Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID
Address Current and Future Challenges (22-AUG-03, GAO-03-946).
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) oversees
humanitarian and economic assistance--an integral part of the
U.S. global security strategy--to more than 160 countries. GAO
recommended in 1993 that USAID develop a comprehensive workforce
plan; however, human capital management continues to be a
high-risk area for the agency. GAO was asked to examine how
changes in USAID's workforce over the past 10 years have affected
the agency's ability to deliver foreign aid and to assess its
progress in implementing a strategic workforce planning system.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-946
ACCNO: A08159
TITLE: Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help
USAID Address Current and Future Challenges
DATE: 08/22/2003
SUBJECT: Federal aid to foreign countries
Human resources utilization
International relations
Personnel management
Strategic planning
Labor force
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GAO-03-946
a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
Report to Congressional Requesters
August 2003 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID
Address Current and Future Challenges
GAO- 03- 946
USAID has evolved from an agency in which U. S. direct- hire staff
directly implemented development projects to one in which U. S. direct-
hire staff oversee the activities of contractors and grantees. Since 1992,
the number of USAID U. S. direct- hire staff declined by 37 percent, but
the number of countries with USAID programs almost doubled and, over the
last 2 years, program funding increased more than 50 percent. As a result
of these and other changes in its workforce
and its mostly ad- hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several
human capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of experienced
foreign service officers and inadequate training and mentoring have
sometimes led to the deployment of staff who lack essential skills and
experience. The agency also lacks a *surge capacity* to respond to
evolving foreign policy priorities and emerging crises. With fewer and
less experienced staff managing more
programs in more countries, USAID*s ability to oversee the delivery of
foreign assistance is becoming increasingly difficult. USAID has taken
steps toward developing a workforce planning and human capital management
system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges and achieve
its mission in response to the President*s Management Agenda, but it needs
to do more. For example, USAID has begun its workforce analysis but it has
not yet conducted a comprehensive assessment of the skills and
competencies of its current workforce and has not yet included its civil
service
and contracted employees in its workforce planning efforts. Because USAID
has not adopted a strategic approach to workforce planning, it cannot
ensure that it has addressed its workforce challenges appropriately and
identified the right skill mix to carry out its assistance programs.
USAID U. S. Direct- Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002 USAID U. S.
direct hires 1992 2002
Percentage change
Total number 3,163 1,985 (37) Number assigned overseas 1,082 631 (42)
Number of countries receiving USAID assistance with U. S. direct- hire
presence 66 71 7 Number of countries receiving USAID assistance with no U.
S. direct- hire presence 16 88 450
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
The U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) oversees
humanitarian and economic assistance* an integral part of the
U. S. global security strategy* to more than 160 countries. GAO
recommended in 1993 that USAID
develop a comprehensive workforce plan; however, human capital management
continues to be a high- risk area for the agency.
GAO was asked to examine how changes in USAID*s workforce over the past 10
years have affected the agency*s ability to deliver foreign aid and to
assess its progress in implementing a strategic workforce planning system.
To help USAID plan for changes in its workforce and continue operations in
an uncertain environment, we recommend that the USAID Administrator
develop and institutionalize a strategic workforce planning and management
system that takes advantage of strategic workforce planning principles.
USAID noted that our report
captured its complex workforce issues and agreed with our findings and
recommendations. USAID also referred to a recently formed team that will
carry out a comprehensive workforce analysis and planning effort to
identify and address its
workforce needs.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 946. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512- 4268 or FordJ@ gao. gov.
Highlights of GAO- 03- 946, a report to
congressional requesters
August 2003
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future
Challenges
Page i GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 4 USAID*s Changing Workforce Affects Ability to Deliver Foreign
Assistance 6 USAID*s Progress in Implementing Strategic Workforce Planning
Principles Is Limited 15 Conclusions 21 Recommendations for Executive
Action 22 Scope and Methodology 22 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23
Appendix I Selected Reports Related to USAID*s Workforce Planning 25
Appendix II USAID Worldwide Foreign Assistance Programs Locations 27
Appendix III Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
31
Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 32 GAO Contacts 32
Acknowledgments 32 Table
Table 1: USAID U. S. Direct- Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002 11
Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Figures
Figure 1: USAID U. S. Direct- Hire Workforce and Program Funding Levels,
Fiscal Years 1990- 2003 7 Figure 2: USAID*s Workforce Profile as of
December 31, 2002 8 Figure 3: Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce
Planning 15 Abbreviations
OMB Office of Management and Budget USAID United States Agency for
International Development
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Page 1 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning August 22, 2003 The Honorable
Christopher Shays, Chairman
The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich, Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations Committee
on Government Reform House of Representatives
Humanitarian and economic development assistance is an integral part of U.
S. global security strategy, particularly as the United States seeks to
diminish the underlying conditions of poverty and corruption that may be
linked to instability and terrorism. Since 1962, the U. S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) has managed more than $273 billion in
such assistance. 1 In fiscal year 2003, Congress appropriated almost $11.5
billion to USAID, and the agency managed programs in almost 160 countries.
Agency staff often work in difficult environments and under evolving
program demands. More will be demanded of USAID*s staff as they implement
large- scale relief and reconstruction programs in Afghanistan and Iraq
while continuing traditional long- term development assistance programs.
USAID administers foreign aid through a decentralized staffing structure,
with its headquarters in Washington, D. C., and missions located
throughout the world. In 1993, we recommended that USAID develop a
comprehensive workforce planning and management system to better identify
staffing needs and requirements. 2 However, human capital management
continues to be a high- risk area at USAID and throughout much of the
federal government. 3 According to the Office of Management Budget (OMB),
the federal government* including USAID* significantly
1 U. S. Agency for International Development, U. S. Overseas Loans and
Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-
September 30, 2001. Figure equals $541 billion in fiscal year 2003 dollars
and includes USAID*s Food for Peace and title
II section 416 emergency and development programs. 2 U. S. General
Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: AID Strategic Direction and
Continued Management Improvements Needed, GAO/ NSIAD- 93- 106 (Washington,
D. C.:
June 11, 1993). 3 U. S. General Accounting Office, High- Risk Series: An
Update, GAO- 01- 263 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 1, 2001).
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning downsized its workforce
during the 1990s through across- the- board cuts rather than targeted
reductions aligned with agency missions, and human
resources planning remains weak in most agencies. The President*s
Management Agenda, issued in fiscal year 2002, represents the
administration*s effort to improve the performance of federal departments
and agencies through 14 initiatives, including human capital management.
OMB concluded that without proper planning, the skill mix of the federal
workforce will not reflect tomorrow*s missions. 4 In light of USAID*s
long- standing workforce planning and management
problems, you expressed concern about its ability to manage and oversee
its foreign assistance programs. In particular, you expressed concern
about USAID*s apparent inability to identify and readily address staffing
requirements. At your request, we examined (1) the changes in USAID*s
workforce since fiscal year 1990 and their effect on the agency*s ability
to deliver foreign assistance and (2) USAID*s progress in developing and
implementing a strategic workforce planning system.
To accomplish our objectives, we analyzed personnel data and workforce
planning documents and interviewed knowledgeable USAID officials
representing the agency*s regional, technical, and management bureaus in
Washington, D. C. We conducted fieldwork at seven overseas missions*
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Mali, Peru, Senegal, and the West
Africa Regional Program in Mali. We also evaluated USAID*s strategic
workforce planning efforts in terms of workforce planning principles used
by leading organizations: ensuring the involvement of agency leadership,
employees, and stakeholders; determining current skills and competencies
and those needed; implementing strategies to address critical staffing
needs; and evaluating progress in achieving human capital goals. Since
1990, USAID has continued to evolve from an agency in which U. S.
direct- hire foreign service employees directly implemented development
projects to one with a declining number of direct- hire staff that oversee
the contractors and grantees who carry out most of its day- to- day
activities. Personal services contractors* chiefly foreign national staff
at overseas missions* play an increasing role in managing the development
4 Office of Management and Budget, The President*s Management Agenda,
Fiscal Year 2002. Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning activities that are designed,
implemented, and evaluated mainly by thirdparty contractors and grantees.
As direct- hire staff levels decreased by
37 percent since fiscal year 1992, the number of countries with USAID
programs almost doubled, and program funding recently increased more than
57 percent* from $7.3 billion in fiscal year 2001 to almost $11.5 billion
in fiscal year 2003. As a result of the decreases in U. S. directhire
foreign service staff levels, increasing program demands, and a mostly ad
hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID now faces several human capital
vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of its more experienced
foreign service officers, difficulty in filling overseas positions, and
limited opportunities for training and mentoring have sometimes led to (1)
the deployment of direct- hire staff who lack essential skills and
experience and (2) the reliance on contractors to perform most overseas
functions. In addition, USAID lacks a *surge capacity* to enable it to
respond quickly to emerging crises and changing strategic priorities. As a
result, according to USAID officials and a recent overseas staffing
assessment, the agency is
finding it increasingly difficult to manage the delivery of foreign
assistance.
In response to the President*s Management Agenda, USAID has taken steps
toward developing a comprehensive workforce planning and human capital
management system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges and
achieve its mission, but progress has been limited. In evaluating USAID*s
efforts in terms of proven strategic workforce planning principles, USAID
has more to do. For example: The involvement of USAID leadership,
employees, and stakeholders in
developing and communicating a strategic workforce plan has been mixed.
USAID*s human resource office is drafting a human capital strategy, but it
has not yet been finalized or approved by such stakeholders as OMB and the
Office of Personnel Management. As a result, we cannot
comment on whether USAID employees and other stakeholders will have an
active role in developing and communicating the agency*s workforce
strategies.
USAID has begun identifying the core competencies its future workforce
will need and is conducting a workforce analysis and planning pilot at
three headquarters units that will include an analysis of current skills
and will eventually cover the entire workforce. However, it has not yet
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the critical skills and
competencies of its current workforce. USAID is in the process of
determining the appropriate information technology instrument and
Page 4 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning methodology that will permit
the assessment of its current workforce skills and competencies.
USAID*s strategies to address critical skill gaps are not comprehensive
and have not been based on a critical analysis of current capabilities
matched with future requirements. USAID has begun hiring foreign service
officers and Presidential Management Interns to replace staff lost through
attrition. However, the agency has not completed its civil service
recruitment plan and has not yet included personal services contractors*
the largest segment of its workforce* in its agencywide workforce analysis
and planning efforts.
USAID has not created a system to monitor and evaluate its progress
toward reaching its human capital goals and ensuring that its efforts
continue under the leadership of successive administrators. Because it has
not yet institutionalized a comprehensive workforce planning and
management system, USAID cannot ensure that it has the essential skills
needed to carry out its ongoing and future programs.
To help USAID plan for changes in its workforce and continue operations in
an uncertain environment, we recommend that the USAID Administrator
develop and institutionalize a strategic workforce planning and management
system that takes advantage of strategic workforce
planning principles. USAID is the lead U. S. agency for administering
humanitarian and economic assistance to about 160 countries. The USAID
Administrator reports to the Secretary of State and receives overall
foreign policy guidance from the Department of State. USAID operates its
foreign assistance programs from its offices in Washington, D. C., and
from missions and offices around the world.
In 1993, we reported that USAID had not adequately managed changes in its
overseas workforce and recommended that USAID develop a comprehensive
workforce planning and management system to better identify staffing needs
and requirements. 5 5 GAO/ NSIAD- 93- 106. Background
Page 5 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning In the mid- 1990s, USAID
reorganized its activities around strategic objectives and began reporting
in a results- oriented format but had made little progress in personnel
reforms. 6 In July 2002, we reported that USAID
could not quickly relocate or hire the staff needed to implement a
largescale reconstruction and recovery program in Latin America, and we
recommended actions to help improve USAID*s staffing flexibility for
future disaster recovery requirements. 7 Appendix I summarizes several
reports and studies prepared by GAO and others since 1989 that address
USAID workforce planning and human capital management issues.
Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that highly
successful service organizations in both the public and private sectors
use effective strategic management approaches to prepare their workforces
to meet present and future mission requirements. We define strategic
workforce planning as focusing on long- term strategies for acquiring,
developing, and retaining an organization*s workforce and aligning human
capital approaches that are clearly linked to achieving programmatic
goals. Based on work with the Office of Personnel Management, other U. S.
government agencies, the National Academy for Public Administration, and
the International Personnel Management Association, we identified
strategic workforce planning principles used by leading organizations.
According to these principles, an organization*s strategic workforce
planning and management system should (1) involve senior management,
employees, and stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing
the workforce plan; (2) determine the agency*s current critical skills and
competencies and those needed to achieve program results; (3) develop
strategies to address gaps in critical skills and
competencies; and (4) monitor and evaluate progress and the contribution
of strategic workforce planning efforts in achieving program goals.
6 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of USAID*s
Reforms, GAONSIAD- 241- BR (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 24, 1996); Foreign
Assistance: USAID*s Reengineering at Overseas Missions, GAO/ NSIAD- 97-
194 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 12, 1997).
7 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery
Program Addressed Intended Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility
to Improve Its Response Capability, GAO- 02- 787 (Washington, D. C.: July
24, 2002).
Page 6 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning USAID has changed from an
agency of U. S. direct- hires that largely provided direct, hands- on
implementation of development projects to one
that manages and oversees the activities of contractors and grantees.
During the past decade, this trend has affected USAID*s ability to
implement its foreign assistance program as the number of U. S. direct-
hire foreign service officers declined and much of USAID*s direct- hire
workforce was replaced by foreign national personal services contractors.
In addition, while program funding remained relatively stable from fiscal
year 1990 through fiscal year 2000, it increased from $7.3 billion in
fiscal year 2001 to $11.5 billion in fiscal year 2003, and USAID*s fewer
direct hires are now responsible for programs in more countries with
little or no resident U. S. direct- hire presence. Moreover, USAID
operates in a difficult
and uncertain environment that presents unique challenges to its ability
to plan and manage its overseas workforce. Because USAID did not have a
strategic workforce planning system while these changes were underway,
several human capital vulnerabilities have surfaced. For example, an
across- the- board reduction in force for both the foreign service and the
civil service, followed by a 5- year decline in the number of U. S.
directhires, has left the agency with critical shortages of experienced
mid- level staff and in the pipeline of junior staff. In addition, 37
positions remain vacant, and opportunities for training and mentoring
staff are limited, sometimes forcing the placement of staff who may lack
essential skills and experience. USAID also lacks a *surge* capacity to
help it deal with emerging crises and changing strategic priorities.
According to USAID documents and our discussions with agency officials,
these vulnerabilities are making it increasingly difficult for the agency
to adequately manage and oversee its foreign assistance activities.
USAID*s U. S. direct- hire workforce decreased from about 8,600 in 1962 to
about 3,162 in 1990. USAID could not continue its hands- on project
approach as the number of U. S. direct hires, including foreign service
staff, declined and responsibilities for planning, financing, and
monitoring projects shifted to contractors, grantees, and host country
governments. As figure 1 shows, this trend has continued as the number of
U. S. directhire staff further decreased to 1,985 by December 2002. The
number of foreign national employees* both direct- hires and personal
services contractors* also decreased from 5,211 in fiscal year 1995 to
4,725 in fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, while program funding levels
remained relatively stable for most of this period, program funding
increased 57 percent from $7.3 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $11.5
billion in fiscal year 2003. USAID*s Changing
Workforce Affects Ability to Deliver Foreign Assistance
USAID Staff Functions Have Evolved from Implementation to Management
Page 7 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Figure 1: USAID U. S. Direct-
Hire Workforce and Program Funding Levels, Fiscal Years 1990- 2003
Notes: Workforce data exclude the Office of the Inspector General. U. S.
direct- hire data for fiscal year 2003 are as of December 31, 2002.
Program funding information is in constant fiscal year 2003 appropriated
dollars. Program funding includes supplementals and money appropriated to
the U. S. Department of Agriculture for Title II and Title III food
programs administered by USAID. Fiscal year 1990 also includes Title I
funding, but after January 1, 1991, the funds were administered by the
Department of Agriculture. Program funding does not include operating
expenses and is not adjusted for deobligations/ reobligations,
rescissions, transfers, or miscellaneous trust funds.
As numbers of U. S. direct- hire staff declined, mission directors began
relying on other types of employees, primarily foreign national personal
services contractors, to manage mission operations and oversee development
activities implemented by third parties. In December 2002, according to
USAID*s staffing report, the agency*s workforce totaled 7,741,
Page 8 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning including 1,985 U. S. direct
hires. 8 Personal services contractors made up more than two- thirds of
USAID*s total workforce, including 4,653 foreign
national contractors (see fig. 2). Of the 1,985 U. S. direct hires, 974
were foreign service officers, about 65 percent of whom were posted
overseas.
Figure 2: USAID*s Workforce Profile as of December 31, 2002
Note: *Other* includes fellows and U. S. government staff from other
agencies employed under participating agency service agreements and
resource support service agreements. For our analysis, we used the
workforce definition developed by USAID*s
1990 Workforce Planning Working Group. This group defined the agency*s
workforce as those who have a direct employer- employee relationship with
USAID. This includes the following staff categories:
U. S. citizen direct- hire civil service in Washington, D. C.; U. S.
citizen direct- hire foreign service, most of whom serve at overseas
missions; 8 All figures exclude the staff of USAID*s Office of the
Inspector General, which includes 95 foreign service officers (51 posted
overseas) and 76 civil service staff in Washington, D. C.
Page 9 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning foreign national (non- U.
S. citizen) direct hires, whom USAID can employ overseas for any foreign
service- related mission, program, or activity; 9 and
personal services contractors, both U. S. and foreign nationals, who are
individuals on contract with USAID for the specific services of that
individual only. 10 In addition, USAID includes in its monthly staffing
report other types of
nondirect- hire staff with an employer- employee relationship, such as
staff detailed from a number of organizations and other U. S. government
agencies and centrally contracted technical advisors.
Other individuals not directly employed by USAID also perform a wide range
of services in support of the agency*s programs. These individuals include
employees of institutional or services contractors, private voluntary
organizations, and grantees. 11 Last year, we reported that USAID relies
heavily on nongovernmental organizations to deliver foreign assistance. 12
In fiscal year 2000, USAID directed about $4 billion of its $7.2 billion
assistance funding to nongovernmental organizations, including at least $1
billion to private voluntary organizations (charities) working overseas.
We further noted that, although USAID generally chooses funding mechanisms
that delegate a large amount of program control to implementing
organizations, it has not compiled data on its use of specific types of
funding or evaluated their effectiveness. In addition to hiring third
parties to implement its programs, USAID also contracts with
outside organizations to provide contract management and oversight of
large programs. As we reported in July 2002, 13 the agency hired several
9 Most foreign national direct- hire staff have been converted to personal
services contractors. 10 The Federal Acquisition Regulations define a
personal services contract as one that makes the contractor appear as a
government employee by the nature of the relationship that is established.
USAID is authorized by section 636( a)( 3) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended, to contract with individuals for personal services
abroad. USAID*s personal services contractors may be U. S. citizens, host-
country nationals, or third- country nationals.
11 In 1990, USAID estimated that this extended workforce was approximately
10,000 individuals. For this report, USAID was unable to provide an
estimate. 12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: USAID
Relies Heavily on Nongovernmental Organizations, but Better Data Needed to
Evaluate Approaches,
GAO- 02- 471 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 25, 2002). 13 GAO- 02- 787.
Page 10 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning firms to manage and oversee
some of the contractors and grantees conducting USAID hurricane
reconstruction activities in Latin America. At
present, USAID is also planning to hire outside parties to oversee the
large- scale contracts recently awarded for reconstruction activities in
Iraq.
Despite the reliance on personal services and institutional contractors,
USAID officials maintain that the direct- hire foreign service officer is
still the core of mission staffing. He or she works toward achieving U. S.
foreign policy goals, gives direction to the country program, brings
corporate knowledge and a better understanding of agency guidance to the
mission, and provides the authority needed to work effectively with host
country counterparts and other U. S. government agencies. The quality and
deployment of foreign national contractors can vary among missions and
regions. U. S. personal services contractors are an important means for
filling mission positions when U. S. direct hires are not available.
According to USAID regulations, the terms of their contracts essentially
allow personal services contractors to perform almost the same duties as
U. S. government employees. About two- thirds work in technical positions,
but many serve as program and project development officers, controllers,
executive officers, and, occasionally, temporary mission directors*
positions that USAID considers inherently governmental. According to USAID
officials, as a matter of policy, the agency rarely delegates inherently
governmental functions.
According to mission officials, U. S. and foreign national contractors are
an integral part of the mission workforce, but they cannot replace the
agency commitment and experience that U. S. direct- hire foreign service
officers bring to the mission. In addition to filling in for U. S. direct-
hire staff, contractors, particularly foreign nationals, typically make a
career at USAID and provide needed continuity and corporate knowledge of
the country programs. However, officials noted that, compared to direct-
hire staff, personal services contractors generally do not have the same
level of agency commitment; do not fully understand how the agency works
and the political pressures that it faces in Washington, D. C.; are not
subject to the same degree of accountability; and have limited
administrative and decisional authorities. Furthermore, contractors cannot
supervise U. S. direct- hire staff, even if the contractor is very
experienced and the directhire is new to USAID. This further limits the
training and mentoring opportunities for new staff.
In addition to having reduced the number of U. S. direct hires, USAID now
manages programs in more countries with no U. S. direct- hire presence,
and its overseas structure has become more regional. Table 1 illustrates
Page 11 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning the changes in USAID*s U. S.
direct- hire overseas presence between fiscal years 1992 and 2002. In
fiscal year 1992, USAID managed activities in 88
countries with no U. S. direct- hire presence. According to USAID, in some
cases, activities in these countries are very small and require little
management by USAID staff. However, in 45 of these countries USAID manages
programs of $1 million or more, representing a more significant management
burden on the agency. USAID also increasingly provides administrative and
program support to countries from regional service platforms, which have
increased from 2 to 26 between fiscal years 1992 and 2002. 14 Appendix II
contains a complete list of the countries in which USAID operates.
Table 1: USAID U. S. Direct- Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002
USAID U. S. direct hires 1992 2002 Percentage change Total number 3,163 a
1,985 b (37)
Number assigned overseas 1,082 a 631 b (42) Number of countries receiving
USAID assistance with U. S. direct- hire presence 66 c 71 d 7
Number of countries receiving USAID assistance with no U. S. direct- hire
presence 16 c 88 d 450
Sources: USAID and GAO. a USAID*s Monthly Workforce Profile Report, data
as of September 30, 1992.
b USAID*s Quarterly Worldwide Staffing Pattern Report, data as of December
31, 2002. c U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: A Profile
of the Agency for International Development, GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 148
(Washington, D. C.: Apr. 3, 1992). d USAID*s Bureau for Policy and Program
Coordination data provided in May 2003. USAID staff
cautioned that this information was gathered last year and may not be up
to date.
Our data collection efforts in the field and at headquarters revealed the
unique environment in which USAID missions operate and its effect on
workforce planning and management efforts. With the exception of Egypt,
the missions we visited did not prepare formal and separate workforce
plans. USAID missions tend to be relatively small* mission directors and
14 Services include legal, executive office, financial/ controller,
procurement, and program and project development support services.
Services vary among the 26 platforms due to security, ease of travel, and
other local concerns. For example, the regional office in Kenya provides
all services to up to 14 countries, while the Honduras mission simply
shares a contracts officer with Nicaragua. USAID*s Environment
Affects Workforce Planning Capabilities
Page 12 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning office heads have almost
daily contact with the staff and are familiar with their skills and
capabilities. Missions conduct their workforce planning
and staffing projections in conjunction with their long- term* normally 5-
year* country development strategies. Missions provide information on
resource needs in their annual reports and budget submissions to their
respective regional bureaus. USAID*s Bureau for Policy and Program
Coordination allots staff years and funding to the regional bureaus, which
then apportion these resources among their headquarters offices and
overseas missions. According to the bureau, the average mission has six U.
S. direct- hire staff.
Officials noted the difficulties in adhering to a formal workforce plan
linked to country strategies in an uncertain foreign policy environment.
For example, following the events of September 11, 2001, the Middle East
and sub- Saharan African missions we visited* Egypt, Mali, and Senegal*
received additional work not anticipated when they developed their country
development strategies. Mali was seeking two additional personal services
contractors during the time of our visit, including one to manage a
new hunger initiative for Africa, and Egypt was in the process of
determining the staff needed to implement the Middle East Partnership
Initiative. In addition, the mission in Ecuador had been scheduled to
close in fiscal year 2003. However, this decision was reversed due to
political and economic events in Ecuador, including a coup in 2000, the
collapse of the financial system, and rampant inflation. Program funding
for Ecuador
tripled from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2000, while staffing was
reduced from 110 to 30 personnel and the budget for the mission*s
operating expenses was reduced from $2.7 million to $1.37 million.
Other factors unique to USAID*s overseas work environment can affect its
ability to conduct workforce planning and attract and retain top staff.
These factors vary from country to country and among regions. For example:
USAID officials in Mali told us that hardship missions find it much more
difficult to attract U. S. staff. 15 Foreign service staff in Mali receive
a hardship pay differential rate of 25 percent and an additional 15
percent incentive pay. According to mission officials, these pay
incentives are essential for attracting high- quality staff to Mali, and
many of the staff with
15 USAID considers selected missions in sub- Sahara Africa and other areas
*difficult to staff* missions. To entice staff to take these assignments,
USAID provides a differential pay incentive of 15 percent in addition to
the regular pay differential for hardship missions.
Page 13 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning whom we met acknowledged
that the extra pay was a factor when they decided to bid on the Mali
positions.
At several missions we visited* Egypt, Mali, and Peru* USAID officials
told us that the salaries set for foreign national employees by the
respective embassies make it difficult for missions to recruit and retain
the country*s top professional talent. 16 This was particularly true in
the poorest countries with limited human resource capacities, such as
Mali, where the mission director stated that it is becoming increasingly
difficult to compete with international financial institutions and other
donor organizations for the country*s most highly qualified professionals.
Officials at all the missions we visited said that lengthy clearance
processes make it difficult to obtain staff in a timely manner and manage
their workforces. U. S. direct- hire staff and personal services
contractors must obtain both a security clearance and a medical clearance
before they report to work. As we reported in July 2002, 17 in many cases
it took 6 months to a year to hire personal services contractors for the
emergency hurricane reconstruction program in Latin America, and much of
that time was spent waiting for clearances.
USAID officials in several countries* particularly Ecuador, Mali, and
Senegal* also cited the agency*s separately appropriated operating expense
budget as a factor in their ability to support and train U. S. directhire
staff. 18 USAID missions are supposed to pay for all U. S. direct- hire
local expenses* such as housing, dependents* education, travel, and
training* from its operating expense budgets and not from program funds.
According to mission officials, operating expense funds have not kept pace
with rising fixed costs, such as rent, facilities management, and foreign
national salaries and benefits. As a result, missions often opt for
contractor staff who can be paid from program funds. In addition, tight
operating expense funds and the limited number of U. S. direct- hire staff
on board have led some missions to restrict training opportunities for U.
S. direct- hire staff. Officials at the Mali and Senegal missions cited
availability of training for direct- hire staff as one of their major
workforce challenges.
16 Embassies generally set the grading and pay scales for foreign national
employees. Embassies* local hires are generally lower- graded personnel,
such as administrative staff, maintenance workers, and drivers, while
USAID must employ these staff as well as seniorlevel economists and other
technical experts and professionals. 17 GAO- 02- 787.
18 We plan to issue a separate report on the use of USAID*s operating
expense account.
Page 14 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Because USAID has not
responded to its changing workforce requirements with a strategic
workforce planning approach, its ability to carry out its
mission has been weakened. In response to a combination of poor technology
investments and other budgetary pressures in the mid- 1990s, USAID
implemented a reduction in force and froze hiring. However, the downsizing
was conducted across the board and was not linked to a strategic vision or
skills analysis. The agency lost a cadre of experienced foreign service
officers and 5 years elapsed before new staff were hired to replace them.
USAID officials noted that the downsizings of the last decade have
resulted in an insufficient pipeline of junior and mid- level staff with
the experience to take on senior positions. As a result, several human
capital vulnerabilities have surfaced but have not been systematically
addressed. For example:
Increased attrition of U. S. direct hires since the reduction in force
in the mid- 1990s led to the loss of the most experienced foreign service
officers, while the hiring freeze stopped the pipeline of new hires at the
junior level. The shortage of junior and mid- level officers to staff
frontline jobs and a number of unfilled positions have created
difficulties at some overseas missions.
Having fewer U. S. direct hires managing more programs in more countries
has resulted in a workforce that is overstretched, raising concerns about
USAID*s ability to provide effective accountability for program results
and financial management. As of December 31, 2002, USAID reported it had
631 U. S. direct- hire staff overseas compared to 1,082 at the end of
fiscal year 1992. However, USAID has not conducted a comprehensive
workload analysis to determine the extent to which staff may be
overburdened or unable to perform all required tasks.
USAID does not have a *surge capacity* to respond to emergencies;
postconflict situations, such as Afghanistan and Iraq; or new strategic
priorities, such as Pakistan and the Middle East.
USAID has generally recruited staff for their technical and development
expertise, but they spend a significant portion of their time managing
contracts and grants, a responsibility for which some staff have limited
skills or training. Funding limitations and the shortage of U. S direct
hires at USAID missions
have curtailed opportunities for on- the- job and formal training and
mentoring for both new staff and those taking on the most senior mission
positions. Those who have the knowledge and experience have little time
for training and mentoring, and the missions do not have enough staff who
Inadequate Attention to
Workforce Planning Has Affected USAID*s Ability to Deliver Foreign
Assistance
Page 15 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning can cover the tasks of those
in training. This has forced USAID to assign increasing numbers of less
experienced staff overseas who may not have
the essential skills. According to senior USAID officials, the
reductions in direct- hire foreign service staff have limited the agency*s
ability to plan for emerging
development issues because staff must spend most of their time preparing
paperwork and monitoring activities. For example, USAID did not have
adequate staff with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to quickly deal
with such emerging issues as famine and human immunodeficiency virus/
acquired immune deficiency syndrome. Although the agency eventually caught
up with these issues, its ability to anticipate development trends and
demands has decreased. USAID does not have a systematic method for
determining its workforce
needs and for implementing strategies that will enable its staff to meet
the agency*s numerous challenges and accomplish its strategic mission.
USAID is making limited progress in addressing the four principles for
effective strategic workforce planning that we identified as key practices
(see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning USAID*s
Progress in Implementing
Strategic Workforce Planning Principles Is Limited
Page 16 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning USAID*s senior management is
developing a human capital strategy to respond to the President*s
Management Agenda, but it has not identified
how it will significantly involve employees and other stakeholders in
developing and communicating the workforce strategies that result from its
efforts. We found that strategic workforce planning is most likely to
succeed if an agency*s leadership sets the overall direction and goals and
involves employees and stakeholders in developing, communicating, and
implementing workforce and human capital strategies. During the 1990s,
USAID*s downsizing efforts and budgetary constraints took precedence over
strategic workforce planning. Its human resource office was understaffed
and lacked experience in strategic workforce planning, focusing mostly on
collecting workforce data and hiring to replace staff lost through
attrition.
USAID*s leadership has attempted to reform its management systems. It
established the Business Transformation Executive Committee in February
2002 to comply with the President*s Management Agenda*s initiatives, and
it appointed a Chief Human Capital Officer in May 2003 as required by the
Chief Human Capital Officers Act of 2002. 19 In December 2002, the
business transformation committee formed a human capital subcommittee,
consisting of senior program and human resource officials,
to develop USAID*s human capital strategy. USAID*s human capital strategy
has not been finalized or approved by the Office of Management and Budget
and the Office of Personnel Management. In addition, we were unable to
determine whether the draft human capital strategy is linked to the
agency*s overall strategic plan, as we recommended in 1993. USAID*s
strategic plan for fiscal years 2004 through 2009* a joint plan with the
State Department* is also in draft and not planned for issuance until the
end of fiscal year 2003.
In addition to its human capital strategy development, as part of the
effort to comply with the President*s Management Agenda, the USAID
Administrator established a group in January 2003 to develop criteria for
overseas staffing and to rationalize the deployment of foreign service
officers overseas. The group subsequently developed* and the Administrator
approved* a template for staffing overseas missions that gives most weight
to the dollar size of the country program but also considers the relative
performance of the host governments and provides some flexibility to the
regional bureaus as necessary.
19 Public Law 107- 296, November 25, 2002. Involvement of Agency
Leaders, Employees, and Stakeholders in Strategic Workforce Planning Is
Limited
Page 17 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Involving employees and
stakeholders in the strategic workforce planning process is also important
to encourage support and understanding for its outcomes. According to a
USAID senior official, the human capital
subcommittee has involved some internal groups in the planning process
through the use of working groups that include senior and mid- level
employees. In addition, according to USAID officials, the Administrator
has discussed his human capital initiatives and answered questions at
*town hall* meetings with USAID employees. However, because the strategy
is still in draft, we cannot comment on the extent to which agency staff
will be involved in implementing the strategy. Historically, USAID has
established many internal committees to analyze workforce planning
problems but has not always followed through in implementing their
recommendations. 20 In addition, according to senior USAID officials, the
agency has not included nongovernmental organizations and other
implementing partners in the development of its human capital strategy.
USAID has begun to identify the core competencies needed by its workforce,
and it recently established a working group to conduct workforce analysis
and planning related to core USAID competencies. However, it has not
documented the critical skills and competencies of its current workforce,
and its personnel information system does not always
provide reliable and timely data. USAID must determine the critical skills
and competencies required to meet its current and anticipated strategic
program goals. This is especially important as changes in national
security, technology, and other factors alter the environment within which
foreign policy agencies operate. In addition, like many other federal
agencies, USAID*s workforce is increasingly eligible for retirement,
creating an opportunity to refocus its workforce competencies to those
geared toward the critical skills and competencies it will need in the
future. To meet these challenges effectively, USAID needs to know its
present workforce skills and competencies and identify those that are
critical to achieving its strategic goals.
Effective workforce planning and management require that human capital
staff and other managers base their workforce analyses and decisions on
complete, accurate, and timely personnel data. However, USAID*s personnel
information system is not entirely accurate and does not contain all of
the information USAID needs for sound workforce decision 20 See appendix I
for summaries of various studies related to USAID*s human capital issues.
USAID*s Efforts to Identify
Critical Skills and Competencies Are Limited by Inadequate Personnel
Information
Page 18 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning making. For example, a
recent audit of USAID*s human capital data by its Inspector General found
that the data collected through this automated process were not current,
consistent, totally accurate, or complete. 21 USAID is attempting to
address its personnel information system problems
through a recently implemented Web- based application that will allow for
customized, centralized, and real- time reporting. As of mid- June 2003,
about 85 percent of the missions had submitted data through the new
system. Officials at the human resource office, in responding to a draft
of this report, expect this new system to be fully operational in time to
generate the September 30, 2003, worldwide staffing report.
Nevertheless, USAID has no systematic or agencywide method to determine
the skills and competencies of its current staff. Although the new
personnel database will provide better information on the locations and
position categories of its staff, it is not designed to identify current
critical skills and competencies. According to officials from the human
resource office, the new system will provide the position occupational
code for all employees, but this will not include information on current
skills and abilities. However, as part of its draft human capital
strategy, in June 2003 USAID established a team to carry out a
comprehensive
workforce analysis and planning effort. The team will first develop a
pilot workforce plan, including an analysis of current skills and future
needs, in three headquarters offices* human resources, procurement, and
global
health. One of the working group*s tasks is to identify an appropriate
tool to collect, store, and manage data on competencies, training, and
career development.
USAID*s overseas assessment team also developed findings and made a number
of recommendations regarding USAID*s model for delivering assistance and
the types of skills that the agency will need to meet future program
needs. 22 For example, according to the team*s study, USAID*s foreign
service recruitment should focus more on basic agency operational skills
such as program and project development, financial management,
procurement, and legal expertise. The study notes that these abilities are
essential for missions in developing programs, policies, and strategies;
ensuring accountability; and representing U. S. government interests with
21 USAID Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID*s Human Capital Data,
Audit Report 9- 000- 03- 002- P (Washington, D. C.: Dec. 20, 2002). 22 U.
S. Agency for International Development, Report of the Overseas Working
Group,
May 2003.
Page 19 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning host government officials
and other stakeholders. Furthermore, according to the study, due to the
shortage of U. S. direct- hire foreign service staff,
about 160 personal services contractors currently serve in these
positions, which USAID considers inherently governmental functions and
normally fills with U. S. direct- hire staff.
Although USAID has implemented some recruitment strategies to address
attrition concerns and staffing gaps, the strategies are limited to
certain segments of the workforce. Furthermore, USAID cannot be certain
that these measures will be effective, because the recruitment plans have
not been based on analyses that match current skills with those needed to
meet future strategic goals. Our strategic human capital model stresses
the importance of developing human capital strategies* the programs,
policies, and processes that agencies use to build and manage their
workforces* that are tailored to agencies* unique needs. 23 Applying this
principle to strategic workforce planning means that agencies consider how
hiring, training, staff development, performance management, and other
human capital strategies can be used to eliminate gaps and gain the
critical skills and competencies needed in the future.
USAID has implemented specific workforce strategies for some segments of
its workforce to address shortages in critical skills and competencies,
but these efforts are not comprehensive. Since fiscal year 1999, USAID has
hired more than 200 mid- level foreign service officers through its New
Entry Professionals program and 47 civil service employees through the
Presidential Management Intern program. The agency recently reinstituted
its International Development Intern program for junior foreign service
officers and plans to make 15 offers in March 2004. According to USAID
officials, the agency is hiring staff with updated technical and
management skills. These measures are important efforts to bring in
experienced midlevel staff and junior staff with new skill sets that can
help shape the agency*s future as the current workforce becomes eligible
for retirement. However, USAID has not developed a workforce plan for its
civil service staff* a factor noted by OMB in its Presidential Management
Agenda *scorecard* of USAID*s human capital management efforts. In
responding to our draft report, USAID stated that it will not refine its
civil service recruitment plan until its workforce analysis is complete.
In the meantime,
23 U. S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management,
GAO- 02- 373SP (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 15, 2002). USAID*s Strategies to
Address Critical Skill Gaps Are Not Comprehensive
Page 20 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning the current civil service
plan calls for hiring about 15 Presidential Management Interns a year,
allowing offices to replace civil service staff in
accordance with approved reorganization plans, and hiring above
established ceilings for critical staff needs, such as contracts officers.
USAID also has not yet developed workforce plans for its personal services
contractors, who make up the majority of its workforce, although USAID
plans to do so in response to a recommendation by its Inspector General.
24 In addition to its recruitment efforts, USAID has revived certain
training
programs that were halted during the 1990s, such as executive leadership
training and management programs. However, these target mostly senior
management, according to a USAID survey of civil service employees. In
responding to our draft, USAID noted that its leadership training is
conducted at three levels* emerging, senior, and executive* and that its
challenge is to broaden such training and make it more available. USAID
also noted that it needs to offer entry- level training to all staff, not
just foreign service officers. In addition, the agency is revising its
training curriculum to provide more online training opportunities for all
staff.
USAID*s personnel information system has not always provided accurate
data, and the agency has not undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the
skills and competencies of its current staff and matched this data to
future requirements. As a result, USAID cannot ensure that its recruitment
plans
accurately reflect its hiring needs. Since 1999, missions have been
required to submit staffing projections as part of USAID*s annual report
and budget justification process. The human resource office uses this
information to develop its annual foreign service recruitment and training
plans. According to a human resource official, the recent overseas
staffing assessment will result in better guidance to the field and to
headquarters offices on reporting their staffing needs.
Because USAID*s human capital strategy is still in draft and not yet
approved, we cannot comment on whether its action plan will have specific
timetables and indicators to evaluate its progress in meeting its human
capital goals and to help ensure that these efforts continue under the
leadership of successive administrators. Strategic workforce planning 24
Inspector General report, 9- 000- 03- 002- P. USAID employs 116 personal
services
contractors at its headquarters in Washington, D. C. and 5,124 at its
overseas missions. USAID Has Not Created a
System to Monitor and Evaluate Its Progress
Page 21 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning entails the development and
use of indicators to measure both the progress in achieving human capital
goals and how the outcomes of these
strategies can help an organization accomplish its mission and
programmatic goals. USAID has had difficulties in defining practical,
meaningful measures that assess the impact of human capital strategies on
program results. For example, USAID*s fiscal year 2002 performance plan
continues to emphasize the agency*s efforts to achieve activity- oriented
goals, such as the number of employees hired or trained, but these
measures do not help gauge how well USAID*s human capital efforts helped
the agency achieve its programmatic goals. As a result, the link between
specific human capital strategies and strategic program outcomes is not
clear. USAID has evolved from an agency consisting primarily of U. S.
direct- hire
foreign service officers who directly implemented development projects to
one in which foreign service officers manage and oversee development
programs and projects carried out by institutional contractors and
grantees. Since 1992, the number of U. S. direct- hire staff has decreased
by 37 percent, but the number of countries with USAID programs has almost
doubled. In addition, USAID program funding increased 57 percent in fiscal
years 2002 and 2003. As a result, USAID has increasingly relied on
contractor staff* primarily personal services contractors* to manage its
day- to- day activities overseas. In addition to having fewer U. S.
direct- hire foreign service officers to provide direction and
accountability for its foreign assistance programs, USAID operates in
overseas environments that present unique challenges to its ability to
manage a quality workforce. With fewer and less experienced U. S. direct-
hire staff managing increasing levels of foreign assistance in more
countries, along with expected increases in program funds for Afghanistan
and Iraq, significant funding increases for the global initiative to fight
human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immune deficiency, and potential
USAID involvement in the Millennium Challenge Account, USAID*s ability to
provide oversight over its foreign assistance activities and pursue U. S.
foreign policy objectives is becoming increasingly difficult. Because
USAID has not adopted a strategic approach to workforce planning and
management, it cannot ensure that it has addressed these challenges
appropriately and identified the right skill mix and competencies needed
to carry out its development
assistance programs. Conclusions
Page 22 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning To help ensure that USAID
can identify its future workforce needs and pursue strategies that will
help its workforce achieve the agency*s goals, we recommend that the USAID
Administrator develop and institutionalize
a strategic workforce planning and management system that reflects current
workforce planning principles. This effort should include the
implementation of a reliable personnel information system, an agencywide
assessment of staff*s skills and abilities, workforce strategies that
address identified staffing gaps in the foreign and civil services, and a
periodic evaluation of how these efforts contribute toward the achievement
of the agency*s program goals.
To determine how workforce changes have affected USAID*s ability to carry
out its mission, we reviewed the agency*s workforce planning documents and
a number of internal and external reports on USAID*s human capital and
workforce planning issues. We also interviewed knowledgeable USAID
officials representing the agency*s regional, technical, and management
bureaus in Washington, D. C., and conducted fieldwork at seven overseas
missions* the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Mali, Peru, Senegal, and
the West Africa Regional Program in Mali. 25 To ensure consistency in our
data collection efforts, we used the same
data collection instrument at each location. 26 We also administered a
separate data collection instrument at USAID*s human resource office in
Washington, D. C. In examining the changes in USAID*s workforce since
1990, we analyzed personnel data provided by USAID and internal and
external reports on the changing roles of USAID*s workforce. We did not
formally verify the accuracy of USAID*s data; however, we noted in our
findings that USAID*s personnel data were not entirely accurate, complete,
or up to date.
To examine USAID*s progress in developing and implementing a strategic
workforce planning system, we evaluated the agency*s efforts in terms of
principles used by leading organizations that we identified through our
work with the Office of Personnel Management, other U. S. government
agencies, the National Academy for Public Administration, and the
25 We also examined mission workforce documents and interviewed officials
at USAID*s mission to Indonesia. The mission was relocated to Arlington,
Virginia, following its evacuation in October 2002. It has since been
relocated back to Indonesia.
26 We did not use the data collection instrument on our visit to the
Dominican Republic, which we visited in November 2002 to conduct survey
work and test our audit approach. Recommendations for
Executive Action Scope and Methodology
Page 23 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning International Personnel
Management Association. We analyzed USAID*s workforce planning documents,
reviewed internal and external reports on
its human capital and workforce planning efforts, and interviewed
cognizant USAID officials at its Bureau for Management and its Bureau for
Policy and Program Coordination.
We conducted our work between July 2002 and June 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. III).
It concurred with our major findings and recommendations and noted that
our work grasped the agency*s complex human capital situation. USAID also
reiterated that it recently established a working group to carry out an
integrated workforce analysis and planning effort. According to USAID,
this effort will assess the critical skills and competencies of its
workforce, identify the gaps between what the agency currently has and
what it will need in the future, and design workforce strategies to fill
those gaps. USAID also provided separate technical comments on our draft,
which we have incorporated as appropriate.
As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of this
report for 30 days from the date of the report unless you publicly
announce its contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies to
interested congressional committees and to the Administrator, USAID; the
Secretary of State; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no extra charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www. gao. gov. Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 24 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning If you or your staff have
any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 4128 or
at FordJ@ gao. gov. Other contacts and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix IV. Jess T. Ford, Director
International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Selected Reports Related to USAID*s Workforce Planning
Page 25 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Report Findings
Recommendations
Quainton, Anthony C. E. and Fulmer, Amanda M., Human Capital Reform: 21st
Century for USAID (Virginia, IBM Endowment for the Business of Government:
March 2003).
USAID needs increased workforce planning, greater focus on recruitment,
more training opportunities, and increased retention.
Human resources department is not effective.
Strengthen workforce planning and better link workforce planning to the
agency*s mission.
USAID Office of the Inspector General.
Audit of USAID*s Human Capital Data,
Audit Report Number 9- 000- 03- 002- P (Washington, D. C.: Dec. 20, 2002).
USAID*s human capital data collected and maintained was not up to date,
consistent, totally accurate, or complete.
Develop definitions and requirements so reported data is on time,
consistent, accurate, and complete.
Provide training for staff members who enter and correct personnel data.
Develop procedures for missions to attest to the accuracy of their
workforce data.
Institute process to collect data on the reasons for employee attrition.
Develop workforce plans for USAID*s civil
and nondirect- hire workforce. USAID Office of the Inspector General,
Audit of USAID*s Workforce Planning for Procurement Officers, Audit Report
Number 9- 000- 03- 001- P (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 13, 2002).
USAID has not developed a comprehensive workforce plan that covers its
entire procurement workforce.
USAID needs to develop a comprehensive workforce plan for the USAID
procurement workforce.
U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery
Program Addressed Intended Purposes but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to
Improve Its Response Capability, GAO- 02- 787 (Washington, D. C.: July 24,
2002).
Start- up challenges and obstacles affected the initial pace of program
implementation. USAID lacked a *surge capacity* to
quickly design and implement a largescale program with relatively short
time frames.
Implement procedures to (1) allow USAID to quickly reassign key
personnel, (2) allow missions to expedite the hiring of contractor staff,
and (3) facilitate coordination with other U. S. government agencies
involved in reconstruction.
U. S. Agency for International Development, USAID*s Workforce Analysis
(Washington, D. C.: June 29, 2001).
Short- term budget matters take precedence over long- term workforce
planning needs.
Lack of training.
Limited hiring of entry- level staff.
Agency*s program budget increased, but its workforce decreased for 10
years.
Foreign and civil service new hires must possess managerial and
analytical skills.
Agency must decide what skills should be hired and what should be
contracted.
U. S. Agency for International Development, Human Resources Business Area
Analysis: Executive Summary (Washington, D. C.: August 1995).
USAID has significant barriers to workforce planning.
Establish a workforce planning committee to identify program needs on a
continuing basis.
Reduce the number of personnel backstops and develop qualifications in
multiple skills categories.
Create an inventory of staff work history, experience, skills, and
abilities. Adopt a single unified personnel system.
Appendix I: Selected Reports Related to USAID*s Workforce Planning
Appendix I: Selected Reports Related to USAID*s Workforce Planning
Page 26 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Report Findings
Recommendations
U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: AID Strategic
Direction and Continued Management Improvements Needed, GAO/ NSIAD- 93-
106 (Washington, D. C.: June 11, 1993).
Responsibilities of workforce are changing.
Workforce lacked needed skills.
USAID had not adequately planned for workforce needs.
Ineffective placement, training, and recruitment constrained workforce
management.
Develop and implement a comprehensive workforce planning and management
capability as a systematic, agencywide effort.
Institutionalize this capability to ensure its continuation by
successive administrations.
U. S. Agency for International Development, Workforce Planning Working
Group Report (Washington,
D. C.: 1991)
USAID does not have an effective workforce planning system.
Determine the desired general composition of the direct- hire workforce
and develop a plan for reshaping the workforce along those lines.
Conduct an individual skills profile of the existing workforce and
analyze it in the context of the desired general composition of the
direct- hire workforce.
Restructure the personnel backstop system to simplify, reduce, and
thereby broaden categories.
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign Assistance Programs Locations
Page 27 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Countries Receiving USAID
Assistance with U. S. Direct- Hire Staff Presence Africa Region Angola
Benin
Democratic Republic of Congo Eritrea Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Kenya Liberia
Madagascar Malawi Mali
Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Rwanda Senegal South Africa Tanzania Uganda
Zambia Zimbabwe Asia and the Near East Region Cambodia
East Timor Egypt Indonesia Jordan Lebanon Mongolia Morocco
Nepal Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Thailand West Bank and Gaza Yemen
Europe and Eurasia Region Albania
Armenia Azerbaijan Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Croatia Georgia Kazakhstan Kosovo
Kyrgyzstan Moldova Romania Russia Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro Yugoslav Republic of Serbia
Ukraine Uzbekistan Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign
Assistance Programs Locations
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign Assistance Programs Locations
Page 28 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Latin America and the
Caribbean Region
Bolivia Brazil Colombia Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala
Guyana Haiti
Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua
Panama Paraguay Peru
Countries Receiving USAID Assistance with No U. S. Direct- Hire Staff
Presence Africa Region Botswana
Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verdi Central Africa Republic Chad
Comoros Congo (Brazzaville) Cote d*Ivoire Equatorial Guinea
Gabon Guinea Bissau Lesotho
Mauritania Mauritius Niger Sao Tome Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan
Swaziland The Gambia Togo
Asia and the Near East Region Algeria Bahrain China Djibouti Hong Kong
Iraq Israel Kiribati Laos Malaysia Myanmar (Burma) Niue North Korea Oman
Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Singapore Solomon Islands South Korea Taiwan
Tajikistan Tonga Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Vanuatu
Vietnam
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign Assistance Programs Locations
Page 29 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Europe and Eurasia Region
Belarus Cyprus
Czech Republic Estonia Greece Hungary
Ireland and Northern Ireland Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
Anguilla Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Bahamas Barbados British Virgin
Islands Belize Cayman Islands Chile Costa Rica Cuba Dominica
Eastern Caribbean and Windward Islands Grenada Montserrat St. Kitts and
Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and
Tobago Turks and Caicos Islands Uruguay Venezuela
USAID Regional Service Platforms. Services include legal, executive
office, financial/ controller, procurement, and program and project
development support services. Services vary among the 26 platforms; for
example, the regional office in Kenya provides all services to up to 14
countries, while the Honduras mission simply shares a contracts officer
with Nicaragua. Africa Region Benin
Botswana - Regional Center for Southern Africa Ghana Guinea
Kenya - Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and
Southern Africa Mali - West African Regional
Program Senegal South Africa
Asia and the Near East Region Bangladesh Egypt India Indonesia
Jordan Pakistan Philippines Thailand - Regional Development
Office (planned)
Appendix II: USAID Worldwide Foreign Assistance Programs Locations
Page 30 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Europe and Eurasia Region
Georgia - Caucasus Regional Office Hungary - Regional Services Center
Kazakhstan - Central Asia Regional Office Ukraine - West/ Newly
Independent States Regional Office
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
Bolivia (La Paz) Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo) El Salvador (San
Salvador) Guatemala (Guatemala City) Honduras (Tegucigalpa) Peru (Lima)
Appendix III: Comments from the U. S. Agency for International Development
Page 31 GAO- 03- 946 USAID Workforce Planning Appendix III: Comments from
the U. S. Agency for International Development
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Page 32 GAO- 03- 946
USAID Workforce Planning Albert H. Huntington, III (202) 512- 4140 Audrey
Solis (202) 512- 3042
In addition to the above named individuals, Kimberley Ebner, Jeanette
Espinola, and Rhonda Horried made key contributions to this report. Martin
de Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Reid Lowe, and Jose M. Pena, III, provided
technical assistance. Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments
(320136)
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