U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of
Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain	 
(23-AUG-04, GAO-04-1061T).					 
                                                                 
Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9/11 suggested that many  
or most people had a favorable view of the United States and its 
fight against terrorism. By 2003, opinion research indicated that
foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim	 
populations, viewed the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two
studies in 2003 that examined (1) changes in U.S. public	 
diplomacy resources and programs since September 11, 2001, within
the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of	 
Governors (BBG); (2) the U.S. government's strategies for its	 
public diplomacy programs and measures of effectiveness; and (3) 
the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy	 
efforts. GAO made several recommendations to State and the BBG to
address planning and performance issues. Both agencies agreed	 
with these recommendations and have made some progress in	 
implementing them. On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released
its report and recommendations. Two of the Commission's 	 
recommendations relate to the management of U.S. public 	 
diplomacy. For this testimony, GAO was asked to discuss its prior
work as it relates to these recommendations.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-1061T					        
    ACCNO:   A11892						        
  TITLE:     U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting 
Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain
     DATE:   08/23/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign languages					 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International relations				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Public diplomacy					 
	     Radio broadcasting 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Dept. of State Diplomatic Readiness		 
	     Initiative 					 
                                                                 

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GAO-04-1061T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Monday, August 23, 2004

State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post9/11 Efforts but
                               Challenges Remain

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade

GAO-04-1061T

Highlights of GAO-04-1061T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations;
Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives

Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9/11 suggested that many or most
people had a favorable view of the United States and its fight against
terrorism. By 2003, opinion research indicated that foreign publics,
especially in countries with large Muslim populations, viewed the United
States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined (1)
changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September
11, 2001, within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board
of Governors (BBG); (2) the U.S. government's strategies for its public
diplomacy programs and measures of effectiveness; and (3) the challenges
that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts.

GAO made several recommendations to State and the BBG to address planning
and performance issues. Both agencies agreed with these recommendations
and have made some progress in implementing them.

On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its report and
recommendations. Two of the Commission's recommendations relate to the
management of U.S. public diplomacy. For this testimony, GAO was asked to
discuss its prior work as it relates to these recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1061T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)
512-4128 or [email protected].

August 23, 2004

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts
but Challenges Remain

Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts
in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in
the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia
and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger
audiences-particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. These
initiatives are consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that
the United States rebuild its scholarship, library, and exchange programs
overseas. Since 9/11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused
on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa
and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio
Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. The 9/11 Commission report highlights
these broadcast efforts and recommends that funding for such efforts be
expanded.

While State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on
terrorism, we found that there is no interagency strategy to guide
State's, BBG's, and other federal agencies' communication efforts. The
absence of such a strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent
messages to overseas audiences. Likewise, the 9/11 Commission recommended
that the United States do a better job defining its public diplomacy
message. In addition, we found that State does not have a strategy that
integrates and aligns all its diverse public diplomacy activities. State,
noting the need to fix the problem, recently established a new office of
strategic planning for public diplomacy. The BBG did have a strategic
plan, but the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program
objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the
key focus of its plan. We also found that State and the BBG were not
systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of
reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the
United States. The BBG subsequently made audience size a key performance
goal and added broadcaster credibility and plans to add other performance
measures that GAO recommended.

In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying
out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public
diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language
proficiency. State officials are trying to address staffing gaps through
increased recruitment. The BBG also faces a number of media market,
organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to
generate large audiences in priority markets. It has developed a number of
solutions to address these challenges.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's issued work on U.S. public
diplomacy efforts and to focus specifically on the Middle East and related
recommendations by the 9/11 Commission report. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of
cultivating a favorable public opinion of the United States abroad. Recent
opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries
with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. Last
September, we reported to the House International Relations Committee on
the State Department's public diplomacy efforts.1 In July 2003, we issued
a report for that committee on the progress that the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG)-the agency responsible for nonmilitary U.S. international
broadcasting-has made in developing a new strategic approach to reverse
declining audience trends and support U.S. strategic objectives such as
the war on terrorism.2 The Department of State and the BBG share an annual
budget of more than $1 billion for public diplomacy activities. While
neither of our reports focused exclusively on the Middle East, each
identified systemic problems that would apply to public diplomacy
activities there.

Mr. Chairman, on February 10, 2004, I testified before you and this
Subcommittee on public diplomacy.3 Today, I will present a similar
statement updated in light of the 9/11 Commission recommendations on
public diplomacy. I will address (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy
resources and programs since September 11, 2001; (2) the government's
strategies for its public diplomacy programs and measures of
effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public
diplomacy efforts. My testimony will highlight our findings that are
relevant to specific 9/11 Commission recommendations to (1) rebuild our
scholarship, exchange, and library programs overseas, and increase

1GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces
Significant Challenges, GAO-03-951 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2003).

2GAO, U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on
Reaching Large Audience but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives,
GAO-03-772 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).

3GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board
of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant
Challenges, GAO-04435T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2004).

support for broadcasting to Arabs and Muslims; and (2) better define the
U.S.'s public diplomacy message.

As part of our past work underpinning our issued reports, we surveyed top
officials of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide on such
issues as guidance from various State Department offices; sufficiency of
budgetary, staff, and other resources; and ability to adequately measure
performance.4 We met with relevant State officials, members of the BBG,
and senior members of each broadcast entity to discuss management issues.
We also met with academics specializing in public diplomacy and
international affairs issues, and private sector officials from U.S.
public relations and opinion research firms with international operations.
While several government entities conduct public diplomacy activities, my
comments will focus on State's and BBG's efforts since they were the
subject of our work. We conducted our work from May 2002 to May 2003 and
in August 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

Summary 	Since September 11, 2001, both State and the BBG have expanded
their public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to
be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. In the 2 fiscal years
since the terrorist attacks, State has increased its public diplomacy
funding and staffing and expanded its programs in two regions with
significant Muslim populations-South Asia and the Near East. Among other
efforts, State is emphasizing exchange programs targeting young and
diverse audiences, including high school students. State is also expanding
its American Corners program, which provides information about the United
States to foreign audiences through partnerships between U.S. embassies
and local institutions. These efforts are consistent with the 9/11
Commission report recommendation that the United States rebuild its
scholarship, exchange, and library programs for young people. In addition,
since September 11, 2001, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has
initiated several new programs focusing on attracting larger audiences in
priority markets, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East, the Afghanistan
Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. Estimated start-up and recurring
costs for these three projects through fiscal year 2003 totaled about $116
million. The Board also launched an Arabic language television network
(Alhurra) in

4GAO surveyed 156 public affairs officers from March through May 2003; of
these, 118 responded for a 76-percent response rate.

mid-February 2004. The 9/11 Commission report endorses Board requests for
additional resources to expand its broadcast efforts targeted at Arabs and
Muslims. However, although Board research indicates that these initiatives
have garnered sizeable audiences, it is unclear whether program content is
changing audience attitudes or increasing knowledge and awareness of
issues of strategic interest to the United States.

In September 2003, GAO reported that that the U.S. government lacks an
interagency public diplomacy strategy that defines the messages and means
for governmentwide communication efforts targeted at overseas audiences.
Likewise, the 9/11 Commission report recommended that the United States do
a better job of defining its public diplomacy message. Because of their
differing roles and missions, the State Department, Department of Defense,
USAID, and others often focus on different audiences and use varying means
to communicate with them. An interagency strategy would provide a
framework for considering the foreign publics in key countries and
regions, the relevant U.S. national security interests there, the U.S.
government communication channels available, and optimal ways to convey
the desired communication themes and messages. We also reported that State
does not have a strategy that integrates its diverse public diplomacy
activities and directs them toward common objectives, and that neither
State nor the BBG has focused on measuring progress toward long-term
goals. The absence of an integrated strategy may hinder State's ability to
channel its multifaceted programs toward concrete and measurable progress.
Finally, State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring
progress toward its public diplomacy goals and thus has a limited ability
to correct its course of action or direct resources toward activities that
offer a greater likelihood of success. In comparison, the Broadcasting
Board of Governors in July 2001 initiated a 5-year strategic approach to
international broadcasting known as "Marrying the Mission to the Market,"
which emphasizes the need to reach large audiences by applying modern
broadcast techniques and strategically allocating resources to focus on
high-priority broadcast markets, such as the Middle East. However, we
found that this plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program
objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size.
Further, there were no measurable program objectives to support the plan's
strategic goals or to provide a basis for assessing the Board's
performance with regard to changing audience views toward the United
States.

In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying
out their programs. According to public affairs officers at the State
Department, these challenges include insufficient resources to effectively

conduct public diplomacy and a lack of public diplomacy officers with
foreign language proficiency. More than 40 percent of the public affairs
officers we surveyed said that the time available to devote exclusively to
public diplomacy tasks was insufficient, and more than 50 percent reported
that the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform such
tasks was inadequate. Further, about 21 percent of the officers posted
overseas in language designated positions have not attained the level of
language speaking proficiency required for their positions, hampering
their ability to engage with foreign publics. In addition, about 58
percent of the heads of embassy public affairs sections reported that
Foreign Service officers do not have adequate time for training in the
skills required to effectively conduct public diplomacy. The Broadcasting
Board of Governors also faces resource issues, as well as a number of
media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its
efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. These challenges
include outmoded programs and poor signal quality; the disparate structure
of the agency, which consists of seven separate broadcast entities and a
mix of federal and grantee organizations collectively managed by a
part-time Board; and the resource-intensive job of broadcasting 97
language services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. The Board
has developed a number of solutions to address these challenges.

GAO made several recommendations addressing planning and performance
issues that the Secretary of State and the BBG have agreed to implement.
GAO recommended that State develop a strategy that considers the use of
private sector public relations techniques to integrate its public
diplomacy efforts, improve performance measurement, and strengthen efforts
to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages and public
diplomacy. Among GAO's recommendations to the BBG were that the Board
revise its strategic plan to include audience size and other key
measurable program objectives, implementation strategies, resource
requirements, and project time frames, as well as a clear vision of the
Board's intended scope of operations, particularly plans to reduce
overlap.5 In response to our recommendation that State develop a strategy
that considers private sector techniques, State agreed, but no such
strategy has been developed to date. However, State has begun the process
of establishing a new office of strategic planning for public diplomacy.

5We reported overlap in 55 percent of the BBG's language services, meaning
more than one service was reaching the same target audience in the same
language.

Regarding our recommendation to strengthen performance measurement
efforts, State officials said that they are exploring ways to do so and
State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has, among other
things, begun conducting limited pre-and post-testing of its program
participants' understanding of the United States. State acknowledged the
need to strengthen training of Foreign Service officers and told us that
the primary obstacle to doing so is insufficient staffing to allow time
for training. Officials said they have already begun to address staffing
gaps by stepping up recruitment efforts as part of the Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative. In response to our recommendations to the BBG, the
Board has revised its strategic plan to create a single strategic goal of
maximizing impact in priority areas of interest and has made audience size
a key performance measure. The Board has added broadcast credibility and
audience awareness to its array of performance measures and plans to add a
measure to determine whether its broadcasting entities are achieving their
mission. Finally, the Board recently completed a review of language
service overlap that identified about $9.7 million in potential savings.
However, the Board has yet to revise its strategic plan to include details
on implementation strategies, resource requirements, and project time
frames for the various initiatives supporting its strategic goal of
maximizing program impact.

The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and
influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a
wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print,
broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, U.S.
public diplomacy focused on foreign elites-current and future overseas
opinion leaders, agenda setters, and decision makers. However, the
dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have forced
a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider techniques
for communicating with broader foreign audiences. The BBG, as the overseer
of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, supports U.S. public
diplomacy's key objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate information
about the United States, while maintaining its journalistic independence
as a news organization. The BBG manages and oversees the Voice of America
(VOA), WorldNet Television, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Radio Farda, the Middle East Television Network (which consists
of Radio Sawa and Alhurra, the Board's new Arabic language television
station), the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Free Asia. Radio Sawa,
Alhurra, and Radio Farda (Iran), provide regional and local news to
countries in the Middle East.

  Background

Together, State and the BBG spend in excess of $1 billion on public
diplomacy programs each year. State's public diplomacy budget totaled an
estimated $628 million in fiscal year 2004. About 51 percent, or $320
million, is slated for the Fulbright and other educational and cultural
exchange programs. The remainder covers mostly salaries and expenses
incurred by State and embassy officers engaged in information
dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, speaker programs,
publications, and other activities. BBG's budget for fiscal year 2004 is
$546 million. This includes more than $42 million for radio and television
broadcasting to the Middle East. Since initiating the language service
review process in 1999, the Board has reduced the scope of operations of
more than 25 language services and reallocated about $19.7 million in
funds, with the majority redirected toward Central Asia and the Middle
East, including $8 million for Radio Farda service to Iran.

Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Public Diplomacy Budget Resources for State
Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2003
Estimates

aEstimate includes $11 million for Radio Sawa. bEstimate includes $3
million for Radio Farda.

  More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim-Majority Countries

Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its efforts in Muslimmajority
countries that are considered strategically important in the war on
terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and number of
Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern
Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives targeting
broader, younger audiences-particularly in predominantly Muslim
countries-that include expanding exchange programs targeting citizens of
Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies in the war
on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims share certain
values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to support the war on
terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio
Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. In addition, the Board
expanded its presence in the Middle East through the launch of the Alhurra
satellite television network in mid-February 2004. The 9/11 Commission
recommended that the United States rely on such programs and activities to
vigorously defend our ideals abroad, just as the United States did during
the Cold War.

State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East

Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its resources
and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim countries.
For example, while State's bureau of Europe and Eurasia still receives the
largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest
percentage increases in such resources since September 11 occurred in
State's bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs, where many
countries have significant Muslim populations.6 Public diplomacy funding
increased in South Asia from $24 million to $39 million and in the Near
East from $39 million to $62 million, or by 63 and 58 percent,
respectively, from fiscal year 2001 through 2003. During the same period,
authorized American Foreign Service officers in South Asia increased from
27 to 31 and in the Near East from 45 to 57, or by 15 percent and 27
percent, respectively.

Furthermore, in 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange resources
to better support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S. engagement
with Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to emphasize exchanges
with Muslim countries through its Partnership for Learning

6These countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

Program-designed to target young and diverse audiences through academic
and professional exchanges such as the Fulbright, International Visitor,
and Citizen Exchange programs. According to State, under this program, 170
high school students from predominantly Islamic countries have already
arrived and are living with American families and studying at local high
schools. State has also carried out increased exchanges through its Middle
East Partnership Initiative, which includes computer and English language
training for women newly employed by the Afghan government and a program
to assist women from Arab countries and elsewhere in observing and
discussing the U.S. electoral process. In addition, State is expanding its
American Corners program, as recommended by the Advisory Group on Public
Diplomacy in October 2003.7 This program uses space in public libraries
and other public buildings abroad to provide information about the United
States. In fiscal year 2004, State is planning to establish 58 American
Corners in the East and South Asia. In fiscal year 2005, State plans to
open 10 in Afghanistan and 15 in Iraq.

State's Office of International Information Programs has also developed
new initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including a print and
electronic pamphlet titled The Network of Terrorism, distributed in 36
languages via hard copy, the Web, and media throughout the world, which
documented the direct link between the September 11 perpetrators and al
Qaeda; and a publication titled Iraq: From Fear to Freedom to inform
foreign audiences of the administration's policies toward Iraq.

New BBG Initiatives Target Large Audiences in Priority Markets

Several of the BBG's new initiatives focus on reaching large audiences in
priority markets and supporting the war on terrorism. The first of these
programs, Radio Sawa in the Middle East, was launched in March 2002 using
modern, market-tested broadcasting techniques and practices, such as the
extensive use of music formats. Radio Sawa replaced the poorly performing
VOA Arabic service, which had listening rates at around 2 percent of the
population. According to BBG survey research, Radio Sawa is reaching 51
percent of its target audience and is ranked highest for news and news
trustworthiness in Amman, Jordan. Despite such results, it remains unclear
how many people Radio Sawa reaches throughout the entire Middle East
because audience research has been performed only in

7Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World,
Changing Minds Winning Peace (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2003).

  Planning Deficiencies, Inability to Gauge Progress Toward Goals Hinder U.S.
  Public Diplomacy Efforts

selected markets. Further, the State Inspector General and the Advisory
Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have raised
questions about whether Radio Sawa has focused more on audience size and
composition than on potential impact on attitudes in the region. The BBG
has also launched the Afghanistan Radio Network and a language service to
Iran called Radio Farda. Estimated costs for these three initiatives
through fiscal year 2003 are about $116 million. In addition, the Board
started Alhurra, an Arabic language television network in the Middle East,
in mid-February 2004.

While the growth in programs to the Muslim world marks the recognition of
the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population, there still
is no interagency strategy to guide State's and all federal agencies'
communication efforts and ensure consistent messages to overseas
audiences. In addition, as of June 2004, State still lacked a
comprehensive and commonly understood public diplomacy strategy to guide
its programs. We agree with the 9/11 Commission recommendation that the
U.S. government must define its message. State also is not systematically
or comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals.
In addition, we found that , although BBG has a strategic plan, the plan
lacks a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the
Board's success in increasing audience size. Further, the BBG's plan
contains no measurable program objectives to support the plan's strategic
goals or to provide a basis for assessing the Board's performance. Since
our report, however, the Board revised its strategic plan and has improved
its ability to gauge its program effectiveness measures by adding
broadcast credibility and audience awareness measures. The Board also
plans to add additional performance measures, such as whether broadcast
entities are achieving their mandated missions.

Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy Has Not Been Established

No interagency public diplomacy strategy has been implemented that lays
out the messages and means for governmentwide communication efforts to
overseas audiences. The absence of an interagency strategy complicates the
task of conveying consistent messages and thus achieving mutually
reinforcing benefits. State officials told us that, without such a
strategy, the risk of making communication mistakes that are damaging to
U.S. public diplomacy efforts is high. They also said that the lack of a
strategy diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide
public diplomacy efforts.

Our fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance of
interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a very
small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of U.S.
assistance provided to their countries. Egypt is the second largest
recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance totaling more
than an estimated $1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to Morocco totaled more
than $13 million in 2003.

Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in
recent years. Immediately after September 11, 2001, the White House, State
Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated various
public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White House
established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One such
mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information Centers in
Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early stages of U.S.
military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were designed to
provide a rapid response capability for correcting inaccurate news
stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to generate negative
responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news favorable to U.S.
efforts.

In January 2003, the President established a more permanent coordination
mechanism, the White House Office of Global Communications, which is
intended to coordinate strategic communications from the U.S. government
to overseas audiences. The President also established the Strategic
Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by the State
Department and the National Security Council and to work closely with the
Office of Global Communications, to ensure interagency coordination in
disseminating the U.S. message across the globe. Although it is the
committee's long-term objective to develop a National Communications
Strategy, according to recent conversations with U.S. officials, the
committee has not met since March 2003.8

8In July 2004, the State Department established the Policy Coordinating
Committee on Muslim World Outreach, according to State officials. This
Committee has taken on much of the role of the Strategic Communication
Policy Coordinating Committee.

State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide Public Diplomacy
Operations

After September 11, State acknowledged the need for a strategy that
integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them
toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is still in the
development stage. State officials told us that such a strategy is
particularly important because State's public diplomacy operation is
fragmented among the various organizational entities within the agency.
Public affairs officers who responded to our survey indicated that the
lack of a strategy has hindered their ability to effectively execute
public diplomacy efforts overseas. More than 66 percent of public affairs
officers in one region reported that the quality of strategic guidance
from the Office of the Undersecretary at the time of our review
(10/01-3/03) was generally insufficient or very insufficient. More than 40
percent in another region reported the same. We encountered similar
complaints during our overseas fieldwork. For example, in Morocco, the
former public affairs officer stated that so little information had been
provided from Washington on State's post-September 11 public diplomacy
strategy that he had to rely on newspaper articles and guesswork to
formulate his incountry public diplomacy plans.

During our audit work, we learned that private sector public relations
efforts and political campaigns use sophisticated strategies to integrate
complex communication efforts involving multiple players. Although State's
public diplomacy efforts extend beyond the activities of public relations
firms, many of the strategic tools that such firms employ are relevant to
State's situation. While it is difficult to establish direct links between
public diplomacy programs and results, other U.S. government agencies and
the private sector have best practices for assessing information
disseminating campaigns, including the need to define success and how it
should be measured. Executives from some of the largest public relations
firms in the United States told us that initial strategic decisions
involve establishing the scope and nature of the problem, identifying the
target audience, determining the core messages, and defining both success
and failure. Subsequent steps include conducting research to validate the
initial decisions, testing the core messages, carrying out pre-launch
activities, and developing information materials. Each of these elements
contains numerous other steps that must be completed before implementing a
tactical program. Further, progress must be measured continuously and
tactics adjusted accordingly.

State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals

We also found that State is not systematically and comprehensively
measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas
performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program
outputs, rather than gauging progress toward changing foreign publics'
understanding and attitudes about the United States. Some posts judge the
effectiveness of their public diplomacy efforts by simply counting the
number of public diplomacy activities that occur in their host country-for
example, the number of speeches given by the ambassador or the number of
news articles placed in the host-country media. While such measures shed
light on the level of public diplomacy activity, they reveal little in the
way of overall program effectiveness.

State currently has no reporting requirements in place to determine
whether posts' performance targets are actually met. At one overseas post
we visited, the post had identified polling data showing that only 22
percent of the host country's citizens had a favorable view of the United
States-a figure the post used as a baseline with yearly percentage
increases set as targets. However, a former public affairs officer at the
post told us that he did not attempt to determine or report on whether the
post had actually achieved these targets because there was no requirement
to do so. Officials at the other two overseas posts we visited also cited
the lack of any formal reporting requirement for following up on whether
they met their annual performance targets. An official in State's Office
of Strategic and Performance Planning said that they have now begun to
require posts to report on whether they have met performance targets.

Furthermore, public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not
conduct systematic program evaluations. About 79 percent of the
respondents to our survey reported that staffing at their missions was
insufficient to conduct systematic program evaluations. Many officers also
reported that staffing at posts was insufficient to carry out the
long-range monitoring required to adequately measure program
effectiveness. Even if sufficient staffing were available, State would
still have difficulty conducting long-range tracking of exchange
participants because it lacks a database with comprehensive information on
its various exchange program alumni. State had planned to begin building a
new worldwide alumni database with comprehensive data linking all of its
various exchange programs. However, Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs officials told us they had received insufficient funds to do so,
and thus are seeking to improve existing information systems for
individual exchange programs.

BBG Has Strategy for International Broadcasting and Has Made Progress in
Measuring Performance

  A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities

In contrast to State's lack of strategy, BBG has introduced a market-based
approach to international broadcasting that aims to generate large
listening audiences in priority markets that the Board believes it must
reach to effectively meet its mission. Early implementation of this
strategy has focused on markets relevant to the war on terrorism, in
particular the Middle East. The Board's vision is to create a flexible,
multimedia, research-driven U.S. international broadcasting system that
addresses the many challenges we noted in our report, including an
organizational structure that consists of several broadcast entities with
differing missions, broadcast approaches, and constituencies.

In conducting our work on the BBG strategic plan, we found that the plan
did not include a single goal or related program objective designed to
gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy
focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. We also
found that the plan lacked measurable program objectives to support its
strategic goals, including a broadcaster credibility measure. The Board
has taken several steps to address the recommendations we made in our
report. First, the Board created a single strategic goal to focus on the
key objective of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest to the
United States and made audience size a key performance measure. Second,
the Board has added broadcast credibility and plans to add the additional
performance measures we recommended, including audience awareness and
whether broadcast entities are achieving their mandated missions.

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy
resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and
the need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy
with measurable indicators of progress. There are other challenges our
government faces in executing successful public diplomacy activities.
According to public affairs officers, these challenges include
insufficient time and staffing resources to conduct public diplomacy
tasks. In addition, many public affairs officers reported that the time
available to attend public diplomacy training is inadequate. Furthermore,
a significant number of Foreign Service officers involved in public
diplomacy efforts overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. The
Board's key challenge in executing its strategy is how to generate large
audiences while dealing with a number of media market, organizational, and
resources issues.

Insufficient Time and Staff 	More than 40 percent of the public affairs
officers we surveyed reported that the amount of time they had to devote
exclusively to executing public

diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas fieldwork, officers
told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and other foreign embassy
receptions and functions within their host country capitals, it was
particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the capitals to
interact with ordinary citizens. More than 50 percent of those responding
to our survey reported that the number of Foreign Service officers
available to perform public diplomacy duties was inadequate. Although
State increased the actual number of Americans in public diplomacy
positions overseas from 414 in fiscal year 2000 to 448 in fiscal year
2002, State still had a shortfall of public diplomacy staff in 2002, based
on the projected needs identified in State's 2002 overseas staffing model.
In 2002, State's overseas staffing model projected the need for 512 staff
in these positions; however, 64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were
not filled.9 In addition, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy public
affairs sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not have
adequate time for training in the skills required to effectively conduct
public diplomacy.

We reported in 200210 that as part of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,
State has launched an aggressive recruiting program to rebuild the
department's total workforce. Under this initiative, State requested 1,158
new employees above attrition over the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002
through 2004, and according to State officials, the department has met its
hiring goals under this initiative for fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
However, it does not have numerical targets for specific skill
requirements such as language proficiency or regional expertise. Although
State officials are optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in
to address the overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the
recruiting efforts will result in the right people with the right skills
needed to meet specific critical shortfalls.

Shortfalls in Foreign Language Skills

Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many
officers. As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign Service
officers filling "language-designated" public diplomacy positions overseas
did not meet the foreign language speaking requirements of their

9State's overseas staffing model operates on a 2-year cycle. Fiscal year
2002 was the latest year for which data were available on the numbers of
positions filled.

10GAO, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment
System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2002).

positions.11 The highest percentages not meeting the requirements were in
the Near East, where 30 percent of the officers did not meet the
requirement. Although State had no language-designated positions for South
Asia, it had eight language-preferred12 positions, none of which was
filled by officers who had reading or speaking capability in those
languages. It is important to note that most of the foreign languages
required in these two regions, such as Arabic and Urdu, are considered
difficult to master. In contrast, 85 percent of the officers filling
French language-designated positions and 97 percent of those filling
Spanish language-designated ones met the requirements. Officers' opinions
on the quality of the foreign language training they received also varied
greatly by region. The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy noted this
challenge and recommended an increase in public diplomacy staff dedicated
to issues of the Arab and Muslim world, with specific emphasis on
enhancing fluency in local languages.

Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited and
other State officials told us that having fluency in a host country's
language is important for effectively conducting public diplomacy. The
foreign government officials with whom we met in Egypt, Morocco, and the
United Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in countries where English is
widely understood, speaking the host country's language demonstrates
respect for its people and its culture. In Morocco, officers in the public
affairs and other sections of the embassy told us that, because their
ability to speak Arabic was poor, they conducted most embassy business in
French. French is widely used in that country, especially in business and
government. However, embassy officers told us that speaking Arabic would
provide superior entree to the Moroccan public. The ability to speak
country-specific forms of Arabic and other more obscure dialects would
generate even more goodwill, especially outside the major cities.

According to the department, the largest and most significant factor
limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its
long-standing staffing shortfall, which State's Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative is designed

11Language-designated positions are graded for both speaking and reading
proficiency. Most officers who do not meet one requirement do not meet the
other one either, so the percentages are similar. For purposes of clarity,
our figures refer only to the requirements for speaking proficiency.

12These are positions for which language capability is preferred but not
required.

to fill. Other planned actions include bolstering efforts to recruit job
candidates with target language skills, sending language training
supervisors to posts to determine ways to improve training offerings, and
developing a new "language continuum" plan to guide efforts to meet the
need for higher levels of competency in all languages, especially those
critical to national security concerns.

Outdated Broadcast Services and Structure Pose Challenges to Expanding in
Priority Markets

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy
challenges, key among them is how to gain large audiences in priority
markets while dealing with (1) a collection of outdated and noncompetitive
language services, (2) a disparate organizational structure consisting of
seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal agency and grantee
organizations that are managed by a part-time Board of Governors, and (3)
the resource challenge of broadcasting in 97 language services to more
than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. Although its strategic plan
identifies a number of solutions to the competitive challenges the Board
faces and provides a new organizational model for U.S. international
broadcasting,13 we found that the Board's plan did not include specifics
on implementation strategies, resource requirements, project time frames,
or a clear vision of the Board's intended scope of operations. The Board
recently completed a review of the overlap issue and identified six
approaches to addressing the problem while still meeting the discrete
missions of the Voice of America and other broadcast entities. All of the
Board's overlapping services were assessed against this analytical
framework, and more than $9.7 million in potential savings for priority
initiatives were identified. However, the Board has yet to revise its
strategic plan to include details on implementation strategies, resource
requirements, and project timeframes for the various initiatives
supporting its overarching strategic goal of increasing program impact.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have
at this time.

13The Board views the separate entities as part of a "single system" under
the Board's direct control and authority.

Contacts and	For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call
Jess Ford or Diana Glod at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key
contributions to this

Acknowledgments testimony included Robert Ball, Lynn Cothern, and Michael
ten Kate.

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