FBI Transformation: Data Inconclusive on Effects of Shift to	 
Counterterrorism-Related Priorities on Traditional Crime	 
Enforcement (31-AUG-04, GAO-04-1036).				 
                                                                 
As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the  
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has committed to a	 
transformation to increase its focus on national security. The	 
FBI has shifted agent resources to its top priorities of	 
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime. Some of  
these agent resources were shifted away from drug, white-collar, 
and violent crime enforcement programs. The FBI's drug program	 
has sustained, by far, the largest reduction in FBI agent	 
workforce--about 550 positions, or more than 80 percent of the	 
nonsupervisory field agents who were permanently reprogrammed. In
addition, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily	 
redirect agents from drug, white-collar, and violent crime	 
enforcement to address counterterrorism-related workload demands.
While GAO and other organizations have focused considerable	 
attention on the progress of the FBI's transformation, this	 
report addresses questions about the extent to which the shift in
resources has affected federal efforts to combat drug,		 
white-collar, and violent crime and whether other agencies,	 
including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the drug  
enforcement area, are filling gaps created by FBI resource	 
shifts. 							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-04-1036					        
    ACCNO:   A11982						        
  TITLE:     FBI Transformation: Data Inconclusive on Effects of Shift
to Counterterrorism-Related Priorities on Traditional Crime	 
Enforcement							 
     DATE:   08/31/2004 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Crime prevention					 
	     Crimes or offenses 				 
	     Drug trafficking					 
	     Drugs						 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Labor force					 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Reductions in force				 
	     White collar crime 				 

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GAO-04-1036

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO	Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives

August 2004

FBI TRANSFORMATION

Data Inconclusive on Effects of Shift to Counterterrorism-Related Priorities on
                         Traditional Crime Enforcement

GAO-04-1036

Highlights of GAO-04-1036, a report to the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, State, and the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives

As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has committed to a transformation to
increase its focus on national security. The FBI has shifted agent
resources to its top priorities of counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
and cyber crime. Some of these agent resources were shifted away from
drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement programs. The FBI's drug
program has sustained, by far, the largest reduction in FBI agent
workforce-about 550 positions, or more than 80 percent of the
nonsupervisory field agents who were permanently reprogrammed. In
addition, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily redirect agents
from drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement to address
counterterrorism-related workload demands. While GAO and other
organizations have focused considerable attention on the progress of the
FBI's transformation, this report addresses questions about the extent to
which the shift in resources has affected federal efforts to combat drug,
whitecollar, and violent crime and whether other agencies, including the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the drug enforcement area, are
filling gaps created by FBI resource shifts.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1036.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Laurie Ekstrand at (202)
512-8777 or [email protected].

August 2004

FBI TRANSFORMATION

Data Inconclusive on Effects of Shift to Counterterrorism-Related Priorities on
Traditional Crime Enforcement

The data GAO examined are inconclusive about the effect of the shifts in
the FBI's priorities after September 11 on federal efforts to combat drug,
whitecollar, and violent crime. As the figure below shows, indicators are
mixed on the effect of the FBI shift on federal drug, white-collar, and
violent crime enforcement. Further, GAO's analyses should be cautiously
viewed as shortterm indicators that are not necessarily indicative of
long-term trends.

Inconclusive data on effects of shift to counterterrorism-related
priorities

Source: GAO.

aIncludes only nonsupervisory field agent positions directly focused on
investigations.

Data GAO examined on federal drug enforcement efforts did not show a
conclusive effect of the FBI's shift in agent resources to priority areas.
GAO found that combined FBI and DEA nonsupervisory field agent resources
decreased by about 10 percent since September 11 but that DEA is expecting
significant increases in positions over the next 2 fiscal years. The
combined number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by
about 10 percent since 2001, from 22,736 matters in fiscal year 2001,
which ended just after September 11, to 20,387 matters in fiscal year
2003. This decline may be attributed, at least in part, to an increased
emphasis on cases targeting major drug organizations rather than to fewer
investigative resources. In addition, referrals of drug matters to U.S.
Attorneys from all federal sources decreased about 2 percent.

Similarly, data do not show a conclusive impact on federal efforts to
combat white-collar and violent crime resulting from the FBI's shift in
priorities. For example, while the number of white-collar crime referrals
from federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys declined by about 6 percent, from
12,792 in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 in fiscal year 2003, violent crime
referrals from all federal sources have increased by about 29 percent,
from 14,546 in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 in fiscal year 2003.

Views of law enforcement practitioners GAO interviewed were mixed on the
effect of the FBI's shift in resources on drug, white-collar, and violent
crime enforcement efforts. Although these views are not representative of
all practitioners, some did not think the FBI's shift had a significant
impact on these crime enforcement efforts in their communities, while
others said that drug, white-collar and violent-crime investigations had
suffered.

Contents

Letter

Results in Brief
Background
No Conclusive Effect on Federal Drug Enforcement Resulting from

FBI Agent Resource Shifts because Results Are Mixed and
Available Data Have Limitations

Our Analysis Did Not Identify Conclusive Effect on Federal White-
Collar and Violent Crime Enforcement Resulting from FBI
Priority Shifts

                                       1

                                      3 4

                                       9

                                       18

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II	FBI Nonsupervisory Field Special Agent Positions and Work
Years

Appendix III	Decreases in FBI's Newly Opened Drug, White-Collar
and Violent Crime Matters Since September 11, 2001 30

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 33

GAO Contacts 33
Acknowledgments 33

Table

Table 1: Field Locations and Agencies We Visited

Figures

Figure 1: Increase in Nonsupervisory FBI Field Agent Positions
Allocated to Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and
Cyber Crime Programs 6

Figure 2: FBI Field Agent Nonsupervisory Agent Positions Allocated and
Agent Work Years Charged to the Counterterrorism Program Increased after
September 11 7

Figure 3: The FBI's Newly Opened Counterterrorism Matters

Increased after September 11 8 Figure 4: DEA Special Agent Resources Are
the Major Portion of

the Combined FBI and DEA Domestic Drug Enforcement

Program 10 Figure 5: Number of Newly Opened FBI and DEA Drug Matters

Decreased About 10 Percent from Fiscal Year 2001 to

Second Quarter Fiscal Year 2004 13 Figure 6: Referrals of Drug Matters to
U.S. Attorneys by FBI and

DEA and All Federal Agencies Slightly Decreased (Fiscal

Year 2001 to Fiscal Year 2003) 15 Figure 7: Referrals of White-Collar
Crime Matters from All Federal

Agencies Decreased About 6 Percent since September 11 19 Figure 8:
Referrals of Violent Crime Matters from All Federal

Agencies to U.S. Attorneys for Prosecution Increased 22

Percent 20 Figure 9: FBI Drug Program Agent Positions and Work Years 27
Figure 10: FBI White-Collar Crime Program Agent Positions and

Work Years 28 Figure 11: FBI Violent Crime Program Agent Positions and
Work

Years 29 Figure 12: Decreases in Newly Opened FBI Drug Matters 30 Figure
13: Decreases in Newly Opened FBI White-Collar Matters 31 Figure 14:
Decreases in Newly Opened FBI Violent Crime Matters 32

Abbreviations

ATF Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
CPOT Consolidated Priority Organization Targeting
CRS Congressional Research Service
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
EOUSA Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

August 31, 2004

The Honorable Frank Wolf
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State,

and the Judiciary and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations House
of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the dual mission of
protecting national security and combating traditional crimes such as
drug, white-collar, and violent crime. As a result of the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI committed to transforming itself to
strengthen its ability to combat terrorism. One of the goals of the FBI's
transformation efforts was to shift its investigative resources to
increase its focus on its national security mission.

As we have previously reported, the FBI's recent focus on its top
priorities of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime has
required a continuous shift in resources away from drug, white-collar, and
violent crime enforcement, despite additional appropriations to hire
special agents in priority areas. Drug enforcement has sustained, by far,
the largest reduction in FBI agent workforce.

While GAO and other organizations, for example, the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) and the National Academy of Public Administration, have
focused considerable attention on the progress of the FBI's transformation
efforts,1 we have also had questions about the extent to which the shift
in resources has affected federal efforts to combat traditional crimes
that were a significant portion of the FBI's caseload

1Testimonies and reports on FBI's transformation efforts include GAO, FBI
Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform
and Address Priorities, GAO-04-578T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004);
GAO, FBI Organization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major
Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003); and
Congressional Research Service, FBI Intelligence Reform since September
11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, (Washington, D.C., April 6,
2004), and Testimony of the Chairman of the National Academy of Public
Administration on FBI Reorganization (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003).

before the terrorist attacks. Questions have been raised about the effect,
if any, that the FBI's shift in resources into priority areas may have had
on the enforcement of drug, white-collar, and violent crimes and whether
other federal agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) in the drug enforcement area, are filling gaps created as a result
of the FBI resource shift. 2

To assist with its oversight responsibilities, the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary and Related
Agencies has requested that we study the effects FBI's shift to its new
priorities has had on enforcement of selected traditional crimes. To
assess overall impacts of the FBI's shift in resources, this report
examines the following issues: (1) How has FBI's shift in agent resources
since September 11 affected federal efforts to combat drug crime? (2) How
has FBI's shift in priorities affected federal efforts to combat
white-collar and violent crime?

To examine the effect of FBI's post-September 11 shift in resources to
national security priorities on federal efforts to combat domestic drug
crime, we analyzed data related to (1) the combined nonsupervisory field
agent resources devoted to drug enforcement by the FBI and DEA3; (2) the
number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters; (3) the number of drug
matters referred from all federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys' Offices for
prosecution. We also conducted semistructured interviews to determine what
impacts, if any, selected headquarters and field law enforcement
officials4 have observed. To examine the effect of the FBI's
post-September 11 priority shifts on federal efforts to combat
white-collar and violent crime, we analyzed data indicating the number of
such matters referred to U.S. Attorneys' Offices for prosecution from the
FBI and all other federal agencies. In addition, we included in our
semistructured interview for law enforcement officials questions related
to impacts observed, if any, on violent and white-collar crime caseloads
and

2DEA is the nation's single-mission drug enforcement agency, which
referred almost half of all of the federal drug matters referred to U.S.
Attorneys for prosecution in fiscal year 2003.

3We focused the analysis on nonsupervisory field special agent positions
because these positions are directly involved in investigations, while
supervisors, managers, and headquarters agents often have noninvestigative
responsibilities in addition to their investigative duties.

4We interviewed officials of FBI, DEA, U.S. Attorneys' Offices, local
police departments, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

enforcement activities. The interviewees, although working in locations
that experienced some of the sharpest reductions in FBI drug program
resources, are not representative of all locations or even of all of those
locations that experienced similar reductions in resources. The data we
analyzed and interviews with law enforcement officials should be
considered as short-term indicators with limitations in their ability to
determine the effect of FBI priority shifts.

Because the reliability of FBI, DEA, and Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys (EOUSA) information management systems data is significant to
the findings of this review, we also interviewed officials of FBI, DEA,
and EOUSA to determine what steps they take to assess the accuracy of data
elements in these systems and what limitations, if any, they have
identified with the data elements used for our review. We also did a
limited assessment of the reliability of the data systems used for this
report, and we determined that the required data elements are sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this review.

We performed our work from December 2003 to July 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Our scope and
methodology are discussed in greater detail in appendix I.

The data we examined are inconclusive as to whether shifts in the FBI's
priorities after September 11 have had an effect on overall federal
efforts to combat drug crime. Combined agent resources from the FBI and
DEA devoted to drug crime matters have decreased by about 10 percent since
September 11, with FBI agent resources decreasing and DEA agent resources
increasing slightly. DEA officials expect to increase current resource
levels, as they fill new positions authorized in previous budget cycles.
DEA, however, is pacing the hiring of new agents in an effort to manage
its growth so that as new special agents come on board, it has the
necessary infrastructure (i.e., office space, cars, equipment, and
training resources) to support them. The combined number of newly opened
FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about 10 percent since September

11. A DEA official said, however, that this decrease might be due to an
increased emphasis on complex, long-term cases that focus on dismantling
or disrupting major drug organizations rather than from fewer federal drug
enforcement resources. Referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys from
all federal sources decreased about 2 percent from 22,694 matters in
fiscal year 2001 to 22,252 matters in fiscal year 2003. Law enforcement
officials we interviewed expressed mixed perspectives about the impact of
the FBI's shift of resources on drug enforcement in their communities. The

  Results in Brief

data we analyzed and the information we obtained from interviews with law
enforcement officials represent short-term indicators of potential effects
of the FBI's transformation on overall federal efforts to combat crime and
are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. The data should be
considered with caution in light of their limitations. For example, an
interviewee noted that it may be too early to determine the full impact of
the FBI shift out of drug work, since many of the cases now being referred
to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution were opened by investigative agencies
before the terrorist attacks occurred.

Similarly, the data do not show a conclusive impact on federal efforts to
combat white-collar and violent crime resulting from the FBI's shift in
priorities. Since September 11, the number of white-collar crime referrals
from all federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys declined by about 6 percent,
from 12,792 in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 in fiscal year 2003. Violent
crime referrals from all federal agencies have increased by about 29
percent, from 14,546 in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 in fiscal year 2003.
Federal and local law enforcement officials we interviewed had mixed views
on the degree to which the FBI's shift in resources affected efforts to
combat white-collar and violent crime. For example, some officials said
that the FBI was still directing resources where they are needed in
critical violent and white-collar enforcement efforts, while a prosecutor
in another location said that white-collar crime enforcement efforts were
suffering as a result of the FBI's shift of resources.

The Department of Justice (Justice) provided technical comments on a draft
of this report, which we incorporated where appropriate.

Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, national security,
including counterterrorism, was a top-tier priority for the FBI. However,
this top tier combined national security responsibilities with other
issues, and the FBI's focus and priorities were not entirely clear.
According to a Congressional Research Service report, the events of
September 11 made clear the need to develop a definitive list of
priorities.5 In June 2002, the FBI's director announced 10 priorities. The
top 3 priorities were to (1) protect the United States from terrorist
attack (counterterrorism), (2) protect the United States against foreign
intelligence operations and

5Congressional Research Service, The FBI: Past, Present, and Future
(Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2003).

  Background

espionage (counterintelligence), and (3) protect the United States against
cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes (cyber crime). Whitecollar
crime ranked seventh in the priority list, and violent crime ranked
eighth. Drug crimes that were not part of transnational or national
criminal organizations were not specifically among the FBI's top 10
priorities.

In June 2003 and March 2004, we testified that a key element of the FBI's
reorganization and successful transformation is the realignment of
resources to better ensure focus on the highest priorities.6 Since
September 11, the FBI has permanently realigned a substantial number of
its field agents from traditional criminal investigative programs to work
on counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. The FBI's
staff reprogrammings carried out since September 11 have permanently
shifted 674 field agent positions from the drug, white-collar, and violent
crime program areas to counterterrorism and counterintelligence. 7 About
550 of these positions (more than 80 percent of the permanently shifted
positions) came from the FBI's drug program, with substantially smaller
reductions from the white-collar and violent crime programs. In addition,
the FBI established the cyber program. As figure 1 shows, about 25 percent
of the FBI's field agent positions were allocated to counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and cyber crime programs prior to the FBI's change in
priorities. As a result of the staff reprogrammings and funding for
additional special agent positions received through various appropriations
between 2002 and 2004, 8 the FBI staffing levels allocated to the
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber program areas have
increased to about 36 percent and now represent the single largest
concentration of FBI resources. Figure 1 also notes that the number of
nonsupervisory FBI field agent positions has increased from 10,292 in
fiscal year 2002 to 11,021 in fiscal year 2004, about 7 percent.

6See GAO-04-578T and GAO 03-759T.

7The figure of 674 positions excludes 11 supervisory positions that were
returned to the drug program.

8The FBI has the authority to reprogram funds (i.e., move funds between
activities within a given account) without notifying the relevant
appropriations subcommittees unless a specific purpose is prohibited or
the amount of the reprogramming exceeds a dollar threshold ($500,000 or a
10 percent change in funding level, whichever is less).

Figure 1: Increase in Nonsupervisory FBI Field Agent Positions Allocated
to Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and Cyber Crime Programs

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

Additionally, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily redirect
special agent resources from other criminal investigative programs to
address counterterrorism and other higher-priority needs. The FBI
continues to redirect agents from drug, white-collar, and violent crime
programs to address the counterterrorism-related workload demands. These
moves are directly in line with the FBI's priorities and in keeping with
its policy that no counterterrorism leads will go unaddressed. Figure 2
shows that the counterterrorism program continues to rely on resources
that are temporarily redirected from other crime programs. Appendix II
contains figures that show the reductions in FBI nonsupervisory field
agent positions and work years charged to the drug program and, to a
lesser extent, the white-collar and violent crime programs after September
11.

Figure 2: FBI Field Agent Nonsupervisory Agent Positions Allocated and
Agent Work Years Charged to the Counterterrorism Program Increased after
September 11

6,000 5,500 5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000

500

0

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the
counterterrorism program Average number of field agent work years charged
to investigating counterterrorism-related matters Source: GAO analysis of
FBI Time Utilization Record Keeping (TURK) data.

As one might expect, the reallocation of resources to align with
post-September 11 priorities resulted in a significant increase in newly
opened FBI counterterrorism matters, while the number of newly opened FBI
drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters declined between fiscal year
2001 and the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. As shown in figure 3, the
FBI's newly opened counterterrorism matters increased by about 183
percent, from 1,006 matters in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2001 to
2,850 matters in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2003.

10/8-11/4

1/28-2/2412/3-12/30

5/20-5/54/22-5/19

                                   6/17-7/14

                               5/20-6/16 9/9-10/6

                          8/12-9/8 1/27-2/23 4/21-5/18

                               3/24-4/20 8/11-9/7

                      10/6-11/29/8-10/511/3-11/301/26-2/22

3/23-4/194/20-5/3 6/1-6/28 8/24-9/209/21-10/18

                                    5/4-5/31

1/11-2/712/14-1/10 2/8-3/6 4/4-5/1

                                3/7-4/3 5/2-5/29

Figure 3: The FBI's Newly Opened Counterterrorism Matters Increased after
September 11

Number of newly opened counterterrorism matters

12,000

11,000

10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd quarter
quarter quarter quarter

                        FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

In contrast, the number of newly opened FBI drug matters declined from
1,447 in fiscal year 2001 to 587 in fiscal year 2003-a decrease of about
60 percent. FBI newly opened white-collar and violent crime matters also
remained below pre-September 11 levels, though the decreases have not been
as dramatic as those in the drug crime program. The decreases from fiscal
year 2001 to fiscal year 2003 were about 32 percent in the number of newly
opened white-collar crime matters and about 40 percent in newly opened
violent crime matters. See appendix III for figures showing the pre- and
post-September 11 changes in the FBI's newly opened drug, white-collar,
and violent crime matters.

Also, as expected with the significant shift in resources to address
national security priorities, the FBI's referrals of counterterrorism
matters to U.S. Attorneys' Offices for prosecution have increased since
September 11, while referrals of drug, white-collar, and violent crime
matters have decreased. In fiscal year 2001, which ended just after
September 11, 2001, the FBI referred 236 counterterrorism matters to U.S.
Attorneys for prosecution. In fiscal year 2003, the FBI referred 1,821 of
these matters to U.S. Attorneys, an increase of about 671 percent. At the
same time, FBI referrals of drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters
decreased about 39 percent, 23 percent, and 10 percent respectively.

  No Conclusive Effect on Federal Drug Enforcement Resulting from FBI Agent
  Resource Shifts because Results Are Mixed and Available Data Have Limitations

We could not conclusively identify an effect on federal drug enforcement
resulting from the FBI's shift in resources after September 11, because
results of our analyses were mixed and the data we used had limitations.
While the number of FBI nonsupervisory field agents assigned to the drug
program decreased by more than 40 percent after September 11, the decrease
in the number of combined FBI and DEA field agents assigned to drug work
was about 10 percent because the number of DEA field agent positions
increased slightly. Further, DEA, the lead agency for federal drug
enforcement, is continuing to increase its resources as positions
appropriated by Congress in prior fiscal years are filled. The combined
number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about 10
percent since September 11. However, the combined number of referrals of
drug matters to U.S. Attorneys from all federal sources decreased about 2
percent. Finally, law enforcement officials from the FBI, DEA, U.S.
Attorneys' Offices, and local police departments that we interviewed had
mixed views on whether the FBI's shift of resources had an impact on drug
enforcement in their communities. The data we analyzed and interviews with
law enforcement officials should be considered short-term indicators with
some limitations in their ability to depict the complete impact of FBI
priority changes.

Combined FBI and DEA Drug Program Agent Resources Have Decreased, but More
DEA Positions Are Planned

As figure 4 shows, the combined number of FBI and DEA nonsupervisory field
agent positions has decreased about 10 percent since the terrorist
attacks, from about 4,500 nonsupervisory field agents at the end of fiscal
year 2001 to about 4,000 field agent positions in the second quarter of
fiscal year 2004.9 The decrease has not been more pronounced because DEA,
as the nation's single-mission drug enforcement agency, has devoted more
resources to domestic drug enforcement than has the FBI in both pre- and
post-September 11 periods. As the number of FBI nonsupervisory field
special agents assigned to drug program investigations has decreased from
about 1,400 in fiscal year 2001 to about 800 in fiscal year 2004, the
number of DEA nonsupervisory field agents has increased slightly. These
DEA positions increased from a little less than 3,100 positions in fiscal
year 2001 to a little more than 3,200 positions in the second quarter of

9These agent positions do not represent the total FBI and DEA special
agent positions because in an effort to focus on positions directly
involved in investigations, we did not include headquarters and
supervisory field agents in our analysis.

fiscal year 200410. DEA devoted about twice as many agent resources as the
FBI did to domestic drug enforcement before the terrorist attacks, and the
DEA share of the combined FBI and DEA domestic drug enforcement agent
resources has continued to increase since then.

Figure 4: DEA Special Agent Resources Are the Major Portion of the
Combined FBI and DEA Domestic Drug Enforcement Program

Agent positions 5,500

5,000

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004a

DEA

FBI Source: GAO analysis of DEA and FBI data.
aThis includes the first two quarters of fiscal year 2004

A Department of Justice official noted that Justice has pursued the goal
of increasing agent strength, and the DEA domestic drug operations chief
said that he expects the number of DEA domestic drug agents to increase
significantly over the next 2 fiscal years, when positions already
appropriated by Congress are filled. According to the chief, DEA expects
to fill 216 new special agent positions appropriated in fiscal year 2003
by the end of fiscal year 2004. The agency plans to fill 365 additional
positions

10Because DEA's resource management system does not distinguish between
supervisory and nonsupervisory agents, in consultation with DEA, we
subtracted 15 percent of DEA's total domestic drug enforcement agent
positions as an estimate of the number of field supervisory and managerial
positions

appropriated in fiscal year 2004 during fiscal year 2005. Thus, in fiscal
year 2005, the combined number of FBI and DEA drug enforcement agent
resources should exceed the pre-September 11 workforce strength, and in
fiscal year 2006, the total should continue to increase. In fiscal year
2005, DEA is requesting 111 additional agent positions for domestic
enforcement. The chief said that he has worked with FBI and Department of
Justice officials to determine where to deploy new special agent positions
allocated since September 11 and that DEA has put additional resources in
high-threat areas where the FBI had shifted resources out of drug
enforcement. The chief said that DEA is pacing the hiring of new agents in
an effort to manage its growth so that as new special agents come on
board, DEA has the necessary infrastructure, including office space, cars,
equipment, and training resources, to support them.

In contrast, the chief of the FBI's drug section said that FBI officials
do not foresee a significant increase in the number of agents assigned to
drug investigations. However, he was not aware of any plans to withdraw
additional agent resources from the drug program. He also said he was
hopeful that in future years, as the FBI gained experience and resources
for its national security-related priorities, fewer temporary diversions
of special agents from drug work to higher priorities would be necessary.
In addition, a Justice Department official noted that in fiscal year 2004,
FBI received additional agent positions funded under the Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program, and that additional OCDETF
field positions were requested for the FBI in the 2005 budget.11 Since FBI
officials do not foresee a significant increase in the number of special
agents deployed to its drug program, if the trends continue, DEA would
have an even larger portion of the combined FBI and DEA domestic drug
program agent resources in the future than it currently has.

Number of FBI and DEA Newly Opened Drug Matters Decreased About 10 Percent
after September 11

Although the number of the FBI's newly opened drug matters decreased about
60 percent after September 11, the combined decrease in the number of FBI
and DEA newly opened matters is much smaller-about 10 percent-because DEA
has a much larger drug caseload than the FBI. As shown in Figure 5, the
FBI and DEA together opened 22,736 domestic drug matters in fiscal year
2001, compared with a combined total of

11OCDETF is a federal drug enforcement program focusing on disrupting and
dismantling major drug trafficking organizations. It is made up of 11
federal agencies, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies.
These special agent positions are not FBI directfunded positions.

20,387 domestic drug matters in fiscal year 2003. Assuming that the FBI
and DEA open new matters at about the same pace in the last two quarters
of fiscal year 2004 as they did during the first two quarters, fiscal year
2004 levels of newly opened drug crime matters will be similar to those in
fiscal year 2003.

The DEA Chief of Domestic Drug Operations said that he thought the
decrease in the number of newly opened matters was due in part to an
increased Department of Justice emphasis on cases targeting major drug
organizations in its Consolidated Priority Organization Targeting (CPOT)
initiative rather than reduced federal resources for drug enforcement. He
said that the policy has resulted in DEA opening fewer cases but that
those cases have potential to dismantle or disrupt the operations of major
drug cartels. In commenting on a draft of this report, a Department of
Justice official more broadly stated that the decrease in newly opened
drug matters was due to the Justice strategy, which directs resources on
complex, nationwide investigation of entire drug trafficking networks. The
networks involve major international sources of supply, including those on
the Consolidated Priority Organization Target list.

Figure 5: Number of Newly Opened FBI and DEA Drug Matters Decreased About
10 Percent from Fiscal Year 2001 to Second Quarter Fiscal Year 2004

Drug matters 30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0 312 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

DEA FBI Source: GAO analysis of DEA and FBI data.
aThis includes the first two quarters of fiscal year 2004.

Referrals of Drug Crime Matters to U.S. Attorneys from All Investigative
Agencies Did Not Change Significantly after September 11

While the FBI's referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys for
prosecution have decreased about 40 percent, from 2,994 matters to 1,840
matters between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2003, DEA referrals
increased over the same period by about 7 percent, from 9,907 matters in
fiscal year 2001 to 10,596 matters in fiscal year 2003. Almost half of the
total number of drug matters that were referred to U.S. Attorneys' Offices
came from federal agencies other than the FBI and DEA in fiscal year
2003.12 The number of referrals from all federal agencies and departments
other than the FBI and DEA was almost unchanged over the period, with
9,793 referrals in fiscal year 2001 and 9,816 referrals in fiscal year
2003.

As figure 6 shows, U.S. Attorneys' Offices received 22,694 drug offense
referrals in fiscal year 2001 and 22,252 drug offense referrals in fiscal
year 2003, a decrease of about 2 percent from all federal agencies. The
FBI and DEA referred 12,901 drug matters to U.S. Attorneys in fiscal year
2001 and 12,436 drug matters in fiscal year 2003, a decrease of about 4
percent.

12Other federal agencies and departments that EOUSA reported as referring
large numbers of drug matters for prosecution in fiscal year 2003 were the
Customs Service (4,949 matters) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (629 matters). In March 2003, after the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, the Customs Service was merged and
reconstituted into the Bureaus of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
Customs and Border Protection. At the same, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms was transferred from the Department of Treasury to
the Department of Justice and became the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). The EOUSA data management system was not
changed to reflect these realignments and reorganizations, but an official
said that efforts are under way to do so.

Figure 6: Referrals of Drug Matters to U.S. Attorneys by FBI and DEA and
All Federal Agencies Slightly Decreased (Fiscal Year 2001 to Fiscal Year
2003)

Law enforcement practitioners we interviewed had mixed views about the
impact of the FBI's shift in resources on drug enforcement efforts. While
many interviewees representing each of the locations and criminal justice
organizations we visited generally described the FBI as a valuable law
enforcement partner, some of them said that they did not think the FBI's
shift in resources had a significant impact on drug enforcement efforts in
their communities. Other interviewees said that drug investigations have
suffered as a result of the FBI's shift in resources to new priority
areas. For example, officials from 9 of the 14 law enforcement agencies we
visited said that the FBI did not bring any specialized drug program
expertise that in most cases could not be supplied by other agencies.13
However, 7 of the 14 interviewees said that there was a significant impact
on overall drug enforcement efforts in the locations we visited as a
result

13The 14 interviewees cited do not include the FBI officials we
interviewed, all of whom said that the FBI brought certain specialized
expertise to drug enforcement and that the shift in FBI resources out of
the drug program had a negative impact on drug enforcement efforts.

                                     25,000

                                     20,000

                                     15,000

                                     10,000

                                    5,000 0

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003

FBI and DEA combined All federal agencies

                      Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.

Law Enforcement Practitioners We Interviewed Valued the FBI's Role but Had
Mixed Views on the Effect of the FBI's Shift in Resources on Drug
Enforcement Efforts

of the FBI's shift in resources to new priorities. It is important to keep
in mind that the interviewees, although working in locations that
experienced some of the sharpest reductions in the FBI drug program
resources, are not representative of all locations or even of all of those
locations that experienced similar reductions in resources.

The following are examples of some of the comments we received from law
enforcement practitioners who did not think that the shift in the FBI's
resources had an impact on drug crime enforcement efforts in their
communities.

The DEA are the drug experts here. The FBI does not contribute any special
expertise or specialized resources that are not available from the DEA.
-First Assistant U.S. Attorney

The FBI did not bring lots of agents or special skills and equipment to
drug enforcement task forces. It brought information sources from legates
around the world. Partnerships can be rebuilt and remain effective without
the same level of FBI participation. - International Association of Chiefs
of Police representative

In the past it was the FBI that "had it all"-good investigators, money,
technical equipment-to a greater extent than anybody else. Now DEA and
local police departments are catching up." -DEA field division special
agent in charge

The FBI doesn't bring anything different or special to drug investigations
but their intelligence and informant system is excellent. Their biggest
strength is that they can throw manpower and equipment in a crisis for the
short term because they have more people than the DEA and Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) combined. -U.S. Attorney

The FBI shift in focus has had only a minimal impact and resulted in no
noticeable difference in the number of drug-related cases being
investigated and prosecuted. DEA has always done more partnering with
local police than the FBI, so the diversion of local police resources from
the narcotics bureaus and divisions to counterterrorism has been more of a
problem for DEA than has the FBI's shift. --DEA field supervisory agent

We have always done the most work in this area. The FBI often looks to our
police department for drug expertise. We are the organization that does
the most drug crime enforcement in this area. -city police department
supervisor

On the other hand, some law enforcement officials said that drug
investigations have suffered as a result of the FBI shift in resources to
new priority areas. The following are several of the other comments from
law enforcement practitioners we interviewed who thought that the FBI's
shift in resources had affected efforts to combat crime.

The FBI's shift out of drug enforcement is having an impact in this city.
We are receiving fewer drug referrals from the FBI since September 11,
2001, and, consequently, we are receiving fewer drug referrals overall.
The FBI is the best agency at understanding the relationship between drugs
and violence. -U.S. Attorney's Office Criminal Division Chief

Referrals have dropped off since the shift in priorities because there are
fewer agents working in the FBI criminal divisions. The FBI is not working
the long-term drug cases like they did in the past because the bureau
cannot afford to keep cases open for a year or two. -First Assistant U.S.
Attorney

The FBI's shift out of drug work has layered more responsibilities on
state and local police. The organizations are responding by juggling
resources, requiring officers to work more hours, and attempting to work
smarter by improving information systems, using technology, and
communicating more effectively with one another. State and local police
agencies are more efficient now than they have ever been. As a result, FBI
involvement is perhaps not as critical as it may have been in the past.
-International Association of Chiefs of Police representative.

The FBI's shift into counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber
crimes has affected the number of drug cases investigated and prosecuted
at the federal level. -DEA field supervisory agent

The FBI makes a number of important contributions to drug investigations
that we miss when resources are cut. First, FBI has an extensive
intelligence database. The FBI also brings people, money, and equipment at
a higher level than any other federal agency. -Local police supervisor

Current Data Should Be Viewed as Short-Term Indicators with Limitations

Our analyses provide perspectives in the short term (less than 3 years)
and are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. With respect to
the short-term perspective, a U.S. Attorneys' Office Criminal Division
chief noted that cases can take many years to develop, and the full impact
of the FBI's shift in priorities may not be apparent for several years. He
said that cases are being referred to his office for prosecution now that
began long before the September 11 attacks.

We also determined that it was too early to assess possible changes in
drug price, purity, use, and availability, as well as any drug-related
crime trends that have occurred since September 11. Key statistical
studies that track the price and purity of illegal drugs and reports on
hospital emergency department drug episodes and drug abuse violations were
not current enough to provide more than a year of trend data after
September

11. Data over several more years are needed to determine whether changes
in drug use and availability have occurred, and even when data are
available, it will be very difficult to determine whether changes are
specifically attributable to the FBI's shift in priorities or to other
factors (such as improved drug prevention programs or new methods of drug
importation).

There are also other limitations to the data we analyzed. It is important
to note that while we looked at numbers of agent resources, matters
opened, and matters referred for prosecution, we could not fully assess
the less tangible factors of the quality of agent resources and
investigations and the complexity of investigations. Neither could we
determine what drug

  Our Analysis Did Not Identify Conclusive Effect on Federal White-Collar and
  Violent Crime Enforcement Resulting from FBI Priority Shifts

investigations the FBI might have pursued had it had additional drug
program agent resources.

We did ask interviewees their opinions on whether the quality of drug
agent resources and the quality and complexity of drug investigations had
changed since September 11. Some FBI officials said that experienced
agents were lost to the drug program when they were assigned to work in
higher-priority areas and that these agents were unlikely to return to
drug investigations. A top DEA official said that drug investigations are
more complex now than they were prior to September 11. He said that the
reason for the increased complexity is unrelated to counterterrorism
efforts; instead it is the result of a Department of Justice strategy to
target major drug organizations.

We did not conclusively identify an effect on federal white-collar and
violent crime enforcement resulting from the FBI's shift in priorities
after September 11. Our analysis was limited to only the number of these
matters referred to U.S. Attorneys' Offices for prosecution from the FBI
and all other federal agencies and impacts observed by law enforcement
officials we interviewed. Overall, all federal agencies referred about 6
percent fewer white-collar crime matters to U.S. Attorneys--down from
12,792 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 matters in fiscal year 2003.
However, violent crime referrals increased about 29 percent during this
period-from 14,546 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 matters in fiscal
year 2003. Headquarters and field law enforcement officials we interviewed
had mixed views on whether the FBI's shift of resources had an effect on
white-collar and violent crime enforcement in their communities. Caveats
to the results we reported on impacts of the FBI's shift in priorities on
drug enforcement apply to white-collar and violent crime enforcement, as
well. The data we analyzed and interviews with law enforcement officials
should be considered as short-term indicators with limitations in their
ability to determine the impact of the FBI priority shifts.

White-Collar Crime All federal agencies referred about 6 percent fewer
white-collar crime Matters Referred to U.S. matters to U.S. Attorneys,
down from 12,792 matters in fiscal year 2001 to Attorneys Decreased,
12,057 matters in fiscal year 2003. However, violent crime referrals while
Violent Crime increased about 29 percent during this period, from 14,546
matters in fiscal

year 2001 to 18,723 matters in fiscal year 2003. Figures 7 and 8
showReferrals Increased after changes in the number of referrals of
white-collar and violent crime September 11

matters to U.S. Attorneys from all federal enforcement agencies since
September 11, 2001.

Figure 7: Referrals of White-Collar Crime Matters from All Federal
Agencies Decreased About 6 Percent since September 11

Number of white-collar crime referrals 15,000

13,500

12,000

10,500

9,000

7,500

6,000

4,500

3,000

1,500

0 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003

All other federal agencies FBI Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.

Figure 8: Referrals of Violent Crime Matters from All Federal Agencies to
U.S. Attorneys for Prosecution Increased 22 Percent

Number of violent crime referrals 22,000

20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003

All other federal agencies

FBI

Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.

Of all the federal agencies and departments, the FBI refers the greatest
number of white-collar crime matters to U.S. Attorneys. FBI referrals
decreased about 23 percent, from 6,941 matters in fiscal year 2001 to
5,331 matters in fiscal year 2003. At the same time, referrals by all
other agencies increased by about 15 percent, from 5,851 matters in fiscal
year 2001 to 6,726 in fiscal year 2003. Other lead agencies and
departments for referring white-collar crime cases included the Department
of Health and Human Services and the Social Security Administration, with
health care and federal program fraud and other white collar crime
referrals; the U.S. Postal Service, with referrals of tax and bank fraud,
and other white-collar crime matters; the U.S. Secret Service; and the
Internal Revenue Service, with securities and other fraud referrals.

FBI violent crime referrals decreased about 10 percent from 5,003 matters
in fiscal year 2001 to 4,491 matters in fiscal year 2003. However, over
the same period ATF's violent crime referrals increased from 6,919 to
10,789. Several other agencies and departments, including all of the
military services and the Departments of the Interior and Housing and
Urban Development, also referred violent crime matters to U.S. Attorneys

for prosecution. The Chief of the FBI's Violent Crime Section noted that
violent crime referrals by all federal agencies have increased because
efforts are under way nationwide to prosecute gang violence. The
Department of Justice is targeting cities nationwide where high murder and
violence rates persist despite an overall reduction in violent crime rates
to the lowest level in 30 years.

Law Enforcement Practitioners We Interviewed Had Mixed Views on Whether
the FBI's Shift of Resources Had an Impact on White-Collar and Violent
Crime Enforcement

Law enforcement officials we interviewed had mixed views on whether the
FBI's shift of resources had a negative impact on white-collar and violent
crime enforcement in their communities. For example, police and federal
prosecutors in two locations noted that the FBI had continued to provide
necessary resources for critical white-collar and violent crime concerns,
while prosecutors in another location expressed concern that white-collar
crime enforcement was suffering because of the reduced FBI involvement.

The following are comments we received from the local police supervisors
and officials of several U.S. Attorneys' Offices who did not think that
the FBI's shift in resources had an impact on white-collar and violent
crime enforcement efforts in their communities.

The FBI shift in resources did not have an impact on most traditional
crime enforcement areas in our location. Violent crime, firearm, and child
pornography case referrals are all up since September 11. In the
securities and commodities fraud area, the shifts have not kept the FBI
from doing the investigative work that needs to be done. Also, we are
making more use of the U.S. Attorney's Office investigators and Postal
Service investigators. Similarly, for government contract fraud, federal
inspector generals' offices have taken larger post-September 11 roles.
State investigators and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
investigators are referring more environmental crime cases. -U.S.
Attorney's Office division chiefs

The FBI continues to provide resources for traditional crime programs when
they are really needed. The FBI field office in our city was able to make
violent crime a priority to help the local police with its violent crime
problem in the public schools and housing projects. -city police
department supervisor

The FBI can still throw manpower and equipment into a crisis for the short
term because they have more people than DEA and ATF combined. --U.S.
Attorney

The FBI had not been a major partner in white-collar and violent crime
investigations prior to 9/11. Our department's strongest federal
partnerships are with ATF for violent crime and Secret Service on identity
theft. -city police department supervisor

The following are two of the other comments from U.S. Attorneys' Office
and FBI managers and supervisors who thought that the FBI's shift in
resources had affected efforts to combat white-collar and violent crime.

The FBI has raised investigation thresholds for white-collar crime. It
appears that criminals know this and are engaged in counterfeit check
fraud at levels just below the threshold. The white-collar crime expertise
of the FBI is gone. The good white-collar crime agents are now working on
cyber crimes. The FBI has also given up most of their child pornography
cases to the Postal Service and Customs. -U.S. Attorney

The FBI is the primary source of white-collar and public corruption case
referrals in this district. FBI resources for these areas have declined,
and no other agencies appear to be taking up the slack. -U.S. Attorney's
Office Criminal Division Chief

Current Data Should Be Viewed as Short-Term Indicators with Limitations

Caveats to the results we reported on impacts of the FBI's shift in
priorities on drug enforcement apply to indicators of possible impacts on
white-collar and violent crime enforcement as well. The data we analyzed
and interviews with law enforcement officials should be considered as
short-term indicators with limitations in their ability to determine the
full impact of the FBI priority shifts. The data provide perspectives in
the short term of less than 3 years, and they do not consider important
factors such as whether changes have occurred in the quality or complexity
of whitecollar and violent crime matters being referred from federal law
enforcement agencies to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution. Also, our analysis
does not consider the number and quality of cases that could have been
referred for prosecution by the FBI had additional white-collar and
violent crime program resources been available.

We are providing copies of this report to the Department of Justice and
interested congressional committees We will also make copies available to
others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge
on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
me on (202) 512-8777 or by email at [email protected], or Charles Michael
Johnson, Assistant Director on (202) 512-7331 or [email protected].
Key contributors to this report are listed in Appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Laurie Ekstrand Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To examine the effect of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI)
post-September 11 priority shifts on federal efforts to combat domestic
drug crime, we analyzed (1) the impact of resource shifts on the combined
FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) nonsupervisory field special
agent resources devoted to drug enforcement; (2) changes in the number of
newly opened FBI and DEA drug crime matters; (3) changes in the number of
drug crime matters referred from all federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys'
Offices for prosecution; and (4) impacts, if any, observed by headquarters
and field law enforcement officials we interviewed.

Specifically, to determine changes in the combined level of FBI and DEA
nonsupervisory field special agent resources devoted to domestic drug
enforcement, we analyzed FBI time utilization data and DEA data on funded
staff levels for fiscal year 2001, which ended September 30, 2001, through
the second quarter of fiscal year 2004, ending on March 31, 2004. We also
analyzed FBI and DEA budget and resource allocation information. We
focused our analysis primarily on nonsupervisory field special agent
positions because these positions are directly involved in investigations,
while supervisors, managers, and headquarters agents often have
noninvestigative responsibilities in addition to their investigative
duties. To determine the number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters,
we analyzed case management system data for the period from fiscal year
2001 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. We also reviewed the
Department of Justice's Domestic Drug Enforcement Strategy and discussed
resource allocation issues and concerns with FBI and DEA officials. We did
not attempt to analyze data on drug enforcement resource allocations and
drug matters opened for federal agencies and departments other than the
FBI and DEA that are involved in investigating drug-related crimes. To
determine the number of drug referrals from the FBI, DEA, and other
federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys, we analyzed Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys (EOUSA) case management data on the number of referrals received
by referring agency and type of referral for fiscal year 2001 through
2003. We did not have access to criminal case files and thus did not
provide any assessment of changes in the quality or complexity of
traditional criminal investigations in pre-and post-September 11 periods.

To provide perspectives of law enforcement officials on impacts, if any,
they observed on traditional FBI criminal enforcement areas as a result of
the FBI's shift of resources to new priorities, we interviewed selected
federal headquarters and field officials, police department supervisors,
and representatives of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
At FBI headquarters we interviewed the chief of the drug section, and at
DEA

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

headquarters we interviewed the chief of the domestic drug program. The
field locations we visited, as shown in table 1, had among the greatest
shifts of FBI resources from traditional criminal programs into new
priorities. Using a semistructured interview and a data collection
instrument, at each location we asked FBI and DEA field office managers
and U.S. Attorney's Office supervisory prosecutors and local police
department supervisors responsible for drug enforcement about any impacts
they had observed on their caseloads, workloads, and crime in their
communities as a result of the FBI shift in priorities.1 The results of
these interviews cannot be generalized to any broader community of law
enforcement agencies or officials or to other geographic locations.

Table 1: Field Locations and Agencies We Visited

Location Law Enforcement Agencies Visited

Dallas, TX 	FBI, Dallas Field Office DEA, Dallas Division U.S. Attorney's
Office for the Northern District of Texas Dallas Police Department

Los Angeles, CA	FBI, Los Angeles Field Office DEA, Los Angeles Division
U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California Los Angeles
Police Department

Miami, FL 	FBI, Miami Field Office DEA, Miami Division U.S. Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of Florida Miami (Dade County) Police
Department

New York City, NY 	FBI, New York Field Office DEA, New York Division U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York

Washington, D.C.	FBI, Washington, D.C., Field Office DEA, Washington,
D.C., Division U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department

Source: GAO.

1We obtained local police department perspectives from four of the five
locations we visited because the New York City Police Department declined
to participate in an interview.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To examine the effect of the FBI's post-September 11 priority shifts on
federal efforts to combat white-collar and violent crime, we considered
(1) the number of matters referred to U.S. Attorneys' Offices for
prosecution from the FBI and all other federal agencies and (2) the
effects, if any, observed by law enforcement officials we interviewed. To
determine how the numbers of white-collar and violent crime matters
referred to U.S. Attorneys' Offices for prosecution from the FBI and all
other federal agencies have changed, we analyzed case-management system
data from EOUSA. To provide perspectives from selected law enforcement
officials on any changes in federal white-collar and violent crime
enforcement activities as a result of the FBI's shift in priorities, we
included in our structured interview questions about effects federal and
local law enforcement officials we visited might have observed on
whitecollar and violent crime caseloads, workloads, and law enforcement
activities in their communities. We did not attempt to collect information
on the number of newly opened white-collar and violent crime matters from
all federal sources because there is no agency comparable to DEA, with
single-mission dedication to white-collar crime or violent crime
investigations. Many different federal agencies and offices, including
criminal investigative agencies and inspectors general, investigate these
matters, but our time frames did not allow us to obtain resource
allocation data from them.

The data should be viewed as short-term indicators with limitations. The
full impact of the FBI's shift in priorities may not be apparent for
several years. While we looked at numbers of agent resources, matters
opened, and matters referred for prosecution, we could not fully assess
the less tangible factors of the quality of agent resources and
investigations and the complexity of investigations. Neither could we
determine what investigations the FBI might have pursued had it had
additional agent resources.

Because the reliability of FBI, DEA, and EOUSA information management
systems data is significant to the findings of this review, we interviewed
FBI, DEA, and U.S. Attorney personnel to determine what steps they take to
assess the accuracy of data elements and what limitations, if any, they
have identified with the data elements used for our review. As a result of
our assessment, we determined that the required data elements are
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review.

We performed our work from December 2003 to July 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

                     Appendix II: FBI Nonsupervisory Field
                     Special Agent Positions and Work Years

FBI Nonsupervisory Field Special Agent Positions and Work Years Charged to
the Drug, White-Collar, and Violent Crime Programs (fiscal year 2001 to
second quarter, fiscal year 2004).

Figure 9: FBI Drug Program Agent Positions and Work Years

                               Field agents 1,500

                                     1,350

                                     1,200

                                   1,050 900

                                      750

                                      600

                                      450

                                      300

                                     150 0

1st
quarter10/01/00-12/31/001/01/01-3/31/014/01/01-6/30/017/1/01-9/30/0110/01/01-12/31/011/01/02-3/31/024/01/02-6/30/027/01/02-9/30/0210/01/02-12/31/021/01/03-3/31/034/01/03-6/30/037/01/03-9/30/031st
quarter

            1st quarter 1st quarter 10/01/03-12/31/031/1/04-3/31/04

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the drug
program Average number of field agent work years charged to investigating
drug matters Source: GAO analysis of FBI TURK data.

  Appendix II: FBI Nonsupervisory Field Special Agent Positions and Work Years

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the
white-collar crime program Average number of field agent work years
charged to investigating white-collar crime-related matters Source: GAO
analysis of FBI TURK data.

10/8-11/4

1/28-2/2412/3-12/30

5/20-5/54/22-5/19

                                   6/17-7/14

                               5/20-6/16 8/12-9/8

9/9-10/610/7-11/3

                              1/27-2/23 4/21-5/18

                               3/24-4/20 8/11-9/7

                      10/6-11/29/8-10/511/3-11/301/26-2/22

3/23-4/194/20-5/3 6/1-6/28 8/24-9/209/21-10/18

                                    5/4-5/31

1/11-2/712/14-1/10 2/8-3/6 4/4-5/1

                                3/7-4/3 5/2-5/29

  Appendix II: FBI Nonsupervisory Field Special Agent Positions and Work Years

Field agents 2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000 10/8-11/4

1/28-2/2412/3-12/30

5/20-5/54/22-5/19

                                   6/17-7/14

                           5/20-6/16 8/12-9/89/9-10/6

10/7-11/312/2-12/29

                              1/27-2/23 4/21-5/18

                               3/24-4/20 8/11-9/7

                      10/6-11/29/8-10/511/3-11/301/26-2/22

3/23-4/194/20-5/3 6/1-6/28 8/24-9/209/21-10/18

                                    5/4-5/31

1/11-2/712/14-1/10 2/8-3/6 4/4-5/1

                                3/7-4/35/2-5/29

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the violent
crime program Average number of field agent work years charged to
investigating violent crime-related matters Source: GAO analysis of FBI
TURK data.

Appendix III: Decreases in FBI's Newly Opened Drug, White-Collar and Violent
Crime Matters Since September 11, 2001

Number of newly opened drug matters 1,800

1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Non-Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)

OCDETF

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

aThis includes the first two quarters of fiscal year 2004. Assuming that
the FBI opens new matters at about the same pace in the last two quarters
of fiscal year 2004 that it did during the first two quarters, fiscal year
2004 levels of newly opened drug crime matters will be similar to those in
fiscal year 2003.

Appendix III: Decreases in FBI's Newly Opened Drug, White-Collar and
Violent Crime Matters Since September 11, 2001

Number of newly opened white-collar crime matters 7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

         1,000                                                       
       1st 2nd 3rd 4th  1st 2nd 3rd  4th  1st 2nd 3rd  4th  1st 2nd   3rd 
           quarter           quarter           quarter       quarter 
        FY 2001           FY 2002           FY 2003         FY 2004  

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

Appendix III: Decreases in FBI's Newly Opened Drug, White-Collar and
Violent Crime Matters Since September 11, 2001

Number of newly opened violent crime major offender matters 10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd quarter
quarter quarter quarter

                        FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

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(440257)

Laurie Ekstrand, (202) 512-8777
Charles Michael Johnson, (202) 512-7331

David Alexander, Leo Barbour, William Bates, Geoffrey Hamilton,
Benjamin Jordan, Deborah Knorr, Jessica Lundberg, Andrew O'Connell,
and Kathryn Young made significant contributions to this report.

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