Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense

Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a
Layered Defense (16-OCT-03, GAO-04-170T).

Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants
come to the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal
temporary basis--that is, with an authorized period of admission
that expires on a specific date--either (1) with temporary visas
(generally for tourism,business,or work) or, in some cases (2) as
tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without
visas. (The latter group includes Canadians and qualified
visitors from 27 countries who enter under the visa waiver
program.) The majority of visitors who are tracked depart on
time, but others overstay. Four of the 9/11 hijackers who entered
the United States with legal visas overstayed their authorized
periods of admission. This has heightened attention to issues
such as (1) the extent of overstaying, (2) weaknesses in our
current overstay tracking system, and (3) how the tracking system
weaknesses and the level of overstaying might affect domestic
security.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-04-170T
ACCNO: A08732
TITLE: Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component
of a Layered Defense
DATE: 10/16/2003
SUBJECT: Illegal aliens
Immigrants
Counterterrorism
National preparedness
Immigration information systems
Systems design
Systems evaluation
Homeland security
Canada
Mexico
DHS Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology Program

DOJ National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System

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GAO-04-170T

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST

Thursday, October 16, 2003 HOMELAND SECURITY

Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense

Statement of Nancy R. Kingsbury, Managing Director, Applied Research and Methods

GAO-04-170T

Highlights of GAO-04-170T, a testimony to Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives

Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come to
the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis-that is,
with an authorized period of admission that expires on a specific
date-either (1) with temporary visas (generally for tourism, business, or
work) or, in some cases, (2) as tourists or business visitors who are
allowed to enter without visas. (The latter group includes Canadians and
qualified visitors from 27 countries who enter under the visa waiver
program.) The majority of visitors who are tracked depart on time, but
others overstay.

Four of the 9/11 hijackers who entered the United States with legal visas
overstayed their authorized periods of admission. This has heightened
attention to issues such as (1) the extent of overstaying, (2) weaknesses
in our current overstay tracking system, and (3) how the tracking system
weaknesses and the level of overstaying might affect domestic security.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-170T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Nancy Kingsbury at (202)
512-2700 or [email protected].

October 2003

HOMELAND SECURITY

Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense

Significant numbers of foreign visitors overstay their authorized periods
of admission. The Department of Homeland Security estimates the resident
overstay population at 2.3 million as of January 2000. Because the
starting point for this estimate is the 2000 census, it does not cover
short-term overstays who have not established residence here. It also
omits an unknown number of potential long-term overstays from Mexico and
Canada.

Because of unresolved weaknesses in DHS's current system for tracking
arrivals and departures (e.g., noncollection of some departure forms and
inability to match other departure forms to arrivals), there is no
accurate list of overstays. Two new tracking initiatives are intended to
address these weaknesses. NSEERS, the National Security Entry and Exit
Registration System, does not cover most visitors. US-VISIT, the U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, a more comprehensive,
automated program, is being phased in. While its design and implementation
face a number of challenges, evaluating US-VISIT against the weaknesses
GAO identifies here would increase its potential for success.

The current tracking system's weaknesses limit control options and make it
difficult to monitor potential terrorists who enter the country legally.
Like other illegal immigrants, overstays obtain jobs with fraudulent
identity documents, including jobs at critical infrastructure locations,
such as airports. Thus, tracking issues can affect domestic security and
are one component of a layered national defense. Improving the tracking
system could work with intelligence, investigation, information-sharing,
and other factors to help counter threats from foreign terrorists.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss overstays-that is, foreign
citizens who enter the United States legally but do not leave when their
authorized period of admission expires. Overstay issues have gained
heightened attention because some of the 9/11 hijackers had overstayed
their periods of admission. While our work is ongoing, my remarks will
focus on describing our results to date concerning

o the extent to which overstaying occurs,

o weaknesses in the current overstay tracking system, and

o potential impacts on domestic security.

In examining these issues, our main information sources include (1)
relevant GAO and other government reports, (2) interviews with officials
and staff at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S.
Department of Justice, and (3) a variety of data, including quantitative
data from DHS's overstay tracking system (based on the I-94 form), data
that DHS developed, at our request, from Operation Tarmac (the sweep that
identified overstays and other illegal immigrants working at U.S.
airports), and facts about the arrivals, departures, and overstay status
of the 9/11 hijackers and others involved in terrorism.

Our scope did not include aspects of immigration or domestic security
unrelated to overstaying. While the vast majority of overstays appear to
be motivated by economic opportunities, the few who are potential
terrorists could represent a significant threat to our domestic security.
An effective strategy to address this risk is best developed within the
larger context of a layered defense for domestic security. Intelligence,
investigation, and information-sharing are key ingredients supporting this
defense, which is designed and implemented by a wide range of agencies,
including DHS, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the
Social Security Administration, among others.

To summarize the results of our analysis of overstay issues and domestic
security, we found that

o Overstaying is significant and may be understated by DHS's recent
estimate.

o The current system for tracking foreign visitors has several
weaknesses.

o It is more difficult to ensure our domestic security because of the
weaknesses in the tracking system and the level of overstaying that
apparently occurs.

Viewing these results in the context of our nation's layered defense, we
believe that improving the tracking system could work together with other
factors-especially intelligence, investigation, and information-sharing-
to help counter threats from foreign terrorists.

Background Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and
immigrants come to the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal
temporary basis-that is, with an authorized period of admission that
expires on a specific date- either with temporary visas (generally for
tourism, business, or work) issued by the Department of State or, in some
cases, as tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without
visas. The latter group includes Canadians and qualified visitors from 27
countries who enter under the Visa Waiver Permanent program.1 The large
majority of these visitors depart on time, but others overstay.

Our definition of an overstay in this testimony is specifically this:

An overstay is a foreign visitor who is legally admitted to the United
States for a specific authorized period and remains in the United States
after that period expires, unless an extension or a change of status has
been approved.

Although overstays are sometimes referred to as visa overstays, this is
technically a misnomer for two reasons. First, a visitor can overstay the
authorized period of admission set by the DHS inspector at the border
while still possessing a valid visa. (For example, a visitor with a
6-month multiple-entry visa from the Department of State might be issued a
6-week period of admission by the DHS inspector and remain here for 7
weeks, thus overstaying.) Second, some visitors are allowed to enter

1The Visa Waiver Permanent program allows visitors from 27 countries to
enter the United States without visas for up to 90 days for business or
pleasure; the majority of visitors from these countries do enter under the
visa waiver program. (The countries are listed in appendix II.)

the United States without visas and to remain for specific periods of
time, which they may overstay.2

Form I-94 is the basis of the current overstay tracking system. For
visitors from most countries, the period of admission is authorized (or
set) by a DHS inspector when they enter the United States legally and fill
out this form. Each visitor is to give the top half to the inspector and
to retain the bottom half, which should be collected on his or her
departure.

When visiting the United States for business or pleasure, two major groups
are exempt from filling out an I-94 form:

o Mexicans entering the United States with a Border Crossing Card (BCC)
at the Southwestern border who intend to limit their stay to less than 72
hours and not to travel beyond a set perimeter (generally, 25 miles from
the border)3 and

o Canadians admitted for up to 6 months without a perimeter
restriction.4 Thus, the majority of Canadian and Mexican visits cannot be
tracked by the current system, because the visitors have not filled out
Form I-94. Tracking should be possible for almost all other legal
temporary visitors, including visitors from visa waiver countries, because
they are required to fill out the form.

Terrorists might be better prevented from legally entering the United
States if consular officials and DHS inspectors used improved watch lists
to screen visa applicants and make border inspections. However, some
terrorists may continue to slip through these border defenses. Keeping all
dangerous persons and potential terrorist-suspects from legally entering

2For example, Canadians are allowed to enter without visas for purposes of
business or pleasure and to remain for up to 6 months.

3The Department of State considers the Mexican BCC, termed a B-1/B-2 Visa
and Border Crossing Card, to be (1) a visa authorizing its holder to be
lawfully admitted to the United States temporarily for business or
pleasure (for example, as a tourist), as well as (2) a BCC (that is, used
with the 72-hour and perimeter limits). When the card is used as a visa,
Form I-94 must be completed. It should also be noted that DHS inspectors
may, at their discretion, require any Mexican using the card as a BCC to
fill out Form I-94 as a condition of admission and that Form I-94 is
required for visits that exceed 72 hours or include travel beyond the
general 25-mile limit (in some cases in Arizona, travel up to 75 miles
from the border is allowed).

4DHS inspectors may, at their discretion, require any such Canadian to
fill out Form I-94.

the United States is difficult because some do not match the expected
characteristics of terrorists or suspicious persons; in addition, some may
not be required to apply for visas (that is, citizens of Canada or one of
the 27 visa waiver countries).

Watch lists have been improved somewhat since 9/11, but further
improvements are needed. For example, earlier this year we reported that
the State Department "with the help of other agencies, almost doubled the
number of names and the amount of information" in its Consular Lookout and
Support System.5 We also reported that "the federal watch list environment
has been characterized by a proliferation of [terrorist and watch list]
systems, among which information sharing is occurring in some cases but
not in others."6

In this testimony today, we focus primarily on an overstay's illegal
presence within the United States and the potential consequences for
domestic security. Viewed in terms of individuals, the overstay process
can be summarized as aliens' (1) legally visiting the United States, which
for citizens of most nations is preceded by obtaining a passport and a
visa and requires filling out Form I-94 at the U.S. border; (2)
overstaying for a period that may range from a single day to weeks,
months, or years; and, in some cases, (3) terminating their overstay
status by exiting the United States or adjusting to legal permanent
resident status (that is, obtaining a green card).7 Beyond that, the
overstay process can be viewed more broadly in the context of our nation's
layered defense. For example, figure 1 illustrates many issues in this
defense that we have analyzed in numerous reports-ranging from overseas
tracking of terrorists to stateside security for critical infrastructure
locations and aviation.

5U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and
Increased Interagency Coordination Needed to Improve Visa Process,
GAO-03-1013T (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003), p. 3.

6U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch
Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing,
GAO-03-322 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003), p. 28.

7In general, aliens who are present illegally in the United States are
prohibited from obtaining green cards by adjusting, while here, to
permanent resident alien (legal immigrant) status. There are exceptions;
for example, this prohibition was waived for certain aliens who applied
for such adjustment between 1994 and 2001 under S:245(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.

Figure 1: The Layered Defense for Domestic Security

The Extent of Overstaying Is Significant and May Be Understated by DHS's
Estimate

Significant numbers of visitors overstay their authorized periods of
admission. A recent DHS estimate put the January 2000 resident overstay
population at 1/3 of 7 million illegal immigrants, or 2.3 million.8 The
method DHS used to obtain the 1/3 figure is complex and indirect, and we
plan to evaluate that estimate further. However, the 2.3 million overstay
estimate excludes specific groups, and we believe, therefore, that it
potentially understates the extent of overstaying.

By definition, DHS's estimate of 2.3 million overstays as of January 2000
represents only a part of the total overstay problem. DHS's estimate of 7
million illegal immigrants is limited to illegals who settled and were
residing here at the time of the 2000 census.9 It includes only overstays
who were in the actual census count or included in corrections for
possible undercounts of illegal immigrants.

DHS's estimate of overstays as of January 2000 is not defined to include
the following groups:

a. Visitors filling out Form I-94 who

o overstay for short periods of time. Many such persons are not likely
to be included in the 2000 census, which is the starting point of DHS's
2.3 million estimate of the resident overstay population. In our ongoing
work, we will examine indicators of the magnitude, and significance, of
short-term overstaying among visitors who fill out I-94 forms.

b. Mexican and Canadian visitors not filling out Form I-94 who

o overstayed and settled here.10 Overstays in this group are included in
DHS's estimate of 7 million illegal immigrants, but they are categorized
as illegal immigrants other than overstays. This is because

8The other two-thirds were generally categorized as illegal border
crossers (see U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of
Policy and Planning, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population
Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003)).

9Essentially, DHS's estimate of 7 million illegal residents is based on
subtracting foreign-born persons here legally (who are reflected in
statistical immigration records) from census counts of total foreign-born;
subtraction is carried out separately for annual cohorts of arrivals in
the United States.

10As we noted previously, the majority of Mexican and Canadian visits do
not require Form I-94.

DHS used I-94 data from the early 1990s and projected these data forward
to obtain the 1/3 overstay proportion.

o overstay for short periods. As indicated above, many short-term
overstays are not included in the 2000 census, which is the starting point
of DHS's 2.3 million estimate of the resident overstay population.

These groups are illustrated in figure 2.

Figure 2: Key Groups Covered and Not Covered by DHS's Overstay Estimate

aDuring fiscal year 2001, nearly 33 million visits were tracked by I-94
arrival forms. Of these tracked visits, 14 percent (about 4.6 million)
were by Mexican and Canadian citizens.

bAliens not tracked were mainly Canadian citizens or Mexican holders of
BCCs issued by the Department of State. During fiscal years 1999 to 2003,
the Department of State issued 6.4 million Mexican BCCs. According to
unofficial DHS planning figures for fiscal year 2002, there were
approximately 156 million "inspections conducted" for visits by
visa-exempt aliens and aliens with Mexican BCCs at land border crossings.
(See Department of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Program Overview
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2003).) DHS's Office of Immigration
Statistics told us that very few such visits are tracked by the I-94
system. Because some persons may repeatedly visit the United States, the
number of persons inspected is less than the number of inspections.

In part because of coverage issues, the extent of overstaying has not been
definitively measured. In addition, the accuracy of DHS's estimate of the
resident overstay population is not known with precision.11 Other limited
data points may help illustrate the possible magnitude.12

For this testimony, we obtained two small-sample sources of data. First,
we identified a government-sponsored survey, reported in 2002, that had
(1) sampled more than 1,000 adult green-card holders, (2) asked them about
their prior immigration status, and (3) found that more than 300
respondents self-reported prior illegal status.13 From the computer run we
requested, we found that of the roughly 300 former illegals, about 1/3
said they were former overstays, with most of the remaining 2/3 reporting
prior illegal border crossing.14

Second, we obtained data from Operation Tarmac, the 2001-03 sweep of
airport employees who had access to sensitive areas. Although Operation
Tarmac investigators had collected information on overstaying, they did
not systematically record data for overstays versus illegal border
crossers. We requested that DHS manually review a sample of case files and
identify

11We identified challenges and potential weaknesses in INS's previous
estimates of overstays in U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal
Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods Need Improvement,
GAO/PEMD-95-20 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 1995). We note that INS's
previous estimates were higher than 1/3. INS testified in 1999 that
overstays constituted 40 to 50 percent of that population (see Michael D.
Cronin, Acting Associate Commissioner, Programs, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Testimony Regarding Nonimmigrant Overstays before
the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, House Judiciary Committee,
U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., March 18, 1999).

12Earlier reports from INS and the Inspector General of the Department of
Justice indicated that overstays constituted substantial percentages of
groups of illegal residents who legalized their status. See Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Immigration Reform and Control Act: Report of
the Legalized Alien Population (Washington, D.C.: 1992), and U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Immigration and
Naturalization Service Monitoring of Nonimmigrant Overstays, report
I-97-08 (Washington, D.C.: 1997).

13The survey was sponsored by DHS and the National Institute of Child
Health and Human Development, in partnership with other federal agencies.
The sample was drawn from nearly 150,000 adults who had obtained their
green cards in July and August 1996 (see Douglas S. Massey and Nolan
Malone, "Pathways to Legal Immigration," Population Research and Policy
Review 21 (2002): 473-504).

14As previously noted, in general, aliens who are present illegally in the
United States are prohibited from obtaining green cards by adjusting,
while here, to permanent resident alien (legal immigrant) status. There
are exceptions; for example, this prohibition was waived for certain
aliens from 1994 to 2001 under S:245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.

overstays. DHS reported to us that of 286 sampled cases in which illegal
immigrant airport workers (that is, overstays and illegal border crossers)
were arrested or scheduled for deportation, 124 workers, or about 40
percent, were overstays.

While both the survey data and the airport data represent rough
small-sample checks, they provide some additional support for concluding
that overstays are not rare.

Unresolved Tracking System Weaknesses Heighten the Overstay Problem

I-94 Tracking System Weaknesses Limit Control Options

One weakness in DHS's system for tracking the paper Form I-94-its limited
coverage of Mexican and Canadian visitors-was discussed in the section
above. In our previous work, we have pointed to at least three other
weaknesses in this tracking system:

o Failure to update the visitor's authorized period of admission or
immigration status. We reported earlier this year that DHS does not
"consistently enter change of status data . . . [or] integrate these data
with those for entry and departure."15 DHS told us that linkage to obtain
updated information may occur for an individual, as when a consular
official updates information on an earlier period of admission for someone
seeking a new visa, but DHS acknowledged that linkage cannot be achieved
broadly to yield an accurate list of visitors who overstayed.

o Lack of reliable address information and inability to locate visitors.
Some visitors do not fill in destination address information on Form I-94
or they do so inadequately. A related issue that we reported in

15U.S. General Accounting Office, H-1B Foreign Workers: Better Tracking
Needed to Help Determine H-1B Program's Effects on U.S. Workforce,
GAO-03-883 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2003), p. 5. See also U.S. General
Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede Timeliness
of Application Processing, GAO-01-488 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).

2002 is DHS's inability to obtain updated address information during each
visitor's stay; such information could be a valuable addition to the
arrival, departure, and destination address information that is
collected.16

o Missing departure forms. We reported in 1995 that "airlines are
responsible for collecting . . . departure forms when visitors leave [by
air]

. . . . But for some visitors who may have actually left the United States
[there is no] record of the departures."17 DHS acknowledges that this is
still a concern, that the situation is analogous for cruise lines, and
that noncollection is a larger problem for land exits.

Our recent work has also drawn attention to identity fraud, demonstrating
how persons presenting fraudulent documents (bearing a name other than
their own) to DHS inspectors could enter the United States.18 Visitors
whose fraudulent documents pass inspection could record a name other than
their own on their I-94 form.

In our current work, we have identified two further weaknesses in the
tracking system. One weakness is the inability to match some departure
forms back to corresponding arrival forms. DHS has suggested that when a
visitor loses the original departure form, matching is less certain
because it can no longer be based on identical numbers printed on the top
and bottom halves of the original form. The other weakness is that at land
ports (and possibly airports and seaports), the collection of departure
forms is vulnerable to manipulation-in other words, visitors could make it
appear that they had left when they had not. To illustrate, on bridges
where toll collectors accept I-94 departure forms at the Southwestern
border, a person departing the United States by land could hand in someone
else's I-94 form.

16U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate
Many Aliens because It Lacks Reliable Address Information, GAO-03-188
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2002).

17U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration, GAO/PEMD-95-20, p.
2. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Despite Data
Limitations, Current Methods Provide Better Population Estimates,
GAO/PEMD-93-25 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 1993).

18Our investigators have tested DHS inspectors by using counterfeit
driver's licenses and fictitious names to enter the United States from
Barbados, Canada, Jamaica, and Mexico; DHS did not question the
authenticity of the counterfeit documents (see U.S. General Accounting
Office, Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud
Raise Security Concerns, GAO-03-1147T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003).)

Because of these weaknesses, DHS has no accurate list of overstays to send
to consular officials or DHS inspectors. This limits DHS's ability to
consider past overstaying when issuing new visas or allowing visitors to
reenter.

More generally, the lack of an accurate list limits prevention and
enforcement options. For example, accurate data on overstays and other
visitors might help define patterns to better differentiate visa
applicants with higher overstay risk. And without an accurate list and
updated addresses, it is not possible to identify and locate new overstays
to remind them of penalties for not departing. Such efforts fall under the
category of interior enforcement: As we previously testified,
"historically . . . over five times more resources in terms of staff and
budget [have been devoted to] border enforcement than . . . [to] interior
enforcement."19 Despite large numbers of overstays, current efforts to
deport them are generally limited to (1) criminals and smugglers, (2)
employees identified as illegal at critical infrastructure locations, and
(3) persons included in special control efforts such as the domestic
registration (or "call in" component) of the NSEERS program (the National
Security Entry and Exit Registration System).20 DHS statisticians told us
that for fiscal year 2002, the risk of arrest for all overstays was less
than 2 percent.21 For most other overstays (that is, for persons not in
the targeted groups), the risk of deportation is considerably lower.

The effect of tracking system weaknesses on overstay data is illustrated
by the inaccurate-and, according to DHS, inflated-lists of what it terms
"apparent overstays" and "confirmed overstays." For fiscal year 2001
arrivals, the system yielded

o a list of 6.5 million "apparent overstays" for which DHS had no
departure record that matched the arrivals and

19U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Challenges to
Implementing the Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-03-660T,
statement by Richard M. Stana before the Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims, House Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2003), p. 1.

20NSEERS domestic registration has required selected groups of aliens from
a number of countries to register with immigration authorities; for a
subset of these countries, special registration at the point of entry is
required for arriving visitors.

21They calculated this by counting arrests for all legal visitors and
overstays, including the targeted groups, and dividing by DHS's estimate
of the resident overstay population.

o an additional list of a half million "confirmed overstays," or visits
that ended after the visitors' initial periods of admission expired (see
appendixes I and II).

However, DHS has no way of knowing how many of the 6.5 million are real
cases of overstaying and how many are false (because some of these
visitors had, for example, departed or legally changed their status). Even
the half million "confirmed overstays" are not all true cases of
overstaying, because some visitors may have legally extended their periods
of admission.

In the past, we made a number of recommendations that directly or
indirectly address some of these system weaknesses, but these
recommendations have not been implemented or have been only partially
implemented. (Of these, four key recommendations are in appendix III.)

DHS Intends Its New Tracking Initiatives to Address System Weaknesses, but
Issues Remain

DHS has begun two initiatives intended to remedy some of the weaknesses we
have discussed. DHS recently began, as part of NSEERS, an effort to
register visitors at points of entry (POE) to the United States, conduct
intermittent interviews with registered visitors while they are here, and
have government inspectors register departures. But the POE effort does
not cover most visitors because it focuses on persons born in only eight
countries.22 Moreover, NSEERS procedures do not involve inspectors'
observing departures-for example, registration occurs not at airport
departure gates but at another location at the airport. Also, inspectors
do not generally accompany registrants to observe their boarding.23

US-VISIT, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, is
DHS's new tracking system intended to improve entry-exit data. The first
phase of US-VISIT, now being rolled out, uses passenger and crew manifest
data, as well as biometrics, to verify foreign visitors' identities at
airports and seaports. DHS plans three additional phases and will link its
data to other systems that contain data about foreign nationals. If

22The eight NSEERS POE registration countries are Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Seventeen additional
countries (listed in appendix II) are included in the NSEERS domestic
registration component of this program.

23It is also possible for NSEERS registrants to exit without registering,
although there are penalties for doing so.

successfully designed and implemented, US-VISIT could avoid many of the
weaknesses associated with the Form I-94 system.

We believe special efforts are needed to ensure US-VISIT's success. DHS
concurred with our recent report, pointing to risks and the need for
improved management of US-VISIT. For example, we reported that, among
other issues, "important aspects defining the [US-VISIT] program's
operating environment are not yet decided [and its] facility needs are
unclear and challenging."24 Our recommendations included, among others,
that DHS develop acquisition management controls and a risk management
plan for US-VISIT, as well as defining performance standards.

We also believe that checking US-VISIT's program design against the
weaknesses of the Form I-94 system, outlined here, might help in
evaluating the program and ensuring its success.

Overstay Issues May Complicate Efforts to Ensure Domestic Security

Tracking System Weaknesses Encourage Overstays and Hamper Some
Counterterrorism Efforts

Tracking system weaknesses may encourage overstaying on the part of
visitors and potential terrorists who legally enter the United States.
Once here, terrorists may overstay or use other stratagems-such as exiting
and reentering (to obtain a new authorized period of admission) or
applying for a change of status-to extend their stay. As shown in table 1,
three of the six pilots and apparent leaders were out of status on or
before 9/11, two because of short-term overstaying.

24Highlights page in U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security:
Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be
Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003).

Table 1: Overstay and Other Immigration Status Data on 9/11 Terrorists

Change-of-status
Hijacker group Immigration status Entries applications
issue
6 pilotsa and 2 prior overstays;b 18 total
apparent leaders
1 out-of-status (1 to 7
studentc entries each)
13 other hijackers 2 overstays 13 total
(1 each)
Total = 19 4 overstays total; 31 total 3 total
hijackers
5 violations (including (from 1 to 7
overstays and entries each) (0 to 1 each)
the out-of-status
student)

Sources: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and GAO analysis.

Note: We define an overstay as a legally admitted foreign visitor who
remains even 1 day after his or her authorized period of admission
expires, if an extension or status change has not been approved.

aPilots or co-pilots. (Three were both pilots, or co-pilots, and apparent
leaders.)

bThe two prior overstays had remained here beyond their authorized period
of admission. They accrued days of overstay.

cViolated terms of student visa by not attending school.

Additionally, a current overstay recently pled guilty to identity document
fraud in connection with the 9/11 hijackers. Two others with a history of
overstaying were recently convicted of crimes connected to terrorism
(money-laundering and providing material support to terrorists); both had
overstayed for long periods.

Terrorists who enter as legal visitors are hidden within the much larger
populations of all legal visitors, overstays, and other illegals such as
border crossers. Improved tracking could help counterterrorism
investigators and prosecutors track them and prosecute them, particularly
in cases in which suspicious individuals are placed on watch lists after
they enter the country. The director of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking
Task Force told us that he considered overstay tracking data helpful. For
example, these data-together with additional analysis-can be important in
quickly and efficiently determining whether suspected terrorists were in
the United States at specific times.

As we reported earlier this year, between "September 11 and November 9,
2001 [that is, over the course of 2 months], . . . INS compiled a list of
aliens whose characteristics were similar to those of the hijackers" in
types of visa, countries issuing their passports, and dates of entry into
the United

States.25 While the list of aliens was part of an effort to identify and
locate specific persons for investigative interviews, it contained
duplicate names and data entry errors. In other words, poor data hampered
the government's efforts to obtain information in a national emergency,
and investigators turned to private sector information. Reporting earlier
that INS data "could not be fully relied on to locate many aliens who were
of interest to the United States," we had indicated that the Form I-94
system is relevant, stressing the need for improved change-of-address
notification requirements.26 INS generally concurred with our findings.

Overstays' Employment in Sensitive Airport Jobs Illustrates Potential
Effects on Domestic Security

DHS has declared that combating fraudulent employment at critical
infrastructures, such as airports, is a priority for domestic security.27
DHS has planned and ongoing efforts to identify illegal workers in key
jobs at various infrastructures (for example, airport workers with
security badges). These sweeps are thought to reduce the nation's
vulnerability to terrorism, because, as experts have told us, (1) security
badges issued on the basis of fraudulent IDs constitute security breaches,
and (2) overstays and other illegals working in such facilities might be
hesitant to report suspicious activities for fear of drawing authorities'
attention to themselves or they might be vulnerable to compromise.

Operation Tarmac swept 106 airports and identified 4,271 illegal
immigrants who had misused Social Security numbers and identity documents
in obtaining airport jobs and security badges.28 A much smaller number of
airport employees had misrepresented their criminal histories in order to
obtain their jobs and badges. The illegal immigrant workers with access to
secure airport areas were employed by airlines (for example, at Washington
Dulles International Airport and Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport, this included American, Atlantic Coast, Delta, Northwest, and
United Airlines as well as SwissAir and British Airways) and by a variety
of other companies (for example, Federal

25See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Justice
Department's Project to Interview Aliens after September 11, 2001,
GAO-03-459 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2003). In that report, we also
reviewed other problems with the post-9/11 interviewing initiative.

26U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate,
GAO-03-188.

27After 9/11, DHS shifted its interior enforcement focus to jobs with
access to sensitive, critical-infrastructure areas.

28Such employees must have a security badge to work in (or escort others
into) a secure area.

Express and Ogden Services). Job descriptions included, among others,
aircraft maintenance technician, airline agent, airline cabin service
attendant, airplane fueler, baggage handler, cargo operations manager,
electrician, janitorial supervisor, member of a cleaning crew,
predeparture screener, ramp agent, and skycap.

In the large majority of these cases, identity fraud or counterfeit IDs
were involved; without fraud or counterfeit documents, illegal workers
would not have been able to obtain the jobs and badges allowing them
access to

secure areas.

As we discussed earlier in this testimony, when we obtained data on the
specific immigration status of workers who were arrested or scheduled for
deportation at 14 Operation Tarmac airports, we found that a substantial
number were overstays. A DHS official told us that Operation Tarmac is
likely not to have identified all illegal aliens working in secure areas
of airports.

Conclusion Weaknesses in DHS's current overstay tracking system and the
magnitude of the overstay problem make it more difficult to ensure
domestic security. DHS has recently initiated two efforts to develop
improved systems, but challenges remain. Designing and implementing a
viable and effective tracking system is a critical component of the
nation's domestic security and continues to be a DHS priority. Viewing our
results in the context of our nation's layered defense, we believe that
improvements in the tracking system must work together with other
factors-such as intelligence, investigation, and information-sharing-to
help ensure domestic security.

29Efforts to combat domestic identity fraud are part of our nation's
layered defense, and we have testified that "identity theft is a major
facilitator of international terrorism" (see U.S. General Accounting
Office, Identity Fraud: Prevalence and Links to Alien Illegal Activities,
GAO-02-830T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002), p. 9).

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond
to any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have.

For information regarding this testimony, please contact
Nancy R. Kingsbury, Managing Director, Applied Research and Methods,
on 202-512-2700. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony
are Donna Heivilin, Judy Droitcour, Daniel Rodriguez, and Eric M. Larson.

Appendix I: I-94 Data: Number of Foreign Visitor Arrivals by Air, Sea, and
Land and "Overstay Cases," Fiscal Year 2001

Annual "overstay cases" (a mixture of real and false cases)

"Apparent": "Confirmed":
Mode of Annual nondeparturesb late departuresc Total "overstay
arrival arrivalsa cases"
Air and sea 29,688,000 4,349,000 212,000 4,561,000
Land 3,109,000 2,217,000 231,000 2,448,000
All modes 32,799,000 6,566,000 443,000 7,010,000

Sources: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration
Statistics, and GAO analysis.

Note: Includes visitors' arrivals October 2000 through September 2001 and
their departures through January and February 2002. Arrival data represent
arrivals rather than the number of visitors who arrived; that is, the data
do not correct for multiple entries, and possibly multiple exits, by the
same person. Figures may not sum because of rounding and because the "all
modes" category includes some visits for which the mode of arrival is not
known.

aExcludes many Mexicans and Canadians who, visiting for business and
pleasure, are exempt from Form I-94 procedures.

bIncludes cases in which no departure form could be matched to the arrival
form (including some departing visitors who had lost their departure forms
and filled out another form that could not be matched to their arrival
form).

cIncludes some departing visitors who had extended their stay or adjusted
their status.

Appendix II: I-94 Data: "Overstay Cases" (A Mix of Real and False Cases)
by Mode of Arrival and Citizenship, Fiscal Year 2001

"Apparent" nondeparturesa for visitors who arrived by

"Confirmed" late departuresb for visitors who arrived by

Total "overstay cases" for visitors who arrived by

Citzenship group

Air and sea Land All modes

Mexicoc 446,000 1,825,000 2,270,000 18,000 222,000 240,000 463,000 2,046,000 2,510,000
Canadac 45,000 41,000 86,000 1,000 2,000 3,000 46,000 43,000 89,000
Countries
in visa
waiver
program d 1,963,000 207,000 2,171,000 62,000 4,000 66,000 2,025,000 210,000 2,236,000

Countries
subsequently
listed in the
NSEERS
domestic
registration
programe 103,000 12,000 115,000 7,000 - 8,000 110,000 13,000 123,000

Rest of world 1,793,000 132,000 1,924,000 123,000 4,000 128,000 1,916,000
136,000 2,052,000

Total 4,349,000 2,217,000 6,566,000 212,000 231,000 443,000 4,561,000 2,448,000
7,010,000

Sources: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration
Statistics, and GAO analysis.

aIncludes cases in which no departure form could be matched to the arrival
form (including some departing visitors who had lost their departure forms
and filled out another form that could not be matched to their arrival
form).

bIncludes some departing visitors who had extended their stay or adjusted
their status.

cExcludes many Mexicans or Canadians who, visiting for business and
pleasure, are exempt from Form I-94 procedures.

dMost, but not all, visitors from Permanent Visa Waiver countries enter
under this program. Visa waiver countries in this tally are Andorra,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. (Excludes
Argentina and Uruguay, which were visa waiver countries in fiscal year
2001.)

eThe 25 countries in the NSEERS domestic registration program include (1)
8 countries also subject to point-of-entry (POE) registration (Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) and (2) 17 other
countries (Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea,
Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar,
Somalia, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates). The 123,000 total "overstay
cases" (all modes of arrival) from these countries in fiscal year 2001
include approximately 49,000 cases from the countries subject to POE
registration and approximately 73,000 cases from the other countries,
excluding North Korea. The data exclude North Korea from the NSEERS
countries tally because DHS did not provide information separately for
North and South Korea.

Appendix III: Four Prior Recommendations to INS/DHS Related to Overstay
Tracking, Data, or Estimates

1. We recommended that to improve the collection of departure forms, the
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service should ensure
that INS examine the quality control of the Nonimmigrant Information
System database and determine why departure forms are not being recorded.
For example, this could involve examining a sample of the passenger
manifest lists of flights with foreign destinations to determine the
extent of airline compliance and possibly developing penalties on airlines
for noncompliance. Discovery of the incidence of various causes of
departure loss could allow more precise estimation of their occurrence and
development of possible remedies. (U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal
Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current Methods Provide Better
Population Estimates, GAO/PEMD-93-25 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 1993).)

INS agreed in principle with our recommendation to study why departure
forms are not being collected and subsequently initiated a pilot project
that was criticized by the Department of Justice Inspector General and
then discontinued. DHS has not told us of any further efforts to study or
determine why departure forms are not being collected.

2. We recommended that the Commissioner of INS should have new overstay
estimates prepared for air arrivals from all countries, using improved
estimation procedures such as those discussed in this report, including,
as appropriate, the potential improvements suggested by INS or by
reviewers of this report. (U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal
Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods Need Improvement,
GAO/PEMD-95-20 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 1995).)

INS initially concurred and produced revised estimates as part of its
comments on our report. However, in our response to INS's comments, we
described the new estimates as a "first step" and identified concerns
about INS's methodological procedures that we said needed further study.
DHS told us that it has not further studied making overstay estimates by
air arrivals. Valid estimation of overstays is extremely difficult, given
current tracking system weaknesses.

3. We recommended that to promote compliance with the change of address
notification requirements through publicity and enforcement and to improve
the reliability of its alien address data, the Attorney General should
direct the INS Commissioner to identify and implement an effective means
to publicize the change of address notification requirement nationwide.
INS should make sure that, as part of its publicity effort, aliens are
provided with information on how to

Appendix III: Four Prior Recommendations to INS/DHS Related to Overstay
Tracking, Data, or Estimates

comply with this requirement, including where information may be available
and the location of change of address forms. (U.S. General Accounting
Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens because It Lacks
Reliable Address Information, GAO-03-188 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21,
2002).)

INS/DHS concurred with this recommendation and has identified it as a
long-term strategy that will require 2 years to fully implement. It has
been less than a year since we made this recommendation, and thus there
has not been sufficient time for DHS to implement it fully or for us to
review that implementation.

4. We recommended that to provide better information on H-1B workers and
their status changes, the Secretary of DHS take actions to ensure that
information on prior visa status and occupations for permanent residents
and other employment-related visa holders is consistently entered into
current tracking systems and that such information become integrated with
entry and departure information when planned tracking systems are
complete. (U.S. General Accounting Office, H-1B Foreign Workers: Better
Tracking Needed to Help Determine H-1B Program's Effects on U.S.
Workforce, GAO-03-883 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2003).)

DHS concurred with this recommendation, made just a month ago. Sufficient
time has not elapsed for DHS to implement this recommendation.

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