Military Aircraft: Observations on DOD's Aerial Refueling	 
Aircraft Acquisition Options (14-OCT-03, GAO-04-169R).		 
                                                                 
During the Senate Armed Services Committee's September 4, 2003	 
hearing on the Department of Defense's (DOD) proposed lease of	 
100 Boeing KC-767A aerial refueling aircraft, Congress expressed 
concern about a significant "bow-wave" funding requirement in	 
future years to pay for leasing and then buying these 100	 
aircraft at the end of their leases, while continuing efforts to 
modernize the remainder of the tanker fleet. Subsequently,	 
Congress requested that DOD analyze the option of leasing 25	 
aircraft, followed by a procurement of the remaining 75 aircraft.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense responded to the request on	 
September 22, 2003, identifying several alternative acquisition  
strategies, with associated cost and savings estimates. On	 
September 25, 2003, Congress asked that GAO review the DOD	 
response and assess the validity of the department's assumptions 
and the accuracy of the cost and savings estimates, and identify 
any other alternative acquisition strategies that the Committee  
should consider. This letter responds to that request.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-169R					        
    ACCNO:   A08731						        
  TITLE:     Military Aircraft: Observations on DOD's Aerial Refueling
Aircraft Acquisition Options					 
     DATE:   10/14/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Air Force procurement				 
	     Contract costs					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Equipment leases					 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Procurement evaluation				 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     KC-135 Aircraft					 
	     KC-767A Aircraft					 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-04-169R

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

October 14, 2003

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

Subject: Military Aircraft: Observations on DOD's Aerial Refueling
Aircraft Acquisition Options

During the Senate Armed Services Committee's September 4, 2003 hearing on
the Department of Defense's (DOD) proposed lease of 100 Boeing KC-767A
aerial refueling aircraft, you expressed concern about a significant
"bow-wave" funding requirement in future years to pay for leasing and then
buying these 100 aircraft at the end of their leases, while continuing
efforts to modernize the remainder of the tanker fleet. Subsequently, you
requested that DOD analyze the option of leasing 25 aircraft, followed by
a procurement of the remaining 75 aircraft. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense responded to your request on September 22, 2003, identifying
several alternative acquisition strategies, with associated cost and
savings estimates. On September 25, 2003, you asked that GAO review the
DOD response and assess the validity of the department's assumptions and
the accuracy of the cost and savings estimates, and identify any other
alternative acquisition strategies that the Committee should consider.
This letter responds to your request.

DOD's response compared the six acquisition options offered by the Deputy
Secretary to acquire 100 KC-767A aircraft: (1) leasing all 100 aircraft as
outlined in the Air Force plan reported to the Congress in July 2003; (2)
purchasing all 100 aircraft at the time of order under the same multiyear
conditions as the lease; (3) leasing the first 25 aircraft and purchasing
the remaining 75 when the order is placed; (4) leasing the first 25
aircraft and purchasing the remaining 75 when the aircraft are delivered;
(5) leasing 25 aircraft, followed by a traditional multiyear procurement
of 75 aircraft under a separate contract, and (6) leasing all

                                    Summary

100 aircraft initially, then planning to seek $2.4 billion between fiscal
years 2008-2010 to purchase 26 of the 100 aircraft.1

To perform our work, we met with DOD and Air Force officials to obtain
details on these options, including the assumptions and information used
to generate the cost and savings estimates contained in DOD's response. We
also conducted our own independent analysis. See enclosure I for more
details on our scope and methodology.

In our opinion, the assumptions used by DOD to develop its analysis of
acquisition options generally appear to be reasonable, and the
computations of the cost and savings estimates associated with these
options appear to be accurate based on the current terms and conditions of
the negotiated lease. We do believe, however, that the costs and savings
numbers could be further refined under the options involving purchase. For
example, Air Force officials indicated that The Boeing Company would pay
the cost to underwrite the issuance of the bonds needed for financing in
the original lease option. However, they could not definitively say
whether the underwriting costs were included in the $131 million price for
each aircraft. Because fewer bonds, if any, would be issued under the
options involving purchase, the costs should be lower and the savings
higher.

With the exception of the fifth option-Chairman Warner's suggestion of
leasing 25 aircraft, followed by a purchase of the remaining 75 aircraft
at delivery-DOD did not significantly deviate from the costs, schedules,
and support provisions contained in its July 10, 2003 report to the
Committee and the Congress. Air Force officials stated that their analysis
of options complied with the Chairman's request and that analyses outside
the proposed lease's terms and provisions would be academic exercises that
might not be representative of the final negotiated prices. These
officials also stated that changes from the proposed contract would
require new negotiations and new review and approval actions, and
consequently would lead to additional delays.

1 Figures 4 and 5 of the Deputy Secretary's letter also mentioned another
version of this- to identify $2 billion in fiscal year 2008-2009, but this
option was not discussed in the narrative of the letter.

In addition to the options presented by DOD, we believe two other possible
approaches-lease fewer tankers or purchase tankers on a slower
schedule-may be of interest to the Congress. Both options would involve
fewer than 100 aircraft-one through leasing and one through direct
purchase. Both options have advantages and disadvantages that we have not
fully explored in the time available.

Our Assessment of DOD's Analysis

In our opinion, the assumptions used by the DOD to develop its analysis of
acquisition options generally appear to be reasonable, and the
computations of the cost and savings estimates associated with these
options appear to be accurate based on the current terms and conditions of
the negotiated lease. Table 1 summarizes DOD's estimated costs and savings
for the six options it considered, followed by our observations on the
approach, data, and assumptions used. As indicated in table 1, the current
proposal being considered by the Congress for the Air Force-the lease of
100 KC-767A aircraft for 6 years each, followed by their purchase at the
end of the lease-is the most costly of the options over the next decade,
requiring about $29.8 billion (then-year dollars). As we have testified,2
leasing requires the least up-front funding to the 2004-2009 Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP), about $5.5 billion (then-year dollars). While
purchase of the 100 aircraft would cost the least amount over the long
term-$24.3 billion, or $5.5 billion less than the lease, it would require
the largest up-front increase to the FYDP-nearly $13 billion more than the
lease option. DOD approved the lease proposal, at least in part, because
it requires the least amount of up-front funding for refueling aircraft
while keeping the funding for other programs intact.

2 Military Aircraft: Observations on the Proposed Lease of Aerial
Refueling Aircraft by the Air Force. GAO-03-923T. Washington, D.C.:
September 4, 2003.

     Table 1: Options and Cost Comparisons (then-year dollars in billions)

Savings over current Options Cost during FYDPa Total costsb lease proposal

1. Lease 100 5.5 29.8 NA

2. Purchase 100 18.4c 24.3c

3. Lease 25/buy 75, pay when order 16.6 25.6

4. Lease 25/buy 75, pay at delivery 10.1 26.3

5. Separate contracts (lease 25, buy 75) 16.0 27.1c

6. Lease with $2.4 billion increase 7.5 28.6

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

aAircraft cost only. Includes cost of purchasing leased aircraft at end of
lease.

bIncludes operating and support costs, other government costs, and
military construction.

cAssumes that multi-year procurement authority was granted.

We have the following comments and observations on DOD's options:

o  	The estimated costs and savings for all options except for number 5
are based on the cost figures from the currently negotiated lease with
Boeing. Based on our analysis, we believe these represent a reasonable
estimate of the likely total costs and savings in then-year dollars. We do
think, however, that the costs and savings numbers could be further
refined in the options involving purchase or lease. For example, Air Force
officials indicated that The Boeing Company would pay the cost to
underwrite the issuance of the bonds in the original lease option.
However, they could not definitively say whether the underwriting costs
were included in the $131 million price for each aircraft. Because fewer
bonds, if any, would be issued under the options involving purchase, the
costs should be lower and the savings higher.

o  	The fifth option entails a contract for leasing 25 aircraft followed
by a separate contract for a traditional multi-year procurement. With this
option, Air Force officials stated that the capital markets may not
support the lease because of risk concerns, particularly in exercising the
option to buy the planes at the end of the lease, and, therefore, the
option is potentially unexecutable. In examining this concern, we would
point out that 90 percent of the present value of the fair market value of
the aircraft will have been paid at the end of their 6-year leases, and it
would make little sense not to purchase the planes. Also, given the
long-term need to replace the tanker fleet, it is unlikely that the planes
would not be purchased at the end of the lease.

o  	All of the options except for number 5 assume delivery of 60 aircraft
during the FYDP period on the same delivery schedule. DOD believes

option 5 would require new negotiations, internal and external review, and
congressional approval-a process that could take as long as a year and
could result in higher prices than currently negotiated for the lease of
100 aircraft. Because of this potential delay, DOD also estimates that
this option would result in delivery of only 40 aircraft during the FYDP
period. Based on our analysis, we believe the costs and savings estimates
by the Air Force are more speculative for this option. It is unclear to us
why the process to negotiate and process the changes would take so long to
gain final approval. Also, any purchase of the aircraft, including those
specified in each of the other options, required congressional approval.

o  	As presented by DOD, all the options considered represent a trade-off
between more up-front budget authority during the FYDP period and more
potential savings over the life of the program.

o  	All of the options except for number 5 assume the same early delivery
schedule as the currently proposed lease; that is, the first 4 aircraft
would be delivered at the end of fiscal year 2006, 16 in 2007, and 20 per
year in subsequent years until 100 have been delivered. This assumes that
it is more urgent to begin replacement of the tanker fleet now rather than
proceed with the previously planned procurement schedule, which the Air
Force has said would begin delivering aircraft in fiscal year 2009.

o  	DOD was not asked to and did not assess other options outside the
terms and provisions of the existing lease, which could potentially
provide additional cost savings. For example, what costs and savings might
accrue if the number of KC-767A aircraft leased and/or procured varied
from 100 aircraft? How would competitive bidding by commercial airlines
and independent maintenance, repair, and overhaul facilities for KC-767A
maintenance and training support affect costs and savings? How would
program costs change if the purchase price per plane was closer to the
$120.7 million estimate postulated by the Institute for Defense Analyses,
rather than the $131.0 million price contained in the contract?3

o  	The Deputy Secretary's letter presenting the Air Force savings
estimates states that the department proposes to find an extra $2.4
billion to buy out the leases for 26 aircraft in the 2008-10 timeframe.
Air Force officials told us that DOD will try to identify these funds in
the current FYDP and may even seek support from the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps. This is option number 6 in the table. DOD and Air Force acquisition
officials we spoke with said that the Deputy Secretary of Defense's letter
to the committee represents a firm commitment to identify these funds in
the fiscal year

3At your request, we reviewed the Institute of Defense Analyses study and
concluded that its methodology was reasonable. See Military Aircraft:
Institute for Defense Analyses Purchase Price Estimate for the Air Force's
Aerial Refueling Aircraft Leasing Proposal.

GAO-04-164R. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2003.

2008-2010 time frame. If the Congress agreed to that approach, it might
want more assurance that the increase in funding would really occur,
otherwise the savings will not materialize and the Congress may simply be
asked to provide additional budget authority. The initial 100 KC-767A
aircraft being discussed represent only about 20 percent of the KC-135
inventory. DOD and the Air Force have stated that tanker replacement
efforts need to continue beyond these aircraft, and that this will be an
expensive and lengthy undertaking. As a result, the funding requirements
for tanker replacement will extend for many years beyond those addressed
in the lease proposal, and will have to compete with other high priority
programs among the Air Force and the other services in a
fiscally-constrained environment. Thus, the Committee's concern about a
tanker "bow wave" is appropriate and relevant as we pointed out in our
September 4, 2003 testimony, regardless of the option chosen for the first
100 aircraft. The options involving a 25/75 split of leased and purchased
aircraft all have a positive effect on the "bow wave" concern beyond
fiscal year 2012, as was discussed at the September 4, 2003 hearing. By
committing more funding in the early years of the program, costs are
reduced considerably in the out years. This should ease the burden on
budgets for follow-on procurements of tanker aircraft. The proposal to
plus up the budget by $2.4 billion to buy out 26 of the leases also has a
positive effect on reducing the bow wave, but not to as great an extent as
the other options. This approach still incurs costs in the $3 billion
range in fiscal year 2011-13. To illustrate the effect of DOD's various
options on this long-term spending picture, we have developed charts
showing the budget authority that would be required to execute the
acquisition of the first 100 aircraft followed by a subsequent purchase of
another 100 KC-767A aircraft. (See enclosure II).

Other Alternative 	The DOD response represents a reasonable analysis of
the 25/75 split option and it offers an additional option-option number 6,
which

Approaches 	proposes to add $2.4 billion for tankers to be used to buy out
leases for 26 aircraft. In effect, this would be a "lease 74/buy 26"
approach. We believe at least two additional options may be of interest to
the committee as it considers its decision. These include the following:

o  	Lease fewer tankers. Section 8159 of the 2002 Act4 authorized a pilot
program for leasing no more than 100 Boeing 767s as tankers. The act did

not specify leasing 100; it set 100 as the maximum. A smaller leasing
program would still meet the intent of the act, would be less expensive,
would start replacement of the KC-135s, and most importantly, would

allow some time for the Air Force to study tanker force requirements and

conduct a thorough analysis of alternatives before committing to a large

acquisition program.5 Such an approach would probably need to include

leasing as many as 40 to 50 aircraft to provide sufficient time for the

needed studies. This approach is still more expensive than purchase, and
it

might still involve the use of the special purpose entity6 to facilitate
lease

financing, but it allows the program to proceed with early delivery of
aircraft without disruption to Air Force budgets in the short-term. We do
not know what effect this approach would have on delivery schedules or
whether Boeing would agree to the same lease terms for fewer aircraft.

o  	Purchase tankers on a slower schedule. The Air Force plans to spend
about $5.5 billion during the FYDP period for the proposed lease, and the
Deputy Secretary stated in his letter to you that the department proposes
to identify an additional $2.4 billion during this period to buy out some
of the leases. If that total of $7.9 billion were applied toward purchase
of tankers, it would represent a reasonable start toward replacing the
tanker fleet through a normal acquisition process. Because the Boeing 767
commercial aircraft has been in production since 1982 and thus represents
little development risk, the Air Force should be able to negotiate a
multi-year procurement for a substantial number of aircraft. This would
not provide the same firm order for 100 aircraft in the current lease
proposal, but it would still represent a large transaction for Boeing on
its 767 production line. However, this approach might involve delays in
deliveries of the first aircraft, depending on how much budget authority
is available

4 Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act,
Pub. L. 107-117, S: 8159, 115 Stat. 2230, 2284-85.

5 Section 309 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and
Afghanistan Security and Reconstruction for Fiscal Year, 2004, S. 1689,
108th Cong. S: 309 (2003), requires that the Secretary of Defense submit a
report to the congressional defense committees describing an analysis of
alternatives for replacing the capabilities of the fleet of KC-135 fleet
aircraft. The Air Force has indicated, however, that it will probably
initiate a tanker requirements study sometime between fiscal years
2004-2006, followed by a formal analysis of alternatives (AOA). Air Force
officials have stated that a formal AOA could take up to two years to
complete.

6 The Special Purpose Entity would be a trust created under the laws of
Delaware that would issue bonds to raise sufficient capital to purchase
the new aircraft from The Boeing Company and lease them to the Air Force.

in fiscal year 04 and fiscal year 05. Deliveries might also have to be
spread over a longer period if the Air Force and DOD do not provide
additional funding priority for tankers. This approach, too, would provide
the Air Force some time to study tanker requirements and analyze options
before committing to a large program.

We could not develop costs for these two options in the time available.
Air Force officials believe that adoption of either of these options would
delay delivery of the first aircraft and further believe that while less
costly in the short term, the proposals could increase total program
costs.

In oral comments on a draft of this correspondence, DOD and Air Force
officials generally concurred with our analysis. These officials also
pointed out that their analysis, as contained in the letter from the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, was limited specifically to the questions
asked of them by you although they have considered other options that were
not included.

                                Agency Comments
                               and Our Evaluation

We conducted this work from September to October 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution
of this letter until 10 days from its issue date. At that time, we will
send copies of this letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, and the defense
subcommittees of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations. We
will send a copy to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House
Committee on Armed Services, for whom we are conducting a broader body of
work in this area. We will also send copies to the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make
copies available to other interested parties upon request. In addition,
the letter will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

We appreciate this opportunity to be of assistance. If you or your
staffs have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at
(202) 512-4914 or Brian J. Lepore, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-4523.
Other key contributors to this review were Ann M. Dubois, Joseph J. Faley,
Jennifer K. Echard, Kenneth W. Newell, Madhav S. Panwar, Charles W.
Perdue, Kenneth E. Patton, and Tim F. Stone.

Neal P. Curtin, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosures

                       Enclosure I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the validity of the Department of Defense's (DOD) assumptions,
accuracy of cost and savings estimates associated with the various options
addressed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his response to the
Committee, and to identify alternative acquisition strategies, we met with
DOD and Air Force officials to discuss detailed information related to the
options. These discussions included the nature and scope of the options
selected, as well as the assumptions and methodologies used in the
analyses. We also obtained and reviewed Air Force data used to generate
the cost and savings estimates contained in DOD's response, validated that
the data was appropriately included or excluded to support the details of
the individual options chosen, tested the accuracy of the computations,
and conducted our own independent analyses.

To assess the funding impacts of the various options when combined with a
subsequent purchase of 100 aircraft, we compared Air Force data for each
of the options to a postulated buy of an additional 100 aircraft beginning
in fiscal year 2012 at the rate of 20 aircraft per year. We used the Air
Force's purchase price for the aircraft, spread the payments for each
aircraft over a 4-year period per Air Force data, and adjusted the data to
reflect then-year dollars.

Enclosure II: Impact of Air Force Options on Budget Authority Requirements

Follow-on procurements to the initial lease of 100 aircraft will be a
necessary part of any tanker replacement program. Because the funding
requirements of the proposed lease are deferred until later years, those
requirements will impact the requirements for subsequent tanker
acquisitions. The following figures provide an approximate illustration of
how the various options effect the funding requirements for future
refueling aircraft purchases beyond the first 100.

Figure 1: Annual Budget Authority Required to Initially Lease 100 Aircraft
and to Purchase 100 Follow-On Aircraft

Enclosure II: Impact of Air Force Options on Budget Authority Requirements

Combining a follow-on purchase of 100 aircraft with the Air Force's
original proposal to lease 100 aircraft, would require maximums of about
$6.3 billion and $6.4 billion in budget authority in fiscal years 2012 and
2013 respectively, as shown in figure 1. About $3.6 billion would be
required during the current FYDP and a total of about $38.5 billion would
be required over the entire program.1

1 These totals include only procurement costs and do not represent total
program costs.

Enclosure II: Impact of Air Force Options on Budget Authority Requirements

Figure 2: Annual Budget Authority Required to Purchase Both an Initial 100
And Second Block of 100 Aircraft

Purchasing the initial 100 aircraft, when combined with a follow-on
purchase, would have the least impact on overall budget authority
requirements. As figure 2 shows, an initial purchase of 100 aircraft
followed by a subsequent purchase of an additional block of 100 aircraft
would require maximums of about $3.4 billion in budget authority in fiscal
years 2008 and 2013 to procure the aircraft. About $15.8 billion would be
required during the current FYDP and a total of about $33 billion would be
required over the entire program to procure the 200 aircraft.

Enclosure II: Impact of Air Force Options on Budget Authority Requirements

Figure 3: Annual Budget Authority Required to Lease 25 Aircraft and to
Purchase 75 Aircraft at Time of Order and to Purchase 100 Follow-On
Aircraft

Combining a follow on purchase of 100 aircraft with the alternative of
initially leasing 25 aircraft and purchasing 75 others, would require
maximums of about $4.1 billion and $4.3 billion in budget authority in
fiscal years 2012 and 2013, respectively, as shown in figure 3, if the 75
aircraft were paid for when ordered. About $14.5 billion would be required
during the current FYDP and a total of about $34.3 billion would be
required over the entire program.

Enclosure II: Impact of Air Force Options on Budget Authority Requirements

Figure 4: Annual Budget Authority Required to Lease 25 Aircraft and to
Purchase 75 Aircraft at Time of Delivery and to Purchase 100 Follow-On
Aircraft

Paying for the initial 75 aircraft in the previous option on delivery
would require maximums of about $5.6 billion and $6.7 billion in budget
authority in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, respectively, as shown in figure
4. About $8.1 billion would be required during the current FYDP and a
total of about $35 billion would be required over the entire program.

Enclosure II: Impact of Air Force Options on Budget Authority Requirements

Figure 5: Annual Budget Authority Required To Initially Lease 25 Aircraft
and to Purchase the Remaining 75 Aircraft of the Initial Block under a
Separate Contract and to Purchase 100 Follow-On Aircraft

Combining a follow-on purchase of 100 aircraft with the option of
initially leasing 25 of the initial 100 aircraft and negotiating a
separate contract for the purchase of the remaining 75 aircraft of the
initial block, would require maximums of about $4.6 billion and $4.5
billion in budget authority in fiscal years 2009 and 2013, respectively,
as shown in figure 5. About $14.4 billion would be required during the
current FYDP and a total of about $35.3 billion would be required over the
entire program.

Enclosure II: Impact of Air Force Options on Budget Authority Requirements

Figure 6: Annual Budget Authority Required to Initially Lease 74 Aircraft
and to Purchase 26 Aircraft and to Purchase 100 Follow-On Aircraft

Combining a follow-on purchase of 100 aircraft with the option of
purchasing 26 of the initial 100 aircraft, would require maximums of about
$5.5 billion and $5.7 billion in budget authority in fiscal years 2012 and
2013, respectively, as shown in figure 6. About $5.6 billion would be
required during the current FYDP and a total of about $37.3 billion would
be required over the entire program.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

GAO's Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm
of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of
the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of
public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through the Internet. GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts
and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an expanding
archive of older products. The Web site features a search engine to help
you locate documents using key words and phrases. You can print these
documents in their entirety, including charts and other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files.
To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and
select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order GAO Products"
heading.

Order by Mail or Phone 	The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington, D.C.
20548

To order by Phone: 	Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

Contact:

To Report Fraud, Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

Waste, and Abuse in E-mail: [email protected]

Federal Programs Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202)
512-7470

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800

Public Affairs 	U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
*** End of document. ***