Mine Safety: MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Ensuring the	 
Safety and Health of Coal Miners, but Its Programs Could Be	 
Strengthened (05-SEP-03, GAO-03-945).				 
                                                                 
Despite a drop in injury and fatality rates since the formation  
of the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health		 
Administration (MSHA), mining is still a dangerous industry.	 
Focusing on underground coal mines, GAO assessed how well MSHA	 
oversees its process for reviewing and approving critical types  
of mine plans and the extent to which MSHA's inspections and	 
accident investigations processes help ensure the safety and	 
health of underground coal miners.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-945 					        
    ACCNO:   A08315						        
  TITLE:     Mine Safety: MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Ensuring 
the Safety and Health of Coal Miners, but Its Programs Could Be  
Strengthened							 
     DATE:   09/05/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Coal mining					 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Mine safety					 
	     Mining						 
	     Mining accidents					 
	     Occupational health standards			 
	     Occupational safety				 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Safety standards					 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-03-945

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2003

MINE SAFETY

MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Ensuring the Safety and Health of Coal
                 Miners, but Its Programs Could Be Strengthened

GAO-03-945

Highlights of GAO-03-945, a report to congressional requesters

Despite a drop in injury and fatality rates since the formation of the
Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), mining
is still a dangerous industry.

Focusing on underground coal mines, GAO assessed how well MSHA oversees
its process for reviewing and approving critical types of mine plans and
the extent to which MSHA's inspections and accident investigations
processes help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners.

In order to provide better oversight over its operations, GAO recommends
that the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health

o  	monitor the timeliness of technical inspections conducted as part of
the 6-month review of certain mine plans,

o  	ensure that mine operators are correcting hazards identified during
inspections in a timely manner,

o  	develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of
qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, and

o  	revise the systems used to collect information on accidents and
investigations.

In its comments on the report, MSHA did not comment on our recommendations
but disagreed with many of the findings on which the recommendations are
based.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-945.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Bob Robertson at (202)
512-9889, [email protected].

September 2003

MINE SAFETY

MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Ensuring the Safety and Health of Coal
Miners, but Its Programs Could Be Strengthened

To help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners, MSHA
staff review and approve mine plans, conduct inspections, and investigate
serious accidents. In these three areas, GAO found that MSHA has extensive
procedures and qualified staff. However, MSHA can improve its oversight,
guidance, and human capital planning efforts.

MSHA is not effectively monitoring a few key areas. MSHA headquarters does
not ensure that 6-month technical inspections of ventilation and roof
support plans are being completed in a timely fashion. This may lead to
mines operating without up-to-date plans or mine operators not following
all requirements of the plans. Additionally, MSHA officials do not always
ensure that hazards found during inspections are corrected promptly. Gaps
were found in the information that MSHA uses to monitor fatal and nonfatal
injuries, limiting trend analysis and agency oversight. Specifically, the
agency does not collect information on hours worked by independent
contractor staff needed to compute fatality and nonfatal injury rates for
specific mines, and it is difficult to link information on accidents at
underground coal mines with MSHA's investigations.

Guidance provided by MSHA management to agency employees could be
strengthened. Some inspection procedures are unclear and are contained in
many sources, leading to differing interpretations by mine inspectors. The
guidance on coordinating inspections conducted by specialists and regular
inspectors is also unclear, resulting in some duplication of effort.

Finally, although about 44 percent of MSHA's underground coal mine
inspectors will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years, the agency has
no plan for replacing them or using other human capital flexibilities
available to the agency to retain its highly qualified and trained
inspectors. The potential shortage of inspectors may limit MSHA's ability
to ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners.

Miners Exiting an Underground Coal Mine

Contents

Letter

Results in Brief
Background
MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Approving Mine Plans, but

Does Not Provide Adequate Oversight of the Approval Process

MSHA Has Extensive Procedures, Highly Qualified Staff, and Conducts Most
Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Its Inspection Process Could Be
Improved

MSHA Has a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Accident Investigations,
but Does Not Fully Utilize It to Prevent Future Accidents

Conclusions
Recommendations
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      3 6

11

18

27 30 31 32

Appendix I 	MSHA's Approval Process for Ventilation and Roof Support Plans

Appendix II MSHA's Approval Process for Impoundment Plans

      Appendix III         Comments from the Department of Labor           38 
                                       GAO Comments                        47 
       Appendix IV     GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments              51 
                                       GAO Contacts                        51 
                                   Staff Acknowledgments                   51 

Tables

Table 1: Number of Staff Assigned to Each District Office, May 31, 2003 11
Table 2: Quarterly Inspections of Underground Coal Mines, Fiscal Years
1993 to 2002 20

Table 3: Number of Underground Coal Mine Inspectors Assigned to Each
District Office, Percentage Eligible to Retire in the Next 5 Years, and
Number of Inspector Trainees in Each District, July 2003

Figures

Figure 1: Number of Coal Mines and Mine Workers, 1993 to 2002 6 Figure 2:
Fatality Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines, 1993 to 2002 8
Figure 3: Nonfatal Injury Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines,
1993 to 2002 9 Figure 4: Miners Working in "Low Coal" (a Mine No More Than
40" High) 10

Figure 5: Percentage of All Citations Issued from 1993 to 2002 for Which
Inspectors Did Not Follow Up by the Specified Deadlines 21

Figure 6: Contractor Staff as a Percentage of All Workers in Underground
Coal Mines 26

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

September 5, 2003

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions United States Senate

The Honorable Arlen Specter

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Harkin

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Committee
on Appropriations United States Senate

Last year at the Quecreek mine in Pennsylvania, a group of nine coal
miners accidentally broke through to an abandoned mine not shown on their
map and were trapped underground for 3 days. Although they were eventually
rescued, this event and other more tragic mining accidents, including the
explosion in 2001 at a mine in Alabama in which 13 miners were killed,
serve as a reminder that the safety and health of the thousands of men and
women who mine the coal in over 2,000 mines that is used to produce over
half of the country's electricity must be protected. In passing the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the "Mine Act"), Congress gave
much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety and health of mine
workers to the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA). Since that time, the nation's mines have become safer-in the past
25 years, both the number and the rate of deaths and nonfatal injuries
have declined. However, despite these trends, mining remains a dangerous
industry. Data collected by MSHA on serious injuries (those involving days
away from work) indicate that mining, particularly underground coal
mining, is one of the most dangerous industries in the United States.

Under the stringent requirements of the Mine Act, MSHA protects the health
and safety of miners by inspecting each underground coal mine at least
four times a year, citing mine operators for violations of the act or
regulations, ensuring that hazards are quickly corrected, restricting
operations or closing mines for serious violations, and investigating

serious mine accidents. In addition, MSHA must approve the initial plans
that mine operators prepare for essential systems that protect mine
workers-such as ventilation and roof support systems-and revisions to the
plans. As part of its review of these plans, MSHA conducts technical
inspections of the mines every 6 months to determine whether mine
operators are following the plans and whether the plans have been updated.
These technical inspections are conducted in addition to the comprehensive
quarterly inspections1 of each mine. MSHA's headquarters office is
responsible for managing the operations of the agency and monitoring the
activities of the 11 district offices responsible for protecting safety
and health at coal mines nationwide. The district offices have day-to-day
responsibility for reviewing and approving mine plans, conducting
inspections, and investigating mine accidents. To carry out all of these
responsibilities, MSHA received an appropriation for fiscal year 2003 of
almost $273 million. This included funding for the approximately 350
inspectors who are responsible for inspecting underground and surface coal
mines and investigating mine accidents and the 210 specialists who are
responsible for reviewing and approving mine plans, conducting technical
inspections of mine plans, and participating in investigations of mine
accidents.

You asked us to provide you with information on MSHA's efforts by
assessing (1) how well MSHA oversees its process for reviewing and
approving three critical types of mine plans, (2) the extent to which
MSHA's inspection process helps ensure the safety and health of mine
workers, and (3) the extent to which MSHA uses its accident investigations
process to improve the future safety and health of mine workers.

We reviewed MSHA's policies and procedures, interviewed agency officials,
and analyzed data obtained from computer files and documents

1Although the Mine Act does not require MSHA to conduct these
comprehensive inspections each quarter-it only requires four annual
inspections-MSHA policy is to inspect each underground coal mine once each
quarter, and many MSHA staff refer to them as quarterly inspections. MSHA
also refers to these comprehensive inspections as "AAA" inspections
because this is the code to which time spent on these inspections is
charged.

  Results in Brief

at the agency's headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.2 We also reviewed
documents and interviewed officials at the National Mine Health and Safety
Academy in Beckley, West Virginia (Mine Academy); the Pittsburgh Safety
and Health Technology Center in Bruceton, Pennsylvania (Technology
Center); and 5 of MSHA's 11 district offices. In order to include a review
of the districts' accident investigations, we selected districts in which
serious accidents had occurred in the past 5 years. We visited several
underground coal mines and interviewed mine operators and workers at these
mines. In addition, we obtained documents from and interviewed officials
with industry associations, including the United Mine Workers of America
and the National Mining Association. We conducted our work between
November 2002 and July 2003 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

Although MSHA devotes substantial effort to reviewing and approving mine
plans, it does not provide adequate oversight of the plan approval
process. MSHA has extensive procedures for approving mine plans and, for
two of the three types of plans we reviewed-ventilation and roof support3
plans-has assigned highly qualified staff to the review and approval
process and approves plans submitted by mine operators on a timely basis.
However, MSHA headquarters does not monitor completion of the 6-month
technical inspections that district offices conduct in order to verify
that mine operators are updating the plans as required and following all
of the plans' requirements. As a result, some mines may be operating
without adequate ventilation or roof support systems, which could directly
affect the safety and health of mine workers. For example, data submitted
by the district offices to MSHA headquarters indicate that 5 of the 11
districts had not completed technical inspections of the mines'
ventilation plans during most quarters of the most recent 5-year period,
including several quarters in which they had not completed over 50 percent
of the inspections. MSHA headquarters also has not provided adequate
oversight of district office operations by providing clear guidance on how
to coordinate technical inspections with its quarterly

2Much of the data we analyzed was provided in a database assembled by MSHA
at our request. MSHA provided information from several of its databases on
the types of mines, the number of employees and hours worked, the number
and types of accidents and injuries, and on the number and types of
inspections, violations, and fines. Through interviews and electronic
testing, we concluded that the database provided by MSHA was reliable for
our work.

3MSHA refers to these plans as "roof control" plans.

inspections of mines. For example, in one of the district offices we
visited, both the specialists who conduct technical inspections and
regular inspectors spent several days inspecting ventilation systems in
the district's mines during separate inspections. If they had coordinated
these inspections, many hours of duplicate work could have been avoided.
Finally, many of the plans for containing debris produced by mines are not
approved on a timely basis because MSHA lacks qualified staff for
reviewing and approving these complex plans. However, MSHA has recognized
this problem and has developed a plan for hiring additional staff in order
to eliminate delays.

MSHA has extensive procedures for conducting inspections of mines, highly
trained and experienced staff, and conducts most annual mine inspections
as required, but the extent to which the inspection process helps ensure
the safety and health of mine workers is limited by several factors.
First, although MSHA's procedures for inspecting underground coal mines
are quite comprehensive, some of the procedures are unclear, resulting in
inconsistent interpretations of the procedures by inspectors, and the
procedures are dispersed throughout so many different sources that they
are sometimes hard to find. For example, the definition of what
constitutes a more serious safety and health violation-those classified as
"significant and substantial"-is not clear, and inspectors often differ on
which violations to categorize in this manner. Second, although MSHA
conducts most quarterly inspections as required, MSHA headquarters does
not provide adequate oversight to ensure that the district offices follow
through on unsafe conditions identified during inspections, making sure
that mine operators correct the conditions by the deadlines set by the
inspectors. Using MSHA's inspections data, we found that, over the past 10
years, almost half of the violations for which MSHA inspectors issued
citations, including almost half of the more serious violations, were not
corrected by the required deadlines. Third, although MSHA has many well
trained and experienced staff, it has no plan for addressing the fact that
about 44 percent of its inspectors will be eligible to retire in the next
5 years. This is especially important because it takes at least 18 months
of classroom and on-the-job training for new inspectors to meet the
minimum requirements of the job. Finally, MSHA does not collect all of the
information it needs to compute fatal and nonfatal injury rates in order
to assess the effectiveness of its enforcement activities because the data
it collects do not include information on contractor staff who work at
each mine. Although the regulations require independent contractors to
report injuries and the number of hours worked by their staff at specific
mines, MSHA issued guidance in 1981 stating that the employment reporting
requirement for certain independent contractors would be limited so that

they need only report information in the aggregate for all mines. Since
that time, the percentage of contractor staff has increased from about 5
percent of all underground coal mine workers to about 18 percent, and the
percentage of mine workers represented by contractor staff who incurred
nonfatal injuries in underground coal mines increased steadily over the
most recent 10-year period, 1993 to 2002.

MSHA has a comprehensive process for conducting investigations of mine
accidents, but it does not use the process to the fullest extent possible
to improve the future safety and health of mine workers. MSHA has
extensive procedures for conducting investigations, uses experienced and
specially trained staff to conduct them, and monitors the quality of the
investigations and resulting reports. However, weaknesses in the databases
MSHA uses to track mine accidents and accident investigations limit its
ability to monitor trends in mine hazards and ensure that all serious
accidents are investigated. Specifically, it is difficult to associate
injuries with specific accidents or investigations of these accidents,
monitor trends in the types of hazards that cause injuries, or determine
the extent to which districts are investigating accidents. For example,
although MSHA can identify the total number of individuals who were
injured by roof falls during a specific period, it cannot easily determine
how many accidents were caused by roof falls during the period or how many
of these roof falls were investigated, information that could help the
agency in its efforts to prevent future accidents.

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Labor to improve MSHA's
ability to protect the safety and health of miners. These recommendations
should help MSHA provide better oversight over its operations and use its
resources more effectively by improving its mine plan review and approval,
inspections, and accident investigation processes. In commenting on a
draft of this report, MSHA officials did not comment on our
recommendations but disagreed with the findings on which several of our
recommendations are predicated. For example, MSHA disagreed with our
findings regarding district offices' timely completion of technical
inspections related to mine plans, the agency's lack of a plan for
addressing the large number of inspectors eligible to retire in the next 5
years, and weaknesses in the databases used to track mine accidents and
accident investigations. MSHA also provided a few technical comments and
clarifications, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. Our
summary evaluation of the agency's comments is shown on pages 32 and 33.
MSHA's comments and our detailed responses are provided in full in
appendix III.

Background

As of the end of calendar year 2002, the United States had approximately
2,050 coal mines-about 700 underground coal mines and 1,350 surface mines.
Over the past 10 years, the number of underground and surface coal mines
in the United States has declined: from approximately 1,300 underground
mines in 1993 to just over 700 mines in 2002, and from over 2,100 surface
mines in 1993 to about 1,300 in 2002. Over that same period, the number of
mine workers also decreased; from over 62,500 underground coal mine
workers in 1993 to about 45,500 in 2002 and from over 74,000 surface coal
miners in 1993 to about 62,000 in 2002. As shown in figure 1, the number
of coal mines and mine workers declined from 1993 to 2002.

Figure 1: Number of Coal Mines and Mine Workers, 1993 to 2002

Miners Mines 80,000 2,500

70,000

2,000 60,000

50,000 1,500

40,000

30,000 1,000

20,000 500

10,000

00 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Year

Underground coal miners
Surface coal miners
Number of surface coal mines
Number of underground coal mines

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.

These mines produced over 1 billion tons of coal in 2002, about one-third
by underground mines. Despite the decrease in the number of mines and
miners from 1993 to 2002, production has remained constant because of the
increased use of mechanized mining equipment and more efficient mining
techniques. In addition, over the past several decades, coal production
has shifted from primarily underground mines to large surface mines,
including mines in Wyoming and other areas west of the Mississippi that
produce millions of tons of coal annually. The 20 largest coal companies
account for 70 percent of all coal that is produced in the United States.

Some underground mines do not actively produce coal all year. Some mines
are only operated seasonally because of local weather conditions, and mine
operators often suspend operations at smaller, less cost-effective mines
when the price of coal drops below a certain level. MSHA is required to
inspect inactive mines as long as some miners are still working at the
mine; however, these inspections generally take substantially less time
than inspections of active mines.

Both the fatality rates and the nonfatal injury rates-the number of
fatalities and injuries for every 200,000 hours worked-are higher for
underground coal mines than surface mines. As shown in figure 2, our
analysis of MSHA's data on fatalities for the 10-year period from 1993 to
2002 indicated that the fatality rates for underground coal mines were
much higher than those for surface mines for this period.

Figure 2: Fatality Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines, 1993 to
2002

Fatality ratea 0.08

0.07

0.06

0.05

0.04

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.00 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Year

Fatality rate for underground coal mines

Fatality rate for surface coal mines Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.
aNumber of fatalities for every 200,000 hours worked.

For 1993 to 2002, nonfatal injury rates for underground coal mines were
higher than those for surface mines, as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3: Nonfatal Injury Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines,
1993 to 2002

Nonfatal injury ratea

10.0

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

1.0 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Year

Nonfatal injury rate for underground coal mines

Nonfatal injury rate for surface coal mines

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.

aNumber of nonfatal injuries for every 200,000 hours worked.

A variety of factors contribute to underground coal mines being more
dangerous than surface mines. One factor is that many underground coal
mines are less than 40 inches high, requiring miners to kneel, crawl, or
crouch in the mine throughout their work shifts. In some cases, the
workspace is so small that the large machinery used to mine the coal takes
up most of the space in the passageway, as shown in figure 4.

Figure 4: Miners Working in "Low Coal" (a Mine No More Than 40" High)

Source: MSHA.

Another critical factor that contributes to the hazardous working
conditions is methane gas, which is highly explosive. It is often produced
in large quantities when coal is extracted from underground mines.
Additional factors are the geological conditions in many areas of the
country that make the roofs of mines unstable, the danger posed by fire in
an underground mine, coal and silica dust that can cause silicosis and
pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), and the close proximity of unknown
areas of abandoned mines, which can lead to flooding of the mine, as it
did at the Quecreek mine last year.

MSHA's Coal Administration's headquarters is located in Arlington,
Virginia, and 8 of its 11 district offices are located in the eastern
United States near coal seams located in or near the Appalachian
Mountains. As shown in table 1, as of May 2003, MSHA's 11 districts had a
total of 1,017 staff who were responsible for protecting the safety and
health of mine workers nationwide, including 283 inspectors and 200
specialists assigned specifically to underground coal mines. In addition
to the district office staff, MSHA had 38 headquarters staff members
assigned to coal mine safety and health, for a total of 1,055 staff.

Table 1: Number of Staff Assigned to Each District Office, May 31, 2003 District
                                     office

                         One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine Ten Eleven Total 
        Managers           7  16    16   24   18  18    17    11   14  12      7   160 
 Underground inspectors    5  30    22   61   23  44    30    20   27  14      7   283 
Underground specialists    8  21    19   31   21  14    33    14   15  11     13   200 
Surface inspectors      7  10     6    9    7  11    10     2    5   2      2 
  Surface specialists      0   0     2    4    0   2     1     0    0   1      0 
        Trainees           0   0     8    5   11   7     5     2    1   0      5 
  Subtotal-enforcement    20  61    57 110    62 78     79    38   48  28     27   608 
         staff                                                                   
    Technical staff        1   0     2    6    5   4     6     1    2   2      2 
  Enforcement support      1   2     3    9    2   3     2     2    1   0      0 
     Office support        4  15    13   24   14  16    17    10    3   6      3   125 
 Administrative support    3   5     3    5    5   6     5     5   14   3      4 
Subtotal-non-enforcement   9  22    21   44   26  29    30    18   20  11      9   239 
         Othera            0   0     2    0    2   3     1     1    0   1      0 
         Total            36  99    96 178  108  128   127    68   82  52     43 1,017 

     Source: Monthly staffing report dated May 31, 2003, obtained from MSHA
                            headquarters officials.

  MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Approving Mine Plans, but Does Not Provide
  Adequate Oversight of the Approval Process

a"Other" includes students and part-time employees.

MSHA has extensive procedures and highly qualified staff for approving two
of the three types of plans we reviewed-ventilation and roof support
plans-and most of these plans are reviewed and approved on a timely basis.
However, MSHA headquarters does not adequately monitor completion of
6-month technical inspections conducted as part of the districts' review
of ventilation and roof support plans; data maintained by the district
offices indicate that some districts are not completing these inspections
in a timely manner. In addition, MSHA headquarters has not provided clear
guidance to the districts on coordinating technical inspections related to
mine plans with quarterly inspections of underground coal mines in order
to avoid duplication of effort by district staff. Finally, staffing
shortages have prevented MSHA from reviewing and approving plans for
containing debris produced by the mines on a timely basis.

MSHA Has Extensive Procedures and Highly Qualified Staff for Approving
Ventilation and Roof Support Plans

MSHA has extensive procedures for approving ventilation and roof support
plans. The Mine Act and its implementing regulations contain many of the
requirements for approving ventilation and roof support plans. Additional
procedures are contained in MSHA's Program Policy Manual, ventilation and
roof support plan approval procedures handbooks, and the standard
operating procedures for each district office. These procedures provide
specific steps for approving the ventilation and roof support plans
submitted by mine operators to MSHA for approval. Mine operators are
required to submit their initial ventilation and roof support plans to the
MSHA district in which the mine is located for approval prior to operating
a mine and are required to submit revised plans to the district whenever
significant changes are made to the plans. The district managers are
ultimately responsible for approving ventilation and roof support plans
submitted to their districts. Generally, districts are required to approve
ventilation and roof support plans within 45 days of receipt unless
problems are found that must be resolved. In some of the districts we
visited, state mine agencies were also required to approve the mine plans.
See appendix I for additional information on MSHA's approval process for
ventilation and roof support plans.

Specialists assigned to each district office to review and approve mine
plans are generally highly trained and experienced. MSHA currently has 200
underground specialists assigned to its 11 district offices who review
ventilation, roof support, and other types of mine plans. A majority of
the specialists assigned to underground mines have at least 5 years of
experience in mining and were former inspectors of underground coal mines.
As such, they receive 25 weeks of underground coal mine inspector training
at the Mine Academy as well as on-the-job training, which qualifies them
to conduct inspections and write citations for safety and health
violations. In addition, most specialists have several years of experience
as inspectors before applying for specialist positions. Each specialist is
also required to take a minimum of 2 weeks of training in mine safety and
health, such as specialized training on ventilation or roof support
systems, every 2 years.

Most district offices approve ventilation and roof support plans within
the required 45-day period. District offices track the review and approval
of ventilation and roof support plans, noting the date mine operators
submit the plans to the district, the dates plans are assigned to
specialists for review, and the dates the plans are approved. We reviewed
this information for the most recent 5-year period, 1998 to 2002, and
found that most districts approve these plans on a timely basis.

MSHA Does Not Ensure Districts Are Completing Technical Inspections of
Mine Plans

MSHA headquarters does not adequately monitor completion of 6-month
technical inspections of ventilation and roof support plans by the
district offices. Districts conduct technical inspections of the
ventilation and roof support plans at least once every 6 months in order
to ensure that mine operators are updating the plans to reflect changes in
the ventilation and roof support systems and following the requirements of
the plans. The specialists who review the mine plans during the approval
process also conduct many of these technical inspections.

Our analysis of the information submitted by the district offices to MSHA
headquarters on the timeliness of 6-month technical inspections of mines'
ventilation and roof support plans for the most recent 5-year period, 1998
to 2002, indicated that several districts had not completed the
inspections as required by agency procedures.4 The data showed that,
although 6 of MSHA's 11 district offices completed the 6-month technical
inspections of ventilation plans for most quarters of the 5-year period, 5
districts did not, and 2 districts did not complete these inspections
during any quarter of the 5-year period.5 In addition, our analysis of the
data submitted by the district offices to MSHA headquarters on technical
inspections related to roof support plans for the same period showed that
3 of the 11 districts had not completed these inspections during most
quarters of the 5-year period.

As a result of districts not completing these 6-month technical
inspections in a timely manner, some mines may be operating without
adequate ventilation or roof support systems. Technical inspections of the
mines' ventilation and roof support plans are essential in ensuring
adequate airflow and controlling the accumulation of dust particles in
underground

4We analyzed the timeliness of these inspections by reviewing reports
prepared by the district offices from information in the databases they
use to track the timeliness of the plan approval process and related
technical inspections (the Mine Plan Approval System). Follow up telephone
conversations with district officials indicated that, while some of the
data showing districts had not completed their 6-month technical
inspections were accurate, other data were not. The officials told us
that, in some cases, the data in their systems were not current and that
the technical inspections had been completed. Therefore, while we can
confidently state that not every district is completing its 6-month
technical inspections in a timely manner, the reports-and the underlying
data on which they are based-do not enable us to give an exact statement
of the degree to which they did not complete the inspections as required.

5Although district offices conduct technical inspections of the
ventilation and roof support systems every 6 months, they conduct
inspections throughout the year and collect and report data on the
completion of these inspections for each quarter of the year.

coal mines and that the roofs are adequately supported. Inadequate
ventilation systems or roof support systems can directly affect the safety
and health of mine workers. For example, our review of MSHA's data on
fatalities at underground coal mines from 1998 to 2002 showed that
problems related to ventilation and roof support systems accounted for
high proportions of fatalities in underground coal mines. For this 5-year
period, ignitions or explosions from excessive gas or coal dust accounted
for the third largest percentage of all fatalities, 14 percent, and roof
falls accounted for the largest percentage, 34 percent.

Officials at MSHA headquarters initially were not aware that these
inspections had not all been completed in a timely manner and contacted
the district offices to find out why. We also contacted several districts
and, according to district officials, all technical inspections related to
the mines' ventilation and roof support plans had been conducted, but not
all of the inspections were completed within the 6-month time frame. In
addition, officials in the 5 districts in which the data indicated that
technical inspections had not been completed in almost every quarter of
the 5-year period we reviewed-districts 1, 2, 4, 9, and 10-told us that
information in their databases was not accurate and that most inspections
had been completed within the 6-month time frame. However, they were not
able to explain why they had not corrected the information in their
databases on completion of the 6-month technical inspections.

Headquarters officials told us that ensuring the timely completion of
technical inspections would be included in one of the agency's new
initiatives. As part of this initiative, which was started in June 2003,
individuals from MSHA's Safety Division have been assigned to each one of
the 11 district offices and given responsibility for monitoring the
district's performance. These monitoring efforts include ensuring that the
district is conducting all inspections, tracking trends in the number and
rates of injuries and fatalities at the district's mines, and reviewing
the number and types of safety and health violations cited. In addition,
the Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health told us that MSHA plans
to incorporate the databases the districts use to track the completion of
6-month technical inspections of ventilation and roof control plans into
MSHA's overall data systems as part of its agencywide upgrade of MSHA's
databases. This part of the upgrade is currently planned for 2006.

MSHA Has Not Provided Clear Guidance to Districts on Coordinating
Inspections

MSHA headquarters has not provided clear guidance to its district offices
on coordinating technical inspections of mine plans with quarterly
inspections of underground coal mines in order to avoid duplication of
effort by district staff. Specialists who conduct on-site technical
inspections of underground coal mines related to mine plans often spend
several days inspecting the mines' ventilation and roof support systems.
For example, a ventilation specialist might spend several days walking
through the 30 to 50 miles of airways at large mines to test whether an
adequate amount of air is passing through the ventilation system and
ensure that the passageways are not blocked. Inspectors are required to
walk through these same airways during each quarterly inspection of the
mine. They may, however, rely on the work of specialists who conduct the
technical inspections, if the specialists coordinate their inspections
with the inspectors and charge their time to the quarterly inspections.
However, in 2 of the 5 districts we visited, we found that, in some
instances, specialists and inspectors were duplicating each other's work,
resulting in an inefficient use of MSHA's resources. In one of these
districts, because district management prohibited specialists from
charging their time to quarterly inspections, inspectors could not count
the time spent by specialists examining certain areas of the mines that
inspectors are required to examine as part of their quarterly inspections,
such as ventilation systems. Therefore, in this district, inspectors were
required to examine the same areas of the mines even when a specialist had
recently examined them. If the district had allowed the specialists to
coordinate with the inspectors and charge the time they spent examining
these systems to the quarterly inspections as in other districts, the
inspectors would not have been required to examine these same systems
again during the quarterly inspection. District officials told us it was
their understanding that MSHA's procedures prohibited them from charging
specialists' time to quarterly inspections, although MSHA headquarters
officials told us there was no such prohibition.

MSHA headquarters officials told us they have no procedures that require
specialists to coordinate technical inspections with quarterly inspections
in order to avoid duplication. They agreed that the policies and
procedures governing whether specialists may charge their time to
quarterly inspections are unclear and told us they plan to clarify the
procedures soon. In the interim, MSHA headquarters issued a memorandum to
the district offices in June 2003 encouraging them to better coordinate
inspections by specialists and inspectors.

MSHA Does Not Approve Plans for Containing Mine Debris on a Timely Basis

MSHA is responsible for approving plans for containing mine debris, called
impoundment plans.6 Many of these plans are extremely complex and require
highly qualified engineers who are familiar with technical areas such as
dam building techniques, hydrology, and soil conditions. Failure of an
impoundment can be devastating to nearby communities, which may be flooded
with water and sludge, and to the environment, affecting streams and water
supplies for years afterwards. Because of the potential for failure, such
as the impoundment dam failure in 1972 in Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, in
which 125 people were killed and 500 homes were destroyed,7 MSHA is
extremely careful about approving impoundment plans. MSHA has
responsibility for approximately 600 coal impoundments.

All but one of MSHA's district offices send most of their mines'
impoundment plans to the Mine Waste and Geotechnical Engineering Division
of MSHA's Safety and Health Technology Center, which the agency
established in 1973 to provide district offices with the technical
expertise needed to review impoundment plans. District staff review and
approve only plans that are less complex or contain only minor
modifications of existing impoundments. The one district that reviews its
own impoundment plans has a professional engineer with the qualifications
and experience needed to review such plans. See appendix II for additional
information on the process for reviewing and approving impoundment plans.

Many impoundment plans sent to the Technology Center are not approved on a
timely basis because MSHA does not have an adequate number of technical
staff needed to review these complex plans. The Technology Center has
historically faced staffing shortages that affect its ability to approve
impoundment plans on a timely basis. As a result, the backlog of
impoundment plans has grown-it now takes MSHA 2 to 3 years to approve most
plans and has taken as long as 5 years to approve some plans.8 In an
effort to address the growing backlog, MSHA developed an expedited process
for reviewing and approving impoundment plans in

6MSHA refers to the large embankment dams built to contain debris produced
by the mines (debris that consists mainly of water, rock, and coal) as
"impoundments."

7The Bureau of Mines had responsibility for overseeing impoundments at the
time of the Buffalo Creek disaster.

8These delays do not, for the most part, affect mines' operations because
most plans submitted to MSHA for approval are for modifications to
existing impoundments at mines that already have an impoundment in place.

order to avoid disruption of the mines' operations. This system, however,
added time to the approval process for plans that were not part of the
expedited process. In addition, because so many plans were expedited, a
backlog of expedited plans developed. For example, the number of regular
(not expedited) impoundment plans pending review almost doubled during the
3-year period from 1998 to 2001, from 124 plans to 245. In 2000, when the
expedited system was implemented, there were 69 expedited plans pending
review. By the following year, there were 148 expedited plans waiting to
be reviewed. During this period, engineers who left the Technology Center
were not always replaced because, according to MSHA officials, the agency
has had difficulty attracting civil engineers and certified professional
engineers at the salary levels offered.

MSHA conducted two reviews of its procedures for approving impoundment
plans and has begun to take steps for improving the process. The most
recent review identified several weaknesses in the procedures, including
the need for the agency to develop guidance for determining which
impoundment plans should receive expedited review as well as evaluating
the staffing levels needed to ensure timely and complete review of the
plans.9 MSHA officials acknowledged that the delays in the review and
approval of impoundment plans have been a problem for a number of years.
However, the officials told us that they have recently taken a number of
steps to alleviate these delays. First, they are in the process of hiring
additional engineers for the Technology Center to review impoundment plans
and provide assistance to staff in district offices. Second, to reduce the
backlog of plans, the Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health sent a
memorandum to all district managers in January 2003 encouraging them to
hire specialists with experience in civil engineering and have them review
less complex impoundment plans instead of sending them to the Technology
Center for review. Finally, MSHA has formed a committee to rewrite the
Impoundment Inspection Handbook, which the agency plans to issue in March
2004. According to MSHA headquarters officials, these new procedures will
bring more uniformity to the review and inspection process and will
eliminate a number of outdated and confusing procedures and policies. The
committee is also tasked with developing a system for rating the
complexity of impoundment plans. This rating system will establish

9In October 2000, the floor of an impoundment for a mine in Martin County,
Kentucky, broke through sealed underground areas of the mine, causing a
major coal waste spill in the surrounding community. Although the
impoundment dam did not fail, this event prompted MSHA to review its
processes for approving all impoundment plans.

  MSHA Has Extensive Procedures, Highly Qualified Staff, and Conducts Most
  Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Its Inspection Process Could Be
  Improved

criteria for districts to use in deciding which impoundment plans to
review in the district and which ones to send to the Technology Center for
review. Agency officials said they expect to have this rating system in
place no later than March 2004.

Although MSHA's procedures for conducting inspections of underground coal
mines are comprehensive, its inspectors are highly qualified, and it
conducts almost all quarterly inspections as required by MSHA policy, the
inspection process could be improved in a number of ways. Although MSHA
has extensive inspection procedures, some of them are unclear, while
others are difficult to locate because they are contained in so many
different sources. In addition, although MSHA conducted over 96 percent of
required quarterly inspections each year over the past 10 years, MSHA
headquarters does not provide adequate oversight to ensure that its
district offices follow through to make sure that unsafe conditions
identified during inspections are corrected. And, although MSHA has highly
qualified inspectors, it has no plan for addressing the fact that 44
percent of them will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years. Finally,
MSHA does not collect all of the information it needs to assess the
effectiveness of its enforcement efforts because it does not collect data
on independent contractor staff who work at each mine.

MSHA Has Extensive Procedures for Inspecting Mines, but Some Procedures
Are Unclear

MSHA has extensive procedures for inspecting mines. The two major sources
of inspection procedures are the policy manual and the inspection
handbook. In addition, MSHA issues many ad hoc procedures in formats such
as bulletins and memorandums. MSHA's procedures require inspectors to
follow many different steps in conducting quarterly inspections of mines.
These steps include, among many others, (1) walking all of the air
passages in the mine which, in a large mine, can total over 50 miles in
length; (2) taking samples of the mine environment, including air, dust,
and noise levels; (3) observing miners' work habits; and (4) reviewing the
mine operators' records of their own daily inspections of the mine.
Inspectors are also required to issue citations for any violations of the
law, health or safety standards, rules, orders, or regulations they
identify during inspections.

Although MSHA has extensive inspection procedures, some of them are
unclear and they are located in so many different sources that they can be
difficult to find. Some procedures do not clearly specify the criteria
inspectors should use in citing violations. For example, several district
officials in two of the districts we visited told us that the lack of
specific

criteria for floating coal dust10 makes it difficult to determine what is
an allowable level. As a result, mine inspectors must rely on their own
experience and personal opinion to determine if the accumulation of
floating coal dust is a safety hazard that constitutes a violation.
According to some of the inspectors we interviewed, this has led, in some
cases, to inconsistencies in inspectors' interpretations of the
procedures-some inspectors have cited violations for levels of floating
coal dust that have not brought citations from other inspectors. In
addition, the inspection procedures are located in so many different
handbooks, manuals, policy bulletins, policy letters, and memorandums that
it can be difficult for inspectors to make sure that they are using the
most recent guidance and procedures.

MSHA headquarters officials told us that they are working to clarify the
agency's procedures and consolidate the number of sources in which they
are located. For example, MSHA established a committee in February 2003 to
clarify and consolidate its inspection procedures, including developing a
checklist for inspections that will be available, along with the
procedures, to inspectors on their portable computers. These online
procedures will provide a single source of guidance for all types of coal
mine inspections. MSHA plans to have these new online inspection
procedures completed by late 2003.

MSHA Conducts Most Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Does Not Always
Follow Through to Ensure Unsafe Conditions Identified During Inspections
are Corrected

MSHA's data on its quarterly inspection completion rates indicates that,
of the over 2,000 quarterly inspections district offices are required to
conduct each year, they completed over 96 percent each year from fiscal
year 1993 to 2002, as shown in table 2.

10MSHA refers to this as "float" coal dust. It is extremely combustible
and can cause explosions in underground coal mines.

 Table 2: Quarterly Inspections of Underground Coal Mines, Fiscal Years 1993 to
             2002 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

  Number of quarterly inspections required 4,216 3,927 3,549 3,195 3,102 2,957
                            2,513 2,641 2,714 2,519

 Number of quarterly inspections completed 4,211 3,780 3,420 3,148 3,066 2,928
                            2,485 2,613 2,638 2,495

 Percent completed 99.9% 96.3% 96.4% 98.5% 98.8% 99.0% 98.9% 98.9% 97.2% 99.0%

Source: MSHA.

aNote: We were not able to independently verify MSHA's completion rates.

Although MSHA conducts almost all of the quarterly inspections as
required, MSHA headquarters does not monitor district office performance
to ensure that inspectors are following up with mine operators to
determine that unsafe conditions identified during inspections have been
corrected. During inspections of mines, MSHA's inspectors set deadlines
for the mine operators to correct the safety and health hazards violations
identified. The deadlines vary based on a number of factors-including the
degree of danger to miners affected by the violation-and range from 15
minutes from the time the inspector writes the citation to 27 days
afterwards. Deadlines can be a short as 15 minutes because some of the
hazards have the potential to quickly lead to serious injuries. MSHA's
procedures require inspectors to follow up with mine operators within the
deadline they set or to extend the deadline. Inspectors may extend the
deadlines under certain circumstances, such as when a mine has temporarily
shut down its operations or when a mine operator is unable to obtain a
part needed to correct a violation cited for a piece of equipment. MSHA
tracks all citations, deadlines for correction, and extensions of
deadlines in its Coal Management Information System.

Our analysis of MSHA's data for the most recent 10-year period, 1993 to
2002, indicated that, for almost half-48 percent-of the 536,966 citations
for which a deadline was established, inspectors did not follow up in a
timely manner to make sure mine operators had corrected the hazards.11
However, as shown in figure 5, of the 48 percent of the citations for
which the inspectors did not follow up in a timely manner, they followed
up on many citations within 4 days of the deadline and, for all but 11
percent of the citations, they followed up in less than two weeks to
verify that the mine operators had corrected the hazards identified during
inspections.

11MSHA does not set a deadline for correction of every type of violation.
For example, inspectors are not required to set a deadline for an order in
which the mine is closed due to "imminent danger."

Figure 5: Percentage of All Citations Issued from 1993 to 2002 for Which
Inspectors Did Not Follow Up by the Specified Deadlines

22%

Follow-up completed within 4 days after the deadline

15%

Follow-up completed within 13 days after the deadline

11%

Follow-up not completed until 14 or completed by more days after

the deadline the deadline

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.

Moreover, the more serious type of violations-"significant and
substantial" (S&S) violations-accounted for a significant proportion of
the citations for which inspectors did not follow up by the deadlines. For
the over 235,447 citations written for S&S violations from 1993 to 2002
for which a deadline was specified, inspectors did not follow up on more
than 48 percent of the citations by the deadline. However, inspectors
followed up on all but about 10 percent of the citations for S&S
violations within less than 14 days of the deadline.

MSHA headquarters and district officials told us that there are many
different reasons why inspectors may not follow up by the deadlines
specified in their citations. One of these, according to several district
officials, is scheduling conflicts that prevent inspectors from visiting
the mine within the specified deadline. In addition, there are
circumstances in which inspectors are not able to follow up, such as when
a mine operator suspends a mine's operations. However, in these instances,
the inspector should update the information in the database to extend the
deadline.

District officials we interviewed said that they are tracking the number
of citations for which inspectors have not followed up by the deadlines
and are taking steps to reduce this number. For example, officials in
District 6 told us that they are revising the process of scheduling mine
visits to improve the timeliness of follow up. In addition, MSHA
headquarters officials said that tracking the number of citations on which
inspectors

have not followed up in a timely manner in each district office is part of
their new initiative to better monitor district office performance that
began in June 2003.

We did not review the quality of MSHA's quarterly inspections. Some
inspectors and mine operators we interviewed at 2 of the 5 district
offices we visited, as well as officials from the United Mine Workers of
America headquarters, told us that staffing shortages sometimes cause MSHA
to rush its inspections at the end of the quarter. For example, inspectors
and a mine operator in one district told us that, last year, some of the
quarterly inspections were not completed until the end of the quarter and
that, in some cases, MSHA sent a large number of inspectors to a few of
the district's mines at the end of the quarter in order to complete the
inspections as required. MSHA headquarters officials said they were in the
process of balancing the workloads of the district offices in order to
address some of these staffing shortages. They also have begun hiring
additional inspectors for some districts.

MSHA Has Highly Trained and Experienced Staff, but Lacks a Plan for
Replacing the Large Number of Inspectors Who May Soon Retire

MSHA's mine inspectors are highly trained and experienced. Under the Mine
Act, inspectors are required to have, whenever possible, 5 years of
practical mining experience before being hired. Newly hired inspectors
receive a minimum of 18 months of classroom and on-the-job training before
qualifying to conduct inspections on their own. Classroom training for new
mine inspectors includes 25 weeks of instruction at MSHA's Mine Academy
provided in 3-and 4-week segments. The classroom training covers a wide
range of topics, from inspecting mine equipment to conducting tests of air
quality. In between attending classes at the Mine Academy, new inspectors
accompany experienced inspectors on mine inspections. Once they have
completed their training and are certified by the district office to which
they are assigned-a process that takes, on average, 18 to 24 months
according to MSHA officials-inspectors receive their Authorized
Representative credentials indicating that they are certified underground
Coal Mine Inspectors and are allowed to write citations. In addition to
their initial training, inspectors are required to take at least 2 weeks
of refresher training every 2 years. Finally, MSHA's current underground
coal mine inspectors have been with the agency, on average, for over 18
years and most had a number of years of mining experience prior to joining
MSHA. For example, each of the four inspectors we interviewed in one of
the districts we visited had at least 10 years of mining experience prior
to joining MSHA and had from 3 to 16 years' experience inspecting mines.

Although many of MSHA's highly trained and experienced underground coal
mine inspectors will be eligible to retire within the next 5 years, and
the agency's historic attrition rates indicate that many of them will
actually retire, the agency has not developed a plan for replacing these
inspectors. As shown in table 3, about 44 percent of MSHA's inspectors
will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years and, in 2 districts, a much
larger proportion will be eligible to retire. The table also shows that
districts have fewer inspector trainees on board than vacancies that will
need to be filled when inspectors retire. MSHA's historic attrition data
show that half of the individuals who are eligible for retirement actually
retire within 1 year of the date they are eligible and 85 percent retire
within 4 years.

Table 3: Number of Underground Coal Mine Inspectors Assigned to Each
District Office, Percentage Eligible to Retire in the Next 5 Years, and
Number of Inspector Trainees in Each District, July 2003

District office

                    One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine Ten    Total 
                                                                 Eleven 
      Number of                                                         
underground coal                                                     
         mine                                                           
      inspectors      5  30    22   61  23   43    30    20   27   14 7   282 
      Number of                                                         
      inspectors                                                        
     eligible to                                                        
      retire in                                                         
the next 5 years   1  23    19   18  11   14    13     6    9    7 2   123 

 Percent eligible to retire within 5 years 20% 77% 86% 30% 48% 33% 43% 30% 33%
                                  50% 29% 44%

Number of underground inspector
trainees 0 0 63 7 5 5 000 3

Source: MSHA.

MSHA headquarters officials also told us that it will be difficult for
them to quickly hire and train replacements for the inspectors who retire.
In addition to the fact that it takes at least 18 months to train each new
inspector, it takes the agency several months from the date an individual
retires to advertise and fill each vacant position. As a result of losing
these inspectors, MSHA may find it difficult to maintain its current level
of enforcement activity, including completing all quarterly inspections of
underground coal mines.

MSHA headquarters and district officials told us that they do not have a
plan that addresses the potential staffing shortages among its inspection
staff because, although they recognize that the shortages may affect their
ability to complete all required inspections, they cannot fill vacancies
until individuals actually retire, so their options are limited.

However, MSHA is not making full use of available human capital
flexibilities to streamline its hiring procedures or retain the services
of inspectors.12 For example, it is not using the direct-hire authority
available to federal agencies that would allow the agency to choose
applicants directly for inspector positions.13 Furthermore, use of a
category-based rating and selection procedure could help MSHA increase the
number of qualified applicants for its inspector positions. In addition,
MSHA is not using retention allowances to keep employees with specialized
skills, including inspectors, who are critical to accomplishing the
agency's mission. Finally, MSHA has not formally reviewed its hiring
process, including identifying internal deficiencies, such as problems
with its process for assessing the quality of applicants that causes
delays in hiring new inspectors. MSHA headquarters officials told us,
however, that they are considering conducting a review of their hiring
system.

MSHA Does Not Collect Data on Independent Contractor Staff Needed to
Assess the Effectiveness of Its Enforcement Activities

MSHA does not collect all of the information on staff employed by
independent contractors14 who work in underground coal mines needed to
assess the effectiveness of its enforcement activities. The regulations
implementing the Mine Act require mine operators, including independent
contractors, to report the number of hours worked by staff at specific
mines as well as injuries received during the performance of that work.
However, MSHA issued a memorandum in 1981 that limited the reporting
requirements for independent contractors who performed all but nine types
of services in "high hazard activities," including mining coal, and

12Human capital flexibilities represent the policies and practices that an
agency has the authority to implement, in managing its workforce, to
accomplish its mission and goals. We recently reported on the key
practices agencies should use when implementing human capital
flexibilities. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital:
Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing Their
Workforces, GAO-03-2 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2002).

13Direct hire authority, which was authorized in the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, provides agencies with the authority to appoint candidates
directly to jobs for which the Office of Personnel Management has
determined that there is a severe shortage of candidates or a critical
hiring need.

14The Mine Act defines a mine operator to include independent contractors
that perform services or construction at a mine.

exempted other independent contractors completely.15 As a result, MSHA
only collects aggregate information from independent contractors that
engage in these hazardous activities. It collects data on the number of
hours worked by their staff at all mines, but does not collect this
information for contractor staff at specific mines. MSHA headquarters
officials told us the agency exempted independent contractors from these
reporting requirements in order to reduce the regulatory burden on them
and because, at the time the memorandum was issued, independent contractor
staff represented a relatively small proportion of all coal miners.

However, because MSHA does not collect information on the hours worked by
contractor staff who mine coal in each underground coal mine, it cannot
calculate accurate fatality or nonfatal injury rates for mines that use
contractor staff to mine coal-rates used to evaluate the effectiveness of
its enforcement efforts.16 Although MSHA can determine whether it is
meeting these goals for all underground coal mines as a whole, it cannot
determine whether it is meeting its goals for specific mines. In addition,
MSHA cannot track trends in fatal or nonfatal injury rates at mines that
use contractor staff to mine coal. The fact that MSHA is not tracking the
number of independent contractor staff who work in each mine has become
more important in recent years, because the proportion of miners who work
for independent contractors has grown significantly since 1981, when they
represented only 5 percent of all mine workers. Our analysis of MSHA's
data on workers in underground coal mines shows that the percentage of
underground coal miners who work for independent contractors increased
from 13 percent in 1993 to 18 percent in 2002, as shown in figure 6, and
the percentage who incurred nonfatal injuries also increased over this
period.

15MSHA's memorandum exempted all independent contractors from some of the
reporting requirements of the Mine Act except those whose staff provide
services in one of the following nine high hazard activities: (1) mine
development, including shaft and slope sinking; (2) construction or
reconstruction of mine facilities; (3) demolition of mine facilities; (4)
construction of dams; (5) excavation or earthmoving activities involving
mobile equipment; (6) equipment installation, such as crushers and mills;
(7) equipment service or repair of equipment on mine property for a period
exceeding 5 consecutive days at a particular mine; (8) material handling
within mine property, including haulage of coal, ore, and refuse, unless
for the sole purpose of direct removal from or delivery to mine property;
and (9) drilling and blasting. Procedures later issued by MSHA clarifying
these requirements stated that mining coal was included in activity (8).

16Two of MSHA's key performance goals are to reduce the fatal injury rate
and the rate of all injuries in coal mines.

Figure 6: Contractor Staff as a Percentage of All Workers in Underground
Coal Mines

Percent

1993 Year

                  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Contractors as a percentage of all mine workers
Contractor fatalities as a percentage of all fatalities
Contractor nonfatal injuries as a percentage of all nonfatal injuries

                       Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.

To address these concerns, MSHA established a task group that was directed
to work with the members of the mining community17 to (l) determine how to
best identify and collect data on independent contractor staff and (2)
develop an enforcement policy for independent contractors. MSHA
headquarters officials said the task group is in the process of drafting
an action plan but is having difficulty identifying independent
contractors because the agency has issued a number of duplicate
identification numbers to these contractors. In addition, MSHA
headquarters officials told us that obtaining information on the hours

17The mining community is a commonly used term for referring to the
various types of entities and individuals involved in mining. It can
include MSHA enforcement personnel, state mining agency personnel, mine
operators, miners and labor organizations, special interest groups, and
mining equipment manufacturers.

  MSHA Has a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Accident Investigations, but
  Does Not Fully Utilize It to Prevent Future Accidents

worked by contractor staff at specific mines will be difficult because
these workers often work at more than one mine.

MSHA's process for conducting accident investigations is comprehensive,
but the agency does not use its investigations to the fullest extent to
improve the future safety of mine workers. MSHA has detailed policies and
rigorous requirements for how investigations must be conducted and
reported and uses a number of mechanisms to monitor the quality of its
accident investigations process. However, weaknesses in its databases make
it difficult for MSHA to track key data on mine hazards and potentially
useful indicators of its own performance.

MSHA's Polices and Procedures for Conducting Accident Investigations Are
Extensive

MSHA has extensive policies and procedures for conducting accident
investigations. These policies and procedures are contained in the Mine
Act and its implementing regulations, the Accident Investigations
Handbook, policy documents, and a training manual. They provide guidance
for determining when to conduct investigations, who should conduct them,
how they should be conducted, and how to report the results. MSHA is
required to investigate all accidents involving fatalities and may also
investigate nonfatal accidents. While the decisions regarding whether to
conduct investigations of most accidents are made at the district level,
investigations of high-profile accidents, such as those involving more
than two fatalities and mine emergencies, are handled by MSHA's
headquarters office.18 The primary objective of an accident investigation,
as stated in the investigation handbook, is "to determine the root
cause(s) of the mine accident and to utilize and share this information
with the mining community and others for the purpose of preventing similar
occurrences." Other purposes of investigations are to determine whether
any violations of the Mine Act or its implementing regulations contributed
to the accident and to help formulate and assess MSHA's health and safety
standards.

18Although the investigation handbook states that MSHA headquarters is
responsible for investigations of mine emergencies, it does not define
what constitutes a mine emergency.

MSHA's accident investigations are conducted by experienced teams of
inspectors and specialists, usually consisting of staff from the district
in which the accident occurred. Additional staff from MSHA headquarters
and the Technology Center, and, in the case of fatal accidents, attorneys
from the Department of Labor's Solicitor's Office, may also provide
assistance. In order to become qualified to conduct investigations of mine
accidents, inspectors and specialists are required to take special
training on accident investigations, in addition to that received by all
inspectors and specialists during their initial training. The special
accident investigation training covers such topics as data and evidence
collection, accident reconstruction, interviewing techniques, and
preparation of investigative reports. MSHA investigators are also required
to take an accident investigation retraining seminar every other year.

Investigators are required to follow specific steps in conducting and
documenting each accident, including trying to determine the underlying,
or "root," cause of the accident. Investigators must conduct an on-site
examination of the accident scene, interview witnesses, and analyze
relevant mining equipment and material. Investigators must also follow
detailed reporting requirements, including completing standardized forms
and, in the case of serious accidents such as those involving a fatality,
preparing formal written reports that cover specific topics. In addition
to determining the direct causes of an accident, MSHA's investigators must
determine the underlying causes. For example, for one mine in which
frequent ignitions were occurring, investigators determined that the
direct cause of the ignitions was sparks from the metal bit of a cutting
machine striking rock. These sparks in turn ignited the methane released
as the coal was cut out of the seam. The investigation team also went
further and identified the underlying cause as a problem with ventilation
at the mine. As a result, the mine operator made changes to the mine's
ventilation plan and, according to MSHA officials, there had been no
further ignitions in that section of the mine.

MSHA uses several means to monitor the quality of accident investigations.
The accident investigation program manager in MSHA's headquarters office
and the accident investigation coordinator at each district office monitor
the progress of each investigation and provide guidance and
recommendations to investigators on resources, collection of evidence, and
conducting interviews. A number of individuals at the district and
headquarters level review draft investigation reports, which the accident
investigation program manager then approves. The district manager, the
Office of the Solicitor, and the accident investigation

program manager each review proposed citations and orders to be issued as
a result of accident investigations.

Although we did not conduct a comprehensive review of MSHA's accident
investigations, we reviewed eight investigations in great depth at several
of the district offices we visited. For these selected cases, we reviewed
MSHA files and reports, interviewed investigators, and interviewed miners
and mine operators at some of the mines involved. We found that, for these
cases, the MSHA investigators had followed the required procedures for
conducting accident investigations.

MSHA's Databases Used to Track Accidents and Investigations Have
Weaknesses

Because of weaknesses in the databases that MSHA uses to collect data on
accidents and its investigations, MSHA cannot properly monitor its
accident investigations activity, including determining whether accidents
were investigated, or track trends in mine hazards that cause accidents.

MSHA cannot use the data it collects on accidents, injuries, and
investigations to readily determine whether accidents were investigated or
monitor district performance in regard to their accident investigation
activity. MSHA has one database that contains information on all accidents
and injuries reported to MSHA by mine operators and contractors.19 It has
another database that tracks MSHA's accident investigations activity,
including time spent by inspectors and specialists on each investigation.
However, it is very difficult to link the information on accidents and
investigations contained in these two databases. As a result, MSHA
headquarters cannot easily use the data to monitor whether districts have
investigated all fatal accidents as required or determine which serious
nonfatal accidents have been investigated. For example, we analyzed
information from both databases in an attempt to determine whether MSHA
investigated all fatal accidents in underground coal mines from 1993 to
2002. Although we were able to manually match each fatality to a fatal
accident investigation using the mine identification number and the date
of the investigation, and we found that MSHA had investigated all
fatalities as required, it was a difficult, time-consuming process.

19Mine operators and independent contractors are required to file detailed
reports with MSHA on injuries that result from a mine accident. These
reports include information on the name of the injured person, the
seriousness of the injury and the body part(s) affected, and the number of
days of missed work or restricted activity, if any, that resulted from the
injury.

In addition, it is difficult for MSHA to track trends in the most frequent
causes of mine accidents or to readily determine which types of accidents
result in multiple injuries or the percentage of accidents that result in
injuries. This occurs because MSHA does not assign an identifier to each
accident but rather tracks only the information reported by mine operators
on individuals injured in accidents.20 For example, MSHA cannot easily
determine the number of roof falls that occurred each year, or the
percentage of all roof falls that were investigated. It can only show the
number of individuals who were injured or killed as the result of roof
falls and the number of noninjury roof falls that occurred.

A few years ago, MSHA established a third database on accident
investigations in order to record and disseminate information on accident
investigations, including the results of investigations. The database
contains detailed information on some accidents as well as MSHA's
investigations activity. However, because the information in the database
is not complete (it does not contain information on all accidents), it
cannot be used to monitor trends in the types of accidents or to determine
the percentage of accidents investigated. Further, MSHA headquarters
officials told us that few field or headquarters staff use the database to
obtain or analyze information on accident investigations because the
system is not user friendly.

MSHA plays an important role in protecting the safety and health of coal
miners. MSHA has extensive policies and procedures and has assigned highly
qualified staff to its processes for reviewing and approving mine plans,
conducting inspections of underground coal mines, and investigating
accidents. However, it is important for MSHA headquarters to ensure that
the district offices to which it has delegated much of the responsibility
for protecting the safety and health of mine workers have appropriate
oversight, guidance, and staffing and to collect all of the data needed to
evaluate their performance.

MSHA headquarters has not always provided the oversight of district office
operations needed to ensure timely completion of 6-month technical
inspections in some districts, nor has it ensured that hazards identified
during inspections are being corrected by mine operators on a timely
basis. As a result, some mines may be operating without accurate or

Conclusions

20MSHA does, however, assign an identifier to accidents in which no one
was injured.

complete ventilation or roof control systems or with uncorrected hazards,
which may adversely affect the safety and health of mine workers.

Headquarters also has not provided inspectors with the guidance they need
to carry out their work. Some procedures and guidance it has provided to
district offices for inspections are unclear and, in some cases, difficult
to locate. In the absence of such guidance, inspectors may not be
consistently applying the law and regulations designed to protect the
safety and health of mine workers. Moreover, the lack of guidance with
regard to coordinating inspections has led to duplication of effort,
diminishing MSHA's ability to use its staff resources most efficiently.

In addition, MSHA is not preparing for a likely shortage of inspectors in
the future. MSHA officials have said the fact that they are unable to hire
until someone retires justifies their lack of planning. However, this
discounts the possibility that they might be able to better use their
existing resources or plan ways to lessen disruptions during the
transitions. If MSHA does not develop a plan for addressing the large
number of retirements of inspectors over the next 5 years, it may not be
able to continue to ensure the safety and health of underground coal
miners.

Finally, MSHA is not collecting all of the data needed to evaluate its
performance and prevent future accidents. It does not collect data on the
hours worked by staff employed by independent contractors at specific
mines. MSHA also does not track information on accidents needed to
identify trends in mining accidents or link accidents and injuries to
investigations. Given the latitude that district managers have in deciding
whether to investigate serious accidents, it is important for MSHA
headquarters to be able to link information on accidents and
investigations in order to monitor district office performance. As a
result, MSHA is not able to assess the adequacy of its enforcement efforts
at mines that employ independent contractor staff to mine coal, properly
target its efforts to improve mine safety at mines with relatively high
injury rates, or maximize the likelihood of preventing future accidents.

Recommendations 	In order to provide better oversight over its operations,
including collecting all of the data needed to provide this oversight, we
recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for
Mine Safety and Health to

o  	monitor the timeliness of 6-month technical inspections conducted as
part of MSHA's review of ventilation and roof control plans to ensure that
all inspections are completed by the district offices;

o  	monitor follow-up actions taken by its district offices to ensure that
mine operators are correcting hazards identified during inspections on a
timely basis;

o  	update and consolidate guidance provided to its district offices on
plan approval and inspections to eliminate inconsistencies and outdated
instructions, including clarifying guidance on coordinating technical
inspections with regular quarterly inspections of mines;

o  	develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of
qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, including considering
options such as streamlining the agency's hiring process and offering
retention allowances;

o  	amend the guidance provided to independent contractors engaged in
high-hazard activities requiring them to report information on the number
of hours worked by their staff at specific mines so that MSHA can use this
information to compute the injury and fatality rates used to measure the
effectiveness of its enforcement efforts; and

o  revise the systems it uses to collect information on accidents and

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

investigations to provide better data on accidents and make it easier to
link injuries, accidents, and investigations.

We provided a draft of this report to MSHA for comment. MSHA did not
comment on our recommendations but expressed concern about many of our
findings and disagreed with three of the findings on which our
recommendations are based. In addition, MSHA provided a few technical
comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. MSHA's
full comments and our responses are contained in appendix III.

MSHA disagreed with our finding that the agency does not ensure the
completion of 6-month technical inspections related to mine plans
conducted by its district offices. While MSHA acknowledged that the
information provided by the district offices to MSHA headquarters on
technical inspections is not accurate or complete, the agency said that
the inspections are actually being conducted by the district offices but
not recorded by the districts in the database, as evidenced by reports on
file in

the district offices. MSHA also noted that the database is being upgraded,
which will enhance the agency's ability to track and monitor the status of
technical inspections. In our view, MSHA's current system places all
oversight responsibility on the district offices because MSHA headquarters
does not have the data needed to ensure that districts are completing
technical inspections as required by agency procedures. We maintain that
MSHA cannot properly monitor the completion of technical inspections by
its district offices when the information provided by the districts to
MSHA headquarters for this purpose is inaccurate.

MSHA expressed concern that it would be difficult to develop guidance for
all district offices on coordinating different types of inspections in
order to avoid duplication of effort because of the dynamic nature of the
mining industry. MSHA said that District Managers should be responsible
for developing standard operating procedures in this area. We continue to
believe that, while developing such guidance may be difficult, it is
needed to ensure that MSHA's resources are used most effectively. In
addition, several district officials told us that more coordination of
effort in this area by MSHA could lead to better use of the agency's
resources and eliminate potential duplication of effort.

MSHA took issue with portions of our finding related to the procedures
provided to inspectors for inspecting underground coal mines, noting that
the agency provides extensive training to inspectors on the procedures and
that inspectors must rely on their experience and knowledge in determining
what constitutes a violation. MSHA also noted that it is in the process of
providing additional training to its inspectors and improving the ease of
use of its manuals and other procedures. While we commended MSHA on its
efforts to provide additional training to inspectors and consolidate its
procedures, we noted that over reliance on inspectors' experience can lead
to inconsistencies in their interpretations of the procedures.

On following through on its inspections to make sure that unsafe
conditions are corrected in a timely manner, MSHA agreed that this is an
important issue and said that it has already taken several actions to
address inconsistencies in this area. The agency detailed its efforts to
provide better guidance and additional training, establish a new
accountability program to ensure the consistency of its enforcement
actions, and stress the importance of timely follow up by inspectors to
ensure that hazards are corrected.

MSHA disagreed with our finding that it does not have a plan for replacing
the large number of inspectors who will be eligible to retire in the next
5 years, saying that it does have such a plan. After receiving MSHA's
comments on our draft report, we asked MSHA officials for a copy of the
plan referred to in their comments. They told us they did not have one
plan but, instead, had recently developed plans for each of the 11
district offices and provided us with a copy of a plan for one district.
This plan, however, does not contain all of the elements of a high quality
human capital plan, such as linking the accomplishment of the agency's
strategic goals to its future human capital needs. We maintain that MSHA
needs to develop a comprehensive plan that addresses the agency's human
capital needs related to protecting the safety and health of coal miners.

Finally, MSHA disagreed with our finding that the databases it uses to
track mine accidents and investigations of these accidents have weaknesses
that limit its ability to monitor trends in mine hazards and determine
whether districts are investigating accidents. MSHA said that the
information it collects on accidents in its databases can be used for
these purposes. Our finding is accurate. The Accident Investigation
Database to which MSHA refers in its comments does not track all
accidents, it only tracks those that were investigated; therefore, the
database cannot be used to monitor trends in all mine accidents. In
addition, as noted in our report, the information in the database is
incomplete, and the database is not widely used throughout the agency
because it is not user friendly.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Secretary of Labor, the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health,
and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to others upon
request. This report is also available at no charge on GAO's web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-7215 or Revae Moran at (202) 512-3863. Other major contributors
are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Robert E. Robertson Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security
Issues

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.

Page 36 GAO-03-945 Mine Safety

Appendix II: MSHA's Approval Process for Impoundment Plans

                       Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data.

aModifications to the plan can be made at any point throughout the review
and approval process.

bIf the plan is disapproved, MSHA forwards the review comments and
requests for additional technical information to the mine operator via the
same process indicated for plan approval.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

                                 See comment 4.

                                 See comment 5.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

                                 See comment 6.

                                 See comment 7.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

                                 See comment 8.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

                                 See comment 9.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

                                See comment 10.

                                See comment 11.

                                See comment 12.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

                                See comment 13.

                                See comment 14.

                                See comment 15.

                                See comment 16.

                                See comment 17.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

  GAO Comments

1. 	The briefing to which MSHA refers is the exit conference held on
August 5, 2003, in which we described the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations contained in this report to MSHA in detail. At this
conference, as well as briefings held with top MSHA officials in June,
MSHA generally concurred with our findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. The information presented at the exit conference and the
other briefings is consistent with the information contained in this
report.

2. 	We believe the title of the report presents a fair, balanced, and
accurate representation of the information in our report. Moreover, MSHA's
own suggested title acknowledges a need for improvement.

3. 	Our finding that MSHA does not provide adequate oversight of the
districts' completion of 6-month technical inspections is accurate. As
MSHA acknowledges in its comments, the information reported by the
district offices to MSHA headquarters on technical inspections is not
accurate or complete. Therefore, MSHA headquarters cannot use this
information to monitor the completion of inspections by the districts. Our
draft report noted problems with the accuracy of the data reported by
district offices to MSHA headquarters on technical inspections. However,
because of the concerns MSHA expressed in its comments about the accuracy
of the data, we clarified the discussion of this issue in the report and
deleted detailed information included in an appendix to the draft derived
from the data. We commend MSHA on its efforts to improve the accuracy of
the data collected by its district offices, thereby enhancing the agency's
ability to monitor the status of these inspections.

4. 	We used the term "technical inspection" in our report in order to
provide a reader friendly method of referring to the on-site inspections
conducted by MSHA related to mine plans. The term "plan review" used by
MSHA does not distinguish the reviews specialists conduct at the district
offices in order to determine whether written plans submitted by mine
operators comply with the law, regulations, and MSHA's procedures from the
on-site inspections conducted at the mines in order to compare the plans
to actual conditions at the mines.

5. 	We clarified the language in the report to more accurately reflect
agency procedures.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

6. 	While MSHA believes the "dynamics" of the mining industry preclude a
formal plan for coordinating inspections, several district officials we
interviewed said that more coordination of effort in this area by MSHA
could lead to better use of agency resources and eliminate potential
duplication of effort. Furthermore, MSHA headquarters officials issued a
memorandum in June 2003 encouraging districts to better coordinate
inspections conducted by specialists and inspectors, suggesting that
coordination could be important in avoiding duplication.

7. 	We commend MSHA on its efforts to address this problem. Both of the
initiatives MSHA mentions are included in our report, and we encourage the
agency to move forward with these hiring and staffing initiatives.

8. 	We commend MSHA on its efforts to provide additional training to
inspectors and to consolidate its procedures. However, our interviews with
inspectors indicate that they interpret guidance they receive differently
and are sometimes uncertain as to what constitutes a violation. While we
acknowledge that an inspector's experience is an important component of
the decision-making process, an over reliance on experience can lead to
inconsistencies in inspectors' interpretations of the procedures. We also
note that MSHA's comment that our report implies that MSHA and the Office
of the Solicitor have been inattentive in ensuring that inspectors receive
accurate and timely training on the legal tests needed to be applied for
various enforcement decisions is not accurate. Our report makes no such
statement; it refers only to the written procedures provided by MSHA to
inspectors.

9. 	We commend MSHA's efforts in this area and again stress the importance
of using the data it collects in its Coal Management Information System to
monitor the timeliness of inspectors' actions to ensure that mine
operators are correcting all mine hazards as required. MSHA's own guidance
states that a violation cannot be abated until an inspector re-inspects
the area. As noted in our report, MSHA officials told us that they have
begun tracking the numbers of citations for which inspectors have not
followed up in a timely manner as part of a new initiative to better
monitor district office performance.

10. We made this correction to the report. However, we note that we did,
in fact, request information from MSHA officials on the historical status
of each mine but chose not to use the information because the officials
expressed doubts about its accuracy.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

11. In several conversations with senior level MSHA officials, including
the Assistant Director for Human Resources, they told us that, although
they were in the process of developing a plan for addressing the large
number of retirements the agency is facing over the next 5 years, they had
not yet developed such a plan. After receiving MSHA's comments on our
draft report, we asked MSHA officials for a copy of the plan referred to
in the agency's comments. They told us they did not have one plan but,
instead, had recently developed plans for each of the 11 district offices
and provided us with a copy of a plan for one district dated March 2003.
When we visited this district office in March 2003, we discussed the issue
of how the district will address the large number of inspectors who will
retire in the next 5 years. At that time, the district officials told us
they were in the process of developing a plan for how to replace these
inspectors but had not completed the plan. They did not mention having
such a plan in place, and we were not provided with a copy of the plan at
that time.

Based on our review of the district plan provided to us by MSHA, we
commend the agency for beginning to take appropriate actions necessary to
address anticipated staffing shortages. The plan, however, does not
integrate accomplishment of MSHA's mission to protect the safety and
health of coal miners with its human capital approaches, including
identifying the total number of inspectors needed to accomplishment its
mission, or address how these numbers will be maintained through hiring
and training of new inspectors as retirements occur. The plan also does
not link the accomplishment of MSHA's strategic goals using outcome
data-such as trends in the incidence rate (fatalities and nonfatal
injuries) at underground coal mines-to its future human capital needs. As
noted in our recommendation, MSHA needs to develop a comprehensive plan
that addresses the human capital needs of the agency as they pertain to
protecting the safety and health of coal miners rather than just
developing plans for each of its district offices.

12. We suggested the use of retention allowances as one type of human
capital flexibility that can benefit an agency facing a potential loss of
employees in a particular skill area. The use of retention allowances,
however, is only one of the human capital flexibilities we mentioned in
the report. In including a list of human capital flexibilities, our intent
was that MSHA would select those that are cost-effective and beneficial to
the agency.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor

13. While we commend MSHA in its continuing efforts to address the issue
of reporting by independent contractors, our recommendation to amend
guidance so that all independent contractors are required to report the
number of hours worked by their staffs at specific mines would not require
a regulatory change. However, if MSHA believes that a regulatory change is
necessary, it should take appropriate action. In either case, we believe
that obtaining input from the mining community prior to making such a
change and notifying them of the change would be beneficial to the entire
mining community.

14. Our report does not state that information on certain types of
accidents and investigations cannot be linked but rather that doing so is
a difficult process and, in its comments, MSHA agreed that the process is
cumbersome. The report, however, refers to linking data in the Part 50
Database in which injuries resulting from accidents are tracked with data
in the Coal Management Information System on accident investigations. In
its comments, MSHA refers to linking data from the Part 50 Database to
information in the Accident Investigation Database. MSHA is correct in
stating that injuries and noninjury accidents recorded in the Part 50
Database can be linked to accident investigations in the Accident
Investigation Database. However, the Accident Investigations Database only
contains information on accidents that were investigated, not all mine
accidents. In addition, as noted in our report, the database is incomplete
and is not widely used throughout the agency because it is not user
friendly.

15. Our finding that MSHA does not assign an identifier to each mine
accident is accurate. The document number on the Form 7000-1 to which MSHA
refers in its comments is assigned to each injury, not each accident,
except for accidents in which no injuries occur. Therefore, it is
difficult to determine how many accidents of each type occurred or to
track trends in the types of accidents that account for the most injuries.

16. The detailed list MSHA provided to us as an appendix to its comments
shows the total number of injuries, by degree, that resulted from roof
falls and the total number of noninjury accidents that occurred as a
result of roof falls for the past 20 years. The data do not, as MSHA
implies, show the total number of roof falls that occurred during this
period. As noted in our report, this makes it difficult for MSHA to track
trends in the most frequent causes of mine accidents or readily determine
the percentage of accidents that result in injuries.

17. We made this correction to the report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

  Staff Acknowledgments

(130200)

Revae E. Moran, (202) 512-3863

Other major contributors to this report are Patrick J. Dibattista, Julian
P. Klazkin, Stanley J. Kostyla, Anne Inserra, Lori Rectanus, Leslie C.
Ross, Jerome T. Sandau, Linda W. Stokes, and Kris Trueblood.

  GAO's Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm
of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of
the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of
public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through the Internet. GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts
and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an expanding
archive of older products. The Web site features a search engine to help
you locate documents using key words and phrases. You can print these
documents in their entirety, including charts and other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files.
To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and
select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order GAO Products"
heading.

Order by Mail or Phone 	The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington, D.C.
20548

To order by Phone: 	Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

Contact:

To Report Fraud, Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

  Waste, and Abuse in E-mail: [email protected]

Federal Programs Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202)
512-7470

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4800

Public Affairs 	U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
*** End of document. ***