Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
Security Challenges (30-JUN-03, GAO-03-843).
The economic well being of the U.S. is dependent on the
expeditious flow of people and goods through the transportation
system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats
and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to
September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary
responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In
the wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary
responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation.
TSA was recently transferred to the new Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the challenges in
securing the transportation system and the federal role and
actions in transportation security.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-843
ACCNO: A07308
TITLE: Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help
Address Security Challenges
DATE: 06/30/2003
SUBJECT: Emergency preparedness
Internal controls
National preparedness
Strategic planning
Transportation industry
Transportation legislation
Transportation operations
Transportation safety
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GAO-03-843
A
June 30, 2003 Let er t Congressional Requesters
The attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the
nation*s transportation system to the terrorist threat. Terrorist events
around the world have also shown that transportation systems are often
targets of attack* roughly one- third of terrorist attacks worldwide
target transportation systems. 1 While most of the early attention
following the September 11 attacks focused on airport security, emphasis
on the other modes of transportation has since grown as concerns are
voiced about possible vulnerabilities, such as introducing weapons of mass
destruction into this country through ports or launching chemical attacks
on mass transit systems. The entire transportation industry has remained
on a heightened state of alert since the attacks. For example, as of May
2003, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had issued over 15 terrorist
threat advisories to different segments of the transportation industry
since September 11.
As requested, this report examines (1) challenges in securing the nation*s
transportation system; (2) actions transportation operators, 2 as well as
state and local governments, have taken since September 11 to enhance
security; (3) the federal role in securing the transportation system and
actions the federal government has taken to enhance transportation
security since September 11; and (4) future actions that are needed to
further enhance the security of the nation*s transportation system. To
address these objectives, we analyzed the Federal Bureau of
Investigation*s recent threat assessment and the administration*s security
strategies. 3 We also analyzed the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and DOT
security- related documents and reports as well as relevant statutes and
regulations. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOT, the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and TSA as well as
1 Congressional Research Service, Transportation Issues in the 107 th
Congress,
(Washington, D. C.: July 16, 2002). 2 Transportation operators may be
private, public, or quasi- public entities that provide transportation
services. 3 The White House, National Strategy for The Physical Protection
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003; Federal Bureau
of Investigation, The Terrorist Threat to the U. S. Homeland: An FBI
Assessment, January 2003; and The White
House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002.
representatives from numerous transportation industry associations and
transportation security experts. We selected transportation industry and
state and local government associations that represent the different modes
of transportation and levels of government. We selected transportation
security experts based on their knowledge/ expertise and reputation as
being an expert in the transportation security arena. We also consulted
with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying appropriate
transportation security experts. Finally, we reviewed our past reports on
homeland, port, transit, and aviation security and other research on
terrorism and transportation security. (See app. I for a more detailed
discussion of our report*s scope and methodology.)
Results in Brief Transportation stakeholders face numerous challenges in
securing the nation*s transportation system. Some of these challenges are
common to all
modes of transportation while other challenges are specific to aviation,
maritime, or land transportation modes. Common security challenges include
the extensiveness of the transportation system, the interconnectivity of
the system, funding limitations, and the number of stakeholders involved
in transportation security. For example, the transportation system
includes about 3.9 million miles of roads, over 100,000 miles of rail,
almost 600,000 bridges, over 300 ports, 2.2 million miles of pipelines,
500 train stations, and over 5,000 public- use airports. The size of the
system simultaneously provides a substantial number of potential targets
for terrorists and makes it difficult to secure. Additionally, the number
of stakeholders* including over 20 federal entities, state and local
governments, and hundreds of thousands of private businesses* can lead to
coordination, communication, and consensus- building challenges. Further
exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures
confronting transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy
has weakened the transportation industry*s financial condition by
decreasing ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided
additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but
demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available. The
aviation, maritime, and land transportation modes also face particular
challenges in enhancing security. For instance, maritime and land
transportation systems generally have open access designs so that users
can enter the systems at multiple points; however, this openness leaves
them vulnerable because transportation operators cannot monitor or control
who enters or leaves the systems.
Despite these challenges, transportation operators and state and local
governments have implemented numerous actions to enhance security since
September 11. Although security was always a priority, the terrorist
attacks elevated the importance and urgency of security. According to
representatives from a number of industry associations we interviewed,
transportation operators have implemented new security measures or
increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities. For example,
many transportation operators conducted risk or security assessments,
undertook emergency drills, and developed security plans. State and local
governments, which play a critical role in securing the system because
they own a large portion of the transportation system as well as serve as
first
responders to incidents involving transportation assets, have also acted
to improve the security of the transportation system. Some examples of
their actions since September 11 include deploying additional law
enforcement personnel and participating in emergency drills with the
transportation industry.
The roles of federal government agencies in securing the nation*s
transportation system are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had
primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In
the wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility
for the security of all modes of transportation. During TSA*s first year
of existence, TSA*s primary focus was on aviation security. While TSA was
focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations 4 launched
various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and land
transportation modes. For example, the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) launched a multipart security initiative to enhance transit
security,
which included grants for emergency drills, security assessments, and
training. TSA has recently started to assert a greater role in securing
the maritime and land transportation modes and is launching a number of
new security initiatives. For example, TSA is planning to issue security
standards for all modes of transportation, starting this summer. However,
a number of representatives from transportation industry and state and
local government associations that we contacted expressed concerns about
not being adequately involved in TSA*s decision- making, such as the
development of security standards. DOT modal administrations are also
continuing their transportation security efforts. For example, the Federal
4 DOT*s modal administrations are the departmental units responsible for
the different modes of transportation, such as the Federal Railroad
Administration or the Federal Highway Administration.
Highway Administration (FHWA) is coordinating a series of workshops this
year on emergency response and preparedness for state departments of
transportation and other agencies. The roles and responsibilities of TSA
and DOT in transportation security have yet to be clearly delineated,
which creates the potential for duplicating and/ or conflicting efforts as
both entities move forward with their security efforts.
Transportation security experts and representatives from transportation
industry and state and local government associations that we spoke with
identified a number of actions that they said should be implemented to
enhance the security of the nation*s transportation system. In general,
they believe that the transportation system is generally more secure today
than it was prior to September 11; however, all noted that more work is
needed to improve the security of the system. Transportation security
experts and representatives from transportation industry and state and
local government associations identified a number of future actions
needed; and
stated that the identified actions are primarily the responsibility of the
federal government. For instance, representatives from industry and state
and local government associations told us that clarifying federal roles
and coordinating federal efforts is important because their members are
not clear about which agency to contact for their various security
concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues. Some
representatives from the transportation industry and state and local
government associations
also noted that they have received conflicting messages from the different
federal entities.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a memorandum of
agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT
in transportation security matters. We provided draft copies of this
report to Amtrak, DOT, and DHS for their review and comment. Amtrak
generally agreed with our findings and recommendation and provided some
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. DOT
and DHS generally agreed with the report*s findings; however, they
disagreed with the conclusions and recommendation that their roles and
responsibilities in transportation security matters need to be clarified.
We continue to believe our recommendation would help address
transportation security challenges, based on our discussions with
transportation security stakeholders. For example, representatives from
several associations stated that their members were unclear as to which
agency to contact for their various security concerns and which agency has
oversight for certain issues. Furthermore, both entities are moving
forward
with their security efforts, and both entities have statutory
responsibilities for transportation security. Therefore, we continue to
recommend that DOT and DHS clarify and delineate their roles and
responsibilities in security matters and communicate this information to
stakeholders. (See app. II and app. III for DOT and DHS comments and our
responses.)
Background The nation*s transportation system is a vast, interconnected
network of diverse modes. Key modes of transportation include aviation;
highways;
motor carrier (i. e., trucking); motor coach (i. e., intercity bus);
maritime; pipeline; rail (passenger and freight); and transit (e. g.,
buses, subways, ferry boats, and light rail). The transportation modes
work in harmony to facilitate mobility through an extensive network of
infrastructure and operators, as well as through the vehicles and vessels
that permit passengers and freight to move within the system. For example,
the nation*s transportation system moves over 30 million tons of freight
and provides approximately 1.1 billion passenger trips each day. The
diversity and size of the transportation system make it vital to our
economy and national security, including military mobilization and
deployment.
Given the important role the transportation system plays in our economy,
security, and every- day life, the transportation system is considered a
critical infrastructure. The USA PATRIOT Act defines critical
infrastructure as those *systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economy security, national public health or safety, or combination of
those matters.* 5 In the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the administration identifies the
transportation system as one of the 13 critical infrastructure sectors
that must be protected. The administration*s National Strategy for the
Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets defines the
administration*s plan for protecting our critical infrastructures and key
assets, including the transportation system, from terrorist attacks. This
strategy also outlines the guiding principles that will underpin the
nation's efforts to secure the infrastructures vital to national security,
governance, the economy and public confidence. The strategy is designed to
serve as a foundation for building and fostering the necessary cooperation
between
5 P. L. No. 107- 56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
government, private industry and citizens in protecting critical
infrastructures.
Private industry, state and local governments, and the federal government
all have roles and responsibilities in securing the transportation system.
Private industry owns and operates a large share of the transportation
system. For example, almost 2, 000 pipeline companies and 571 railroad
companies own and operate the pipeline and freight railroad systems,
respectively. Additionally, 83 passenger air carriers and 640,000
interstate motor coach and motor carrier companies operate in the United
States. State and local governments also own significant portions of the
highways, transit systems, and airports in the country. For example, state
and local
governments own over 90 percent of the total mileage of highways. State
and local governments also administer and implement regulations for
different sectors of the transportation system and provide protective and
emergency response services through various agencies. Although the federal
government owns a limited share of the transportation system, it issues
regulations, establishes policies, provides funding, and/ or sets
standards for the different modes of transportation. The federal
government uses a variety of policy tools, including grants, loan
guarantees, tax incentives, regulations, and partnerships, to motivate or
mandate state and local governments or the private sector to help address
security concerns.
Prior to September 11, DOT was the primary federal entity involved in
transportation security matters. However, in response to the attacks on
September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary
responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. 6 The
act also gives TSA regulatory authority over all transportation modes.
Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has focused primarily on meeting
the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. With the passage of the
Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, TSA, along with over 20 other
agencies, was transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). 7 6 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
7 P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
Throughout the world, all modes of transportation have been targets of
terrorist attacks. For example, aviation has long been an attractive
target for terrorists. Aircraft hijackings became a regular occurrence in
the 1970s,
leading to the first efforts in aviation security. In 1988, a Pan Am
flight was bombed over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 on board. In
1995, a plot to bomb as many as 11 U. S. airliners was discovered. Most
recently, U. S. aircraft were hijacked on September 11, 2001, and crashed
into the World
Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D. C., and a
field in Pennsylvania, killing about 3,000 people and destroying billions
of dollars* worth of property.
Public surface transportation systems have also been a common target for
terrorist attacks around the world. For example, the first large- scale
terrorist use of a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 on the Tokyo subway
system. In this attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a subway
train, killing 11 people and injuring 5,500. According to the Mineta
Transportation Institute, 8 surface transportation systems were the target
of
more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997 through 2000. The Transportation
The United States maintains the world*s largest and most complex national
System as a Whole
transportation system. Improving the security of such a system is fraught
with challenges for both public and private entities. To provide safe
Faces Numerous
transportation for the nation, these entities must overcome issues common
Challenges
to all modes of transportation as well as issues specific to the
individual modes of transportation.
All Modes of Transportation Although each mode of transportation is
unique, they all face some
Face Common Challenges common challenges in trying to enhance security.
Common challenges
stem from the extensiveness of the transportation system, the
interconnectivity of the system, funding security improvements, and the
number of stakeholders involved in transportation security.
8 Congress, as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991 (ISTEA), established the Mineta Transportation Institute. The
Institute focuses on international surface transportation policy issues as
related to three primary responsibilities: research, education, and
technology transfer.
Size and Diversity of The size of the transportation system makes it
difficult to adequately
Transportation Modes Create secure. The transportation system*s extensive
infrastructure crisscrosses Security Challenges
the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers
and tons of freight each day. (See fig. 1 for maps of the different
transportation modes.) The extensiveness of the infrastructure as well as
the sheer volume of freight and passengers moved through the system
creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists. Furthermore, as
industry representatives and transportation security experts repeatedly
noted, the extensiveness of the infrastructure makes it impossible to
equally protect all assets.
Figure 1: Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of
Transportation Airports
Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
FTA data. Note: This map shows the location of all airports with Federal
Security Directors except for the nine airports in Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, the American Samoa, and the Mariana Islands. Federal
Security Directors are TSA employees who oversee federal security
operations at the nation*s airports. A total of 433 airports are shown in
this map.
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
(Continued) Ports
Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
FTA data. Note: This map shows the location of all U. S. ports for eight
ports located in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. A total of 353 ports
are shown.
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
(Continued) Highways
Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
FTA data. Note: This map shows the National Highway Planning Network. It
does not show all urban and rural roads in the United States.
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
(Continued) Rail
Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
FTA data. Note: This map shows the rail lines of Class I railroads, which
are the largest railroads, as defined by operating revenue. Class I
railroads represent the majority of rail freight activity.
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
(Continued) Transit
Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
FTA data. Note: This map shows the location of all mass transit agencies
that were eligible to receive federal urbanized area formula funding in
2001, except for 13 transit agencies located in Puerto Rico. A total of
589 transit agencies are shown.
Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
(Continued) Pipelines
Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
FTA data. Note: This map shows the location of pipelines that are at least
12 inches in diameter, which accounts for the majority of all pipeline
capacity.
Protecting transportation assets from attack is made more difficult
because of the tremendous variety of transportation operators. Some are
multibillion- dollar enterprises, while others have very limited
facilities and very little traffic. Some are public agencies, such as
state departments of transportation, while some are private businesses.
The type of freight moved through the different modes is similarly varied.
For example, the maritime, motor carrier, and rail operators haul freight
as diverse as dry bulk (grain) and hazardous materials. Additionally, some
transportation operators carry passengers while others haul freight.
Interconnectivity and Additional challenges are created by the
interconnectivity and Interdependency Also Present
interdependency among the transportation modes and between the Challenges
transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The
transportation system is interconnected or intermodal because passengers
and freight can use multiple modes of transportation to reach a
destination. For example, from its point of origin to its destination, a
piece of freight, such as a shipping container, can move from ship to
train to truck. (See fig. 2.) The interconnective nature of the
transportation system creates several security challenges. First, events
directed at one mode of transportation can have ripple effects throughout
the entire system. For example, when
the port workers in California, Oregon, and Washington went on strike in
2002, the railroads saw their intermodal traffic decline by almost 30
percent during the first week of the strike, compared with the year
before. Second, the interconnecting modes can contaminate each other* that
is, if a particular mode experiences a security breach, the breach could
affect other modes. 9 An example of this would be if a shipping container
that held a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a U. S. port where it
was placed on a truck or train. In this case, although the original
security breach occurred
in the port, the rail or trucking industry would be affected as well.
Thus, even if operators within one mode established high levels of
security they could be affected because of the security efforts, or lack
thereof, of the other modes. Third, intermodal facilities where a number
of modes connect and interact* such as ports* are potential targets for
attack because of the
presence of passenger, freight, employees, and equipment at these
facilities. (See fig. 3.)
9 Similarly, there are opportunities for cross contamination within the
same mode. For example, a bag containing an explosive device could be
placed on one airline and then transferred to another airline where it
explodes.
Figure 2: Illustration of Possible Freight Movements within the
Transportation System 1. 7.
Overseas Destination
factory
2. STOP Maritime
6.
Truck
3.
U. S. port
4. 5.
Rail Distribution center
Source: GAO.
Figure 3: Intermodal Activity at a U. S. Port
Interdependencies also exist between transportation and nearly every other
sector of the economy. Consequently, an event that affects the
transportation sector can have serious impacts on other industries. For
example, when the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the rail
industry stated that it restricted the movement of many hazardous
materials, including chlorine, because of a heightened threat of a
terrorist attack. However, within days, many major water treatment
facilities reported that they were running out of chlorine, which they use
to treat drinking water, and would have to shut down operations if
chlorine deliveries were not immediately resumed. Additionally, the
transportation system can be affected by other sectors. For example,
representatives of the motor coach industry told us that the drop in the
tourism industry has negatively affected motor coach profits.
The Number of Stakeholders Securing the transportation system is made more
difficult because of the
Creates Challenges number of stakeholders involved. As illustrated in
figure 4, numerous
entities at the federal, state, and local levels, including over 20
federal entities and thousands of private sector businesses, play a key
role in transportation security. For example, the Departments of Energy,
Transportation, and Homeland Security, state governments, and about 2,000
pipeline operators are all responsible for securing the pipeline system.
The number of stakeholders involved in transportation security can lead to
communication challenges, duplication, and conflicting
guidance. Representatives from several state and local government and
industry associations told us that their members are receiving different
messages from the various federal agencies involved in transportation
security. For instance, one industry representative noted that both TSA
and DOT asked the industry to implement additional security measures when
the nation*s threat condition was elevated to orange at the beginning of
the Iraq War; 10 however, TSA and DOT were not consistent in what they
wanted done* that is, they were asking for different security measures.
Moreover, many representatives commented that the federal government needs
to
better coordinate its security efforts. These representatives noted that
dealing with multiple agencies on the same issues and topics is
frustrating and time consuming for the transportation sector.
10 DHS created the Homeland Security Advisory System. The system has five
threat conditions* ranging from low to severe* representing different
levels of risk for terrorist attacks.
Figure 4: Key Stakeholders in Transportation Security
Coast Bureau of
Guard Citizenship and
Federal Federal Immigration
Local Highway Railroad
Pipeline Services
governments Administration
Administration operators
Federal Aviation Admnistration
Operators of Saint ports
Chemical shippers
DOE Seaway Lawrence State
Development governments
Corporation Federal
Information and Bureau of agencies intelligence Infrastructure
Analysis Customs and
Industry National Highway Railroads
Protection Border
associations Traffic Safety
Protection Administration
Maritime Marine
Military Traffic Administration
vessel Amtrak
Management Federal
operators Command
Emergency Bureau of
Federal Management Investigation
Agency Federal Motor
Tr ansit Transportation Operators of
Carrier Safety operators
Security airports
Federal Administration
Administration Transit
Administration and
Office of the carriers Information
and Research Programs Office of the
Secretary of Air Sharing Analysis Special Secretary of
Transportation workers
Transportation Labor Centers
Administration Homeland
Security unions
Federal State and local Private Other a Source: GAO.
a *Other* includes private, public, or quasi- public entities.
The number of stakeholders also makes it difficult to achieve the needed
cooperation and consensus to move forward with security efforts. As we
have noted in past reports, coordination and consensus- building is
critical to successful implementation of security efforts. 11
Transportation stakeholders can have inconsistent goals or interests,
which can make consensus- building challenging. For example, from a safety
perspective, vehicles that carry hazardous materials should be required to
have placards that identify the contents of a vehicle so that emergency
personnel know how best to respond to an incident. However, from a
security perspective, identifying placards on vehicles that carry
hazardous materials make them a potential target for attack.
Funding Is A Key Challenge According to transportation security experts
and state and local government and industry representatives we contacted,
funding is the most pressing challenge to securing the nation*s
transportation system. While some security improvements are inexpensive,
such as removing trash cans from subway platforms, most require
substantial funding. Additionally, given the large number of assets to
protect, the sum of even relatively less
expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. For example, reinforcing
shipping containers to make them more blast resistant is one way to
improve security, which would cost about $15,000 per container. With
several million shipping containers in use, however, this tactic would
cost billions of dollars if all of them were reinforced. The total cost of
enhancing the security of the entire transportation system is unknown;
however, given the size of the system, it could amount to tens of billions
of dollars. The magnitude of the potential cost is illustrated by several
examples:
The President*s fiscal year 2004 budget request for TSA includes about
$4.5 billion for aviation security. According to TSA, this funding will be
used for security screeners, air marshals, aviation related research and
development, and surveillance detection techniques, among other things.
The total estimated cost of the identified security improvements at
eight mass transit agencies we visited was about $711 million. 12
11 See *Related GAO Products.* 12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Mass
Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
Challenges, GAO- 03- 263 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).
The Coast Guard estimates the cost of implementing the new International
Maritime Organization security code 13 and the security provisions in the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 14 to be approximately $1.5
billion for the first year and $7.4 billion over the succeeding decade.
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO) 15 estimates that enhancing highway and transit security will
cost $2 billion annually in capital costs and $1 billion in operating
costs.
The current economic environment makes this a difficult time for the
private industry or state and local governments to make security
investments. According to industry representatives and experts we
contacted, most of the transportation industry operates on a very thin
profit margin, making it difficult to pay for additional security
measures.
The sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation industry*s
financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. For example,
airlines are in the worst fiscal crisis in their history and several have
filed for bankruptcy. Similarly, the motor coach and motor carrier
industries and Amtrak report decreased revenues because of the slow
economy. In addition, nearly every state and local government are facing a
large budget deficit for fiscal year 2004. For example, the National
Governors
Association estimates that states are facing a total budget shortfall of
$80 billion this upcoming year. Given the tight budget environment, state
and local governments and transportation operators must make difficult
tradeoffs between transportation security investments and other needs,
such as service expansion and equipment upgrades. According to the
National Association of Counties, many local governments are planning to
defer some maintenance of their transportation infrastructure to pay for
some security enhancements.
13 The International Maritime Organization, an United Nations agency
devoted exclusively to maritime matters, adopted international measures
for port and shipping security in December 2002.
14 P. L. No. 107- 295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 15 AASHTO is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan association representing highway and transportation
departments in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
Further exacerbating the problem of funding security improvements is the
additional costs the transportation sector incurs when the federal
government elevates the national threat condition. Industry
representatives stated that operators tighten security, such as increasing
security patrols, when the national threat condition is raised or
intelligence information suggests an increased threat against their mode.
However, these representatives stated that these additional measures drain
resources and are not sustainable. For example, Amtrak estimates that it
spends an additional $500,000 per month for police overtime when the
national threat condition is increased. Transportation industry
representatives also noted that employees are diverted from their regular
duties to implement
additional security measures, such as guarding entranceways, in times of
increased security, which hurts productivity.
The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation
security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional
amounts made available. For example, Congress appropriated a total of $241
million for grants for ports, motor carriers, and Operation Safe Commerce
in 2002. 16 However, as table 1 shows, the grant applications received by
TSA for these security grants totaled $1.8 billion* 7 times more than the
amount available. Due to the costs of security enhancements and the
transportation industries* and state and local governments* tight budget
environments, the federal government is likely to be viewed as a source of
funding for at least some of these enhancements. However, given the
constraints on the federal budget as well as competing claims for federal
assistance, requests for federal funding for transportation security
enhancements will likely continue to exceed available resources.
16 Operation Safe Commerce focuses on using new technology, such as
container seals, to help shippers ensure the integrity of the cargo
included in containers being sent to the United States.
Table 1: Comparison of Transportation Security Grant Requests to Federal
Funding Available, 2002 to 2003
Dollars in millions
Total amount requested Type of grant Amount appropriated in all grant
applications
Port security grants a $93.3 $697 Port security grants b 105 996 Intercity
bus grants b 15 45.6 Operation Safe Commerce
28 97.9 grants b Total $241.3 $1, 836.5
Source: TSA. Note: Both the Department of Defense and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P. L. No. 107- 117) and the Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P. L. No. 107- 206) provided funding for port security
grants.
a P. L. No. 107- 117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002). b P. L. No. 107- 206, 116
Stat. 820 (2002).
Balancing Potential Economic Another challenge is balancing the potential
economic impacts of security
Impacts and Security enhancements with the benefits of such measures.
While there is broad Enhancements Is Also
support for greater security, this task is a difficult one because the
nation Challenging
relies heavily on a free and expeditious flow of goods. Particularly with
*just in time* deliveries, which require a smooth and expeditious flow
through the transportation system, delays or disruptions in the supply
chain could have serious economic impacts. As the Coast Guard
Commandant stated about the flow of goods through ports, *even slowing the
flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant
random selection of imports would be economically intolerable.* 17
Furthermore, security measures may have economic and competitive
ramifications for individual modes of transportation. For instance, if the
federal government imposed a particular security requirement on the rail
industry and not on the motor carrier industry, the rail industry might
incur additional costs and/ or lose customers to the motor carrier
industry. Striking the right balance between increasing security and
protecting 17 Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled
Strategy for a Balanced and
Practical Response (September 2001); and Global Trade: America*s Achilles*
Heel (February 2002) by Admiral James M. Loy and Captain Robert G. Ross,
U. S. Coast Guard.
economic vitality of the national economy and individual modes will remain
an important and difficult task.
Individual Transportation In addition to the overarching challenges that
transportation stakeholders
Modes Also Confront will face in attempting to improve transportation
security, they also face a
Unique Challenges number of challenges specific to the aviation, maritime,
and land
transportation modes. Although aviation security has received a
significant amount of attention and funding since September 11, more work
is needed. In general, transportation security experts believe that the
aviation system is more secure today than it was prior to September 11.
However, aviation experts and TSA officials noted significant
vulnerabilities remain,
including: 18 Perimeter security: Terrorists could launch attacks, such
as launching shoulder- fired missiles, from a location just outside an
airport*s perimeter. Since September 11, airport operators have increased
their patrols of airport perimeter areas, but industry officials state
that they do not have enough resources to completely protect against these
attacks. Air cargo security: Although TSA has focused much effort and
funding
on ensuring that bombs and other threat items are not carried onto planes
by passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in securing the
cargo carried aboard commercial passenger and all- cargo aircraft. For
example, employees of shippers and freight forwarders are not universally
subject to a background check. Theft is also a major problem in air cargo
shipping, signifying that unauthorized personnel may still be gaining
access to air cargo shipments. Air cargo shipments pass through
several hands in going from sender to recipient, making it challenging to
implement a system that provides adequate security for air cargo.
According to TSA officials, TSA is developing a strategic plan to address
air cargo security and has undertaken a comprehensive outreach process to
strengthen security programs across the industry.
18 See *Related GAO Products* at the end of this report for information on
GAO reports that examine aviation security issues.
General aviation security: While TSA has taken several actions related
to general aviation 19 since September 11, this segment of the industry
remains potentially more vulnerable than commercial aviation. For example,
general aviation pilots are not screened prior to taking off and the
contents of a plane are not examined at any point. According to TSA,
solutions that can be implemented relatively easily at the nation*s
commercial airports are not practical at the 19, 000 general aviation
airports. It would be very difficult to prevent a general aviation pilot
who is intent on committing a terrorist attack with his or her aircraft
from doing so. The vulnerability of the system was illustrated in January
2002, when a Florida teenage flight student crashed his single- engine
airplane into a Tampa skyscraper. 20 TSA is working with the appropriate
stakeholders to close potential security gaps and to raise the security
standards across this diverse segment of the aviation industry. Maritime
and land transportation systems have their own unique security
vulnerabilities. For example, maritime and land transportation systems
generally have an open design, meaning the users can access the system at
multiple points. The systems are open by design so that they are
accessible and convenient for users. In contrast, the aviation system is
housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The
openness of the
maritime and land transportation systems can leave them vulnerable because
transportation operators cannot monitor or control who enters or leaves
the systems. However, adding security measures that restrict the flow of
passengers or freight through the systems could have serious consequences
for commerce and the public. Individual maritime and land transportation
modes also have unique
challenges and vulnerabilities. For example, representatives from the
motor carrier industry noted that the high turnover rate (about 40 to 60
percent) of drivers means that motor carrier operators must be continually
conducting background checks on new drivers, which is expensive and time
consuming. Additionally, representatives from the motor coach
industry commented that the number of used motor coaches on the market
coupled with the lack of guidance or requirements on buying or selling
these vehicles is a serious vulnerability. In particular, there are
19 General aviation includes more than 200,000 corporate- and privately-
owned aircraft at over 19, 000 airports. 20 It should be noted that this
event was not a terrorist attack.
approximately 5,000 used motor coaches on the market; however, there is
very little information on who is selling and buying them, nor is there
any consistency among motor coach operators in whether they remove their
logos from the vehicles before they are sold. These vehicles could be used
as a weapon or to transport a weapon. Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration officials told us they have not issued guidance to the
industry on this potential vulnerability because TSA is responsible for
security and therefore would be responsible for issuing such guidance.
Transportation Since September 11, transportation operators and state and
local
Operators and State governments have been working to strengthen security,
according to
associations we contacted. Although security was a priority before and
Local
September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of
Governments Have transportation security for transportation operators and
state and local
Taken Steps to governments. The industry has been consistently operating
at a heightened
state of security since September 11. State and local governments have
also Improve Security
made transportation security investments since September 11.
Transportation Operators
According to representatives from a number of industry associations we
Have Undertaken a Variety
interviewed, 21 transportation operators have implemented new security of
Security- Enhancing measures or increased the frequency or intensity of
existing activities.
Actions Some of the most common measures cited include:
Conducted vulnerability or risk assessments: Many transportation
operators conducted assessments of their systems to identify potential
vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure or assets, and corrective actions
or needed security improvements. For example, the railroad industry
conducted a risk assessment, that identified over 1,300 critical assets
and served as a foundation for the industry*s security plan.
Tightened access control: Many transportation operators have tightened
access control to their facilities and equipment by installing fences and
requiring employees to display identification cards, among
21 Some of the industry associations we contacted include the American Bus
Association, American Gas Association, American Trucking Associations, and
Association of American Railroads. See appendix I for a complete list of
industry associations we contacted.
other things. For example, some motor carrier operators have installed
fences around truck yards and locked inventory at night.
Intensified security presence: Some transportation operators have
increased the number of police or security who patrol their systems. For
example, transit agencies have placed surveillance equipment, alarms, or
security personnel at access points to subway tunnels, bus yards, and
other nonpublic places and required employees to wear brightly colored
vests for increased visibility.
Increased emergency drills: Many transportation operators have increased
the frequency of emergency drills. For example, Amtrak reported that it
has conducted two full- scale emergency drills in New York City and is
currently trying to arrange a drill at Union Station in Washington, D. C.
The purpose of emergency drilling is to test emergency plans, identify
problems, and develop corrective actions. Figure 5 is a photograph from an
annual emergency drill conducted by the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority.
Figure 5: Emergency Drill in Progress
Developed or revised security plans: Transportation operators developed
security plans or reviewed existing plans to determine, what changes, if
any, needed to be made. For example, DOT*s Office of Pipeline Safety
worked with the industry to develop performance
oriented security guidance. The Office of Pipeline Safety also encouraged
all pipeline operators to develop security plans and directed operators
with critical facilities to develop security plans for these
facilities.
Provided additional training: Many transportation operators have either
participated in and/ or conducted additional training on security or
antiterrorism. For example, the United Motorcoach Association is
developing an online security training program for motor coach operators,
using funds from the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program. Similarly, many
transit agencies attended seminars conducted by FTA or
by the American Public Transportation Association. Some transportation
industries have also implemented more innovative security measures,
according to associations we contacted. For example, the natural gas
industry modeled the impact of pipeline outages on the natural gas supply
in the Northeast, which helped to identify vulnerabilities and needed
improvements. The motor carrier industry developed a program called the
Highway Watch Program, supported by the American Trucking Associations. 22
The program is a driver- led, state- organized safety system that since
September 11 has included a security component. Specifically, drivers are
provided terrorism awareness training and are encouraged to report
suspicious activities they witness on the road to a
Highway Watch Program call center, which is operated 24 hours a day, 7
days a week. The call center then directs the call to appropriate
authorities.
State and Local As we have previously reported, state and local
governments are critical Governments Have Also
stakeholders in the nation*s homeland security efforts. 23 This is equally
true Increased Security- Related
in securing the nation*s transportation system. State and local
governments Efforts
play a critical role, in part, because they own a significant portion of
the transportation infrastructure, such as airports, transit systems,
highways, and ports. For example, state and local governments own over 90
percent of the total mileage of the highway system. Even when state and
local governments are not the owners or operators, they nonetheless are
directly affected by the transportation modes that run through their
jurisdictions.
Consequently, the responsibility for protecting this infrastructure and
responding to emergencies involving the transportation infrastructure
often falls to state and local governments.
22 The Highway Watch Program is funded by a $500,000 grant from the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. 23 See *Related GAO Products*
at the end of this report.
Security efforts of local and state governments have included developing
counter terrorist plans, participating in training and security- related
research, participating in transportation operators* emergency drills and
table- top exercises, conducting vulnerability assessments of
transportation assets, and participating in emergency planning sessions
with transportation operators. Some state and local governments have also
hired additional law enforcement personnel to patrol transportation
assets. Much of the funding for these efforts has been covered by the
state and local governments, with a bulk of the expenses going to
personnel costs,
such as additional law enforcement officers and overtime. Congress and
Federal The Congress, DOT, TSA, and other federal agencies, took numerous
steps Agencies Have Taken
to enhance transportation security since September 11. The roles of the
federal agencies in securing the nation*s transportation system, however,
Numerous Actions to
are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had primary responsibility
for Enhance Security, but
the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11,
Roles Remain Unclear
Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the security of all
modes of transportation. However, DOT and TSA have not yet formally
defined their roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of
transportation. Furthermore, TSA is moving forward with plans to enhance
transportation security. For example, TSA plans to issue security
standards for all modes. DOT modal administrations are also continuing
their security efforts for different modes of transportation.
Congress and Federal Congress has acted to enhance the security of the
nation*s transportation
Agencies Have Acted to system since September 11. In addition to passing
the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 24 Congress passed numerous pieces of
Enhance Transportation
legislation aimed at improving transportation security. For example,
Security
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 25 which mandates federal
background checks of individuals operating vehicles carrying hazardous
materials and the Homeland Security Act, 26 which created DHS and moved
TSA to the new department. 27 Congress also provided funding for
transportation security enhancements through various appropriations acts.
24 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 25 P. L. No. 107- 56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001). 26 P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
For example, the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act, in part, provided
(1) $738 million for the installation of explosives detection systems in
commercial service airports, (2) $125 million for port security
activities, and (3) $15 million to enhance the security of intercity bus
operations. (See app. IV for a listing of the key pieces of transportation
security- related legislation that has been passed since September 11.)
Federal agencies, notably TSA and DOT, have also taken steps to enhance
transportation security since September 11. In its first year of
existence, TSA worked to establish its organization and focused primarily
on meeting the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. In January
2002, TSA had 13 employees to tackle securing the nation*s transportation
system* 1 year later, TSA had about 65, 000 employees. TSA reports that it
met over 30 deadlines during 2002 to improve aviation security, including
two of its
most significant deadlines* to deploy federal passenger screeners at
airports across the nation by November 19, 2002, and to screen every piece
of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2002. 28 According to
TSA, other completed TSA activities included the following: recruiting,
hiring, training, and deploying about 56,000 federal screeners.
awarding grants for port security; and implementing performance
management system and strategic planning
activities to create a results- oriented culture. As TSA worked to
establish itself and improve the security of the aviation system, DOT
modal administrations acted to enhance security of air, land,
27 The U. S. Coast Guard was also transferred to DHS. In the Terms of
Reference Regarding the Respective roles of the U. S. Coast Guard and the
Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard is designated as
the lead DHS agency for maritime security and is directed to coordinate as
appropriate with other agencies. The document further notes that a
supporting memorandum of agreement between the Commandant of the Coast
Guard and the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration
is being developed.
28 The Homeland Security Act, P. L. 107- 296 (November 25, 2002) the
legislation that created DHS, amended this deadline to allow some airports
up to an extra year (December 31, 2003) to deploy all of the necessary
explosive detection equipment to enable TSA to screen all checked baggage.
TSA reported that as of December 31, 2002, about 90 percent of all checked
baggage were screened with an explosive detection system or explosives
trace detection equipment and the remaining checked baggage was screened
using alternative means as is allowed under the law.
and maritime transportation. As table 2 shows, the actions taken by DOT
modal administrations varied. For example, FTA launched a multipart
initiative for mass transit agencies, which provided grants for emergency
drills, offered free security training, conducted security assessments at
36
transit agencies, provided technical assistance, and invested in research
and development. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration developed
three courses for motor coach drivers. The response of various DOT modal
agencies to the threat of terrorist attacks on the transportation system
has varied due to differences in authority and resource limitations.
Table 2: Key Actions Taken By DOT Modal Administrations to Secure the
Different Transportation Modes, September 2001 to May 2003
Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions taken
All (transport of Research and Special Established regulations for
shippers and transporters of certain hazardous materials
hazardous Programs Administration
to develop and implement security plans and to require security awareness
training materials) (Office of Hazardous Materials
for hazmat employees. Safety)
Developed hazardous materials transportation security awareness training
for law enforcement, the industry, and the hazmat community. Published
security advisory, which identifies measures that could enhance the
security of the transport of hazardous materials. Investigated the
security risks associated with placarding hazardous materials, including
whether removing placards from certain shipments improve shipment
security, and whether alternative methods for communicating safety hazards
could
be deployed. Aviation Federal Aviation Established rule for
strengthening cockpit doors on commercial aircraft.
Administration Issued guidance to flight school operators for additional
security measures. Assisted Department of Justice in increasing
background check requirements for foreign nationals seeking pilot
certificates. Increased access restrictions at air traffic control
facilities. Developed computer security strategy.
Highways Federal Highway Provided vulnerability assessment and emergency
preparedness workshops. Administration Developed and prioritized list of
highway security research and development
projects. Convened blue ribbon panel on bridge and tunnel
vulnerabilities.
Maritime U. S. Coast Guard a Activated and deployed port security units
to help support local port security patrols in high threat areas.
Boarded and inspected ships to search for threats and confirmed the
identity of
those aboard. Conducted initial assessments of the nation*s ports to
identify vessel types and facilities that pose a high risk of being
involved in a transportation security incident. Established a new
centralized National Vessel Movement Center to track the movement of all
foreign- flagged vessels entering U. S. ports of call.
Established new guidelines for developing security plans and
implementing security measures for passenger vessels and passenger
terminals. Used the pollution and hazardous materials expertise of the
Coast Guards* National Strike Force to prepare for and respond to
bioterrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. Maritime Administration
Increased port security and terrorism emphasis at National Port
Readiness Network Port Readiness Exercises. Provided port security
training and developed standards and curriculum to educate and train
maritime security personnel. Increased access restrictions and
established new security procedures for the Ready Reserve Force.
Provided merchant mariner background checks for Ready Reserve Force and
sealift vessels in support of Department of Defense and Coast Guard
requirements. Provided merchant mariner force protection training.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions taken
Motor carrier Federal Motor Carrier Safety Conducted 31, 000 on- site
security sensitivity visits for hazardous materials carriers;
Administration made recommendations after visits. Initiated a field
operational test to evaluate different safety and security technologies
and procedures, and identify the most cost effective means for protecting
different types of hazardous cargo for security purposes. Provided free
training on trucks and terrorism to law enforcement officials and industry
representatives. Conducted threat assessment of the hazardous materials
industry.
Motor coach Federal Motor Carrier Safety Developed three courses for
drivers on security- related information including,
Administration different threats, how to deal with packages, and how to
respond in the case of an emergency.
Pipeline Research and Special Developed contact list of operators who
own critical systems. Programs Administration
Convened blue ribbon panel with operators, state regulators, and unions
to develop (Office of Pipeline Safety)
a better understanding of the pipeline system and coordinate efforts of
the stakeholders. Worked with TSA to develop inspection protocols to use
for pipeline operator security inspections. The Office of Pipeline Safety
and TSA have begun the
inspection of major operators. Created email network of pipeline
operators and a call- in telephone number that pipeline operators can use
to obtain information. Directed pipeline operators to identify critical
facilities and develop security plans for critical facilities that address
deterrence, preparedness, and rapid response and recovery from attacks.
Worked with industry to develop risk- based security guidance, which is
tied to national threat levels and includes voluntary, recommended
countermeasures.
Rail Federal Railroad Shared threat information with railroads and rail
labor. Administration Reviewed Association of American Railroads* and
Amtrak*s security plans.
Assisted commuter railroads with their security plans. Provided
funding for security assessments of three commuter railroads, which were
included in FTA*s assessment efforts. Reached out to international
community for lessons- learned in rail security.
Transit Federal Transit Administration Awarded $3.4 million in grants to
over 80 transit agencies for emergency response drills. Offered free
security training to transit agencies. Conducted security assessments at
the largest 36 transit agencies. Provided technical assistance to 19,
with a goal of 60, transit agencies on security and emergency plans and
emergency response drills. Increased funding for security research and
development efforts. Source: GAO presentation of information provided by
DOT modal administrations.
a The U. S. Coast Guard was transferred to DHS in the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)).
In addition to TSA and DOT modal administrations, other federal agencies
have also taken actions to improve security. 29 For example, the Bureau of
29 See appendix IV for highlights of final regulations issued since
September 11 that govern transportation security.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), previously known as the U. S. Customs
Service, has played a key role in improving port security. 30 Since
September 11, the agency has launched a number of initiatives to
strengthen the security of the U. S. border, including ports. The
initiatives are part of a multilayered approach, which rely on
partnerships between foreign nations and the U. S. to identify problems at
their source, cooperation from the global trade community to secure the
flow of goods, and collaboration between federal, state, and local law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to ensure that information is
analyzed and used to
target scarce resources on the highest risk issues. Some of the specific
initiatives that CBP has implemented to interdict high risk cargo before
it reaches the U. S. include the following:
Developing and deploying of a strategy for the detection of nuclear and
radiological weapons and materials. The elements of this strategy*
equipment, training, and intelligence* are focused on providing inspectors
with the tools to detect weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers
and vehicles. In the maritime environment, this includes the deployment of
radiation portal monitors, personal radiation detectors,
large- scale nonintrusive inspection technology, such as truck and
container x- rays and mobile x- ray vans. Much of the development of this
equipment has been done in partnership with the Department of Energy.
Figure 6 shows new mobile gamma ray imaging devices at ports to help
inspectors examine the contents of cargo containers and vehicles. 30 The
U. S. Customs Service was transferred from the Department of Treasury to
DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat.
2135 (2002)) and renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
Figure 6: Photograph of Inspection Equipment in Use
Establishing the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT),
which is a joint government business initiative aimed at securing the
supply chain of global trade against terrorist exploitation. According to
CBP, this initiative has leveraged the cooperation of the owners of the
global supply chain by working with this community to implement and share
standard security best practices. The members of C- TPAT include importing
businesses, freight forwarders, carriers, and U. S. port
authorities and terminal operators. According to CBP, C- TPAT members
bring 96 percent of all containers coming into the U. S. After the initial
application and training phase of this program, CBP conducts foreign and
domestic validations to verify that the supply chain security
measures contained in C- TPAT participants* security profiles are
reliable, accurate, and effective. C- TPAT members are strongly encouraged
to self- police such areas as personnel screening, physical security
procedures and personnel, and the security of service providers.
Launching the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which is designed
specifically to secure the ocean- going sea container. The key elements of
CSI include using advance information to identify high- risk containers;
inspecting containers identified through the prescreening process as high-
risk before they are shipped to the U. S.; using detection
technology to quickly inspect containers identified as high- risk; and
developing and using smarter, more secure containers. According to CBP,
the U. S. has signed agreements with 18 of the countries with the world*s
largest seaports, which allows for the deployment of U. S. inspectors and
equipment to these foreign seaports, and is beginning the expansion of CSI
to other global ports with significant volume or strategic locations.
TSA Moves Forward as Its TSA is moving forward with efforts to secure the
entire transportation
Role in Transportation system. TSA has adopted a systems approach* that
is, a holistic rather
Security Evolves than a modal approach* to securing the transportation
approach. In
addition, TSA is using risk management principles to guide its
decisionmaking. To help TSA make risk- based decisions, TSA is developing
standardized criticality, threat, and vulnerability assessment tools. TSA
is also planning to establish security standards for all modes of
transportation and is launching a number of new security efforts for the
maritime and land
transportation modes. TSA Adopts a Systems Approach
TSA is taking a systems approach to securing the transportation system. to
Securing All Modes of
Using this approach, TSA plans to address the security of the entire
Transportation transportation system as a whole, rather than focusing on
individual modes of transportation. According to TSA officials, using a
systems approach to security is appropriate for several reasons. First,
the transportation system is intermodal, interdependent, and
international. Given the intermodalism of the system, incidents in one
mode of transportation could affect other modes. Second, it is important
not to drive terrorism from one mode of
transportation to another mode because of perceived lesser security* that
is, make a mode of transportation a more attractive target because another
mode is *hardened* with additional security measures. Third, it is
important that security measures for one mode of transportation are not
overly stringent or too economically challenging compared with others.
Fourth, it is important that the attention on one aspect of transportation
security (e. g., cargo, infrastructure, or passengers) does not leave the
other aspects vulnerable.
The systems approach is reflected in the organizational structure of TSA*s
Office of Maritime and Land Security, which is responsible for the
security of the maritime and land modes of transportation. Rather than
organize around the different modes of transportation, such as DOT*s modal
administrations, the office is organized around cross- modal issues. As
figure 7 shows, the Office of Maritime and Land Security has six
divisions, including Cargo Security and Passenger Security. The director
of each division will be responsible for a specific aspect of security of
multiple modes. For example, the Director of Cargo Security will be
responsible for cargo security for all surface modes of transportation.
Figure 7: Organizational Chart of TSA*s Office of Maritime and Land
Security, June 2003
Note: See appendix V to view the organizational chart for TSA and where
the Office of Maritime and Land Security is located within the
organization.
TSA Applies Risk Management TSA has adopted a risk management approach for
its efforts to enhance the
Principles security of the nation*s transportation system. A risk
management
approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and
the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key
decisions in order to link resources with prioritized efforts. Table 3
describes this approach. As figure 8 illustrates, the highest priorities
emerge where the three elements of risk management overlap. For example,
transportation infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset,
vulnerable to attack,
and a likely target would be at most risk and therefore would be a higher
priority for funding compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable
to attack. According to TSA officials, risk management principles will
drive all decisions* from standard setting to funding priorities to
staffing.
Table 3: Elements of a Risk Management Approach
A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
This assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential
threats before they materialize. However, even if updated often, a threat
assessment might not adequately capture some emerging
threats. The risk management approach, therefore, uses vulnerability and
criticality assessments as additional input to the decision- making
process.
A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited by
identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses.
A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in
terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and
the economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which
structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from
attack. As such, it helps managers to determine operational requirements
and target resources to the highest priorities while reducing the
potential for targeting resources to lower priorities.
Source: GAO.
Figure 8: Illustration of How Risk Management Approach Can Guide
DecisionMaking
Using risk management principles to guide decision- making is a good
strategy, given the difficult trade- offs TSA will likely have to make as
it moves forward with its security efforts. We have advocated using a risk
management approach to guide federal programs and responses to better
prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite
national resources to areas of highest priority. As representatives from
local government and industry associations and transportation security
experts repeatedly noted, the size of the transportation system precludes
all assets from being equally protected; moreover, the risks vary by
transportation assets within modes and by modes. In addition, requests for
funding for transportation security enhancements will likely exceed
available resources. Risk management principles can help TSA determine
security priorities and identify appropriate solutions.
Other transportation stakeholders are also using risk management
principles. For example, the rail industry conducted a comprehensive risk
analysis of its infrastructure, which included an assessment of threats,
vulnerabilities, and criticality. The results of the risk analysis formed
the basis for the rail industry*s security management plan, which
identified countermeasures for the different threat levels. Similarly, the
pipeline industry is using a risk management approach in securing its
infrastructure. The Office of Pipeline Safety and industry associations
noted that the pipeline industry had adopted a risk management approach
for safety prior to September 11. As a result, the industry extended this
approach to its security efforts after September 11.
TSA Is Developing Standard Assessment Tools to Help Make RiskBased
Decisions
To help TSA make risk based decisions, TSA*s Office of Threat Assessment
and Risk Management is developing two assessment tools that will help
assess threats, criticality, and vulnerabilities. The first tool will
assess the criticality of a transportation asset or facility. TSA is
working with DHS* Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
(IAIP) Directorate to ensure that TSA*s criticality tool will be
consistent with the IAIP*s approach for managing critical infrastructure.
TSA*s criticality tool will incorporate multiple factors, such as
fatalities, economic importance, and sociopolitical importance, to arrive
at a criticality score. The score will enable TSA, in conjunction with
transportation stakeholders, to rank assets and facilities within each
mode. According to TSA, by identifying and prioritizing assets and
facilities, TSA can focus resources on that which is deemed most
important. The second tool is referred to as the Transportation Risk
Assessment and
Vulnerability Evaluation Tool (TRAVEL). This tool will assess threats and
analyze vulnerabilities for all transportation modes. According to TSA
officials, TSA has worked with a number of organizations in developing
TRAVEL, including the Department of Defense, Sandia National Laboratories,
and AASHTO. TSA is also working with economists on developing the benefit/
cost component of this model. TSA officials believe that a standard threat
and vulnerability assessment tool is needed so that TSA can identify and
compare threats and vulnerabilities across the modes. If different
methodologies are used in assessing the threats and vulnerabilities,
comparisons can be problematic. A standard assessment tool would ensure
consistent methodology. Using TRAVEL, TSA plans to
gather comparable threat and vulnerability information across all modes of
transportation, which would inform TSA*s risk- based decision- making.
TSA Plans to Issue National TSA plans to issue national security standards
for all modes of Security Standards
transportation. The federal government has historically set security
standards for the aviation sector. For instance, prior to the passage of
ATSA, FAA set security standards that the airlines were required to follow
in several areas including screening equipment, screener qualifications,
and access control systems. In contrast, prior to the September 11
attacks, limited statutory authority existed to require measures to ensure
the security of the maritime and land transportation systems. According to
a TSA report, the existing regulatory framework leaves the maritime and
land transportation systems unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack.
For example, the rail, transit, and motor coach transportation systems are
subject to no mandatory security requirements, resulting in little or no
screening of passengers, baggage, or crew. Additionally, seaborne
passenger vessel and seaport terminal operators have inconsistent levels
and methods of screening, and are largely free to set their own rules
about the hiring and training of security personnel. Hence, TSA will set
standards to ensure consistency among modes and across the transportation
system and to reduce the transportation system*s vulnerability to attacks.
TSA
plans to begin rolling out the standards starting summer 2003. 31
According to TSA officials and documents, TSA*s standards will be
performance-, risk-, and threat- based, and mandatory. More specifically:
Standards will be performance- based. Rather than prescriptive
standards, TSA standards will be performance- based, which will allow
transportation operators to determine how best to achieve the desired
level of security. TSA officials believe that performance- based standards
31 The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
within DHS is working with TSA, Coast Guard, and other federal agencies on
developing a set of national standards that would apply to all ports.
These efforts are well under way. The Coast Guard has been developing a
set of standards since May 2002 as part of its efforts to conduct
vulnerability assessments for all U. S. Ports. The standards will go into
effect on July 1, 2004, as part of the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments and the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) that was adopted by the International
Maritime Organization conference in December 2002. The Coast Guard
considers that the implementation of these standards is best done through
mandating compliance with the SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code.
According to TSA, because of Coast Guard's significant role in securing
maritime transportation, TSA will likely play a coordination role in the
maritime arena.
provide for operator flexibility, allow for operators to use their
professional judgment in enhancing security, and encourage technology
advancement.
Standards will be risk- based. Standards will be set for areas for which
assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that
an attack would have a national impact. A number of factors could be
considered in determining *national impact,* such as fatalities and
economic damage.
Standards will be threat- based. The standards will be tied to the
national threat condition and/ or local threats. As the threat condition
escalates, the standards will require transportation operators to
implement additional countermeasures.
Standards may be mandatory. The standards will be mandatory when the
risk level is too high or unacceptable. TSA officials stated that in these
cases, mandatory standards are needed to ensure accountability. In
addition, according to TSA officials, voluntary requirements put
security- conscious transportation operators that implement security
measures at a competitive disadvantage* that is, they have spent money
that their competitors may have not spent. This creates a disincentive for
transportation operators to implement voluntary requirements. TSA
officials believe that mandatory standards will reduce this problem. In
determining whether mandatory standards are needed, TSA will review the
results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best
practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with the
private sector and other government agencies.
Although TSA officials expect some level of resistance to the standards by
the transportation industry, they believe that their approach of using
risk-, threat-, and performance- based standards will increase the
acceptance of
the standards. For example, performance- based standards allow for more
operator flexibility in implementing the standards, compared with rigid,
prescriptive standards. Moreover, TSA plans to issue only a limited number
of standards* that is, standards will be issued only when assessments of
the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that the level of
risk is too high or unacceptable.
TSA also expects some level of resistance to the standards from DOT modal
administrations. Although TSA will establish the security standards, TSA
expects that they will be administered and implemented by existing
agencies and organizations. DOT modal administrations may be reluctant to
assume this role because it could alter their relationships with the
industry. Historically, DOT surface transportation modal administrations*
missions have largely focused on maintaining operations and improving
service and safety, not regulating security. Moreover, the authority to
regulate security varies by DOT modal administration. For example, FTA has
limited authority to regulate and oversee security at transit agencies. In
contrast, FRA has regulatory authority for rail security, and DOT*s Office
of Pipeline Safety has responsibility for writing safety and security
regulations on liquefied natural gas storage facilities. In addition, DOT
modal administrations may be reluctant to administer and implement
standards because of resource concerns. FHWA officials commented that,
given the current uncertainty about the standards and their impacts, FHWA
is reluctant to commit, in advance, to staff or funding to enforce new
security
standards. Because transportation stakeholders will be involved in
administering, implementing, and/ or enforcing TSA standards, stakeholder
buy- in is critical to the success of this initiative. Compromise and
consensus on the part of stakeholders is also necessary. However,
achieving such consensus and compromise may be difficult, given the
conflicts between some stakeholders* goals and interests.
Stakeholders Are Concerned About Pending Standards
Transportation stakeholders expressed concerns about TSA*s plan to issue
mandatory security standards for all modes of transportation. A common
concern raised by associations was that standards represent unfunded
mandates, unless the federal government pays for the standards that it
promulgates. According to the industry and state and local government
associations we spoke to, unfunded mandates create additional financial
burdens for transportation operators, who are already experiencing
financial difficulties. TSA officials said they hope to provide grants to
implement the standards; however, it is unclear at this time if grants
will be available. Another common concern expressed by transportation
security experts
and industry associations is that TSA does not have the necessary
expertise or knowledge to develop appropriate security standards for the
industry. In a 2003 report to Congress, TSA recognizes that each
transportation mode has unique characteristics that make various security
measures more or
less feasible or appropriate. 32 However, a number of industry
associations, transportation security experts, and DOT modal
administrations expressed concern that TSA does not have a good
understanding of the unique challenges of the modes, such as the need to
maintain accessibility in transit systems, or the possible negative
ramifications* both operationally and financially* of standards. Officials
from one DOT modal administration noted that industry representatives left
a meeting with TSA officials with serious concerns regarding TSA
officials* understanding of their industry. Senior TSA officials stated
that TSA employees have extensive subject matter expertise in
transportation and security issues. Moreover, TSA officials stated that
they will draw on the expertise and knowledge of the transportation
industry and other DHS agencies, such as the Coast Guard, as well as all
stakeholders in developing the standards.
A number of representatives from industry associations also expressed
concerns that TSA may issue mandatory or regulatory standards, especially
since their industries have taken proactive steps to enhance security
since September 11. Industry associations also noted that the majority of
transportation infrastructure in some modes is privately owned. As such,
transportation operators have an economic incentive to ensure the security
of their infrastructure; hence, operators are voluntarily implementing
increased security measures. For example, the pipeline industry worked
with DOT*s Office of Pipeline Safety to develop industry- wide security
guidelines. These guidelines are risk- based and identify countermeasures
that pipeline operators should implement at different threat levels. The
pipeline guidelines are also voluntary. According to pipeline industry
associations, the pipeline industry is implementing these security
guidelines. Representatives from industry associations stated that TSA
should wait to see if industry- developed, voluntary measures are working
before issuing mandatory standards. TSA officials noted that TSA will
review the results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current
best
practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with the
private sector and other government agencies before issuing mandatory
standards.
Finally, industry representatives expressed concern that TSA has not
adequately included the transportation industry in its development of
standards. Many industry representatives and some DOT officials we met
32 Transportation Security Administration, Report to Congress on
Transportation Security, (March 31, 2003).
with were unsure of whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards
would entail, or the time frames for issuing the standards. The
uncertainty about the pending standards can lead to confusion and/ or
inaction. For example, Amtrak officials noted that they are reluctant to
spend money to implement certain security measures because they are
worried that TSA will subsequently issue standards that will require
Amtrak to redo its efforts. TSA officials repeatedly told us they
understand the importance of gaining stakeholder buy- in and partnering
with the industry. They also stated that they have conducted outreach to
transportation stakeholders and plan to continue their outreach efforts in
the future. TSA is developing a strategy that will serve as its framework
for communicating with transportation stakeholders and obtaining
stakeholders* input in TSA*s decision- making. TSA plans to finalize this
strategy in July 2003.
TSA Is Launching Other Security TSA is also working on a number of
additional security efforts, such as
Initiatives establishing the Transportation Workers Identification Card
(TWIC)
program, developing the next generation of the Computer Assisted Passenger
Pre- Screening System, developing a national transportation system
security plan, and exploring methods to integrate operations and security,
among other things. The TWIC program is intended to improve access control
for the 12 million transportation workers that require unescorted physical
or cyber access to secure areas of the nation*s transportation modes by
establishing a uniform, nationwide standard for secure identification of
transportation workers. Specifically, TWIC will combine standard
background checks and biometrics so that a worker can be positively
matched to his/ her credential. Once the program is fully operational, the
TWIC would be the standard credential for transportation workers and would
be accepted by all modes of transportation. According to TSA, developing a
uniform, nationwide standard for identification will minimize redundant
credentialing and background checks. DOT Modal Agencies Are
As TSA moves forward with new security initiatives, DOT modal Continuing
Forward with
administrations are also continuing their security efforts and, in some
Their Security Efforts
cases, launching new security initiatives. For example, FHWA is
coordinating a series of workshops this year on emergency response and
preparedness for state departments of transportation and other agencies.
FTA also has a number of current initiatives under way in the areas of
public awareness, research, training, technical assistance, and
intelligence sharing. For example, FTA developed a list of the top 20
security actions transit agencies should implement and is currently
working with transit
agencies to assist them in implementing these measures. FTA*s goal is to
have the largest 30 agencies implement at least 80 percent of these
measures by the end of fiscal year 2003.
FAA is also continuing its efforts to enhance cyber security in the
aviation system. Although the primary responsibility for securing the
aviation system was transferred to TSA, FAA remains responsible for
protecting the nation*s air traffic control system* both the physical
security of its air traffic control facilities and the computer systems.
The air traffic control system*s computers help the nation*s air traffic
controllers safely direct and separate traffic* sabotaging this system
could have disastrous consequences. FAA is moving forward with efforts to
increase the physical security of its air traffic control facilities and
ensure that contractors who have access to the air traffic control system
undergo background checks.
TSA*s and DOT*s Roles and The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in
transportation security
Responsibilities Have Not have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates
the potential for
Been Clearly Defined duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities
move forward with their
security efforts. DOT modal administrations were primarily responsible for
the security of the transportation system prior to September 11. In
November 2001, Congress passed ATSA, which created TSA and gave it
primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation. 33
However, during TSA*s first year of existence, TSA*s main focus was on
aviation security* more specifically, on meeting ATSA deadlines. While TSA
was primarily focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations
launched various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and
land transportation modes. With the immediate crisis of meeting many
aviation security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to focus more on
the security of all modes of transportation. Legislation has not defined
TSA*s role and responsibilities in securing all
modes of transportation. In particular, ATSA does not specify TSA*s role
and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation
modes in detail as it does for aviation security. For instance, the act
does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain transit security
requirements. Instead, the act simply states that TSA is responsible for
ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act also did not
33 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
eliminate DOT modal administrations* existing statutory responsibilities
for securing the different transportation modes. Moreover, recent
legislation indicates that DOT still has security responsibilities. In
particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of
Transportation is responsible for the security as well as the safety of
rail
and the transport of hazardous materials by all modes. To clarify their
roles and responsibilities in transportation security, DOT modal
administrations and TSA were planning to develop memorandums of agreement.
The purpose of these documents was to define the roles and
responsibilities of the different agencies as they relate to
transportation
security and address a variety of issues, including separating safety and
security activities, interfacing with the transportation industry, and
establishing funding priorities. TSA and the DOT modal administrations
worked for months to develop the memorandums of agreement. The draft
agreements were presented to senior DOT and TSA management for review in
early spring of this year. According to DOT*s General Counsel, with the
exception of the memorandum of agreement between FAA and TSA, the draft
memorandums were very generic and did not provide much clarification.
Consequently, DOT and TSA decided not to execute or sign the memorandums
of agreement, except for the memorandum of agreement between FAA and TSA,
which was signed on February 28,
2003. 34 The General Counsel suggested several reasons why the majority of
draft memorandums of agreement were too general. First, as TSA*s departure
date approached* that is, the date that TSA transferred from DOT to DHS,
TSA and DOT modal administration officials may have grown concerned about
formally binding the organizations to specific roles and responsibilities.
Second, the working relationships between TSA and most
of the DOT modal administrations is still very new; as a result, all of
the potential issues, problem areas, or overlap have yet to be identified.
Thus, identifying items to include in the memorandums of agreement was
more difficult.
Rather than execute memorandums of agreement, the Secretary of
Transportation and the Administrator of TSA exchanged correspondence
34 DOT and TSA have signed other memorandums of agreement that are narrow
in scope and address a specific issue. For example, TSA and DOT signed a
memorandum of agreement regarding the processing of civil rights
complaints.
that commits each entity to continued coordination and collaboration on
security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and Administrator
also agreed to use the memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA as a
framework for their interactions on security matters for all other modes.
TSA and DOT officials stated that they believe memorandums of agreement
are a good strategy for delineating roles and responsibilities and they
would be open to using memorandums of agreement in the future.
Experts and Transportation security experts and representatives of state
and local
Associations Identified government and industry associations we contacted
generally believe that
the transportation system is more secure today than it was prior to Future
Actions to
September 11. Transportation stakeholders have worked hard to Advance the
Security
strengthen the security of the system. Nevertheless, transportation
experts, of the Transportation industry representatives, and federal
officials all recommend that more work be done. Transportation experts and
state and local government and
System industry representatives identified a number of actions that, in
their view,
should be implemented to enhance security, including clarifying federal
roles and coordinating federal efforts, developing a transportation
security strategy, funding security enhancements, investing in research
and development, and providing better intelligence information and related
guidance. The experts and representatives generally believe that these
actions are the responsibility of the federal government.
Clear federal roles and responsibilities is a core issue in transportation
security, according to transportation experts and associations that we
contacted. The lack of clarity about the roles and responsibilities of
federal actors in transportation security creates the potential for
confusion,
duplication, and conflicts. Understanding roles, responsibilities, and
whom to call is crucial in an emergency. However, representatives from
several associations stated that their members were unclear of which
agency to contact for their various security concerns and which agency has
oversight for certain issues. Furthermore, they do not have contacts
within these agencies. As mentioned earlier, several industry
representatives reported that their members are receiving different
messages from various federal agencies involved in transportation
security, which creates confusion and frustration among the industry. They
said the uncertainty about federal roles and the lack of coordination is
straining intergovernmental relationships, draining resources, and raising
the potential for problems in responding to terrorism. One industry
association told us, for instance, that it has been asked by three
different federal agencies to participate in three separate studies of the
same issue.
According to transportation experts and associations we contacted, a
national transportation strategy is essential to moving forward with
transportation security. It is crucial for helping stakeholders identify
priorities, leveraging resources, establishing stakeholder performance
expectations, and creating incentives for stakeholders to improve
security. Currently, local government associations view the absence of
performance expectations* coupled with limited threat information* as a
major obstacle in focusing their people and resources on high priority
threats, particularly at elevated threat levels. The experts also noted
that modal
strategies* no matter how complete* cannot address the complete
transportation security problem and will leave gaps in preparedness. As
mentioned earlier, TSA is in the process of developing a national
transportation system security plan, 35 which according to the Deputy
Administrator of TSA, will provide an overarching framework for the
security of all modes. Transportation security experts and association
representatives we
contacted believe that the federal government should provide funding for
needed security improvements. While an overall security strategy is a
prerequisite to investing wisely, providing adequate funding also is
essential. Setting security goals and strategies without adequate funding
diminishes stakeholders* commitment and willingness to absorb initial
security investments and long- term operating costs, an expert emphasized.
Industry and state and local government associations also commented that
federal funding should accompany any federal security standards; otherwise
these standards will be considered unfunded mandates that the
industry and state and local governments have to absorb. The federal
government needs to play a strong role in investing in and setting a
research and development agenda for transportation security, according to
most transportation security experts and associations we contacted. They
view this as an appropriate role for the federal government, since the
products of research and development endeavors would likely benefit the
entire transportation system, not just individual modes or operators. TSA
is actively engaged in research and development projects, such as the
development of the next generation explosive detection systems for
baggage, hardening of aircraft and cargo/ baggage containers, biometrics
and other access control methods, and human
35 TSA hopes to have a draft of the national transportation system
security plan prepared by the end of this year.
factors initiatives to identify methods to improve screener performance,
at its Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
However, TSA noted that continued adequate funding for research and
development is paramount in order for TSA to be able to meet security
demands with up- to- date and reliable technology.
Transportation security experts and representatives from state and local
government and industry associations stated that the federal government
needs to play a vital role in sharing information* specifically,
intelligence information and related guidance. Representatives from
numerous associations commented that the federal government needs to
provide timely, localized, actionable intelligence information. General
threat
warnings are not helpful. Rather, transportation operators want more
specific intelligence information so that they can understand the true
nature of a potential threat and implement appropriate security measures.
Without more localized and actionable intelligence, stakeholders said they
run the risk of wasting resources on unneeded security measures or not
providing an adequate level of security. Moreover, local government
officials often are not allowed to receive specific intelligence
information because they do not have appropriate federal security
clearances. Also, there is little federal guidance on how local
authorities should respond to a specific threat or general threat
warnings. For example, San Francisco police were stationed at the Golden
Gate Bridge to respond to the elevated national threat condition. However,
without information about the nature of the threat to San Francisco's
large transportation infrastructure or clear federal expectations for a
response, it is difficult to judge whether actions like this are the most
effective use of police protection, according to representatives from a
local government association.
Conclusions During TSA*s first year of existence, TSA met a number of
challenges, including successfully meeting many congressional deadlines
for aviation
security. With the immediate crisis of meeting key aviation security
deadlines behind TSA, it can now examine the security of the entire
transportation system. As TSA becomes more active in securing the maritime
and land transportation modes, it will become even more important that the
roles of TSA and DOT modal administrations are clearly defined. Lack of
clearly defined roles among the federal entities could lead to duplication
and confusion. More importantly, it could hamper the transportation
sector*s ability to prepare for and respond to attacks.
Recommendation for To clarify and define the roles and responsibilities of
TSA and DOT modal
Executive Action administrations in transportation security matters, we
recommend that the
Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Homeland Security use a
mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement to clearly delineate their
roles and responsibilities. At a minimum, this mechanism should establish
the responsibilities of each entity in setting, administering, and
implementing security standards and regulations, determining funding
priorities, and interfacing with the transportation industry as well as
define each entity*s role in the inevitable overlap of some safety and
security activities. After the roles and responsibilities of each entity
are clearly
defined, this information should be communicated to all transportation
stakeholders.
Agency Comments We provided DOT, DHS, and Amtrak with a draft of this
report for review and comment. Amtrak generally agreed with our findings
and
recommendation and provided some technical comments, which we have
incorporated into this report where appropriate.
DOT and DHS generally agreed with the report*s findings. However, they
disagreed with the conclusion and recommendation that their roles and
responsibilities need to be clarified and defined. The two departments
stated that the roles and responsibilities of each entity is clear* that
is, DHS has primary responsibility for transportation security and DOT
will play a supporting role in such matters. We agree that the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act 36 (ATSA) gave TSA primary responsibility
for
securing all modes of transportation. However, neither this act, nor other
legislation defined TSA*s roles and responsibilities in securing all modes
of transportation. Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA*s role and
responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes in
detail as it does for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate
DOT modal administrations* existing statutory responsibilities for
securing the different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent
legislation clarifies that DOT still has transportation security
responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states
that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as
well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all
modes.
36 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
In addition, although DOT and DHS believe their roles and responsibilities
are clearly defined, transportation security stakeholders we contacted are
not as certain. For example, representatives from several associations
stated that their members were unclear as to which agency to contact for
their various security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain
issues. Representatives from several associations also told us that their
members are receiving different messages from the various federal agencies
involved in transportation security. Furthermore, as noted in the report,
both TSA and DOT are moving
forward with transportation security efforts. As both entities continue
with their security efforts, it is important that the roles and
responsibilities of each entity are coordinated and clearly defined. The
lack of clarity can lead to duplication, confusion, and/ or gaps in
preparedness. We therefore continue to recommend that DOT and DHS use a
mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, to clarify and define DOT
modal administration*s and TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
transportation security. After the roles and responsibilities of each
entity are clearly
defined, this information should be communicated to all transportation
stakeholders.
DOT and DHS also noted that the title of the draft report, Transportation
Security: More Federal Coordination Needed to Help Address Security
Challenges, as well as our conclusions and recommendations place too much
emphasis on coordination. To better capture our conclusions and
recommendations* that is, that the roles and responsibilities of TSA and
DOT in security matters should be clearly delineated and communicated to
all transportation security stakeholders* we have changed the report*s
title to Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
Security Challenges. However, we disagree that the report places too much
emphasis on the lack of coordination between DOT and DHS. As noted above,
representatives from several associations told us that their members have
received conflicting messages from the federal agencies involved in
transportation security. Moreover, there appears to be a break down in
communication between TSA and DOT about current security initiatives. For
example, although TSA officials stated that they have informed DOT about
their plans to issue security standards, some DOT officials we met with
were unsure as to whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards
would entail, or the time frames for issuing the standards.
In addition to their written comments, DHS and DOT provided technical
comments to our draft, which we have incorporated into the report where
appropriate.
See appendixes II and III for DOT*s and DHS* comments and our responses.
As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report
to the
Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, the President
and Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and interested congressional committees. We will
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report
will be available at no charge on our Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me on (202) 512- 2834 or at guerrerop@ gao. gov. Individuals making key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Peter Guerrero Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
List of Requesters
The Honorable John McCain Chairman Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation United States Senate
The Honorable Ernest Hollings Ranking Minority Member Committee on
Commerce,
Science, and Transportation United States Senate
The Honorable James Jeffords Ranking Minority Member Committee on
Environment and
Public Works United States Senate
The Honorable Harry Reid Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Transportation
and Infrastructure Committee on Environment and
Public Works United States Senate
The Honorable Thomas Carper United States Senate
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton United States Senate
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison United States Senate
The Honorable Gordon Smith United States Senate
Appendi Appendi xes I x Scope and Methodology To address our four
objectives, we conducted structured interviews with officials from TSA,
Amtrak, and DOT, representatives from the major transportation industry
associations and state and local government associations, and select
transportation security experts. We selected transportation security
experts based on their knowledge/ expertise and reputation as being an
expert in the transportation security arena. We also
consulted with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying appropriate
transportation security experts. Table 4 shows the federal agencies,
industry associations, transportation security experts, and state and
local government associations that were interviewed. Through these
structured interviews we collected information on the challenges that
exist in securing the transportation system, vulnerabilities of different
modes, actions that
transportation stakeholders* including the federal, state, and local
governments and the operators* have taken to enhance security since
September 11, TSA*s and DOT*s ongoing and planned security efforts, roles
and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system,
and future security actions that industry associations and security
experts believe are needed. We synthesized and analyzed the information
from the structured interviews.
Table 4: List of Interviewees Federal agencies
Amtrak Department of Transportation (DOT)
General Counsel Intermodal Hazardous Materials Program Office of Emergency
Transportation Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA)
Office of the Chief Information Officer Office of Security and
Investigations (ASI) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations
(Continued From Previous Page)
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Office of Maritime and Land Security Office
of Policy (Aviation) Risk Management/ Strategic Planning Support Systems
Directorate United States Coast Guard
Industry associations Air Transport Association (ATA) American Association
of Airport Executives (AAAE) American Bus Association (ABA) American Gas
Association (AGA) American Petroleum Institute (API) American Road and
Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA) American Trucking Associations
(ATA) Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL) Association of American
Railroads (AAR) Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) Consolidated
Safety Services (CSS) Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
(INGAA) National Academy of Sciences (NAS) National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) National Private Truck Council
(NPTC) United Motorcoach Association (UMA)
Transportation security experts
Annabelle Boyd, President and Senior Consultant, Boyd, Caton & Grant
Transportation Group, Inc. Mortimer L. Downey III, PB- Consult, Inc.
Stephen E. Flynn, Ph. D., Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National
Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Yacov Y. Haimes, Director,
Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems, University of Virginia
Arnold M. Howitt, Ph. D., Executive Director, Taubman Center for State and
Local Government, Director, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Brian M. Jenkins, Senior
Advisor to the President, RAND Corporation
Douglas R. Laird, Principal, Laird & Associates, Inc. James Wilding,
Executive Director (Retired), Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority
State and local government associations
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO) National Association of Counties (NACO)
(Continued From Previous Page)
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) National League of Cities
(NLC) Source: GAO.
In addition to the structured interviews, we analyzed the administration*s
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation*s The Terrorist Threat to the U. S.
Homeland: An FBI Assessment. We also reviewed current transportation
security- related research as well as transportation security- related
reports and documents from TSA, Amtrak, and DOT, including strategic
planning documents, memorandums, program descriptions, and budget and
financial documents. We also analyzed security- related documents from
industry associations, including action plans, operational information,
and reports, and the U. S. Code and the Code of Federal Regulations. We
also incorporated the findings of previous GAO reports on port, transit,
aviation, and homeland security. 1
We conducted our work from February 2003 through May 2003, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
1 In preparing these previous reports, we contacted numerous
transportation security stakeholders, including transit agencies, port
authorities, and local and state governments as well as representatives
from the chemical and maritime industries. We also contacted various
federal departments including the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland
Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services.
Comments from the Department of
Appendi I I x Transportation Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the
report text appear at the end of this appendix.
See comment 1. See comment 2. See comment 3.
See comment 4. See comment 5.
The following are GAO*s comments on the Department of Transportation
letter dated June 10, 2003.
GAO Comments 1. We agree that the title of the report should be changed.
Our conclusions and recommendation call for the roles and responsibilities
of TSA and DOT in security matters to be clearly delineated and
communicated to
all transportation security stakeholders. To more fully capture our
conclusions and recommendations, we have changed the report*s title to
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed To Help Address Security
Challenges.
However, we disagree that our recommendation advances an *overly
simplistic conclusion that *more Federal coordination* is somehow a
meaningful problem or a key to meeting transportation security
challenges.* Although coordination does not solve all security
challenges, it is a key element in meeting transportation security
challenges. As we have noted in previous reports, coordination among all
levels of the government and the private industry is critical to the
success of security efforts. The lack of coordination can lead to problems
such as duplication and/ or conflicting efforts, gaps in preparedness, and
confusion. Moreover, the lack of coordination can strain intergovernmental
relationships, drain resources, and raise the potential for problems in
responding to terrorism. The administration*s National Strategy for
Homeland Security and the National Strategy
for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
also emphasize the importance of and need for coordination in security
efforts. In particular, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets notes that protecting critical
infrastructure, such as the transportation system, *requires a
unifying organization, a clear purpose, a common understanding of roles
and responsibilities, accountability, and a set of well- understood
coordinating processes.* (Italics added for emphasis.) 2. We disagree that
the commitment of TSA and DOT to broad and routine
consultations through numerous formal and informal mechanisms is working.
As we noted throughout the report, representatives from several
associations told us that they have received conflicting messages from the
federal agencies involved in transportation security. Representatives from
several associations also stated that their members were unclear as to
which agency to contact for their various
security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.
Moreover, there appears to be a break down in communication between TSA
and DOT about current security initiatives. For example, although TSA
officials stated that they have informed DOT about their plans to issue
security standards, some DOT officials we met with were unsure as to
whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards would entail, or the
time frames for issuing the standards.
3. We do not believe the correspondence exchanged by Secretary Mineta and
Admiral Loy adequately defines the roles and responsibilities of TSA and
DOT in security issues. Rather than delineate the roles and
responsibilities of each entity in security matters, such as determining
funding priorities and interfacing with stakeholders, the correspondence
primarily commits each entity to continued coordination and collaboration
on security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and
Administrator also agreed to use the
memorandum of agreement between TSA and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) as a framework for their interactions on security
matters for all other modes. Given the complexities and unique challenges
in securing the different modes of transportation, we do not believe using
the memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA as a framework is
sufficient. The lack of clearly defined roles and
responsibilities can lead to duplication, confusion, conflicts, and most
importantly, gaps in preparedness.
Although designating a DOT liaison to TSA is a step in the right
direction, the roles and responsibilities of each entity and the
coordinating processes need to be documented. Departures of key
individuals within each entity, such as the designated DOT liaison to TSA,
have the potential to erode informal networks. Given the importance of
security efforts, coordinating processes between TSA and DOT need to be
documented so that they span the terms of various administrations and
individuals.
4. We agree that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 1 (ATSA)
gave TSA primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.
However, neither this act, nor other legislation, has defined TSA roles
and responsibilities in securing all modes of transportation.
Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
securing the maritime and land transportation modes
1 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
in detail as it does for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate
DOT modal administrations* existing statutory responsibilities for
securing the different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent
legislation clarifies that DOT still has transportation security
responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states
that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as
well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all
modes.
To clarify and define DOT*s and TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
transportation security, we believe that these entities should establish a
mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement. Using such a mechanism would
serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles and responsibilities
of each entity. It would also serve to hold each entity accountable for
its transportation security responsibilities. Finally, it could serve as a
vehicle to communicate the roles and responsibilities of each entity to
transportation security stakeholders. The mechanism* whether it is a
memorandum of agreement or other
document* used to clarify and define DOT*s and TSA*s roles and
responsibilities should not be static. Rather, it should be a living
document that changes as each entity*s roles and responsibilities in
transportation security matters evolve and events occur. 5. We disagree
that all of DOT*s ongoing security efforts are nonpolicy
making activities. For example, the Research and Special Programs
Administration issued regulations in March 2003 that requires shippers and
carriers of hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans
and to include a security component in their employee training programs.
While DOT*s role in security efforts may decrease in the future, it seems
unlikely that DOT will be devoid of any security responsibilities in the
future. For example, as noted in the report, the Homeland Security Act of
2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the
security as well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous
materials by all modes. In addition, the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 2 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to train
and certify maritime security professionals and establish a grant 2 P. L.
No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
program to fund the implementation of Area Maritime Transportation
Security Plans and facility security plans. Further, although the primary
responsibility for securing the aviation system was transferred to TSA,
FAA remains responsible for protecting the nation*s air traffic control
system* both the physical security of its air traffic control facilities
and computer systems. Although DOT recognizes that DHS has the lead in
transportation security matters, it could be difficult to distinguish its
role in
maintaining transportation operations and improving transportation service
and safety from DHS* role in securing the transportation system. Security
is often intertwined with transportation operations and safety. For
example, installing a fence around truck yards could be considered both a
safety and security measure. Further security measures that restrict the
flow of passengers or freight through the transportation system could have
serious consequences on transportation operations. Because of these
interactions and overlap, the roles and responsibilities of DOT and DHS in
transportation safety and security can be blurred. Consequently, we
continue to believe the entities should establish a mechanism to help
clarify and delineate their roles and responsibilities in security
matters.
Comments from the Department of Homeland
Appendi I I I x Security Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the
report text appear at the end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
See comment 2. See comment 3. See comment 4.
The following are GAO*s comments on the Department of Homeland Security
letter dated June 11, 2003. GAO Comments 1. We disagree that the report
overstates the lack of coordination between
DHS and DOT and that mechanisms to ensure coordination of responsibilities
is unnecessary. Although DHS and DOT report that they are coordinating on
security matters, based on our discussions with representatives from state
and local government and industry associations, it appears that there is a
need to improve such efforts. As we noted throughout the report,
representatives from several associations told us that they have received
conflicting messages from the federal agencies involved in transportation
security. Representatives from several associations also stated that their
members were unclear as to which agency to contact for their various
security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.
Moreover, there appears to be a break down in communication between TSA
and DOT about current security initiatives. For example, although TSA
officials stated that they have informed DOT about their plans to issue
security standards, some DOT officials we met with were unsure as to
whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards would entail, or the
time frames for issuing the standards.
We agree that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 1 (ATSA) gave
TSA primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.
However, neither this act, or other legislation, has defined TSA*s roles
and responsibilities in securing all modes of transportation.
Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA*s role and responsibilities in
securing the maritime and land transportation modes in detail as it does
for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate DOT modal
administrations* existing statutory responsibilities for securing the
different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent legislation clarifies
that DOT still has transportation security responsibilities. In
particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of
Transportation is responsible for the security as well as the safety of
rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all modes.
1 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
To clarify and define DOT*s and TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
transportation security, we believe that these entities should establish a
mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement. Using such a mechanism would
serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles and responsibilities
of each entity. It would also serve to hold each entity accountable for
its transportation security responsibilities. Finally, it could serve as a
vehicle to communicate the roles and responsibilities of each entity to
transportation security stakeholders. The mechanism* whether it is a
memorandum of agreement or other
document* used to clarify and define DOT*s and TSA*s roles and
responsibilities should not be static. Rather, it should be a living
document that changes as each entity*s roles and responsibilities in
transportation security matters evolve and events occur. 2. We disagree
that the report suggests that the continuation of security
efforts by the DOT modal administrations represents a lack of
coordination. The report credits TSA for meeting a number of aviation
security deadlines during its first year of existence and highlights the
efforts of DOT modal administrations and other federal agencies to improve
the security of all modes since September 11. We also note that TSA is
beginning to assert a greater role in securing all modes of transportation
and DOT modal administrations are continuing or launching new security
efforts. We did not suggest that the continuation of such efforts by DOT
modal administrations represents a lack of coordination. Rather, we noted
that as both entities move forward with security efforts, it is
increasingly important that the roles of TSA and
DOT modal administrations are clearly defined. The lack of clearly defined
roles and responsibilities can lead to duplication, confusion, conflicts,
and most importantly, gaps in preparedness.
3. Our intention is not to suggest that the federal government*s efforts
to secure the non- aviation modes of transportation have been
insufficient. To the contrary, we highlight the efforts by DOT modal
administrations and other federal agencies to secure the maritime and land
modes of transportation. We also recognize that TSA*s aviation security
focus during its first year of existence was primarily due to the ATSA
deadlines.
4. We agree that the newly created DHS brings a number of agencies
responsible for transportation security under one roof, which could
ultimately improve coordination and streamline and strengthen
security efforts. However, this does not solve all the potential
coordination problems we highlight in the report because important
transportation stakeholders* specifically, the DOT modal administrations*
are housed in another department. Because both DHS agencies and DOT modal
administrations are moving forward with
transportation security initiatives, it is critical that the roles and
responsibilities of each entity are clearly delineated and communicated to
all stakeholders and that they coordinate their security efforts. The lack
of such clarification, communication, and coordination could create
problems, such as duplication of efforts and gaps in preparedness.
Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations
Appendi V I x Governing Transportation Security Table 5: Authorizations
Modes
Related target dates Public law - Authorization impacted Key provisions
for compliance Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. All
Established Transportation Security
11/ 19/ 2001 L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 et seq. (2001).
Administration (TSA), responsible for, inter
November 19, 2001
alia, security in all modes of transportation. Aviation Established a more
comprehensive federal
air marshals program for international and domestic flights.
Aviation Deployment of federal law enforcement officers at airports to
meet aviation safety and security concerns.
Aviation Directed FAA, in consultation with TSA, to 1/ 18/ 02
develop security- training programs for flight and cabin crew.
Aviation Deployment of federal personnel for the 11/ 19/ 02 screening of
passengers and baggage at airports.
Aviation Appointed Federal Security Managers to 11/ 19/ 02
oversee the screening of passengers and baggage at each airport.
Aviation Authorizes TSA to deploy explosive detection 12/ 31/ 2002
systems (EDS) or equivalent measures allowed by law at all U. S. airports.
Aviation Authorized $500,000, 000 (FY 2002) for FAA 4/ 1/ 2003
to provide federal grants to fortify cockpit doors and for other aircraft
security measures.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Modes Related target dates
Public law - Authorization impacted Key provisions for compliance Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. All Creates the Department of Homeland
107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 et seq. (2002).
Security. November 25, 2002
All Creates Border and Transportation Security Directorate, responsible
for maintaining the security of borders and transportation systems.
Aviation Training and deputizing pilots to be Federal 2/ 25/ 2003 Flight
Deck Officers to defend the flight decks of aircrafts in flight.
All Transferred Transportation Security 3/ 1/ 2003
Administration and Coast Guard from Department of Transportation to
Department of Homeland Security.
Aviation Moved date for EDS installation in all U. S. 12/ 31/ 2003
airports. All Requires all companies that transport or ship
explosives to give the ATF the names and identifying information of all
employees authorized to possess explosive materials. Requires the ATF to
conduct background checks of employees to determine if they are prohibited
from possessing explosive materials.
All Expands the responsibilities of the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), within the Department of Transportation, for
regulating hazardous materials to include hazardous materials
transportation security.
All Protects critical infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to
a covered federal agency from the Freedom of Information Act and other
federal and state disclosure requirements.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Modes Related target dates
Public law - Authorization impacted Key provisions for compliance Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002, Seaport Set up a National Maritime
Transportation Pub. L. No. 107- 295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
Security Plan. November 25, 2002
Implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and coordinate area
plans.
Develop and maintain an antiterrorism cargo identification, tracking, and
screening system for containerized cargo.
To assign Coast Guard personnel as sea marshals to deter or respond to
acts of terrorism.
Authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to train and certify maritime
security professionals. Establishes a program to evaluate and certify
systems of international intermodal transportation.
The Coast Guard shall conduct a vulnerability assessment of facilities and
vessels that may be involved in a transportation security incident at
least every 5 years.
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue biometric transportation
security cards and enhanced crew- member identification for individuals
who require access to secure areas of vessels and port facilities.
The Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Maritime
Administration, shall establish a grant program to fund the implementation
of Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and facility security
plans.
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107- All Mandates federal background
checks of 56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
individuals operating vehicles carrying October 26, 2001
hazardous materials. Criminalizes terrorist attacks and other acts of
10/ 26/ 2001 violence against mass transportation systems.
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pipeline Authorizes the Secretary
of Transportation to
Pub. L. No. 107- 355, 116 Stat. 2985 (2002). reinforce pipeline facilities
deemed potentially
December 17, 2002 unsafe or vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107- 210, 116 All Authorizes the Secretary
of Commerce to Stat. 933 (2002).
create an electronic data interchange system August 6, 2002
to ensure transportation safety and security of cargo. Source: GAO
analysis of U. S. Code.
Table 6: Appropriations Modes Public law * appropriation impacted Key
provisions Funding appropriated 2001 Emergency Supplemental
All Provided funding for increased transportation Specific appropriations
are found Appropriations Act for Recovery security. Provided funding for
repairing public
in the Pub. L. No. 107- 117. from and Response to Terrorist
facilities and transportation systems damaged by Attacks on the United
States, the attacks. Pub. L. No. 107- 38, 115 Stat. 220 (2001). September
18, 2001
2002 Department of Aviation Provided funding for TSA for civil aviation
$1, 250,000, 000 (app. FY 2002) Transportation Appropriations security
services pursuant to the Aviation and Act, Pub. L. No. 107- 87, 115
Transportation Security Act. Stat. 833 (2001).
Aviation Provided funding for FAA operations for civil $150,154,000 (app.
FY 2002)
December 18, 2001 aviation security program activities. Department Of
Defense And
Seaport Funding for a port security program. $93,300, 000 (app. FY 2002)
Emergency Supplemental Seaport Funding for Coast Guard for their response
to $209,150,000 (app. FY 2002) Appropriations for Recovery
9/ 11 terrorist attacks. From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
United States
Aviation Funding for FAA for their response to 9/ 11 $535,500,000 (app. FY
2002) Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107- 117,
terrorist attacks. 115 Stat. 2230 (2002). Highway Funding for Federal
Highway Administration for
$175,000,000 (app. FY 2002) January 10, 2002
their response to 9/ 11 terrorist attacks. Transit Funding for Federal
Transit Administration for $123,000,000 (app. FY 2002) their response to
9/ 11 terrorist attacks. Rail Funding for Federal Railroad Administration
for
$106,000,000 (app. FY 2002) their response to 9/ 11 terrorist attacks. All
Funding for Research and Special Programs
$2, 500,000 (app. FY 2002) Administration.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Modes Public law * appropriation impacted Key provisions Funding
appropriated 2002 Supplemental
Aviation Provides for the installation of explosives $738,000,000 (app. FY
2003) Appropriations Act for Further
detection systems in commercial service Recovery from and Response
airports. to Terrorist Attacks on the
Seaport Provides funds for port security activities, $125,000,000 (app. FY
2003)
United States, Pub. L. No. 107- including Port Security Grants. 206, 116
Stat. 820 (2002).
August 2, 2002 Seaport Appropriates funds for the port security pilot
$28,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) program, Operation Safe Commerce. Motor Coach
Appropriates grants and contracts to enhance
$15,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) security for intercity bus operations.
Aviation Funds for procurement of air- ground
$15,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) communications systems and devices for the
Federal Air Marshal Program.
All Funds for grants and contracts for radiation $4, 000,000 (app. FY
2003)
detection system test and evaluation. Aviation Funds for grants to airport
authorities for pilot $17,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) projects to improve
airport terminal security. All Funds for grants and contracts for
security,
$10,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) research, development and pilot projects.
Aviation Funds for replacement of magnetometers at
$23,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) airport passenger screening locations in
commercial service airports.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Modes Public law * appropriation impacted Key provisions Funding
appropriated Consolidated Appropriation Aviation Provides for aviation
security (screening
$4, 516,300, 000 (app. FY 2003) Resolution for 2003, Pub. L. No.
activities, airport support, and enforcement including:
108- 7, 117 Stat. 11 (2003). presence) including:
February 20, 2003 additional funding from FAA appropriations for
$144,000,000 (app. FY 2003) explosives detections systems additional
funding for terminal modifications
$265,000,000 (app. FY 2003) needed for the installation of EDS equipment
additional funding for the procurement of $174, 500,000 (app. FY 2003)
checked baggage EDS equipment All Funds administrative, including
intelligence, $308,700,000 (app. FY 2003) activities of the Transportation
Security Administration.
All Enhances maritime and land security including: $244,800,000 (app. FY
2003) including:
provides additional funding for port security $150,000,000 (app. FY 2003)
grants funds for radiation detection and monitoring $4, 000,000 (app. FY
2003) system evaluation and procurement funds for the purpose of deploying
Operation $30,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) Safe Commerce All Appropriates funds
for research and $110, 200,000 (app. FY 2003) development related to
transportation security
including: including:
funds for grants for port security $10,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) Emergency
Wartime
Aviation Provides financial assistance to US flag air $2, 395,750, 000 of
which the first
Supplemental Appropriations carriers for expenses and revenue forgone
$100 million is to reimburse Act for FY 2003, Pub. L. No.
related to aviation security. carriers for strengthening cockpit 108- 11,
117 Stat. 559 (2003)
doors. (app. FY 2003) Seaport Appropriates funds for the Coast Guard to
$228,000,000 (app. FY 2003) support Operation Liberty Shield. Aviation
Appropriates additional funds to TSA for the
$235,000,000 (app. FY 2003) installation of explosive detection systems at
airports.
Seaport Appropriates additional funds to TSA for port $20,000, 000 (app.
FY 2003)
security. Aviation Appropriates additional funds to TSA for $280,000,000
(app. FY 2003) passenger screener hiring, training, and related costs.
Source: GAO analysis of U. S. Code.
Table 7: Regulations Issuing Regulations a Modes impacted agency Key
provisions
Criminal History Records Checks, Aviation FAA Requires airport operators
and aircraft operators to 66 Fed. Reg. 63474 (Dec. 6, conduct fingerprint-
based criminal history records checks
2001). (CHRC*s) of individuals with unescorted access authority
Effective December 6, 2001 to secured areas.
Civil Aviation Security Rules, 67 All TSA Transfers rules governing civil
aviation security to TSA.
Fed. Reg. 8340 (Feb. 22, 2002). Provides screener qualifications and
training.
Effective February 17, 2002 Defines and governs the release of *sensitive
security
information.* Security Programs for Aircraft
Aviation TSA Requires aircraft operators of aircraft with a maximum 12,500
Pounds or More, 67 Fed. takeoff weight of 12,500 lbs. or more to conduct
criminal Reg. 8205 (Feb. 22, 2002).
history records checks on flightcrew members. Effective June 24, 2002
Requires access to the flight deck of such aircraft be restricted.
Passenger Name Record Aviation Customs Service Requires air carriers, upon
request, to electronically Information Required for
provide U. S. Customs Service with access to Passenger Passengers on
Flights in Foreign
Name Record (PNR) information concerning the identity Air Transportation
to or from the
and travel plans of passengers for any international flight United States,
67 Fed. Reg.
to or from the United States. 42710 (June 25, 2002). Effective June 25,
2002
Picture Identification Aviation FAA Requires all certified pilots to carry
photo identification Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg.
subject to inspection upon request from the FAA or any 65858 (Oct. 28,
2002).
federal, state, or local law enforcement officer. Effective October 28,
2002
Discretionary Bridge Candidate Highways Federal Highway Allows
discretionary bridge funds to be used for security
Rating Factor, 67 Fed. Reg. Administration improvements on eligible
bridges, subject to 23 USC 144
63539 (Oct. 15, 2002). requirements.
Effective November 14, 2002 Presentation of Vessel Cargo
Seaport Customs Service Requires the advance and accurate presentation of
Declaration to Customs Before
certain manifest information prior to lading at the foreign Cargo Is Laden
Aboard Vessel at port, in order to enable Customs to evaluate the risk of
Foreign Port for Transport to the
smuggling weapons of mass destruction. United States, 67 Fed. Reg. 66318
(Oct. 31, 2002). Effective December 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Private Charter Aviation TSA Requires private charter
operators using aircraft with a
Security Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. maximum takeoff weight of at least 100, 000
lbs. or which
79881 (Dec. 31, 2002). can seat at least 61 passengers to ensure that
Effective February 1, 2003 passengers and their carry- on baggage are
screened prior to boarding.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Issuing Regulations a Modes impacted agency Key provisions
Coast Guard Transition to Seaport Coast Guard Transfers the Coast Guard
from the Department of
Department of Homeland Transportation to the newly created Department of
Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 9533 (Feb. Homeland Security.
28, 2003). Effective March 1, 2003
Organization and Delegation of Motor Carrier Office of the
Transfers authority of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Powers and Duties,
Update of Secretary,
Administration to determine security risks to the Secretarial Delegations,
68 Fed.
DOT Transportation Security Administration.
Reg. 10988 (March 7, 2003). Effective March 7, 2003
Screening of Aliens and Other Aviation DOJ Prohibits aviation training
providers to train aliens or other
Designated Individuals Seeking designated individuals without prior
approval by the Flight Training, 68 Fed. Reg. 7313
Attorney General. (Feb. 13, 2003). Effective March 17, 2003
Security Requirements for Motor Motor Carrier Federal Motor Carrier
Transfers rulemaking authority addressing the security of
Carriers Transporting Hazardous Safety Administration
motor carrier shipments of hazardous materials to the Materials, 68 Fed.
Reg. 13250
(FMCSA) Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)
(March 19, 2003). from the FMCSA.
Effective March 19, 2003 Hazardous Materials: Security
All RSPA Requires shippers and carriers of certain highly Requirements for
Offerors and
hazardous materials to develop and implement security Transporters of
Hazardous
plans. Materials, 68 Fed. Reg. 14510
Requires all shippers and carriers of hazardous materials (March 25,
2003).
to include a security component in their employee Effective March 25, 2003
training programs. Notification of Arrival in U. S. Ports, Seaport Coast
Guard Makes permanent changes in notification of arrival and 68 Fed. Reg.
9537 (Feb. 28,
departure requirements to ensure public safety and 2003)
security, including requiring electronic submission of Effective April 1,
2003. cargo manifest information to the U. S. Customs Service, and
requiring additional crew and passenger information.
Organization and Delegation of Seaport Office of the
Transfers authority to the Maritime Administrator to Powers and Duties;
Delegation to Secretary, DOT develop standards and curriculum for the
training and the Administrator, Maritime certification of maritime
security professionals. Administrator, 68 Fed. Reg. 16215 (April 3, 2003).
Effective April 3, 2003
(Continued From Previous Page)
Issuing Regulations a Modes impacted agency Key provisions
Implementation of the Safe All ATF Requires applicants for licenses and
permits to provide Explosives Act, 68 Fed. Reg.
with the application the names and appropriate 13768 (March 20, 2003).
identifying information regarding employees authorized to Effective May
24, 2003
possess explosive materials.
Interim Final Rule
Requires applicants for licenses and permits to provide with the
application fingerprints and photographs of *responsible persons* (for
example, site managers, sole proprietors, partners, corporate officers and
directors, and majority shareholders).
Requires the ATF to conduct background checks on responsible persons and
employees authorized to possess explosive materials.
Limitations on the Issuance of Motor Carrier FMCSA Prohibits States from
issuing, renewing, transferring, or Commercial Driver's Licenses
upgrading a commercial driver*s license (CDL) with a with a Hazardous
Materials
hazardous material endorsement unless TSA has Endorsement, 68 Fed. Reg.
conducted a background check of the applicant, including 23844 (May 5,
2003).
administering a hazardous materials knowledge test. Effective May 5, 2003
Interim Final Rule
Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Motor Carrier, RSPA Requires shippers and
transporters to comply with Hazardous Materials
Seaport Federal security regulations that apply to motor carrier
Transportation Security 68 Fed.
and vessel transportation Reg. 23832 (May 5, 2003)
Requires applicants for exemptions from the Hazardous Effective May 5,
2003
Materials Regulations compliance with applicable Interim Final Rule
Federal transportation security laws and regulations. Security Threat
Assessment for
Motor Carrier TSA Establishes security threat assessment standards for
Individuals Applying for a
determining whether an individual poses a security threat Hazardous
Materials warranting denial of a hazardous materials endorsement
Endorsement for a Commercial for a CDL. Also established appeals and
waiver Drivers License 68 Fed. Reg.
procedures. 23852 (May 5, 2003) Effective May 5, 2003
Interim Final Rule
Source: GAO analysis of Code of Federal Regulations. a All regulations
listed are final rules unless otherwise noted.
Organizational Chart of the Transportation
Appendi V x Security Administration Administrator Task Forces
Deputy Administrator Chief of Staff Chief Counsel Strategic Management &
ONRA Analysis
Transition Security & Law Enforcement
Liaison Communication & Public
Information Legislative Affairs Transportation
Civil Rights Security Policy
Ombudsmen Executive Secretariat
Operations Directorate
International Support Systems Directorate Associate
Associate Administrator/ Administrator/ Chief Support Systems Chief
Operating Officer
Officer Human Capital Officer Crisis Management
Aviation Maritime and
Intelligence Operation
Human Training &
Information Security
Internal Finance and
Operations Land
Policy Resources
Quality Technology
Technology Affairs and
Admin. Security
Performance Program
Assistant Assistant
Assistant Assistant
Assistant Assistant
Reviews
Assistant Administrator
Assistant Administrator
Administrator Administrator
Assistant Administrator/
Administrator Administrator/
Administrator Administrator
Chief Assistant
Chief Financial Information
Administrator Officer
Officer Source: TSA.
Appendi VI x GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Cathleen
Berrick, (202) 512- 8777 Susan Fleming, (202) 512- 4431 Peter Guerrero,
(202) 512- 2834
Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Steven Calvo, Nikki
Clowers, Michelle Dresben, Glenn Dubin, Scott Farrow, Libby Halperin,
David Hooper, Hiroshi Ishikawa, Ray Sendejas, and Glen Trochelman made key
contributions to this report.
Related GAO Products Transportation
Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and
Security Reports and
Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments, GAO- 03- 502
(Washington, D. C.: May 1, 2003). Testimonies
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security, GAO- 03- 594T (Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003).
Transportation Security: Post- September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term
Challenges, GAO- 03- 616T (Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003).
Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot
Certification Process, GAO- 03- 248NI (Washington, D. C.: February 3,
2003). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Transportation, GAO- 03- 108 (Washington, D. C.: January 1, 2003)
High Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
Government and the Nation*s Critical Infrastructure, GAO- 03- 121
(Washington, D. C.: January 1, 2003).
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT*s
Enforcement Approach, GAO- 03- 22 (Washington, D. C.: January 10, 2003).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
Cargo System, GAO- 03- 344 (Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002).
Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
Challenges, GAO- 03- 263 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation
Issues, GAO- 03- 253 (Washington, D. C.: November 22, 2002).
Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and
Assets Remain at Risk, GAO- 03- 303T (Washington, D. C.: November 19,
2002).
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO- 03- 297T (Washington, D. C.: November
18, 2002).
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort
for All Missions, GAO- 03- 155 (Washington, D. C.: November 12, 2002).
Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, GAO- 02- 1075T
(Washington, D. C.: September 18, 2002).
Pipeline Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and
Communication Needed, GAO- 02- 785 (Washington, D. C.: August 26, 2002).
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful, GAO- 02- 993T (Washington, D. C.: August 5, 2002).
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
and Long- Term Challenges, GAO- 02- 971T (Washington, D. C.: July 25,
2002).
Critical infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be
Addressed, GAO- 02- 961T (Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports, GAO- 02- 955TNI
(Washington, D. C.: July 23, 2002). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots, GA0- 02- 822R
(Washington, D. C.: June 28, 2002).
Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection
Equipment, GAO- 02- 713C (Washington, D. C.: June 20, 2002). (Classified)
Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO-
02- 538T (Washington, D. C.: March 19, 2002).
Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation*s Air
Transportation System, GAO- 01- 1164T (Washington, D. C.: September 26,
2001). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Aviation Security: Information on the Nation*s Air Transportation System
Vulnerabilities, GAO- 01- 1174T (Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001).
(Not for Public Dissemination)
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations, GAO- 01- 1171T (Washington, D. C.:
September 25, 2001).
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities, GAO- 01- 1165T (Washington, D. C.:
September 21, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
Security, GAO- 01- 1166T (Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation*s Airports, GAO- 01- 1162T (Washington, D. C.:
September 20, 2001).
Terrorism and Risk
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges,
Management
and Key Management Issues, GAO- 03- 715T (Washington, D. C.: May 8, 2003).
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
Results- Oriented Culture, GAO- 03- 190 (Washington, D. C.: January 17,
2003).
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, GAO-
03- 260 (Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Technology Funding and Associated
Management Issues, GAO- 03- 250 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued
Management Challenges, GAO- 02- 1122T (Washington, D. C.: October 1,
2002).
National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges,
GAO- 02- 1048R (Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002).
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success, GAO- 02- 1013T (Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More
Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information Systems,
GAO- 02- 474 (Washington, D. C.: July 15, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security
Challenges Need to Be Addressed, GAO- 02- 918T (Washington, D. C.: July 9,
2002).
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be
Critical to Success, GAO- 02- 901T (Washington, D. C.: July 3, 2002).
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting, GAO- 02- 893T (Washington, D. C.: June 28,
2002).
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy,
GAO- 02- 811T (Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002).
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving
National Goals, GAO- 02- 627T (Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002).
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private
Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland
Security, GAO- 02- 621T (Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a
National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 550T
(Washington, D. C.: April 2, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy, GAO- 02- 549T (Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 548T (Washington, D. C.: March 25,
2002).
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy
to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 547T (Washington, D. C.:
March 22, 2002).
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought,
GAO- 02- 490T (Washington, D. C.: March 12, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State
and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 473T (Washington, D. C.: March 1, 2002).
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long- Term National Needs, GAO- 02- 160T (Washington, D. C.: November 7,
2001).
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts, GAO- 02- 208T (Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness, GAO- 02- 162T (Washington, D. C.: October 17,
2001).
Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure
Protection, GAO- 02- 24 (Washington, D. C.: October 15, 2001).
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,
GAO- 02- 150T (Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001).
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory
Management Are Needed, GAO- 01- 667 (Washington, D. C.: September 28,
2001).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Safeguarding
Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer- Based Attacks,
GAO- 01- 1168T (Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001).
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation*s Efforts, GAO-
01- 1158T (Washington, D. C.: September 21, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-
01- 822 (Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001).
(545030)
Report to Congressional Requesters
June 2003 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY Federal Action Needed to Help Address
Security Challenges
GAO- 03- 843
Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 5 The Transportation System as a
Whole Faces Numerous
Challenges 7 Transportation Operators and State and Local Governments Have
Taken Steps to Improve Security 25 Congress and Federal Agencies Have
Taken Numerous Actions to
Enhance Security, but Roles Remain Unclear 29 Experts and Associations
Identified Future Actions to Advance the
Security of the Transportation System 49 Conclusions 51 Recommendation for
Executive Action 52 Agency Comments 52
Appendixes
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 56
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Transportation 59 GAO
Comments 61
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 65 GAO
Comments 68
Appendix IV: Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
Transportation Security 71
Appendix V: Organizational Chart of the Transportation Security
Administration 80
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 81 GAO Contact 81
Acknowledgments 81
Related GAO Products 82 Transportation Security Reports and Testimonies 82
Terrorism and Risk Management 84 Tables Table 1: Comparison of
Transportation Security Grant Requests to
Federal Funding Available, 2002 to 2003 22
Table 2: Key Actions Taken By DOT Modal Administrations to Secure the
Different Transportation Modes, September 2001 to May 2003 32 Table 3:
Elements of a Risk Management Approach 39 Table 4: List of Interviewees 56
Table 5: Authorizations 71 Table 6: Appropriations 74 Table 7: Regulations
77
Figures Figure 1: Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes
of Transportation 8
Figure 2: Illustration of Possible Freight Movements within the
Transportation System 15 Figure 3: Intermodal Activity at a U. S. Port 16
Figure 4: Key Stakeholders in Transportation Security 18 Figure 5:
Emergency Drill in Progress 27 Figure 6: Photograph of Inspection
Equipment in Use 35 Figure 7: Organizational Chart of TSA*s Office of
Maritime and Land Security, June 2003 38
Figure 8: Illustration of How Risk Management Approach Can Guide Decision-
Making 40
Abbreviations
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act AASHTO American Association
of State Highway and Transportation
Officials CBP Bureau of Customs and Border Protection CSI Container
Security Initiative C- TPAT Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
DHS Department of Homeland Security DOT Department of Transportation FAA
Federal Aviation Administration FHWA Federal Highway Administration FTA
Federal Transit Administration Amtrak National Railroad Passenger
Corporation TSA Transportation Security Administration TWIC Transportation
Workers Identification Card
This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
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a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
Securing the nation*s transportation system is fraught with challenges.
The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our
borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The
extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and
freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure.
Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further
complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved
in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal,
state, and local levels, and thousands of private sector companies.
Further
exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting
transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has
weakened the transportation industry*s financial condition by decreasing
ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional
funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far
outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take a
collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and
future transportation challenges.
Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance
security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting aviation
security deadlines during its first year of existence and DOT launched a
variety of security initiatives to enhance the other modes of
transportation. For example, the Federal Transit Administration provided
grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the
largest transit agencies, among other things. TSA has recently focused
more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is
planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation
starting this summer. DOT is also continuing their security efforts.
However, the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the
transportation system have not been clearly defined, which creates the
potential for overlap, duplication, and confusion as both entities move
forward with their security efforts. The economic well being of the
U. S. is dependent on the expeditious flow of people and goods through the
transportation system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the
threats and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to
September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary
responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake
of September 11, Congress created the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary responsibility for the
security of all modes of transportation. TSA was recently
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was
asked to examine the challenges in securing the transportation system and
the federal role and actions in
transportation security. GAO recommends that DHS and DOT use a mechanism,
such as a memorandum of agreement, to
clarify and delineate DOT*s and TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
transportation security matters. DHS and DOT generally agreed
with the report*s findings; however, they disagreed with the
recommendation. Based on the
uncertainty in the entities* roles and responsibilities that
transportation stakeholders surfaced to us, we continue to
believe our recommendation is valid and would help address transportation
security challenges.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 843. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Peter Guerrero at (202) 512- 2834 or guerrerop@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 843, a report to
Congressional Requesters
June 2003
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges
Page i GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security
Contents
Contents
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Appendix I
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
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Appendix I Scope and Methodology
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Appendix II
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Transportation
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Appendix II Comments from the Department of Transportation
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Appendix II Comments from the Department of Transportation
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Appendix II Comments from the Department of Transportation
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Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
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Appendix IV
Appendix IV Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
Transportation Security Page 72 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security
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Related GAO Products Page 83 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security
Related GAO Products Page 84 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security
Related GAO Products Page 85 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security
Related GAO Products Page 86 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security
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