Foreign Assistance: Observations on Post-Conflict Assistance in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan (18-JUL-03, GAO-03-980T).
The circumstances of armed conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan differed in many respects, but in all three cases the
United States and the international community became involved in
the wars and post-conflict assistance because of important
national and international interests. Over the past 10 years, GAO
has done extensive work assessing post-conflict assistance in
Bosnia and Kosovo and, more recently, has evaluated such
assistance to Afghanistan. GAO was asked to provide observations
on assistance efforts in these countries that may be applicable
to ongoing assistance in Iraq. Specifically, GAO assessed (1) the
nature and extent of post-conflict assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan; (2) essential components for carrying out
assistance effectively; (3) challenges to implementation; and (4)
mechanisms used for accountability and oversight.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-980T
ACCNO: A07466
TITLE: Foreign Assistance: Observations on Post-Conflict
Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan
DATE: 07/18/2003
SUBJECT: Foreign economic assistance
Foreign financial assistance
Federal aid to foreign countries
Strategic planning
International relations
Afghanistan
Bosnia
Kosovo
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-03-980T
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. EDT Friday, July 18,
2003 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Observations on Post- Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan
Statement of Susan S. Westin, Managing Director International Affairs and
Trade
GAO- 03- 980T
Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan as well as in Iraq is part of a broader, long- term assistance
effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance, and
democracy- building measures. While the post- conflict situations in these
countries have varied, they have certain conditions in common most notably
the volatile and highly politicized environment in which assistance
operations take place.
During years of work on post- conflict situations, GAO found that three
key components are needed for effective implementation of assistance
efforts:
* a secure environment where humanitarian and other civilian workers are
able to perform their tasks; a strategic vision that looks beyond the
immediate situation and plans
for ongoing efforts; and strong leadership with the authority to direct
assistance operations.
GAO also observed a number of challenges to implementing assistance
operations, including the need for sustained political and financial
commitment, adequate resources, coordinated assistance efforts, and
support of the host government and civil society.
Finally, GAO found that the international community and the United States
provide a number of mechanisms for accountability in and oversight of
assistance operations.
World Food Program Assistance in Afghanistan The circumstances of armed
conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan differed in many respects, but in all three cases the United
States and the international community became involved in the wars and
post- conflict assistance
because of important national and international interests. Over the past
10 years, GAO has done extensive work assessing postconflict assistance in
Bosnia and Kosovo and, more recently, has
evaluated such assistance to Afghanistan. GAO was asked to provide
observations on assistance
efforts in these countries that may be applicable to ongoing assistance in
Iraq. Specifically, GAO assessed
(1) the nature and extent of postconflict assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan; (2) essential components for carrying out assistance
effectively; (3) challenges to implementation; and (4) mechanisms used for
accountability and oversight.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 980T. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Susan Westin at (202) 512- 4128 or westins@ gao. gov.
Highlights of GAO- 03- 980T, a testimony
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform
July 18, 2003
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Observations on Post- Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan
Page 1 GAO- 03- 980T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here
today to discuss GAO*s observations on assistance efforts that followed
military conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Although
circumstances differed in many respects, in all three cases the United
States and the international community became involved in the military
conflicts and post- conflict assistance efforts in pursuit of important
national and international interests, such as the need to prevent conflict
in the Balkans from destabilizing Europe or to combat terrorists and their
supporters in Afghanistan. My comments today will cover observations on
(1) the nature and extent of post- conflict assistance in these three
locations; (2) the essential
components for carrying out assistance effectively; (3) challenges to
implementation; and (4) mechanisms used for accountability and oversight.
My testimony is based primarily on GAO reports over the past 10 years on
post- conflict assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo, and our recent report on
post- conflict food aid and agricultural assistance to Afghanistan. 1 (See
app. I.) These comments should provide useful context in the
subcommittee*s oversight of post- conflict assistance to Iraq. Summary
Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, is part of a broader, long- term
assistance effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance,
and democracy- building measures. The post- conflict situations in these
locations have varied, but they have certain conditions in common most
notably the volatile and highly politicized environment in which
assistance operations take place. We found that a secure environment, a
strategic vision, and strong leadership are the key components needed for
effective implementation of assistance efforts. In addition, we observed a
number of challenges to these efforts, including the need for sustained
political commitment, adequate human and financial resources to carry out
operations, coordinated assistance, and the support of the host government
and civil society. Our work also showed that the international 1 U. S.
General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and
Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan*s Stability, GAO-
03- 607 (Washington, D. C.: June 30, 2003).
Page 2 GAO- 03- 980T
community and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for
accountability and oversight with regard to assistance operations.
In Bosnia, conflict raged from 1992 through 1995 and involved the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia*s three major ethnic groups.
All were fighting for control of specific territories tied to each group*s
definition of its own state. During this time an estimated 2.3 million
people became refugees or were internally displaced. NATO forces
intervened in the conflict to support international humanitarian and
peacekeeping
operations beginning in 1993, culminating in a month- long bombing
campaign against Bosnian- Serb forces in July 1995. This pressure and U.
S. led negotiating efforts resulted in a cease- fire and negotiation of
the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. About 54,000 NATO- led troops
were deployed beginning in late 1995 to enforce the military aspects of
the agreement and provide security for humanitarian and other assistance
activities. Currently, about 12,000 international troops remain in Bosnia
to provide security, including 1,800 U. S. soldiers.
The conflict in and around the Serbian province of Kosovo between Yugoslav
security forces and ethnic Albanian insurgents fighting for Kosovo*s
independence took place from early 1998 through mid- 1999. NATO initiated
a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999 to end Yugoslav
aggression and subsequently deployed about 50,000 troops
to enforce compliance with cease- fire and withdrawal agreements.
Currently, there are about 25,000 NATO- led peacekeeping troops in Kosovo,
including about 2,500 U. S. soldiers.
The conflict in Afghanistan extends back to the Soviet Union*s 10- year
occupation of the country that began in 1979, during which various
countries, including the United States, backed Afghan resistance efforts.
Three years after Soviet forces withdrew, the communist regime fell to the
Afghan resistance but unrest continued. The Taliban movement emerged in
the mid 1990s, but was removed by coalition forces in late 2001 for
harboring al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States on September
11. In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement was signed, which provided for
interim governance of the country. Currently, about 4,600
International Security Assistance Force troops provide security for the
city Background
Page 3 GAO- 03- 980T
of Kabul and the surrounding area and approximately 11,000 U. S.- led
coalition forces continue to fight remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda. 2
GAO*s work over the past 10 years on Bosnia and Kosovo, and our recent
work on Afghanistan, indicate that post- conflict assistance is a broad,
long- term effort that requires humanitarian, security, economic,
governance, and democracy- building measures. For Bosnia and Kosovo,
forces led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided overall
security, and the international community developed country- specific and
regional frameworks for rebuilding the country and province, respectively.
Bosnia*s plan included the 3- to 4- year, $5.1 billion Priority
Reconstruction Program, which provided humanitarian, economic, and other
assistance based on needs assessments conducted by the World Bank and
other international organizations. 3 A number of international
organizations involved in the Bosnia peace operation, including the Office
of the High Representative, the United Nations, and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, helped develop government institutions
and
supported democracy- building measures and police training. In Kosovo, a
U. N. peace operation oversaw assistance through (1) the United Nations
and other donors for housing winterization, refugee relief, and other
shortterm needs; (2) the medium- term Reconstruction and Recovery Program
devised by the European Commission and the World Bank; and (3) programs to
build a judiciary, a police force, and government institutions. The
Bosnia- and Kosovo- specific programs were complemented in 1999 by the
Stability Pact, which focused on encouraging democratization, human
rights, economic reconstruction, and security throughout the region. For
Afghanistan, the World Food Program*s (WFP) food assistance effort
constituted the largest portion of humanitarian assistance in the
postconflict period. To determine the needs of the Afghan people, WFP
conducted and continues to undertake periodic rapid food needs assessments
and longer- term food and crop supply assessments. Based on
2 NATO has agreed to lead the International Security Assistance Force
beginning in August 2003. 3 The Priority Reconstruction Program: From
Emergency to Sustainability, prepared by the European Commission, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Central Europe
Department of the World Bank for the Donor Information Meeting, vols. 1,
2, and 3 (November 1996), and Implementation of the Priority
Reconstruction Program in 1996, prepared by the European Commission and
the Central Europe Department of the World Bank (March 1997). Nature and
Extent of Post- Conflict
Assistance
Page 4 GAO- 03- 980T
the results of these reviews, WFP designs short- term emergency operations
focusing on free distribution of food, as well as longer- term recovery
operations including health, education, training, and infrastructure
projects. Owing to the size of WFP*s effort and its years of
experience in Afghanistan, WFP provided much of the logistics support for
other organizations operating in Afghanistan during 2002 and 2003. A range
of humanitarian and longer- term development assistance is being provided
through broad assistance programs developed by the United Nations and
other multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental organizations. These
programs include infrastructure rehabilitation, education, health,
agriculture, and governance projects, among others.
Post- conflict assistance efforts differ in the extent of multilateral
involvement. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
is responsible for enforcing the military and security aspects of peace
operations under the terms of U. N. Security Council Resolutions
1031 and 1244, respectively. The United Nations, the European Union, and
other international organizations are responsible for rebuilding political
and civic institutions and the region*s economies under U. N. resolutions
and the Dayton Peace Agreement. In Afghanistan, the United States is one
of many bilateral and multilateral donors of aid helping to implement the
Bonn Agreement. In contrast, in post- conflict Iraq, the United States and
Britain are occupying powers under international law and are recognized as
such in U. N. Security Resolution 1483. The obligations of occupying
forces as enumerated in international conventions include respecting the
human rights of the local population; ensuring public order, safety, and
health; protecting property; and facilitating humanitarian relief
operations, among others. 4 While the post- conflict situation in each
location has varied, certain
similarities are apparent, chief among them that assistance efforts
continue to be provided in volatile and highly politicized environments
where local parties have competing interests and differing degrees of
support for the peace process. In Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb parties
continue to oppose terms of the peace agreement, such as the freedom of
ethnic minority refugees and internally displaced persons to return to
their prewar homes. In Kosovo, groups of Kosovar Albanians and Serbs
retain unauthorized weapons and commit acts of violence and intimidation
4 The obligations of an occupying force, as specified in the Hague
Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Page 5 GAO- 03- 980T
against ethnic minorities in violation of the peace agreements. In
Afghanistan, warlords control much of the country and foster an
illegitimate economy fueled by the smuggling of arms, drugs, and other
goods. They also withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in customs
duties collected at border points in the regions they control, depriving
the central government of revenue to fund the country*s reconstruction.
Our work has consistently shown that effective reconstruction assistance
cannot be provided without three essential elements: a secure environment,
a strategic vision for the overall effort, and strong
leadership. In Bosnia and Kosovo, humanitarian and other civilian workers
were generally able to perform their tasks because they were supported by
large NATO- led forces. In Bosnia, the NATO- led forces enforced the
cease- fire, ensured the separation and progressive reduction of the three
ethnically based armies from more than 400,000 soldiers and militia to
20,000 by 2003, and disbanded paramilitary police units. In Kosovo, the
NATO- led
force provided security by (1) ensuring that uniformed Yugoslav security
forces withdrew from Kosovo as scheduled and remained outside the province
and (2) monitoring the demilitarization and transformation of the Kosovo
Liberation Army. Despite the relative security in these two locations,
various paramilitaries continued to operate, and sporadic violent
incidents occurred against international workers and the local population.
From 1996 through 2002, eight humanitarian workers were
killed in Bosnia and from 1999 to 2002, two humanitarian workers were
killed in Kosovo as a result of hostile action.
In contrast, throughout the post- conflict period in Afghanistan,
humanitarian assistance workers have been at risk due to ongoing security
problems caused by domestic terrorism, long- standing rivalries among
warlords, and the national government*s lack of control over the majority
of the country. The 4,600- troop International Security Assistance Force
operates only in Kabul and surrounding areas, while the mission of the
approximately 11,000- troop (9,000 U. S. and 2,000 non- U. S. troops), U.
S.- led coalition force is to root out the remnants of the Taliban and
terrorist groups not to provide security. In 2002 and 2003, the
deteriorating security situation has been marked by terrorist attacks
against the Afghan government, the Afghan people, and the international
community including humanitarian assistance workers. Among the incidents
were attempted assassinations of the Minister of Defense and the Essential
Components
for Effective PostConflict Assistance
Secure Environment
Page 6 GAO- 03- 980T
President; rocket attacks on U. S. and international military
installations; and bombings in the center of Kabul, at International
Security Assistance Force headquarters, and at U. N. compounds. On June
17, 2003, the U. N. Security Council expressed its concern over the
increased number of attacks against humanitarian personnel, coalition
forces, International Security Assistance Forces, and Afghan Transitional
Administration targets by Taliban and other rebel elements. These
incidents have disrupted humanitarian assistance and the overall recovery
effort. Since the signing of the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, four
assistance workers and 10 International Security Assistance Force troops
were killed due to hostile action.
In our years of work on post- conflict situations, a key lesson learned is
that a strategic vision is essential for providing assistance effectively.
In Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement provided a framework for overall
assistance efforts, but lacked an overall vision for the operation. This
hindered both the military and civilian components of the peace operation
from implementing the peace agreement. For example, the Dayton Agreement
determined that the military operation in Bosnia would accomplish its
security objectives and withdraw in about 1 year but did not address the
security problem for the ongoing reconstruction efforts after that time.
Recognizing this deficiency, NATO, supported by the President of the
United States, subsequently provided an overall vision for the mission by
first extending the time frame by 18 months and then tying
the withdrawal of the NATO- led forces to benchmarks such as establishing
functional national institutions and implementing democratic reforms.
In Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement sets out a framework for establishing a
new government. In addition, multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental
organizations providing humanitarian assistance and longer- term
development assistance have each developed independent strategies, which
have resulted in a highly fragmented reconstruction effort. To bring
coherence to the effort, the Afghan government developed a National
Development Framework and Budget. The framework *provides a vision for a
reconstructed Afghanistan and broadly establishes national goals and
policy directions. The budget articulates development projects intended to
achieve national goals. However, despite the development of these
documents, donor governments and assistance agencies have continued to
develop their own strategies, as well as fund and implement projects
outside the Afghan government*s national budget. Strategic Vision
Page 7 GAO- 03- 980T
Our work also highlights the need for strong leadership in post- conflict
assistance. In Bosnia, for example, the international community created
the Office of the High Representative to assist the parties in
implementing the Dayton Agreement and coordinate international assistance
efforts, but initially limited the High Representative to an advisory
role. Frustrated by
the slow pace of the agreement*s implementation, the international
community later strengthened the High Representative*s authority, which
allowed him to annul laws that impeded the peace process and to remove
Bosnian officials who were hindering progress.
In Afghanistan, WFP recognized the need for strong leadership and created
the position of Special Envoy of the Executive Director for the Afghan
Region. The special envoy led and directed all WFP operations in
Afghanistan and neighboring countries during the winter of 2001* 2002,
when the combination of weather and conflict was expected to increase the
need for food assistance. WFP was thus able to consolidate control of all
resources in the region, streamline its operations, and accelerate
movement of assistance. 5 WFP points to creation of the special envoy as
one of the main reasons it was able to move record amounts of food into
Afghanistan from November 2001 through January 2002. In December 2001
alone, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food, the single largest
monthly food delivery within a complex emergency operation in WFP*s
history.
Among the challenges to implementing post- conflict assistance operations
that we have identified are ensuring sustained political and financial
commitment, adequate human resources and funds to carry out operations,
coordinated assistance efforts, and local support. Ensuring sustained
political and financial commitment for post- conflict
assistance efforts is a key challenge because these efforts take longer,
are more complicated, and are more expensive than envisioned. In Bosnia,
reconstruction continues after 8 years, and there is no end date for
withdrawing international troops, despite the initial intent to withdraw
them in 1 year. Corruption is difficult to overcome and threatens
successful implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. In Kosovo,
5 The special envoy*s term ran from November 2001 to May 2002. A second
envoy was not appointed. Strong Leadership
Challenges to Implementing Assistance Operations
Sustained Political and Financial Commitment
Page 8 GAO- 03- 980T
after 4 years, there is still no agreement on the final status of the
territory* whether it will be a relatively autonomous province of Serbia
or a sovereign entity. This makes it impossible to establish a time frame
for a
transition in assistance efforts. Moreover, providing this assistance
costs more than anticipated. Total U. S. military, civilian, humanitarian,
and reconstruction assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo from 1996 through 2002
was approximately $19.7 billion a figure that significantly exceeded
initial expectations.
In Afghanistan, the preliminary needs assessment prepared by the
international community estimated that between $11.4 billion and $18.1
billion in long- term development assistance would be needed over 10 years
to rebuild infrastructure and the institutions of a stable Afghan state.
Others have estimated that much more is required. For January 2002 through
March 2003, donors pledged $2.1 billion. However, only 27 percent, or $499
million, was spent on major development projects such as roads and
bridges; the remainder was spent on humanitarian assistance. Consequently,
more than a year and a half of the 10- year reconstruction period has
passed and little in the way of reconstruction has begun. For fiscal year
2002, U. S. assistance in Afghanistan totaled approximately $717 million.
The Department of Defense estimates that military costs in
Afghanistan are currently about $900 million per month, or $10.8 billion
annually. Another challenge to effectively implementing assistance efforts
is ensuring sufficient personnel to carry out operations and follow-
through on pledged funds. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the international
community has had difficulties providing civilian staff and the
specialized police for security in the volatile post- conflict
environment. For example, operations in Bosnia had a 40 percent shortfall
in multinational special police trained to deal with civil disturbances
from returns of refugees or from efforts to
install elected officials. These shortfalls sometimes threatened security
in potentially violent situations. In Kosovo, U. N. efforts to establish a
civil administration, create municipal administrative structures, and
foster democracy were hindered by the lack of qualified international
administrators and staff. Delays in getting these staff on the ground and
working allowed the Kosovo Liberation Army to temporarily run government
institutions in an autocratic manner and made it difficult to regain
international control.
In Afghanistan, inadequate and untimely donor support disrupted WFP*s food
assistance efforts. When the operation began in April 2002, WFP had
Shortfalls in Providing Resources
Page 9 GAO- 03- 980T
received only $63.9 million, or 22 percent, of required resources. From
April through June* the preharvest period when Afghan food supplies are
traditionally at their lowest point* WFP was able to meet only 51 percent
of the planned requirement for assistance. WFP*s actual deliveries were,
on average, 33 percent below actual requirements for the April 2002
through January 2003 period. Lack of timely donor contributions forced WFP
to reduce rations to returning refugees and internally displaced persons
from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms. 6 Lack of donor support also forced
WFP and its implementing partners to delay, in some cases for up to 10
weeks, compensation promised to Afghans who participated in the food- for-
work and food- for- asset- creation projects. WFP lost credibility with
Afghans and nongovernmental organizations as a result. Similarly, resource
shortages forced WFP to delay for up to 8 weeks in- kind payments of food
in its civil service support program, which aimed to help the new
government establish itself.
Coordinating and directing assistance activities between and among
multiple international donors and military components has been a
challenge. In Bosnia, 59 donor nations and international organizations
including NATO, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the World Bank, and
nongovernmental organizations had a role in assistance activities but did
not always coordinate their actions. For example, the United Nations and
NATO initially could not agree on who would control and reform the Bosnian
special or paramilitary police units. For the first year of post- conflict
operations, these special police forces impeded assistance activities. The
NATO- led force finally agreed to define these special police forces as
military units and disbanded them in 1997. In Kosovo, the need for overall
coordination was recognized and addressed by giving the United Nations a
central role in providing overall coordination for humanitarian affairs,
civil administration activities, and institution building.
In Afghanistan, coordination of international assistance in general, and
agricultural assistance in particular, was weak in 2002. From the
beginning of the assistance effort, donors were urged to defer to the
Afghan
government regarding coordination. According to the United Nations, 6
These rations are intended to provide sustenance to these groups until
they reestablish their lives. Coordinated Assistance
Efforts
Page 10 GAO- 03- 980T
Afghan government authorities were responsible for coordination, and the
international community was to operate and relate to the Afghan government
in a coherent manner rather than through a series of disparate
relationships. 7 The Afghan government*s attempt to exert leadership over
the reconstruction process in 2002 was largely ineffective primarily
because the bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental assistance
agencies including the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture
Organization, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the U. S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), and others prepared individual
reconstruction strategies, had their own mandate and funding sources, and
pursued development efforts in Afghanistan independently. In addition,
according to the international community, the Afghan government lacked the
capacity and resources to be an effective coordinator, and thus these
responsibilities could not be delegated to it. In December 2002, the
Afghan government instituted a new coordination mechanism, but this
mechanism has not surmounted conditions that prevented effective
coordination throughout 2002.
Another challenge is ensuring that local political leaders and influential
groups support and participate in assistance activities. In Bosnia, the
Bosnian- Serb leaders and their political parties opposed the Dayton Peace
Agreement and blocked assistance efforts at every turn. For example, they
tried to block the creation of a state border service to help all Bosnians
move freely and obstructed efforts to combat crime and corruption, thus
solidifying hard- line opposition and extremist views. In mid- 1997, when
donor nations and organizations started linking their economic assistance
to compliance with the Dayton Agreement, some Bosnian- Serb leaders began
implementing some of the agreement*s key provisions.
Although Afghanistan*s central government is working in partnership with
the international community to implement the Bonn Agreement and rebuild
the country, warlords control much of the country and foster an
illegitimate economy. They control private armies of tens of thousands of
armed men, while the international community led by the U. S. military
struggles to train a new Afghan national army. Meanwhile, the Taliban
regime was not party to the Bonn Agreement, and remnants of the regime
continue to engage in guerilla attacks against the government and the
international community.
7 Immediate and Transitional Assistance Program for the Afghan People,
January 17, 2002. Ensuring Local- Level
Support and Participation
Page 11 GAO- 03- 980T
Over the course of our work, we found that the international community and
the United States provide a number of mechanisms for accountability in and
oversight of assistance operations.
First, the international community has monitored the extent to which
postconflict assistance achieved its objectives through reports from the
United Nations and the international coordinating mechanisms. Individual
donors and agencies also have monitored their respective on- the- ground
operations. For example, the United States monitors aid through the U. S.
Agency for International Development and USAID*s inspector general.
In Bosnia, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)* a group of 59 countries
and international organizations that sponsors and directs the peace
implementation process* oversaw humanitarian and reconstruction programs,
set objectives for the operation, monitored progress toward those goals,
and established mission reconstruction and other benchmarks in the spring
of 1998. The High Representative in Bosnia, whose many responsibilities
include monitoring implementation of the Dayton Agreement, reports to the
Peace Implementation Council on progress and obstacles in this area.
In Kosovo, the High- Level Steering Group (comprised of Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European
Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) performed
a similar guidance and oversight role. It set priorities for an action
plan to rebuild Kosovo and to repair the economies of the neighboring
countries through the Stability Pact. Moreover, the U. N.
interim administration in Kosovo was responsible for monitoring and
reporting on all aspects of the peace operation, including humanitarian
and economic reconstruction efforts.
In Afghanistan, WFP has used a number of real- time monitoring mechanisms
to track the distribution of commodities. Our review of WFP data suggested
that food distributions have been effective and losses minimal. WFP data
indicated that in Afghanistan, on average, 2.4 monitoring visits were
conducted on food aid projects implemented between April 2002 and November
2003.
In addition to WFP monitors, private voluntary organization implementing
partners who distribute food at the local beneficiary level make
monitoring visits in areas where WFP staff cannot travel due to security
Mechanisms Used for Accountability and
Oversight
Page 12 GAO- 03- 980T
concerns. During our visits to project and warehouse sites in Afghanistan,
we observed orderly and efficient storage, handing, and distribution of
food assistance. (Because of security restrictions, we were able to
conduct only limited site visits in Afghanistan.) WFP*s internal auditor
reviewed its monitoring operations in Afghanistan in August 2002 and found
no material weaknesses. USAID has also conducted periodic monitoring of
WFP activities and has not found any major flaws in its operations.
Over the past 10 years, GAO has evaluated assistance efforts in 16
postconflict emergencies, including those in Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Specifically, these evaluations have focused on
governance, democracy- building, rule of law, anticorruption, economic,
military, food, agriculture, demining, refugee, and internally displaced
person assistance projects. In broader terms, our work has examined the
progress toward achieving the goals of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the
military and political settlements for Kosovo, as well as the obstacles
to achieving U. S. policy goals in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Mr.
Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to respond
to any questions you or other members may have.
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Susan Westin at
(202) 512- 4128. Key contributors to this testimony were Phillip J.
Thomas, David M. Bruno, Janey Cohen, B. Patrick Hickey, Judy McCloskey,
Tetsuo Miyabara, and Alexandre Tiersky. Contacts and
Acknowledgments
Page 13 GAO- 03- 980T
Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural
Recovery Threaten Afghanistan*s Stability.
GAO- 03- 607. Washington, D. C.: June 30, 2003.
Rebuilding Iraq. GAO- 03- 792R. Washington, D. C.: May 15, 2003.
Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, But Key Efforts Are Lagging. GAO-
02- 569. Washington, D. C.: June 13, 2002.
Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations.
GAO- 02- 707R. Washington, D. C.: May 24, 2002.
U. N. Peacekeeping: Estimated U. S. Contributions, Fiscal Years 1996-
2001. GAO- 02- 294. Washington, D. C.: February 11, 2002.
Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the
Dayton Peace Agreement.
T- NSIAD- 00- 219. Washington, D. C.: July 19, 2000.
Bosnia Peace Operation: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful
Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 156. Washington, D. C.: July 7, 2000.
Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional
Stability. NSIAD- 00- 125BR. Washington, D. C.: April 24, 2000.
Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of
NATO's Stabilization Force.
GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 19. Washington, D. C.: October 8, 1998.
Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated as
International Involvement Increased.
GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 138. Washington, D. C.: June 5, 1998.
Former Yugoslavia: War Crimes Tribunal*s Workload Exceeds Capacity. GAO/
NSIAD- 98- 134. Washington, D. C.: June 2, 1998. Appendix I: Selected GAO
Reports on Postconflict
Situations
Page 14 GAO- 03- 980T
Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but a Few
Challenges Emerging. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 160. Washington, D. C.: April 29,
1998.
Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward the Dayton Agreement's Goals* An
Update. T- NSIAD- 97- 216. Washington, D. C.: July 17, 1997.
Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's
Goals. GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 132. Washington, D. C.: May 5, 1997.
United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore
Peace. NSIAD- 97- 34. Washington, D. C.: March 27, 1997.
Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Seem Likely to Exceed DOD's Estimate. GAO/
NSIAD- 96- 120BR. Washington, D. C.: March 14, 1996.
Peacekeeping: Assessment of U. S. Participation in the Multinational Force
and Observers. GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 113. Washington, D. C.: August 15, 1995.
Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U. N. Operations in Bosnia.
GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 156BR. Washington, D. C.: April 13, 1994.
(320206)
*** End of document. ***