Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency
of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces (21-AUG-03, GAO-03-921).
On September 14, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that a national
emergency existed by reason of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. Under section 12302 of title 10, United States Code, the
President is allowed to call up to 1 million National Guard and
Reserve members to active duty for up to 2 years. GAO was asked
to review issues related to the call-up of reservists following
September 11, 2001. GAO examined (1) whether the Department of
Defense (DOD) followed existing operation plans when mobilizing
forces, (2) the extent to which responsible officials had
visibility over the mobilization process, and (3) approaches the
services have taken to provide predictability to reservists. GAO
also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces,
which make up over 98 percent of nonretired reservists, were
available.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-921
ACCNO: A07955
TITLE: Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the
Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces
DATE: 08/21/2003
SUBJECT: Armed forces reserves
Counterterrorism
Defense contingency planning
Management information systems
Military operations
Military reserve personnel
Mobilization
Personnel management
Strategic planning
National Guard
Emergency preparedness
National preparedness
Advanced notification
Armed forces standard operating cycle
DOD Individual Ready Reserve Program
DOD Selected Reserve Program
DOD Inactive National Guard Program
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GAO-03-921
Report to the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.
S. Senate
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
August 2003 MILITARY PERSONNEL
DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve
Forces
GAO- 03- 921
About 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel have
been called to active duty since September 11, 2001. They fought on the
front lines in Iraq; tracked terrorists throughout Asia and Africa;
maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and
participated in a wide range of
domestic missions. However, DOD*s process to mobilize reservists after
September 11 had to be modified and contained numerous inefficiencies.
Existing operation plans did not fully address the mobilization
requirements needed to deal with the terrorist attacks or uncertain
overseas requirements. For example, no previous requirements called for
the extended use of National Guard and Reserve members to fly combat air
patrols over the nation*s capital and major cities. Because DOD could not
rely on existing operation plans to
guide its mobilizations, it used a modified process that relied on
additional management oversight and multiple layers of coordination, which
resulted in a process that was slower and less efficient than the
traditional process. Under the modified process, the Secretary of Defense
signed 246 deployment orders to mobilize over 280,000 reservists compared
to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize over 220, 000
reservists during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
DOD did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process primarily
because it lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel and other
resources. DOD*s primary automated readiness reporting system could not
adequately track the personnel and other resources within the small units
that were frequently needed. Also, visibility was lost because some
services* active and
reserve systems for tracking personnel were incompatible, resulting in ad
hoc coordination between active and reserve officials. Both groups often
resorted to tracking mobilizations with computer spreadsheets. In
addition, some reservists were deployed beyond dates specified in their
orders or stayed on alert for more than a year and never mobilized because
officials lost visibility.
The services have used two primary approaches* predictable operating
cycles and advance notification* to provide time for units and personnel
to prepare for mobilizations. All the services provide predictability to
portions of their forces through some type of standard operating cycle,
but only the Air Force has a
standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both its active and
reserve forces. The Army prioritizes its units, and lower- priority units
generally need extra training and preparation time before deploying. Yet,
since September 11, a number of lower- priority units have been mobilized
with relatively little advance notice. Despite the large number of lower-
priority units within the Army Guard and Reserve, the Army does not have a
standard operating cycle to provide predictability to its reserves.
Without such a concept, the Army*s opportunities to provide extra training
and preparation time to its reserve forces are limited. Mobilizations were
hampered because one- quarter of the Ready Reserve was not
readily available for mobilization. Over 70,000 reservists could not be
mobilized because they had not completed their training requirements, and
the services lacked information needed to fully use the 300,000 pretrained
IRR members. On September 14, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that a
national
emergency existed by reason of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Under section 12302 of title 10, United States Code, the President is
allowed to call up to 1 million National Guard and Reserve members to
active duty for up to 2 years. GAO was asked to review issues related to
the call- up
of reservists following September 11, 2001. GAO examined (1) whether the
Department of Defense (DOD) followed existing operation plans when
mobilizing forces, (2) the extent to which responsible officials had
visibility over the mobilization process, and (3) approaches the services
have taken to provide predictability to
reservists. GAO also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve
forces, which make up over 98 percent of nonretired reservists, were
available.
GAO recommends that DOD improve mobilization planning, increase visibility
over the readiness of small units, provide for the seamless transfer of
reservists* data, update
mobilization guidance, improve predictability for Army units, increase
access to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and update IRR policies. DOD
generally concurred with the
recommendations in this report.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 921. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Derek B. Stewart at (202) 512- 5559 or stewartd@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 921, a report to the
Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate
August 2003
MILITARY PERSONNEL
DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve
Forces
Page i GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel Letter 1 Results in Brief 3
Background 7 DOD*s Mobilizations after September 11, 2001, Were Not Based
on
Existing Operation Plans 19 DOD Officials Had Limited Visibility Over the
Mobilization Process 24 The Services Have Two Approaches to Provide
Preparation Time for Mobilizations and Deployments 31 DOD Has Limited
Access to Portions of the Ready Reserve 36 Conclusions 42 Recommendations
for Executive Action 43 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 44 Appendix I
Scope and Methodology 46
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 50
Appendix III Staff Acknowledgments 54
Tables
Table 1: Authorities Used to Mobilize Reservists after September 11, 2001
9 Table 2: Numbers of Army National Guard or Army Reserve Units
That Were on Alert in Excess of 90 Days (March 28, 2003) 28 Table 3:
Fiscal Year 2002 Questionnaire Response Rates 38 Table 4: IRR Screening
Event Participation Rates 40 Figures
Figure 1: Flowchart of the Mobilization Process 11 Figure 2: Guard and
Reserve Members on Active Duty (January 2002- July 2003) 15 Figure 3:
Reserve Force Mobilizations by Service (January 2002* July 2003) 16 Figure
4: Reserve Force Mobilizations as Percentages of Service Ready Reserve
Strengths (January 2002* July 2003) 17 Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense GSORTS Global Status of Resources and Training
System IRR Individual Ready Reserve OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
RFF Request for Forces
This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
Page 1 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel August 21, 2003 The Honorable Saxby
Chambliss
Chairman The Honorable E. Benjamin Nelson Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Personnel Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
Mobilization is a complex process used to move the military from its
peacetime posture to a heightened state of readiness to support national
security objectives in time of war or other national emergency. It
involves the activation of all or some of the 1.2 million members of the
National Guard and Reserve components, as well as the assembling and
organizing of supplies and materiel. The process involves many different
organizations and, while reserve component officials have a role in the
process, civilian leaders and active military officials within the
Department of Defense (DOD) take the lead in the process. Active component
officials generate and validate mobilization requirements, and civilian
leaders approve requests to alert, mobilize, and deploy forces. In
addition, when reservists 1 are mobilized they come under the operational
control of the active forces.
On September 14, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that a national emergency
existed by reason of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. His
proclamation 2 further stated that he intended to utilize section 12302 of
title 10, United States Code (commonly referred to as the partial
mobilization authority), which allows the President to call up to 1
million
1 Unless specified otherwise, the terms *reserves* and *reservists* both
refer to the collective forces of the Army National Guard and the Air
National Guard, as well as the forces from the Army Reserve, the Naval
Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast
Guard Reserve. Our review focused on DOD*s reservists and its mobilization
process. We also included the Coast Guard Reserve in our review because it
is considered a reserve component of the U. S. Armed Forces, even though
it was part of the Department of Transportation when we began our review
and part of the Department of
Homeland Security when we completed our review. 2 Proclamation No. 7463 of
September 14, 2001.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel National Guard and Reserve members
to active duty for up to 2 years. We were asked to review issues related
to the call- up of reservists
following September 11, 2001. As agreed with your offices, our review was
focused on the efficiency of DOD*s process for mobilizing reservists from
among its authorized 1.2 million Ready Reserve 3 members. Specifically, we
examined (1) whether DOD followed existing operation plans when mobilizing
reserve forces after September 11, 2001, (2) the extent to which
responsible officials had visibility over the entire mobilization process,
and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to
reservists who were subject to mobilizations and overseas deployments. You
also asked us to determine the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces
were available for mobilization.
To evaluate the efficiency of DOD*s mobilization process, we reviewed
mobilization statutes, regulations, instructions, and guidance. We
analyzed mobilization data obtained during meetings with military and
civilian officials from the offices of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, the reserve component headquarters,
and a number of commands that used mobilized reservists. We also collected
and analyzed information on the roles and responsibilities of key
mobilization officials, the steps of the mobilization process, and the
methods and systems used to track mobilization requirements and reservists
who had been mobilized. To gain first- hand knowledge about the effects of
mobilizations on individual reservists, we interviewed both unit and
individual reservists at sites where they were deployed or undergoing
mobilization processing 4 and training. We also observed DOD*s 2- 1/ 2 day
November 2002 symposium where senior military and civilian officials came
together and reviewed the mobilization process. A more thorough
description of our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.
3 The Ready Reserve accounts for over 98 percent of nonretired reservists
and consists of units and individuals who are liable for active duty under
the provisions of 10 U. S. C.S: 12301 and S: 12302.
4 This processing included attendance at medical, legal, and family
support briefings; personnel record screenings and updates; medical and
dental processing, including receiving inoculations; and receiving combat
equipment, camouflage clothing, Geneva Convention Cards, identification
tags, and the new controlled access cards that have replaced laminated
identification cards.
Page 3 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel About 300,000 of the 1.2 million
National Guard and Reserve personnel have been called to active duty since
September 2001. They fought on the front lines in Iraq; tracked down
terrorists throughout Asia and Africa;
maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and
participated in a wide range of domestic missions. However, the process to
mobilize reservists after September 11 had to be modified and contained
numerous inefficiencies.
DOD did not follow existing operation plans after the events of September
11, 2001, because those plans did not adequately address the mobilization
requirements needed to deal with terrorist attacks at home and abroad, or
with uncertain overseas deployment requirements. The following examples
illustrate how the existing operation plans failed to accurately identify
mobilization requirements.
No previous requirements existed for National Guard troops at the
nation*s civilian airports. No requirements called for the extended use
of Guard and Reserve
members to fly combat air patrols over the nation*s capital and major
cities. Overseas requirements focused on traditional operations against
national military forces, rather than on tracking terrorists throughout
Afghanistan
and around the globe. Requirements in the Iraq operation plan had to be
modified to address the
tenuous political environment, when assumed coalition partners and planned
access to bases and airspaces became uncertain. Requirements for
individuals and small, tailored task forces were much
greater than those contained in the operation plans. Because the existing
operation plans had not adequately identified mobilization requirements,
DOD began using a modified mobilization process after September 11, 2001.
This modified process relied on additional management oversight and
multiple layers of coordination among crisis action teams that were
established to screen, clarify, and fill mobilization requirements. This
additional oversight and coordination resulted in a modified mobilization
process that was slower and less efficient than the traditional process of
synchronized mobilizations and deployments based on existing operation
plans. Coordination was much more difficult under the modified process due
to the large number of deployment orders. For example, under the modified
process, the Secretary of Defense signed 246 deployment orders to mobilize
over 280,000 reservists between September 11, 2001, and May 21, 2003,
Results in Brief
Page 4 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel compared to the less than 10
deployment orders needed to mobilize over 220,000 reservists during the
1991 Persian Gulf War.
DOD officials did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process
primarily because DOD lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel and
other resources. First, DOD*s primary readiness reporting automated data
system tracked only the readiness of large units and not the readiness of
resources within the units that were frequently needed after September 11,
2001. DOD*s readiness reporting system does capture separate information
on the status of various personnel and equipment categories for the unit
as a whole, but it does not capture information on the smaller units that
make up the reporting unit. The Air Force had a system to report the
readiness of small units, but the other services did not have similar
capabilities. As a result, OSD, Joint Staff, and service headquarters
officials could not view automated readiness information for the full
range of units available to meet the small, tailored requirements.
Instead, they had to spend considerable time to coordinate with individual
units or
reserve component headquarters to obtain this information. Second,
visibility was lost because some services* active and reserve component
systems for tracking personnel were incompatible. The reserve systems had
visibility over one part of the mobilization process and the active
systems had visibility over a different part of the process, but the
systems were not able to directly transfer information and data between
the systems. As a result, the tracking of reservists required extensive ad
hoc coordination between active and reserve component officials, and both
groups often resorted to tracking mobilizations with computer
spreadsheets. Also, DOD and service officials sometimes lost visibility
over the length of deployments for mobilized reservists who, in turn, were
inadvertently deployed beyond the original year specified in their orders.
In other cases, hundreds of Guard and Reserve members were kept on alert
to mobilize for more than a year, without ever mobilizing.
In addition, visibility was sometimes lost when coordination and
communication failed to take place due to outdated or conflicting
guidance. For example, Air Force officials drafted a mobilization
instruction to reflect changes to the roles and responsibilities of
personnel and the flow of information that had occurred under the modified
mobilization process. However, this instruction was never finalized and
signed. Some Air Force mobilization officials followed the unsigned draft
instruction, while others followed the older *official* instruction due to
the officials* uncertainty of which to follow. We discovered cases where
air reserve component units had been mobilized without their reserve
Page 5 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel component headquarters being
informed of the mobilizations, because the new guidance had not been
followed. The services have used two primary approaches* predictable
operating cycles and formal advanced notification* to provide time for
units and
servicemembers to prepare for upcoming mobilizations and deployments. Key
officials throughout DOD have acknowledged the importance of
predictability in helping reserve forces to prepare for mobilization and
deployment. Predictability helps units anticipate (1) downtime, so they
can schedule lengthy education and training for personnel and lengthy
maintenance for equipment and (2) the likely periods of mobilization or
deployment, so they can focus on efforts to increase readiness, including
last minute training and the screening of medical, dental, and personnel
records. Predictability also helps individual reservists by giving them
time to prepare their civilian employers and family members for their
possible departures. All the services provide predictability to portions
of their forces through some type of standard operating cycle, but only
the Air Force has a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to
both its active and reserve forces. Faced with a high and increasing pace
of reserve
operations, the Air Force adopted a standard operating cycle to help it
manage its commitments while reducing the deployment burden on its people.
Under the cycle, forces were scheduled to deploy for only 3 of every 15
months. The Army prioritizes its units, and lower- priority units
generally need extra training and preparation time prior to deploying.
However, a number of lower- priority units were mobilized with relatively
little advance notice. For example, five transportation companies
containing 976 reservists were alerted on February 9, 2003, and told to
arrive at their mobilization stations by February 14, 2003. Despite the
large number of lower- priority units within the Army National Guard and
the Army Reserve, the Army does not have a standard operating cycle
concept to provide predictability to its reserve forces. Without such a
concept, the Army*s opportunities to provide extra training and
preparation time to its reserve forces, particularly those with lower
priorities, are limited.
Lacking a standard operating cycle to provide predictability for its
reservists, the Army strives to provide its reservists with official
written orders 30 days in advance of mobilizations, in accordance with an
OSD policy goal. Between September 2001 and March 2003, advance notice for
Army personnel fluctuated from less than 72 hours to more than 4 weeks.
While advanced notice is beneficial to individual reservists, it does not
provide the longer lead times made possible by predictable operating
cycles. Such cycles allow reserve units, which typically drill only once
every 30 days, to schedule their training and maintenance so the units*
Page 6 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel readiness will build as the
mobilization time approaches. While always important, predictability and
preparation times are likely to become even
more important when the pace of reserve operations is high. The Army has
had more than 100,000 reservists mobilized since February 12, 2003, and
the Army Manpower and Reserve Affairs office projected that mobilizations
would remain high at least through the end of 2004. However, the Army does
not employ standard operating cycles for its reserve forces, leaving it
with limited time to prepare for the increased mobilization and deployment
demands on its reserve forces.
After September 11, 2001, mobilizations were hampered because about one-
quarter of the Ready Reserve force was not readily available for
mobilization or deployment. Over 70,000 reserve members could not be
mobilized because they had not completed their training requirements. In
addition, the services lacked vital information necessary to fully use an
additional pool of over 300,000 pretrained individual reservists, known as
the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Many of the IRR members were not
available for mobilization because the services did not have valid contact
information (addresses or phone numbers) for these individuals. For
example, in April 2003, the Army estimated that it had inaccurate
addresses for at least 40, 400 of its IRR members. When the services were
able to contact their IRR members and obtain vital information necessary
to use their IRR pools, exemptions and delays often limited the services*
abilities to fully use these personnel. For example, in February 2003, the
Army sent mobilization orders to 345 IRR members, but 164 of these
reservists requested and were granted exemptions so they did not have to
deploy. Another 35 were granted delays in their reporting dates.
The services have used three primary methods to gain and maintain access
to their IRR members. First, they brief the members when they leave active
duty or drilling reserve positions to make them aware of their
responsibilities as members of the IRR. Next, they send the members
questionnaires to verify basic information, such as current addresses.
Finally, the services conduct a limited number of 1- day screenings where
certain IRR members are ordered to military facilities to physically
verify their fitness for mobilization and deployment. However, service
officials considered response rates for the questionnaires and
participation rates for the screenings low, and the services have not
developed resultsoriented goals and related performance metrics to collect
and maintain updated IRR member information. In addition, some mobilized
Marine Corps IRR members told us that their IRR responsibilities had not
been clearly explained during exit briefings when they left active duty.
Page 7 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel DOD*s reluctance to use the IRR has
resulted in additional situations where the Ready Reserve force was not
readily available for mobilization
or deployment. For example, DOD and service policies have discouraged the
use of the IRR because IRR members do not participate in any regularly
scheduled training and are consequently not paid regularly. The policies
call for the mobilization of reservists who have been participating in
regular paid training, no matter the type of mobilization requirement that
is being filled. This reluctance to use the IRR contributes to situations
where individual mobilization requirements are filled with personnel from
reserve units, thus creating personnel shortages within the units that had
supplied the reservists and affecting the units* readiness to mobilize and
deploy. As the Army mobilized forces for the war in Iraq, it moved unit
reservists from one unit to another to fill vacancies within the units,
which were first to mobilize and deploy. When units that had supplied
reservists were later mobilized, reservists from other units had to be
transferred into these later deploying units. If IRR members had filled
the initial requirements, many of the subsequent transfers would not have
been necessary. Further, the reluctance of one service to use the IRR can
affect other services. For example, the Air Force*s reluctance to access
any of its more than 44,000 IRR members has left the responsibility for
guarding Air Force bases to over 9,000 Army National Guard unit personnel.
We are making several recommendations to enhance the efficiency of DOD*s
reserve mobilizations. These recommendations are directed at improving
mobilization planning, increasing visibility over the readiness of small
units, providing for the seamless transfer of reservist information
regardless of whether the reservists are in an active or reserve status,
updating mobilization guidance, improving predictability for Army reserve
units, increasing access to the IRR, and updating IRR policies.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred with six of
our seven recommendations and partially concurred with our recommendation
concerning the need for the Army and the Navy to capture additional
readiness information. DOD stated that the Army and the Navy fully support
capturing relevant information in the DOD readiness reporting system but
that combatant commanders will need to establish resource requirements to
include tailored mission requirements. We agree that improvements in
readiness reporting should be closely linked to efforts to more clearly
define requirements.
Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel and
equipment, activating or federalizing the reserve component, and bringing
Background
Page 8 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel the armed forces to a state of
readiness for war or other national emergency. It is a complex undertaking
that requires constant and precise
coordination among a number of commands and officials. Mobilization
usually begins with the President invoking a mobilization authority and
ends with the mobilization of an individual Reserve or National Guard
member.
There are seven reserve components: the Army Reserve, Army National Guard,
Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps
Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. Reserve forces can be divided into three
major categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired
Reserve. The Ready Reserve had approximately 1.2 million Guard and Reserve
members at the end of fiscal year 2002, and its members were the only
reservists who were subject to mobilization under the partial mobilization
declared by President Bush on September 14, 2001.
Within the Ready Reserve, there are three subcategories: the Selected
Reserve, the IRR, and the Inactive National Guard. Members of all three
subcategories are subject to mobilization under a partial mobilization.
In fiscal year 2002, the Selected Reserve had 882,142 members. Members
of the Selected Reserve are all the personnel who are active members of
the National Guard or Reserve units who participate in regularly scheduled
training. As a result, they draw regular pay for their reserve service. It
also includes individual mobilization augmentees* individuals who train
regularly, for pay with active component units.
In fiscal year 2002, the IRR had 314,037 members. During a partial
mobilization these individuals, who were previously trained during periods
of active duty service, can be mobilized to fill requirements. Each year,
the services transfer thousands of personnel who have completed the active
duty or Selected Reserve portions of their military contracts, but who
have not reached the end of their minimum service obligations, to the IRR.
5 5 While enlistment contracts can vary, a typical enlistee would incur an
8- year minimum
service obligation, which could consist of a 4- year active duty
obligation followed by a 4- year IRR obligation. Reserve Components and
Categories
Page 9 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel However, IRR members do not
participate in any regularly scheduled training, and they are not paid for
their membership in the IRR. 6 In fiscal year 2002, the Inactive
National Guard had 3,142 Army National
Guard members. This subcategory contains individuals who are temporarily
unable to participate in regular training but who wish to remain attached
to their National Guard units. These individuals were not subject to
mobilization prior to the declaration of a partial mobilization on
September 14, 2001.
Most reservists who were recalled to active duty for other than normal
training after September 11, 2001, were mobilized under one of the three
authorities listed in table 1.
Table 1: Authorities Used to Mobilize Reservists after September 11, 2001
U. S. C. Title 10 Section Type of
mobilization Number of Ready
Reservists that can be mobilized Length of
mobilizations 12304 Involuntary 200,000 a 270 days 12302 Involuntary
1,000,000 2 years 12301 (d) Voluntary Unlimited Unlimited Source: GAO. a
Under this authority, the services can mobilize the Selected Reserve and
up to 30,000 IRR
members who count against the 200,000- person cap.
DOD had the authority to use section 12304, the Presidential Reserve
CallUp authority, to mobilize reservists in support of contingency
operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia prior to September 11,
2001. It continued to use this authority to mobilize reservists for
ongoing operations in these areas even after the partial mobilization
authority (section 12302) was invoked on September 14, 2001.
The partial mobilization authority has been used to support both domestic
and overseas missions related to the global war on terrorism, including
the
6 IRR members can request to participate in annual training or other
operations, but most do not. Those who are activated are paid for their
service. There are also small groups of IRR members who participate in
unpaid training. The members of this last group are often in the IRR only
for short periods while they are waiting to transfer to paid positions in
the Selected Reserve. IRR members can receive retirement credit if they
meet basic eligibility
criteria through voluntary training or mobilizations. Mobilization
Authorities
Page 10 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. After invoking section 12302 on September 14, 2001, the President
delegated his mobilization authority to the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Transportation. The
Secretary of Defense further delegated this authority to the service
secretaries and allowed them to delegate the authority to any civilian
official who was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 7
When the Secretary of Defense delegated his authority, he set limits on
the
numbers of personnel that the services could mobilize. On September 14,
2001, the Secretary of Defense assigned the Army a mobilization cap of
10,000 personnel; the Navy a cap of 3, 000; the Marine Corps a cap of
7,500; and the Air Force a cap of 13,000, for a total cap of 33,500. The
caps were
raised several times, but in aggregate they have remained below 300,000
since they were first established.
Since September 11, 2001, the services have also made extensive use of
their section 12301( d) authority. This authority can involve complicated
administrative processing because reservists must volunteer to be
activated, and individuals who are brought on to active duty under this
authority have varying starting and ending dates. However, this authority
provides flexibility that is advantageous to both individual reservists
members and the services. The reservists can schedule their active duty
periods around family and work responsibilities, and the services are not
constrained by the numerical caps and time limitations of other
mobilization authorities.
As figure 1 indicates, mobilization is a decentralized process that
requires the collaboration of many organizations throughout DOD. 7 Within
each of the military departments, this authority was delegated to the
offices with primary responsibility for reserve issues* the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). Mobilization
Process
Page 11 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel Figure 1: Flowchart of the
Mobilization Process
Note: Shaded blocks emphasize the extra coordination that was required
under the modified process.
Page 12 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel The mobilization process typically
begins with the component commanders, who are responsible for commanding
their services* active
and reserve forces within a combatant commander*s area of responsibility.
8 The component commanders identify requirements for wars or contingency
operations within their areas of responsibility and submit the
requirements to the combatant commanders. The combatant commanders, who
have responsibility and operational control over forces from two or more
services, consolidate the requirements from their
component commanders and develop *requests for forces* (RFF). Each RFF
generally identifies the mission, along with the equipment, personnel,
units, types of units, or general capabilities that are necessary to carry
out the mission. RFFs may be very detailed or very general, depending on
the nature of the mission. Furthermore, RFFs typically contain
requirements that must be filled by more than one service.
The combatant commanders send RFFs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who is the principal military advisor to the President and the
Secretary of Defense on mobilization matters. The Joint Staff validates
and prioritizes requirements from the combatant commanders and then sends
draft deployment orders via E- mail to the supporting commanders, who will
supply forces or equipment. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff considers (1) the assessments of the service headquarters, reserve
component commanders, and supporting combatant commanders; (2) input from
his own staff; and (3) the technical advice, legal opinions, and policies
provided by OSD. The Chairman then makes a recommendation to the Secretary
of Defense concerning the timing of mobilizations and the units or
individuals to be mobilized.
When the Secretary of Defense completes his review of the validated RFF
and is satisfied with the mobilization justification, he authorizes the
deployment of forces, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues
a deployment order. The services then review the approved requirements on
the deployment order and coordinate with applicable force providers and
reserve component headquarters to check the readiness of the units that
had been projected to fill the requirements. If necessary, units or
individuals may be identified to substitute for, or augment, the units and
individuals that were originally projected. When the units or individuals
8 The number of combatant commanders is not fixed by law or regulation and
may vary over time. While most of the combatant commands are organized on
a geographical basis, some are organized on a functional basis.
Page 13 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel are firmly identified for
mobilization, the assistant secretaries of the military departments who
have responsibilities for manpower and reserve
affairs issues approve the mobilization packages. 9 Finally, the services
issue mobilization orders to units and individuals. These orders state
where and when to report for duty, as well as the length of duty. In
September 2001, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel
and Readiness), which is responsible for developing the policies, plans,
and programs to manage the readiness of both active and reserve forces,
issued a memorandum containing specific mobilization guidance. This
guidance instructed the military departments to write mobilization orders
for 1 year 10 but allowed the service secretaries the option of extending
mobilizations for a second year.
In subsequent mobilization guidance, issued in January, March, and July
2002, the Under Secretary instructed the services to use volunteers to the
maximum extent possible, so that involuntary mobilizations would be
minimized. In conjunction with the services, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, which has overall responsibility
for reserve policies and procedures within DOD, set a goal to provide
reservists with 30 days notice prior to mobilization, when operationally
feasible. The services took different approaches when alerting their
reservists prior to mobilization. The Army took the most formal approach
and attempted to provide its reservists with official orders 30 days prior
to their mobilization dates. The other services took less formal
approaches and tried to notify reservists of impending mobilizations and
deployments when requirements were identified or validated, or at some
other key point in the mobilization process. 11 According to DOD
officials, the mobilization process* from the time a
requirement is generated until the time that a reservist reports to a 9 In
September 2001, this final approval authority was delegated from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to the military departments. However,
during the final buildup for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Under Secretary
of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) acted as the final mobilization
authority. 10 These orders did not prevent the services from demobilizing
personnel prior to the end of the year.
11 Some high- priority reserve units are required to be available for
deployment within 72 or even 24 hours of notification so it is well-
recognized that formal notification will not always be available 30 days
prior to mobilization. Even informal notification may be short for quickly
emerging requirements.
Page 14 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel mobilization site to fill that
requirement* can take anywhere from 1 day to several months, but it
normally takes several weeks. Based on our observations at mobilization
processing sites and discussions with
mobilization officials, we found that most reservists were able to
complete their required briefings, screenings, and administrative
functions within 24 to 96 hours after reaching their mobilization sites.
However, some reservists required lengthy postmobilization training before
they were able to deploy.
Unreliable and inconsistent data make it difficult to quantify the exact
change in the tempo of reserve operations since September 11, 2001. 12
Officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve
Affairs have characterized mobilization data from the early days and weeks
following September 11 as questionable. In addition, because reservists
can perform a wide variety of sometimes- overlapping training and
operational missions, in a variety of voluntary or involuntary duty
statuses, mobilization data have been captured differently over time. For
example, because the state governors mobilized large numbers of National
Guard troops to provide security at their civilian airports, DOD*s
mobilization figures for most of 2002 included state active duty figures
as well as figures for federal mobilizations. However, state active duty
was dropped from DOD*s mobilization figures after the National Guard moved
out of the last civilian airport in September 2002. It is also difficult
to fully capture increases in reserve tempos because mobilization figures
that are based strictly on section 12302 partial mobilization orders
ignore the major contributions of reserve volunteers, some of whom are
serving lengthy tours under section 12301( d) orders. Despite the
identified data challenges, figure 2 uses consistently reported data to
demonstrate that reserve mobilizations have not dipped below 50,000 during
any week since January 2002. Figure 2 also shows the dramatic increase in
mobilizations that began in January 2003 to support operations in Iraq.
12 Tempo refers to the total days reservists spend participating in normal
drills, training, and exercises, as well as domestic and overseas
operational missions. Reserve Tempo
Page 15 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel Figure 2: Guard and Reserve
Members on Active Duty (January 2002- July 2003)
Note: Data from the early days and weeks following September 11, 2001, are
not reliable. Further, the services captured mobilization data differently
over time, making it difficult to aggregate the data. To present the data
consistently, our figures display data beginning with January 2002.
Figures 3 and 4 show the mobilizations of each of the services between
January 2002 and July 2003.
Page 16 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel Figure 3: Reserve Force
Mobilizations by Service (January 2002* July 2003)
Note: Data from the early days and weeks following September 11, 2001, are
not reliable. Further, the services captured mobilization data differently
over time, making it difficult to aggregate the data. To present the data
consistently, our figures display data beginning with January 2002.
Figure 3 shows that between January 2003 and July 2003, the Army had more
reservists mobilized than did all the other services combined. However,
figure 4 shows that the mobilizations were most wide reaching within the
Coast Guard, which had more than one- third of its Ready Reserve forces
mobilized during April 2003.
Page 17 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel Figure 4: Reserve Force
Mobilizations as Percentages of Service Ready Reserve Strengths (January
2002* July 2003)
Note: Data from the early days and weeks following September 11, 2001, are
not reliable. Further, the services captured mobilization data differently
over time, making it difficult to aggregate the data. To present the data
consistently, our figures display data beginning with January 2002.
Previously, we reported on several issues surrounding the increased use of
reserve forces. Our June 2002 report noted that maintaining employers*
continued support for their reservist employees will be critical if DOD is
to retain experienced reservists in these times of longer and more
frequent Relevant GAO Products
Page 18 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel deployments. 13 We assessed the
relations between reservists and their civilian employers, focusing
specifically on DOD*s outreach efforts
designed to improve these important relationships. We found that many
employers we surveyed were not receiving adequate advance notice prior to
their reservist employees* departure for military duty. We reported that
in spite of repeated memoranda from the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, advance notification continued to be a problem and
that the services had not consistently met the 30- day advance
notification goal. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the
services to determine how many orders are not being issued 30 days in
advance of
deployments and why, and then take the necessary corrective actions toward
fuller compliance with the goal. DOD agreed with the merit to studying why
the reserve components miss the 30- day goal.
Citing the increased use of the reserves to support military operations,
House Report 107- 436 accompanying the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense
Authorization Act directed us to review compensation and benefit programs
for reservists serving on active duty. In response, we are reviewing (1)
income protection for reservists called to active duty, (2) family support
programs, and (3) health care access. In March 2003, we testified before
the Subcommittee on Total Force, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, on our preliminary observations
related to this work. 14 During the 1990- 1991 Persian Gulf War, health
problems prevented the
deployment of a significant number of Army reservists. To help correct
this problem the Congress passed legislation that required reservists to
undergo periodic physical and dental examinations. The National Defense
Authorization Act for 2002 directed us to review the value and
advisability of providing examinations. 15 We also examined whether the
Army is
13 U. S. General Accounting Office, Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to
Better Manage Relations between Reservists and Their Employers, GAO- 02-
608 (Washington, D. C.: June 13, 2002).
14 U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Preliminary
Observations Related to Income, Benefits, and Employer Support for
Reservists During Mobilization,
GAO- 03- 549T (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 19, 2003). We also provided a
statement for the record to the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on
Armed Services, U. S. Senate, titled Military Personnel: Preliminary
Observations Related to Income, Benefits, and Employer Support for
Reservists During Mobilization, GAO- 03- 573T (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 19,
2003). 15 Pub. L. No. 107- 107, section 724.
Page 19 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel collecting and maintaining
information on reservists* health. In April 2003, we reported that without
adequate examinations, the Army may train, support, and mobilize
reservists who are unfit for duty. 16 Further, the Army
had not consistently carried out the statutory requirements for monitoring
the health and dental status of Army early deploying reservists. At the
early deploying units we visited, approximately 66 percent of the medical
records were available for review. We found that about 68 percent of the
required physical examinations for those over age 40 had not been
performed and that none of the annual medical certificates required of
reservists had been completed by reservists and reviewed by the units. We
recommended that the Secretary of Defense ensure that for early
deploying reservists the required physical examinations, annual medical
certificates, and annual dental examinations be completed. DOD concurred
with our recommendations.
DOD did not follow its existing operation plans after the events of
September 11, 2001, to mobilize nearly 300,000 reservists. DOD*s
traditional mobilization process relies on requirements from operation
plans that have been coordinated with key mobilization officials prior to
the start of the mobilization process. The operation plans in existence on
September 11, 2001, did not include all the requirements that were needed
to respond to the domestic terrorist threat. Overseas operation plans did
not focus on terrorist threats or the uncertain political environment in
southwest Asia. Nor did operation plans adequately address the increasing
requirements for individuals and small, tailored task forces. Because DOD
could not rely on existing operation plans to guide its mobilizations, it
used a modified mobilization process that was slower than the traditional
mobilization process.
DOD has called about 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve
personnel to active duty since September 2001. These reservists fought on
the front lines in Iraq; tracked down Taliban and al Qaeda members
throughout Asia and Africa; maintained the peace in the Balkans,
Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and participated in domestic missions ranging
from providing security at airports and at the Salt Lake City Olympics to
fighting drug trafficking and providing disaster relief. With many of
these
16 U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Health Care: Army Needs to
Assess the Health Status of All Early Deploying Reservists, GAO- 03- 437
(Washington, D. C.: Apr. 15, 2003). DOD*s Mobilizations
after September 11, 2001, Were Not Based on Existing Operation Plans
About 300,000 Reservists Called to Active Duty
Page 20 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel missions* including those
associated with the global war on terrorism* expected to continue, reserve
force mobilizations are likely to persist for
the foreseeable future. DOD recognized before September 11, 2001, that no
significant operation could be conducted without reserve involvement.
DOD*s mobilization process was designed to mobilize reservists based on
the execution of combatant commander operation plans and a preplanned flow
of forces. As a result, the mobilization process operates most efficiently
when operation plans accurately and completely capture mobilization
requirements. However, since DOD develops its operation plans using a
deliberate planning process that involves input and coordination from OSD,
the Joint Staff, and the services, the process can take years, and
operation plans have not been quick to respond to changes
in the threat environment. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, we
issued a number of reports highlighting the need for effective U. S.
efforts to combat terrorism domestically and abroad. 17 For example, we
recommended that the federal government conduct multidisciplinary and
analytically sound threat and
risk assessments to define and prioritize requirements and properly focus
programs and investments in combating terrorism. 18 Threat and risk
assessments are decision- making support tools that are used to establish
requirements and prioritize program investments. DOD uses a variation of
this approach. We also reported on DOD*s use of a risk- assessment model
to evaluate force protection security requirements for mass casualty
terrorists* incidents at DOD military bases. 19 While DOD*s goal is to
conduct mobilizations based on operation plans
developed through a deliberate planning process, the department recognizes
that during the initial stages of an emergency it may have to resort to a
crisis action response rather than adhering to its operation plans. This
is particularly true if the emergency had not been anticipated.
17 See www. gao. gov for a complete listing of our reports on homeland
security, terrorism, and airport security from 1980 to present. 18 U. S.
General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and
Related
Recommendations, GAO- 01- 822 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20, 2001). 19 U.
S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts
to Protect Its Forces Overseas, GAO- NSIAD- 97- 207 (Washington, D. C.:
July 21, 1997) and Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U. S. Forces in
Turkey and the Middle East,
GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 44 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 28, 1997). Sound Operation
Plans Can
Help the Efficiency of DOD*s Mobilization Process
Page 21 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel During such crisis response
periods, DOD can use a variety of authorities to position its forces where
they are needed. For example, following the
events of September 11, 2001, DOD used voluntary orders and other
available means to get and keep reservists on active duty. As of November
8, 2001, almost 40,000 reservists had been mobilized under the partial
mobilization authority for the global war on terrorism, but almost 19,000
reservists were on active duty and positioned where they were needed under
other federal authorities. By comparison, more than 53,000 reservists were
mobilized under the partial mobilization authority for the global war on
terrorism on December 3, 2002, but the reservists on active duty under
other federal authorities had dropped to less than 5,000. 20 When DOD
moved beyond its crisis action response to the events of
September 11, 2001, it was not able to rely on operation plans to guide
its mobilizations because operation plans did not contain requirements to
address the domestic response to the terrorist threat. According to senior
DOD officials, when terrorists crashed planes into the Pentagon, the World
Trade Center, and a field in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, none of
DOD*s operation plans contained requirements for National Guard troops to
deploy to the nation*s civilian airports. In September 2001, we reported
that some threats are difficult, if not impossible, to predict. 21
Therefore, an effective antiterrorism program that can reduce
vulnerabilities to such attacks is an important aspect of military
operations. We also reported that the effectiveness of the DOD
antiterrorism program was becoming an important aspect of military
operations. However, the effectiveness of the program had been limited
because DOD had not (1) assessed vulnerabilities at all installations, (2)
systematically prioritized resource requirements, and (3) developed a
complete assessment of potential threats. DOD has been taking steps to
improve the program.
Despite the lack of airport security requirements in operation plans,
between November 2001 and April 2002, an average of approximately 7,500
National Guard members were mobilized at the nation*s civilian airports.
22 During the same period, an average of almost 1,900 National Guard
members were on state active duty, many to provide security at
20 Reservists were also serving on active duty under state authorities on
these dates. 21 U. S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism:
Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism Program Implementation and
Management, GAO- 01- 909 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 19, 2001).
22 These reservists were under the control of their state governors.
Operation Plans Did Not
Include Requirements to Address the Domestic Terrorist Threat
Page 22 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel other key infrastructure sites
such as tunnels, bridges, and nuclear power plants. According to senior
Air Force officials, none of the operation plans
that existed on September 11, 2001, contained requirements for the
extended use of Guard and Reserve members to fly combat air patrols over
the nation*s capital and major cities. Yet, reservists were performing
that mission on September 11, 2001, and they continue to support the
combat air patrol mission, particularly when the national threat level is
raised.
According to DOD officials, preexisting service mobilization plans called
for Guard and Reserve forces to move to active duty bases and provide
security at those bases after the active forces had departed from the
bases. However, after September 11, many Guard and Reserve members were on
active duty (voluntarily and involuntarily) at active and reserve bases
and were filling security requirements that were not in any operation
plan. For example, even while active forces remained, two selected Marine
Corps battalions were mobilized for approximately 12 months* one at Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, and one at Camp Pendleton, California* to quickly
respond to any additional terrorist attacks within the United States. In
addition, the Air Force had to unexpectedly bring reservists on active
duty to provide security for their reserve bases after September 11. In
particular, Air National Guard security forces were needed to provide
security at bases from which the Guard was flying combat air patrol
missions.
According to DOD officials, requirements in overseas operation plans
focused on traditional operations against national military forces, rather
than on tracking terrorists throughout Afghanistan and around the globe.
For several years, defense planning guidance had been formulated around
the concept that the military had to be ready to fight and win two major
theater wars, generally viewed as one in southwest Asia and one on the
Korean peninsula. According to DOD officials, operation plans for these
areas focused on the threats posed by rogue countries. Moreover, even
after defense planning guidance had begun to indicate a need for the
military to be capability based rather than threat based, operation plans
continued to focus on conventional adversaries.
According to DOD officials, some of the mobilizations that took place in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom followed the order and timing
established in the relevant operation plan and its associated time- phased
force deployment and data file. However, the order and timing of other
mobilizations changed due to the tenuous political environment and
uncertainties concerning coalition partnerships and access to airspaces,
as Overseas Operation Plans Did
Not Focus on the Terrorist Threat or the Uncertain Political Environment
in Southwest Asia
Page 23 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel well as access to bases in Turkey,
Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Access- to- base issues had also arisen during the
1991 Persian Gulf War.
According to DOD officials, the combatant commanders* requests for small,
tailored task forces and individuals have been increasing since September
11, 2001, but the requirements for these small groups and individuals have
not been fully addressed in the combatant commanders* existing operation
plans. Mobilization statistics demonstrate the large numbers of small
groups and individuals that have been mobilized recently. For example, a
DOD report showed that on March 5, 2003, the services had thousands of
reservists mobilized as parts of small units or as individuals. The Navy
had 266 one- person and 152 two- person units mobilized, and the Army also
had hundreds of one- and two- person units mobilized. The Marine Corps
strives to keeps its units intact, and Marine Corps policy states that
detachments must consist of at least two people, but the Marine Corps had
24 two- person and 22 three- person units mobilized. The Air Force had
just 6 units with less than 20 people mobilized on that date. However, the
services also had 12,682 individual augmentees mobilized on March 5, 2003*
1,438 of them from the Air Force*s two reserve components.
After September 11, 2001, DOD used a modified mobilization process because
existing operation plans had not adequately addressed mobilization
requirements and changing priorities. The modified process was able to
respond to changing priorities and new requirements. However, because key
mobilization officials did not have a lengthy deliberate planning period
to discuss these new requirements and changing priorities, coordination
had to take place during the mobilization process, thus lengthening the
process. Under the modified process, close to two dozen approvals are
needed to mobilize one unit or individual. A contractor study conducted
for the Army Operations Office looked at how long it took from the time
the U. S. Central Command issued a RFF until
the time a deployment order was issued. Preliminary results showed that
the monthly averages from February through June 2002 ranged from 18 to 19
days for this portion of the mobilization process. 23 Coordination was
much more difficult under the modified process due to the large number of
deployment orders. For example, under the modified
23 The minimum time was 1 day and the maximum time was 45 days. Operation
Plans Did Not
Adequately Address Increasing Requirements for Individuals and Small,
Tailored Task Forces The Modified Mobilization
Process Was Slower and Less Efficient Than the Traditional Process
Page 24 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel process, the Secretary of Defense
signed 246 deployment orders to mobilize over 280,000 reservists between
September 11, 2001, and May 21, 2003, compared to the less than 10
deployment orders needed to mobilize
over 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Gulf War. The longer modified
mobilization process is less efficient than the traditional process
primarily because it relies on additional management oversight and
multiple layers of coordination between the services, OSD, and the Joint
Staff during the validating, approving, and filling of mobilization
requirements. Many of these factors are detailed in the sections below.
DOD officials did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process
primarily because DOD lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel and
other resources. First, DOD*s primary automated readiness reporting system
could not adequately track the personnel and other resources within the
small units that were frequently needed by combatant commanders. Second,
some systems used by the active and reserve components to track personnel
were incompatible. In addition, outdated mobilization guidance led to
communication and coordination problems amongst the components.
DOD officials had limited visibility over the readiness of the entire
force because DOD*s primary readiness reporting data system tracked the
readiness only of large units and not the readiness of resources within
the small units that made up the larger reporting units. These smaller
units were often sufficient to meet the combatant commanders* requirements
for the small, tailored units that were frequently requested after
September 11, 2001. 24 Because DOD officials did not have quick access to
readiness information of these small units, they had to coordinate with
reserve headquarters officials and, in some cases, the individual units
themselves to obtain the readiness information needed to determine which
unit would be best able to fill the combatant commanders* requirements.
The Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) is DOD*s
single automated system for reporting the readiness of all operational
units within the U. S. armed forces. It does not function as a detailed
24 For example, an Army battalion would report its overall readiness as
well as its overall personnel and equipment readiness, but it would not
report the readiness of individual platoons within its companies. DOD
Officials Had Limited Visibility Over
the Mobilization Process Data Systems Unable to
Track Readiness of Resources Within Units
Page 25 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel management information system, but
it does provide broad information on selected readiness indicators 25 and
include a commander*s assessment of
the unit*s ability to undertake the missions for which the unit was
organized or designed. Units provide readiness reports to a central site
where the data are processed and stored and then distributed to decision
makers. The information in the system is supposed to support crisis
response planning as well as deliberate planning. However, the services
are only required to register forces that are included in operation plans
or other war- planning documents. Generally, all large units report their
readiness in the system. However, resources within the units are not
necessarily reported. For example, GSORTS could show that a specific unit
is not ready to perform its mission, but fail to capture information that
would indicate that some of the personnel and equipment within the unit
are capable of performing their mission. Such information would benefit
the services in their efforts to assemble the forces needed to meet joint
organizational requirements.
Because the Air Force combined various capabilities into nontraditional
force groups in support of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force, it
recognized the need to report readiness for small *building block* units
that could be combined to provide the needed capabilities. As a result,
the Air Force developed its own readiness reporting system that reported
the readiness of more than 67,000 units in January 2003.
The Army and the Navy do not report readiness at this small unit level.
Consequently, when the combatant commanders submit RFFs that do not
coincide with the forces that are reported in GSORTS, the decision makers
within the services must coordinate with active and reserve component
commanders to determine the readiness of the forces that would be
available to fill the requested requirements.
DOD officials also lost visibility over the mobilization of reservists
because some active and reserve component personnel tracking systems were
not compatible. Some components within the respective services maintain
personnel data in their own data systems for different purposes. In those
cases, both the active and reserve components require data that are
provided only in the other*s data systems. Yet, in some cases, active and
reserve component systems were not always compatible with each other,
25 Specifically, units report personnel levels, equipment and supply
levels, condition of equipment, and training levels. Some Active and
Reserve
Personnel Tracking Systems Were Incompatible
Page 26 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel resulting in cumbersome
workarounds or extensive ad hoc coordination between active and reserve
officials, and, according to DOD officials, the sometimes outright loss of
visibility over the length of reservists*
mobilization or deployment status. The reserve and active components
within some of the respective services maintain personnel data for
different purposes. The individual reserve components maintain the
mobilization data in their respective systems in order to track and
maintain visibility over reservists* physical location and mobilization
status. The reserve systems also maintain information on reservists*
mobilization dates. Active components* systems maintain personnel data for
forces that are under their control. Using a variety of data systems, the
active components track such information as the number of personnel, the
units to which the personnel are attached, and the location of the unit.
However, the active components cannot always
discern between the regular active and mobilized reserve servicemembers in
their data systems.
The services* active and reserve components have developed their
respective computerized systems to track their personnel data, but they
are often unable to directly transfer information and data between their
systems. Often, these systems do not report information in a standardized
format and are not integrated with each other. For example, while most of
the services provide DOD with unclassified mobilization data, some
services provide classified mobilization data. DOD must then aggregate
selected unclassified information on a separate computer file that can be
used to produce a single consolidated mobilization report.
The incompatibilities between some active and reserve component data
systems required mobilization officials to develop workarounds to acquire
the information needed. Air Force officials cited the lack of a central
automated system to manage and track mobilized reservists as a major
problem that required extensive coordination between active and reserve
components. Some components, like the Air National Guard and the Air Force
Reserve, developed their own mobilization reporting systems to track the
location and status of their reservists using computer spreadsheets.
The use of local, nonintegrated data systems also affects the validity of
some mobilization data. For example, we requested mobilization data from
the Army Reserve on several occasions during our review, but Army Reserve
officials cautioned us concerning the use of figures from their
computerized database. They stated that the figures were unreliable and
Page 27 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel conflicted with the overall number
of personnel they thought had been mobilized. Without an automated means
for quickly and reliably capturing mobilization data, the Army has had to
rely on a slow mobilization process
that requires constant coordination between active and reserve component
officials.
The coordination between active and reserve component officials within the
Army and the Navy often takes the form of relatively inefficient methods
to determine the status of mobilized reservists. For example, in the
initial months following September 11, 2001, the Navy had no automated
means to track reservists from their home stations to their gaining
commands. The entire mobilization process was based on paper, telephone
calls, faxes, and e- mail messages.
The lack of compatibility between automated data systems, and the
sometimes cumbersome workarounds undertaken by the services to obtain
reservists* information, has at times led to the outright loss of DOD
visibility over the length of reservists* mobilization or deployment
status and resulted in cases where reservists were inadvertently deployed
beyond the original year specified in their orders. Additionally, Air
Force officials told us that their major commands have had trouble filling
new requirements because they cannot consistently determine who has
volunteered and who is already serving on active duty. Because of limited
visibility, some Navy processing personnel did not know in advance which
reservists had been ordered to their mobilization processing sites or when
the reservists were expected to report.
Air Force officials said that they either totally lost or had diminished
visibility over their reservists once they were mobilized and assigned to
active commands. Reserve component officials from the Air Force said that
a tracking system does not exist to effectively monitor reservists from
the time they are mobilized and assigned to an active command to the time
they are demobilized and return to their normal reserve status. As a
result,
reservists were deployed beyond their scheduled return dates and were not
able to take the leave to which they were entitled prior to the expiration
of their orders. Reserve officials said that this happened because
replacement personnel had not arrived in time to relieve the reservists
and the active commands were not willing to send the deployed reservists
home until replacements had arrived. In many cases, Air Force reserve
component headquarters said they did not have visibility over the
replacement personnel because these personnel were coming from active
component units.
Page 28 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel The Army experienced situations
where the lack of visibility contributed to the breaking of service
policies. During the current partial mobilization,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) issued
a verbal policy that stated that units were not to be placed on alert for
more than 90 days. The Army*s force providers were to review the list of
units on alert each month and determine whether the units needed to remain
on alert. If the force providers needed to keep any units on alert
beyond 90 days, they could request an extension from the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). 26 Table 2 shows
that on March 28, 2003, 204 units had been on alert for more than 90 days
and that 12 units* representing hundreds of Guard and Reserve members* had
been on alert for more than a year. The Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) told us that he was not aware that the 12
units had been on alert for more than a year. He worked to resolve this
matter as soon as we brought it to his attention.
Table 2: Numbers of Army National Guard or Army Reserve Units That Were on
Alert in Excess of 90 Days (March 28, 2003)
Days on alert Number of units on alert a > 365 12 181 to 365 20 91 to 180
172 Sources: U. S. Army (data); GAO (analysis). a The Army*s *Units On
Alert* report does not identify the actual numbers of reservists on alert,
but it does include authorized strength information for some units.
Authorized strength figures were available for 8 of the 12 units that had
been on alert for more than a year and totaled 1,939.
Some service components developed their own systems to gain visibility
over their mobilized reservists. For example, the Navy adapted a system
from the Marine Corps in February 2003 that provides all Navy mobilization
officials with the capability to track reservists throughout the
mobilization process. Commands now have visibility over the entire
mobilization process and can monitor the status of reservists en route to
their commands, including the reservists* current locations. Since
implementing this system, the Navy has processed more than 8,000
mobilization orders and 6,000 demobilization orders.
26 Officials provided several reasons why units might remain on alert for
more than 90 days including: changing mission requirements or unit
readiness and rotational requirements.
Page 29 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel The Marine Corps implemented its
system in 1994 to provide visibility over its reserve forces. This local
area network- based system supports the
continuous processing and tracking of newly mobilized Marines. However,
this system is not integrated with the Navy*s system, and data cannot be
exchanged between the two systems. As a result, the Navy is not
automatically made aware of requirements for Navy medical, religious, or
other support personnel who are embedded in Marine Corps units, when the
associated Marine Corps units are mobilized.
Finally, key DOD and service guidance* including mobilization instructions
and publications* had not been updated in all instances to reflect the
modified mobilization process, leading to failures in communication and
coordination between components and further reducing officials* visibility
over the mobilization process. In some instances where DOD and the
services did draft updated guidance to reflect the modified mobilization
process, it was not clear to all mobilization officials which guidance to
follow. The lack of updated guidance and the appearance of conflicting
guidance resulted in situations where the components were not effectively
coordinating and
communicating their mobilization efforts with each other. OSD and the
Joint Staff provide guidance and instructions on the mobilization policy,
roles and responsibilities of mobilization officials, and mobilization
planning and execution. Similar guidance and instructions are provided by
the respective services for planning and executing mobilization within
their respective commands. However, some of DOD*s guidance failed to
clearly identify the steps of the modified mobilization process, the roles
and responsibilities of mobilization officials, and the flow of
information. While the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness) has issued several mobilization guidance memorandums since
September 11, 2001, many of DOD*s key mobilization instructions,
directives, and publications have not been updated to reflect current
changes to the mobilization process. For example,
DOD*s *Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning Policies and Procedures*
instruction has not been updated since 1986; DOD*s *Activation,
Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready
Reserve* directive was last updated in 1995; and DOD*s *Management of
the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Inactive National Guard (ING)*
directive was last updated in 1997. Outdated Mobilization
Guidance Led to Communication and Coordination Problems
Page 30 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel In addition, the Joint Staff had
not updated its key mobilization guidance. The *Joint Doctrine for
Mobilization Planning* publication was under
revision when we completed our review, but the update to the 1995
publication had not yet been released.
Within the Air Force, the lack of clear and consolidated guidance hindered
the mobilization process. The service*s mobilization guidance was issued
in 1994, and although several draft revisions to this guidance have been
circulated since September 11, 2001, the guidance has yet to be officially
updated. Officials in both the Air National Guard and the Air Force
Reserve told us that they did not know whether they were supposed to
follow the old *official* instruction or the revised (but unsigned)
instructions. The lack of clear guidance led to situations where Air
National Guard units had been mobilized without the knowledge of the Air
National Guard headquarters* crisis action teams, consisting of officials
responsible for matching requirements with available units and personnel.
For example, on February 22, 2003, the Air Mobility Command mobilized the
163rd Air Refueling Wing at the March Air Reserve Base. When we contacted
the Air National Guard crisis action team 3 days later, the team was
unaware that the 163rd had been mobilized. According to a senior
level Air National Guard official, the Air Mobility Command had bypassed
the Guard*s crisis action team and directly notified the unit of the
mobilization. According to this official, the Guard*s crisis action team
had been bypassed on mobilizations directed by both the Air Mobility
Command and the Air Combat Command.
The lack of clear guidance for mobilizing reservists also slowed down the
Army*s mobilization process. On October 24, 2001, the Army issued guidance
on the mobilization process. However, according to senior Army policy
officials, the Army*s initial personnel replacement policy was
unclear. This led to cases where the Army Reserve would send a request for
a requirement to fill an empty position through the entire mobilization
process rather than simply attempt to fill the position with another
qualified individual. Between September 2001 and June 2002, the Army
Reserve submitted 567 requests for just one individual because the initial
person selected could not fill the position. These requests slowed down
the mobilization process as each request was reviewed. The Army recently
drafted a policy to clarify its replacement procedures.
The Navy*s failure to update its guidance on the delegation of
mobilization authority led to a redundancy of efforts. In June 2002, the
Secretary of Defense, under the President*s partial mobilization
authority, delegated mobilization authority to the service secretaries and
permitted further
Page 31 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel delegation only to civilian
officials who were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
However, the Navy had not updated its
mobilization authority guidance, and consequently the Secretary of the
Navy continued delegating mobilization authority to the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who in turn continued
to approve mobilizations until 2003. When the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy became aware that mobilization authority had been improperly
delegated to military leaders within the Department of the
Navy, he rescinded the delegated authority and reviewed and revalidated
previously approved mobilizations, in addition to all new mobilization
requests.
In some cases, the failure of mobilization guidance to define the roles
and responsibilities of officials participating in the mobilization
process also resulted in delays. For example, the Air Force found that the
roles and responsibilities of its crisis action teams had not been
adequately defined and that there was insufficient coordination between
these crisis action teams during the planning and execution stages of the
mobilization process. This led to different interpretations of the
policies concerning the use of volunteers. Moreover, a lack of an
established coordinated process resulted in delays getting policy,
guidance, and tasks to the field. For
example, whereas the requirement is to mobilize within 72 hours, there
were instances where the mobilization process took 9 days.
The services have used two primary approaches* predictable operating
cycles and formal advanced notification* to provide time for units and
servicemembers to prepare for upcoming mobilizations and deployments. All
the services provide predictability to portions of their active forces
through some type of standard operating cycle, but only the Air Force has
a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both its active
and reserve forces. The Army assigns priority categories to its units, and
lowerpriority units generally need extra training and preparation time
prior to deploying. Advanced mobilization notice, while important, does
not provide the long lead times made possible by predictable operating
cycles. The increased use of the Army*s reserve forces heightens the need
for predictability so these units and individuals can prepare for upcoming
mobilizations and deployments. The Services Have
Two Approaches to Provide Preparation Time for Mobilizations and
Deployments
Page 32 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel The Air Force is the only service
that uses a standard operating cycle* providing deployments of a
predictable length that are preceded and
followed by standard maintenance and training periods* to bring
predictability to both its active and reserve forces. The Navy and the
Marine Corps have used a variety of operating cycles to bring such
predictability to portions of their forces. Likewise, the Army has used an
operating cycle concept to bring predictability to a portion of its active
force, under its Division Ready Brigade program. 27 Key officials
throughout DOD have acknowledged the importance of
predictability in helping reserve forces to prepare for mobilization and
deployment. Predictability helps units anticipate (1) downtime, so they
can schedule lengthy education and training for personnel and lengthy
maintenance for equipment and (2) the likely periods of mobilization or
deployment, so they can focus on efforts to increase readiness, including
last minute training 28 and the screening of medical, dental, and
personnel records. Predictability helps individual reservists by giving
them time to prepare their civilian employers and family members for their
possible departures.
In the years following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Air Force Reserve
and Air National Guard forces, which already had the highest tempos of any
of DOD*s reserve component forces, faced increasing tempos. 29 In August
1998, the Air Force adopted the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept to
help it manage its commitments while reducing the deployment burden on its
people. This concept established a standard 15- month
operating cycle and divided the Air Force into 10 groups, each containing
a mix of active, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve forces. Two
groups were scheduled to deploy during each of the five, 3- month
increments within the standard 15- month operating cycle. However,
27 Within the Army*s active divisions, brigades are rotated into an alert
status for 1- month periods. 28 Because some skills (1) are very
perishable (certifications may last for 1 year or less), (2) require long
training times, and (3) may not be needed prior to deployment, units may
be reluctant to send their personnel to the required schools if the units
do not know when they are going to deploy. Predictability helps units to
efficiently and effectively schedule
personnel for certification schools. Army officials cited combat lifesaver
and hazardous materiel coordinators as two of these certified skills. 29
Between fiscal year 1992 and 1999, tempos in the Air Force*s reserve
components had risen from 55 to 65 days of active duty per year, while the
tempos in the other reserve components had remained much lower* between 33
and 47 days per year. Air Force Standard
Operating Cycle Provides Predictability to Active and Reserve Forces
Page 33 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel because two groups contained more
forces than were generally needed to cover worldwide contingency
operations, and because the predictable cycles provided reservists with
months of advance notice, the Air Force
Reserve and the Air National Guard were able to rely on volunteers to meet
significant portions of their requirements, thus avoiding large- scale
involuntary mobilizations.
While the predictability offered by the Air Force*s standard operating
cycle has proved beneficial during *steady state* operations, the
Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept is not yet able to deal with large
and rapid surges in requirements. When the concept was first implemented,
Air Force officials stated that the expeditionary concept would not be
used to deploy forces to a major war prior to 2007. In the months
immediately following the September 11th attacks and during the buildup
for* and
execution of* the 2003 war in Iraq, the Expeditionary Aerospace Force
operating cycles broke down. For example, personnel with certain high-
demand skills were involuntarily mobilized for longer than the intended 3
months* up to 2 full years, in some cases. However, for much of 2002, the
Air Force used its operating cycles, and it has a plan to return to normal
15- month operating cycles by March of 2004.
The Army prioritizes its units, and lower- priority units generally need
extra training and preparation time prior to deploying. The Army allocates
human capital and other resources using a tiered resourcing system that is
based on the placement of units in existing operation plans. Units that
are identified as the first to mobilize and deploy are resourced at the
highest level. Units identified for later deployment are placed in
subsequently lower resourcing tiers, based on their planned deployment
dates. A unit*s resource tier affects its priority with respect to (1)
recruiting and filling vacancies, (2) full- time staffing, (3) filling
equipment needs, (4) maintaining equipment, (5) obtaining access to
schools and training seats, and (6) funding for extra drills.
Consequently, lower- priority units need more time to prepare for
mobilization and deployment.
The Army*s resourcing strategy is a cost- effective means for maintaining
the Army*s reserve forces when reserve forces will have long lead times to
mobilize. However, a large number of reserve forces were quickly
mobilized* from less than 30,000 on January 1, 2003, to over 150,000 on
March 26, 2003* to respond to the rapid surge in requirements for
operations related to Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on
terrorism. Because existing operation plans had not accurately identified
all mobilization requirements, a number of lower- priority units were
Preparation Time Is
Especially Important to the Army*s Lower- Priority Units
Page 34 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel mobilized with relatively little
advance notice. For example, 5 transportation companies containing 976
reservists were alerted on February 9, 2003, and told to arrive at their
mobilization stations by
February 14, 2003. On January 20, 2003, four other lower- priority Army
National Guard companies, with over 1,000 reservists, were alerted and
told to report to their mobilization stations by January 27, 2003. If
these units had been able to plan for their mobilizations and deployments
based on a standard operating cycle, they may have been able to complete
some of their mobilization requirements during normally scheduled training
periods prior to their mobilizations. Despite the large number of lower-
priority units within the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, the
Army does not have a standard operating cycle concept to provide
predictability to its reserve forces. 30 Without such a concept, the
Army*s opportunities to provide extra training and preparation time to its
reserve forces, particularly those with low priorities, are limited.
OSD established a goal of providing reservists with at least 30 days
notice prior to mobilization when operationally feasible, but such
advanced notice does not provide the longer lead times made possible by
predictable operating cycles. Nonetheless, OSD*s advanced notice policy
was written in recognition of the benefits of such notice to individual
reservists.
The Army, lacking a standard operating cycle to provide predictability for
its reservists, strives to provide its reservists with official written
orders 30 days in advance of mobilizations in accordance with DOD*s
policy. However, in the early days following September 11, 2001, this
level of advanced notice was often not possible because reservists were
required immediately. In the weeks and months that followed, advanced
notice increased. Army data covering the mobilizations of over 6,400
personnel between June and August of 2002 showed that 83 percent of the
personnel had 4 or more weeks advanced notice. However, advanced notice
dropped again in the weeks leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. During
the first 15 days of March 2003, 95 percent of the Army units that were
mobilized received less than 30 days advanced notice, 31 and 8 percent of
the units
30 While the Army scheduled some of its reserve forces for deployments to
the Balkans several years in advance of the deployments, the deployments
were not part of an operating cycle and the deployed forces did not know
when they might be deployed again. 31 Within these units, 21,908 personnel
were mobilized. Advanced Notice Is Not As
Beneficial As Predictable Operating Cycles
Page 35 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel received less than 72 hours
advanced notice. Much of this short notice is attributable to the extra
time that was required to validate and approve
requirements under the modified mobilization process. While 30 days
advanced notice is clearly beneficial to individual reservists, it does
not provide the longer lead times made possible by predictable operating
cycles. As discussed earlier, such cycles allow reserve units, which
typically drill only once every 30 days, to schedule their training and
maintenance so the units* readiness will build as the mobilization time
approaches. While always important, predictability and preparation times
are likely to
become even more important when the pace of reserve operations is high.
Figure 3, on page 16, shows the shift that occurred in July 2002 when the
number of Army reservists on active duty exceeded the number of Air Force
reservists on active duty. The figure also shows the dramatic increase in
Army mobilizations in 2003. During calendar year 2002, the Army had an
average of about 30,000 reserve component members mobilized each week. By
February 12, 2003, the Army had more than 110,000 reservists mobilized,
and mobilizations peaked in March 2003, when more than 150,000 of the
216,811 reservists mobilized were members of the Army National Guard or
the Army Reserve. On June 18, 2003, over 139,000 Army reservists were
still mobilized, and the Army Manpower and Reserve Affairs office
projected that mobilizations would remain high at least through the end of
2004. 32 Given its ongoing commitments in Iraq, the Balkans, Afghanistan,
and at home, many of the Army*s reserve component forces will likely face
the same types of high operational tempos that Air National Guard and Air
Force Reserve forces faced in the 1990s.
As described above, the Air Force has effectively used predictable
operating cycles to help prepare its reserve units and individuals for
mobilization and deployment and to mitigate the negative factors 33
associated with high operational tempos. However, the Army does not
employ such operating cycles for its reserve forces, thus leaving those 32
An estimate placed the mobilization number at 90,000 through the end of
2004. 33 Senior DOD officials have repeatedly expressed concerns that
repeated mobilizations of the reserves could eventually lead to recruiting
and retention problems. Increased Reliance on the
Army*s Reserve Forces Heightens the Need for Predictability
Page 36 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel forces with limited time to
prepare for the increased mobilization and deployment demands facing them.
After September 11, 2001, mobilizations were hampered because about one-
quarter of the Ready Reserve was not readily accessible. Some Selected
Reserve members could not be mobilized due to the lack of training.
Furthermore, the services lack information that is needed to make full use
of the IRR. Finally, OSD and service policies reflect a reluctance to use
the IRR, resulting in situations where Ready Reserve forces were not
readily available for mobilization or deployment.
In fiscal year 2002, most of the military*s approximately 880,000 Selected
Reserve members were available for mobilization and deployment, but over
70,000 Selected Reserve members had not completed the individual training
that is required prior to deploying. 34 By law, members of the armed
forces are not permitted to deploy outside the United States and its
territories until they have completed the basic training requirements of
the applicable military services. 35 The law further stipulates that in
time of a national emergency (such as the one in effect since September
11, 2001) the basic training period may not be less than 12 weeks, except
for certain medical personnel. 36 The over 70,000 Selected Reserve members
who were
not deployable in fiscal year 2002 included personnel who had entered the
service and were awaiting their initial active duty training, 37 personnel
who were awaiting the second part of a split initial active duty training
program, and reservists who were still participating in initial active
duty training programs. Each year between fiscal year 1997 and 2002, 7 to
10 percent of Selected Reserve members were not deployable because they
had not completed their required initial training. 34 In fiscal year 2002,
the Selected Reserve made up 74 percent of the Ready Reserve. 35 10 U. S.
C. S: 671. 36 10 U. S. C. S: 671( c). 37 The Fiscal Year 2003 National
Defense Authorization Act (section 533 (a) P. L. 107- 314, Dec. 2, 2002)
increased the maximum time that reservists may delay commencement of their
initial active duty training from 270 days (10 U. S. C. S: 12103) to 1
year after their enlistments. DOD Has Limited Access to Portions of
the Ready Reserve Many Selected Reserve Members Could Not Be Mobilized Due
to the Lack of Training
Page 37 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel While most members of the Selected
Reserve had met the initial active duty training requirements in fiscal
year 2002 and were therefore available
for mobilization, a portion of these personnel belonged to units that
would have required lengthy periods of unit training before they would
have been deployable. In particular, the reserve forces from the Army*s
bottom two
resourcing categories generally require lengthy postmobilization training
periods before they are deployable. Because both the Presidential Reserve
Call- up 38 and partial mobilization 39 authorities prevented the services
from mobilizing reservists specifically for training, the Army could not
use many
of its tier three and four Guard and Reserve units to meet requirements
that had to be filled immediately. On April 10, 2003, DOD proposed that
Congress change portions of the United States Code to allow the military
departments to order reservists to active duty for up to 90 days of
training in order to meet deployment standards. 40 The services lack the
vital information necessary to fully use their IRR
pools of over 300,000 pretrained individual reservists. 41 Many of the IRR
members were inaccessible because the services did not have valid contact
information (addresses or phone numbers) for these individuals. Moreover,
the services* use of three primary access methods* exit briefings,
questionnaires, and screenings* did not obtain the results necessary to
gain and maintain access to their IRR members. Finally, the services have
not developed results- oriented goals and performance measures to improve
the use of their primary methods to access IRR members.
The services could not access many IRR members because they did not have
valid addresses or phone numbers for the members. For example, in April
2003, the Army estimated that it had inaccurate addresses for more than
40,400 of its IRR members. When the services were able to contact their
IRR members and obtain the vital information necessary to use its
IRR pool, exemptions and delays often limited the services* abilities to
38 10 U. S. C. S: 12304. 39 10 U. S. C. S: 12302. 40 *The Defense
Transformation for the 21st Century Act* had not been signed into law as
of the date of publication of our report. 41 In fiscal year 2002, the IRR
and the Inactive National Guard made up 26 percent of the Ready Reserve.
Services Lack Vital Information That Is
Necessary to Make Full Use of the IRR
Services Lacked Valid Contact Information for IRR Members
Page 38 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel fully use these personnel. For
example, in February 2003, the Army sent mobilization orders to 345 IRR
members, but 164 of these reservists
requested and were granted exemptions for specific reasons, such as
medical issues, so they did not have to deploy, and another 35 were
granted delays in their reporting dates.
The services* use of their three primary IRR access methods did not obtain
the results necessary to gain and maintain full access to their IRR
members. These methods include (1) briefings provided to members when they
leave active duty or a drilling reserve position; (2) questionnaires to
verify basic member information, such as contact information; and (3) 1-
day screenings to verify member fitness for mobilization.
First, the services brief the members when they leave active duty or a
Selected Reserve position. These briefings are designed to make the
individuals aware of their responsibilities as members of the IRR.
However, mobilized reservists that we spoke with said that IRR
responsibilities had not been clearly explained during exit briefings when
they left active duty. For example, Marine Corps reservists stated that
the separation briefings did not provide the detail necessary for them to
fully
understand their commitment and responsibilities when entering the IRR.
They stated individuals conducting these briefings should emphasize that
reservists entering the IRR must keep their reserve component informed of
specific changes, including their home address, marital status, number of
dependents, civilian employment, and physical condition. They added that
reservists assigned to the IRR need to know that they may volunteer for
active duty assignments to refresh or enhance their military skills.
Next, the services send the members questionnaires to verify basic
information* such as current addresses, marital status, and physical
condition* to ascertain whether the reservists are available immediately
for active duty during a mobilization. However, response rates to the
questionnaires have been considered low, as shown in table 3.
Table 3: Fiscal Year 2002 Questionnaire Response Rates Army Navy Air Force
Coast Guard a 40.41% 51.47% 28.97% 25.00%
Source: GAO analysis of service data. Note: The Marine Corps did not
conduct a survey during fiscal year 2002 and could not provide survey
specific information for prior years. a Coast Guard responses include
questionnaires returned by members of the Selected Reserve and
the IRR.
Services Did Not Obtain the Results Necessary to Fully Access Their IRR
Members
Page 39 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel The services attributed the low
response rate, in part, to incorrect mailing addresses as indicated by the
questionnaires returned as undeliverable.
During fiscal year 2002, for example, the Air Force stated that 12 percent
of the questionnaires mailed out were returned as undeliverable. The Air
Force is the only service that specifically tracks undeliverable rates,
but the Navy estimated a 30 to 40 percent undeliverable rate and the Army
estimated that approximately 30 percent of its questionnaires were
returned as undeliverable. The Coast Guard has not measured the number of
questionnaires returned as undeliverable. Although the Marine Corps did
not send out questionnaires in fiscal year 2002 and could not provide
documented response rates for prior years, a Marine Corps official
indicated that the Corps had experienced about a 10 percent undeliverable
rate in previous years; but he was unable to provide any data to support
the claim. According to this official, most of the returned questionnaires
were mailed to junior enlisted personnel, including lance corporals,
corporals, and sergeants who appeared to change residences more frequently
than senior enlisted personnel or officers.
The services have taken some specific steps to correct bad addresses and
improve servicemember reporting of required mobilization- related
information. Specifically, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps use
commercial contractors to try to update inaccurate address information.
For the last 4 years, a contractor has been regularly matching the Army*s
entire personnel database of bad addresses with a credit bureau*s address
database. For over 10 years, the Army has used another contractor to
update a small number of addresses, one at a time. Despite these efforts,
the Army still had over 40,000 bad addresses in its database as of April
2003, and it recently contracted with its second contractor to do batch
updates rather than one- at- a- time updates. The Marine Corps just
started using its contractor. Finally, the Army and the Coast Guard have
implemented Web- based systems that encourage IRR members to update
critical contact information on the Internet. 42 According to an official
representing the Naval Reserve Personnel Center, the Navy has also started
to create a Web- based screening questionnaire to better track IRR
members. However, these efforts are not linked to a results- oriented
management framework that establishes specific goals to improve access
42 The Coast Guard*s Web- based system had only been in place for part of
fiscal year 2002, when the 25 percent response rate was reported. Response
rates, which reached 48 percent after the Web- based system had been
deployed for a full year, are being reported monthly.
Page 40 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel to accurate addresses and
identifies the resources and performance measures necessary to ensure
success.
Finally, the services order a small number of their IRR members to
participate in a 1- day screening event at a specific site to verify they
are fit and available for mobilization. 43 The screening events focus on a
specific number of IRR members to verify their physical existence,
condition, and
personal contact data. Even though the total number of IRR members ordered
to report for screening during a fiscal year is relatively small, the
services have met with limited success as the screening event
participation rates in table 4 indicate. Table 4: IRR Screening Event
Participation Rates
Navy Marine Corps Air Force Army
Last available fiscal year that screening occurred 2002 2002 2001 2000
Total IRR population for applicable fiscal year 71,140 58,039 47,940
161,622
Total number of orders mailed to reservists 3,990 4,100 4,656 2,714
Percentage of personnel that attended screening event 35.9 56.4 51.3 25.8
Source: GAO*s analysis of service data. Note: The Coast Guard does not
require members of the IRR to participate in screening events.
As indicated in table 4, the Army and the Air Force have not conducted
screenings since 2000 and 2001, respectively. An Army Personnel Command
After Action Report concluded that screenings should not be conducted
until clear objectives are established and realistic cost and benefit
assessments are completed. The Air Force also decided not to conduct
screening events. Thus, these two services are not using one of their
three primary methods to gain and maintain access to their IRR members.
Furthermore, table 3 shows that the participation rates are relatively
low. The services indicated that the low screening event participation
rates were based on the services* inability to contact members of the IRR
43 The services call these screenings musters.
Page 41 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel because of incorrect addresses;
IRR members who were excused because of stated conflicts involving work,
vacation plans, religious issues, or physical disabilities among others;
and members who ignored orders and
avoided participation in the screening events. The services do not have
results- oriented goals and performance measures to improve their reliance
on the three primary methods to access IRR members. Specifically, the
services have concentrated their efforts on exit briefings, questionnaires
to update critical information, and periodic screening events. However,
they have not focused on the results of those activities, as evidenced by
persistent low response rates to questionnaires and low screening event
participation rates. By focusing on the execution of these activities
rather than their results, the services have not
established objective, quantifiable, and measurable performance goals to
improve the results of their three primary efforts to access;
established a basis for comparing actual program results with the goals in
order to develop performance indicators to track their progress in
attaining results- oriented goals; and described the resources and means
required to verify and validate
measured values. OSD and service policies have discouraged the use of the
IRR because IRR members do not participate in any regularly scheduled
training and thus are not regularly paid. The policies are also intended
to avoid the negative effects on individual IRR members. For example, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness provided guidance
dated July 19, 2002, to the services that emphasized the use of volunteers
before involuntarily mobilizing reservists to minimize the effects of
mobilization on the lives of the reservists, their families, and their
employers.
Policies intended to avoid the negative effects on individual reservists
may be disruptive to all reservists as well as to entire units, because
they contribute to situations where individual mobilization requirements
are filled with personnel from reserve units, thus creating personnel
shortages within the units that had supplied the reservists and affecting
the units* readiness to mobilize and deploy. For example, in its
reluctance to use the IRR, the Army filled many of its individual
mobilization requirements with personnel from reserve units. In doing so,
the Army created personnel
shortages within the units that had supplied the reservists. In some
cases, the Army had to later locate and transfer replacement personnel
into these units when the units were mobilized, thus transferring several
unit The Services Lack
Results- Oriented Goals and Performance Measures to Improve Use of IRR
Access
OSD and Service Policies Have Discouraged the Use of the IRR
Page 42 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel personnel as a result of a single
individual requirement. Specifically, the Army mobilized a combat support
hospital unit that was 142 individuals
short, including the commanding officer, of its authorized strength of 509
personnel. To increase the hospital unit*s strength to an acceptable level
for mobilization, the Army took a commanding officer and other needed
personnel from four reserve units. By taking this course of action, the
Army immediately degraded the mission capability and readiness of the four
affected units. The Army compounded this negative effect when it later
mobilized the already significantly degraded unit that gave up its
commanding officer to the hospital unit.
Further, the reluctance of one service to use the IRR can affect other
services. For example, the Air Force*s reluctance to access any of its
more than 44,000 IRR members has left the responsibility for guarding Air
Force bases to over 9,000 Army National Guard unit personnel. According to
a senior Air Force official, the Air Force did not even consider using its
own IRR pool. Because the Army National Guard volunteered for the mission,
the Air Force did not consider mobilizing any of its 3,900 IRR members who
held security force specialty codes.
About 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel have
been called to active duty since September 11, 2001. They fought on the
front lines in Iraq; tracked down terrorists throughout Asia and Africa;
maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and
participated in a wide range of domestic missions. However, the process to
mobilize reservists had to be modified and contained numerous
inefficiencies. Existing operation plans did not adequately address the
mobilization requirements needed to deal with terrorist attacks and
overseas requirements. We recognize that some threats are impossible to
predict but until the combatant commanders identify all of the
mobilization requirements that have evolved since September 11, 2001* and
create or update their operation plans as necessary to account for these
requirements* DOD risks the continued need for additional management
oversight and coordination between officials to fill mobilization
requirements, thus slowing the mobilization effort and making it less
efficient.
DOD officials also did not have visibility over the entire mobilization
process. Specifically, without the ability to capture the readiness of
personnel and other resources within the small units that were frequently
needed by combatant commanders, the Army and the Navy will continue to
face difficulties in their efforts to assemble the forces needed to meet
Conclusions
Page 43 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel joint organizational requirements.
Furthermore, until all of the services develop fully integrated automated
systems that provide for the seamless
transfer of reservists* information between reserve and active components,
the components will continue to face cumbersome workarounds to obtain the
data to track the length of reservists* mobilization or their deployment
status. In addition, until the services update key mobilization
instructions, notices, and publications to reflect the modified
mobilization process, DOD and the services risk continued mobilization
slowdowns and duplication of efforts.
All of the services provide predictability to portions of their active
forces through some type of standard operating cycle, but only the Air
Force has a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both
its active and reserve forces. Moreover, the Army*s reserve forces face
increasing use to meet operational requirements. However, without a
standard operating concept to help increase predictability for its units,
the Army risks mobilizing units and individuals that are unprepared for
deployment.
Finally, the services have limited access to portions of the Ready Reserve
and are thus forced to spread requirements across the remaining reserve
force, leading to longer or more frequent deployments. Specifically, the
services* use of their primary IRR access methods* exit briefings,
questionnaires, and screenings* did not obtain the results necessary to
gain and maintain access to their members. Until the services develop
results- oriented goals and performance measures to improve the use of
their primary methods to access IRR members, the services will be unable
to systematically identify opportunities to better access their IRR
members for mobilization. Moreover, OSD and service policies have
discouraged the use of the IRR in order to avoid the negative effects on
individual IRR members. However, until the services review and update
their IRR policies to take into account the nature of the mobilization
requirements and the types of reservists who are available to fill the
requirements, the services will risk the continued disruption to units
that provide individual personnel rather than mobilizing IRR members.
We are making several recommendations to enhance the overall efficiency of
the reserve mobilization process. Specifically, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
identify all of the mobilization
requirements that have evolved since September 11, 2001, and create or
update operation plans as necessary, to account for these requirements;
Recommendations for
Executive Action
Page 44 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel the Secretaries of the Army and
the Navy to capture readiness information on the resources within all the
units that are available to meet the tailored
requirements of combatant commanders so that these resources will be
visible to key mobilization officials within DOD, the Joint Staff, and the
service headquarters; the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, in
conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,
to develop a single automated system or fully integrated automated systems
that will provide for the seamless transfer of reservists information,
regardless of whether the reservists are in an active or reserve status;
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to update their applicable
mobilization instructions, notices, and publications; the Secretary of
the Army to develop a standard operating cycle concept
to help increase predictability for Army reserve units; the service
secretaries to develop and use results- oriented performance
metrics to guide service efforts to gain and maintain improved information
on IRR members; and the service secretaries to review and update their
IRR policies to take into
account the nature of the mobilization requirements as well as the types
of reservists who are available to fill the requirements.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with our recommendations. The department specifically concurred with our
recommendations to (1) create or update operation plans as necessary, to
account for mobilization requirements that have evolved since September
11, 2001, (2) develop an automated system to provide for the seamless
transfer of reservists* information, (3) update mobilization notices and
publications, (4) develop a standard operating cycle to increase
predictability for Army Reserve and National Guard units, (5) develop and
use results- oriented performance metrics to gain and maintain information
on IRR members, and (6) update IRR policies to take
into account the nature of mobilization requirements and the types of
reservists who are available to fill the requirements.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army and the Navy
capture readiness information on the resources within all units that are
available to meet the tailored requirements of combatant commanders
so that these resources will be visible to key officials within DOD. DOD
stated that the Army and the Navy fully support capturing relevant
information in the DOD readiness reporting system but that combatant
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 45 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel commanders will need to establish
resource requirements to include tailored mission requirements. We agree
that improvements in readiness
reporting should be closely linked to efforts to more clearly define
requirements. DOD also stated that the Army is currently developing and
implementing a system to provide visibility on readiness issues in support
of the combatant commanders. We did not evaluate this system because it
was not fully implemented during our review.
DOD also provided technical comments from the Joint Staff, and we received
technical comments from the Coast Guard. These technical comments were
incorporated in the final draft as appropriate. DOD*s comments are
reprinted in appendix II.
We performed our work between September 2002 and June 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; the Secretary of Transportation; and the Commandant of the Coast
Guard. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staffs have any questions concerning
this report, please
contact me at (202) 512- 5559 or stewartd@ gao. gov or Brenda S. Farrell
at (202) 512- 3604 or farrellb@ gao. gov. Others making major
contributions to this report are included in appendix III.
Derek B. Stewart Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 46 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel
To evaluate whether the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services
followed their existing operation plans when mobilizing reserve forces
after September 11, 2001, we reviewed and analyzed a small group of
requests for forces from the combatant commanders and discussed
differences between planned and actual requirements with the mobilization
officials responsible for validating and approving mobilization
requirements. To find out how the services screen and fill requirements,
as well as their procedures for turning generic *capability* type
requirements into actual unit and personnel requirements, we met with, and
collected and analyzed data from, a variety of active and reserve
component offices within each of the services. Specifically, we met with
officials from the following offices or commands:
National Guard Bureau; 1 Department of the Army, Army Operations
Center; Office of the Chief, Army Reserve; Army National Guard,
Headquarters; U. S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;
U. S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Department of the
Air Force, Headquarters; Air National Guard, Headquarters; Air
National Guard Readiness Center; Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force
Base, Illinois; Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base,
Georgia; Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center, Langley Air Force
Base,
Virginia; Navy Personnel Command, Millington, Tennessee; Commander
Naval Forces Command, New Orleans, Louisiana; U. S. Marine Corps
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters,
Quantico, Virginia; Marine Forces Reserve, Headquarters, New Orleans,
Louisiana;
U. S. Coast Guard, Headquarters; and U. S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area
Maintenance Logistic Command, Norfolk, Virginia.
1 Unless otherwise noted, the officials listed in this appendix have their
offices in the Pentagon or at other locations in the Washington D. C.,
metropolitan area. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 47 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel
We reviewed our prior work on risk management and issues related to
combating terrorism. We met with RAND Corporation officials to discuss
and coordinate ongoing work related to the requests for forces. We also
met with the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force who are responsible for approving mobilization orders.
To determine the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over
the entire mobilization process, we reviewed sections of the United States
Code, Executive Orders, Secretary of Defense memoranda, Joint Staff
publications, and service instructions related to mobilization. We also
met with senior and key mobilization officials involved with the various
phases of the mobilization process to document their roles and
responsibilities and collect data about the process. We observed a 2- 1/ 2
day DOD symposium in November 2002, where senior military and civilian
officials came together to review the entire mobilization process. We
reviewed relevant GAO reports and reports from other audit and inspection
agencies. We also met with Army Audit Agency and Air Force Audit Agency
officials. We reviewed the services* detailed flowcharts, which documented
the mobilization process from different service perspectives. We also
discussed and observed the operation of the classified and unclassified
automated systems that are being used to track mobilized units and
individuals, as well as mobilization requirements. The Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs served as our primary
source for aggregate personnel and mobilization data. However, data from
the early days and weeks following September 11, 2001, are not reliable.
Further, the services captured mobilization data differently over time,
making it difficult to aggregate the data. To present the data
consistently, our figures display data beginning with January 2002.
To evaluate the services* approaches to provide predictability to
reservists subject to mobilization and deployment, we met with officials
from the Air Force offices that were responsible for the development and
implementation of the rotational Air Expeditionary Force concept and
analyzed data that documented the successes and challenges that the
program had experienced since September 11, 2001. We discussed the 30- day
advance notice goal with service officials and officials from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) office, which had issued the goal. We
also discussed efforts to increase advanced warning or predictability with
officials from the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps and, where data
were available, compared alert dates to mobilization dates. To gain
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 48 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel
first- hand knowledge about the effects of mobilizations on individual
reservists, we visited a number of sites where reservists were deployed or
were undergoing mobilization processing and training. 2 At these sites, we
collected mobilization data, obtained copies of mobilization processing
checklists, and observed the preparations for deployment that take place
after reservists have been mobilized. Specifically, we met with officials
from the offices or commands listed below:
Army Headquarters, I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington; 4th Brigade, 91st
Division (Training Support), Fort Lewis, Washington; 2122nd Garrison
Training Support Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington; 2122nd Garrison
Support Unit, North Fort Lewis, Washington; Soldier Readiness Processing
Site, Fort Lewis, Washington; Soldier Readiness Processing Site, Fort
McPherson, Georgia;
Central Issue Facility, Fort Lewis, Washington; Navy Mobilization
Processing Site, Millington, Tennessee; Navy Mobilization Processing
Site, San Diego, California;
Marine Corps Mobilization Processing Center, Mobilization Support
Battalion, Camp Pendleton, California;
452nd Air Mobility Wing, March Air Reserve Base, California; and Coast
Guard Integrated Support Command, Portsmouth, Virginia.
While at these sites, we interviewed individual and unit reservists who
had been mobilized, as well as the active duty, reserve, and civilian
officials who were conducting the mobilization processing and training. At
the mobilization processing stations, we observed reservists getting
medical, legal, and family support briefings; having their personnel,
medical, and dental records screened and updated; and receiving
inoculations, combat equipment, camouflage clothing, Geneva Convention
Cards, identification tags, and the controlled access cards that have
replaced laminated identification cards. We also observed weapons
qualification training.
To determine the extent to which Ready Reserve forces were available for
mobilization, we reviewed sections of the United States Code and OSD and
service policies on the use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). We
2 A small number of personnel were undergoing demobilization processing
during some of our site visits.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 49 GAO- 03- 921 Military Personnel
collected and analyzed longitudinal data on the sizes of different
segments of the Ready Reserve. We examined the data for trends,
specifically
focusing on the IRR and the portion of the Selected Reserve that was still
in the training pipeline. We also collected and analyzed data from the
commands that are responsible for managing the IRR, specifically
the U. S. Army Reserve Personnel Command, St. Louis, Missouri; the
Naval Reserve Personnel Center, New Orleans, Louisiana; the Air Reserve
Personnel Center, Denver, Colorado;
the Marine Corps Reserve Support Command, Kansas City, Missouri; and
the Coast Guard Personnel Command, Washington, D. C.
Officials from these commands also provided data on IRR members that we
analyzed to determine (1) response rates to questionnaires to verify basic
member information and (2) participation rates at 1- day screening events
to verify member fitness for mobilization.
We conducted our review from September 2002 through June 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 50 GAO- 03- 921
Military Personnel Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 51 GAO- 03- 921
Military Personnel Now on p. 44. Now on p. 44.
Now on p. 43.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 52 GAO- 03- 921
Military Personnel Now on p. 44. Now on p. 44.
Now on p. 44.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 53 GAO- 03- 921
Military Personnel Now on p. 44.
Appendix III: Staff Acknowledgments Page 54 GAO- 03- 921 Military
Personnel James R. Bancroft, Larry J. Bridges, Michael J. Ferren, Chelsa
L. Kenney, Irene A. Robertson, and Robert K. Wild also made significant
contributions to the report. Appendix III: Staff Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
(350247)
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