Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio
System Program (11-AUG-03, GAO-03-879R).
The recent emergence of software-defined radio technology offers
the potential to address key communications shortfalls and
significantly improve military capabilities. The Joint Tactical
Radio System (JTRS) program was initiated in 1997 to develop and
apply this technology and to bring together separate service-led
programs into a joint software-defined radio development effort.
JTRS radios are intended to interoperate with existing radio
systems and provide the war fighter with additional
communications capability to access maps and other visual data,
communicate via voice and video with other units and levels of
command, and obtain information directly from battlefield
sensors. As such, the JTRS program is considered a major
transformational effort for the military and is expected to
enable information superiority, network-centric warfare as well
as modernization efforts, such as the Army's Future Combat
Systems. Although total program costs have yet to be determined,
the Army's effort to acquire and field close to half of the
estimated 250,000 JTRS radios that are needed is expected to cost
$14.4 billion. Congress asked us to review the JTRS program to
determine if there are either management or technical challenges
and risks that could jeopardize a successful program outcome.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-879R
ACCNO: A07957
TITLE: Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical
Radio System Program
DATE: 08/11/2003
SUBJECT: Internal controls
Military radio
Program management
Strategic planning
Program evaluation
DOD Joint Tactical Radio System
******************************************************************
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GAO-03-879R
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program United States General
Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
August 11, 2003 The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
Subject: Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio
System Program The recent emergence of software- defined radio technology
offers the potential
to address key communications shortfalls and significantly improve
military capabilities. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program was
initiated in 1997 to develop and apply this technology and to bring
together separate service- led programs into a joint software- defined
radio development effort. JTRS radios are intended to interoperate with
existing radio systems and provide the war fighter with additional
communications capability to access maps and other visual data,
communicate via voice and video with other units and levels of command,
and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors. As such, the
JTRS program is considered a major transformational effort for the
military and is expected to enable information superiority, network-
centric warfare as well as modernization efforts, such as the Army*s
Future Combat Systems. 1 Although total program costs have yet to be
determined, the Army*s effort to acquire and field close to half of the
estimated 250,000 JTRS radios that are needed is expected to cost $14.4
billion.
You asked us to review the JTRS program to determine if there are either
management or technical challenges and risks that could jeopardize a
successful program outcome. We briefed your staff on May 5, 2003, on the
results of our review. This report summarizes that information and
transmits the briefing itself (see enc. I).
1 The Future Combat Systems program is a major Army transformational
effort, comprised of 18 networked weapon systems that will replace several
current combat systems.
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 2
Challenges Facing the JTRS Program
We found that the JTRS Program has made considerable progress to date in
planning and developing key aspects of the JTRS radios. At a fundamental
level, a Joint Program Office has been established to bring together the
services* individual efforts to develop software- defined radios. The
program office was instrumental in developing a standard software
communications architecture that provides a foundation for building JTRS
radios and evolving an open systems approach to
facilitate technology insertion. The program office has reduced risk by
employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy, whereby improved
communications capabilities will be delivered in increments.
However, the program still faces several managerial and technological
challenges that could affect the Department of Defense*s (DOD*s) ability
to develop and procure JTRS radios successfully. These include managing
requirements and funding, maturing key technologies, integrating system
components, testing, and developing secure communications. The most
significant challenge we identified is the lack of a strong, joint-
management structure.
The current JTRS management structure is made up of a Joint Program
Office, designated service- led program clusters, and other DOD
organizations carrying out several related acquisition activities. 2 The
Joint Program Office is responsible for developing the communications
architecture, radio waveforms, and security components, while the services
are primarily responsible for developing, acquiring, and funding the
actual radios. This structure, while preferable over individual service
efforts, is still fragmented, making it difficult to resolve interservice
differences involving requirements and funding, and hampering the
production of key program
documents, as in the following examples:
It has been difficult to get the services to commit the funding necessary
to execute the JTRS program.
The program management structure has been unable to get the services to
reach agreement over new and changing requirements expeditiously.
Key program documents, such as the Concept of Operations and Migration
Plans, have not effectively provided a joint vision for how JTRS
capabilities will be developed and used.
As a consequence, several program development efforts, such as handheld
radios, have been delayed by more than a year. In the meantime, the Army
has purchased more existing radios with fewer communications capabilities,
which may further delay the delivery of JTRS capabilities to users.
Technology maturity is another significant challenge facing the JTRS
program. Our work on best practices has shown that programs that move to
product development
2 Clusters are radio development efforts that are organized around weapons
platforms, such as ground vehicles and helicopters, as well as fixed- wing
aircraft and maritime systems.
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 3 with immature
technologies have greater difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and
performance requirements than programs that mature technologies before
moving into product development. 3 The initial JTRS radio development, for
helicopters and ground vehicles, was allowed to proceed into the Systems
Development and Demonstration phase with technology readiness levels lower
than those recommended by best practices. Further, technologies that are
critical to several JTRS variants* such as miniaturized components,
batteries, and multimodal antennas* are not sufficiently advanced to meet
requirements and will take several more years to mature. Examples of other
technological challenges include the development of complex software, the
difficulty of integrating radios with host platforms, and a compressed
testing schedule. In addition, developing encrypted capabilities and
secure communications will be difficult because of the complex nature of
the radio.
Recommendations for Executive Action
While significant accomplishments have been realized, management and
technological challenges exist that could impair JTRS*s success. We
recommend the Secretary of Defense take steps to strengthen the joint-
program management
structure to facilitate program funding and requirements outcomes and
assure configuration management of JTRS. In strengthening the structure,
the Secretary should consider (1) establishing centralized program
funding, (2) realigning the Joint Program Office under a different
organizational arrangement, and (3) placing the cluster development
programs under the Joint Program Office control. We also recommend that
the Secretary of Defense take action to ensure the JTRS Program realizes
its full potential by (1) directing the completion of key program
documents detailing the program*s vision; (2) making sure key enabling
technologies, such as networking capabilities, are adequately addressed;
and (3) assessing the impact that the continued purchase of existing
radios may have on JTRS.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments to a draft of this report (see enc. II), DOD concurred
with our findings and both of our recommendations. However, DOD disagreed
with one of the options we suggested for implementing our recommendation
on strengthening the JTRS joint management structure. While DOD supports
consolidation of all research, development, test, and evaluation funding
for JTRS, it believes that procurement and integration funding is best
left in the individual service budgets. We agree that this would be a good
first step, but we also believe funding needs to be closely monitored as
the program progresses towards procurement.
3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Matching of
Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO- 01-
288 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 8, 2001).
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 4
Scope and Methodology
To assess the status of the program, we reviewed relevant DOD and service
program documents and interviewed key officials. In examining the program,
we analyzed technological and management factors that could affect the
program*s success and key program development efforts as well as projected
funding and schedule profiles. We conducted our work from October 2002
through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
- - - - - We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of
Defense; Secretary of the Air Force; Secretary of the Army; Secretary of
the Navy; Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao.
gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this
report, please contact me on (202) 512- 2811 or John Oppenheim at (202)
512- 3111. Principal contributors to this report were Joel Christenson,
Gary Middleton, John Swain, Hai Tran, and Nicole Volchko.
Paul L. Francis Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Enclosures
Enclosure I Enclosure I 5 GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System
Program Joint Tactical Radio System
(JTRS) Program JTRS
Briefing to the House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense May 5, 2003
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 6
2
Focus of Review
* Are there challenges and risks associated with the JTRS program that
could jeopardize a successful outcome?
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 7
3
Briefing Structure
JTRS background Program details Factors affecting program success
Summary observations Options to increase likelihood of JTRS program
success
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 8
4
JTRS Background Introduction
JTRS was born out of a desire to address key shortfalls in tactical
battlefield communications capabilities, and bring separate service- led,
software- defined radio programs together into a joint development effort.
Many legacy radios do not interoperate with one another, are out of
date, and are expensive to maintain. Recent emergence of software-
defined radio technology in
the commercial sector provides DOD with new opportunities to address past
problems and increase communications capabilities.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 9
5 JTRS:
Is a major transformational effort for the military Enables
information superiority, network- centric warfare, and
modernization efforts such as the Future Combat Systems Combines
functions and uses common components,
reducing the unit cost and number of radios needed (250, 000 JTRS radios,
compared to 750,000 legacy radios currently in use)
Increases communications capabilities High data throughput, improved
interoperability, and networking
JTRS Background Intended Impacts
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 10
6 Develop a family of interoperable, digital, modular, softwaredefined
radios that: Provide voice, data, video capabilities as needed
Interoperate with legacy systems (32 legacy waveforms to be developed such
as Link- 16)
Utilize a common, standard software architecture Provide flexibility
to fit radios into a broad range of platforms Supply new wideband
networking capability* Wideband
Networking Waveform (WNW)
JTRS Background Program Objectives
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 11
7
JTRS Background Acquisition Strategy
Employ an evolutionary acquisition approach, fielding capabilities in
blocks and allowing for technology insertion
Develop software communications architecture to provide foundation for
building interoperable radios
Assign development and acquisition responsibilities to different
organizations* the Joint Program Office (JPO) to develop architecture and
manage waveform acquisition, while services manage and acquire radios
Migrate and field radios in a phased approach as new
platforms are produced and as legacy systems are retired
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 12
8
JTRS Background Program Management Structure
Recommends JTRS Clusters
A Lead Service PMO acquires JTRS o Sets based on Cluster requirements
recommended by the Joint Service Working Group, and approved by the DAE
Cluster Radios
PEO
ASD (C3I) General Officer Steering Council
Joint Service Working Group Cluster
PMO SAE SAE
Waveforms, Architecture, Certification
CIO JPO
Endorses JTRS Clusters
Recommends JTRS Clusters
A Lead Service PMO acquires JTRS Radi Radio Sets based on Cluster
requirements recommended by the Joint Service Working Group, and approved
by the DAE
Cluster Radios
PEO
ASD (C3I) General Officer Steering Council
Joint Service Working Group Cluster
PMO SAE SAE SAE
Waveforms, Architecture, Certification
CIO CIO JPO JPO
Endorses JTRS Clusters
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 13
9
JTRS Background Program Management Structure
The JPO, which reports to the Army Acquisition Executive, is responsible
for:
Evolving the open systems architecture, Developing waveform
applications and associated cryptographic
algorithms, Certifying compliance of hardware and software waveforms,
and Ensuring overall joint interoperability.
Radio development and acquisition is conducted through service- led
clusters, based on grouping platforms with similar requirements.
Each cluster to be considered a separate acquisition program; currently
two acquisition programs have ACAT 1D designations (Cluster 1 and JPO/
waveform).
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 14
10
JTRS Background Program Management Structure
A Joint Service Working Group and General Officers Steering Council
monitor, guide, and coordinate development of JTRS and provide forum for
resolving
issues. Additional guidance and planning are facilitated through
Integrated Product Teams. Funding of JTRS (JPO and clusters) is not
centralized but comes from individual service budgets.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 15
11
Program Details
Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy 33
waveforms (21 + WNW contracted to Cluster 1) and
26 Cryptographic algorithms Army
N/ A
JPO
(ACAT ID) Army Air Force Navy Special Operations Special Operations Army
Lead Service
Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Aviation
sets (8 channel) Airborne
Cluster 4
TBD TBD
Embedded
Cluster X
Air Force Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy Air Force, Army, Marine
Corps, and Navy
Air Force and Marine Corps
Other Services
Maritime * fixed station set (4 channel) Manpack set (2 channel) Handheld
set (1 and 2
channel) Aviation set
(4 channel), Ground vehicle radio (3 channel),
21 legacy waveforms, and WNW
Deliver ables
Maritime & fixed station Manpack Handheld Helicopters & ground vehicles
Platform Cluster 3 Cluster 2 Cluster 1
(ACAT ID)
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 16
12
Program Details
2 Q 09 4 Q 08 1 Q 09 N/ A N/ A 3 Q 07 N/ A Full- rate production
TBD Multifunctional information distribution system (I) Digital modular
radio (I) or multifunctional information distribution system (A)
Multiband, multimission
radio (I) Multiband inter/ intra team radio
(I) N/ A N/ A Possible interim radios (I) or alternate
radios (A)
1 Q 07 3 Q 02
4 Q 97 N/ A
$796. 3 million*
JPO
(ACAT ID) 47,270 9,540 7,467 44,175 72,692 138,913 Required number of
radios
TBD 3 Q 02 3 Q 02 TBD TBD 2 Q 01 Program initiation
4 Q 07 4 Q 04 Unknown
Cluster 4
1 Q 07 2 Q 04 Unknown
Cluster X
4 Q 06 4 Q 06 2 Q 06 2 Q 06 Milestone C
1 Q 04 2 Q 04 3 Q 03 (Delayed) 3 Q 02 Milestone B
Unknown Unknown Unknown $14.4 billion* Total acquisition cost
Cluster 3 Cluster 2 Cluster 1
(ACAT ID) * Current estimate, base year FY2002 dollars
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 17
13
Program Details Total = $5, 908. 0 million
0.0 200. 0
400. 0 600. 0
800. 0 1000. 0
1200. 0
Dollars in millions
2002+ 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Fiscal Year IdentifiedJTRSProgramFunding*
JPO Army AirForce Navy MarineCorps Special Operations Other * See slide
number 29 for information supporting this chart.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 18
14
Factors Affecting Program Success JTRS Knowledge Development
JTRS is a large, multi- faceted, and complex program that will take time
to reach its full capabilities. Program success will mean developing,
producing, and
delivering joint tactical radios that are affordable, interoperable, and
offer enhanced communications capability. GAO*s best practices work has
shown that complex weapons programs are more likely to reach a successful
outcome when a high level of knowledge exists about critical facets of the
product being developed at key junctures during its development.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 19
15
Factors Affecting Program Success JTRS Knowledge Development
The knowledge- based process followed by leading commercial firms can be
broken down into three key knowledge points: 1. A match must be made
between user needs and the available resources*
technology, engineering, time, and funding* before system development is
launched. The results achieved from this match are balanced and realistic
requirements, sufficient investment to complete the development, and a
firm commitment to deliver the product. 2. A product*s design must
demonstrate its ability to meet performance requirements and be stable
about midway through development. 3. The developer must show the product
can be manufactured within cost,
schedule, and quality targets and demonstrate it is reliable before
production begins. To date, the JTRS program has made considerable
progress in
acquiring knowledge on several key aspects of product development, but it
also faces numerous technical and management challenges that could affect
a successful outcome.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 20
16
Factors Affecting Program Success Positive Developments
DOD recognizes the need for a transformational, joint, interoperable
radio solution to enable network centric operations.
The evolutionary acquisition strategy for developing and delivering JTRS
radios can provide improved capabilities at reduced risk.
As technology advances, enhanced capabilities should be able to be added
because of the open systems architecture. DOD envisions upgrades being
delivered through new software, much like
desktop personal computers. Development of a software communications
architecture provides a
foundation for building compatible radios and may become the standard for
software programmable radios.
Architecture has received strong support from commercial sector and is
currently going through certification process by the Object Management
Group.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 21
17 Demonstrated JTRS concept
Recent test conducted of small network of prototype JTRS radios in a
field environment exercise
Established Integrated Product Teams and Joint Services Working Group to
facilitate coordination and knowledge sharing
Clusters have also established ad hoc communications arrangements to
augment formal channels
Cluster 1 program office has recognized product development risks and
defined risk management processes DOD has emphasized competitiveness in
contract awards to address affordability
Cluster 1 prime contractor is responsible for qualifying two
subcontractors to develop and build Cluster 1 JTRS radios
Factors Affecting Program Success Positive Developments
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 22
18
Factors Affecting Program Success Management Challenges
Managing requirements: Ensuring the services jointly identify and
coordinate requirements of JTRS has been problematic since the program
began. Joint program management process has been unable to effectively
resolve some interservice differences.
ORD has gone through several iterations since the program began
Disagreement exists between Army and OSD over new and changing
requirements for Cluster 2 and proposed Cluster X radios. As a
consequence, initiation of Cluster 2 development has been delayed more
than a year.
Other differences in meeting requirements have recently surfaced and
have slowed progress of Clusters 3 and 4 (e. g., how to fold the
Multifunctional Information Distribution System program into JTRS).
Further requirements changes (e. g., bringing other information data
systems
like the Joint Tactical Terminal into the JTRS program) may hinder JTRS
progress. Army, as the service acquisition executive, has greater clout
over requirements determination than other services.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 23
19
Factors Affecting Program Success Management Challenges
Concept of Operations: Should provide vision for how JTRS capabilities
will be used in an operational environment and should guide key aspects of
the program such as requirements definition and fielding strategies.
JTRS Concept of Operations has not sufficiently provided this
perspective.
According to program officials, Concept of Operations does not reflect
the joint vision of JTRS but instead reflects service- centric, radio-
replacement perspective.
Services are currently revising Concept of Operations, to be issued
later this year
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 24
20
Factors Affecting Program Success Management Challenges
Funding: Ensuring service funding commitments to cluster radio
development efforts and articulating overall JTRS program costs has been
difficult.
Services have been slow to commit funding to the program, although
situation has gotten better over time. However, services (except for
some limited Army funding) have not committed
funding to Cluster 2 development. Restriction on Special Operations
Command funds further hampers program. Acquisition costs still undefined
for major components of the program. JPO must rely on funding by the
Army for its activities and has been unable to meet staffing goals.
Migration planning: Creating a road map for integrating JTR sets into
the services in the most timely, cost efficient, and productive way has
been difficult.
An Acquisition Decision Memorandum called for a joint migration plan by
October 2001; still no plan has been issued, although the services are
working on one.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 25
21
Factors Affecting Program Success Management Challenges
Schedule: Direction from DOD leadership is trying to accelerate
development schedules to field capabilities and meet anticipated needs.
Cluster 1 schedule is rated medium to high risk by program office, due
to a compressed test and evaluation phase which leaves little room for
error.
Other clusters have taken a significant amount of time to get started.
Waiver process: Balancing immediate service needs to acquire
legacy radios with longer- term service JTRS requirements. DOD- wide
waiver process was created in 1998 to minimize purchases of
legacy radios or development of other radios that are not JTRS compliant.
Since January 2003 alone, more than $75 million approved for purchases
of legacy radios to satisfy immediate requirements.
Army made a significant number purchases of handheld radios via this
process while reducing its requirement for JTRS radios.
Additional funding for legacy radios may increase costs and delay
delivery of JTRS capabilities to users.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 26
22
Factors Affecting Program Success Technology Challenges
Technology readiness: Continued focus needed on maturing and integrating
technologies into JTRS Cluster 1 approved at Milestone B with technology
readiness levels lower than those recommended by best practices.
Additional technological advances will be needed for handheld and embedded
radios such as miniaturization, batteries, and
heat dissipation. Furthermore, advanced antennas that can operate over
different frequencies and transmit and receive with other radios
on- the- move are essential. Antenna development is not a part of JTRS
program, although some research and development efforts are
underway elsewhere in DOD.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 27
23
Factors Affecting Program Success Technology Challenges
Waveforms: Adapting waveforms, developing new WNW, and transitioning
from legacy waveforms to WNW
Waveform development is software intensive Cluster 1 developing 22
waveforms (21 legacy + WNW) WNW development complex (operating
frequency, channel bandwidth
requirements, hardware processing requirements) Software Communications
Architecture: Architecture provides a
core framework for software applications to operate on different JTRS
platforms but alone is not sufficient to ensure interoperability
JTRS program must closely manage cluster development efforts to ensure
similar interpretation of the architecture, and it must evolve the
architecture to meet evolving requirements Clusters 2 and 3 are evolving
existing radios into software communications architecture- compliant as an
interim capability, but will begin distinct
development efforts for the longer term to achieve JTRS capabilities
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 28
24
Factors Affecting Program Success Technology Challenges
Portability: Ensuring waveform and other software capabilities are
available to all JTR sets in *plug and play* format.
Each cluster must adapt *core* waveforms for use in its particular
radios.
Integration: Two key sets of integration issues must be adequately
addressed* integrating hardware and software components into a workable
radio that meets requirements and integrating radio sets into a broad
range of different platforms.
Radio set integration: Cluster 1 technology readiness assessment
highlighted the lack of a hardware and software integrated radio.
Platform integration: Cluster 4 must plan for over 65 distinct aircraft
platforms.
Testing: Testing process required to ensure interoperability among
diverse set of radios.
JPO has established consortium of testing components to coordinate
testing, but aggressive testing schedules planned for some clusters.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 29
25
Factors Affecting Program Success Technology Challenges
Security/ encryption: Developing, integrating, and certifying security
into JTRS sets.
Requires development of new cryptographic algorithms. Must go through
a National Security Agency certification process,
which can be lengthy and is outside control of JTRS program. Networking:
Development and fielding of networks will be
essential to realize full capabilities of JTRS. Services have other
network programs underway (e. g., Army
Warfighter Information Network- Tactical), but it is not clear whether
they are well coordinated and aligned with JTRS.
Spectrum management: Obtaining spectrum certification for JTRS radios
will be challenging because current spectrum approval process has never
addressed the multi- channel, multimode,
multi- frequency nature of software programmable radios.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 30
26
Summary Observations
JTRS is a critical program to the military*s transformational efforts.
The concept of JTRS and what it can provide for the military is very
promising. To date, significant accomplishments have been realized such
as the software communications architecture, open systems approach,
demonstration of prototype radios, risk management processes, and contract
competitiveness.
However, progress (particularly, in starting several of the clusters)
has been hampered by difficulties in reaching a match between user
requirements and resources.
The lack of a strong joint management structure has made it difficult to
resolve funding and requirements issues and produce key documents that
articulate the JTRS vision (Concept of Operations, migration plans).
Success will also depend on key enablers that have not been incorporated
into JTRS development efforts and it is not clear they are being
adequately addressed elsewhere in DOD* development of networking
capabilities and advanced antennas. Furthermore, the services are
spending large amounts of money on legacy radio
purchases which may have significant impacts on JTRS.
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 31
27
Options to Increase Likelihood of JTRS Program Success
Strengthen joint management structure to facilitate program funding and
requirements outcomes and assure configuration management of JTRS. For
example, consider:
Establishing centralized program funding Realigning JPO under
different/ rotating/ independent leadership Putting cluster programs
under JPO control Complete principal documents (Concept of Operations,
migration plans)
and ensure they provide joint vision for the program Ensure that the key
enablers that will be necessary for JTRS to reach its
full capabilities are adequately addressed, such as the Need for
networking capabilities and Need for technology advances (e. g.,
miniaturization, batteries,
antennas) Examine current radio waiver process and assess potential
impact that
continued waiver purchases of legacy radios may have on JTRS
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 32
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Program
Backup Slide
Enclosure I Enclosure I
GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program 33
29
Program Details Identified JTRS Program Funding
Mi lli ons of Dollars FY02 + FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 TOTAL JPO
RDT& E $192.5 $62. 9 $134.7 $91.6 $62.8 $55.9 $28.8 $27.3 $656.5 ARMY RDT&
E 110.9 95. 6 270.8 194.1 122.5 82.6 57 31.4 964. 9 ARMY PROCURE 0 0 1. 9
159.2 165.6 194.4 185.1 189.8 896 AF RDT& E 4 18. 3 54 52.1 112.8 77.9
52.6 37 408. 7 AF PROCURE 0 0 0 6. 8 134.8 486 537.5 567.6 1732.7 AF O &M
0 0 0 0 0 11.5 11.7 11. 835 NAVY RDT& E 8. 8 19. 9 87.9 84.1 57.7 11 9. 7
7.1 286. 2 NAVY PROCURE 0 0 26 40.6 127.2 123.2 112.7 117.4 547. 1 NAVY O&
M 0 2. 6 2. 8 3 3. 1 3. 2 3. 3 3. 4 21. 4 USMC RDT& E 0 0. 6 8. 1 8. 7 4.
1 3. 7 1. 6 1. 6 28. 4 USMC PROCURE 0 0 13.9 33.1 32.5 90.9 80.7 73.2 324.
3 SOCOM 50 0 00 00 05 OTHER 1. 20.6 0 00 00 01. 8
TOTAL $322.4 $200. 5 $600.1 $673.3 $823.1 $1,140.3 $1,080.7 $1,067.6
$5,908. 0
Enclosure II Enclosure II 34 GAO- 03- 879R Joint Tactical Radio System
Program Comments from the Department of Defense (120182)
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