Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill  
Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process (18-JUN-03, GAO-03-908T).	 
                                                                 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing 
the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all	 
legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute  
or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in
the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the	 
Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it
learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that
some of these individuals may have entered the United States	 
before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked	 
GAO to (1) assess the effectiveness of the visa revocation	 
process and (2) identify the policies and procedures of State,	 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective	 
actions in the process. 					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-908T					        
    ACCNO:   A07248						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed  
to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process			 
     DATE:   06/18/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Immigrants 					 
	     Immigration or emigration				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Identification cards				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Immigration information systems			 
	     Department of State Consular Lookout and		 
	     Support System					 
                                                                 
	     National Strategy for Homeland Security		 

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GAO-03-908T

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. EST Wednesday, June
18, 2003 BORDER SECURITY

New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation
Process

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade

GAO- 03- 908T

Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process was not being fully
utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process broke down
when information on individuals with revoked visas was not shared between
State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke
down even further when individuals had already entered the United States
prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to
investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in
the United States after their visas were revoked. In our review of 240
visa revocations, we found that * appropriate units within INS and the FBI
did not always receive

notifications of all the revocations;  names were not consistently posted
to the agencies* watch lists of

suspected terrorists;  30 individuals whose visas were revoked on
terrorism grounds had

entered the United States and may still remain; and  INS and the FBI were
not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases
of individuals who remained in the United States

after their visas were revoked. These weaknesses resulted from the U. S.
government*s limited policy guidance on the process. None of the agencies
have specific, written policies on using the visa revocation process as an
antiterrorism tool.

Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification System a On March 1,
2003, INS*s various functions transferred to the Department of Homeland
Security. The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for

preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all
legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring
immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United
States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had

revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected
terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have
entered the United States before or after State*s action. Congressional
requesters

asked GAO to (1) assess the effectiveness of the visa revocation process
and (2) identify the

policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that

govern their respective actions in the process. GAO makes recommendations
to the Department of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the
Departments of State and Justice, to develop specific policies and

procedures for the interagency visa revocation process to ensure that when
State revokes a visa because of terrorism concerns, the appropriate units
within State, INS, and the FBI are notified

immediately and that proper actions are taken. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/
getrpt? GAO- 03- 908T. To view the full product, click on the link

above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512- 4128 or
fordj@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 908T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

June 2003 BORDER SECURITY

New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation
Process

Page 1 GAO- 03- 908T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here to
discuss the report 1 we are issuing today on the need for new policies and
procedures to fill gaps in the visa revocation process. As you are aware,
Mr. Chairman, in the National Strategy for Homeland Security 2 the
President said that the U. S. government has no more important mission
than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks. Our report
calls for new policies and procedures to ensure that when the Department
of State revokes a visa because of terrorism concerns, homeland security
and law enforcement agencies that protect our country are promptly
notified of this information and take

appropriate action. Since the September 11 attacks, State*s Bureau of
Consular Affairs has been receiving an increased volume of information
from the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and other
sources on suspected terrorists. In some cases, the department decided to
revoke visas of certain individuals when it received potentially
derogatory information on them after issuing the visas. This issue was
raised in our October 2002 report on strengthening the visa process as an
antiterrorism tool. 3 In that report, we found that the State Department
had revoked the

visas of certain individuals after learning that they might be suspected
terrorists, raising concerns that some of these people may have entered
the United States before or after their visas were revoked.

At your request, Mr. Chairman, and that of Senator Grassley, we evaluated
how the visa revocation process is being used as an antiterrorism tool. We
(1) assessed the effectiveness of the visa revocation process,
specifically (a) the steps State took to notify appropriate units within
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 4 which is now part of
the Department of

1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and
Procedures Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process (Washington,
D. C.: June 18, 2003). 2 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy
for Homeland Security (Washington, D. C.: July 2002). 3 U. S. General
Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as
an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO- 03- 132NI (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 21, 2002).
4 On March 1, 2003, INS became part of three units within the Department
of Homeland Security. INS inspection functions transferred to the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection; its investigative and enforcement
functions transferred to the Bureau of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and its immigration services function
became part of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Because
our work focused on visa revocation cases that took place before the March
1 reorganization, our report refers to the U. S. government*s immigration
agency as INS.

Page 2 GAO- 03- 908T

Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of
revocations and the procedures used by the three agencies to post lookouts
on these revocations to their terrorist watch lists; 5 (b) whether any of
the individuals whose visas had been revoked were able to enter the United
States before or after the revocation; and (c) the actions taken by INS
and the FBI to investigate; locate; and, where appropriate, clear, remove,
or prosecute the individuals who did enter the United States and may still
remain here after their visas have been revoked; and (2)

determined the policies and procedures of the State Department, INS, and
the FBI that govern their respective actions in the visa revocation
process. Our work focused on all 240 of State*s visa revocations on
terrorism grounds from September 11, 2001, through December 31, 2002.

Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process is not being fully
utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process could be
more aggressively used to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the
country and to alert homeland security and law enforcement agencies that
individuals who entered before their visas were revoked might be security
risks. However, we found that, in practice, the process broke down when

information on visa revocations was not shared between State and
appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke down even
further when the individuals in question had already entered the United

States prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely taking
actions to investigate, 6 locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who
remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. Depending on
the results of the investigations, the cases could be resolved by clearing

persons who were wrongly suspected of terrorism, removing suspected
terrorists from the country, or prosecuting suspected terrorists on
criminal charges.

5 These watch lists are automated databases that contain information about
individuals who are known or suspected terrorists so that these
individuals can be prevented from entering the country, apprehended while
in the country, or apprehended as they attempt to exit the country.
Specific entries on watch lists are sometimes referred to as *lookouts.*

6 The Attorney General*s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations provide for graduated
levels of investigative activity by the FBI, allowing the bureau to act
well in advance of the commission of planned terrorist acts or other
federal crimes. The three levels of investigative activity defined in the
guidelines are (1) the prompt and extremely limited checking of initial
leads; (2) preliminary inquiries; and (3) full investigations. In this
testimony, we are not prescribing which level of investigative activity is
appropriate for persons with revoked visas who may be in the United
States. Summary

Page 3 GAO- 03- 908T

In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found numerous cases where
notification of the revocation did not reach appropriate units within INS
and the FBI and cases where lookouts were not posted to the agencies*
watch lists of suspected terrorists. We also found evidence that 30
individuals whose visas were revoked because of terrorism concerns entered
the United States and may still remain in the country. 7 Additionally, INS
and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to

investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in
the United States after their visas were revoked. I would like to expand
on these weaknesses in the process, and then comment on the U. S.
government*s lack of a specific policy on visa revocations. Finally, I
will outline the recommendations we have developed to strengthen the visa
revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. In general, we recommend the
development of specific policies and procedures to ensure that persons
whose visas have been revoked because of potential terrorism concerns be
denied entry to the United States and those who may already be in the
United States be investigated to determine if they pose a security threat.

In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found examples where
information on visa revocations did not flow between the State Department
and appropriate units overseas and within INS and the FBI. State
Department officials from the Visa Office told us that when they revoke a
visa in Washington, they are supposed to take the following steps: (1)
notify consular officers at all overseas posts that the individual is a
suspected terrorist by entering a lookout on the person into State*s

watch list, the Consular Lookout and Support System, known as CLASS; (2)
notify the INS Lookout Unit via a faxed copy of the revocation certificate
so that the unit can enter the individual into its watch list and notify
officials at ports of entry; and (3) notify the issuing post via cable so
that the post can attempt to contact the individual to physically cancel
his

visa. Information- only copies of these cables are also sent to INS*s and
FBI*s main communications enters. State officials told us they rely on INS
and FBI internal distribution mechanisms to ensure that these cables are
routed to appropriate units within the agencies.

7 This number is based on our analysis of data we received from INS as of
May 19, 2003. On May 20 and 21, the INS and FBI, respectively, provided
additional information related to this matter. Because of the nature and
volume of this data, we were not able to fully

analyze it in time for this testimony. The data could show that the number
of persons is higher or lower than 30. Weaknesses in

Notification and Watch List Procedures

Page 4 GAO- 03- 908T

Figure 1 demonstrates gaps that we identified in the flow of information
from State to INS and the FBI, and within these agencies, as well as the
resulting inconsistencies in the posting of lookouts to the agencies*
respective watch lists.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 908T

Figure 1: Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification System and
Watch List Procedures

a Now within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. b Now within the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 908T

The top arrow in the diagram shows the extent of communication on visa
revocations between the State Department*s Bureau of Consular Affairs and
State*s overseas consular posts. We found that State had not consistently
followed its informal policy of entering a lookout into its CLASS lookout
system at the time of the revocation. State officials said that they post
lookouts on individuals with revoked visas in CLASS so that, if the
individual attempts to get a new visa, consular officers at overseas posts
will know that the applicant has had a previous visa revoked and that a
security advisory opinion on the individual is required before issuing a
new visa. Without a lookout, it is possible that a new visa could be
issued without additional security screening. We reviewed CLASS records on
all 240 individuals whose visas were revoked and found that the State
Department did not post lookouts within a 2- week period of the revocation
on 64 of these individuals.

The second arrow depicts the information flow on revocations between State
and the INS Lookout Unit, which is the inspections unit that posts
lookouts on INS*s watch list to prevent terrorists (and other inadmissible
aliens) from entering the United States. Officials from the INS Lookout
Unit told us they had not received any notice of the revocations from
State in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47 cases, the INS Lookout Unit
received the revocation notice only via a cable; however, these cables
took, on average, 12 days to reach the Lookout Unit, although in one case
it took 29 days. An official from the INS communications center told us
that, because State*s cables were marked *information only,* they were
routed through the Inspections division first, which was then supposed to
forward them to the Lookout Unit. He told us that if the cables had been
marked as *action* or *urgent,* they would have been sent immediately to
the Lookout Unit. In cases where the INS Lookout Unit could document that
it received a notification, it generally posted information on these
revocations in its lookout database within one day of receiving the
notice. When it did not receive notification, it could not post
information on these individuals in its lookout database, precluding INS
inspectors at ports of entry from knowing that these individuals had had
their visas revoked.

The third arrow on the diagram shows the communication between State and
INS*s National Security Unit that is responsible for investigations. This
broken arrow shows that the State Department did not send copies of the
faxed revocation certificates or cables to the unit. Further, in cases
where the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notification from
State, INS Lookout Unit officials said that they did not routinely check
to see whether these individuals had already entered the United States or
notify investigators in the National Security Unit of the visa
revocations. Without

Page 7 GAO- 03- 908T

this notification, the National Security Unit would have no independent
basis to begin an investigation. In May 2003, an official from the Lookout
Unit said that her unit recently established a procedure in which, upon
receiving notification of a revocation, she will query the Interagency
Border Inspection System to determine if the individual recently entered
the country. She will then give this information to investigators in the

National Security Unit, which is now part of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.

The bottom arrow on the diagram shows the information flow on visa
revocations from State to the FBI*s Counterterrorism units. We found that
that these units did not consistently receive information on visa
revocations. FBI officials said that the agency*s main communications
center received the notifications but the officials could not confirm if
the notifications were then distributed internally to the appropriate
investigative units at the FBI or to the agency*s watch list unit, known
as the Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit. The Department of Justice said
that to add a person to its watch list, 8 additional information must be
provided to the FBI, such as the person*s full name, complete date of
birth, physical

descriptors, and watch list- specific classification information. The
revocation notifications did not include most of this information.

Our analysis shows that thirty individuals with revoked visas have entered
the United States and may still remain in the country. Twenty- nine of
these individuals entered before State revoked their visas. An additional
person who may still be in the country entered after his visa was revoked.
INS inspectors allowed at least three other people to enter the country
even though their visas had already been revoked, largely due to
breakdowns in the notification system. These three people have left the
country.

Despite these problems, we noted cases where the visa revocation process
prevented possible terrorists from entering the country or cleared
individuals whose visas had been revoked. For example, INS inspectors
successfully prevented at least 14 of the 240 individuals from entering
the country because the INS watch list included information on the
revocation action or had other lookouts on them. In addition, State
records showed

that a small number of people reapplied for a new visa after the 8 This
watch list, known as the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File, is
accessed by local and state law enforcement officials via the National
Crime Information Center. Individuals with

Revoked Visas May Be in the United States

Page 8 GAO- 03- 908T

revocation. State used the visa issuance process to fully screen these
individuals and determined that they did not pose a security threat.

The INS and the FBI did not routinely attempt to investigate or locate any
of the individuals whose visas were revoked and who may be in the country.

Due to congressional interest in specific cases, INS investigators located
four of the persons in the United States but did not attempt to locate
other revoked visa holders who may have entered the country. INS officials
told us that they generally do not investigate these cases because it
would be

challenging to remove these individuals unless they were in violation of
their immigration status even if the agency could locate them. A visa
revocation by itself is not a stated grounds for removal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Investigators from INS*s National
Security Unit said they could investigate individuals to determine if they
were violating the terms of their admission, for example by overstaying
the amount of time they were granted to remain in the United States, but
they believed that under the INA, the visa revocation itself does not
affect the alien*s legal status in the United States* even though the
revocation was for terrorism reasons. They and other Homeland Security
officials raised a number of legal issues associated with removing an
individual from the country after the person*s visa has been revoked. Our
report discusses these issues in detail.

FBI officials told us that they did not routinely attempt to investigate
and locate individuals with revoked visas who may have entered the United
States. They said that State*s method of notifying them did not clearly
indicate that visas had been revoked because the visa holder may pose
terrorism concerns. Further, the notifications were sent as *information
only* and did not request specific follow- up action by the FBI. Moreover,
State did not attempt to make other contact with the FBI that would
indicate any urgency in the matter. INS and the FBI Did

Not Routinely Take Action on Individuals with Revoked Visas Who Had
Entered the United States

Page 9 GAO- 03- 908T

The weaknesses I have outlined above resulted from the U. S. government*s
limited policy guidance on the visa revocation process. Our analysis
indicates that the U. S. government has no specific policy on the use of
visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to
guide

State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism
grounds. State and INS have written procedures that guide some types of
visa revocations; however, neither they nor the FBI has written internal
procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific
actions on visas revoked by State Department headquarters officials, as
was the case for all the revoked visas covered in our review. While State
and INS officials told us they use the visa revocation process to prevent

suspected terrorists from entering the United States, neither they nor FBI
officials had policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating,
and taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already
entered the country.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the visa process could be an important tool
to keep potential terrorists from entering the United States. Ideally,
information on suspected terrorists would reach the State Department
before it decides to issue a visa. However, there will always be some
cases when the information arrives too late and State has already issued a
visa. Revoking a visa can mitigate this problem, but only if State
promptly notifies appropriate border control and law enforcement agencies
and if these agencies act quickly to (1) notify border control agents and
immigration inspectors to deny entry to persons with a revoked visa, and
(2) investigate persons with revoked visas who have entered the country.
Currently there are major gaps in the notification and investigation
processes. One reason for this is that there are no specific written
policies and procedures on how notification of a visa revocation should
take place and what agencies should do when they are notified. As a
result, there is heightened risk that suspected terrorists could enter the
country with a revoked visa or be allowed to remain after their visa is
revoked without undergoing investigation or monitoring.

State has emphasized that it revoked the visas as a precautionary measure
and that the 240 persons are not necessarily terrorists or suspected
terrorists. State cited the uncertain nature of the information it
receives from the intelligence and law enforcement communities on which it
must base its decision to revoke an individual*s visa. We recognize that
the visas were revoked as a precautionary measure and that the persons
whose visas were revoked may not be terrorists. However, the State
Department determined that there was enough derogatory information to
revoke visas for these persons because of terrorism concerns. Our
recommendations, Systemic Weaknesses

Were the Resul t of Limited Guidance on Visa Revocation Process

Page 10 GAO- 03- 908T

which are discussed below, are designed to ensure that persons whose visas
have been revoked because of potential terrorism concerns be denied entry
to the United States and those who may already be in the United States be
investigated to determine if they pose a security threat.

To remedy the systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who is now
responsible for issuing regulations and administering and enforcing
provisions of U. S. immigration law relating to visa issuance, work in
conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to:

 develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa
revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for
suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information are transmitted
from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies, and their
respective inspection and investigation units, in a timely manner;

 develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law
enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals
whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in the
United States after revocation; and

 determine if any persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in
the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat.

In commenting on our report, Homeland Security agreed that the visa
revocation process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool. State
and Justice did not comment on our recommendations.

I would be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the
subcommittee may have.

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or
John Brummet at (202) 512- 4128. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony included Judy McCloskey, Kate Brentzel, Mary Moutsos, and
Janey Cohen. Contacts and

Acknowledgments

(320197)

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