Energy Task Force: Process Used to Develop the National Energy	 
Policy (22-AUG-03, GAO-03-894). 				 
                                                                 
On January 29, 2001, the President established the National	 
Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG)--a group of cabinet-level
and other senior administration officials, chaired by the Vice	 
President--to gather information, deliberate, and recommend a	 
national energy policy. The group presented its final report to  
the President in May 2001. GAO was asked to (1) describe the	 
process used by the NEPDG to develop the National Energy Policy  
report, including whom the group met with and what topics were	 
discussed and (2) determine the costs associated with that	 
process. Although appointed NEPDG Chair, the Vice President	 
elected not to respond to GAO's request for certain factual NEPDG
information. Accordingly, as authorized by GAO's access-torecords
statute, and after exhausting efforts to achieve a resolution and
following the processes specified in that statute, GAO filed suit
in U.S. District Court to obtain the information. The district	 
court later dismissed GAO's suit on jurisdictional grounds,	 
without reaching the merits of GAO's right to audit and evaluate 
NEPDG activities or to obtain access to NEPDG records. For a	 
variety of reasons, GAO decided not to appeal the district court 
decision. DOE, Interior, and EPA reviewed the draft report and	 
chose not to comment. OVP declined an offer to review the draft  
and comment.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-894 					        
    ACCNO:   A08178						        
  TITLE:     Energy Task Force: Process Used to Develop the National  
Energy Policy							 
     DATE:   08/22/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Cost accounting					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Data collection					 
	     National policies					 
	     Reports management 				 
	     Energy policies					 

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GAO-03-894

                                       A

Letter

August 22, 2003 Congressional Requesters: As one of the new
administration*s first major actions, on January 29, 2001, the President
created a group of cabinet- level and other senior federal officials,
chaired by the Vice President, to develop a national energy policy. The
President charged the group, called the National Energy Policy

Development Group (NEPDG), with developing *a national energy policy
designed to help the private sector, and government at all levels, promote
dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production and
distribution of energy for the future.* 1 NEPDG presented its final report
to

the President on May 16, 2001. 2 The report contained over 100
recommendations for executive actions or new legislation. The Congress is
now considering the energy- related legislative proposals.

You asked us to examine the process used by the President*s energy policy
taskforce. 3 Specifically, our objectives were to (1) describe the process
used by NEPDG to develop the National Energy Policy report, including whom
the group met with and the topics discussed at these meetings, and (2)
determine the costs associated with that process. In order to close out
this request, we are providing a limited analysis based on the best
information that has been made available to us.

To address our objectives, we followed a two- pronged information
gathering effort. First, starting in the spring of 2001, we began
gathering information from several federal agencies involved in the
report*s development* the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of
the

Interior (Interior), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). At
each of the agencies, we interviewed senior agency officials that were
involved in the NEPDG effort and received written correspondence and other
materials from them providing detailed responses to our questions.

Agency officials based most of their answers on their best recollections
or 1 Pres. Memorandum (Jan. 29, 2001). 2 National Energy Policy: Report of
the National Energy Policy Development Group. U. S. Government Printing
Office (Washington, D. C.: May 2001).

3 In April 2001, Representatives Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell asked
us to examine the process and costs associated with the NEPDG.
Subsequently, Senators Joseph I. Lieberman, Ernest F. Hollings, Carl M.
Levin, and Byron L. Dorgan, chairs of their respective committees or
subcommittees at the time of their request, also requested this analysis.

on information reconstructed from electronic schedules. Our meetings with
officials yielded information regarding the meetings that Cabinet- level
agency officials attended and meetings that agency officials held with
NEPDG support staff (Support Group). Officials also provided us with
selected information on meetings held with nonfederal energy stakeholders
to discuss issues related to energy aspects of their agency*s activities.

Second, also starting in spring of 2001, we initiated contact with the
Office of the Vice President (OVP), as NEPDG Chair, to obtain NEPDG
records responsive to your request. From the outset, OVP did not respond
to our request for information, including descriptive information on the
process by which the National Energy Policy report was developed,
asserting that we lacked statutory authority to examine NEPDG activities.
We were also denied the opportunity to interview staff assisting the Vice
President on the

NEPDG effort. As a result, throughout the spring and summer of 2001, we
engaged in extensive attempts to reach an agreement with OVP on our
information request in an effort to fulfill our statutory responsibilities
in a manner that accommodated the Vice President*s asserted need to
protect certain executive deliberations. Importantly, we significantly
narrowed the scope of our review by, among other things, withdrawing our
initial request for minutes of NEPDG meetings. We also offered flexibility
in how we would access certain documents. Despite our concerted efforts to
reach a reasonable accommodation, the Vice President denied us access to
virtually all requested information, with the exception of a few documents

purportedly related to NEPDG costs that OVP provided to us. The Vice
President*s denial of access challenged GAO*s fundamental authority to
evaluate the process by which NEPDG had developed a national energy

policy and to obtain access to records that would shed light on that
process. As authorized by GAO*s access- to- records statute, after
exhausting the processes specified in that statute for achieving a
resolution and receiving a request from two senate full committee chairs
and two senate subcommittee chairs to pursue our evaluation, 4 we filed
suit in the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia on February
22, 2002, to obtain

4 31 U. S. C. S: 717( b)( 3) requires GAO to conduct evaluations requested
by chairs of congressional committees of relevant jurisdiction.

the limited factual NEPDG information that we had requested. 5 On December
9, 2002, the district court dismissed GAO*s suit on jurisdictional
grounds, without reaching the merits of GAO*s authority to audit and
evaluate NEPDG activities or to obtain access to NEPDG records. 6 After
considerable bipartisan outreach efforts to the Congress, GAO decided not
to appeal the district court decision. 7 A detailed chronology of our
efforts to obtain access to NEPDG records can be found on GAO*s Web site.

OVP*s unwillingness to provide NEPDG records and other related information
precluded us from fully achieving our objectives in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards and substantially limited
our ability to answer the questions you asked and the depth of our
analysis. Yet, given the unique circumstances surrounding this request,
our protracted attempts to acquire this information, and the availability
of certain related documents in the public realm, we gathered and analyzed
available information on the NEPDG effort to provide as robust an account
as possible under the circumstances. Specifically, in order to more fully
analyze and describe the NEPDG report development process, beginning in
March 2002, we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed NEPDG- related

information from federal agencies involved in the NEPDG effort that was 5
As authorized by 31 U. S. C. S: 716( b)( 1), the Comptroller General sent
a formal request for the NEPDG records to OVP on July 18, 2001. After a
requisite 20- day period passed without any meaningful action, the
Comptroller General reported on August 17, 2001, to the Congress, the
President, the Vice President, and other officials, that OVP had not
provided

the requested information. After a second requisite 20- day period passed,
again without any meaningful action, and subsequent to a reasonable amount
of time after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and additional
attempts to reach resolution of this matter, the Comptroller General filed
suit on February 22, 2002, as authorized by 31 U. S. C. S: 716 (b)( 2).
The executive branch chose not to invoke the *safety valve* certification
mechanism in 31 U. S. C. S: 716 (d)( 1)( C) that would have precluded GAO
from taking the unprecedented step

of going to court. Furthermore, the President did not seek to protect the
information from disclosure by claiming that it was subject to executive
privilege.

6 Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D. D. C. 2002). 7 Although GAO
believes the district court*s decision is incorrect, as detailed in the
Comptroller General*s statement on February 7, 2003, continuing to pursue
GAO*s access request through the courts would have required significant
time and resources over several years. At the same time, several private
litigants are seeking much of the same NEPDG information from OVP that GAO
sought, and we plan to obtain those records, if these cases are
successful. Moreover, because the district court*s decision in GAO*s case
did not reach

the merits of GAO*s audit or access authority, the decision in no way
diminishes these authorities or the obligation of agencies to provide GAO
with information. The court*s decision is confined to the unique
circumstances posed by this particular case and does not preclude GAO from
filing suit on a different matter involving different facts in the future.

released under court order in four other ongoing lawsuits filed under
other statutes. 8 The agencies releasing documents included DOE, Interior,
and EPA, as well as the Department of Transportation, Department of
Commerce, Department of Agriculture, and the Office of Management and
Budget. We could not independently verify some of the information
contained in these documents because the agencies had redacted data from
more than one- third of the pages. The agencies asserted that the redacted
information was exempt from production under the Freedom of

Information Act because it reflected deliberative processes among other
things. For the thousands of pages that contained some information
responsive to our objectives, we compared and contrasted their contents,
sought corroboration from other sources, and pieced together a general
description of the National Energy Policy report development process.

Included in these pages were several hundred E- mails and other documents
generated by OVP or the Support Group. Some of these documents revealed
information about the process used to develop the NEPDG report, but none
of them contained cost information beyond that which we had previously
obtained. Results in Brief According to the best information that we could
obtain, the National

Energy Policy report was the product of a centralized, top- down,
shortterm, and labor- intensive process that involved the efforts of
several hundred federal employees governmentwide. NEPDG* comprised mostly
of cabinet- level officials (Principals)* and its Support Group* comprised
mostly of select DOE officials detailed to OVP* controlled most facets of

the report*s development. Officials from each participating agency served
on a select interagency working group (Working Group), which prepared
draft report chapters for the Principals* review. Agency staff played a
tributary role, helping their respective agency complete its NEPDG-
related

8 These suits have since been consolidated into two lead suits: Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Department of Energy, No. 1: 01CV2545 (D. D.
C.) (filed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)), and Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. NEPDG et al., No. 01- 1530 (D. D. C.) (filed under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and other statutes). OVP has refused
to produce any documents to date in either litigation and the Vice
President filed an action in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C.
Circuit seeking to have the latter district court case dismissed. See In
re Cheney, No. 02- 5354 (D. C. Cir.). On July 8, 2003, the D. C. Circuit
denied the Vice President*s petition in the D. C. Circuit; the Vice
President is seeking rehearing of this denial. As part of the court
proceedings in the consolidated FACA cases, DOE, Interior, and EPA
produced interrogatory responses, which were provided to us. Certain
documents generated by OVP personnel were produced in the NRDC v. DOE FOIA
cases, but these were produced by other agencies, not by OVP.

assignments, providing draft outlines and chapters to the Working Group
and Principals, and responding to the Support Group*s subsequent requests
for information, review, or comment. In developing the National Energy
Policy report, the Principals, Support Group, and participating agency
staff also met with, solicited input from, or received information and
advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders, principally petroleum, coal,
nuclear, natural gas, and electricity industry representatives and
lobbyists. To a more limited degree, they also obtained information from
academic experts, policy organizations, environmental advocacy groups, and
private citizens. The extent to which submissions from any of these
stakeholders were solicited, influenced policy deliberations, or were
incorporated into the final report is not something that we can determine
based on the limited information at our disposal. Nor can we, because of
OVP*s unwillingness to provide us with information, provide a
comprehensive listing of the dates or purposes of these meetings, their
attendees, or how the attendees, when solicited, were selected. NEPDG held
periodic meetings and conducted its work in two distinct phases: the first
culminating in a March 19, 2001, briefing on challenges relating to energy
supply and the resulting economic impact; the second ending with the May
16, 2001, presentation of the final report to the President.

None of the federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort that we
contacted provided us with a complete accounting of the costs that they
incurred during the development of the National Energy Policy report. The
two federal entities responsible for funding the NEPDG effort* OVP and
DOE* did not provide us with the comprehensive cost information that we
requested. Instead, OVP provided us with 77 pages of information,
twothirds of which contained no cost information or were essentially
blank, while the remaining one- third contained some miscellaneous

information* such as a meal receipt or telephone bills* of little to no
usefulness. In response to our requests seeking clarification of the
provided information, OVP stated that it would not provide any additional
information. DOE, EPA, and Interior provided us with estimates of their
costs associated with the report development process, but these estimates,
all calculated in different ways, were not comprehensive. DOE provided us
with selected cost information, including salary estimates for its
employees detailed to OVP, printing and publication costs, and other
incidental expenses. EPA and Interior provided salary cost estimates for
some of their senior officials involved in the report*s development. The
precision of these estimates varied. Although most of the identified costs
were salaryoriented, officials noted that employees did not specifically
record the amount of time spent on NEPDG- related tasks because many of
them

already worked on energy policy and thus would have likely conducted a
substantial portion of the work even without the NEPDG project taking
place. One agency cautioned us not to expect its salary estimate to be
precise, noting that it had been primarily based on employee recollection

and guesswork. The National Energy

The National Energy Policy report was the product of a short- term,
laborintensive

Policy Report Was the process that involved the efforts of several hundred
federal

employees governmentwide. In the 3 1/2 months between NEPDG*s inception
Product of a

and its presentation of the final report, the Principals and Support Group
Centralized, Top- Down controlled most facets of the report*s development,
including setting

Process meeting schedules and agendas, controlling the workflow,
distributing

work assignments, rewriting chapters, approving recommendations, and
securing the report*s contents from premature disclosure. Senior agency
officials served on a select interagency Working Group, while the majority
of staff working on the NEPDG effort played a tributary role, (1) helping
their agency fulfill its NEPDG- related obligations, (2) providing NEPDG
with analytical information, and (3) responding to the Support Group*s
subsequent requests for information, review, or comment. In developing the
National Energy Policy report, the NEPDG Principals, Support Group, and
participating agency staff also met with, solicited input from, or
received information and advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders,
primarily petroleum, coal, nuclear, natural gas, electricity industry
representatives and lobbyists. To a more limited degree, they also
received information from academic experts, policy organizations,
environmental

advocacy groups, and private citizens. NEPDG met and conducted its work in
two distinct phases: the first phase culminated in a March 19, 2001,
briefing on challenges relating to energy supply and the resulting
economic impact; the second phase ended with a May 16, 2001, presentation
of the final report to the President. Figure 1 depicts the top- down
process and its participants.

Figure 1: Structure Used in Developing the National Energy Policy a

a All of the tiers shown here to some extent met with, solicited input
from, or received information and advice from nonfederal energy
stakeholders. Cabinet- Level Officials and In a January 29, 2001,
memorandum, the President established NEPDG* Support Group Staff

comprised of the Vice President, nine cabinet- level officials, and four
other Controlled the Report

senior administration officials* to gather information, deliberate, and
Development Process

make recommendations to the President by the end of fiscal year 2001. 9
The President called on the Vice President to chair the group, direct its
work and, as necessary, establish subordinate working groups to assist
NEPDG. The President requested NEPDG to submit two reports: the first, an
assessment of the difficulties experienced by the private sector in
ensuring that local and regional energy needs are met; the second, a
report outlining a recommended national energy policy designed to help the
private sector, and as necessary and appropriate, federal, state, and
local

governments, to promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound
production and distribution of energy for the future. More specifically,
the memorandum mentioned four areas of concentration: (1) growing demand
for energy; (2) the potential for disruptions in energy supplies or
distribution; (3) the need for responsible policies to protect the
environment and promote conservation; and (4) the need for modernization
of the energy generation, supply, and transmission infrastructure.

NEPDG Principals The 14 NEPDG members* the Vice President, 9 Cabinet-
level officials, and 4 other senior administration officials* were
responsible for developing the National Energy Policy report. In a series
of formal meetings convened by the Vice President, the group presented
briefings, received assignments and the latest drafts, and discussed
agenda items and recommendations. The following list shows the NEPDG
members.

 The Vice President, NEPDG Chair;  The Secretary of State;  The
Secretary of the Treasury;  The Secretary of the Interior;  The
Secretary of Agriculture;  The Secretary of Commerce;

9 In the Judicial Watch FACA litigation now pending in district court (see
footnote 8), the plaintiffs contend that NEPDG membership was not limited
to these federal officials but also included certain nonfederal parties.
The court has not yet decided this issue, and this report takes no
position on it.

 The Secretary of Transportation;  The Secretary of Energy;  The
Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency;  The Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency;  The Director of the Office of
Management and Budget;  The Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief
of Staff for Policy;  The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy;
and  The Deputy Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs.
10 NEPDG formally convened 10 times between January 29, 2001, and May 16,
2001. Meetings were held on the following dates: January 29, February 9
and 16, March 12 and 19, April 3, 11, and 18, May 2 and 16, 2001. 11 All
but two of the meetings were held in the Vice President*s Ceremonial
Office. According to OVP staff and other federal officials who attended
these

formal meetings, attendance was strictly limited to officers and employees
of the federal government. These officials indicated that none of the
Principals* meetings was open to the public nor did any nonfederal
participants attend. However, no party provided us with any documentary
evidence to support or negate this assertion. Due to space constraints,
the Principals* meetings typically included the Vice President, the
Principals and their accompanying staff, the Support Group, and members of
the Vice President*s staff. For meetings that took place when the
Principals could not be present, or when the Principal had yet to be
appointed, another agency official would attend instead. Agency officials
participating in these meetings could not recollect whether official
rosters or minutes were kept at the meetings.

10 The President originally named the Assistant to the President for
Intergovernmental Affairs as an NEPDG member. However, because the
President had not appointed anyone to serve in this position, the Vice
President instead invited the Deputy Assistant to the President and
Director of Intergovernmental Affairs to attend the meetings.

11 NEPDG Principals met one more time on July 13, 2001, after the
publication of the final report. We did not include this meeting in our
total because it lay beyond the scope of our review.

The 10 Principals* meetings covered a variety of topics, depending on the
status of efforts on the report and concerns raised about these efforts.
The Support Group developed the meeting agendas and sent them out to
agencies shortly before the meetings commenced. According to the proposed
meeting agendas and our discussions with agency officials, the meetings
generally lasted between 1 and 2 hours, and nearly all of them included a
brief update on the California energy situation. The early meetings
involved more procedural discussions than the later meetings, which
focused more on a discussion of specific policy recommendations. (See
table 1.)

Tabl e 1: NEPDG Principals* Meetings from January 29 to May 16, 2001
Meeting date Location Meeting agenda

January 29, 2001 The Vice President*s Ceremonial A brief, ceremonial event
at which the President announced the Office, Eisenhower Executive

formation of NEPDG, its mission, membership, and chair. Office Building
(EEOB) February 9, 2001 The Vice President*s Ceremonial (1) Status report
on the California crisis, (2) Discussion of Senator

Office, EEOB Murkowski*s and Congressman Barton*s pending legislative
initiatives, (3) Discussion of the seven working subgroups to be
established: shortterm energy supply; programs for consumers and low-
income households; economic impact of energy; development of alternative
and renewable energy sources; conservation and increased energy
efficiency; increased production of traditional energy sources;

infrastructure investment, integrity, and safety; and national energy
security and international affairs. February 16, 2001 The Vice President*s
Ceremonial (1) Briefing on California/ Western electricity and natural gas
situation, Office, EEOB (2) Energy Information Administration briefing on
its Annual Energy Outlook 2001, and (3) Review of final report outline.
March 12, 2001 The Vice President*s Ceremonial An Energy Information
Administration briefing, distribution of final draft

Office, EEOB interim report, discussion of rollout, and status update on
final report. March 19, 2001 The White House, Cabinet Room Oral
presentation of interim report to the President. April 3, 2001 The Vice
President*s Ceremonial Discussions of the following issues/
recommendations: Corporate Office, EEOB Average Fuel Economy standards; a
multi- pollutant strategy; nuclear

energy; Outer Continental Shelf/ Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; safe
drinking water/ hydraulic fracturing; energy efficiency. A last- minute
agenda item was added shortly before the meeting. April 11, 2001 The Vice
President*s Ceremonial Discussions of the following issues/
recommendations: carbon dioxide, Office, EEOB hydropower licensing,
Coastal Zone Management Activities, tax credit

issues, and permitting.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Meeting date Location Meeting agenda

April 18, 2001 The Vice President*s Ceremonial (1) Update on California
energy situation; (2) update on final written Office, EEOB report to the
President; (3) discussion of key report issues and proposed
recommendations: energy policy principles, tax credit issues, New Source
Review reform, reformulated gas, and electricity deregulation; and (4) an
executive session without staff to further discuss proposed
recommendations.

May 2, 2001 The Vice President*s Ceremonial Agenda items: (1) Update on
California energy situation; (2) Update on Office, EEOB final written
report to the President; (3) Discussion of following energy issues:
spiking gasoline prices, refineries, New Source Review, boutique

fuels, final report rollout status. An executive session followed for
further discussion. May 16, 2001 The White House, Cabinet Room
Presentation of final report to the President. Source: GAO.

NEPDG Support Group A support staff of seven* six DOE employees assigned
to OVP and one White House fellow* assisted NEPDG in developing the
National Energy Policy. The Support Group consisted of an executive
director, a deputy director, two senior professionals, a communications
director, the fellow, and a staff assistant. 12

The Support Group served as the hub of the overall NEPDG effort and
coordinated its workflow. Among its many tasks, the Support Group assigned
specific responsibilities and chapters to individual agencies; established
and presided over an interagency Working Group; scheduled and attended
NEPDG- related meetings and determined their agendas; set internal
deadlines; controlled the workflow; served as a central collection and
distribution point for participating agencies* draft outlines, report

chapters, comments, and recommendations; and drafted the final report. The
executive director and deputy director also held meetings with various
agency staff to discuss their agencies* input to individual chapters,
conduct peer review sessions, and discuss other issues.

The Support Group did not generally discuss its activities with staff at
the agencies. Instead the Support Group frequently used meetings as a
forum to unveil new assignments, drafts, topics, and guidance for Working
Group members to deliver back to their respective agencies. The Support
Group staff, specifically the executive director and deputy director,
provided

12 Two members of the Support Group staff joined the NEPDG effort in April
2001: a senior professional, who was brought in to help draft the final
report, and the communications director, who was brought in to develop a
marketing strategy for rolling out the final report.

instructions to the Working Group participants and coordinated the
activities of each participating agency. Agencies transmitted their work
product to other Working Group members largely through the White House.
NEPDG Interagency Working

To coordinate the day- to- day work of developing the National Energy

Group

Policy report, the NEPDG executive director established an interagency
Working Group, comprised of staff- level officials from each participating
agency and several White House and Support Group staff. The NEPDG
executive director and deputy director oversaw the Working Group*s
activities, instructed participating agencies on their roles and
assignments, and facilitated communication among the Working Group
participants. The Working Group developed a draft outline for the energy
policy report and relayed work assignments to the agencies responsible for
particular areas. Available information did not allow us to determine the
number of Working

Group meetings held or the number of attendees at any given meeting. NEPDG
members were free to assign one or more staff to the Working Group. The
Working Group met frequently in February and March 2001 to review the
latest outlines and drafts, report on the status of their specific

assignments, represent agency views, provide comments to other agencies,
and obtain further instructions. For example, the first Working Group
meeting held on February 9, 2001, concentrated on the group*s approach to
developing a national energy policy and the milestones for completing the
process. The second meeting held on February 13, 2001, focused on
determining the chapters that would be included in the final report.
Subsequent meetings typically involved a review of drafts in which the
lead authors would lead discussion on a chapter*s main points. Attendees
would comment on the chapters or propose new or revised text for the
group*s discussion. The Working Group considered various alternatives in
language, tone, and recommendations for the report and then decided on a
particular course of action to recommend to the Vice President.

The Working Group met often in February and March 2001, generally several
days before and immediately following the Principals* meetings. Most of
these meetings took place in the Vice President*s Ceremonial Office,
although several had to be rescheduled elsewhere. Working Group meetings
were frequently cancelled or postponed as a result of scheduling

conflicts. In a sworn declaration submitted to the court in one of the

lawsuits seeking NEPDG records, 13 the NEPDG deputy director stated that
all attendees at the Working Group meetings were federal employees, with
one exception* a contractor, who engaged in providing technical writing
and graphic design services, worked with the group and sat in on portions

of no more than three of the meetings. However, attendance lists and
minutes of these meetings, if kept, were not made available to us, nor
were members of the Support Group allowed to discuss these meetings with
us. Thus we were unable to verify any assertions about the composition of

personnel at the meetings or about the general subjects discussed. The
Working Group met with Support Group staff for the last time on April 3,
2001. For the remainder of April 2001, the Support Group worked alone,
condensing the list of potential recommendations for NEPDG discussion

and recasting the chapters to fit the recommendations. During this period,
the Support Group contacted agencies primarily to verify facts or rewrite
specified sections of the report. Agency officials rejoined the process
after April 30, 2001, when the Support Group released the draft chapters
for final comment.

Staff from Multiple Federal The development of the National Energy Policy
report involved hundreds

Agencies Participated in the of staff from nine federal agencies and
several White House offices.

NEPDG Effort Agencies had considerable latitude in determining how to
staff their

NEPDG assignments. Most agencies developed a multilevel, top- down process
coordinated by the agency*s lead NEPDG contact or Working Group member.
Generally, the NEPDG Support Group forwarded specific writing assignments,
information requests, meeting times and agendas to the agency contacts,
who then disseminated the information to a coordination team. The
coordination team distributed assignments to lead

officials in offices or bureaus throughout the department. These officials
then assigned staff to complete the tasks. When the completed work had
interoffice concurrence, it was then passed back up the chain of command.
The NEPDG agency staff contact then reviewed and approved all agency
submissions before releasing them to the Principals, the Support Group, or

other agencies for review or comment. Agency staff contacts also held
regular update meetings with the coordination team and provided assorted
updates and briefings to the agency Principal. Not all agencies
experienced the same workload. For example, DOE, which was assigned the
lead role in

developing multiple chapters, had greater responsibilities, more meetings
13 Declaration of Karen Y. Knutson, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. NEPDG et al.,
No. 01- 1530 (D. D. C.) (Sept. 3, 2002).

to attend, and larger efforts to coordinate than some other agencies, such
as Interior, that played more of an advisory role. Frequent interaction
also took place between agencies in developing the report chapters. More
than 80 DOE employees from eight departmental offices had direct input
into the development of the National Energy Policy report, including
science specialists and representatives with significant science
expertise. DOE*s Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary led the
department*s internal effort to develop information for an interim and
final report, and to identify policy recommendations for the report. The
official joined the Acting Director of the then Office of Policy in
periodic meetings with the Support

Group staff and other agency officials to discuss drafts of specific
chapters. In addition, the official joined DOE Office of Policy and
program officials to relay comments from NEPDG meetings and to coordinate
writing activities within DOE. The Acting Director of the Office of
Policy, who was responsible for the day- to- day coordination and
management of the process of producing DOE*s contributions to the NEPDG
effort, led a coordination team of senior managers from the department*s
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Office of Nuclear
Energy, Office of Fossil Energy, Office of Policy, Office of International
Affairs, Energy

Information Administration, and the Bonneville Power Administration. The
team was charged with coordinating the writing of chapters, and each
office formed a similar group within their areas of expertise to write its
respective chapters. The Office of Policy took the lead on chapter 1
(Taking Stock), Energy Efficiency took the lead on chapter 4 (Using

Energy Wisely) and chapter 6 (Nature*s Power), and Fossil Energy took the
lead on chapter 5 (Energy for a New Century). In addition, DOE contributed
draft sections to chapters for which other agencies had been assigned the
lead role. Each office developed recommendations and, after internal
discussions, forwarded them for high- level review within DOE before they
were released to the NEPDG Principals for review.

DOE staff researched historical information about energy and energy
markets; identified key energy issues; examined and analyzed the current
situation in energy markets; discussed likely energy issues, such as
energy production, conservation and energy efficiency, energy prices,
renewable

and alternative energy sources, and national energy security; and prepared
issue papers, memoranda, and talking points relating to these subjects.
They also assisted with writing and reviewing drafts of report chapters,
providing supporting statistical and other information, reviewing and

responding to comments from other executive branch components, fact-

checking, developing citations and graphics, and briefing the Secretary on
energy policy issues.

Interior was not assigned a lead role in writing any of the report
chapters. The department*s relationship with NEPDG, including the Working
Group and Support Group staff, therefore consisted of the discussions at

Principals* and Working Group meetings, comments on drafts, provision of
an options paper, and responses to questions from NEPDG staff. To support
the NEPDG effort, Interior*s Office of Policy Analysis formed an energy
task force comprised of 11 issue teams to examine opportunities to

make more energy available from public lands and to streamline and improve
various planning and permitting processes for facilitating energy
development. Approximately 100 Interior employees, representing 13
departmental offices or bureaus, helped to develop information for the

NEPDG effort. These teams helped develop an internal paper that agency
officials used during Working Group discussions of other agencies* draft
chapters. EPA*s general role was to ensure that environmental issues were
accurately and adequately addressed and reflected in the development of
the report. More than 110 EPA employees participated in the agency*s
internal NEPDG

efforts. EPA*s Associate Administrator for Policy, Economics, and
Innovation served as the lead manager of the agency*s NEPDG activities,
overseeing its role in drafting the report chapter on the environment
(Protecting America*s Environment) and analyzing environmental issues
contained in the other draft chapters of the report. This EPA official and
two senior managers from the Office of Air and Radiation worked closely
with senior staff from other offices within EPA and senior officials from
other contributing agencies. The office leads circulated the draft to
others, usually to staff within their particular office, as they deemed
appropriate. The managers reviewed documents each time EPA staff prepared
or

revised them. Upon approval, EPA*s draft was then conveyed to the Support
Group.

Nonfederal Energy Stakeholders The NEPDG Principals, Support Group,
Working Group, and participating

Contributed to the NEPDG agency officials met with, solicited input from,
or received information and

Effort advice from a variety of nonfederal energy stakeholders while
developing the National Energy Policy report. According to our analysis of
agency

documents produced under court order, stakeholder involvement in the NEPDG
process included private citizens offering general energy advice to the
President, industry leaders submitting detailed policy recommendations to
NEPDG, and individual meetings with Principals as

well as the Vice President. The extent to which submissions from any of
these stakeholders were solicited, influenced policy deliberations, or
were incorporated into the final report is not something that we can
determine based on the limited information at our disposal. Nor can we
provide a comprehensive listing of the dates or purposes of these
meetings, their attendees, or how the attendees, when solicited, were
selected, because of OVP*s unwillingness to provide us with information.

The Principals met with a variety of nonfederal entities to discuss energy
issues and policy. DOE reported that the Secretary of Energy discussed
national energy policy with chief executive officers of petroleum,
electricity, nuclear, coal, chemical, and natural gas companies, among
others. The Secretary of Energy also reportedly asked nonfederal parties

for their recommendations for short- and long- term responses to petroleum
product price and supply constraints. Several corporations and
associations, including Chevron, the National Mining Association, and the
National Petrochemical & Refiners Association, provided the Secretary of
Energy with detailed energy policy recommendations. EPA reported that
agency managers* including the EPA Administrator* held many meetings with
outside parties, where the issue of energy policy was raised. For example,
according to the Administrator*s schedule, the Administrator and

agency staff met separately with the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers,
the Edison Electric Institute, and a group of environmental and
conservation leaders. Interior reported that the Secretary of the Interior
and staff attended meetings with private industry to discuss energy
issues, including one meeting with Rocky Mountain- based petroleum
companies interested in leasing federal lands and another meeting with an
Indian tribe from Pyramid Lake, Nevada interested in building a power
plant on its lands. In addition, in its response to a congressional
inquiry, OVP reported that the Vice President met with the chairman and
chief executive officer of

Enron Corporation to discuss energy policy matters. 14 The Vice President
also received a lobbying group*s appeal to stop treating carbon dioxide as
a pollutant and policy recommendations from a coalition of utilities, coal
producers and railroads calling itself the Coal- Based Generation
Stakeholders. We cannot determine the extent to which any of these
communications with NEPDG Principals affected the content or development
of the final report.

14 David S. Addington, Counsel to the Vice President, to the Honorable
Henry A. Waxman, U. S. House of Representatives (Jan. 3, 2002).

In response to another congressional inquiry, 15 the NEPDG executive
director reported that the Support Group staff held meetings with
individuals involved with companies or industries, including those in the
electricity, telecommunications, coal mining, petroleum, gas, refining,
bioenergy, solar energy, nuclear energy, pipeline, railroad and automobile
manufacturing sectors; environmental, wildlife, and marine advocacy; state
and local utility regulation and energy management; research and teaching

at universities; research and analysis at policy organizations; energy
consumers, including consumption by businesses and individuals; a major
labor union; and about three dozen Members of Congress or their staffs.
However, the NEPDG executive director did not specify the frequency,
length, or purpose of the meetings, or how participants were selected to

attend. In addition, OVP reported that the Support Group staff also met
with numerous nonfederal stakeholders during the development of the final
report, including a meeting with representatives of various utilities and
two meetings with representatives of Enron Corporation. 16

Finally, senior agency officials participated in numerous meetings with
nonfederal energy stakeholders to discuss the national energy policy.
Based on our analysis of the agency documents produced under court

order, senior DOE officials, in addition to attending meetings with the
Secretary of Energy, met with a variety of industry representatives,
lobbyists, and energy associations, including the American Coal Company,
Small Refiners Association, the Coal Council, CSX, Enviropower, Inc.,
Detroit Edison, Duke Energy, the Edison Electric Institute, General
Motors, the National Petroleum Council, and the lobbying firm of Barbour,
Griffith

& Rogers. These senior DOE officials also solicited recommendations,
views, or points of clarification from other parties. For example, one
senior DOE official solicited detailed energy policy recommendations from
a variety of nonfederal energy stakeholders, including the American
Petroleum Institute, the National Petrochemical and Refiners* Association,

the American Council for an Energy- Efficient Economy, and Southern
Company. This official also received policy recommendations from others,
including the American Gas Association, Green Mountain Energy, the
National Mining Association, and the lobbying firms the Dutko Group and 15
Responses of Andrew Lundquist, Executive Director for the National Energy
Policy

Development Group, to questions from the Ranking Minority Members of the
House Committee on Government Reform and the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce (May 4, 2001).

16 Addington to Waxman (Jan. 3, 2002).

the Duberstein Group. Senior EPA officials, in addition to accompanying
the Administrator to meetings with nonfederal energy stakeholders,
discussed issues related to the development of an energy policy at
meetings with the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the American
Public Power Association, and the Yakama Nation Electric Utility. Interior
told us that senior agency officials met with nonfederal parties to
discuss energy policy or other energy- related issues, but provided us
with no further details about these meetings.

In addition to the meetings listed above, the agency documents reveal that
the NEPDG Principals, Support Group, and agency staff received a
considerable amount of unsolicited advice, criticisms, meeting requests,
and/ or recommendations from other parties, including private citizens;

university professors; local, state, and international officials; regional
energy stakeholders; and a variety of interest groups representing
energyrelated causes. Again, because of the limited information available
to us, we cannot determine the extent to which these communications
affected the content or development of the final report.

The National Energy Policy

The National Energy Policy report was developed in two distinct phases,
Report Was Developed in

in accordance with the general criteria defined in the President*s January
Two Distinct Phases 29, 2001, memorandum. The first phase involved the
development of an outline; the distribution of research and writing
assignments to participating agencies; and the development of narrative,
topical chapters

that ultimately formed the basis of the final report. The first phase
culminated in a March 19, 2001, presentation to the President on energy
supply disruptions and their regional effects. In the second phase, agency

officials reviewed and finalized draft chapters; consolidated a list of
options and recommendations and discussed them with the Working Group; and
developed short position papers on each of the recommendations that the
Working Group considered to be controversial. These papers served as the
primary basis for discussion at subsequent Principals* meetings. After the
final meeting of the Working Group on April 3, 2001, the Support Group
took the provided materials under consideration and drafted the final
report. Agency officials had a final opportunity to review the partial
draft of the recommendations before the report was finalized, published,
and presented to the President on May 16, 2001, as the National Energy
Policy.

NEPDG Drafted Chapters and In the first week of the administration, the
Vice President worked with the

Prepared an Interim Report in soon- to- be- named NEPDG executive director
to define the process for

the First Phase developing a proposed national energy policy. They decided
that a group of

senior federal officials would generate an interim report that would
detail energy supply problems and a final report that would outline
solutions. The President*s memorandum, released on January 29, 2001,
reflected this work plan.

In early February 2001, the NEPDG executive director distributed a
memorandum at the first Working Group meeting detailing the group*s
mission, reporting requirements, and a proposed structure of seven
targeted interagency workgroups to review specific issue areas. At the
meeting, the Support Group named lead agencies to coordinate the
development of each of the 10 assigned chapters. 17

The Support Group tasked the lead agencies* DOE, DOT, EPA, Treasury, and
the State Department* with developing a report outline for each of their
assigned chapters to be forwarded to the White House for final approval.
The Support Group instructed agencies to write chapters without proposing
improvements, noting that the draft chapters would not be sent to the
President, but would serve as the basis of a more detailed version that
NEPDG would use when drafting the final report. While the drafting of

chapters for the final report continued, the Support Group, Working Group,
and participating agency staff focused much of their collective effort
throughout February on developing sections of an interim report. The

Support Group released the interim report to the Principals for review in
early March 2001, then shifted its attention to the second phase of the
process* finalizing the draft and making recommendations. The interim
briefing, which took place at the White House on March 19, 2001, mostly
consisted of oral presentations on the energy supply and demand situation
and short- term regional energy supply disruptions.

NEPDG Selected Immediately following the March 19, 2001, presentation of
the interim

Recommendations and Finalized report to the President, the Working Group
met to refine the chapters of the

the Report in the Second Phase final report and to discuss potential
recommendations that agencies had

accumulated. The Support Group provided the agencies with a copy of the
Bush- Cheney energy- related initiatives developed during the presidential
campaign, asking them to ensure that they incorporated these initiatives

17 The number of chapters was later reduced from 10 to 8, as several
chapters were consolidated during the writing process.

when developing their respective recommendations. They asked each agency
in the Working Group to prepare an *option paper* that included proposals
for streamlining energy production and steps to implement them.

In March 2001, the Working Group continued to develop chapters and discuss
recommendations, and pared down each agency*s list of potential
recommendations. The Support Group prepared five one- page issue paper
summaries of the recommendations that the Working Group considered to be
controversial* a multi- pollutant strategy, fuel efficiency standards,
energy efficiency, nuclear energy, and the moratoria on Outer Continental
Shelf leasing* to the Principals for further discussion. Shortly before
the

April 3, 2001, Principals* meeting, the Support Group added a last- minute
agenda item to be discussed with the other recommendations. The actual
agenda item, however, had been redacted from the documents that we
reviewed.

In early April 2001, the Support Group stopped accepting comments on the
proposals and began sorting through them, asking agencies to incorporate
what the Support Group deemed to be the less controversial recommendations
into the draft chapters. For the remainder of April 2001, the Support
Group mostly worked alone, selecting recommendations to present to NEPDG
Principals and rewriting the chapters to fit the

recommendations. The Principals met to discuss several of the potentially
more controversial recommendations and to decide which proposals to add to
the chapters. In some cases, agencies were told to rewrite sections of the
chapters to incorporate the proposed recommendations. The agencies
continued to draft their chapters and incorporate various

other agencies* comments until the Support Group issued a deadline and
requested the final submission of chapters for editing. The Support Group
then released the drafts to all of the agencies for a cursory review,

informing agency officials that the drafts were now considered *final* and
that only high priority comments would be accepted.

The Support Group asked agencies to protect their lists of proposed
recommendations, instructing officials to hold all proposals closely and
not to circulate them. The Support Group then sent the draft chapters to
the agencies without any recommendations. On April 30, 2001, the Support
Group invited each agency*s Principal or chief of staff to visit the White
House for an on- site review of the final draft recommendations. The
Support Group continued to make last- minute alterations to the report to
incorporate revised recommendations, called on the agencies to verify

facts and to provide citations, and ushered the final draft through the
editing and printing processes. On May 16, 2001, the Vice President
presented the final National Energy Policy report to the President. The
final report contained over 100 proposals to increase the nation*s energy
supply. The presentation brought the National Energy Policy report
development process to a close.

Federal Agencies Did None of the key federal entities involved in the
NEPDG effort provided us

Not Track the Amount with a complete accounting of the costs they incurred
during the

development of the National Energy Policy report. Several agencies of
Public Money Spent

provided us with rough estimates of their respective NEPDG- related costs;
on NEPDG Activities

but these estimates, all calculated in different ways, were not
comprehensive. The two federal entities responsible for funding the NEPDG
effort* OVP and DOE* did not provide us with the comprehensive cost
information we requested. OVP provided us with 77 pages of information,
two- thirds of which contained no cost information, while the remaining
one- third contained miscellaneous information of little to no usefulness.
In response to our requests seeking clarification on the provided
information, OVP stated that it would not provide any additional
information. DOE, EPA, and Interior provided us with their estimates of
costs associated with the NEPDG effort, which aggregated about $860, 000.
DOE provided us with selected cost information, including salary

estimates, printing and publication costs, and other incidental expenses.
EPA and Interior provided salary cost estimates for some of their senior
officials involved in the report*s development. DOE and Interior officials
reported that although most of the identified costs were salary- oriented,
employees had not specifically recorded the amount of time they had spent
on NEPDG- related tasks because many of them already worked on energy
policy and thus would have likely conducted a substantial portion of the

work, even without the NEPDG project taking place. An Interior official
cautioned us not to expect a precise estimate, noting that the estimate
primarily had been based on employee recollection and guesswork.

DOE and OVP Were In his January 29, 2001, memorandum that established
NEPDG, the

Responsible for Funding President instructed the Vice President to consult
with the Secretary of

NEPDG Activities Energy to determine the need for funding. DOE was to
*make funds

appropriated to the Department of Energy available to pay the costs of
personnel to support the activities of the Energy Policy Development
Group.* The memorandum further stated that if DOE required additional

funds, the Vice President was to submit a proposal to the President to use
*the minimum necessary portion of any appropriation available to the
President to meet the unanticipated need* or obtain assistance from the
National Economic Council staff. 18

OVP Provided Limited Cost In response to our inquiry about the NEPDG*s
receipt, disbursement, and

Information Responsive to use of public funds, OVP provided us with 77
pages of *documents

Our Request Regarding retrieved from the files of the Office of the Vice
President responsive to

that inquiry.* 19 The Vice President later referred to these documents as
NEPDG*s Receipt, *responsive to the Comptroller General*s inquiry
concerning costs Disbursement, and Use of

associated with the Group*s work.* 20 Our analysis of the documents,
Public Funds

however, showed that they responded only partially to our request. The
documents that OVP provided contain little useful information or insight
into the overall costs associated with the National Energy Policy
development. Of the 77 pages that we received, 52 contained no cost
information while the remaining 25 contained some miscellaneous
information of little to no usefulness. For example, OVP provided us with
two pages illustrating a telephone template and four pages containing

indecipherable scribbling, but no discernible cost information. OVP also
provided documents that contained some miscellaneous information,
predominantly reimbursement requests, assorted telephone bills and random
items, such as the executive director*s credit card receipt for pizza. In
response to our requests seeking clarification of the provided
information, OVP stated that it would not provide us with any additional
information. Consequently, we were unable to determine the extent to which
OVP documents reflected costs associated with the report*s development.

DOE Did Not DOE reported spending about $300,000 on NEPDG- related
activities, more

Comprehensively Track than half of which was used for the salaries of its
employees detailed to

Overall NEPDG Costs OVP and two designated DOE staff contacts for the
period from January 29,

18 Pres. Memorandum (Jan. 29, 2001). 19 Letter from David Addington,
Counsel to the Vice President, to Anthony Gamboa, General Counsel, the U.
S. General Accounting Office (June 21, 2001). 20 Letter from the Vice
President to the U. S. House of Representatives (Aug. 2, 2001).

2001, through May 29, 2001. DOE reported spending most of the remaining
funds to print and produce 10,000 policy publications and graphic support,
pay for 16 large briefing boards, and reimburse the NEPDG executive
director for his lodging and per diem expenses. DOE did not provide any

information on the Support Group members* requests for the reimbursement
of taxi, parking, meal, or duplicating expenditures contained in the 77
pages of OVP documents. However, DOE officials noted that the department
did not pay for furniture, telephones, or other

expenses that DOE employees on the Support Group may have incurred setting
up their offices, saying that they assumed that the White House paid these
costs.

EPA Provided Estimates of EPA reported spending an estimated $131,250 in
NEPDG- related costs to Its NEPDG- Related Salary

pay the salaries of the officials most involved in NEPDG activities. EPA
Costs, but Did Not Include

officials calculated this estimate by taking the number of full- time Its
Incidental Expenses

equivalents, the officials* average annual salaries, and prorating the
amount for the 3 1/2 months they spent working on the NEPDG effort. EPA
officials also reported that the agency incurred multiple incidental
expenses in helping to prepare the NEPDG report, such as taxi fares,
duplication costs,

and courier fees, but they neither itemized these expenditures nor
provided us with any further documentation.

Federal Employee Salaries Interior reported spending an estimated $430,000
on salary- related costs

Accounted for All of associated with the NEPDG report development. It also
reported that it did

Interior*s Reported NEPDGRelated not incur any NEPDG- related contracting
costs. The agency official who

Costs provided us with the estimate warned that although it was the best

possible, its precision was uncertain because it had been based on
employees* personal recollections and guesswork as to the amount of time
they spent working on NEPDG- related activities. The official then added
an additional 20 percent to the estimated sum to reflect the employee
benefits

that accrued during the period. Interior did not create a unique job code
or accounting process to track the time that Interior employees spent on
developing the NEPDG report. According to one official, many of the staff

involved with the NEPDG effort already worked on energy policy for their
respective bureaus or offices and thus a substantial portion of the work
would likely have been conducted, even without the NEPDG project taking
place.

Agency Comments We provided DOE, Interior, and EPA with an opportunity to
review and comment on a draft of this report. Representatives from each of
these three

agencies reviewed the report and chose not to provide written comments.
Interior and EPA provided several technical clarifications orally, which
we incorporated, as appropriate, into the final report. We also provided
OVP with an opportunity to review and comment on our draft report, but the
office did not avail itself of the opportunity.

We conducted our review from May 2001 through July 2003. We plan no
further distribution of this report until August 25. On that date, we will
send copies of this report to interested congressional committees. This
report is also available on GAO's home page at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please call me
at (202) 512- 3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix
I. Robert A. Robinson Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment

List of Congressional Requesters

Senate House The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman a The Honorable Henry A.
Waxman Ranking Minority Member Ranking Minority Member Committee on
Governmental Affairs Committee on Government

United States Senate Reform House of Representatives The Honorable Ernest
F. Hollings a The Honorable John D. Dingell Ranking Minority Member
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Commerce, Science, Committee on
Energy and

and Transportation Commerce United States Senate House of Representatives

The Honorable Carl M. Levin a Ranking Minority Member Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Governmental Affairs United
States Senate

The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan a Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Competition, Foreign Commerce, and Infrastructure b Committee on Commerce,
Science,

and Transportation United States Senate

a At the time of their joint request to GAO, the four senators were
chairmen of their respective committees or subcommittees. b This
subcommittee was formerly called the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs,
Foreign Commerce, and Tourism.

Appendi Appendi xes x I

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment GAO Contacts Robert A. Robinson
(202) 512- 3841 Peg Reese (202) 512- 9695 Acknowledgment In addition to
the individuals named above, Doreen Feldman, Lynn Gibson,

Richard Johnson, Bob Lilly, Jonathan S. McMurray, Susan Poling, Susan
Sawtelle, Amy Webbink, and Jim Wells made key contributions to this
report.

(360086)

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Report to Congressional Requesters

August 2003 ENERGY TASK FORCE Process Used to Develop the National Energy
Policy

GAO- 03- 894

Contents Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 The National Energy Policy Report Was the Product of a

Centralized, Top- Down Process 6 Federal Agencies Did Not Track the Amount
of Public Money Spent

on NEPDG Activities 21 Agency Comments 24

Appendix

Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment 26 GAO Contacts 26
Acknowledgment 26

Table Table 1: NEPDG Principals* Meetings from January 29 to May 16, 2001
10 Figure Figure 1: Structure Used in Developing the National Energy
Policy 7

Abbreviations

DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental Protection Agency NEPDG
National Energy Policy Development Group OVP Office of the Vice President

This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

According to the best information that GAO could obtain, the National
Energy Policy report was the product of a centralized, top- down, short-
term, and labor- intensive process that involved the efforts of several
hundred federal employees governmentwide. In the 3  1/2 months between the
inception of NEPDG and its presentation of the final report, the
Principals (the Vice President, selected cabinet- level and other senior
administration officials) and their support staff (Support Group)
controlled most facets of the report*s development, including setting
meeting schedules and agendas, controlling the workflow, distributing work
assignments, rewriting chapters, and approving recommendations. Senior
agency officials served on a select

interagency Working Group, while the majority of agency staff working on
the NEPDG effort played a tributary role, helping their agencies fulfill
their NEPDG- related obligations and responding to the Support Group*s

subsequent requests for information, review, or comment. In developing the
National Energy Policy report, the NEPDG Principals, Support Group, and
participating agency officials and staff met with, solicited input from,
or received information and advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders,
principally petroleum, coal, nuclear, natural gas, and electricity
industry representatives and lobbyists. The extent to which submissions
from any of these stakeholders were solicited, influenced policy
deliberations, or were incorporated into the final report cannot be
determined based on the limited information made available to GAO. NEPDG
met and conducted its work in two distinct phases: the first phase
culminated in a March 19, 2001, briefing to the President on challenges
relating to energy supply and the resulting economic impact; the second

phase ended with the May 16, 2001, presentation of the final report to the
President. The Office of the Vice President*s (OVP) unwillingness to
provide the NEPDG records or other related information precluded GAO from
fully achieving its objectives and substantially limited GAO*s ability to
comprehensively analyze the NEPDG process.

None of the key federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort provided GAO
with a complete accounting of the costs that they incurred during the
development of the National Energy Policy report. The two federal entities
responsible for funding the NEPDG effort* OVP and the Department of Energy
(DOE)* did not provide the comprehensive cost information that GAO
requested. OVP provided GAO with 77 pages of information, two- thirds of
which contained no cost information while the remaining one- third
contained some miscellaneous information of little to no usefulness. OVP
stated that it would not provide any additional information. DOE, the
Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
provided GAO with estimates of certain costs and salaries associated with
the NEPDG effort, but these estimates, all calculated in different ways,
were not comprehensive. On January 29, 2001, the President

established the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG)* a group
of cabinet- level and other senior administration officials, chaired by
the Vice President* to gather information, deliberate, and recommend a
national energy policy. The group presented its final report to the

President in May 2001. GAO was asked to (1) describe the process used by
the NEPDG to develop the

National Energy Policy report, including whom the group met with and what
topics were discussed and (2) determine the costs associated with that
process.

Although appointed NEPDG Chair, the Vice President elected not to respond
to GAO*s request for

certain factual NEPDG information. Accordingly, as authorized by GAO*s
access- torecords statute, and after exhausting efforts to achieve a
resolution and following the

processes specified in that statute, GAO filed suit in U. S. District
Court to obtain the information. The district court later dismissed GAO*s
suit on jurisdictional grounds, without reaching the merits of GAO*s right
to audit and evaluate NEPDG activities or to obtain

access to NEPDG records. For a variety of reasons, GAO decided not to
appeal the district court decision.

DOE, Interior, and EPA reviewed the draft report and chose not to comment.
OVP declined an offer to review the draft and comment.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 894. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Robert A. Robinson at (202) 512- 3841 or robinsonr@
gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 894, a report to

congressional requesters

August 2003

ENERGY TASK FORCE

Process Used to Develop the National Energy Policy

Page i GAO- 03- 894 Energy Task Force

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Appendix I

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Service Requested

Presorted Standard Postage & Fees Paid

GAO Permit No. GI00
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