Border Security: Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS	 
Needed to Guide Biometric Visas and Related Programs (09-SEP-04, 
GAO-04-1080T).							 
                                                                 
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has made a	 
concerted effort to strengthen border security by enhancing visa 
issuance policies and procedures, as well as expanding screening 
of the millions of foreign visitors who enter the United States  
annually. Consistent with the 9/11 Commission report that	 
recommends a biometric entry-exit screening system for travelers,
the Department of State's biometric program complements the	 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program--a	 
governmentwide program to better control and monitor the entry,  
visa status, and exit of visitors. GAO was asked to present the  
findings of its report on State's Biometric Visa Program, as well
as discuss other aspects of visa processing and border security  
that require coordinated, joint actions by State and DHS.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-1080T					        
    ACCNO:   A12315						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and 
DHS Needed to Guide Biometric Visas and Related Programs	 
     DATE:   09/09/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Identification cards				 
	     Identity verification				 
	     Immigration or emigration				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Biometrics 					 
	     Border security					 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Dept. of State Biometric Visa Program		 
	     INS Automated Biometric Identification		 
	     System						 
                                                                 

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GAO-04-1080T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT BORDER SECURITY

Thursday, September 9, 2004

Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Needed to Guide Biometric Visas and
                                Related Programs

Joint Statement of Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, Managing Director,
International Affairs and Trade, and Randolph Hite, Director of Information
Technology Architecture and Systems Issues

GAO-04-1080T

Highlights of GAO-04-1080T, a testimony before the Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representative

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has made a concerted effort
to strengthen border security by enhancing visa issuance policies and
procedures, as well as expanding screening of the millions of foreign
visitors who enter the United States annually. Consistent with the 9/11
Commission report that recommends a biometric entry-exit screening system
for travelers, the Department of State's biometric program complements the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program-a governmentwide
program to better control and monitor the entry, visa status, and exit of
visitors.

GAO was asked to present the findings of its report on State's Biometric
Visa Program, as well as discuss other aspects of visa processing and
border security that require coordinated, joint actions by State and DHS.

GAO has recommended that DHS and State develop and provide guidance to
consular posts on how to use information from the biometric program to
adjudicate visas. In other reports, GAO has made recommendations to DHS
and State to improve US-VISIT, as well as several aspects of the
nonimmigrant visa process. The agencies generally agreed and are taking
actions to implement our recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1080T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jacquelyn L.
Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-4128 or [email protected].

September 9, 2004

BORDER SECURITY

Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Needed to Guide Biometric Visas and
Related Programs

Our report issued today finds that State is implementing the Biometric
Visa Program on schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004,
deadline for issuing visas that include biometric indicators, as mandated
by Congress. As of September 1, 2004, State had installed program hardware
and software at 201 visa issuing posts overseas and plans to complete the
installation at the remaining 6 posts by September 30. Technology
installation has progressed smoothly, however State and DHS have not
provided comprehensive guidance to consular posts on when and how
information from the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT)
on visa applicants should be considered by adjudicating consular officers.
In the absence of such guidance, we found that these officers are unclear
on how best to use the biometric program and IDENT information.

Since September 11, State and DHS have made many improvements to visa
issuance and border security policies. Nevertheless, in prior reports, we
have found additional vulnerabilities that need to be addressed through
joint, coordinated actions. For example, DHS has not adequately defined
the operational context for US-VISIT, which affects the biometric program.
In addition, we identified systemic weaknesses in information sharing
between State and DHS in the visa revocation process. Moreover, we found
related weaknesses in an interagency security check process aimed to
prevent the illegal transfer of sensitive technologies.

Example of Fingerprints and Photograph Capture

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be here to discuss our report1 being issued today on the
Department of State's Biometric Visa Program, which requires that all
persons applying for U.S. visas have certain biometrics2 (in this case,
fingerprints) and digital photographs collected during the visa3
application process and cleared through the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) before
receiving a visa. In addition, we will discuss several previous GAO
reports that highlight the need for joint, coordinated efforts by State
and DHS on programs to enhance border security and visa processes.

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has made a concerted effort
to strengthen border security by enhancing visa issuance policies and
procedures, as well as improving the screening of the millions of foreign
visitors who enter, stay in, and exit the United States annually. State's
Biometric Visa Program complements the DHS-run United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program-a governmentwide
program that collects, maintains, and shares information on foreign
nationals to better control and monitor the entry, visa status, and exit
of visitors. The Biometric Visa Program prescreens visa applicants at U.S.
consulates overseas to ensure that they are qualified to obtain visas,
while the US-VISIT program, among other things, verifies that the same
person who applied for a visa is the one who is entering the United States
using that visa.4 The biometric program is consistent with

1See GAO, BORDER SECURITY: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on
Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging, GAO-04-1001 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2004).

2Biometrics is a wide range of technologies that can be used to, among
other things, verify a person's identity by capturing and analyzing his or
her physiological characteristics. In this case, and for the purposes of
this report, "biometric identifiers" refers to fingerprints. See GAO,
Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

3In this report, we use the term "visa" to refer to nonimmigrant visas
only. The United States also grants visas to people who intend to
immigrate to the United States. A visa allows a foreign visitor to present
himself at a port of entry for admission to the United States.

4DHS currently does not have information on individuals apprehended at
ports of entry when their prints and photographs did not match those
captured at the consular posts for the visa they were using. On July 19,
2004, DHS implemented a system to assist in identifying such cases and
indicated that it will be able to develop better information in the
future.

the July 2004 9/11 Commission report,5 which recommends using biometric
identifiers for border and transportation systems and a biometric
entry-exit screening system for travelers.

Our statement today will focus on border security programs requiring
joint, coordinated efforts by State and DHS. We will first discuss our
observations of State's Biometric Visa Program. In addition, based on
prior GAO reports, we will discuss some of our findings and our
recommendations that called for coordinated efforts between DHS and State
to improve other aspects the nonimmigrant visa process (NIV) and border
security, including US-VISIT.

Summary 	We found that State is implementing the Biometric Visa Program on
schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004, deadline for issuing
visas with biometric identifiers, as mandated by Congress.6 As of
September 1, 2004, State had installed program hardware and software at
201 of 207 overseas posts that issue visas, and State plans to complete
the installation at the remaining 6 posts by September 30. The biometric
technology installation has progressed smoothly; however, DHS and State
have not provided comprehensive guidance to consular posts on when and how
information from IDENT on visa applicants should be considered by
adjudicating consular officers.7 In the absence of such guidance, officers
may be unclear on how best to use the biometric program and IDENT
information. Therefore, in our report issued today, we have recommended
that DHS and State develop and provide comprehensive guidance to consular
posts on how information on visa applicants available through

5The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2004).

6Section 303 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-173) requires that no later than October 26, 2004,
the State Department issue visas that use biometric identifiers.

7The Homeland Security Act of 2002 establishes DHS's role in the visa
process, and a subsequent September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding
between the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security further outlines
the visa issuance authorities. According to the memorandum, DHS is
responsible for establishing visa policy, reviewing implementation of the
policy, and providing additional direction, while State is responsible for
managing the visa process, managing the consular corps and its functions,
and carrying out U.S. foreign policy. DHS and State share responsibility
for policy and implementation of the Biometric Visa Program.

IDENT should be used to help adjudicate visas. DHS concurred with our
report, and State acknowledged that there may be a lag in guidance.

State and DHS have made many improvements to border security and visa
issuance policies since September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, in our reviews
of various aspects of border security and visa issuance, we have found
weaknesses that both agencies need to address through joint, coordinated
actions. For example,

o  	DHS has deployed an initial US-VISIT operating capability for entry to
115 airports and 14 seaports. DHS plans to expand the initial operating
capability to the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December 2004, and to
all remaining land ports of entry by December 2005. It has also deployed
an exit capability, on a pilot basis, at two airports and one seaport.8
However, the program's operational context, or homeland security
enterprise architecture,9 has not yet been adequately defined.10 DHS
released an initial version of its enterprise architecture in September
2003; however, we found that this architecture was missing important
content. This content is needed to help clarify and optimize the
relationships between US-VISIT and other homeland security programs and
operations, such as State's Biometric Visa Program.

o  	In 2003, we identified systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation
process,11 many of which were the result of a failure of U.S. agencies to
share and fully utilize information.12 We reported that information on

8These are the Baltimore/Washington International Airport, Chicago O'Hare
International Airport, and the Miami Royal Caribbean seaport.

9An enterprise architecture provides a clear and comprehensive picture of
the structure of an entity, whether an organization or a functional or
mission area, including depictions of the enterprise's current or "as-is"
technical and operational environments, its target or "tobe" technical and
operational environments, and a plan for transitioning to the target. A
properly managed enterprise architecture can clarify and help optimize the
interdependencies and relationships among business operations, as well as
those between these operations and the underlying information technology
infrastructure and applications.

10See GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts Are Underway to Develop Enterprise
Architecture, But Much Work Remains, GAO-04-777 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6,
2004).

11The visa revocation process is a homeland security tool that can prevent
potential terrorists from entering the United States and can help DHS
officials identify and investigate potential terrorists that may have
already entered the country.

12See GAO, BORDER SECURITY: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill
Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-03-798 (Washington, D.C.: June
18, 2003).

individuals with visas revoked on terrorism grounds was not shared between
State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. We made
several recommendations to State and DHS, which they agreed to implement.
A follow-up review in summer 2004, showed that although State and DHS had
made improvements in the revocation process, some weaknesses remained.13
For instance, in some cases State took a week or

longer to notify DHS that individuals with revoked visas might have been
in the country. As a result, we made additional recommendations to both
agencies, which they agreed to implement.

o  Timely information sharing among State, DHS, and other agencies also

Background

affects the time it takes to adjudicate a visa for a science student or
scholar. In some cases, consular officers determine that some of these
applicants must undergo a security check, known as Visas Mantis, to
protect against sensitive technology transfers.14 In February 2004, we

found that it was difficult to resolve some Visas Mantis cases
expeditiously given the way in which information was disseminated among
State, DHS, and other agencies. 15 Again, we addressed recommendations to
both State

and DHS, and they are currently implementing them.

Overall, our work has demonstrated that joint, coordinated actions by
State and DHS are critical for homeland and border security.

State's $162 million Biometric Visa Program is designed to work
hand-inhand with the DHS multibillion-dollar US-VISIT program. Both
programs aim to improve U.S. border security by verifying the identity of
persons entering the United States. Both programs rely on the DHS
Automated Biographic Identification System, known as IDENT, which is a
repository of fingerprints and digital photographs of persons who either
have applied for U.S. visas since the inception of the program in
September 2003, have entered the United States at one of 115 air or 14 sea
ports of entry since

13See GAO, BORDER SECURITY: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate
Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process, GAO-04-795 (Washington, D.C.:
July 13, 2004).

14The Visas Mantis process allows all participating agencies, including
DHS, to provide information and raise any particular concerns that they
may have regarding the applicant and/or the applicant's proposed
activities in the United States. According to State, the key role of the
Visas Mantis process is to protect U.S. national security, particularly in
combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, and conventional weapons.

15See GAO, BORDER SECURITY: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to
Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars, GAO-04-371
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2004).

January 2004, or are on a watch list-whether for previous immigration
violations or as part of the FBI's database of terrorists and individuals
with felony convictions.16

Biometric Process at U.S. Consulates Overseas

The process for determining who will be issued a visa consists of several
steps. When a person applies for a visa at a U.S. consulate, a fingerprint
scan is taken of his right and left index fingers. These prints are then
transmitted from the overseas post through servers17 at State to DHS's
IDENT system, which searches its records and sends a response back through
State to the post.18 A "hit" response-meaning that a match to someone
previously entered in the system was found-prevents the post's computer
system from printing a visa for the applicant until the information is
reviewed and cleared by a consular officer. According to State data, the
entire process generally takes about 30 minutes. If the computer cannot
determine if two sets of prints match, IDENT refers the case to DHS
fingerprint experts, who have up to 24 hours to return a response to State
(see fig. 1).

16IDENT data includes FBI information on all known and suspected
terrorists, selected wanted persons (foreign-born, unknown place of birth,
previously arrested by DHS), and previous criminal histories for high risk
countries; DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement information on deported
felons and sexual registrants; and DHS information on previous criminal
histories. Information from the bureau includes fingerprints from the
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.

17A server is a computer on a network that manages network resources, such
as storing files, managing printers, managing network traffic, or
processing database queries

18In a hit record, information is included on the person's previous entry
in the system, either at a port of entry or U.S. consulate, or through the
watch list.

Figure 1: Biometric Fingerprint Analysis Process

United States Visitor and US-VISIT aims to enhance national security,
facilitate legitimate trade and Immigrant Status Indicator travel,
contribute to the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and Technology
Program adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies by

o  	collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign
nationals who enter and exit the United States;

o  	identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the
terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration
status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement
officials;

o  	detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity,
and determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and

o  	facilitating information sharing and coordination among appropriate
agencies.

The process by which a foreign national is screened for entry is as
follows: When a foreign national arrives at a port of entry to the United
States, a DHS inspector scans the machine-readable travel documents.
Existing records on the foreign national, including biographic lookout
hits are returned. The computer presents available biographic information
and a photograph and determines whether IDENT contains existing
fingerprints for the foreign national. The inspector then scans the
foreign national's fingerprints (left and right index fingers) and takes a
photograph. This information is checked against stored fingerprints in
IDENT. If no matching prints are in IDENT, the foreign national is
enrolled in US-VISIT (i.e., biographic and biometric data are entered). If
the foreign national's fingerprints are already in IDENT, the system
performs a comparison of the fingerprint taken at the port of entry to the
one on file to confirm that the person submitting the fingerprints is the
person on file. If the system finds a mismatch of fingerprints or a watch
list hit, the foreign national is held for further screening or
processing.

State's implementation of the technology aspects of the biometric visa
program is currently on schedule to meet the October 26, 2004, deadline.
According to State officials, a well-planned rollout of equipment and
software and fewer technical problems than anticipated led to smooth
implementation of the technological aspects of the program at the 201
posts that had the program operating as of September 1, 2004. But amid the
fast pace of rolling out the program to meet the deadline, DHS and State
have not provided comprehensive guidance for consular posts on how the
information about visa applicants made available through the Biometric
Visa Program should best be used to help adjudicate visas. Indeed, we
found several significant differences in the implementation of the
biometric program during our visits to San Salvador, El Salvador, and
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. State acknowledged that posts may be
implementing the program in various ways across the 207 consular posts
that issue nonimmigrant visas.

  Biometric Visa Implementation Nearing Completion, but Some Guidance Still
  Needed

State Expects to Meet According to State officials, the implementation
process for the biometric

Implementation Deadline 	program led to far fewer technical problems than
expected. Early on, State had a few difficulties in transmitting data
between the posts and DHS's IDENT, primarily related to server and
firewall (computer security) issues. According to State, most issues were
resolved within a few days. In fact, 201 nonimmigrant visa (NIV)-issuing
posts out of 207 had the software and hardware installed and were
transmitting prints to IDENT for analysis as

of September 1, 2004. State anticipates the completion of the installation
by the October 2004 deadline.

                             Fingerprinting Raising
                             Issues in Visa Process

According to State's data, from February to August 2004, the total
biometric visa process averaged about 30 minutes for an applicant's prints
to be sent from an overseas post to the State server, and on to DHS for
IDENT analysis and then for the response to be returned through State's
server to the posts. IDENT response time could affect visa issuance times
because a visa cannot be issued until the post has received and reviewed
the IDENT response. Our observations at posts in San Salvador and Santo
Domingo demonstrated the importance of the length of time required to
receive an IDENT response. We observed that most interviews average only a
few minutes, but the IDENT response time currently is 30 minutes. Thus, if
interviewing officers collect prints during the interview, the interview
would be completed before the IDENT response would be available to
consular officers. Since the visa cannot be issued until the IDENT
information is considered by the consulate, potential delays in the IDENT
response times could have a major effect on the visa issuance process and
inconvenience visa applicants. State has encouraged consular officials to
issue visas the day after interviews since part of the visa process now
relies on another agency's system. This will require significant changes
for posts such as Santo Domingo, which still issues same-day visas.

Guidance Lagging for Program Implementation

State has focused on implementing the Biometric Visa Program by the
mandated deadline; however, our report identifies certain lags in guidance
on how the program should be implemented at consular posts. State and DHS
have not yet provided to posts details of how all aspects of the program
will be implemented, including who should scan fingerprints, where and who
should review information about applicants returned from IDENT, and
response times for the IDENT system. In addition, DHS and State have not
provided comprehensive guidance for consular posts on how the information
about visa applicants made available through the Biometric Visa Program
should be used to help adjudicate visas.

We believe that it is important for State and DHS to articulate how the
program could best be implemented, providing a roadmap for posts to
develop implementation plans that incorporate the guidance. We recognize,
however, that the workload, personnel and facility resources vary
considerably from post to post. As a result, each post may not be able to
easily implement the Biometric Visa Program according to a precise set

                Program Implementation Varies at Consular Posts

of guidelines. However, posts could develop procedures to implement the
guidance, identify resource and facility constraints, and implement
mitigating actions to address their own unique circumstances. Therefore,
we have recommended that DHS and State provide comprehensive guidance to
consular posts on how information about visa applicants that is now
available from IDENT should be used to help adjudicate visas. In
responding to our recommendation, DHS generally concurred and State
acknowledged that there may be a lag in guidance.

Our work at two posts shows that, because they lack specific guidance on
the system's use, consular officers at these overseas posts are uncertain
how they should implement the Biometric Visa Program and are currently
using the returned IDENT responses in a variety of ways. For example, we
found that, in cases in which the IDENT response information is available
to the overseas post by the time of the visa applicant interview, some
consular officers who conduct interviews review information before the
interview, some review it during the interview, and some rely instead on a
designated officer or the line chief to review the information after the
interview is completed and before affected visas are printed.

We found several differences in the visa operations at two posts-San
Salvador, El Salvador, and Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic-that handle a
large volume of visa applications. For example,

o  	San Salvador, one of the first posts to begin implementing the program
in September 2003, has a large new embassy complex that allowed the post
great flexibility in implementing the collection of biometrics. Applicants
are led through outdoor security screening before entering the interview
waiting room. Once in the waiting room, they immediately proceed to a
fingerprint scanning window where an American officer verifies their names
and photographs and scans their fingerprints. By the time they arrive at
their interview windows, usually the interviewing officer has received
their IDENT responses. However, the post has designated one officer to
review all of the IDENT responses, so some interviewing officers do not
take the time to review IDENT information on those they interview even if
the information is available at the time of the interview.

o  	Santo Domingo's consular section is hampered by significant facility
constraints. The NIV applicant waiting area is very cramped and has been
even more restricted over recent months due to construction efforts. Some
of the NIV applicants are forced to share space in the immigrant visa
waiting area. Santo Domingo has fewer interviewing windows than San
Salvador and cannot easily spare one to designate for fulltime fingerprint

scanning due to high interview volume. Some interviewing officers scan
applicants' fingerprints at the time of the interview, so the interview
ends before the IDENT response has been returned from DHS. One consular
officer is designated to review the IDENT responses for all of the
applicants, and interviewing officers may not see IDENT information on the
applicants they interview. In some cases, the designated officer
determines if the applicant should receive a visa, and in others he brings
the IDENT information back to the original interviewing officer for the
case for further review.

  Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Required on Many Aspects of Visa
  Processing and Border Security

Since September 11, 2001, we have issued reports recommending that State
and DHS work together to improve several aspects of border security and
the visa process, as described below. These reports show the importance of
joint, coordinated actions by State and DHS to maximize program
effectiveness.

US-VISIT Operating at Selected Points of Entry, but DHS Further Defining
its Operational Context

The US-VISIT program supports a multifaceted, critical mission: to help
protect approximately 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable waterways
through inspections of foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry. DHS has
deployed an initial operating capability for entry to 115 airports and 14
seaports. It has also deployed an exit capability, as a pilot, at two
airports and one seaport. Since becoming operational, DHS reports that
more than eight million foreign nationals have been processed by US-VISIT
at ports of entry, resulting in hundreds being denied entry. Its scope is
large and complex, connecting 16 existing information technology systems
in a governmentwide process involving multiple departments and agencies.19
In addition to these and other challenges, the program's operational
context, or homeland security enterprise architecture, is not yet
adequately defined.

DHS released an initial version of its enterprise architecture in
September 2003; however, we found that this architecture was missing,
either

19GAO has identified US-VISIT as a high-risk endeavor. See GAO, Homeland
Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need
to Be Addressed,

GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.; Sept. 19, 2003).

partially or completely, all the key elements expected in a well-defined
architecture, such as descriptions of business processes, information
flows among these processes, and security rules associated with these
information flows.20 DHS could benefit from such key elements to help
clarify and optimize the relationships between US-VISIT and other homeland
security programs operations, such as State's Biometric Visa Program, both
in terms of processes and the underlying information technology
infrastructure and applications. Although the biometrics program is
administered by State, it falls under the overall visa policy area of the
DHS Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, and is part of our
national homeland security mission. State officials indicated that they
are waiting for DHS to further define US-VISIT, which would help guide
State's actions on the Biometric Visa Program.

Aspects of NIV Process Require State and DHS Cooperation

Since September 11, 2001, our work has demonstrated the need for State and
DHS to work together to better address potential vulnerabilities in the
visa process. In June 2003, we identified systemic weaknesses in the visa
revocation process, many of which were the result of a failure to share
and fully utilize information. We reported that the visa revocation
process was not used aggressively to share information among agencies on
individuals with visas revoked on terrorism grounds.21 It also broke down
when these individuals had already entered the United States prior to
revocation. Immigration officials and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) were not then routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or
resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after
their visas were revoked. Therefore, we recommended that DHS, in
conjunction with the Departments of State and Justice, develop specific
policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified
of revocations based on terrorism grounds and take proper actions.

In July 2004, we followed up on our findings and recommendations regarding
interagency coordination in the visa revocation process and found that
State and DHS had taken some actions in the summer of 2003 to address
these weaknesses.22 However, our review showed that some weaknesses
remained. For instance, in some cases State took a week or

20DHS plans to release an updated version of its enterprise architecture
in September 2004.

21GAO-03-798.

22GAO-04-795.

longer to notify DHS that individuals with revoked visas might be in the
country. Without these notifications, DHS may not know to investigate
those individuals. Given outstanding legal and policy issues regarding the
removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocation, we
recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State jointly
(1) develop a written governmentwide policy that clearly defines roles and
responsibilities and sets performance standards and (2) address
outstanding legal and policy issues in this area or provide Congress with
specific actions it could take to resolve them. State agreed to work
together with DHS to address these recommendations.

In February 2004, we reported that the time it takes to adjudicate a visa
for a science student or scholar depends largely on whether an applicant
must undergo a security check known as Visas Mantis, which is designed to
protect against sensitive technology transfers.23 Based on a random sample
of Visas Mantis cases for science students and scholars, we found it took
an average of 67 days for the interagency security check to be processed
and for State to notify the post. We also found that the way in which
Visas Mantis information was disseminated at headquarters made it
difficult to resolve some cases expeditiously. Finally, consular staff at
posts we visited stated that they lacked clear guidance on the Visas
Mantis program. While State and FBI officials acknowledged there had been
lengthy waits, they reported having measures under way to improve the
process and to identify and resolve outstanding Visas Mantis cases. We
recommended that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director
of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, develop and implement a
plan to improve the Visas Mantis process. We are currently reviewing the
measures these agencies have taken to improve the Visas Mantis program
made since our February report and will report on our findings at the
beginning of next year.

Overall, we have reported on a number of areas in which joint, coordinated
actions by DHS and State are needed to improve border security and visa
processing. In commenting in our report of State's biometric program, both
DHS and State have pledged their commitment to continued cooperation and
joint actions. Indeed, these agencies are currently working together as
part of the US-VISIT program. For example, State participates in two
DHS-led groups designed to oversee and manage the US-VISIT program. First,
State participates on the US-VISIT Federal

23GAO-04-371.

Conclusion

Stakeholders Advisory Board, which provides guidance and direction to the
US-VISIT program. State also participates as part of the US-VISIT
Integrated Project Team, which meets weekly to discuss, among other
things, operational issues concerning the deployment of US-VISIT.

Mr. Chairman, overall, our work has demonstrated that coordinated, joint
actions by State and DHS are critical for homeland and border security.
State and DHS have worked together to roll out the biometric technology to
consular posts worldwide on schedule. Moreover, their cooperation on
US-VISIT will be critical to ensure that information is available to
consulates to adjudicate visa applications and prevent persons from
unlawfully entering the United States. However, they have not yet provided
comprehensive guidance to the posts on how the program and biometric
information should be used to adjudicate visas. We recognize that it may
not be feasible for each post to implement biometric visas in the same
way, given the variances among posts in workload, security concerns with
the applicant pool, facilities, and personnel. However, guidance to posts
on how to best implement the program, including best practices, would
enable posts to develop operating procedures, identify resource needs, and
implement mitigating actions to address the unique circumstances at each
post.

Therefore we have recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security
and State develop and provide comprehensive guidance to consular posts on
how best to implement the Biometric Visa Program. The guidance should
address the planned uses for the information generated by the Biometric
Visa Program at consular posts including directions to consular officers
on when and how information from the IDENT database on visa applicants
should be considered. Further, we have recommended that the Secretary of
State direct consular posts to develop an implementation plan based on
this guidance. DHS generally concurred with our recommendations, stating
that GAO's identification of areas where improvements are needed in the
Biometric Visa Program will contribute to ongoing efforts to strengthen
the visa process. State acknowledged that there may be a lag in guidance.
Regarding US-VISIT, we made an earlier recommendation that the Secretary
for Homeland Security clarify the operational context in which US-VISIT is
to operate. DHS agreed with our recommendation and plans to issue the next
version of their enterprise architecture in September of 2004. This is an
essential component in establishing biometric policy and creating
consistency between the DHS-run US-VISIT program and State's Biometric
Visa program.

  Contacts and Acknowledgments

(320313)

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions you or other members of the committee may have.

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at (202)
5124128. Other key contributors to this statement include John Brummet,
Sharron Candon, Deborah Davis, Kathryn Hartsburg, David Hinchman, and
David Noone.

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