

    Our analysis of the data collected during the operational evaluation
    indicated that the brigade's training proficiency was insufficient to
    fully demonstrate the brigade's entire capabilities across the full
    spectrum of combat missions. The comments from the observer-controllers
    and subject matter experts confirmed this conclusion because their
    comments generally identified training as a major contributor to the
    identified weaknesses. Moreover, the Army's final operational evaluation
    report identified training as a limitation of the operational evaluation.
    The brigade had never trained as a brigade-sized unit until it reached the
    National Training Center and only three of six battalions had undergone an
    external evaluation prior to the rotation. According to the Army, the
    Stryker brigade needed 15 weeks of unit training after receiving its last
    vehicles and this did not occur. In fact, the brigade was still receiving
    Stryker variants at the end of the National Training Center exercise.

    In May 2002,14 we reported that Fort Lewis training officials would have
    preferred a full 6 months to train after receiving most of the new Stryker
    vehicles. This also did not occur. Most brigades in the Army begin
    training for their deployment to a combat training center, such as the
    National Training Center, 4 to 6 months ahead of time. We also reported
    that the need to train Stryker brigade soldiers in digital systems was
    posing a challenge because the brigade's design requires digitization to
    maintain the

    14 U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army Actions
    Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams,
    GAO-02-442 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2002).

      Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational Evaluation Issues,
      but Deferred Issues Have Implications for Future Brigades

    critical situational awareness capability. These systems use sophisticated
    technology that allows the soldiers to achieve superior battlefield
    information enabling them to engage the enemy long before coming into
    contact. Our analysis of the operational evaluation concludes that 1 year
    later, the brigade still had not mastered the use of its digital systems.

    The Army is implementing a risk management plan to mitigate most issues
    identified in the operational evaluation, which generally correspond with
    the weaknesses we identified. The Army concluded that the issues were
    largely training related, but it also identified a few as design or
    equipment related. Although the Army developed, and is implementing, a
    plan that will mitigate most of the identified issues, the Army's
    immediate focus was to resolve those training and equipment issues that
    affected the brigade's ability to deploy to Iraq. It deferred for future
    consideration the remaining issues and decisions that have implications
    for the future brigades.

    Based on its analysis of the operational evaluation report, the Army first
    developed a matrix that assigned a risk level to issues and determined
    whether issues would preclude the Stryker brigade from a scheduled
    deployment or could be addressed in the future. It then developed a
    mitigation plan to address all issues identified.

    To mitigate the identified training issues and to prepare for the
    brigade's deployment to Iraq, I Corps developed and implemented an 8-week
    modular predeployment training event that included a command post exercise
    to train the staff and a brigade field training exercise that emphasized
    platoon and company operations. The training addressed four general issues
    identified from the operational evaluation:

    o  Army Battle Command System interoperability and connectivity,

    o  staff operations and synchronization,

    o  application of doctrine in unit operations, and

    o  subordinate unit specific training.

    Furthermore, the command post and field training post exercises were to
    ensure that the brigade

    o  	was proficient in stability and support operation tasks as specified
    by the combatant commander,

    o  validated the interoperability of newly fielded systems and equipment,

    o  	validated the integration of newly assigned soldiers and leaders and
    attached units such as the assigned aviation task force,

    o  	exercised the staff planning and battle command process using the
    digital and communications systems to refine the staff planning process,

    o  exercised distributed logistics in a complex environment, and

    o  	exercised force protection and accountability of contractors on the
    battlefield.

    To help the brigade achieve the training objectives, U.S. Forces Command
    provided observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness Training Center to
    provide feedback and conduct informal after-action reviews focused on
    lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. A senior training center
    official stated that 40 to 50 percent of the observer-controllers had
    participated in the operational evaluation segment held at the Joint
    Readiness Training Center. During the command post exercise, the
    observer-controllers viewed the planning and execution of the brigade and
    battalion staffs, and during the field training exercise, they viewed the
    conduct of assigned company-level combat missions.

    After completing the training, the brigade commander assessed the brigade
    as fully trained to perform its combat tasks. The brigade commander
    concluded the brigade was

    o  	completely retrained on those issues identified from the operational
    evaluation with a focus on applicability to planned missions in Iraq and

    o  fully prepared to deploy.

    After the training events were completed, we discussed the brigade's level
    of training and readiness with the brigade commander and senior Army
    officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation. All reported no
    reservations regarding the proficiency of the brigade and its ability to
    deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq. One senior training official
    opined that the Stryker brigade is as well trained as any unit he has
    observed and that the unit can operate in any threat environment.
    Moreover, the issues the Army identified in its risk management matrix and
    exercised during its predeployment training addressed the weaknesses we
    identified in our observations and analysis of the operational evaluation.
    The brigade's performance indicates that the issues and weaknesses are
    being mitigated.

    However, the Army is not fully addressing the potential brigade design and
    the brigade equipment issues identified from the operational evaluation,
    which were not included in the predeployment training, although the issues
    have implications for future brigades. According to the Army staff,

    the issues that were nondeployment related are still under consideration.
    One identified design issue that has both deployment and long-term
    implications was associated with the mobility and survivability of the
    reconnaissance squadron operations officer. Currently, this staff
    officer's mobile command post is a High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle.
    The operational evaluation concluded that the operations officer could not
    sustain the mobility pace of the reconnaissance commander and the
    commander's Stryker vehicle. The evaluation also concluded that the threat
    requires armored protection for this key individual. The short-term
    solution is to consider providing a Stryker vehicle to the operations
    officer from brigade maintenance spares or other sources, such as another
    unit in the brigade. The mitigation plan includes no long-term solution,
    including purchasing additional Strykers. This issue is being considered
    through normal Army processes to determine a long-term solution that may
    affect requirements for future brigades.

    An equipment issue that is not addressed in the mitigation plan, but has
    implications for future brigades, is that not all Stryker vehicles are
    equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. Only two of
    the four Stryker vehicles in each platoon are currently equipped with the
    FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The operational evaluation
    concluded that all infantry platoon Stryker vehicles need to be equipped
    with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The Army had
    previously recognized the need because the brigade's modified table of
    organization and equipment currently authorizes the equipment. However,
    the Army's mitigation plan calls for procuring sufficient sets for only
    the initial Stryker brigade; it does not address plans for the follow-on
    brigades.

    Conclusions 	The operational evaluation provided the Army its first
    opportunity to exercise and evaluate the capabilities of the Stryker
    brigade as a whole. By completing the evaluation and certifying the
    design, the Army and OSD met the requirements of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002. However, as the results of the
    operational evaluation illustrated, issues with the brigade's training,
    design, and equipment exist. The training issues arose because operating
    with a new unit design requires time to develop skills, which the
    accelerated fielding schedule did not allow. In preparation for deployment
    to Iraq, the Army mitigated most of these training issues, but it deferred
    resolution of some design and equipment issues and their respective
    decisions for future consideration. It is important that all issues be
    resolved, including those that affect future brigades, such as provision
    of Stryker vehicles for reconnaissance

      Recommendations for Executive Action

    Agency Comments

    squadron operations officers and procurement of FBCB2 systems and other
    digitized equipment for the infantry platoons' Stryker vehicles. Passing
    on lessons learned from the operational evaluation provides the Army the
    opportunity to ease the transformation process for future Stryker brigades
    by ensuring that the units have the proper training and all necessary
    equipment. As we have stated previously, taking action now to address such
    issues and passing on the remedies learned could enhance the chances that
    future brigade formations will be accomplished smoothly.

    To assist the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams' transformation efforts, we
    recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army
    to

    o  	develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues
    not addressed prior to deploying the brigade and

    o  	apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the training, design, and
    equipment of the brigade to future Stryker brigades.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
    concurred with our recommendations and outlined actions the Army is taking
    in implementing them.

    In responding to our recommendation that the Army develop a plan to
    complete mitigation efforts on those issues not addressed prior to
    deploying the brigade, the department stated that the Army has developed
    and is executing plans for the various issues identified in the
    operational evaluation and that once the armor installation is completed
    in November-December 2003 in Kuwait, the Army will have completed all of
    the mitigation efforts identified in our report.

    With regard to our recommendation that adjustments made to the training,
    design, and equipment of the first brigade are applied, as applicable, to
    future brigades, the department concurred that adjustments were necessary
    and would be applied to future Stryker brigades. The department stated the
    Army had created a Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division deployment
    team, comprised of representatives from across the Army, and that its
    scope included material requirements for the First Brigade, Twenty-Fifth
    Infantry Division (the Army's next Stryker brigade) and future Stryker
    brigades. Regarding proposed changes to the Stryker brigade's structure,
    the Army is reviewing possible design changes through its Documentation
    Assistance and Review Team to determine the

    appropriate solution. The department states that the Army will use this
    same process regarding issues identified from Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
    department also commented that the Army designated Fort Lewis, Washington,
    as the Army's Center of Excellence responsible for concept development,
    lessons learned, and the source for technical and tactical expertise for
    future Stryker brigades and to assist the Army in distributing lessons
    learned from the Stryker brigades.

    Appendix VII contains the full text of the department's comments.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
    Acting Secretary of the Army, and the Director, Office of Management and
    Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
    addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
    at
    http://www.gao.gov.

    If you have any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512
    8365. Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Leo B.
    Sullivan, Robert Ackley, Timothy A. Burke, M. Jane Hunt, and Jim Melton.

    William M. Solis
    Director
    Defense Capabilities

    and Management

    List of Congressional Committees

    The Honorable John W. Warner
    Chairman
    The Honorable Carl Levin
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Ted Stevens
    Chairman
    The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Defense
    Committee on Appropriations
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan Hunter
    Chairman
    The Honorable Ike Skelton
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Jerry Lewis
    Chairman
    The Honorable John P. Murtha
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Defense
    Committee on Appropriations
    House of Representatives

    Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107107 Concerning Limitations on Army
    Transformation Actions

    Public Law 107-107-Dec. 28, 2001

    SEC. 113. LIMITATIONS ON ACQUISITION OF INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLES AND
    DEPLOYMENT OF INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.

    (h) OPERATIONAL EVALUATION - (1) The Secretary of the Army shall conduct
    an operational evaluation of the initial interim brigade combat team. The
    evaluation shall include deployment of the team to the evaluation site and
    team execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential
    threats and operational scenarios.

    (2) The operational evaluation under paragraph (1) may not be conducted
    until the plan for such evaluation is approved by the Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense.

    (i) LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OF INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLES AND DEPLOYMENT
    OF IBCTs. - (1) The actions described in paragraph (2) may not be taken
    until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Secretary of
    Defense -

    (A) submits to Congress a report on the operational evaluation carried out
    under subsection (h); and

    (B) certifies to Congress that the results of that operational evaluation
    indicate that the design for the interim brigade combat team is
    operationally effective and operationally suitable.

    (2) The limitation in paragraph (1) applies to the following actions:

    (A) Procurement of interim armored vehicles in addition to those necessary
    for equipping the first three interim brigade combat teams.

    (B) Deployment of any interim brigade combat team outside the United
    States.

    (3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the applicability of paragraph (1)
    to a deployment described in paragraph (2)(B) if the Secretary -

    (A) determines that the deployment is in the national security interests
    of the United States; and

    Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107107 Concerning Limitations on
    Army Transformation Actions

    (B) submits to Congress, in writing, a notification of the waiver together
    with a discussion of the reasons for the waiver.

                           Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    To determine whether the Army's conduct of the Stryker brigade's
    operational evaluation met the legislative requirements, we focused our
    efforts on understanding the operational evaluation plan and its
    implementation. We obtained and analyzed the Army's operational evaluation
    plan and its associated execution plan. We interviewed officials and
    analysts involved in both the design and evaluation of the plan from the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense; Office of the Secretary of the Army;
    Headquarters, Department of the Army; Army Forces Command; Army Training
    and Doctrine Command; Army Test and Evaluation Command; and I Corps, Fort
    Lewis. We held discussions with the Commanders of the Operations Groups at
    the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center to
    discuss their perspective regarding the operational evaluation.

    To determine how the Army conducted the operational evaluation, we used
    information from the Army's operational evaluation plan and execution plan
    and monitored the conduct of the operational evaluation. We reviewed the
    training procedures and attended the training sessions for the data
    collectors and subject matter experts administering the training events at
    the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. We
    also reviewed the data collection, transfer, and validation processes. We
    attended nightly briefings that were provided to the I Corps leadership
    from officials of each of the two training centers. We observed various
    training activities such as an attack at the National Training Center and
    the tactical movements by ground and air deployments at the Joint
    Readiness Training Center, as well as other events such as the commander's
    combined arms rehearsal prior to the brigade moving to the training site
    at the Joint Readiness Training Center.

    To assess the brigade's performance during the operational evaluation, we
    evaluated information from the Army's data collectors and from our visits
    to the two training centers to observe training events. For the deployment
    portion of the evaluation, we observed various deployment events including
    the loading and unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-130 aircraft at the
    National Training Center; the brigade staging area at Lake Charles,
    Louisiana; and the unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-17 aircraft at the
    Joint Readiness Training Center. We also observed the loading of a Stryker
    company's personnel, vehicles, and supplies into C-130 aircraft as the
    personnel conducted intratheater movement to a different training area at
    the Joint Readiness Training Center. Because of their doctrinal expertise
    and the fact that they provide feedback to all Army units that go through
    the training centers, we monitored transmissions and attended meetings
    held by observer-controllers and operations officials at both training

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    centers. During these meetings, discussions were held regarding the
    performance of the brigade and any difficulties the brigade was
    experiencing. To gain perspective on the Army's analytical process, we
    attended and participated in scheduled insight meetings that discussed the
    training events and observations that occurred over the previous 24 hours.
    We also discussed the evaluation events with officials from the Army's
    Test and Evaluation Command, as well as representatives from the
    Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the
    Institute for Defense Analysis.

    We obtained and analyzed the database that the Army used to draw its
    conclusions. Using the database, we determined that the most direct
    commentary on the Stryker brigade's performance of its individual key
    operating capabilities came from observer-controller comments. We reviewed
    the comments as grouped by the individual operational capabilities and,
    after identifying the most salient issues, developed seven themes that
    incorporated all nine of the key operating capabilities. These themes are
    ability of the Stryker brigade to deploy, mobility of the Stryker vehicle,
    brigade and battalion staff performance, use of digital systems,
    employment of the new sustainment concept, execution of combat missions,
    and contractor support.

    Regarding the Army's actions to mitigate the identified operational
    evaluation training deficiencies, we reviewed the training methodology
    developed to overcome the deficiencies and held a discussion with senior
    Army officials regarding the brigade's operational readiness. We did not
    observe the activities conducted during the command post exercise or the
    field training exercise. However, we discussed the results of the
    exercises with senior Army officials.

    Our review was performed from October 2002 to October 2003 in accordance
    with generally accepted government audit standards.

    Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and Operational
    Capabilities by Critical Tasks

    Deploy/ Conduct Conduct Simultaneous Redeploy Battle Distributed Offense &
    Area Sustain the Protect by Air Command Defensive Operations Presence
    Brigade the Force

                             Key Organizational Parameters

    Balance between Strategic X X X X X X
    Responsiveness and Battle Space
    Dominance

    Balanced Full Spectrum Utility X X X X X X

    Reduced Sustainment Requirements X X X X X

    Minimize Personnel and Logistical X X X X X
    Footprint

    Commonality of Vehicular Capabilities X X X X X

    Reach-back X X X X X X

    Embedded Unit-based Capabilities X X X X X X

    Internetted Combined Arms to Company X X X X X
    Team Level

                              Key Operational Capabilities

    Mobility X X X X X X

    Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight X X X X X

    Enhanced Situational Understanding X X X X X X
    and Information Superiority

    Holistic Force Protection and X X X X X
    Survivability

    Lethality X X X X X

    Force Effectiveness X X X X X

    Reach-back X X X X X X

    Joint/Multinational/Interagency/Inter-X X X X X X
    operability

    Full Spectrum Flexibility and X X X X X
    Augmentation

    Source: U.S. Army.

    X = annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Critical Training
    Task List (CTTL).

    Appendix IV: Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical Tasks

    Deploy/ Conduct Conduct Simultaneous Redeploy Battle Distributed Offense &
    Area Sustain the Protect Mission Training Plan Tasks by Air Command
    Defensive Operations Presence Brigade the Force

    Establish a Digital Command Post X X X X X X

    Conduct Urban Operations X X X X X

    Conduct a Tactical Road March X X X X X

    Conduct an Attack X X X X X

    Conduct a Defense X X X X X

    Conduct Area Security Operations X X X X X

    Plan Intelligence, Surveillance, and X X X X X
    Reconnaissance Operations

    Conduct Command and Control of X X X X X X
    Operations

    Sustain the Force X X X X X X

    Conduct Strategic Deployment X X X X

    Source: U.S. Army.

    X = annotates central tasks represented by the 10 essential mission
    training plan tasks.

    Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities Compared to Essential
    Mission Training Plan Tasks

    1 2 3 4

    Conduct a Establish a Digital Conduct Urban Tactical Road Conduct an Key
    Organizational Parameters Command Post Operations March Attack

    Balance Between Strategic Responsiveness and X
    Battlespace Dominance

    Balanced Full Spectrum Utility X X X

    Reduced Sustainment Requirements X X

                      Minimize Personnel and Logistical Footprint

    Commonality of Vehicular Platforms

    Reach-back X X

    Embedded Unit-Based Capabilities X X X X

    Internetted Combined Arms to Company-Team Level X X X

                              Key Operational Capabilities

    Mobility X X X

    Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight X X

    Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information X X X X
    Superiority

    Holistic Force Protection and Survivability X X X

    Lethality X X

    Force Effectiveness X X X

    Reach-back X X X

    Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability X X

    Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation X X X
    Source: U.S. Army.

    X= annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Mission Training Plan
    Essential task.

    Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities Compared to
    Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks

    5 6 7 8 9 10

    Plan Intelligence, Survey, and Conduct Conduct a Conduct Area
    Reconnaissance Command and Sustain Conduct Strategic Defense Security
    Operations Operations Control Operations the Force Deployment

    X

    X X X X

    X X

    X

    X

    X X

    X X X

    X X

    X X X X

    X

    X X X X

    X X X X

    X X X

    X X X X X

    X X X X

    X

    X X X X X

    Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key Operational
    Capabilities

    The Stryker brigade's organizational and operational concept document
    defines the unit's essential organizational characteristics, or
    parameters, that the brigade was evaluated against. The document also
    defines the unit's essential operational characteristics, or capabilities,
    that the brigade was evaluated against.

    The eight key organizational parameters are defined below.

    o  	Achieve Balance Between Capabilities for Strategic Responsiveness and
    Requirements for Battle-Space Dominance: The organization must balance
    deployability, sustainability, and its in-theater personnel footprint
    against its combat requirement for lethality, mobility, and survivability.
    The Stryker Brigade Combat Team must approach the deployability standards
    of a light brigade while arriving with the punch and staying power
    approaching that of a mechanized formation.

    o  	Balanced Full Spectrum Utility: The Stryker brigade is deliberately
    optimized for early entry small-scale contingencies, but it also is
    required to be prepared to participate as a "guarantor combat force" in
    stability and support operations to permit peacekeeping and stability
    forces to carry out their missions in a secure environment. Similarly, the
    Stryker brigade must be prepared to fight as a component within a division
    or corps structure in a major theater of war.

    o  	Reduced Sustainment Requirements: The Stryker brigade must have
    sustainment requirements well below that of a heavy force.

    o  	Minimize Brigade's Personnel and Logistical Footprint: There is an
    imperative for expanding the combat elements and reducing the support
    capabilities. Strategic deployability and demand reduction must be
    enhanced, while maintaining a robust combat capability.

    o  	Commonality of Vehicular Platforms: A common platform for combat,
    combat support, and combat service support echelons enables deployability,
    demand reduction, and sustainment efficiency. Common platforms must also
    be highly mobile and capable of intratheater deployment by C-130 aircraft.

    o  	Reach-back: To enable the Stryker brigade to maintain a deployable
    structure with a minimized logistics footprint, it must be able to
    reachback and access those functions that can be accomplished by
    higherechelon or out-of-theater organizations. It is both an
    organizational and operational principle.

    Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key
    Operational Capabilities

    o  	Embedded Unit-Based Capabilities: Military intelligence, signal,
    engineer, antitank, artillery, and combat service support elements have
    been tailored specifically to the unique requirements of the unit's
    mission set. For the Stryker brigade, analysis demonstrates that mission
    capabilities are best enhanced if they are embedded within the unit's
    organic organization. Attaching divisional elements to a Stryker brigade
    unnecessarily enlarges the brigade's deployment requirements and theater
    footprint and introduces different vehicle types and equipment sets into
    the structure, violating the principle of commonality and increasing
    sustainment and infrastructure requirements.

    o  	Internetted Combined Arms to Company-Team Level: An operational
    analysis for the Stryker brigade indicates that, within the environment of
    complex/urban terrain, force effectiveness is best enhanced and the
    requirement for responsive mutual support is best satisfied through
    internetted combined arms to company-team level, i.e., to a degree beyond
    traditional practice.

    The nine key operational capabilities are defined below.

    o  Mobility:

    o  	Strategic - Organized, equipped, and configured to support a goal of
    deploying the brigade in 96 hours from first wheels up. (Ninety-six hours
    was originally a requirement.)

    o  	Operational - Capable of intratheater lift by ground/sea or by U.S.
    Air Force family of tactical aircraft. (Concept document specifies C-130
    aircraft.)

    o  	Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight: Achieves tactical decision by
    means of combined arms at the company/team level focused on dismounted
    assault, supported by direct fires, and on the integration of mortars,
    artillery, mobility support, and joint fires/effects.

    o  	Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information Superiority: This
    is the fundamental force enabler across all Stryker brigade battlefield
    operating systems and the foundation of risk mitigation with respect to
    brigade vulnerabilities, particularly the lack of armor protection.

    o  	Holistic Force Protection and Survivability: Overall, the Stryker
    brigade must meet force protection challenges through the holistic
    application of a variety of capabilities, including early warning;
    situational understanding; avoidance of surprise; deception; rapid

    Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key
    Operational Capabilities

    mobility; signature control; nontemplateable operations; avoidances of
    enemy fires; mutual support; use of cover and concealment; and
    implementation of innovative tactic, techniques, and procedures.

    o  	Lethality: The Stryker brigade possesses a robust array of direct and
    indirect fire systems to shape the battle space and achieve decision in
    the close fight inherent within complex and urban terrain, greater than
    current light brigades.

    o  	Force Effectiveness: Although the Stryker brigade must have the
    capability to achieve/maintain information superiority, it will not always
    enjoy combat platform superiority. The Stryker brigade will offset the
    platform limitations of its medium-weight platforms through the holistic
    integration of all other capabilities, particularly the internetted
    actions of the combined arms company teams.

    o  	Reach/Reach-back: The capability of the Stryker brigade to exploit a
    multitude of nonorganic resources to accomplish its assigned missions. The
    Stryker brigade executes reach-back on a routine, deliberate basis as a
    combat power and sustainment multiplier in five primary areas: fires and
    effects, intelligence and information, planning and analysis, force
    protection, and sustainment.

    o  	Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability: The Stryker brigade
    will benefit from exploiting the knowledge and capabilities residing
    within multinational forces; U.S. interagency organizations operating in
    the theater; and other international, local, nongovernmental, and private
    organizations involved in the crisis, conflict, or instability.

    o  	Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation: The Stryker brigade will
    have the requisite capabilities to achieve decision in conjunction with
    the joint fight in low-end contingencies such as current operations in the
    Balkans. If conditions escalate, requiring additional capabilities that do
    not reside within the Stryker brigade, it will receive augmentation. The
    Stryker brigade may participate in major theater of war operations as a
    subordinate element within a division. Again, adjustments to the task
    organization, including augmentation, will be required in a major theater
    of war environment.

    Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense

                       Page 49 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation

    Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense

                       Page 50 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation

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    Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should Be
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    Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
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    Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its
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    Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges.
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