Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Future Waste Volumes and Disposal	 
Options Are Uncertain (30-SEP-04, GAO-04-1097T).		 
                                                                 
Low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) management concerns persist	 
despite the LLRW Policy Act of 1980, as amended, which made	 
states responsible for providing for disposal of class A, B, and 
C LLRW and made the Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for	 
the disposal of greater-than-class C LLRW. This testimony is	 
based on GAO's June 2004 report, which examined the adequacy of  
disposal availability for class A, B, and C wastes, and GAO's	 
April 2003 report, which assessed recovery efforts involving	 
greater-than-class-C waste. This testimony examines (1) changes  
in LLRW disposal availability since 1999, (2) recent LLRW	 
disposal volumes and potential future volumes, (3) any current or
anticipated shortfalls in disposal availability, (4) the	 
potential effects of any such shortfalls, (5) the effectiveness  
of the Act in developing regional disposal options for class A,  
B, and C wastes, and (6) the status of DOE's effort to dispose of
greater-than-class-C waste.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-1097T					        
    ACCNO:   A12837						        
  TITLE:     Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Future Waste Volumes and    
Disposal Options Are Uncertain					 
     DATE:   09/30/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Facility construction				 
	     Hazardous substances				 
	     Nuclear facilities 				 
	     Radioactive waste disposal 			 
	     Radioactive wastes 				 
	     Site selection					 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     DOE Manifest Management Information		 
	     System						 
                                                                 

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GAO-04-1097T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT Thursday, September 30,
2004

LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

            Future Waste Volumes and Disposal Options Are Uncertain

Statement of (Ms.) Robin M. Nazzaro, Director Natural Resources and Environment

GAO-04-1097T

[IMG]

September 2004

L0W-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Future Waste Volumes and Disposal Options Are Uncertain

                                 What GAO Found

GAO's June 2004 report identified several changes since 1999 that have
affected, or might affect, LLRW disposal availability and federal
oversight. Specifically, one disposal facility plans to close its doors to
most states, but new options are evolving that might offset this
shortfall.

According to data from the three commercial disposal facility operators,
annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased in recent years. In conducting
this assessment, GAO relied on data from the operators because DOE's
national LLRW database was unreliable. The timing and volume of future
waste needing disposal are uncertain because of the difficulty in
forecasting disposal shipments from DOE and nuclear utilities.

At current LLRW disposal volumes, disposal availability for class A waste
is not a problem in the short or longer term. Disposal availability
appears adequate until mid-2008 for class B and C wastes when, if disposal
conditions do not change, most states will not have a place to dispose of
these wastes.

Nevertheless, users of radioactive materials can continue to minimize
waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store waste if there
are no disposal options for class B and C wastes after 2008. While these
approaches are costly, GAO did not identify other immediate widespread
effects.

The Act has not resulted in the development of additional regional
disposal capacity for class A, B, and C wastes. Factors limiting further
development include less waste, adequate disposal capacity, rising
development costs, and public and political resistance in states
designated to host these facilities.

DOE has not yet provided a facility for the permanent disposal of
greater-thanclass-C waste, but it is collecting this material to address
security concerns in the interim.

Lowering Radioactive Waste into a Concrete Barrier at a Commercial
Disposal Facility

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our past and ongoing work on
the management of low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). LLRW is an
inevitable byproduct of nuclear power generation and of government,
industrial, academic, and medical uses of radioisotopes. LLRW includes
items such as rags, paper, liquid, glass, metal components, resins,
filters, and protective clothing that have been exposed to radioactivity
or contaminated with radioactive material. States' management of LLRW
continues to be a concern despite two-decade-old federal legislation
addressing the need for disposal. Under the LLRW Policy Act of 1980, as
amended (the Act), each state is responsible for providing for disposal of
LLRW generated within the state, either by itself or in cooperation with
other states, with the exception of waste produced by the Department of
Energy (DOE) and the nuclear propulsion component of the Department of
Navy. The aim of the Act was to provide for more LLRW disposal capacity on
a regional basis and to more equitably distribute responsibility for the
management of LLRW among the states. As an incentive for states to manage
waste on a regional basis, the Congress consented to the formation of
interstate agreements, known as compacts, and granted compact member
states the authority to exclude LLRW from other compacts or unaffiliated
states.1

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for licensing LLRW
disposal sites and has divided the wastes covered by the Act into
categories of increasing levels of hazard exposure, beginning with class
A, followed by class B and C.2 There are currently three commercial LLRW
disposal facilities where these wastes can be disposed of-the Chem-Nuclear
Systems facility in Barnwell County, South Carolina, the Envirocare
facility in Tooele County, Utah, and the US Ecology facility in Benton
County, Washington. DOE is responsible for disposing of a fourth category
of LLRW, known as

1 Generators of LLRW located in compact or unaffiliated states that do not
have their own disposal facility can contract with a
disposal facility in another compact if this compact allows them to do so.
2 Radioactive waste is classified by type of radionuclide (e.g.,
americium-241) and concentration of radioactivity (often measured in

curies per gram).

greater-than-class-C waste. This latter waste is not generally acceptable
for disposal near the surface like the other three waste classes.

Our testimony today is based on two reports: (1) our June 2004 report in
which we examined the adequacy of LLRW disposal availability for class A,
B, and C wastes;3 this report updated a 1999 report, in which we found
that states were not developing new disposal facilities and that within 10
years the only facility available to waste generators in most states for
class B and C wastes could be full,4 and (2) an April 2003 report
addressing the status of DOE's program to dispose of greater-than-class-C
waste.5 As you requested, our testimony examines the findings and
conclusions of these reports and offers a perspective on the effectiveness
of the Act. Specifically, our testimony examines (1) changes in LLRW
disposal since 1999 that we identified in our 2004 report, (2) recent LLRW
disposal volumes and potential future volumes, (3) any current or
anticipated shortfalls in disposal availability, (4) the potential effects
of any such shortfalls, (5) the effectiveness of the Act in developing
regional disposal options for class A, B, and C wastes, and (6) the status
of DOE's effort to dispose of greater-than-class-C material.

In summary:

In June 2004, we identified several changes since 1999 that have affected,
or might affect, LLRW disposal availability and federal oversight. These
changes include South Carolina's decision to close the Barnwell facility
to noncompact states by mid-2008, issuance of a license for the Envirocare
facility to accept class B and C wastes pending approval by the Utah
legislature and governor, the potential licensing of a new facility in
Texas, and the state of Nebraska's litigation settlement with the Central
Interstate Compact for reneging on its compact obligations to build a new
facility. We also

3 GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability Adequate in the
Short Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify Any
Future Shortfalls. GAO-04-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004).

4 GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Wastes: States Are Not Developing Disposal
Facilities, GAO/RCED-99-238 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
17, 1999).
5 GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued
Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources.
GAO-03-483 (Washington, D.C. April 15, 2003).

identified changes in federal agency monitoring of LLRW management. DOE no
longer has appropriated funds to provide technical assistance to the
states, and the annual requirement that DOE report to the Congress on LLRW
disposal was terminated effective 2003. Furthermore, in the late 1990s,
NRC decreased its involvement in LLRW because no disposal sites were being
developed.

Annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased in recent years; however, the
timing and level of future volumes needing disposal are uncertain.
According to data provided by the three commercial LLRW disposal facility
operators, disposal volumes grew to about 12 million cubic feet in 2003,
an increase of 200 percent over 1999. Class A waste accounted for 99
percent of the disposal volume-DOE's cleanup program generated about 78
percent of the total class A waste. The Envirocare facility disposed of 99
percent of the nation's class A waste disposed of in commercial facilities
in 2003 while the Barnwell facility disposed of 99 percent of the class B
and C wastes that went to commercial disposal. We relied on data from
these operators because the national LLRW database maintained by DOE
lacked data on the department's waste shipped for commercial disposal and
had other deficiencies. Even if the data problems are resolved,
uncertainties will remain regarding the timing and volume of LLRW needing
disposal in the future, which will largely depend on the disposal
decisions made by DOE and nuclear utility companies.

There appears to be enough disposal availability to serve the nation's
needs at least until mid-2008, when generators in many states might have a
shortfall in disposal availability for their class B and C wastes.
Disposal availability for class A waste is not a problem in the short or
longer term, provided that the Envirocare facility continues in operation.
According to Envirocare, the disposal facility can take 20 years or more
of such waste under its current license. Capacity at the Barnwell and
Richland facilities, which are licensed to accept all three classes of
LLRW, is more than sufficient to serve the needs of the 14 states within
the compacts served by these facilities. However, South Carolina has
enacted legislation to terminate noncompact states' access to this
facility after mid

2008. This action will affect the 36 states that currently rely on
Barnwell to dispose of their class B and C wastes but are not members of
the Atlantic compact.

Users of radioactive materials can continue to minimize waste generation,
process waste into safer forms, and store waste if there are no disposal
options for class B and C wastes after 2008. These approaches, however,
can be costly, with a higher financial burden on some licensees than
others. Notwithstanding these business costs, we did not identify other
effects of any shortfalls in disposal availability that might have wider
implications.

The Act has not resulted in the development of additional regional
disposal capacity for class A, B and C wastes. As we previously reported,
several reasons account for this lack of progress: decreased waste
generation, adequate disposal capacity, the rising cost of developing
disposal facilities, and public and political resistance in states
designated to host these facilities.

We reported in April 2003 on DOE's lack of progress in providing a
permanent disposal facility for greater-than-class-C waste. DOE created
the Off-Site Source Recovery Project as an interim step toward meeting its
obligation under the Act. The project provides secure storage for material
that could be particularly attractive for use in a radiological dispersion
device, or "dirty bomb." As we reported, the project has experienced a
number of problems. For example, we noted that DOE had inadequate capacity
to store certain isotopes, particularly sources containing plutonium-239
that in sufficient quantity could be used to fabricate a crude nuclear
weapon. Such sources, in some cases, were not being securely stored and
most holders of the material expressed their desire to dispose of it as
quickly as possible.

The two reports discussed in this testimony contained a number of
recommendations. In our June 2004 report on disposal availability, we
recommended that the Secretary of Energy halt the dissemination of
information in its national LLRW database as long as the database has
shortcomings in its usefulness and reliability. DOE decided to leave the

database online but has added a notice to users of the database regarding
inaccuracies and is taking steps to identify and update erroneous data.
Our report also suggested that the Congress might wish to consider
directing NRC to report to it if LLRW disposal and storage conditions
should change enough to warrant consideration of new legislation to
improve the reliability and cost-effectiveness of disposal availability.
Our April 2003 report on DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project
recommended that DOE (1) determine whether the priority given to the
recovery project was commensurate with the threat posed by
greater-than-class-C sealed sources, (2) provide, as soon as possible,
storage space for sealed sources containing the isotopes plutonium-239,
strontium-90, and cesium-137 with the appropriate level of security, and
(3) initiate the process to develop a permanent disposal facility for
greater-than-class-C radioactive waste, develop a plan to help manage this
process, and develop a plan to ensure the continued recovery and storage
of greater-than-class-C sealed sources until such a disposal facility is
available. As a result of our recommendation, DOE moved the program and
realigned management responsibility for the project out of the Office of
Environmental Management and into the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) in order to better address the national security
risks posed by these materials.6 To date, over 10,000 sources have been
recovered, but more still need to be collected. In addition, DOE has added
more storage space and is again recovering sources containing
plutonium-239. DOE is also planning to conduct the initial environmental
analysis required to develop a permanent disposal facility for this waste.

Background

The disposal of LLRW is the end of the radioactive material life cycle
that spans production, use, processing, interim storage, and disposal. In
general, the life cycle starts with the procurement of the radioactive
isotopes that have medical, industrial, agricultural, and research
applications. The isotopes come in either sealed or unsealed sources.
While a metal container shields a sealed source, unsealed sources remain

6 NNSA has combined the recovery project with other nonproliferation
activities under the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction Program.

accessible in a glass vial or other type of container. Common uses of this
radioactive material are in radiotherapy, radiography, smoke detectors,
the irradiation and sterilization of food and materials, gauging, and
illumination of emergency exit signs. In the course of working with these
materials, other material, such as protective clothing and gloves, pipes,
filters, and concrete that come in contact with them will become
contaminated. The nuclear utility industry generates the bulk of this LLRW
through the normal operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants, and
through the decommissioning of these plants. Some sealed sources can be
recycled for other uses that require less radioactivity. Once these
materials have served their purpose, they become LLRW. Specialized
companies or those licensed to use these materials can reduce the volume
and sometimes the radioactivity level of the waste through processing
before it is either put into a licensed interim storage or a disposal
facility. After a period of storage, some LLRW can decay to the point that
it is safe for disposal in regulated landfill sites. During the life
cycle, there will also be some loss of radioactive materials to
abandonment, misplacement and theft. Figure 1 diagrams the life-cycle
process for radioactive materials.

Figure 1: Conceptual Flow Diagram of Radioactive Sources from Production
to Disposal

Source: GAO.

In the 1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission began to encourage the
development of commercial LLRW disposal facilities to accommodate the
increased volume of commercial waste that was being generated. Six such
disposal facilities were licensed, two of which, the facility in
Washington State, licensed in 1965, and in South Carolina, licensed in
1971, remain open today.7 Each of these facilities is located within the
boundaries of or adjacent to a much larger site owned by DOE. The third
facility in Utah is about 80 miles west of Salt Lake City. Utah initially
licensed the Envirocare facility in 1988 to accept naturally occurring
radioactive waste. In 1991, Utah amended the license to permit the
disposal of some LLRW, and the Northwest Compact agreed to allow
Envirocare to accept these wastes from noncompact states. By 2001, the
facility was allowed to accept all types of class A waste. Because of its
higher radioactive content, greater-than-class-C waste cannot be disposed
of in these commercial disposal facilities. Instead, the Act requires DOE
to provide a facility for disposing of all greater-than-class-C
radioactive waste.

Currently, 10 compacts include 43 states: the Appalachian, Atlantic,
Central, Central Midwest, Northwest, Midwest, Rocky Mountain, Southeast,
Southwestern, and Texas

7 Under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission, four other
commercial disposal facilities were licensed in the 1960s, including
facilities in Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada, and New York.

compacts. Seven states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico, are unaffiliated. Figure 2 shows the state LLRW compacts and
unaffiliated states.

Figure 2: State LLRW Compacts and Unaffiliated States

Since 1999, LLRW Disposal Availability and Federal Oversight Have Changed

In June 2004, we identified a number of important changes that had
occurred since our 1999 report; these changes have affected, or might
affect, future disposal availability for these wastes and federal
oversight of states' LLRW management. Changes that might have implications
for long-term disposal availability include the following:

o  	In 2001, South Carolina enacted legislation restricting the use of the
Barnwell disposal facility to generators in the three-member Atlantic
compact after mid2008. In the past, the state legislature has changed its
position on restricting access to this facility, both closing and
reopening the facility to noncompact member states over the years.

o  	In 2001, Envirocare received a license from the state regulatory
authority to accept class B and C wastes pending approval by the Utah
legislature and governor. Currently, the state has imposed a moratorium on
approving the use of this license until February 2005, after a review of
the recommendations of a hazardous waste regulation and policy task force.
The task force is expected to issue its final report by November 2004.
Granting approval for Envirocare to use its class B and C wastes license
could help to alleviate a shortfall in disposal availability for class B
and C wastes.

o  	In 2003, Texas enacted legislation designating a geographic area in
the state as acceptable for a new LLRW disposal facility, and the state
regulator developed a license application process for this facility. In
August 2004, a private company submitted a license application to the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality for approval to construct and
operate a disposal facility 30 miles west of Andrews, Texas. Current
projections by the state of Texas suggest that the earliest a facility
could be licensed is 2007. Non-compact states' access to this facility has
not been determined. If the Texas facility were allowed to accept waste
nationally, it would mitigate a potential shortfall in disposal
availability for class B and C wastes.

o  	In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit affirmed a federal
district court decision that Nebraska, as a designated host state, is
liable for $151 million in damages for reneging on its obligations to the
Central Compact to build a disposal facility. Since the issuance of our
June 2004 report, the Central Interstate Compact voted to accept a
settlement with Nebraska for $141 million plus interest. Under the
settlement, if Nebraska and other compact members negotiate access to the
proposed disposal facility in Texas, the amount Nebraska would have to pay
would be reduced to $130 million plus interest.

The remaining changes affect federal agency guidance and oversight of LLRW
management by the states. These include the following:

o  	In 2001, DOE significantly diminished its involvement in guiding and
overseeing LLRW management by the states. DOE's reporting requirement on
LLRW management, as originally required by the Act, terminated effective
May 2000. In addition, DOE's technical assistance activities under the Act
have essentially ended after a period of shifting emphasis and decline.

o  	Since the late 1990s, NRC has decreased its direct involvement in
states' LLRW management because no new disposal sites were being developed
and more states have taken on the responsibility for the regulation of
radioactive material from NRC.

Annual LLRW Disposal Volumes Have Increased, but Future Volumes Are
Uncertain

Annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased significantly in recent years,
primarily the result of cleaning up DOE sites and decommissioning nuclear
power plants. To obtain disposal volume information, we relied on data
from the three commercial disposal facility operators because the Manifest
Management Information System (MIMS)-the online commercial disposal LLRW
database maintained by DOE-is not as up-to-date as the facilities' data
and has other deficiencies. Future disposal volumes remain uncertain and
will depend largely on waste disposal decisions by DOE and nuclear utility
companies.

LLRW Disposal Volumes Have Increased Significantly Since 1999

Since the beginning of 1999, disposal volumes have steadily increased to
over 12 million cubic feet in 2003, an increase of over 200 percent. Class
A waste accounted for 99 percent of all waste disposed of at the three
commercial disposal facilities. The Envirocare facility received 99
percent of this class A waste, and about 78 percent of this

class A waste came from DOE clean up sites. According to Envirocare, DOE
has increased its shipment of waste to the facility from about 36,000
cubic feet in 1994 (6.6 percent of the class A waste disposed) to almost
9.3 million cubic feet in 2003 (77.8 percent of the class A waste
disposed). In contrast, disposal volumes of commercial class B waste
declined 47 percent, from about 23,500 cubic feet in 1999, to about 12,400
cubic feet by 2003. Commercial class C waste disposal volumes were more
volatile, changing as much as 107 percent in a single year. The total
annual disposal volume of class C waste alternately rose and fell between
1999 and 2003, with the annual total reaching over 20,000 cubic feet in
1999, falling as low as about 11,000 cubic feet in 2002, then rising to
over 23,000 cubic feet in 2003. Of the total class B and C wastes disposed
of in commercial facilities in 2003, 99 percent went to Barnwell.

Concerns about the Completeness and Reliability of National LLRW Database

Because of concerns about data completeness and reliability, we did not
use the database that DOE maintains and operates for the LLRW community
and public when we determined recent disposal volumes. Nor did we use
other information in this database to analyze sources of LLRW by state,
compact, and generator type because of shortcomings in its usefulness and
reliability. Instead, we relied on data supplied to us from the three
commercial disposal operators for our analysis because these data include
DOE waste volumes sent for commercial disposal, are more up to date and
are the primary source data input into MIMS.

With respect to data completeness, even though DOE ships large quantities
of LLRW to a commercial disposal facility, this information is not
captured in MIMS. Also, other types of information, such as the storage of
waste and volume of waste reduction, are not collected in this database.
The consensus among the compact and unaffiliated state officials we
surveyed was that they could more effectively regulate and monitor LLRW in
their compacts and states if MIMS offered more comprehensive and reliable
data. Despite these shortcomings, these officials have sometimes used MIMS
data as a convenient source of information for public, media, and
stakeholder inquiries, as a means of monitoring LLRW within their compact
or region, and as an external check on

the LLRW interstate shipment data reported to compact and state regulators
by the disposal operators.

We also identified shortcomings in the reliability of the MIMS database.
We found inconsistencies between what the disposal facility operators
claimed had been disposed of at their facilities and what was recorded in
this database. For example, excluding waste generated by DOE, the volumes
of LLRW reported to us by Envirocare for 1999 to 2003 totaled 10.4 million
cubic feet, compared to the 15.7 million cubic feet reported in MIMS.
There were also problems with other kinds of data in MIMS. States and
compacts have also identified discrepancies that undermine the data's
usefulness, particularly regarding the state-specific information on the
origins of waste. For example, Tennessee, which is the base of operations
for companies that transport and process the waste from generators in
other states prior to disposal, reports that it is erroneously recorded in
MIMS as the state of origin of this waste.

The data DOE puts into MIMS comes from the three commercial LLRW disposal
facility operators in electronic format. DOE pays each operator varying
amounts of money to extract data from the records accompanying shipments
of LLRW that provide information on the volume, radioactivity level,
source, and other information about the waste. These records are called
manifests, and NRC requires their use to track shipment of radioactive
materials. The disposal operator then transmits some of this information
to DOE for entry into MIMS. Each disposal facility operator is responsible
for ensuring the validity of these data, but DOE's contracts with these
operators leave to them what steps, if any, should be taken to validate
the data. DOE takes no responsibility for verifying the accuracy of the
data supplied by the disposal facility operators. Furthermore, while DOE
takes some steps to ensure that it accurately uploads operatorsupplied
data into MIMS, it does not perform other systematic quality checks on the
data, such as "reasonableness" checks, cross tabulations, or exceptions
reports. As a result, the lack of consistent and comprehensive internal
controls, such as controls over information processing, undermine our
confidence in the data output in MIMS for several

types of information, including sources of waste coming from states,
compacts, and generator types.

We recommended in our June 2004 report that the Secretary of Energy halt
dissemination of information in DOE's national LLRW database as long as
the database has shortcomings in its usefulness and reliability. DOE
subsequently decided to leave the database online but has added a notice
to users of the database regarding inaccuracies and is taking steps to
identify and update erroneous data.

Uncertainties Surround Projecting Future LLRW Disposal Volumes

Notwithstanding problems obtaining comprehensive and reliable LLRW
disposal data, uncertainties remain concerning the timing and volume of
LLRW needing disposal in the future, which largely will depend on the
disposal decisions made by nuclear utility companies and DOE, as well as
on possible changes in regulatory standards for what constitutes LLRW. For
example, officials at DOE told us that projections for sites now being
cleaned up have not proven very accurate, and have tended to significantly
overestimate waste volumes that would require disposal as LLRW. They cited
several reasons for this difficulty: records from "legacy" sites-former
nuclear weapons production sites that DOE is cleaning up-have not proven
to be reliable; the decay rate of known buried radioactive wastes have
often been higher than expected so wastes that were expected to need
disposal as LLRW can instead be legally classified as radioactive waste
mixed with nonradioactive but hazardous wastes and sent to less expensive
disposal facilities; contractors have become more innovative and skilled
in sorting and segregating hazardous and mixed wastes from LLRW so that a
higher percentage of wastes can be disposed of as hazardous or mixed
wastes rather than LLRW; and some debris and material from site cleanup
projected to be LLRW has no appreciable radioactivity when generated and
can therefore be disposed in sanitary landfills or other non-LLRW disposal
facilities. There are some indications that the volume of DOE cleanup
waste likely to be sent to commercial LLRW disposal facilities could
currently be at or near a peak and could soon rapidly decline as cleanup
at some DOE sites winds down and as cleanup activity shifts to other DOE
sites that have considerable on-site

disposal capacity. As a result, DOE officials expect the use of commercial
LLRW disposal facilities will start declining after 2006 and will stay
comparatively low until another anticipated spike in 2014. DOE officials
stressed, however, that "high confidence numbers" are not yet available
because the department is still in the process of reorganizing and
developing new baselines for its accelerated cleanup projects, and it does
not have a management system in place to develop corresponding waste
projections.

Potential changes to the threshold at which waste is classified as LLRW
are currently under consideration and could affect the amount of waste
needing disposal in the future. The National Research Council and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are separately studying this issue
and considering possible changes that might affect the future management
of LLRW. The National Research Council is studying the issue because
members of its Board on Radioactive Waste Management are concerned that
the statutes and regulations governing LLRW management may be overly
restrictive in some cases, leading to excessive costs and other burdens on
the waste generator and, in other cases, may lead to an exaggeration of
the potential risks posed by these materials. EPA is examining its
existing waste regulations and has begun soliciting public comment as it
considers new rulemaking in this area. Specifically, EPA is exploring an
option with NRC to establish a regulatory framework that allows some of
the lower activity radioactive waste to be disposed of at non-LLRW
disposal facilities. Finally, and in a similar vein, government and
industry LLRW stakeholders have discussed harmonizing U.S. standards with
the prevailing international standards for LLRW under consideration by the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Such a change could prompt U.S.
regulators to consider raising the threshold at which the radioactivity of
waste would trigger regulation as LLRW and would allow for lower activity
LLRW to be disposed of under other regulatory regimes.

LLRW Disposal Availability Appears Adequate Until Mid-2008

Disposal availability appears adequate to serve the nation's needs at
least until mid-2008, when many states might lose disposal access for
their class B and C wastes. Disposal availability for class A waste is not
a problem in the short or longer term. According to Envirocare
representatives, their disposal site, which accepted over 99 percent of
the nation's commercially disposed of class A waste in 2003, has enough
capacity to accept this waste at the current volume levels for more than
20 years. The Richland facility has about 21 million cubic feet of
capacity remaining for all classes of waste, which is more than enough to
accommodate the LLRW coming from the 11 states in the Northwest and Rocky
Mountain compacts until the expected closure of this facility in 2056. The
Barnwell disposal facility has about 2.7 million cubic feet of remaining
capacity, most of which has been set aside for waste from generators in
the Atlantic Compact until 2050. Barnwell also appears to have enough
disposal capacity to continue accepting class B and C wastes from other
states until mid-2008, when it is scheduled to close to all but the three
Atlantic compact states. According to the Director of Disposal Services at
Chem-Nuclear Systems, the operator of the Barnwell facility, there should
be enough space at the facility to accommodate the typical 20,000 to
25,000 cubic feet of class B and C wastes accepted at this facility in
recent years. This representative told us that many generators have
already contracted to dispose of their B and C wastes in the short-term,
and any generator outside of the Atlantic Compact anticipating a need to
dispose of these wastes could still contract for the necessary space until
mid- 2008.

A number of factors support the likelihood that disposal space for class B
and C wastes will be available at Barnwell until mid-2008, if disposal
volumes do not exceed anticipated levels. Based on current space
commitments at this disposal facility under the conditions of the volume
caps set by the South Carolina legislature, there remains between 24,500
to 44,500 cubic feet of uncommitted space until 2008. The amount of space
available depends on whether Atlantic Compact generators use all of their
setaside space through 2008. In addition, utilities are likely to take
more aggressive efforts to ensure sufficient space for class B and C
wastes at Barnwell. Industry officials said

utilities might consider several initiatives and conditions that could
alleviate the diminishing disposal availability for class B and C wastes.
For example, utilities could send class A waste to Envirocare rather than
Barnwell to save the remaining space at Barnwell for class B and C wastes.
In addition, utilities might increase waste reduction efforts and storage.

After 2008, disposal availability for the class B and C wastes generated
in the 36 states outside the Northwest, Rocky Mountain, and Atlantic
compacts is more uncertain. Disposal availability for these states will
depend on a number of possibilities, including extending access to
Barnwell beyond mid-2008 or creating new disposal options for these
classes of waste. The Barnwell facility has opened and closed to
noncompact member states before and could again. Given the difficulties of
attracting class A waste to Barnwell because of the high disposal fees,
and the fairly consistent level of class B and C wastes shipped to this
site each year, the facility might not even reach its volume cap of 35,000
cubic feet per year after 2008. In addition, the set-aside of 2.2 million
cubic feet for Atlantic Compact generators through 2050 may be negotiated
downward, freeing up additional space at this disposal facility. It is
also possible that new disposal options will become available in the
future that could alleviate any disposal crisis for class B and C wastes.
Finally, regardless of the outcome, representatives of the Nuclear Energy
Institute, the policy organization of the nuclear energy industry, said
that utilities, the greatest generator of class B and C wastes, can store
these wastes on site if they have no disposal option.

Any LLRW Disposal Shortfall After Mid-2008 Unlikely to Pose Immediate
Problem

If after mid-2008, there are no new disposal options for class B and C
wastes, licensed users of radioactive materials can continue to minimize
waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store waste pending
the development of additional disposal options. These approaches, however,
can be costly, with a higher financial burden on

some licensees than others. Notwithstanding these business costs, we did
not identify other effects of any shortfalls in disposal availability that
might have wider implications.

LLRW Minimization and Storage Can Lessen Effects of Any Disposal Shortfall

The licensed users of radioactive materials that must eventually dispose
of their LLRW have employed a variety of techniques to both minimize and
process this waste to reduce its volume before storage and eventual
disposal. These techniques include substituting nonradioactive materials
for radioactive materials, separating radioactive materials from
nonradioactive materials, recycling, compaction, dilution, and
incineration. For example, it is reported that most large research
institutions make concerted efforts to find suitable and appropriate
alternatives to the use of radioactive materials. One university official
told us that such efforts have reduced LLRW generation at his institution
by 30 percent in the last 5 years. The Electric Power Research Institute
is encouraging nuclear utilities to use vendor volume reduction programs
for resins, the single largest component of class B and C wastes, to
reduce volume. Some licensees have used processors to super-compact class
A waste to achieve up to a 5,000 percent reduction in volume, or to reduce
this waste to ash through incineration, albeit increasing the
concentration of radioisotopes.

In addition to minimizing LLRW, licensees can decide to store this waste
when no disposal option is available to them. In order to obtain a license
to possess radioactive materials, entities must demonstrate the technical
capability to safely manage them. These entities give various reasons for
storing waste, including allowing short-lived radioactive materials to
decay to innocuous levels to avoid the need for disposal in a more
expensive LLRW facility, the prohibitively high cost of disposal for some
licensees, and concerns about the potential liability of sending the waste
to a disposal site. Universities and biomedical companies generally rely
on storage for decay for their LLRW, although finding space within large
research institutions in urban settings is more difficult. The high cost
of LLRW disposal can also pose financial problems for some licensees. Over
the last 25 years, disposal costs have risen from $1 per cubic foot of

LLRW to over $400 per cubic foot, with projections of well over $1,000 per
cubic foot in the future. For some LLRW, the Barnwell disposal facility
now charges $1,625 per cubic foot. These disposal costs can reach hundreds
of millions of dollars for utility companies that are decommissioning
their nuclear power plants. NRC reported to us that the cost to fully
decommission a plant could run as high as $675 million. Finally, some
licensees will not send their LLRW to disposal facilities because they are
concerned that the mixing of their waste with other waste might draw them
into litigation if the disposal site should ever require cleanup under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, as amended (commonly referred to as Superfund).

While NRC policy favors disposal rather than storage over the long-term,
since the mid1990s the Commission has allowed on-site storage of LLRW
without a specified time limit as long as it is safe. The Commission took
this approach in part because LLRW can be stored and the states were not
developing any new disposal facilities. NRC's and Agreement States' (that
is, states that have taken over the responsibility for regulating
radioactive materials from NRC) license and inspection programs help
ensure the safe management of stored LLRW. However, some licensees are
concerned that a fire, flood, or earthquake might cause an unintended
radioactive release. If an emergency ever should arise from stored LLRW,
NRC has authority under the Act to override any compact restrictions to
allow shipment of LLRW to a regional or other nonfederal disposal
facility, if necessary under narrowly defined conditions, and to eliminate
an immediate and serious threat to the public health and safety or to the
common defense and security. Since September 11, 2001, the perception of
the risks posed by potential use of stored LLRW by terrorists has
increased. A recent report found that at least a few radioisotopes of
greatest security concern are classified as LLRW. According to the report,
while radiological dispersal devices, such as a dirty bomb, are not
weapons of mass destruction, they could cause mass disruption,
dislocation, and adverse financial consequences associated with
decontamination and rebuilding. NRC officials told us that as the volume
and duration of stored LLRW increases so might the safety and security
risks.

LLRW Minimization and Storage Can Be Costly

Waste minimization and storage can alleviate the need for disposal, but
they can be costly. The licensees that we interviewed provided many
instances of the high cost of managing LLRW. For example, one university
recently built a $12 million combined hazardous and radioactive waste
management facility, of which two-thirds is devoted to processing and
temporarily storing class A waste. A medical center official took us to a
small (12' x12') LLRW interim storage and processing room that cost the
institution about $150,000 to construct to meet stringent health and
environmental standards. Costs are also associated with operating storage
facilities. Representatives from one university system told us that the
system spends about $100,000 annually to maintain its interim storage
building in a remote area of the state. Added to the cost of building and
operating a storage facility is the cost of securing it. Such costs have
been accounted for in higher utility rates, university overhead charges,
drug prices, and medical treatments. These costs of doing business are
more difficult for some entities to absorb than others. Representatives
from several biotechnology companies told us that the industry,
particularly the smaller start-up companies, are not prepared for the
financial cost of storing and securing LLRW.

No Other Widespread Effects Detected of Shortfall in LLRW Disposal
Availability

Notwithstanding the cost of minimizing and storing LLRW, we did not detect
widespread national impacts on LLRW generators that have resulted or might
result from any disposal shortfalls. In a survey we administered to
compact and unaffiliated state LLRW officials regarding documented effects
on LLRW generators of any restricted disposal availability, the officials
raised few concerns. We then sought information from a broader
constituency to determine whether any problems were occurring. We
collaborated with medical researchers at the University of Texas to seek
information from two overlapping groups involved in LLRW management: the
approximately 2,000 subscribers of the RadSafe Listserv, a listserv for
radiation safety officers, and the approximately 6,000 members of the
Health Physics Society, a scientific and professional organization whose
members specialize in occupational and environmental radiation

safety. We sought information on any known cases where there have been or
might be adverse effects on research activities and clinical practice
stemming from costs or difficulties related to the storage and disposal of
LLRW. Specifically, we e-mailed questionnaires asking if these factors
have caused or might cause a discontinuance or disapproval of any research
or clinical endeavors to RadSafe listserv subscribers and placed a notice
in the Health Physics Society's newsletter asking for volunteers to answer
the same questions we sent to the listserv subscribers. We obtained an
extremely low response rate to these questionnaires-14 responses from
listserv subscribers and 6 from Health Physics Society members. Because
these were a nonprobability sample surveys, the results are not
generalizable and can only be used for anecdotal purposes. Of these
respondents, only two said that the difficulties associated with LLRW had
adversely affected research or clinical practice. Several respondents
cited the challenges of dealing with LLRW but also noted that they work
around the difficulties through waste minimization, including substituting
nonradioactive materials for radioactive materials when possible, and
on-site storage as needed. The survey results provided no evidence of any
widespread effects on research activities and clinical practice stemming
from costs or difficulties related to the storage and disposal of LLRW in
the last 5 years. Other published information was largely consistent with
our findings.

Owing to the uncertainties regarding future disposal availability and the
safety and security of storing waste, our report suggested that the
Congress may wish to consider directing NRC to report to it if LLRW
disposal and storage conditions should change enough to warrant
consideration of new legislation to improve the reliability and cost
effectiveness of disposal availability.

The Act Has Not Accomplished Goal of Providing More Region Disposal
Capacity

The Act has not effectively facilitated the development of additional
regional disposal capacity for class A, B, and C wastes. Although a
nuclear industry association estimates that expenditures may now have
reached approximately $1 billion on various facility

development efforts, only one new commercial LLRW disposal facility has
been developed since passage of the Act-the Envirocare facility-and this
facility was not developed at the instigation of the compact in which it
operates. As we reported in 2004, the conditions dampening any impetus to
developing new disposal facilities for class A, B and C wastes have not
changed since 1999. These conditions include a combination of factors:
significant decreases in commercial LLRW generation, available capacity at
the three existing facilities to meet national disposal needs, and rising
costs of developing disposal facilities. Developing new LLRW disposal
facilities also encountered public and political resistance in states
designated to host these facilities.

DOE Has Not Provided a Disposal Facility for Greater-Than-Class-C Waste
but Is Collecting This Material

In our April 2003 report, we provided information on DOE's efforts to
recover and dispose of greater-than-class-C sealed radioactive sources. As
you know, since September 11, 2001, there has been a great deal of concern
about the control of sealed sources containing radioactive material that
are used in medicine, agriculture, research, and industry throughout the
United States. The radioactive material in these sources is encapsulated,
or sealed, in metal-such as stainless steel, titanium, or platinum-to
prevent its dispersal. The small size and portability of the sealed
sources make them susceptible to misuse, improper disposal, and theft. If
these sealed sources fell into the hands of terrorists, they could be used
as simple and crude but potentially dangerous radiological weapons,
commonly called dirty bombs.

Certain sealed sources are considered particularly attractive for
potential use in dirty bombs because, among other things, they contain
more concentrated amounts of radioactive material such as americium-241,
cesium-137, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90. Applications
of greater-than-class-C sealed sources include portable and fixed gauges
used by the construction industry for testing the moisture content of
soil, medical pacemakers, medical diagnostics and treatments, gauges used
for petroleum exploration, and government and private research and
development. While a

study by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory estimates that there
currently could be about 250,000 to 500,000 greater-than-class-C sealed
sources in the United States, the actual number of greater-than-class-C
sealed sources that are no longer wanted is not known because no one kept
track of this information.

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 19858 requires
DOE to provide a facility for disposing of all greater-than-class-C
radioactive waste, including greater-than-class-C sealed sources that are
no longer wanted by their owners. A permanent disposal facility has not
yet been developed, but in the interim, DOE created the Off-Site Source
Recovery Project that, since fiscal year 1999, has been recovering
unwanted greater-than-class-C sealed sources from their owners and
temporarily storing them at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New
Mexico. NNSA officials told us that, to date, the project has recovered
over 10,000 sealed sources.

In April 2003, we reported that DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery Project
faced three problems that could hinder future recovery efforts. First, we
reported that DOE's Office of Environmental Management, which was
responsible for the Off-Site Source Recovery Project at the time of our
report, had a questionable long-term commitment to the project. The
project did not receive full funding because of other higher-priority
projects, and officials from the Office of Environmental Management told
us that they would have liked responsibility for the project to be placed
in another DOE office because of inconsistencies between the mission of
the project and the main mission of the Office of Environmental Management
to accelerate the cleanup and closure of contaminated DOE weapons
development facilities.

Second, we reported that the Off-Site Source Recovery Project was unable
to recover any additional sealed sources containing plutonium-239 (which,
in sufficient quantity, could be used to fabricate a crude nuclear weapon)
because there was no more space at the Los Alamos National Laboratory that
met DOE's security standards for storing these sources. As a result, about
150 holders (mostly universities) of over 400 unwanted

8 Pub. L. No. 99-240.

sources containing plutonium-239 were forced to retain them and keep them
properly secured until space became available. In some instances, sealed
sources at these facilities were stored in unlocked and open rooms, and
most holders expressed their desire to dispose of the sources as quickly
as possible. In addition to plutonium-239, at the time of our report, DOE
had not approved a means for temporarily storing sources containing
strontium-90 and cesium-137.

Finally, we reported that, as of February 2003, DOE's Office of
Environmental Management had not made progress toward providing for the
permanent disposal of greater-than-class-C radioactive waste, and it was
unlikely to provide such a facility by fiscal year 2007 as it had planned
because it is not a priority within the office. Specifically, the office
had not begun the first step in developing a disposal facility- completing
an appropriate analysis as required by the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 and its implementing regulations. Such an analysis would
likely take the form of an Environmental Impact Statement. Officials from
DOE's Office of Environmental Management told us that funding had been
provided in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to conduct an environmental
analysis, but these funds had been reallocated to other priorities.

Our April 2003 report recommended that DOE determine whether the priority
given to the Off-Site Source Recovery Project was commensurate with the
threat posed by greater-than-class-C sealed sources and ensure that
adequate resources are devoted to the project to cover the costs of
recovering and storing these sealed sources as quickly as possible. In
addition, we recommended that DOE take immediate action to provide secure
storage space for unwanted sealed sources containing plutonium-239,
strontium90, and cesium-137. Furthermore, we recommended that DOE initiate
the process to develop a permanent disposal facility for
greater-than-class-C radioactive waste as required by the LLRW Policy
Amendments Act and develop a plan to ensure the continued recovery and
storage of greater-than-class-C sealed sources until such a disposal
facility is available.

DOE has made progress addressing the problems we identified. Specifically,
to address the problem of the low priority given to the Off-Site Source
Recovery Project within the Office of Environmental Management, DOE
transferred the project to NNSA in October 2003. Now renamed the U.S.
Radiological Threat Reduction Program, the project is managed by NNSA's
Office of Global Radiological Threat Reduction and is part of NNSA's
larger efforts to secure potential dirty bomb material worldwide. The
project has also experienced funding increases following the transfer.
According to NNSA officials, the project was appropriated nearly $2
million in fiscal year 2004 and received an additional $3.5 million that
was transferred by the Secretary of Energy from the Office of
Environmental Management. In addition, the project completed spending from
an additional $10 million that the Congress appropriated in August 2002 as
part of the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from
and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States.9 In total, the
project spent about $8 million in fiscal year 2004. In our view, funding
for this effort must be sustained for the foreseeable future to continue
progress in the recovery of material that potentially could be fabricated
into dirty bombs.

With regard to the continued recovery of sealed sources containing
plutonium-239, NNSA completed the security requirements for accepting
additional plutonium-239 at Los Alamos National Laboratory. NNSA officials
also told us that additional storage capacity has become available at the
Nevada Test Site for additional plutonium-239 storage. The project began
recovering plutonium-239 sources in November 2003. As of September 2004,
the project has recovered over 260 sources containing plutonium-239.
Although the project estimated at the time of our report that there were
over 400 unwanted plutonium-239 sources, NNSA officials told us that about
400 additional excess sources have been identified that will be recovered.
Recovered sources are stored at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the
Nevada Test Site until they are eventually shipped to the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for permanent disposal. According to
an NNSA official, these shipments are due to begin in April 2005.

                             9 Pub. L. No. 107-206.

According to NNSA officials, the project started recovery of large
strontium-90 sources in February 2004 and has recovered four of the six
known large strontium-90 sources in the United States. The project plans
to recover the remaining two large strontium-90 sources in fiscal year
2005. For cesium-137 sources, NNSA officials told us that they are
currently working to find commercial partners to leverage existing
disposal and recycling options for this material and to securely store
cesium-137 sources in the interim.

Finally, in response to our recommendation that DOE initiate the process
to develop a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-class-C
radioactive waste, DOE transferred the responsibility for developing the
environmental analysis from the Office of Environmental Management to
DOE's Office of Environment, Safety, and Health. DOE plans to publish an
Advance Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement.
This Environmental Impact Statement will evaluate disposal options and
other considerations. However, DOE has been unable to tell us when the
Advance Notice of Intent will be published or when DOE expects to complete
the Environmental Impact Statement.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgements

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)
512-3841. Gene Aloise, Ryan T. Coles, Daniel Feehan, Doreen Feldman,
Richard Kasden, Thomas Laetz, Ilene Pollack, Leslie Pollock, Carol
Herrnstadt Shulman, and Kevin Tarmann made key contributions to this
testimony.

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