Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies	 
Related to Terrorism (22-SEP-04, GAO-04-1075T). 		 
                                                                 
In an effort to increase homeland security following the	 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the  
executive branch issued seven national strategies related to	 
combating terrorism and homeland security. Per the request of the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and	 
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform,	 
this testimony will focus primarily on the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security but also include relevant aspects of the	 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Together, these two	 
national strategies address preventing terrorist attacks within  
the United States, reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism,
and minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from	 
future attacks, if they occur. This testimony covers three	 
topics: (1) To what extent are elements of the Homeland Security 
and Combating Terrorism strategies aligned with recommendations  
issued by the 9/11 Commission? (2) What key departments have	 
responsibilities for implementing the Homeland Security strategy,
and what actions have they taken to implement the strategy? and  
(3) What challenges are faced by key departments in assessing	 
their progress towards achieving homeland security objectives?	 
This testimony continues GAO's efforts to establish baseline	 
assessments related to homeland security. Together, these	 
baseline efforts are intended to aid congressional oversight in  
assessing the effectiveness of federal homeland security	 
activities.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-1075T					        
    ACCNO:   A12692						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Observations on the National	      
Strategies Related to Terrorism 				 
     DATE:   09/22/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Crime prevention					 
	     Federal intelligence agencies			 
	     National defense operations			 
	     National policies					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Physical security					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     International relations				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     National Strategy for Combating			 
	     Terrorism						 
                                                                 
	     National Strategy for Homeland Security		 

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GAO-04-1075T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO	Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST HOMELAND SECURITY

Wednesday, September 22, 2004

          Observations on the National Strategies Related to Terrorism

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin,
Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

GAO-04-1075T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to address
national strategies related to homeland security.

We at GAO applaud the efforts of the 9/11 Commission and the dedicated
family members of the victims of that tragic day whose combined efforts
have resulted in a definitive account of the past events and 41
recommendations for the future. As the Commission notes, we are safer
today but we are not safe, and much work remains. We concur with the
Commission's conclusion that the American people should expect their
government to do its very best. We also acknowledge the efforts of earlier
congressionally chartered commissions-the Bremer, Gilmore, and Hart-Rudman
Commissions-that also analyzed terrorist incidents and government programs
and made recommendations to improve homeland security.

In an effort to increase homeland security following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the executive branch issued
seven national strategies related to combating terrorism and homeland
security. Per your request, this testimony will focus primarily on the
National Strategy for Homeland Security but also include relevant aspects
of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Together, these two
national strategies address preventing terrorist attacks within the United
States, reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the
damage and assisting in the recovery from future attacks, if they occur.

In my testimony today, I will cover three topics.

o  	To what extent are elements of the Homeland Security and Combating
Terrorism strategies aligned with recommendations issued by the 9/11
Commission?

o  	What key departments have responsibilities for implementing the
Homeland Security strategy, and what actions have they taken to implement
the strategy?

o  	What challenges are faced by key departments in assessing their
progress towards achieving homeland security objectives?

This testimony continues GAO's efforts to establish baseline assessments
related to homeland security. In February, we testified on the desired

Summary

characteristics of national strategies, and whether various strategies-
including the Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism strategies-
contained those desired characteristics.1 In March, we summarized
strategic homeland security recommendations by GAO and congressionally
chartered commissions that preceded the 9/11 Commission in issuing their
reports.2 We organized this March analysis by critical mission area, as
defined in the Homeland Security strategy. In July, we reported on GAO
recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
department's progress in implementing such recommendations.3 We organized
this July analysis by DHS directorate or division. Together, these
baseline efforts are intended to aid congressional oversight in assessing
the effectiveness of federal homeland security activities.

The 9/11 Commission issued 8 recommendations that were not addressed in
the specific initiatives for the critical mission areas of the Homeland
Security strategy or the goals and objectives of the Combating Terrorism
strategy. These recommendations pertain to enhancing analytical
capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency, reorganizing the
intelligence community, improving accountability of intelligence
operations, leadership of the Department of Defense in paramilitary
operations, continuity of national security policymaking, and modifying
congressional oversight. As the national strategies are expected to evolve
over time, they could reflect some of these recommendations. The remaining
33 Commission recommendations are aligned with the specific initiatives of
the Homeland Security strategy or the objectives of the Combating
Terrorism strategy. For example, in the area of Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats, the Commission recommended that the United States
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by expanding and
supporting existing counterproliferation initiatives. Similarly, the
Homeland Security strategy includes an initiative to prevent terrorist use
of nuclear weapons. The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the United
States engage with other nations in developing a strategy

1 GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 3, 2004).

2 GAO, Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally
Chartered Commissions and GAO, GAO-04-591 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31,
2004).

3 GAO, Status of Key Recommendations GAO Has Made to DHS and Its Legacy
Agencies, GAO-04-865R (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004).

against terrorism and an approach toward detention and humane treatment of
captured terrorists. Likewise, the Combating Terrorism strategy includes
an objective to establish and maintain an international standard and
accountability with regard to combating terrorism.

Our preliminary analysis identifies six departments-the Departments of
Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice,
and State-as having key roles in implementing the Homeland Security
strategy. These six departments represent 94 percent of the proposed $47
billion budget for homeland security in fiscal year 2005. In addition, our
preliminary analysis shows that these six departments have lead agency
roles in implementing the Homeland Security strategy. For example, DHS was
designated as the lead agency for 37 of the 43 initiatives in that
strategy. According to information received from agency officials, at
least one of these six departments has demonstrated planning and/or
implementation activities in each of the 43 initiatives. While our
preliminary analysis indicates that planning or implementation activities
were occurring, it was not within the scope of the analysis to assess the
status or quality of the various departments' activities on each
initiative. In a forthcoming report for this committee, we will provide
more detailed information on these departments' efforts, including an
analysis of lead agencies' current implementation activities.

As key departments continue to implement the Homeland Security strategy,
the development of performance goals and measures will help them assess
their progress in implementing homeland security efforts. Once they are
established, performance measures, such as costeffectiveness and net
benefits, can be used to link costs to outcomes. Development of standards,
particularly systems and service standards, will also provide an important
means to measure preparedness and guide resource investments.

Background 	Terrorism is generally defined as politically motivated
violence to coerce a government or civilian population. The term
"combating terrorism" generally refers to the full range of policies,
strategies, programs, and activities to counter terrorism both at home and
abroad. The distinction between "homeland security" and "combating
terrorism overseas" is that

federal efforts on homeland security have a domestic focus whereas
combating terrorism overseas efforts have an international focus.4

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush issued
several national strategies related to homeland security and combating
terrorism. These included the National Strategy for Homeland Security
(July 2002), the National Money Laundering Strategy (July 2002), the
National Security Strategy (September 2002), the National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002), the National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism (February 2003), the National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (February
2003), and the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003).5
This testimony focuses on the Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism
strategies.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security

The Homeland Security strategy, with a domestic focus, sets out a plan to
organize federal, state, local, and private sector organizations, on an
array of functions. The strategy organizes these functions into six
critical "mission areas":6

o  	Intelligence and Warning (which involves the collection, analysis, and
distribution of information appropriate for preempting or preventing a
terrorist attack).

o  	Border and Transportation Security (which emphasizes the efficient and
reliable flow of people, goods, and services across borders, while
deterring terrorist activity).

4 For a more detailed discussion of the definition of terrorism and
related terms, see GAO, Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and
Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat, GAO-03-165 (Washington,
D.C.: May 2003), pp. 12-15.

5 For our detailed analysis of all of these strategies, see GAO, Combating
Terrorism, Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies
Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).

6 The strategy also includes a discussion of "foundations" which we did
not identify separately in our analysis. The strategy describes these
foundations as unique American strengths that cut across all sectors of
society, such as law, science and technology, information sharing and
systems, and international cooperation. The discussion of these
foundations overlaps with the six mission areas. For example, improving
international shipping security is covered by the mission area of border
and transportation security as well as the foundation area of
international cooperation.

o  	Domestic Counterterrorism (which focuses on law enforcement efforts to
identify, halt, prevent, and prosecute terrorists in the United States.).

o  	Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (which stresses
securing the nation's individual pieces and interconnecting systems that,
if disrupted, may cause significant damage to the nation).

o  	Defending Against Catastrophic Threats (which emphasizes the
detection, deterrence, and mitigation of terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction).

o  	Emergency Preparedness and Response (which focuses on damage
minimization and recovery from terrorist attacks).

The Homeland Security strategy also identifies "major initiatives" to be
addressed within each of these six mission areas. For example, within the
Intelligence and Warning critical mission area, five major initiatives are
indicated: (1) enhancing the analytic capabilities of the FBI; (2)
building new capabilities through the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Division of the proposed DHS; (3) implementing
the Homeland Security Advisory System; (4) utilizing dual-use analysis to
prevent attacks; and (5) employing "red team" techniques.7 In all, the
strategy cites 43 major initiatives across the 6 critical mission areas.

Since the Homeland Security strategy was issued in July 2002, the
President has also released 12 Homeland Security Presidential Directives
(HSPDs) that provide additional guidance related to these mission areas.
For example, HSPD-4 focuses on defending against catastrophic threats, and
HSPD-7 focuses on protecting critical infrastructure.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

The Combating Terrorism strategy, with an overseas focus, emphasizes
identifying and defusing threats before they reach the borders of the
United States. This strategy calls for fighting terrorist organizations of
global reach and reducing their scope and capabilities to the regional and
then local levels. The goal is to reduce the scope of terrorism to make it
more localized, unorganized, and relegated to the criminal domain. The
strategy seeks to accomplish this through four goals and 15 subordinate
objectives. Together, these goals comprise the "4D Strategy:"

7 Red-team techniques are those where the U.S. government would create a
team that plays the role of terrorists in terms of identifying
vulnerabilities and planning attacks.

o  	Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their
sanctuaries; leadership command, control, and communications; material
support; and finances.

o  	Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorist by
ensuring that other states accept their responsibilities to take actions
against these international threats within their sovereign territory.

o  	Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by
enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources
on the areas most at risk.

o  	Defend the United States, its citizens, and its interests at home and
abroad by both proactively protecting the homeland and extending defenses
to identify and neutralize the threat as early as possible.

Congressionally Chartered Congress, because of concerns about terrorism in
recent years, chartered

Commissions 	four commissions to examine terrorist threats and the
government's response to such threats, as well as to make recommendations
to federal, state, local, and private organizations. These commissions
included:

o  	The Bremer Commission (the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired
by Ambassador Paul Bremer), which issued its report in June 2000.

o  	The Gilmore Commission (the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired
by Governor James S. Gilmore, III), which issued its final report in
December 2003.

o  	The Hart-Rudman Commission (the U.S. Commission on National
Security/21st Century, chaired by Senators Gary Hart and Warren B.
Rudman), which issued its final report in February 2001.

o  	The 9/11 Commission (the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, chaired by Governor Thomas H. Kean), which issued its
final report in July 2004.

The 9/11 Commission was established by Congress on November 27, 2002, to
(1) investigate the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; (2) identify, review, and
evaluate lessons learned from these attacks; and (3) report to the
President and Congress on findings, conclusions, and recommendations that
generate from the investigation and review. The Commission's
investigations were

to focus on intelligence agencies; law enforcement agencies; diplomacy;
immigration, nonimmigrant visas, and border control; the flow of assets to
terrorist organizations; commercial aviation; the role of congressional
oversight and resource allocation; and other areas of the public and
private sectors determined to be relevant by the Commission for its
inquiry. As a result of its work, the 9/11 Commission issued a report on
July 22, 2004, which included 41 primary recommendations8 for improvements
in the United States' approach to securing the homeland and combating
terrorism.

Of the 41 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, 30 are strategic in
the sense that they are broad in focus and implementation would require
coordination across multiple departments, levels of government, and
sectors. Examples of such recommendations are tracking terrorist financing
and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In
contrast, 8 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission are agencyspecific
and could be addressed in a single agency's implementation plan. The
departments and agencies targeted by these recommendations are DHS, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). For example, the Commission recommended that DOD and
its oversight committees regularly assess the adequacy of Northern
Command's strategies and planning and that the FBI should establish a
specialized and integrated national security workforce. The remaining 3
recommendations are foreign-country-specific. For example, the 9/11
Commission recommended that the U.S. support Pakistan's government in its
struggle against extremists, with a comprehensive effort that extends from
military aid to support for better education. While some of the 9/11
Commission's recommendations are specific to an individual agency,
department, or foreign country, the national strategies guide agencies in
their implementation of homeland security efforts, whether these efforts
are collaborative or individual, broad or specific. Therefore, we have
included all of the Commission's recommendations in our comparative
analysis with the national strategies.

8 We define "primary recommendations" as those recommendations that were
highlighted in bold and specifically identified as a recommendation in the
9/11 Commission report.

Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the 9/11 Commission recommendations are
aligned with the national strategies, we took a number of steps. We looked
at each of the primary 9/11 Commission recommendations in the context of
one or more of the six mission areas of the Homeland Security strategy.
Then, to the extent appropriate, we matched each recommendation with one
or more of the major initiatives for each mission area. For those
recommendations that were not associated with any of the mission areas, we
determined the extent to which these recommendations were covered in the
objectives of the Combating Terrorism strategy. Our detailed analysis
first focused on the Homeland Security strategy because it is more
comprehensive in describing its purpose, scope, and objectives than the
Combating Terrorism strategy.

To determine what key departments have implementation responsibilities for
the Homeland Security strategy, we examined the latest available homeland
security funding data for federal agencies. We then selected the six
departments with the largest proposed homeland security budgets- DHS, DOD,
the Department of Energy (Energy), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of State
(State)-which together account for 94 percent of the President's proposed
$47 billion budget for homeland security in fiscal year 2005.
Additionally, we reviewed the language in the Homeland Security strategy
and HSPDs to determine whether these departments had been designated as
"lead agencies" in implementing the initiatives. We then determined
whether the six key federal departments addressed these 43 strategy
initiatives in their planning and implementation activity by conducting a
review of each department's high-level strategic planning documents
related to homeland security. As part of this analysis, we determined
whether each department was specifically engaged in conducting planning
and implementation activities related to each of the 43 initiatives. We
provided the results of our analyses to officials from the various
departments for their verification. Departments provided the data during
fiscal year 2004; however, we did not conduct our own audit to verify the
accuracy of the data or the progress of particular activities. Nor did we
assess the status, extent or quality of the work being planned or
implemented, as it was not in the scope of our engagement. We further
recognize that the departments may continue to plan and implement at least
some of their strategies and programs through the remainder of fiscal year
2004, resulting in a change in findings over time.

To determine the challenges faced by key departments in measuring progress
in implementing homeland security efforts, we reviewed and

The National Strategies Are Generally Aligned with the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations

summarized our products related to strategic planning and performance
measurement.

We conducted our work between February and September 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

While we would not expect to see a direct correlation between the national
strategies' objectives and the 9/11 Commission recommendations, it is
nevertheless helpful to examine them side-by-side, to ascertain whether
there is some alignment.

Although the Commission's recommendations are broadly aligned with the two
strategies, 8 of the 41 recommendations are not addressed in the specific
initiatives of the critical mission areas of the Homeland Security
strategy or the objectives of the Combating Terrorism strategy. For
example, the 9/11 Commission recommendations suggest enhancing the
analytical capabilities of the CIA and reorganizing the intelligence
community- initiatives that are not identified in either strategy.9 Table
1 lists these 8 recommendations.

9 In August 2004, the President issued a series of executive orders
related to the management of the intelligence community and sharing
terrorist information. We have not evaluated the extent to which these
orders address the 9/11 Commission recommendations.

Table 1: 9/11 Commission Recommendations that are Not Addressed in the
Mission Area Initiatives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security or
the Objectives of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

"The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the CIA's analytic
capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine service by building its
human intelligence capabilities; (c) developing a stronger language
program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives; (d)
renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations officers so
they can blend more easily in foreign cities; (e) ensuring a seamless
relationship between human source collection and signals collection at the
operational level; and (f) stressing a better balance between unilateral
and liaison operations."

"We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of national government
organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning
and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies.
The head of the NCTC should have authority to evaluate the performance of
the people assigned to the Center."

"The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be
replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of
responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific
subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the
national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to
it."

"Finally, to combat the secrecy and complexity we have described, the
overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and
to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret. Congress should
pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence, defending the broad
allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been assigned
among the varieties of intelligence work."

"Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations,
whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department.
There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training,
direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the
Special Operations Command."

"Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice, we
should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national security
policymaking during the change of administrations by accelerating the
process for national security appointments. We think the process could be
improved significantly so transitions can work more effectively and allow
new officials to assume their new responsibilities as quickly as
possible."

"Congress should create a single principal point of oversight and review
for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what
committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties.
But we believe that Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the
House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent
standing committee with nonpartisan staff."

"Congressional oversight for intelligence - and counterterrorism - is now
dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem. We have considered
various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single committee in each house of
Congress, combining authorization and appropriating authorities, is
another."

          Source: GAO analysis of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.

Of the remaining 33 initiatives, 22 are aligned with at least one
initiative related to the critical mission areas of the Homeland Security
strategy and 11 were aligned with at least one of the objectives of the
Combating Terrorism strategy. For example, the 9/11 Commission recommended
that a specialized and integrated national security workforce be
established at the FBI in order to enhance the agency's expertise in
intelligence and national security. Similarly, the Homeland Security
strategy includes initiatives regarding the restructuring and enhanced
capabilities of the FBI. The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the
United States provide economic and development support to Muslim nations
to help prevent the use of these nations as terrorist sanctuaries.
Likewise, one of the objectives of the Combating Terrorism strategy is to
strengthen weak states and prevent the emergence or reemergence of
terrorism.

While the Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism strategies are aligned
with the vast majority of recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, the
additional recommendations may be considered in future updates of the
national strategies.

Preliminary Results Indicate Key Federal Departments Have Initiated Planning and
Implementation of Homeland Security Strategy Initiatives

We identified six departments-DOD, Energy, HHS, DHS, DOJ, and State-as
having key roles in implementing the Homeland Security strategy. As shown
in figure 1, these six departments have the highest level of funding and
together comprise 94 percent of the proposed $47 billion budget for
homeland security in fiscal year 2005. While not shown in figure 1, these
departments also dominate funding for most of the individual homeland
security mission areas. For example, DHS features prominently across all
critical mission areas, representing the majority of funding requested in
intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, and
emergency preparedness and response, as well as substantial portions of
the budget submissions for domestic counterterrorism, critical
infrastructure protection, and catastrophic threat defense. Similarly,
three of these departments comprise the majority of funding requested in
three mission areas, respectively - DOJ in domestic counterterrorism, DOD
in critical infrastructure protection, and HHS in catastrophic threat
defense.

Figure 1. Proposed Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding by Federal
Department (budget authority in millions of dollars)

Note: Other agencies includes the Departments of Agriculture ($651
million), Veterans Affairs ($297 million), Transportation ($243 million),
Commerce ($150 million), and Treasury ($87 million), as well as the
National Science Foundation ($344 million), National Aeronautics and Space
Administration ($207 million), Social Security Administration ($155
million), Environmental Protection Agency ($97 million), U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers ($84 million), General Services Administration ($80 million),
and several smaller agencies.

Our preliminary analysis of these six departments reinforced their
position as key players because they have lead agency roles in
implementing the Homeland Security strategy. Specifically, the strategy
and HSPDs designate the six departments as lead agencies for particular
initiatives (or functions within the initiatives). DHS was clearly the
most important department for implementation because it was designated as
a lead agency for 37 of the 43 initiatives in the Homeland Security
strategy. The other 5 departments were also designated as a lead as
follows-DOJ (a lead on 9

initiatives); HHS and State (each a lead on 5 initiatives); DOD (a lead on
4 initiatives); and Energy (a lead on 3 initiatives).

While we consider the designation of lead agencies as a positive step in
establishing accountability, 14 of the 43 initiatives have multiple lead
agencies. This indicates that interagency coordination of roles and
activities will be important, particularly on those initiatives involving
multiple leads (e.g., domestic counterterrorism and critical
infrastructure protection).

Based on our preliminary analysis, it appears that the six key departments
have incorporated the Homeland Security strategy's initiatives in their
strategic planning and implementation activities. Our initial analysis
shows that all 43 of the strategy's initiatives were included in some of
the activities implemented by the six departments; however, we have not
assessed the status, extent, or quality of the various departments'
activities on each initiative, as it was not in the scope of our review.
All five Intelligence and Warning initiatives have been covered by at
least one department in each of the initiatives. There are six initiatives
under the Border and Transportation Security mission area, each addressed
by at least two departments' planning or implementation activities.
Domestic Counterterrorism has six initiatives, each of which are covered
by at least one department's planning or implementation activities. The
strategy identifies eight initiatives under the Protecting Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets mission area, in which each of the
initiatives are addressed by at least four departments. There are six
initiatives under the Defending Against Catastrophic Threats mission area;
all of the initiatives feature planning or implementation activities by at
least two departments. For the Emergency Preparedness and Response mission
area, the strategy identifies 12 initiatives with coverage of each
initiative by at least one department's activities. In a forthcoming
report for this committee, we will provide more detailed information on
these departments' efforts, including an analysis of current
implementation activities.

Development of Performance Goals and Measures May Assist Key Agencies in
Assessing Progress Towards Implementing Homeland Security Efforts

Developing clear performance measures and standards for implementing the
Homeland Security strategy is important for agencies to assess their
progress in achieving their mission-related goals and objectives. However,
as we stated in an earlier testimony, the strategy's initiatives often do
not provide a baseline set of performance goals and measures upon which to
assess and improve preparedness.10 Thus, is it a challenge for the nation
to ensure both a successful and a fiscally responsible preparedness
effort.

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) required federal
agencies to develop strategic plans with long-term, outcomeoriented goals
and objectives, annual goals linked to achieving the longterm goals, and
annual reports on the results achieved.

We identified strategic planning as one of the critical success factors
for new organizations.11 For example, as part of its implementation phase,
we noted that DHS should engage in strategic planning through the
involvement of stakeholders, assessment of internal and external
environments, and an alignment of activities, core processes, and
resources to support mission-related outcomes. We are currently reviewing
DHS's first strategic plan to, among other things, assess the extent to
which it reflects GPRA requirements and supports the Homeland Security
strategy.

Additionally, we have reported that expanding agency use of performance
measures that link costs to outcomes is important. However, we have found
that agencies are generally weak on linking costs to performance, whether
through measures such as cost-effectiveness, net benefits, or others. Such
measures are broadly required for planning regulatory and investment
decisions but are seldom used to evaluate actual performance, even though
the planning documents can sometimes provide a basis to compare forecasts
and actual outcomes.12 The Congressional Committee report on the
establishment of GPRA devoted considerable attention on links between
performance and cost.

10 GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key
to Success, GAO-02-1011T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2002).

11 GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues,
GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).

12 For example, OMB Circulars A-11 and A-94.

To find an example of the need for baseline performance goals and measures
we need look no further than the nation's efforts at emergency
preparedness and response. We have reported that there is not yet a
comprehensive set of preparedness standards for measuring first responder
capacities, identifying gaps in those capacities, and measuring progress
in achieving performance goals. Additionally, in our past work on
bioterrorism preparedness,13 we reported that state and local officials
were concerned about the lack of specific standards for measuring
preparedness, and these officials noted that specific benchmarks would
help them determine whether they were adequately prepared to respond to a
bioterrorism incident. Moreover, in our past work on interoperable
communications,14 we discussed the need to establish national
interoperability performance goals and standards. Finally, we have
reported on the lack of reliable information on existing federal, state,
and local capabilities for combating terrorism and the need to develop a
comprehensive inventory of existing capabilities. Without standards linked
to such capabilities, it will be a challenge to assess preparedness gaps
and efforts to address the gaps.15

Since homeland security relies upon the coordinated actions of federal,
state, local governments, and the private sector-and, in many cases, upon
"layers" of defenses-a challenge exists in measuring progress across
numerous dimensions. Systems and services standards-which focus on the
performance, design, and overall management of processes and
activities-hold great potential to both improve coordination across such
dimensions and enhance measurement of continued preparedness. Such
standards could assist in overcoming challenges in identifying
interdependencies, defining roles and relationships, assigning
responsibilities, and linking federal, state, and local governments, and
the private sector in a measurable, dependable, and reliable manner. The
private sector already sets standards within various business chains, such

13 GAO, Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local
Jurisdictions, GAO-03-373 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2003).

14 GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental
Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable
Communications, GAO-04-963T (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004) and Homeland
Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable Communications for First
Responders, GAO-04-231T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2003).

15 GAO, Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to
Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region,
GAO-04-904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004).

as in the design, raw materials, supply, manufacture, sales, delivery, and
customer support chain. Within homeland security process chains, standards
will be essential to overcome the challenge of assuring the stability and
reliability of all links in the interdependent business chains of all
involved parties responsible for homeland security.

Standards can also aid in identifying and fixing fragile links that could
lead to particularly catastrophic cascading events, such as widespread
power outages or domino effect impacts on food supply or product
distribution systems. Systems, services, and management standards can also
help clarify the important roles each organization, level of government,
and public or private sector plays in improving homeland security.
Standards will factor in costs, legal, jurisdictional and other
constraints, and identify ways to imbed homeland security principles into
business and government systems in ways compatible with other important
social and economic goals. Standards will also enable more effective
oversight by providing means to measure preparedness and guide resource
investments.16

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We look forward to
providing you with a more detailed report on department plans, activities
and challenges regarding the implementation of the Homeland Security
strategy. I will now be pleased to respond to any questions that you or
other members of the committee have.

For further information about this testimony, please contact Norman J.
Rabkin at 202-512-8777. Other key contributors to this statement were
Stephen L. Caldwell, Kristy N. Brown, Jared Hermalin, Wayne A. Ekblad,
Ricardo Marquez, and Amy Bernstein.

16 GAO, Homeland Security: The Need for National Standards, Statement of
Randall Yim, Managing Director, National Preparedness, Homeland Security
and Justice, before The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States. (Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003).

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements

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