Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland  
Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation 
Missions (16-JUN-03, GAO-03-902T).				 
                                                                 
Balancing our nation's security and commercial needs is a	 
longstanding issue that is especially important in the aftermath 
of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that changed the	 
nation's security environment. Addressing this challenge now	 
falls principally to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	 
and its Border and Transportation Security directorate. Within	 
this directorate, responsibility has been assigned primarily to  
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). BCBP consists
of the inspections component of the former U.S. Customs Service; 
the Border Patrol and Inspections component of the former	 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a former component of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health  
Inspection Service. Achieving the balance between security and	 
commercial needs is greatly affected by BCBP's commercial and	 
border and immigration control workload. Regarding commercial	 
workload, in fiscal year 2002, the former U.S. Customs Services  
processed 24.9 million trade import entries valued at over $1.1  
trillion and collected $23.8 billion in duties and fees; it also 
processed about 6 million cargo containers arriving at U.S. sea  
ports. While the cargo workload has stabilized somewhat as a	 
result of the recent global economic slowdown, it is likely to	 
begin growing again, when an economic recovery is underway at	 
some point in the future, thus exacerbating the challenges BCBP  
faces. Regarding border and immigration control workload, in	 
fiscal year 2002, inspectors at over 300 ports of entry inspected
nearly 450 million travelers while the Border Patrol apprehended 
nearly 960,000 aliens trying to enter the U.S. illegally between 
the ports of entry.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-902T					        
    ACCNO:   A07198						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of   
Homeland Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade	 
Facilitation Missions						 
     DATE:   06/16/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Facility security					 
	     Identification cards				 
	     Identity verification				 
	     Inspection 					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Strategic planning 				 

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GAO-03-902T

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 3: 00 p. m. EDT Monday, June 16,
2003 HOMELAND SECURITY

Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing its
Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director Homeland Security and Justice
Issues

GAO- 03- 902T

Page 1 GAO- 03- 902T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the longstanding challenge of balancing our nation*s
security and commercial needs, an issue that is especially important in
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that changed
the nation*s security environment. Addressing this challenge now falls
principally to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Border
and Transportation Security directorate. Within this directorate, the
responsibility has been assigned primarily to the Bureau of

Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). BCBP consists of the inspections
component of the former U. S. Customs Service; the Border Patrol and
Inspections components of the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS); and a former component of the U. S. Department of
Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). 1
Achieving the balance between security and commercial needs is greatly

affected by BCBP*s commercial and border and immigration control workload.
Regarding commercial workload, in fiscal year 2002, the former U. S.
Customs Service processed 24.9 million trade import entries valued at over
$1.1 trillion and collected $23.8 billion in duties and fees; it also
processed about 6 million cargo containers arriving at U. S. sea ports.
While the cargo workload has stabilized somewhat as a result of the recent
global economic slowdown, it is likely to begin growing again when an

economic recovery is underway at some point in the future, thus
exacerbating the challenges BCBP faces. Regarding border and immigration
control workload, in fiscal year 2002, inspectors at over 300 ports of
entry inspected nearly 450 million travelers while the Border Patrol
apprehended nearly 960,000 aliens trying to enter the U. S. illegally
between the ports of entry.

BCBP faces many challenges as it performs its important missions. In my
testimony today, I make the following points:

 With respect to cargo, BCBP has attempted to select and inspect the
highest- risk incoming cargo, while enabling legitimate cargo to be
cleared in a timely manner. These efforts pose a range of challenges, from
the availability of threat assessments and actionable intelligence to the
capability of nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially 1
Following the creation of DHS and its absorption of Customs, the Secretary
of the Treasury retained authority over Customs* revenue functions.

Page 2 GAO- 03- 902T

harmful contraband. BCBP has made some progress in implementing
initiatives that are designed to improve the efficiency of its regulation
of legitimate commercial activities. But, additional challenges remain,
including the need to improve its trade compliance program and to
successfully implement its new trade processing information system.

 BCBP also faces many challenges with respect to preventing illegal entry
by individuals into the United States. These challenges impact BCBP*s
ability to detect and deter illegal entry between ports of entry and to
identify those individuals who should not be permitted entry at the ports.
BCBP is faced with continuing to implement its southwest border strategy
while simultaneously addressing emerging concerns over illegal entry along
the northern border, mitigating the negatives affects the strategy may
have on communities, and responding to continuing concerns over the safety
of aliens who cross in remote and desolate areas. At our nation*s borders,
the challenges include detecting false admissibility documents, unifying
and enhancing inspector training, providing timely intelligence to the
field, and successfully implementing the new entry- exit system.

 In our recent Performance and Accountability series report, we
designated implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk based on
three factors. First, the implementation and transformation of DHS is an
enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an effective and
efficient manner. Second, components to be merged into DHS, including
those forming BCBP, already face a wide array of existing challenges,

some of which are described in this statement. Finally, failure to
effectively carry out its mission would expose the nation to potentially
very serious consequences.

My testimony today is intended to provide an overview based primarily on
the results of work that we have completed in recent years, namely, our
Performance and Accountability Series and High- Risk reports related to
DHS, Justice and Treasury; 2 DHS*s international mail and package
inspection processes; 3 DHS*s acquisition and deployment of radiation

2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO- 03- 95 (Washington, D. C.: Jan.
2003); Major Management Challenges and Program Risks Department of
Homeland Security,

GAO- 03- 102 (Washington, D. C., Jan. 2003); Major Management Challenges
and Program Risks: Department of the Treasury, GAO- 03- 109 (Washington,
D. C.: Jan. 2003); and HighRisk Series: An Update, GAO- 03- 119
(Washington, D. C.: Jan. 2003).

3 U. S. General Accounting Office, U. S. Customs Service: International
Mail and Package Inspection Processes at Selected Locations, GAO- 02- 967
(Washington, D. C.: Aug. 2002).

Page 3 GAO- 03- 902T

detection equipment; 4 the Border Patrol*s southwest border strategy; 5
DHS*s spending plans for its planned system to monitor the flow of foreign
nationals in and out of the United States; 6 and our investigators*
efforts to enter the country using fraudulent documents. 7 My testimony
also highlights our ongoing work related to cargo inspections and
individual inspections at land ports of entry. 8 BCBP has undertaken
efforts to focus its enforcement on selecting and

inspecting the highest- risk incoming cargo, while enabling legitimate
cargo to be cleared in a timely manner. It has a number of initiatives
underway aimed at improving its ability to identify potentially risky
cargo for inspection. BCBP and Customs before it have longstanding efforts
to use information, personnel, and technology to identify such cargo.
These efforts pose a range of challenges, from the availability of threat
assessments and actionable intelligence to the capability of nonintrusive
inspection technology to detect potentially harmful contraband. From a
trade facilitation perspective, BCBP has made some progress in
implementing initiatives that are designed to improve the efficiency of
its regulation of commercial activities. But additional challenges remain,
including the need to improve its evolving trade compliance program and
acquire a new trade processing system.

4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Customs Service: Acquisition and
Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO- 03- 235T (Washington, D.
C.: Oct. 2002). 5 U. S. General Accounting Office, INS* Southwest Border
Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO- 01-
842 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 2001). 6 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit
System Expenditure Planning, GAO- 03- 563 (Washington, D. C.: June 2003).

7 U. S. General Accounting Office, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into
the United States, GAO- 03- 438T (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 30, 2003) and
Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States from Certain Western
Hemisphere Countries Not Detected,

GAO- 03- 713T (Washington, D. C.: May 13, 2003). 8 The cargo inspection
work was requested by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. The
individual inspections at land ports of entry work is being done pursuant
to a mandate in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996. Since this work is ongoing and involves
information that BCBP considers to be law enforcement sensitive, we are
precluded from further discussing it in this unclassified statement.
Challenges Related to

Cargo Processing

Page 4 GAO- 03- 902T

According to the Commissioner of BCBP, the priority mission is to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. This
important mission means improving security at our physical borders and
ports of entry, as well as extending the zone of security beyond our
physical borders. BCBP has a number of initiatives underway aimed at
improving security, including:

 Container Security Initiative, which stations BCBP personnel in key
international ports to examine high- risk cargo before it is placed on
ships bound for the United States.

 Customs- Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and the Free and Secure
Trade Program, which are designed to increase supply chain security and
expedite the clearance of legitimate trade.

 Non- Intrusive Inspection technology, which increases the ability to
detect conventional explosives, nuclear weapons, radioactive components,
and other weapons of mass destruction.  Automated Targeting System, which
is used by the National Targeting

Center and field targeting units in the United States and overseas to help
target high- risk cargo and passengers entering the United States.

We have work underway to review most of these initiatives and will make
our results available to the Subcommittee as soon as the work is
completed.

Separating high- risk cargo from low- or no- risk cargo is extremely
important to BCBP because searching each and every cargo and traveler that
enters the United States would cripple the flow of legitimate trade and
travel and would require a huge resource commitment. Over the years
Customs has recognized that it needed to identify what is high risk* and
to do so as early in the process as possible* and target its limited
resources accordingly. To select, or *target,* and inspect the highest-
risk cargoes and travelers, BCBP relies on the use of threat assessments
and actionable intelligence, the ability of inspectors to quickly discover
or sense an unlawful cargo, and the use of nonintrusive inspection
technology to detect potentially harmful contraband. Each of these poses
challenges to BCBP.

Information is key to identifying high- risk cargo. Such information can
come from manifests for air and sea shipments, from importers, or from
intelligence units within or outside DHS. Accurate information can help
BCBP make reliable risk determinations, particularly when it is used in
DHS computerized models that help assess cargo risk. Obviously, when Major
Cargo Security

Initiatives Selecting Highest- Risk Cargo for Inspection

Page 5 GAO- 03- 902T

information or intelligence is incomplete or unreliable, it can adversely
impact on BCBP*s ability to identify potentially risky cargo for
inspection.

We are currently reviewing how BCBP is targeting cargo for further
inspection and how such cargo is inspected at ports. In this regard, we
are reviewing how BCBP developed the model used in targeting, how BCBP is
handling the targets generated by the model at sea ports, and whether and

how BCBP intends to evaluate targeting. Since this work is ongoing, and
involves information that BCBP also considers to be law enforcement
sensitive, we are precluded from discussing specific aspects of this
matter in this unclassified statement. However, in the broadest terms, our
work to date shows that BCBP*s targeting efforts face a range of
challenges relating to threat assessments, actionable intelligence, and
nonintrusive inspection technology.

Having sufficient numbers of well- trained and motivated staff is also key
to identifying high- risk cargo. Inspectors and canine officers are
trained to detect unusual or abnormal behaviors or circumstances that
suggest a

potential threat or unlawful activity. Many have developed a *sixth sense*
in that they pick up on latent clues and unconnected information.
Nevertheless, these inspectors are challenged by the tight timeframes and
pressures they work under to move legitimate cargo through the ports.

Our recent work on the inspection of international mail showed that
relying on inspectors alone can increase the risk that contraband enters
the country. The inspection of incoming foreign mail remains largely a
manual process that relies primarily on physical examination. We found
several challenges relating to this process, but BCBP*s determination that
our results were law enforcement sensitive precludes our discussing them
here. However, at the time our work was completed, one courier was working
with the former Customs Service to pilot test an advance manifest system*
a computerized database that receives cargo manifest

information. The database is intended to allow Customs to analyze incoming
package information and make more informed decisions about what packages
to inspect.

In addition to information and staff, technology provides for a more
effective and efficient process. Large- scale x- ray and gamma* ray
imaging systems, portal radiation monitors, and portable and hand- held
radiation

detection devices can reduce the need for costly, intensive inspections
and save inspection time and resources.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 902T

As important as the use of technology is, there are certain limitations
and challenges that need to be considered. For example, we reviewed
Customs* acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment. We
found that some of the radiation detection equipment being used* radiation
pagers* have a limited range and are not designed to detect weapons-
usable nuclear material. Furthermore, experts we contacted did not view
pagers as search instruments but rather as personal safety

devices. We plan to report later this summer on BCBP*s acquisition and
deployment of radiation detection equipment.

In trying to achieve the commercial- security balance, BCBP is challenged
to ensure that antiterrorism efforts do not slow the flow of legitimate
international commerce and travel. According to BCBP, it has worked with
importers on concerns such as where their goods originated, the physical
security and integrity of their overseas plants and those of their foreign
suppliers, the background of their personnel, the means by which they
transport goods, and those who they have chosen to transport their goods
into the country. BCBP has reaffirmed to importers the importance of
knowing their customers and has examined the security practices of their
freight forwarders and the routes their shipments travel.

Although BCBP has made some progress in implementing initiatives that are
designed to improve the efficiency of its regulation of commercial
activities, additional challenges remain, particularly in view of the new
and heightened emphasis on terrorism. These challenges include (1)

continuing to improve its evolving trade compliance program and (2)
acquiring a new trade processing system.

Although tempered recently by the global economic slowdown, growth in the
volume and value of imports continues to create profound challenges for
BCBP to facilitate and enforce U. S. trade laws and regulations. The

volume of trade is expected to surpass $2 trillion in the year 2006. To
speed the processing of imports and improve compliance with trade laws,
specifically, the Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act of
Assuring the Timely Flow

of Legitimate Cargo Implementing the Customs Modernization Act

Page 7 GAO- 03- 902T

1993 (also known as the *Mod Act*), 9 BCBP*s predecessor, Customs,
developed an *informed compliance strategy.*

In 1999, we recommended that the Customs Service develop and implement an
evaluation of the effectiveness of its informed compliance strategy.
Customs agreed with our recommendation and completed its Trade Compliance
Strategy Study on May 24, 2001. The study indicated that the strategy
improves compliance, but the impact on overall compliance rates is small.
For example, one initiative, the Company Enforced Compliance Process
(CECP), was to address large importers* noncompliance that had a
significant negative impact on the overall national compliance rates.
According to the study, Customs was to punish noncomplying companies by
imposing *confirmed risk* designations, increasing examinations, removing
privileges, and referring for penalties. However, the confirmed risk
status was only used six times, and loss of

privileges and referral for penalties were never used. The study concluded
that CECP was not much of an enforced compliance process, and it was
discontinued.

On the other hand, the study found that the companies* compliance rates
increased after they participated in the other initiatives such as
compliance assessment and account management initiatives. While it is not
possible to attribute the increase in compliance totally to these
initiatives, the study concluded that these programs had a positive
impact.

Customs* ongoing effort to acquire a new trade processing system is key to
modernizing how Customs tracks, controls, and processes all commercial
goods imported into and exported out of the United States. This large and
complex system, known as the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), is
expected to cost about $1.7 billion and is to replace Customs* antiquated
system. Expected benefits from ACE include speeding the flow of legitimate
commerce into and out of the United States, identifying and targeting
high- risk commerce requiring greater scrutiny, and providing a

single interface between the trade community and the federal government
for trade data. In April 2001, Customs awarded a 5- year contract, with 9
P. L. 103- 183, title VI. The Mod Act fundamentally altered the
relationship between importers and, at the time, Customs by giving the
importer the legal responsibility for declaring the value, classification,
and rate of duty applicable to merchandise being imported into the United
States. Customs, however, is responsible for determining the final
classification and value of the merchandise. The Mod Act also gave Customs
and importers a shared responsibility for ensuring compliance with trade
laws. Acquiring a New Trade Processing System

Page 8 GAO- 03- 902T

options to extend the contract to not more than 15 years, to a system
integrator responsible for developing and deploying ACE.

Successfully managing a project as large and complex as ACE is a
challenging undertaking. Over the last 4 years, we have reported on ACE
and recommended steps Customs needed to take to minimize project risks. To
its credit, Customs has taken action to implement our recommendations, as
follows:

 We recommended Customs incrementally justify the ACE investment. Customs
defined and committed to implement process controls for justifying and
making ACE investment decisions incrementally. After implementing the
first ACE release, Customs plans to verify that actual costs and benefits
meet expectations and plans to continue this incremental investment
approach for the remaining ACE releases.  We recommended Customs ensure
ACE alignment with its enterprise

architecture. Customs ensured that its enterprise architecture contained
sufficient detail to build the first ACE release and has aligned the
release with the enterprise architecture. Customs plans to continue to
extend its enterprise architecture as necessary to build subsequent ACE
releases.  We recommended Customs have sufficient human capital
resources.

Customs developed and plans to implement a human capital management
strategy for the Customs modernization office, which is responsible for
managing the ACE acquisition.  We recommended Customs develop rigorous
and analytically verifiable

cost estimating. Customs began developing and plans to implement a
costestimating program that employs the tenets of effective cost
estimating as defined by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI).  We
recommended Customs employ effective software acquisition

processes. Customs continues to make progress and has plans to establish
effective software acquisition process controls, as embodied primarily in
the second level of SEI*s Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model.
10 Customs has made progress in implementing some, but not all, of our

recommendations. Moreover, because Customs is in the early stages of
acquiring ACE, many challenging tasks remain before Customs will have
implemented full ACE capability.

10 Capability Maturity Model SM is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon
University, and CMM is registered in the U. S. Patent and Trademark
Office. The SA- CMM identifies key process areas that are necessary to
effectively manage software- intensive system acquisitions. Achieving the
second level of the SA- CMM*s five- level scale means that an organization
has the software acquisition rigor and discipline to repeat project
successes.

Page 9 GAO- 03- 902T

To prevent illegal entry of individuals into the United States between the
ports of entry, BCBP has deployed significant resources but estimates
significantly more are needed. Continued implementation of the southwest
border strategy faces a range of challenges, including meeting hiring
goals and obtaining needed approvals to deploy fencing and technology to
implement its strategy while simultaneously addressing emerging concerns
over illegal entry along the northern border, mitigating the negatives
affects the strategy may have on communities that experience an increase
in illegal alien traffic, and responding to continuing concerns over the
safety of aliens who cross in remote and desolate areas. At our nation*s
ports, BCBP faces an array of challenges, including improving inspectors*
ability to verify the identity of travelers and whether they can be
admitted into the country, unifying and enhancing inspector training, and
complying

with the congressional mandate to implement a system to track the entry
and exit of all aliens.

Deterring illegal entry between the nation*s ports of entry will continue
to be a challenge for BCBP. In previous work, we reported that the Border
Patrol had estimated that significantly more resources would be needed to
fully implement its border control strategy and that various factors had
impeded the Border Patrol*s ability to implement its strategy as
originally planned.

Since 1994, the Border Patrol has been implementing a phased strategy to
increase deterrence to illegal entry beginning, first, with the areas that
had the largest influx of illegal aliens. The strategy postulated that as
resources were applied in one area, the flow of illegal alien traffic
would shift to other locations along the southwest border where resources
had yet to be applied.

In our last report on the southwest border strategy in August 2001, we
reported that the Border Patrol estimated it would need between 11,700 and
14,000 agents, additional support personnel, and hundreds of millions of
dollars in additional technology and infrastructure to fully implement the
Southwest border strategy. 11 We reported that it would take at least 5
more years (until 2006) to reach the minimum number of agents the Border
Patrol believed it needed along the Southwest border if (1) the

11 See U. S. General Accounting Office, INS* Southwest Border Strategy:
Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO- 01- 842
(Washington, D. C.: Aug. 2001). Challenges Related to

Immigration Control Deterring Illegal Entry between the Ports of Entry

Page 10 GAO- 03- 902T

administration*s agent hiring goals at that time were maintained and met
and (2) all new agents were deployed to the southwest border. However,
this estimate was made before the September 11, 2001, attacks and the
subsequent concerns regarding the need for additional resources to deter
illegal entry along the northern border.

BCBP continues to face hiring challenges to meet its estimated needs. The
Border Patrol currently has about 9,500 agents deployed along the
southwest border. While nearly a 3- fold increase from the 3,400 agents
the Border Patrol had along the southwest border in 1994, it is still
about 2,200 agents short of the minimum number, 11,700, the Border Patrol
said it needed to fully implement the southwest border strategy.
Currently, the Border Patrol has 567 agents deployed along the northern
border.

We also reported on various factors that had impeded the Border Patrol*s
ability to implement its strategy, some of which still appear to be
problematic. For example, it had taken the Border Patrol longer to
implement the strategy than originally planned because, among other
things, the Border Patrol experienced difficulties hiring agents and
delays in obtaining approvals needed to deploy technology and build
fences.

The Border Patrol also recognized the need to make outreach efforts to
communities because its initial failure to warn some communities about
anticipated increases in illegal alien traffic caught community officials
by surprise and angered some residents due to the negative effects the
increased traffic had on the community. When apprehensions surged in
communities into which the illegal alien traffic was reportedly pushed,
officials and residents in one community reported experiencing loss of
business, destruction of private property, and environmental degradation.
Concerns have been raised over the environmental impact of current plans

to build additional fencing along the border in Arizona. A recent news
article described how some local residents in the border area southwest of
Tucson, Arizona, are patrolling the border to report illegal crossings

raising the concern of law enforcement officials. The Border Patrol has
realized its goal of shifting illegal alien traffic away from urban areas
into more remote areas. However, rather than being deterred from
attempting illegal entry, many aliens have instead risked injury and death
by trying to cross mountains, deserts, and rivers. This prompted the
Border Patrol to

implement a Border Safety Initiative consisting of, among other things, a
media campaign to warn aliens about the dangers of crossing illegally, as
well as establishing search- and- rescue units.

Page 11 GAO- 03- 902T

We further reported in August 2001 that although alien apprehensions had
shifted along the border as expected, overall apprehensions along the
southwest border had continued to increase to over 1.6 million in fiscal
year 2000* raising questions about the strategy*s effect on overall
illegal entry along the southwest border. However, since then
apprehensions along the southwest border have declined to less than 1
million in fiscal year 2002.

While there may be many reasons for the decline in apprehensions, in
response to our recommendation, the Border Patrol has developed a plan
designed to evaluate the impacts of its southwest border strategy.
However, the evaluation has yet to be completed. Our recent work at ports
of entry and our ongoing work specifically at

land border ports, indicate that BCBP inspectors continue to face
challenges that those from their predecessor agencies also faced in
balancing the need to identify violators of immigration and other laws
while facilitating the movement of lawful travelers. Today, I will touch
on several issues relating to the inspection of entry documents, inspector
training, intelligence information needs of the field, and BCBP plans for
implementing the U. S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology
system, known as the U. S. VISIT system.

At land border ports of entry, inspectors must quickly make decisions
about whether to admit a traveler into the United States or refer
travelers for more intensive inspection if admissibility cannot be readily
determined. Two of the factors that challenge inspectors* ability to
verify the travelers* identity and admissibility are that (1) some
travelers may

enter the United States without having to present a travel document and
(2) travelers can present a variety of documents to gain entry into the
United States, some of which can be easily counterfeited.

First, some travelers do not need to present proof of citizenship at the
border. U. S. and certain Canadian citizens are exempt from having to
present any document upon entry. Instead, they can make an oral claim of
citizenship, if this satisfies the inspector. According to immigration
data,

inspectors at land border ports intercepted nearly 15,000 people in 2002
who falsely claimed to be U. S. citizens in order to gain illegal entry,
suggesting an unknown number of travelers successfully entered the United
States this way. Preventing Illegal Entry at

Ports of Entry Determining Traveler Admissibility

Page 12 GAO- 03- 902T

Second, a variety of documents are accepted at ports, and many can be
counterfeited or used fraudulently with apparent ease. With nearly 200
countries issuing unique passports, official stamps, seals, and visas, the
potential for document fraud is great. A wide variety of documents can be
presented for inspection* including more than 8,000 state and local
offices issue birth certificates, driver*s licenses, and other documents,
any of which could potentially be counterfeit. According to immigration
data, inspectors at land ports intercepted nearly 60,000 fraudulent
documents in fiscal year 2002, including over 10,000 U. S. citizenship-
related documents. Clearly, others have successfully gained access to this
country using counterfeit documents. Earlier this year, we testified on
how our investigators entered the country from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica
through land, air, and sea ports of entry using fictitious names, and
counterfeit driver*s licenses and birth certificates made using readily
available software. 12 INS and Customs Service inspectors never questioned
the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and our investigators
encountered no difficulty in entering the country using them.

BCBP will also face an array of challenges in ensuring that its border
inspectors are adequately trained, including ensuring appropriate training
is provided in the detection of fraudulent documents. For example, former
INS and Customs inspectors are still being trained at separate basic

training academies using two different curricula. If border inspectors are
to wear *one face* at the border, a unified curriculum and training
approach will need to be developed and implemented. These training
challenges will continue beyond the academy* BCBP will also need to ensure
that a field training program is established that meets the needs of the
newest as well as experienced inspectors at the ports. For example,
neither the former INS nor Customs agencies had a standard on- the- job
training program for their inspectors working at land border ports. The
prior work I mentioned in which our investigators used counterfeit
documents to enter the United States, as well as our ongoing work at 15
land border ports, suggest that one training challenge for BCBP will be to
ensure that both new and experienced border inspectors are capable of
readily detecting fraudulent documents.

12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into
the United States, GAO- 03- 438T (Washington D. C.: Jan. 30, 2003) and
Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States from Certain Western
Hemisphere Countries Not Detected,

GAO- 03- 713T (Washington D. C.: May 13, 2003). Unifying and Enhancing

Inspector Training

Page 13 GAO- 03- 902T

Our ongoing work at land border ports suggests that the Bureau will also
face challenges regarding the collection, analysis, and use of
intelligence information in the field. The former INS recognized the need
for more intelligence support in the field. In 1997, an INS- contracted
study reported the lack of an intelligence capability at all INS
locations, including districts and ports. 13 More recent studies suggest
needs in this area persist. Although some steps have been taken to bring
the intelligence function to the field level, additional steps remain if
the intelligence needs of the field are to be met. These challenges
include, but are not limited, to decisions

related to staffing and training, as well as merging intelligence
positions from the former Customs and INS.

One of the most significant challenges facing DHS at ports of entry is the
implementation of the U. S. VISIT system. This significant undertaking is
intended to capture both entry and exit data on travelers. It will also
have many implications for operations at U. S. ports of entry, including
expenditures, staffing, inspection procedures, and infrastructure. We
reviewed INS*s fiscal year 2002 expenditure plan and associated system
acquisition documentation and system plans. We reported that INS*s

preliminary plans showed that it intended to acquire and deploy a system
that will satisfy the general scope of capabilities required under various
laws. However, we found that the initial plan did not provide sufficient
information about INS commitments for the system, such as what specific
system capabilities and benefits will be delivered, by when, and at what
cost. We concluded that this lack of detail is a material limitation in
the first plan that will become even more problematic in the future as the
magnitude and complexity of the system acquisition increases, as will the
importance of creating plans with the appropriate level and scope of
information. 14 Responsibility for implementing U. S. VISIT now resides in
the Border and Transportation Security directorate. We are currently
reviewing the fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan and will ascertain whether
these problems were addressed.

13 INS Intelligence Program Strategic Plan, September 30, 1997 (submitted
by LB& M Associates, Inc.). 14 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit
system Expenditure Planning, GAO- 03- 563 (Washington D. C.: Jun. 2003).
Meeting Field Intelligence

Needs Implementing the New U. S. VISIT System

Page 14 GAO- 03- 902T

We designated implementation and transformation of the new Department of
Homeland Security as high risk based on three factors. First, the
implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous undertaking that
will take time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. Second,
components to be merged into DHS* including those that now form BCBP*
already face a wide array of existing challenges, some of which we have
described in this statement. Finally, failure to effectively carry out its
mission would expose the nation to potentially very serious consequences.

In the aftermath of September 11, invigorating the nation*s homeland
security missions has become one of the federal government*s most
significant challenges. DHS, with an anticipated budget of almost $40
billion and an estimated 170,000 employees, will be the third largest
government agency; not since the creation of the Department of Defense
(DOD) more than 50 years ago has the government sought an integration and
transformation of this magnitude. In DOD*s case, the effective
transformation took many years to achieve, and even today, the department
continues to face enduring management challenges and highrisk areas that
are, in part, legacies of its unfinished integration.

Effectively implementing and transforming DHS may be an even more daunting
challenge. DOD was formed almost entirely from agencies whose principal
mission was national defense. DHS will combine 22 agencies specializing in
various disciplines: law enforcement, border security, biological
research, disaster mitigation, and computer security, for instance.
Further, DHS will oversee a number of non- homeland- security activities,
such as the Coast Guard*s marine safety responsibilities and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency*s (FEMA) natural disaster response functions.
Yet, only through the effective integration and collaboration of these
entities will the nation achieve the synergy that can help provide better
security against terrorism. The magnitude of the responsibilities,
combined with the challenge and complexity of the transformation,
underscores the perseverance and dedication that will be required of all
DHS*s leaders, employees, and stakeholders to achieve success.

Further, it is well recognized that mergers of this magnitude in the
public and private sector carry significant risks, including lost
productivity and inefficiencies. Generally, successful transformations of
large organizations, even those undertaking less strenuous reorganizations
and with less pressure for immediate results, can take from 5 to 7 years
to achieve. Necessary management capacity and oversight mechanisms must be
established. Moreover, critical aspects of DHS*s success will depend on
Challenges Related to

Implementing and Transforming DHS

Page 15 GAO- 03- 902T well- functioning relationships with third parties
that will take time to establish and maintain, including those with state
and local governments,

the private sector, and other federal agencies with homeland security
responsibilities, such as the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, DOD, and the Department of
Health and Human Services. Creating and maintaining a structure that can
leverage partners and stakeholders will be necessary to effectively
implement the national homeland security strategy.

The new department is also being formed from components with a wide array
of existing major management challenges and program risks. For instance,
one DHS directorate*s responsibility includes the protection of critical
information systems that we already consider a high risk. In fact, many of
the major components merging into the new department, including the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FEMA and the U. S. Coast
Guard, face at least one major problem, such as strategic human capital
risks, critical information technology challenges, or financial management
vulnerabilities; they also confront an array of challenges and risks to
program operations. For example, TSA has had considerable challenges in
meeting deadlines for screening baggage, and the agency has focused most
of its initial security efforts on aviation security, with less attention
to other modes of transportation. The Coast Guard faces the challenges
inherent in a massive fleet modernization.

DHS*s national security mission is of such importance that the failure to
address its management challenges and programs risks could have serious
consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizens* health and
safety, and our economy. Overall, our designation of the implementation

and transformation of DHS as a high- risk area stems from the importance
of its mission and the nation*s reliance on the department*s effectiveness
in meeting its challenges for protecting the country against terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may
have.

Page 16 GAO- 03- 902T

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Richard
M. Stana at (202) 512- 8777. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony included Seto J. Bagdoyan, Michael P. Dino, Darryl W. Dutton,
Barbara Guffy, E. Anne Laffoon, and Lori Weiss. Appendix: Contacts and
Acknowledgments

(440222)

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