    Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
    Security Challenges (30-JUN-03, GAO-03-843).

    The economic well being of the U.S. is dependent on the
    expeditious flow of people and goods through the transportation
    system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats
    and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to
    September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary
    responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In
    the wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary
    responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation.
    TSA was recently transferred to the new Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the challenges in
    securing the transportation system and the federal role and
    actions in transportation security.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-843
        ACCNO:   A07308
      TITLE:     Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help
    Address Security Challenges
         DATE:   06/30/2003
      SUBJECT:   Emergency preparedness
    	     Internal controls
    	     National preparedness
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Transportation industry
    	     Transportation legislation
    	     Transportation operations
    	     Transportation safety

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    GAO-03-843

                                           A

    June 30, 2003 Let er t Congressional Requesters

    The attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the
    nation*s transportation system to the terrorist threat. Terrorist events
    around the world have also shown that transportation systems are often
    targets of attack* roughly one- third of terrorist attacks worldwide
    target transportation systems. 1 While most of the early attention
    following the September 11 attacks focused on airport security, emphasis
    on the other modes of transportation has since grown as concerns are
    voiced about possible vulnerabilities, such as introducing weapons of mass
    destruction into this country through ports or launching chemical attacks
    on mass transit systems. The entire transportation industry has remained
    on a heightened state of alert since the attacks. For example, as of May
    2003, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had issued over 15 terrorist
    threat advisories to different segments of the transportation industry
    since September 11.

    As requested, this report examines (1) challenges in securing the nation*s
    transportation system; (2) actions transportation operators, 2 as well as
    state and local governments, have taken since September 11 to enhance
    security; (3) the federal role in securing the transportation system and
    actions the federal government has taken to enhance transportation
    security since September 11; and (4) future actions that are needed to
    further enhance the security of the nation*s transportation system. To
    address these objectives, we analyzed the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation*s recent threat assessment and the administration*s security
    strategies. 3 We also analyzed the Transportation Security Administration
    (TSA) and DOT

    security- related documents and reports as well as relevant statutes and
    regulations. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOT, the National
    Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and TSA as well as

    1 Congressional Research Service, Transportation Issues in the 107 th
    Congress,

    (Washington, D. C.: July 16, 2002). 2 Transportation operators may be
    private, public, or quasi- public entities that provide transportation
    services. 3 The White House, National Strategy for The Physical Protection
    of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003; Federal Bureau
    of Investigation, The Terrorist Threat to the U. S. Homeland: An FBI
    Assessment, January 2003; and The White

    House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002.

    representatives from numerous transportation industry associations and
    transportation security experts. We selected transportation industry and
    state and local government associations that represent the different modes
    of transportation and levels of government. We selected transportation

    security experts based on their knowledge/ expertise and reputation as
    being an expert in the transportation security arena. We also consulted
    with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying appropriate
    transportation security experts. Finally, we reviewed our past reports on
    homeland, port, transit, and aviation security and other research on
    terrorism and transportation security. (See app. I for a more detailed
    discussion of our report*s scope and methodology.)

    Results in Brief Transportation stakeholders face numerous challenges in
    securing the nation*s transportation system. Some of these challenges are
    common to all

    modes of transportation while other challenges are specific to aviation,
    maritime, or land transportation modes. Common security challenges include
    the extensiveness of the transportation system, the interconnectivity of
    the system, funding limitations, and the number of stakeholders involved
    in transportation security. For example, the transportation system
    includes about 3.9 million miles of roads, over 100,000 miles of rail,
    almost 600,000 bridges, over 300 ports, 2.2 million miles of pipelines,
    500 train stations, and over 5,000 public- use airports. The size of the
    system simultaneously provides a substantial number of potential targets
    for terrorists and makes it difficult to secure. Additionally, the number
    of stakeholders* including over 20 federal entities, state and local
    governments, and hundreds of thousands of private businesses* can lead to
    coordination, communication, and consensus- building challenges. Further
    exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures

    confronting transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy
    has weakened the transportation industry*s financial condition by
    decreasing ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided

    additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but
    demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available. The
    aviation, maritime, and land transportation modes also face particular

    challenges in enhancing security. For instance, maritime and land
    transportation systems generally have open access designs so that users
    can enter the systems at multiple points; however, this openness leaves
    them vulnerable because transportation operators cannot monitor or control
    who enters or leaves the systems.

    Despite these challenges, transportation operators and state and local
    governments have implemented numerous actions to enhance security since
    September 11. Although security was always a priority, the terrorist
    attacks elevated the importance and urgency of security. According to
    representatives from a number of industry associations we interviewed,
    transportation operators have implemented new security measures or
    increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities. For example,
    many transportation operators conducted risk or security assessments,

    undertook emergency drills, and developed security plans. State and local
    governments, which play a critical role in securing the system because
    they own a large portion of the transportation system as well as serve as
    first

    responders to incidents involving transportation assets, have also acted
    to improve the security of the transportation system. Some examples of
    their actions since September 11 include deploying additional law
    enforcement personnel and participating in emergency drills with the
    transportation industry.

    The roles of federal government agencies in securing the nation*s
    transportation system are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had
    primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In
    the wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility
    for the security of all modes of transportation. During TSA*s first year
    of existence, TSA*s primary focus was on aviation security. While TSA was
    focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations 4 launched
    various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and land
    transportation modes. For example, the Federal Transit Administration
    (FTA) launched a multipart security initiative to enhance transit
    security,

    which included grants for emergency drills, security assessments, and
    training. TSA has recently started to assert a greater role in securing
    the maritime and land transportation modes and is launching a number of
    new security initiatives. For example, TSA is planning to issue security
    standards for all modes of transportation, starting this summer. However,
    a number of representatives from transportation industry and state and
    local government associations that we contacted expressed concerns about
    not being adequately involved in TSA*s decision- making, such as the
    development of security standards. DOT modal administrations are also
    continuing their transportation security efforts. For example, the Federal

    4 DOT*s modal administrations are the departmental units responsible for
    the different modes of transportation, such as the Federal Railroad
    Administration or the Federal Highway Administration.

    Highway Administration (FHWA) is coordinating a series of workshops this
    year on emergency response and preparedness for state departments of
    transportation and other agencies. The roles and responsibilities of TSA
    and DOT in transportation security have yet to be clearly delineated,
    which creates the potential for duplicating and/ or conflicting efforts as
    both entities move forward with their security efforts.

    Transportation security experts and representatives from transportation
    industry and state and local government associations that we spoke with
    identified a number of actions that they said should be implemented to
    enhance the security of the nation*s transportation system. In general,
    they believe that the transportation system is generally more secure today
    than it was prior to September 11; however, all noted that more work is
    needed to improve the security of the system. Transportation security
    experts and representatives from transportation industry and state and
    local government associations identified a number of future actions
    needed; and

    stated that the identified actions are primarily the responsibility of the
    federal government. For instance, representatives from industry and state
    and local government associations told us that clarifying federal roles
    and coordinating federal efforts is important because their members are
    not clear about which agency to contact for their various security
    concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues. Some
    representatives from the transportation industry and state and local
    government associations

    also noted that they have received conflicting messages from the different
    federal entities.

    We are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
    Secretary of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a memorandum of
    agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT
    in transportation security matters. We provided draft copies of this
    report to Amtrak, DOT, and DHS for their review and comment. Amtrak
    generally agreed with our findings and recommendation and provided some
    technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. DOT

    and DHS generally agreed with the report*s findings; however, they
    disagreed with the conclusions and recommendation that their roles and
    responsibilities in transportation security matters need to be clarified.
    We continue to believe our recommendation would help address

    transportation security challenges, based on our discussions with
    transportation security stakeholders. For example, representatives from
    several associations stated that their members were unclear as to which
    agency to contact for their various security concerns and which agency has
    oversight for certain issues. Furthermore, both entities are moving
    forward

    with their security efforts, and both entities have statutory
    responsibilities for transportation security. Therefore, we continue to
    recommend that DOT and DHS clarify and delineate their roles and
    responsibilities in security matters and communicate this information to
    stakeholders. (See app. II and app. III for DOT and DHS comments and our
    responses.)

    Background The nation*s transportation system is a vast, interconnected
    network of diverse modes. Key modes of transportation include aviation;
    highways;

    motor carrier (i. e., trucking); motor coach (i. e., intercity bus);
    maritime; pipeline; rail (passenger and freight); and transit (e. g.,
    buses, subways, ferry boats, and light rail). The transportation modes
    work in harmony to facilitate mobility through an extensive network of
    infrastructure and operators, as well as through the vehicles and vessels
    that permit passengers and freight to move within the system. For example,
    the nation*s transportation system moves over 30 million tons of freight
    and provides approximately 1.1 billion passenger trips each day. The
    diversity and size of the transportation system make it vital to our
    economy and national security, including military mobilization and
    deployment.

    Given the important role the transportation system plays in our economy,
    security, and every- day life, the transportation system is considered a
    critical infrastructure. The USA PATRIOT Act defines critical
    infrastructure as those *systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
    so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
    systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
    economy security, national public health or safety, or combination of
    those matters.* 5 In the

    National Strategy for Homeland Security, the administration identifies the
    transportation system as one of the 13 critical infrastructure sectors
    that must be protected. The administration*s National Strategy for the
    Physical

    Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets defines the
    administration*s plan for protecting our critical infrastructures and key
    assets, including the transportation system, from terrorist attacks. This
    strategy also outlines the guiding principles that will underpin the
    nation's efforts to secure the infrastructures vital to national security,
    governance, the economy and public confidence. The strategy is designed to
    serve as a foundation for building and fostering the necessary cooperation
    between

    5 P. L. No. 107- 56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

    government, private industry and citizens in protecting critical
    infrastructures.

    Private industry, state and local governments, and the federal government
    all have roles and responsibilities in securing the transportation system.
    Private industry owns and operates a large share of the transportation
    system. For example, almost 2, 000 pipeline companies and 571 railroad
    companies own and operate the pipeline and freight railroad systems,

    respectively. Additionally, 83 passenger air carriers and 640,000
    interstate motor coach and motor carrier companies operate in the United
    States. State and local governments also own significant portions of the
    highways, transit systems, and airports in the country. For example, state
    and local

    governments own over 90 percent of the total mileage of highways. State
    and local governments also administer and implement regulations for
    different sectors of the transportation system and provide protective and
    emergency response services through various agencies. Although the federal
    government owns a limited share of the transportation system, it issues
    regulations, establishes policies, provides funding, and/ or sets

    standards for the different modes of transportation. The federal
    government uses a variety of policy tools, including grants, loan
    guarantees, tax incentives, regulations, and partnerships, to motivate or

    mandate state and local governments or the private sector to help address
    security concerns.

    Prior to September 11, DOT was the primary federal entity involved in
    transportation security matters. However, in response to the attacks on
    September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security

    Act (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary
    responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. 6 The
    act also gives TSA regulatory authority over all transportation modes.
    Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has focused primarily on meeting
    the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. With the passage of the
    Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, TSA, along with over 20 other
    agencies, was transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS). 7 6 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

    7 P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

    Throughout the world, all modes of transportation have been targets of
    terrorist attacks. For example, aviation has long been an attractive
    target for terrorists. Aircraft hijackings became a regular occurrence in
    the 1970s,

    leading to the first efforts in aviation security. In 1988, a Pan Am
    flight was bombed over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 on board. In
    1995, a plot to bomb as many as 11 U. S. airliners was discovered. Most
    recently, U. S. aircraft were hijacked on September 11, 2001, and crashed
    into the World

    Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D. C., and a
    field in Pennsylvania, killing about 3,000 people and destroying billions
    of dollars* worth of property.

    Public surface transportation systems have also been a common target for
    terrorist attacks around the world. For example, the first large- scale
    terrorist use of a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 on the Tokyo subway
    system. In this attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a subway
    train, killing 11 people and injuring 5,500. According to the Mineta
    Transportation Institute, 8 surface transportation systems were the target
    of

    more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997 through 2000. The Transportation

    The United States maintains the world*s largest and most complex national
    System as a Whole

    transportation system. Improving the security of such a system is fraught
    with challenges for both public and private entities. To provide safe
    Faces Numerous

    transportation for the nation, these entities must overcome issues common
    Challenges

    to all modes of transportation as well as issues specific to the
    individual modes of transportation.

    All Modes of Transportation Although each mode of transportation is
    unique, they all face some

    Face Common Challenges common challenges in trying to enhance security.
    Common challenges

    stem from the extensiveness of the transportation system, the
    interconnectivity of the system, funding security improvements, and the
    number of stakeholders involved in transportation security.

    8 Congress, as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
    Act of 1991 (ISTEA), established the Mineta Transportation Institute. The
    Institute focuses on international surface transportation policy issues as
    related to three primary responsibilities: research, education, and
    technology transfer.

    Size and Diversity of The size of the transportation system makes it
    difficult to adequately

    Transportation Modes Create secure. The transportation system*s extensive
    infrastructure crisscrosses Security Challenges

    the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers
    and tons of freight each day. (See fig. 1 for maps of the different
    transportation modes.) The extensiveness of the infrastructure as well as
    the sheer volume of freight and passengers moved through the system
    creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists. Furthermore, as
    industry representatives and transportation security experts repeatedly
    noted, the extensiveness of the infrastructure makes it impossible to
    equally protect all assets.

    Figure 1: Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of
    Transportation Airports

    Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
    FTA data. Note: This map shows the location of all airports with Federal
    Security Directors except for the nine airports in Puerto Rico, the Virgin
    Islands, the American Samoa, and the Mariana Islands. Federal

    Security Directors are TSA employees who oversee federal security
    operations at the nation*s airports. A total of 433 airports are shown in
    this map.

    Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
    (Continued) Ports

    Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
    FTA data. Note: This map shows the location of all U. S. ports for eight
    ports located in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. A total of 353 ports
    are shown.

    Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
    (Continued) Highways

    Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
    FTA data. Note: This map shows the National Highway Planning Network. It
    does not show all urban and rural roads in the United States.

    Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
    (Continued) Rail

    Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
    FTA data. Note: This map shows the rail lines of Class I railroads, which
    are the largest railroads, as defined by operating revenue. Class I
    railroads represent the majority of rail freight activity.

    Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
    (Continued) Transit

    Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
    FTA data. Note: This map shows the location of all mass transit agencies
    that were eligible to receive federal urbanized area formula funding in
    2001, except for 13 transit agencies located in Puerto Rico. A total of
    589 transit agencies are shown.

    Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes of Transportation
    (Continued) Pipelines

    Source: GAO presentation of Bureau of Transportation statistics, TSA, and
    FTA data. Note: This map shows the location of pipelines that are at least
    12 inches in diameter, which accounts for the majority of all pipeline
    capacity.

    Protecting transportation assets from attack is made more difficult
    because of the tremendous variety of transportation operators. Some are
    multibillion- dollar enterprises, while others have very limited
    facilities and very little traffic. Some are public agencies, such as
    state departments of transportation, while some are private businesses.
    The type of freight moved through the different modes is similarly varied.
    For example, the maritime, motor carrier, and rail operators haul freight
    as diverse as dry bulk (grain) and hazardous materials. Additionally, some
    transportation operators carry passengers while others haul freight.

    Interconnectivity and Additional challenges are created by the
    interconnectivity and Interdependency Also Present

    interdependency among the transportation modes and between the Challenges

    transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The
    transportation system is interconnected or intermodal because passengers
    and freight can use multiple modes of transportation to reach a
    destination. For example, from its point of origin to its destination, a
    piece of freight, such as a shipping container, can move from ship to
    train to truck. (See fig. 2.) The interconnective nature of the
    transportation system creates several security challenges. First, events
    directed at one mode of transportation can have ripple effects throughout
    the entire system. For example, when

    the port workers in California, Oregon, and Washington went on strike in
    2002, the railroads saw their intermodal traffic decline by almost 30
    percent during the first week of the strike, compared with the year
    before. Second, the interconnecting modes can contaminate each other* that
    is, if a particular mode experiences a security breach, the breach could
    affect other modes. 9 An example of this would be if a shipping container
    that held a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a U. S. port where it
    was placed on a truck or train. In this case, although the original
    security breach occurred

    in the port, the rail or trucking industry would be affected as well.
    Thus, even if operators within one mode established high levels of
    security they could be affected because of the security efforts, or lack
    thereof, of the other modes. Third, intermodal facilities where a number
    of modes connect and interact* such as ports* are potential targets for
    attack because of the

    presence of passenger, freight, employees, and equipment at these
    facilities. (See fig. 3.)

    9 Similarly, there are opportunities for cross contamination within the
    same mode. For example, a bag containing an explosive device could be
    placed on one airline and then transferred to another airline where it
    explodes.

    Figure 2: Illustration of Possible Freight Movements within the
    Transportation System 1. 7.

    Overseas Destination

    factory

    2. STOP Maritime

    6.

    Truck

    3.

    U. S. port

    4. 5.

    Rail Distribution center

    Source: GAO.

    Figure 3: Intermodal Activity at a U. S. Port

    Interdependencies also exist between transportation and nearly every other
    sector of the economy. Consequently, an event that affects the
    transportation sector can have serious impacts on other industries. For
    example, when the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the rail
    industry stated that it restricted the movement of many hazardous

    materials, including chlorine, because of a heightened threat of a
    terrorist attack. However, within days, many major water treatment
    facilities reported that they were running out of chlorine, which they use
    to treat drinking water, and would have to shut down operations if
    chlorine deliveries were not immediately resumed. Additionally, the
    transportation system can be affected by other sectors. For example,
    representatives of the motor coach industry told us that the drop in the
    tourism industry has negatively affected motor coach profits.

    The Number of Stakeholders Securing the transportation system is made more
    difficult because of the

    Creates Challenges number of stakeholders involved. As illustrated in
    figure 4, numerous

    entities at the federal, state, and local levels, including over 20
    federal entities and thousands of private sector businesses, play a key
    role in transportation security. For example, the Departments of Energy,

    Transportation, and Homeland Security, state governments, and about 2,000
    pipeline operators are all responsible for securing the pipeline system.
    The number of stakeholders involved in transportation security can lead to
    communication challenges, duplication, and conflicting

    guidance. Representatives from several state and local government and
    industry associations told us that their members are receiving different
    messages from the various federal agencies involved in transportation
    security. For instance, one industry representative noted that both TSA
    and DOT asked the industry to implement additional security measures when

    the nation*s threat condition was elevated to orange at the beginning of
    the Iraq War; 10 however, TSA and DOT were not consistent in what they
    wanted done* that is, they were asking for different security measures.
    Moreover, many representatives commented that the federal government needs
    to

    better coordinate its security efforts. These representatives noted that
    dealing with multiple agencies on the same issues and topics is
    frustrating and time consuming for the transportation sector.

    10 DHS created the Homeland Security Advisory System. The system has five
    threat conditions* ranging from low to severe* representing different
    levels of risk for terrorist attacks.

    Figure 4: Key Stakeholders in Transportation Security

    Coast Bureau of

    Guard Citizenship and

    Federal Federal Immigration

    Local Highway Railroad

    Pipeline Services

    governments Administration

    Administration operators

    Federal Aviation Admnistration

    Operators of Saint ports

    Chemical shippers

    DOE Seaway Lawrence State

    Development governments

    Corporation Federal

    Information and Bureau of agencies intelligence Infrastructure

    Analysis Customs and

    Industry National Highway Railroads

    Protection Border

    associations Traffic Safety

    Protection Administration

    Maritime Marine

    Military Traffic Administration

    vessel Amtrak

    Management Federal

    operators Command

    Emergency Bureau of

    Federal Management Investigation

    Agency Federal Motor

    Tr ansit Transportation Operators of

    Carrier Safety operators

    Security airports

    Federal Administration

    Administration Transit

    Administration and

    Office of the carriers Information

    and Research Programs Office of the

    Secretary of Air Sharing Analysis Special Secretary of

    Transportation workers

    Transportation Labor Centers

    Administration Homeland

    Security unions

    Federal State and local Private Other a Source: GAO.

    a *Other* includes private, public, or quasi- public entities.

    The number of stakeholders also makes it difficult to achieve the needed
    cooperation and consensus to move forward with security efforts. As we
    have noted in past reports, coordination and consensus- building is
    critical to successful implementation of security efforts. 11
    Transportation stakeholders can have inconsistent goals or interests,
    which can make consensus- building challenging. For example, from a safety
    perspective, vehicles that carry hazardous materials should be required to
    have placards that identify the contents of a vehicle so that emergency
    personnel know how best to respond to an incident. However, from a
    security perspective, identifying placards on vehicles that carry
    hazardous materials make them a potential target for attack.

    Funding Is A Key Challenge According to transportation security experts
    and state and local government and industry representatives we contacted,
    funding is the most pressing challenge to securing the nation*s
    transportation system. While some security improvements are inexpensive,
    such as removing trash cans from subway platforms, most require
    substantial funding. Additionally, given the large number of assets to
    protect, the sum of even relatively less

    expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. For example, reinforcing
    shipping containers to make them more blast resistant is one way to
    improve security, which would cost about $15,000 per container. With
    several million shipping containers in use, however, this tactic would
    cost billions of dollars if all of them were reinforced. The total cost of
    enhancing the security of the entire transportation system is unknown;
    however, given the size of the system, it could amount to tens of billions
    of dollars. The magnitude of the potential cost is illustrated by several
    examples:

     The President*s fiscal year 2004 budget request for TSA includes about
    $4.5 billion for aviation security. According to TSA, this funding will be
    used for security screeners, air marshals, aviation related research and
    development, and surveillance detection techniques, among other things.

     The total estimated cost of the identified security improvements at
    eight mass transit agencies we visited was about $711 million. 12

    11 See *Related GAO Products.* 12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Mass
    Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
    Challenges, GAO- 03- 263 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).

     The Coast Guard estimates the cost of implementing the new International
    Maritime Organization security code 13 and the security provisions in the
    Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 14 to be approximately $1.5
    billion for the first year and $7.4 billion over the succeeding decade.

     The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
    (AASHTO) 15 estimates that enhancing highway and transit security will
    cost $2 billion annually in capital costs and $1 billion in operating
    costs.

    The current economic environment makes this a difficult time for the
    private industry or state and local governments to make security
    investments. According to industry representatives and experts we
    contacted, most of the transportation industry operates on a very thin
    profit margin, making it difficult to pay for additional security
    measures.

    The sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation industry*s
    financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. For example,
    airlines are in the worst fiscal crisis in their history and several have
    filed for bankruptcy. Similarly, the motor coach and motor carrier
    industries and Amtrak report decreased revenues because of the slow
    economy. In addition, nearly every state and local government are facing a
    large budget deficit for fiscal year 2004. For example, the National
    Governors

    Association estimates that states are facing a total budget shortfall of
    $80 billion this upcoming year. Given the tight budget environment, state
    and local governments and transportation operators must make difficult
    tradeoffs between transportation security investments and other needs,
    such as service expansion and equipment upgrades. According to the
    National Association of Counties, many local governments are planning to
    defer some maintenance of their transportation infrastructure to pay for
    some security enhancements.

    13 The International Maritime Organization, an United Nations agency
    devoted exclusively to maritime matters, adopted international measures
    for port and shipping security in December 2002.

    14 P. L. No. 107- 295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 15 AASHTO is a nonprofit,
    nonpartisan association representing highway and transportation
    departments in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

    Further exacerbating the problem of funding security improvements is the
    additional costs the transportation sector incurs when the federal
    government elevates the national threat condition. Industry
    representatives stated that operators tighten security, such as increasing
    security patrols, when the national threat condition is raised or
    intelligence information suggests an increased threat against their mode.
    However, these representatives stated that these additional measures drain
    resources and are not sustainable. For example, Amtrak estimates that it
    spends an additional $500,000 per month for police overtime when the
    national threat condition is increased. Transportation industry
    representatives also noted that employees are diverted from their regular
    duties to implement

    additional security measures, such as guarding entranceways, in times of
    increased security, which hurts productivity.

    The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation
    security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional
    amounts made available. For example, Congress appropriated a total of $241
    million for grants for ports, motor carriers, and Operation Safe Commerce
    in 2002. 16 However, as table 1 shows, the grant applications received by
    TSA for these security grants totaled $1.8 billion* 7 times more than the
    amount available. Due to the costs of security enhancements and the
    transportation industries* and state and local governments* tight budget
    environments, the federal government is likely to be viewed as a source of
    funding for at least some of these enhancements. However, given the
    constraints on the federal budget as well as competing claims for federal
    assistance, requests for federal funding for transportation security
    enhancements will likely continue to exceed available resources.

    16 Operation Safe Commerce focuses on using new technology, such as
    container seals, to help shippers ensure the integrity of the cargo
    included in containers being sent to the United States.

    Table 1: Comparison of Transportation Security Grant Requests to Federal
    Funding Available, 2002 to 2003

    Dollars in millions

    Total amount requested Type of grant Amount appropriated in all grant
    applications

    Port security grants a $93.3 $697 Port security grants b 105 996 Intercity
    bus grants b 15 45.6 Operation Safe Commerce

    28 97.9 grants b Total $241.3 $1, 836.5

    Source: TSA. Note: Both the Department of Defense and Emergency
    Supplemental Appropriations Act (P. L. No. 107- 117) and the Supplemental
    Appropriations Act (P. L. No. 107- 206) provided funding for port security
    grants.

    a P. L. No. 107- 117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002). b P. L. No. 107- 206, 116
    Stat. 820 (2002).

    Balancing Potential Economic Another challenge is balancing the potential
    economic impacts of security

    Impacts and Security enhancements with the benefits of such measures.
    While there is broad Enhancements Is Also

    support for greater security, this task is a difficult one because the
    nation Challenging

    relies heavily on a free and expeditious flow of goods. Particularly with
    *just in time* deliveries, which require a smooth and expeditious flow
    through the transportation system, delays or disruptions in the supply
    chain could have serious economic impacts. As the Coast Guard

    Commandant stated about the flow of goods through ports, *even slowing the
    flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant
    random selection of imports would be economically intolerable.* 17

    Furthermore, security measures may have economic and competitive
    ramifications for individual modes of transportation. For instance, if the
    federal government imposed a particular security requirement on the rail
    industry and not on the motor carrier industry, the rail industry might
    incur additional costs and/ or lose customers to the motor carrier
    industry. Striking the right balance between increasing security and
    protecting 17 Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled
    Strategy for a Balanced and

    Practical Response (September 2001); and Global Trade: America*s Achilles*
    Heel (February 2002) by Admiral James M. Loy and Captain Robert G. Ross,
    U. S. Coast Guard.

    economic vitality of the national economy and individual modes will remain
    an important and difficult task.

    Individual Transportation In addition to the overarching challenges that
    transportation stakeholders

    Modes Also Confront will face in attempting to improve transportation
    security, they also face a

    Unique Challenges number of challenges specific to the aviation, maritime,
    and land

    transportation modes. Although aviation security has received a
    significant amount of attention and funding since September 11, more work
    is needed. In general, transportation security experts believe that the
    aviation system is more secure today than it was prior to September 11.
    However, aviation experts and TSA officials noted significant
    vulnerabilities remain,

    including: 18  Perimeter security: Terrorists could launch attacks, such
    as launching shoulder- fired missiles, from a location just outside an
    airport*s perimeter. Since September 11, airport operators have increased
    their patrols of airport perimeter areas, but industry officials state
    that they do not have enough resources to completely protect against these
    attacks.  Air cargo security: Although TSA has focused much effort and
    funding

    on ensuring that bombs and other threat items are not carried onto planes
    by passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in securing the
    cargo carried aboard commercial passenger and all- cargo aircraft. For
    example, employees of shippers and freight forwarders are not universally
    subject to a background check. Theft is also a major problem in air cargo
    shipping, signifying that unauthorized personnel may still be gaining
    access to air cargo shipments. Air cargo shipments pass through

    several hands in going from sender to recipient, making it challenging to
    implement a system that provides adequate security for air cargo.
    According to TSA officials, TSA is developing a strategic plan to address
    air cargo security and has undertaken a comprehensive outreach process to
    strengthen security programs across the industry.

    18 See *Related GAO Products* at the end of this report for information on
    GAO reports that examine aviation security issues.

     General aviation security: While TSA has taken several actions related
    to general aviation 19 since September 11, this segment of the industry
    remains potentially more vulnerable than commercial aviation. For example,
    general aviation pilots are not screened prior to taking off and the
    contents of a plane are not examined at any point. According to TSA,
    solutions that can be implemented relatively easily at the nation*s
    commercial airports are not practical at the 19, 000 general aviation
    airports. It would be very difficult to prevent a general aviation pilot
    who is intent on committing a terrorist attack with his or her aircraft
    from doing so. The vulnerability of the system was illustrated in January
    2002, when a Florida teenage flight student crashed his single- engine
    airplane into a Tampa skyscraper. 20 TSA is working with the appropriate

    stakeholders to close potential security gaps and to raise the security
    standards across this diverse segment of the aviation industry. Maritime
    and land transportation systems have their own unique security
    vulnerabilities. For example, maritime and land transportation systems

    generally have an open design, meaning the users can access the system at
    multiple points. The systems are open by design so that they are
    accessible and convenient for users. In contrast, the aviation system is
    housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The
    openness of the

    maritime and land transportation systems can leave them vulnerable because
    transportation operators cannot monitor or control who enters or leaves
    the systems. However, adding security measures that restrict the flow of
    passengers or freight through the systems could have serious consequences
    for commerce and the public. Individual maritime and land transportation
    modes also have unique

    challenges and vulnerabilities. For example, representatives from the
    motor carrier industry noted that the high turnover rate (about 40 to 60
    percent) of drivers means that motor carrier operators must be continually
    conducting background checks on new drivers, which is expensive and time
    consuming. Additionally, representatives from the motor coach

    industry commented that the number of used motor coaches on the market
    coupled with the lack of guidance or requirements on buying or selling
    these vehicles is a serious vulnerability. In particular, there are

    19 General aviation includes more than 200,000 corporate- and privately-
    owned aircraft at over 19, 000 airports. 20 It should be noted that this
    event was not a terrorist attack.

    approximately 5,000 used motor coaches on the market; however, there is
    very little information on who is selling and buying them, nor is there
    any consistency among motor coach operators in whether they remove their
    logos from the vehicles before they are sold. These vehicles could be used
    as a weapon or to transport a weapon. Federal Motor Carrier Safety

    Administration officials told us they have not issued guidance to the
    industry on this potential vulnerability because TSA is responsible for
    security and therefore would be responsible for issuing such guidance.

    Transportation Since September 11, transportation operators and state and
    local

    Operators and State governments have been working to strengthen security,
    according to

    associations we contacted. Although security was a priority before and
    Local

    September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of
    Governments Have transportation security for transportation operators and
    state and local

    Taken Steps to governments. The industry has been consistently operating
    at a heightened

    state of security since September 11. State and local governments have
    also Improve Security

    made transportation security investments since September 11.
    Transportation Operators

    According to representatives from a number of industry associations we
    Have Undertaken a Variety

    interviewed, 21 transportation operators have implemented new security of
    Security- Enhancing measures or increased the frequency or intensity of
    existing activities.

    Actions Some of the most common measures cited include:

     Conducted vulnerability or risk assessments: Many transportation
    operators conducted assessments of their systems to identify potential
    vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure or assets, and corrective actions
    or needed security improvements. For example, the railroad industry
    conducted a risk assessment, that identified over 1,300 critical assets
    and served as a foundation for the industry*s security plan.

     Tightened access control: Many transportation operators have tightened
    access control to their facilities and equipment by installing fences and
    requiring employees to display identification cards, among

    21 Some of the industry associations we contacted include the American Bus
    Association, American Gas Association, American Trucking Associations, and
    Association of American Railroads. See appendix I for a complete list of
    industry associations we contacted.

    other things. For example, some motor carrier operators have installed
    fences around truck yards and locked inventory at night.

     Intensified security presence: Some transportation operators have
    increased the number of police or security who patrol their systems. For
    example, transit agencies have placed surveillance equipment, alarms, or
    security personnel at access points to subway tunnels, bus yards, and
    other nonpublic places and required employees to wear brightly colored
    vests for increased visibility.

     Increased emergency drills: Many transportation operators have increased
    the frequency of emergency drills. For example, Amtrak reported that it
    has conducted two full- scale emergency drills in New York City and is
    currently trying to arrange a drill at Union Station in Washington, D. C.
    The purpose of emergency drilling is to test emergency plans, identify
    problems, and develop corrective actions. Figure 5 is a photograph from an
    annual emergency drill conducted by the Washington Metropolitan Area
    Transit Authority.

    Figure 5: Emergency Drill in Progress

     Developed or revised security plans: Transportation operators developed
    security plans or reviewed existing plans to determine, what changes, if
    any, needed to be made. For example, DOT*s Office of Pipeline Safety
    worked with the industry to develop performance

    oriented security guidance. The Office of Pipeline Safety also encouraged
    all pipeline operators to develop security plans and directed operators
    with critical facilities to develop security plans for these

    facilities.

     Provided additional training: Many transportation operators have either
    participated in and/ or conducted additional training on security or
    antiterrorism. For example, the United Motorcoach Association is
    developing an online security training program for motor coach operators,
    using funds from the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program. Similarly, many
    transit agencies attended seminars conducted by FTA or

    by the American Public Transportation Association. Some transportation
    industries have also implemented more innovative security measures,
    according to associations we contacted. For example, the natural gas
    industry modeled the impact of pipeline outages on the natural gas supply
    in the Northeast, which helped to identify vulnerabilities and needed
    improvements. The motor carrier industry developed a program called the
    Highway Watch Program, supported by the American Trucking Associations. 22
    The program is a driver- led, state- organized safety system that since
    September 11 has included a security component. Specifically, drivers are
    provided terrorism awareness training and are encouraged to report
    suspicious activities they witness on the road to a

    Highway Watch Program call center, which is operated 24 hours a day, 7
    days a week. The call center then directs the call to appropriate
    authorities.

    State and Local As we have previously reported, state and local
    governments are critical Governments Have Also

    stakeholders in the nation*s homeland security efforts. 23 This is equally
    true Increased Security- Related

    in securing the nation*s transportation system. State and local
    governments Efforts

    play a critical role, in part, because they own a significant portion of
    the transportation infrastructure, such as airports, transit systems,
    highways, and ports. For example, state and local governments own over 90
    percent of the total mileage of the highway system. Even when state and
    local governments are not the owners or operators, they nonetheless are
    directly affected by the transportation modes that run through their
    jurisdictions.

    Consequently, the responsibility for protecting this infrastructure and
    responding to emergencies involving the transportation infrastructure
    often falls to state and local governments.

    22 The Highway Watch Program is funded by a $500,000 grant from the
    Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. 23 See *Related GAO Products*
    at the end of this report.

    Security efforts of local and state governments have included developing
    counter terrorist plans, participating in training and security- related
    research, participating in transportation operators* emergency drills and
    table- top exercises, conducting vulnerability assessments of
    transportation assets, and participating in emergency planning sessions
    with transportation operators. Some state and local governments have also
    hired additional law enforcement personnel to patrol transportation
    assets. Much of the funding for these efforts has been covered by the
    state and local governments, with a bulk of the expenses going to
    personnel costs,

    such as additional law enforcement officers and overtime. Congress and
    Federal The Congress, DOT, TSA, and other federal agencies, took numerous
    steps Agencies Have Taken

    to enhance transportation security since September 11. The roles of the
    federal agencies in securing the nation*s transportation system, however,
    Numerous Actions to

    are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had primary responsibility
    for Enhance Security, but

    the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11,
    Roles Remain Unclear

    Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the security of all
    modes of transportation. However, DOT and TSA have not yet formally
    defined their roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of
    transportation. Furthermore, TSA is moving forward with plans to enhance
    transportation security. For example, TSA plans to issue security
    standards for all modes. DOT modal administrations are also continuing
    their security efforts for different modes of transportation.

    Congress and Federal Congress has acted to enhance the security of the
    nation*s transportation

    Agencies Have Acted to system since September 11. In addition to passing
    the Aviation and

    Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 24 Congress passed numerous pieces of
    Enhance Transportation

    legislation aimed at improving transportation security. For example,
    Security

    Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 25 which mandates federal
    background checks of individuals operating vehicles carrying hazardous
    materials and the Homeland Security Act, 26 which created DHS and moved
    TSA to the new department. 27 Congress also provided funding for

    transportation security enhancements through various appropriations acts.
    24 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 25 P. L. No. 107- 56, 115
    Stat. 272 (2001). 26 P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

    For example, the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act, in part, provided
    (1) $738 million for the installation of explosives detection systems in
    commercial service airports, (2) $125 million for port security
    activities, and (3) $15 million to enhance the security of intercity bus
    operations. (See app. IV for a listing of the key pieces of transportation
    security- related legislation that has been passed since September 11.)
    Federal agencies, notably TSA and DOT, have also taken steps to enhance

    transportation security since September 11. In its first year of
    existence, TSA worked to establish its organization and focused primarily
    on meeting the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. In January
    2002, TSA had 13 employees to tackle securing the nation*s transportation
    system* 1 year later, TSA had about 65, 000 employees. TSA reports that it
    met over 30 deadlines during 2002 to improve aviation security, including
    two of its

    most significant deadlines* to deploy federal passenger screeners at
    airports across the nation by November 19, 2002, and to screen every piece
    of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2002. 28 According to
    TSA, other completed TSA activities included the following:  recruiting,
    hiring, training, and deploying about 56,000 federal screeners.

     awarding grants for port security; and  implementing performance
    management system and strategic planning

    activities to create a results- oriented culture. As TSA worked to
    establish itself and improve the security of the aviation system, DOT
    modal administrations acted to enhance security of air, land,

    27 The U. S. Coast Guard was also transferred to DHS. In the Terms of
    Reference Regarding the Respective roles of the U. S. Coast Guard and the
    Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard is designated as
    the lead DHS agency for maritime security and is directed to coordinate as
    appropriate with other agencies. The document further notes that a
    supporting memorandum of agreement between the Commandant of the Coast
    Guard and the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration
    is being developed.

    28 The Homeland Security Act, P. L. 107- 296 (November 25, 2002) the
    legislation that created DHS, amended this deadline to allow some airports
    up to an extra year (December 31, 2003) to deploy all of the necessary
    explosive detection equipment to enable TSA to screen all checked baggage.
    TSA reported that as of December 31, 2002, about 90 percent of all checked
    baggage were screened with an explosive detection system or explosives
    trace detection equipment and the remaining checked baggage was screened
    using alternative means as is allowed under the law.

    and maritime transportation. As table 2 shows, the actions taken by DOT
    modal administrations varied. For example, FTA launched a multipart
    initiative for mass transit agencies, which provided grants for emergency
    drills, offered free security training, conducted security assessments at
    36

    transit agencies, provided technical assistance, and invested in research
    and development. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration developed
    three courses for motor coach drivers. The response of various DOT modal
    agencies to the threat of terrorist attacks on the transportation system
    has varied due to differences in authority and resource limitations.

    Table 2: Key Actions Taken By DOT Modal Administrations to Secure the
    Different Transportation Modes, September 2001 to May 2003

    Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions taken

    All (transport of Research and Special  Established regulations for
    shippers and transporters of certain hazardous materials

    hazardous Programs Administration

    to develop and implement security plans and to require security awareness
    training materials) (Office of Hazardous Materials

    for hazmat employees. Safety)

     Developed hazardous materials transportation security awareness training
    for law enforcement, the industry, and the hazmat community.  Published
    security advisory, which identifies measures that could enhance the
    security of the transport of hazardous materials.  Investigated the
    security risks associated with placarding hazardous materials, including
    whether removing placards from certain shipments improve shipment
    security, and whether alternative methods for communicating safety hazards
    could

    be deployed. Aviation Federal Aviation  Established rule for
    strengthening cockpit doors on commercial aircraft.

    Administration  Issued guidance to flight school operators for additional
    security measures.  Assisted Department of Justice in increasing
    background check requirements for foreign nationals seeking pilot
    certificates.  Increased access restrictions at air traffic control
    facilities.  Developed computer security strategy.

    Highways Federal Highway  Provided vulnerability assessment and emergency
    preparedness workshops. Administration  Developed and prioritized list of
    highway security research and development

    projects.  Convened blue ribbon panel on bridge and tunnel
    vulnerabilities.

    Maritime U. S. Coast Guard a  Activated and deployed port security units
    to help support local port security patrols in high threat areas.
    Boarded and inspected ships to search for threats and confirmed the
    identity of

    those aboard.  Conducted initial assessments of the nation*s ports to
    identify vessel types and facilities that pose a high risk of being
    involved in a transportation security incident.  Established a new
    centralized National Vessel Movement Center to track the movement of all
    foreign- flagged vessels entering U. S. ports of call.

     Established new guidelines for developing security plans and
    implementing security measures for passenger vessels and passenger
    terminals.  Used the pollution and hazardous materials expertise of the
    Coast Guards* National Strike Force to prepare for and respond to
    bioterrorism and weapons of mass

    destruction. Maritime Administration

     Increased port security and terrorism emphasis at National Port
    Readiness Network Port Readiness Exercises.  Provided port security
    training and developed standards and curriculum to educate and train
    maritime security personnel.  Increased access restrictions and
    established new security procedures for the Ready Reserve Force.

     Provided merchant mariner background checks for Ready Reserve Force and
    sealift vessels in support of Department of Defense and Coast Guard
    requirements.  Provided merchant mariner force protection training.

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions taken

    Motor carrier Federal Motor Carrier Safety  Conducted 31, 000 on- site
    security sensitivity visits for hazardous materials carriers;

    Administration made recommendations after visits.  Initiated a field
    operational test to evaluate different safety and security technologies
    and procedures, and identify the most cost effective means for protecting
    different types of hazardous cargo for security purposes.  Provided free
    training on trucks and terrorism to law enforcement officials and industry
    representatives.  Conducted threat assessment of the hazardous materials
    industry.

    Motor coach Federal Motor Carrier Safety  Developed three courses for
    drivers on security- related information including,

    Administration different threats, how to deal with packages, and how to
    respond in the case of an emergency.

    Pipeline Research and Special  Developed contact list of operators who
    own critical systems. Programs Administration

     Convened blue ribbon panel with operators, state regulators, and unions
    to develop (Office of Pipeline Safety)

    a better understanding of the pipeline system and coordinate efforts of
    the stakeholders.  Worked with TSA to develop inspection protocols to use
    for pipeline operator security inspections. The Office of Pipeline Safety
    and TSA have begun the

    inspection of major operators.  Created email network of pipeline
    operators and a call- in telephone number that pipeline operators can use
    to obtain information.  Directed pipeline operators to identify critical
    facilities and develop security plans for critical facilities that address
    deterrence, preparedness, and rapid response and recovery from attacks.

     Worked with industry to develop risk- based security guidance, which is
    tied to national threat levels and includes voluntary, recommended
    countermeasures.

    Rail Federal Railroad  Shared threat information with railroads and rail
    labor. Administration  Reviewed Association of American Railroads* and
    Amtrak*s security plans.

     Assisted commuter railroads with their security plans.  Provided
    funding for security assessments of three commuter railroads, which were
    included in FTA*s assessment efforts.  Reached out to international
    community for lessons- learned in rail security.

    Transit Federal Transit Administration  Awarded $3.4 million in grants to
    over 80 transit agencies for emergency response drills.  Offered free
    security training to transit agencies.  Conducted security assessments at
    the largest 36 transit agencies.  Provided technical assistance to 19,
    with a goal of 60, transit agencies on security and emergency plans and
    emergency response drills.  Increased funding for security research and
    development efforts. Source: GAO presentation of information provided by
    DOT modal administrations.

    a The U. S. Coast Guard was transferred to DHS in the Homeland Security
    Act of 2002 (P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)).

    In addition to TSA and DOT modal administrations, other federal agencies
    have also taken actions to improve security. 29 For example, the Bureau of

    29 See appendix IV for highlights of final regulations issued since
    September 11 that govern transportation security.

    Customs and Border Protection (CBP), previously known as the U. S. Customs
    Service, has played a key role in improving port security. 30 Since
    September 11, the agency has launched a number of initiatives to
    strengthen the security of the U. S. border, including ports. The
    initiatives are part of a multilayered approach, which rely on
    partnerships between foreign nations and the U. S. to identify problems at
    their source, cooperation from the global trade community to secure the
    flow of goods, and collaboration between federal, state, and local law
    enforcement and intelligence agencies to ensure that information is
    analyzed and used to

    target scarce resources on the highest risk issues. Some of the specific
    initiatives that CBP has implemented to interdict high risk cargo before
    it reaches the U. S. include the following:

     Developing and deploying of a strategy for the detection of nuclear and
    radiological weapons and materials. The elements of this strategy*
    equipment, training, and intelligence* are focused on providing inspectors
    with the tools to detect weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers
    and vehicles. In the maritime environment, this includes the deployment of
    radiation portal monitors, personal radiation detectors,

    large- scale nonintrusive inspection technology, such as truck and
    container x- rays and mobile x- ray vans. Much of the development of this
    equipment has been done in partnership with the Department of Energy.
    Figure 6 shows new mobile gamma ray imaging devices at ports to help
    inspectors examine the contents of cargo containers and vehicles. 30 The
    U. S. Customs Service was transferred from the Department of Treasury to
    DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat.
    2135 (2002)) and renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.

    Figure 6: Photograph of Inspection Equipment in Use

     Establishing the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT),
    which is a joint government business initiative aimed at securing the
    supply chain of global trade against terrorist exploitation. According to
    CBP, this initiative has leveraged the cooperation of the owners of the
    global supply chain by working with this community to implement and share
    standard security best practices. The members of C- TPAT include importing
    businesses, freight forwarders, carriers, and U. S. port

    authorities and terminal operators. According to CBP, C- TPAT members
    bring 96 percent of all containers coming into the U. S. After the initial
    application and training phase of this program, CBP conducts foreign and
    domestic validations to verify that the supply chain security

    measures contained in C- TPAT participants* security profiles are
    reliable, accurate, and effective. C- TPAT members are strongly encouraged
    to self- police such areas as personnel screening, physical security
    procedures and personnel, and the security of service providers.

     Launching the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which is designed
    specifically to secure the ocean- going sea container. The key elements of
    CSI include using advance information to identify high- risk containers;
    inspecting containers identified through the prescreening process as high-
    risk before they are shipped to the U. S.; using detection

    technology to quickly inspect containers identified as high- risk; and
    developing and using smarter, more secure containers. According to CBP,
    the U. S. has signed agreements with 18 of the countries with the world*s
    largest seaports, which allows for the deployment of U. S. inspectors and
    equipment to these foreign seaports, and is beginning the expansion of CSI
    to other global ports with significant volume or strategic locations.

    TSA Moves Forward as Its TSA is moving forward with efforts to secure the
    entire transportation

    Role in Transportation system. TSA has adopted a systems approach* that
    is, a holistic rather

    Security Evolves than a modal approach* to securing the transportation
    approach. In

    addition, TSA is using risk management principles to guide its
    decisionmaking. To help TSA make risk- based decisions, TSA is developing
    standardized criticality, threat, and vulnerability assessment tools. TSA
    is also planning to establish security standards for all modes of
    transportation and is launching a number of new security efforts for the
    maritime and land

    transportation modes. TSA Adopts a Systems Approach

    TSA is taking a systems approach to securing the transportation system. to
    Securing All Modes of

    Using this approach, TSA plans to address the security of the entire
    Transportation transportation system as a whole, rather than focusing on
    individual modes of transportation. According to TSA officials, using a
    systems approach to security is appropriate for several reasons. First,
    the transportation system is intermodal, interdependent, and
    international. Given the intermodalism of the system, incidents in one
    mode of transportation could affect other modes. Second, it is important
    not to drive terrorism from one mode of

    transportation to another mode because of perceived lesser security* that
    is, make a mode of transportation a more attractive target because another
    mode is *hardened* with additional security measures. Third, it is
    important that security measures for one mode of transportation are not
    overly stringent or too economically challenging compared with others.
    Fourth, it is important that the attention on one aspect of transportation

    security (e. g., cargo, infrastructure, or passengers) does not leave the
    other aspects vulnerable.

    The systems approach is reflected in the organizational structure of TSA*s
    Office of Maritime and Land Security, which is responsible for the
    security of the maritime and land modes of transportation. Rather than
    organize around the different modes of transportation, such as DOT*s modal
    administrations, the office is organized around cross- modal issues. As
    figure 7 shows, the Office of Maritime and Land Security has six
    divisions, including Cargo Security and Passenger Security. The director
    of each division will be responsible for a specific aspect of security of
    multiple modes. For example, the Director of Cargo Security will be
    responsible for cargo security for all surface modes of transportation.

    Figure 7: Organizational Chart of TSA*s Office of Maritime and Land
    Security, June 2003

    Note: See appendix V to view the organizational chart for TSA and where
    the Office of Maritime and Land Security is located within the
    organization.

    TSA Applies Risk Management TSA has adopted a risk management approach for
    its efforts to enhance the

    Principles security of the nation*s transportation system. A risk
    management

    approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and
    the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key
    decisions in order to link resources with prioritized efforts. Table 3
    describes this approach. As figure 8 illustrates, the highest priorities
    emerge where the three elements of risk management overlap. For example,
    transportation infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset,
    vulnerable to attack,

    and a likely target would be at most risk and therefore would be a higher
    priority for funding compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable
    to attack. According to TSA officials, risk management principles will
    drive all decisions* from standard setting to funding priorities to
    staffing.

    Table 3: Elements of a Risk Management Approach

    A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
    basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
    This assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential
    threats before they materialize. However, even if updated often, a threat
    assessment might not adequately capture some emerging

    threats. The risk management approach, therefore, uses vulnerability and
    criticality assessments as additional input to the decision- making
    process.

    A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited by
    identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses.

    A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in
    terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and
    the economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which
    structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from
    attack. As such, it helps managers to determine operational requirements
    and target resources to the highest priorities while reducing the
    potential for targeting resources to lower priorities.

    Source: GAO.

    Figure 8: Illustration of How Risk Management Approach Can Guide
    DecisionMaking

    Using risk management principles to guide decision- making is a good
    strategy, given the difficult trade- offs TSA will likely have to make as
    it moves forward with its security efforts. We have advocated using a risk
    management approach to guide federal programs and responses to better
    prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite
    national resources to areas of highest priority. As representatives from
    local government and industry associations and transportation security
    experts repeatedly noted, the size of the transportation system precludes
    all assets from being equally protected; moreover, the risks vary by
    transportation assets within modes and by modes. In addition, requests for
    funding for transportation security enhancements will likely exceed
    available resources. Risk management principles can help TSA determine
    security priorities and identify appropriate solutions.

    Other transportation stakeholders are also using risk management
    principles. For example, the rail industry conducted a comprehensive risk
    analysis of its infrastructure, which included an assessment of threats,
    vulnerabilities, and criticality. The results of the risk analysis formed
    the basis for the rail industry*s security management plan, which
    identified countermeasures for the different threat levels. Similarly, the
    pipeline industry is using a risk management approach in securing its
    infrastructure. The Office of Pipeline Safety and industry associations
    noted that the pipeline industry had adopted a risk management approach
    for safety prior to September 11. As a result, the industry extended this
    approach to its security efforts after September 11.

    TSA Is Developing Standard Assessment Tools to Help Make RiskBased
    Decisions

    To help TSA make risk based decisions, TSA*s Office of Threat Assessment
    and Risk Management is developing two assessment tools that will help
    assess threats, criticality, and vulnerabilities. The first tool will
    assess the criticality of a transportation asset or facility. TSA is
    working with DHS* Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
    (IAIP) Directorate to ensure that TSA*s criticality tool will be
    consistent with the IAIP*s approach for managing critical infrastructure.
    TSA*s criticality tool will incorporate multiple factors, such as
    fatalities, economic importance, and sociopolitical importance, to arrive
    at a criticality score. The score will enable TSA, in conjunction with
    transportation stakeholders, to rank assets and facilities within each
    mode. According to TSA, by identifying and prioritizing assets and
    facilities, TSA can focus resources on that which is deemed most
    important. The second tool is referred to as the Transportation Risk
    Assessment and

    Vulnerability Evaluation Tool (TRAVEL). This tool will assess threats and
    analyze vulnerabilities for all transportation modes. According to TSA
    officials, TSA has worked with a number of organizations in developing
    TRAVEL, including the Department of Defense, Sandia National Laboratories,
    and AASHTO. TSA is also working with economists on developing the benefit/
    cost component of this model. TSA officials believe that a standard threat
    and vulnerability assessment tool is needed so that TSA can identify and
    compare threats and vulnerabilities across the modes. If different
    methodologies are used in assessing the threats and vulnerabilities,
    comparisons can be problematic. A standard assessment tool would ensure
    consistent methodology. Using TRAVEL, TSA plans to

    gather comparable threat and vulnerability information across all modes of
    transportation, which would inform TSA*s risk- based decision- making.

    TSA Plans to Issue National TSA plans to issue national security standards
    for all modes of Security Standards

    transportation. The federal government has historically set security
    standards for the aviation sector. For instance, prior to the passage of
    ATSA, FAA set security standards that the airlines were required to follow
    in several areas including screening equipment, screener qualifications,
    and access control systems. In contrast, prior to the September 11
    attacks, limited statutory authority existed to require measures to ensure
    the security of the maritime and land transportation systems. According to
    a TSA report, the existing regulatory framework leaves the maritime and
    land transportation systems unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack.
    For example, the rail, transit, and motor coach transportation systems are
    subject to no mandatory security requirements, resulting in little or no
    screening of passengers, baggage, or crew. Additionally, seaborne
    passenger vessel and seaport terminal operators have inconsistent levels
    and methods of screening, and are largely free to set their own rules
    about the hiring and training of security personnel. Hence, TSA will set
    standards to ensure consistency among modes and across the transportation
    system and to reduce the transportation system*s vulnerability to attacks.
    TSA

    plans to begin rolling out the standards starting summer 2003. 31
    According to TSA officials and documents, TSA*s standards will be
    performance-, risk-, and threat- based, and mandatory. More specifically:

     Standards will be performance- based. Rather than prescriptive
    standards, TSA standards will be performance- based, which will allow
    transportation operators to determine how best to achieve the desired
    level of security. TSA officials believe that performance- based standards

    31 The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
    within DHS is working with TSA, Coast Guard, and other federal agencies on
    developing a set of national standards that would apply to all ports.
    These efforts are well under way. The Coast Guard has been developing a
    set of standards since May 2002 as part of its efforts to conduct
    vulnerability assessments for all U. S. Ports. The standards will go into
    effect on July 1, 2004, as part of the International Convention for the
    Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments and the International Ship and
    Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) that was adopted by the International
    Maritime Organization conference in December 2002. The Coast Guard
    considers that the implementation of these standards is best done through
    mandating compliance with the SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code.
    According to TSA, because of Coast Guard's significant role in securing
    maritime transportation, TSA will likely play a coordination role in the
    maritime arena.

    provide for operator flexibility, allow for operators to use their
    professional judgment in enhancing security, and encourage technology
    advancement.

     Standards will be risk- based. Standards will be set for areas for which
    assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that
    an attack would have a national impact. A number of factors could be
    considered in determining *national impact,* such as fatalities and
    economic damage.

     Standards will be threat- based. The standards will be tied to the
    national threat condition and/ or local threats. As the threat condition
    escalates, the standards will require transportation operators to
    implement additional countermeasures.

     Standards may be mandatory. The standards will be mandatory when the
    risk level is too high or unacceptable. TSA officials stated that in these
    cases, mandatory standards are needed to ensure accountability. In
    addition, according to TSA officials, voluntary requirements put

    security- conscious transportation operators that implement security
    measures at a competitive disadvantage* that is, they have spent money
    that their competitors may have not spent. This creates a disincentive for
    transportation operators to implement voluntary requirements. TSA
    officials believe that mandatory standards will reduce this problem. In
    determining whether mandatory standards are needed, TSA will review the
    results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best
    practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with the
    private sector and other government agencies.

    Although TSA officials expect some level of resistance to the standards by
    the transportation industry, they believe that their approach of using
    risk-, threat-, and performance- based standards will increase the
    acceptance of

    the standards. For example, performance- based standards allow for more
    operator flexibility in implementing the standards, compared with rigid,
    prescriptive standards. Moreover, TSA plans to issue only a limited number
    of standards* that is, standards will be issued only when assessments of
    the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that the level of
    risk is too high or unacceptable.

    TSA also expects some level of resistance to the standards from DOT modal
    administrations. Although TSA will establish the security standards, TSA
    expects that they will be administered and implemented by existing

    agencies and organizations. DOT modal administrations may be reluctant to
    assume this role because it could alter their relationships with the
    industry. Historically, DOT surface transportation modal administrations*
    missions have largely focused on maintaining operations and improving
    service and safety, not regulating security. Moreover, the authority to
    regulate security varies by DOT modal administration. For example, FTA has
    limited authority to regulate and oversee security at transit agencies. In
    contrast, FRA has regulatory authority for rail security, and DOT*s Office
    of Pipeline Safety has responsibility for writing safety and security
    regulations on liquefied natural gas storage facilities. In addition, DOT
    modal administrations may be reluctant to administer and implement
    standards because of resource concerns. FHWA officials commented that,
    given the current uncertainty about the standards and their impacts, FHWA
    is reluctant to commit, in advance, to staff or funding to enforce new
    security

    standards. Because transportation stakeholders will be involved in
    administering, implementing, and/ or enforcing TSA standards, stakeholder
    buy- in is critical to the success of this initiative. Compromise and
    consensus on the part of stakeholders is also necessary. However,
    achieving such consensus and compromise may be difficult, given the
    conflicts between some stakeholders* goals and interests.

    Stakeholders Are Concerned About Pending Standards

    Transportation stakeholders expressed concerns about TSA*s plan to issue
    mandatory security standards for all modes of transportation. A common
    concern raised by associations was that standards represent unfunded
    mandates, unless the federal government pays for the standards that it

    promulgates. According to the industry and state and local government
    associations we spoke to, unfunded mandates create additional financial
    burdens for transportation operators, who are already experiencing
    financial difficulties. TSA officials said they hope to provide grants to
    implement the standards; however, it is unclear at this time if grants
    will be available. Another common concern expressed by transportation
    security experts

    and industry associations is that TSA does not have the necessary
    expertise or knowledge to develop appropriate security standards for the
    industry. In a 2003 report to Congress, TSA recognizes that each
    transportation mode has unique characteristics that make various security
    measures more or

    less feasible or appropriate. 32 However, a number of industry
    associations, transportation security experts, and DOT modal
    administrations expressed concern that TSA does not have a good
    understanding of the unique challenges of the modes, such as the need to
    maintain accessibility in transit systems, or the possible negative
    ramifications* both operationally and financially* of standards. Officials
    from one DOT modal administration noted that industry representatives left
    a meeting with TSA officials with serious concerns regarding TSA
    officials* understanding of their industry. Senior TSA officials stated
    that TSA employees have extensive subject matter expertise in
    transportation and security issues. Moreover, TSA officials stated that
    they will draw on the expertise and knowledge of the transportation
    industry and other DHS agencies, such as the Coast Guard, as well as all
    stakeholders in developing the standards.

    A number of representatives from industry associations also expressed
    concerns that TSA may issue mandatory or regulatory standards, especially
    since their industries have taken proactive steps to enhance security
    since September 11. Industry associations also noted that the majority of
    transportation infrastructure in some modes is privately owned. As such,

    transportation operators have an economic incentive to ensure the security
    of their infrastructure; hence, operators are voluntarily implementing
    increased security measures. For example, the pipeline industry worked

    with DOT*s Office of Pipeline Safety to develop industry- wide security
    guidelines. These guidelines are risk- based and identify countermeasures
    that pipeline operators should implement at different threat levels. The
    pipeline guidelines are also voluntary. According to pipeline industry
    associations, the pipeline industry is implementing these security
    guidelines. Representatives from industry associations stated that TSA
    should wait to see if industry- developed, voluntary measures are working
    before issuing mandatory standards. TSA officials noted that TSA will
    review the results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current
    best

    practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with the
    private sector and other government agencies before issuing mandatory
    standards.

    Finally, industry representatives expressed concern that TSA has not
    adequately included the transportation industry in its development of
    standards. Many industry representatives and some DOT officials we met

    32 Transportation Security Administration, Report to Congress on
    Transportation Security, (March 31, 2003).

    with were unsure of whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards
    would entail, or the time frames for issuing the standards. The
    uncertainty about the pending standards can lead to confusion and/ or
    inaction. For example, Amtrak officials noted that they are reluctant to
    spend money to implement certain security measures because they are
    worried that TSA will subsequently issue standards that will require
    Amtrak to redo its efforts. TSA officials repeatedly told us they
    understand the importance of gaining stakeholder buy- in and partnering
    with the industry. They also stated that they have conducted outreach to
    transportation stakeholders and plan to continue their outreach efforts in
    the future. TSA is developing a strategy that will serve as its framework
    for communicating with transportation stakeholders and obtaining
    stakeholders* input in TSA*s decision- making. TSA plans to finalize this
    strategy in July 2003.

    TSA Is Launching Other Security TSA is also working on a number of
    additional security efforts, such as

    Initiatives establishing the Transportation Workers Identification Card
    (TWIC)

    program, developing the next generation of the Computer Assisted Passenger
    Pre- Screening System, developing a national transportation system
    security plan, and exploring methods to integrate operations and security,
    among other things. The TWIC program is intended to improve access control
    for the 12 million transportation workers that require unescorted physical
    or cyber access to secure areas of the nation*s transportation modes by
    establishing a uniform, nationwide standard for secure identification of
    transportation workers. Specifically, TWIC will combine standard
    background checks and biometrics so that a worker can be positively
    matched to his/ her credential. Once the program is fully operational, the
    TWIC would be the standard credential for transportation workers and would
    be accepted by all modes of transportation. According to TSA, developing a
    uniform, nationwide standard for identification will minimize redundant
    credentialing and background checks. DOT Modal Agencies Are

    As TSA moves forward with new security initiatives, DOT modal Continuing
    Forward with

    administrations are also continuing their security efforts and, in some
    Their Security Efforts

    cases, launching new security initiatives. For example, FHWA is
    coordinating a series of workshops this year on emergency response and
    preparedness for state departments of transportation and other agencies.
    FTA also has a number of current initiatives under way in the areas of
    public awareness, research, training, technical assistance, and
    intelligence sharing. For example, FTA developed a list of the top 20
    security actions transit agencies should implement and is currently
    working with transit

    agencies to assist them in implementing these measures. FTA*s goal is to
    have the largest 30 agencies implement at least 80 percent of these
    measures by the end of fiscal year 2003.

    FAA is also continuing its efforts to enhance cyber security in the
    aviation system. Although the primary responsibility for securing the
    aviation system was transferred to TSA, FAA remains responsible for
    protecting the nation*s air traffic control system* both the physical
    security of its air traffic control facilities and the computer systems.
    The air traffic control system*s computers help the nation*s air traffic
    controllers safely direct and separate traffic* sabotaging this system
    could have disastrous consequences. FAA is moving forward with efforts to
    increase the physical security of its air traffic control facilities and
    ensure that contractors who have access to the air traffic control system
    undergo background checks.

    TSA*s and DOT*s Roles and The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in
    transportation security

    Responsibilities Have Not have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates
    the potential for

    Been Clearly Defined duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities
    move forward with their

    security efforts. DOT modal administrations were primarily responsible for
    the security of the transportation system prior to September 11. In
    November 2001, Congress passed ATSA, which created TSA and gave it

    primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation. 33
    However, during TSA*s first year of existence, TSA*s main focus was on
    aviation security* more specifically, on meeting ATSA deadlines. While TSA
    was primarily focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations
    launched various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and
    land transportation modes. With the immediate crisis of meeting many
    aviation security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to focus more on
    the security of all modes of transportation. Legislation has not defined
    TSA*s role and responsibilities in securing all

    modes of transportation. In particular, ATSA does not specify TSA*s role
    and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation
    modes in detail as it does for aviation security. For instance, the act
    does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain transit security
    requirements. Instead, the act simply states that TSA is responsible for
    ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act also did not

    33 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

    eliminate DOT modal administrations* existing statutory responsibilities
    for securing the different transportation modes. Moreover, recent
    legislation indicates that DOT still has security responsibilities. In
    particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of
    Transportation is responsible for the security as well as the safety of
    rail

    and the transport of hazardous materials by all modes. To clarify their
    roles and responsibilities in transportation security, DOT modal
    administrations and TSA were planning to develop memorandums of agreement.
    The purpose of these documents was to define the roles and
    responsibilities of the different agencies as they relate to
    transportation

    security and address a variety of issues, including separating safety and
    security activities, interfacing with the transportation industry, and
    establishing funding priorities. TSA and the DOT modal administrations
    worked for months to develop the memorandums of agreement. The draft
    agreements were presented to senior DOT and TSA management for review in
    early spring of this year. According to DOT*s General Counsel, with the

    exception of the memorandum of agreement between FAA and TSA, the draft
    memorandums were very generic and did not provide much clarification.
    Consequently, DOT and TSA decided not to execute or sign the memorandums
    of agreement, except for the memorandum of agreement between FAA and TSA,
    which was signed on February 28,

    2003. 34 The General Counsel suggested several reasons why the majority of
    draft memorandums of agreement were too general. First, as TSA*s departure
    date approached* that is, the date that TSA transferred from DOT to DHS,
    TSA and DOT modal administration officials may have grown concerned about
    formally binding the organizations to specific roles and responsibilities.
    Second, the working relationships between TSA and most

    of the DOT modal administrations is still very new; as a result, all of
    the potential issues, problem areas, or overlap have yet to be identified.
    Thus, identifying items to include in the memorandums of agreement was
    more difficult.

    Rather than execute memorandums of agreement, the Secretary of
    Transportation and the Administrator of TSA exchanged correspondence

    34 DOT and TSA have signed other memorandums of agreement that are narrow
    in scope and address a specific issue. For example, TSA and DOT signed a
    memorandum of agreement regarding the processing of civil rights
    complaints.

    that commits each entity to continued coordination and collaboration on
    security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and Administrator
    also agreed to use the memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA as a
    framework for their interactions on security matters for all other modes.
    TSA and DOT officials stated that they believe memorandums of agreement
    are a good strategy for delineating roles and responsibilities and they
    would be open to using memorandums of agreement in the future.

    Experts and Transportation security experts and representatives of state
    and local

    Associations Identified government and industry associations we contacted
    generally believe that

    the transportation system is more secure today than it was prior to Future
    Actions to

    September 11. Transportation stakeholders have worked hard to Advance the
    Security

    strengthen the security of the system. Nevertheless, transportation
    experts, of the Transportation industry representatives, and federal
    officials all recommend that more work be done. Transportation experts and
    state and local government and

    System industry representatives identified a number of actions that, in
    their view,

    should be implemented to enhance security, including clarifying federal
    roles and coordinating federal efforts, developing a transportation
    security strategy, funding security enhancements, investing in research
    and development, and providing better intelligence information and related
    guidance. The experts and representatives generally believe that these
    actions are the responsibility of the federal government.

    Clear federal roles and responsibilities is a core issue in transportation
    security, according to transportation experts and associations that we
    contacted. The lack of clarity about the roles and responsibilities of
    federal actors in transportation security creates the potential for
    confusion,

    duplication, and conflicts. Understanding roles, responsibilities, and
    whom to call is crucial in an emergency. However, representatives from
    several associations stated that their members were unclear of which
    agency to contact for their various security concerns and which agency has
    oversight for certain issues. Furthermore, they do not have contacts
    within these agencies. As mentioned earlier, several industry
    representatives reported that their members are receiving different
    messages from various federal agencies involved in transportation
    security, which creates confusion and frustration among the industry. They
    said the uncertainty about federal roles and the lack of coordination is
    straining intergovernmental relationships, draining resources, and raising
    the potential for problems in responding to terrorism. One industry
    association told us, for instance, that it has been asked by three
    different federal agencies to participate in three separate studies of the
    same issue.

    According to transportation experts and associations we contacted, a
    national transportation strategy is essential to moving forward with
    transportation security. It is crucial for helping stakeholders identify
    priorities, leveraging resources, establishing stakeholder performance
    expectations, and creating incentives for stakeholders to improve
    security. Currently, local government associations view the absence of
    performance expectations* coupled with limited threat information* as a
    major obstacle in focusing their people and resources on high priority
    threats, particularly at elevated threat levels. The experts also noted
    that modal

    strategies* no matter how complete* cannot address the complete
    transportation security problem and will leave gaps in preparedness. As
    mentioned earlier, TSA is in the process of developing a national
    transportation system security plan, 35 which according to the Deputy
    Administrator of TSA, will provide an overarching framework for the
    security of all modes. Transportation security experts and association
    representatives we

    contacted believe that the federal government should provide funding for
    needed security improvements. While an overall security strategy is a
    prerequisite to investing wisely, providing adequate funding also is
    essential. Setting security goals and strategies without adequate funding
    diminishes stakeholders* commitment and willingness to absorb initial
    security investments and long- term operating costs, an expert emphasized.
    Industry and state and local government associations also commented that
    federal funding should accompany any federal security standards; otherwise
    these standards will be considered unfunded mandates that the

    industry and state and local governments have to absorb. The federal
    government needs to play a strong role in investing in and setting a
    research and development agenda for transportation security, according to
    most transportation security experts and associations we contacted. They
    view this as an appropriate role for the federal government, since the
    products of research and development endeavors would likely benefit the
    entire transportation system, not just individual modes or operators. TSA
    is actively engaged in research and development projects, such as the
    development of the next generation explosive detection systems for
    baggage, hardening of aircraft and cargo/ baggage containers, biometrics
    and other access control methods, and human

    35 TSA hopes to have a draft of the national transportation system
    security plan prepared by the end of this year.

    factors initiatives to identify methods to improve screener performance,
    at its Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
    However, TSA noted that continued adequate funding for research and
    development is paramount in order for TSA to be able to meet security
    demands with up- to- date and reliable technology.

    Transportation security experts and representatives from state and local
    government and industry associations stated that the federal government
    needs to play a vital role in sharing information* specifically,
    intelligence information and related guidance. Representatives from
    numerous associations commented that the federal government needs to
    provide timely, localized, actionable intelligence information. General
    threat

    warnings are not helpful. Rather, transportation operators want more
    specific intelligence information so that they can understand the true
    nature of a potential threat and implement appropriate security measures.
    Without more localized and actionable intelligence, stakeholders said they
    run the risk of wasting resources on unneeded security measures or not
    providing an adequate level of security. Moreover, local government
    officials often are not allowed to receive specific intelligence
    information because they do not have appropriate federal security
    clearances. Also, there is little federal guidance on how local
    authorities should respond to a specific threat or general threat
    warnings. For example, San Francisco police were stationed at the Golden
    Gate Bridge to respond to the elevated national threat condition. However,
    without information about the nature of the threat to San Francisco's
    large transportation infrastructure or clear federal expectations for a
    response, it is difficult to judge whether actions like this are the most
    effective use of police protection, according to representatives from a
    local government association.

    Conclusions During TSA*s first year of existence, TSA met a number of
    challenges, including successfully meeting many congressional deadlines
    for aviation

    security. With the immediate crisis of meeting key aviation security
    deadlines behind TSA, it can now examine the security of the entire
    transportation system. As TSA becomes more active in securing the maritime
    and land transportation modes, it will become even more important that the
    roles of TSA and DOT modal administrations are clearly defined. Lack of
    clearly defined roles among the federal entities could lead to duplication
    and confusion. More importantly, it could hamper the transportation
    sector*s ability to prepare for and respond to attacks.

    Recommendation for To clarify and define the roles and responsibilities of
    TSA and DOT modal

    Executive Action administrations in transportation security matters, we
    recommend that the

    Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Homeland Security use a
    mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement to clearly delineate their
    roles and responsibilities. At a minimum, this mechanism should establish
    the responsibilities of each entity in setting, administering, and
    implementing security standards and regulations, determining funding
    priorities, and interfacing with the transportation industry as well as
    define each entity*s role in the inevitable overlap of some safety and
    security activities. After the roles and responsibilities of each entity
    are clearly

    defined, this information should be communicated to all transportation
    stakeholders.

    Agency Comments We provided DOT, DHS, and Amtrak with a draft of this
    report for review and comment. Amtrak generally agreed with our findings
    and

    recommendation and provided some technical comments, which we have
    incorporated into this report where appropriate.

    DOT and DHS generally agreed with the report*s findings. However, they
    disagreed with the conclusion and recommendation that their roles and
    responsibilities need to be clarified and defined. The two departments
    stated that the roles and responsibilities of each entity is clear* that
    is, DHS has primary responsibility for transportation security and DOT
    will play a supporting role in such matters. We agree that the Aviation
    and Transportation Security Act 36 (ATSA) gave TSA primary responsibility
    for

    securing all modes of transportation. However, neither this act, nor other
    legislation defined TSA*s roles and responsibilities in securing all modes
    of transportation. Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA*s role and
    responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes in
    detail as it does for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate
    DOT modal administrations* existing statutory responsibilities for
    securing the different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent
    legislation clarifies that DOT still has transportation security
    responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states
    that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as
    well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all
    modes.

    36 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

    In addition, although DOT and DHS believe their roles and responsibilities
    are clearly defined, transportation security stakeholders we contacted are
    not as certain. For example, representatives from several associations
    stated that their members were unclear as to which agency to contact for
    their various security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain
    issues. Representatives from several associations also told us that their
    members are receiving different messages from the various federal agencies
    involved in transportation security. Furthermore, as noted in the report,
    both TSA and DOT are moving

    forward with transportation security efforts. As both entities continue
    with their security efforts, it is important that the roles and
    responsibilities of each entity are coordinated and clearly defined. The
    lack of clarity can lead to duplication, confusion, and/ or gaps in
    preparedness. We therefore continue to recommend that DOT and DHS use a
    mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, to clarify and define DOT
    modal administration*s and TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
    transportation security. After the roles and responsibilities of each
    entity are clearly

    defined, this information should be communicated to all transportation
    stakeholders.

    DOT and DHS also noted that the title of the draft report, Transportation
    Security: More Federal Coordination Needed to Help Address Security
    Challenges, as well as our conclusions and recommendations place too much
    emphasis on coordination. To better capture our conclusions and

    recommendations* that is, that the roles and responsibilities of TSA and
    DOT in security matters should be clearly delineated and communicated to
    all transportation security stakeholders* we have changed the report*s
    title to Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
    Security Challenges. However, we disagree that the report places too much

    emphasis on the lack of coordination between DOT and DHS. As noted above,
    representatives from several associations told us that their members have
    received conflicting messages from the federal agencies involved in
    transportation security. Moreover, there appears to be a break down in
    communication between TSA and DOT about current security initiatives. For
    example, although TSA officials stated that they have informed DOT about
    their plans to issue security standards, some DOT officials we met with
    were unsure as to whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards
    would entail, or the time frames for issuing the standards.

    In addition to their written comments, DHS and DOT provided technical
    comments to our draft, which we have incorporated into the report where
    appropriate.

    See appendixes II and III for DOT*s and DHS* comments and our responses.
    As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
    of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
    days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report
    to the

    Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
    Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, the President
    and Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak, the Director of the Office of
    Management and Budget, and interested congressional committees. We will
    make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report
    will be available at no charge on our Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me on (202) 512- 2834 or at guerrerop@ gao. gov. Individuals making key
    contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

    Peter Guerrero Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

    List of Requesters

    The Honorable John McCain Chairman Committee on Commerce,

    Science, and Transportation United States Senate

    The Honorable Ernest Hollings Ranking Minority Member Committee on
    Commerce,

    Science, and Transportation United States Senate

    The Honorable James Jeffords Ranking Minority Member Committee on
    Environment and

    Public Works United States Senate

    The Honorable Harry Reid Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
    Transportation

    and Infrastructure Committee on Environment and

    Public Works United States Senate

    The Honorable Thomas Carper United States Senate

    The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton United States Senate

    The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison United States Senate

    The Honorable Gordon Smith United States Senate

    Appendi Appendi xes I x Scope and Methodology To address our four
    objectives, we conducted structured interviews with officials from TSA,
    Amtrak, and DOT, representatives from the major transportation industry
    associations and state and local government associations, and select
    transportation security experts. We selected transportation security
    experts based on their knowledge/ expertise and reputation as being an
    expert in the transportation security arena. We also

    consulted with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying appropriate
    transportation security experts. Table 4 shows the federal agencies,
    industry associations, transportation security experts, and state and
    local government associations that were interviewed. Through these
    structured interviews we collected information on the challenges that
    exist in securing the transportation system, vulnerabilities of different
    modes, actions that

    transportation stakeholders* including the federal, state, and local
    governments and the operators* have taken to enhance security since
    September 11, TSA*s and DOT*s ongoing and planned security efforts, roles
    and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system,
    and future security actions that industry associations and security
    experts believe are needed. We synthesized and analyzed the information
    from the structured interviews.

    Table 4: List of Interviewees Federal agencies

    Amtrak Department of Transportation (DOT)

    General Counsel Intermodal Hazardous Materials Program Office of Emergency
    Transportation Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA)

    Office of the Chief Information Officer Office of Security and
    Investigations (ASI) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Federal Motor
    Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Federal Railroad Administration
    (FRA) Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

    Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Office of Maritime and Land Security Office
    of Policy (Aviation) Risk Management/ Strategic Planning Support Systems
    Directorate United States Coast Guard

    Industry associations Air Transport Association (ATA) American Association
    of Airport Executives (AAAE) American Bus Association (ABA) American Gas
    Association (AGA) American Petroleum Institute (API) American Road and
    Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA) American Trucking Associations
    (ATA) Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL) Association of American
    Railroads (AAR) Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) Consolidated
    Safety Services (CSS) Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
    (INGAA) National Academy of Sciences (NAS) National Association of
    Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) National Private Truck Council
    (NPTC) United Motorcoach Association (UMA)

    Transportation security experts

    Annabelle Boyd, President and Senior Consultant, Boyd, Caton & Grant
    Transportation Group, Inc. Mortimer L. Downey III, PB- Consult, Inc.
    Stephen E. Flynn, Ph. D., Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National
    Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Yacov Y. Haimes, Director,
    Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems, University of Virginia
    Arnold M. Howitt, Ph. D., Executive Director, Taubman Center for State and
    Local Government, Director, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness,
    Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Brian M. Jenkins, Senior
    Advisor to the President, RAND Corporation

    Douglas R. Laird, Principal, Laird & Associates, Inc. James Wilding,
    Executive Director (Retired), Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority

    State and local government associations

    American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
    (AASHTO) National Association of Counties (NACO)

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) National League of Cities
    (NLC) Source: GAO.

    In addition to the structured interviews, we analyzed the administration*s
    National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for the
    Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets and the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation*s The Terrorist Threat to the U. S.
    Homeland: An FBI Assessment. We also reviewed current transportation
    security- related research as well as transportation security- related
    reports and documents from TSA, Amtrak, and DOT, including strategic
    planning documents, memorandums, program descriptions, and budget and
    financial documents. We also analyzed security- related documents from
    industry associations, including action plans, operational information,
    and reports, and the U. S. Code and the Code of Federal Regulations. We
    also incorporated the findings of previous GAO reports on port, transit,
    aviation, and homeland security. 1

    We conducted our work from February 2003 through May 2003, in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    1 In preparing these previous reports, we contacted numerous
    transportation security stakeholders, including transit agencies, port
    authorities, and local and state governments as well as representatives
    from the chemical and maritime industries. We also contacted various
    federal departments including the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland
    Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services.

    Comments from the Department of

    Appendi I I x Transportation Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the
    report text appear at the end of this appendix.

    See comment 1. See comment 2. See comment 3.

    See comment 4. See comment 5.

    The following are GAO*s comments on the Department of Transportation
    letter dated June 10, 2003.

    GAO Comments 1. We agree that the title of the report should be changed.
    Our conclusions and recommendation call for the roles and responsibilities
    of TSA and DOT in security matters to be clearly delineated and
    communicated to

    all transportation security stakeholders. To more fully capture our
    conclusions and recommendations, we have changed the report*s title to
    Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed To Help Address Security
    Challenges.

    However, we disagree that our recommendation advances an *overly
    simplistic conclusion that *more Federal coordination* is somehow a
    meaningful problem or a key to meeting transportation security
    challenges.* Although coordination does not solve all security

    challenges, it is a key element in meeting transportation security
    challenges. As we have noted in previous reports, coordination among all
    levels of the government and the private industry is critical to the
    success of security efforts. The lack of coordination can lead to problems
    such as duplication and/ or conflicting efforts, gaps in preparedness, and
    confusion. Moreover, the lack of coordination can strain intergovernmental
    relationships, drain resources, and raise the potential for problems in
    responding to terrorism. The administration*s National Strategy for
    Homeland Security and the National Strategy

    for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets

    also emphasize the importance of and need for coordination in security
    efforts. In particular, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection
    of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets notes that protecting critical
    infrastructure, such as the transportation system, *requires a

    unifying organization, a clear purpose, a common understanding of roles
    and responsibilities, accountability, and a set of well- understood
    coordinating processes.* (Italics added for emphasis.) 2. We disagree that
    the commitment of TSA and DOT to broad and routine

    consultations through numerous formal and informal mechanisms is working.
    As we noted throughout the report, representatives from several
    associations told us that they have received conflicting messages from the
    federal agencies involved in transportation security. Representatives from
    several associations also stated that their members were unclear as to
    which agency to contact for their various

    security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.

    Moreover, there appears to be a break down in communication between TSA
    and DOT about current security initiatives. For example, although TSA
    officials stated that they have informed DOT about their plans to issue
    security standards, some DOT officials we met with were unsure as to
    whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards would entail, or the
    time frames for issuing the standards.

    3. We do not believe the correspondence exchanged by Secretary Mineta and
    Admiral Loy adequately defines the roles and responsibilities of TSA and
    DOT in security issues. Rather than delineate the roles and
    responsibilities of each entity in security matters, such as determining
    funding priorities and interfacing with stakeholders, the correspondence
    primarily commits each entity to continued coordination and collaboration
    on security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and
    Administrator also agreed to use the

    memorandum of agreement between TSA and the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) as a framework for their interactions on security
    matters for all other modes. Given the complexities and unique challenges
    in securing the different modes of transportation, we do not believe using
    the memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA as a framework is
    sufficient. The lack of clearly defined roles and

    responsibilities can lead to duplication, confusion, conflicts, and most
    importantly, gaps in preparedness.

    Although designating a DOT liaison to TSA is a step in the right
    direction, the roles and responsibilities of each entity and the
    coordinating processes need to be documented. Departures of key
    individuals within each entity, such as the designated DOT liaison to TSA,
    have the potential to erode informal networks. Given the importance of
    security efforts, coordinating processes between TSA and DOT need to be
    documented so that they span the terms of various administrations and
    individuals.

    4. We agree that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 1 (ATSA)
    gave TSA primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.
    However, neither this act, nor other legislation, has defined TSA roles
    and responsibilities in securing all modes of transportation.
    Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
    securing the maritime and land transportation modes

    1 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

    in detail as it does for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate
    DOT modal administrations* existing statutory responsibilities for
    securing the different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent
    legislation clarifies that DOT still has transportation security
    responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states
    that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as
    well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all
    modes.

    To clarify and define DOT*s and TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
    transportation security, we believe that these entities should establish a
    mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement. Using such a mechanism would
    serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles and responsibilities
    of each entity. It would also serve to hold each entity accountable for
    its transportation security responsibilities. Finally, it could serve as a
    vehicle to communicate the roles and responsibilities of each entity to
    transportation security stakeholders. The mechanism* whether it is a
    memorandum of agreement or other

    document* used to clarify and define DOT*s and TSA*s roles and
    responsibilities should not be static. Rather, it should be a living
    document that changes as each entity*s roles and responsibilities in
    transportation security matters evolve and events occur. 5. We disagree
    that all of DOT*s ongoing security efforts are nonpolicy

    making activities. For example, the Research and Special Programs
    Administration issued regulations in March 2003 that requires shippers and
    carriers of hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans
    and to include a security component in their employee training programs.

    While DOT*s role in security efforts may decrease in the future, it seems
    unlikely that DOT will be devoid of any security responsibilities in the
    future. For example, as noted in the report, the Homeland Security Act of
    2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the
    security as well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous
    materials by all modes. In addition, the Maritime Transportation Security
    Act of 2002 2 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to train

    and certify maritime security professionals and establish a grant 2 P. L.
    No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

    program to fund the implementation of Area Maritime Transportation
    Security Plans and facility security plans. Further, although the primary
    responsibility for securing the aviation system was transferred to TSA,
    FAA remains responsible for protecting the nation*s air traffic control
    system* both the physical security of its air traffic control facilities
    and computer systems. Although DOT recognizes that DHS has the lead in
    transportation security matters, it could be difficult to distinguish its
    role in

    maintaining transportation operations and improving transportation service
    and safety from DHS* role in securing the transportation system. Security
    is often intertwined with transportation operations and safety. For
    example, installing a fence around truck yards could be considered both a
    safety and security measure. Further security measures that restrict the
    flow of passengers or freight through the transportation system could have
    serious consequences on transportation operations. Because of these
    interactions and overlap, the roles and responsibilities of DOT and DHS in
    transportation safety and security can be blurred. Consequently, we
    continue to believe the entities should establish a mechanism to help
    clarify and delineate their roles and responsibilities in security
    matters.

    Comments from the Department of Homeland

    Appendi I I I x Security Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the
    report text appear at the end of this appendix.

    See comment 1.

    See comment 2. See comment 3. See comment 4.

    The following are GAO*s comments on the Department of Homeland Security
    letter dated June 11, 2003. GAO Comments 1. We disagree that the report
    overstates the lack of coordination between

    DHS and DOT and that mechanisms to ensure coordination of responsibilities
    is unnecessary. Although DHS and DOT report that they are coordinating on
    security matters, based on our discussions with representatives from state
    and local government and industry associations, it appears that there is a
    need to improve such efforts. As we noted throughout the report,
    representatives from several associations told us that they have received
    conflicting messages from the federal agencies involved in transportation
    security. Representatives from several associations also stated that their
    members were unclear as to which agency to contact for their various

    security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues.
    Moreover, there appears to be a break down in communication between TSA
    and DOT about current security initiatives. For example, although TSA
    officials stated that they have informed DOT about their plans to issue
    security standards, some DOT officials we met with were unsure as to
    whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards would entail, or the
    time frames for issuing the standards.

    We agree that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 1 (ATSA) gave
    TSA primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.
    However, neither this act, or other legislation, has defined TSA*s roles
    and responsibilities in securing all modes of transportation.
    Specifically, ATSA does not specify TSA*s role and responsibilities in
    securing the maritime and land transportation modes in detail as it does
    for aviation security. The act also did not eliminate DOT modal
    administrations* existing statutory responsibilities for securing the
    different modes of transportation. Moreover, recent legislation clarifies
    that DOT still has transportation security responsibilities. In
    particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of
    Transportation is responsible for the security as well as the safety of
    rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all modes.

    1 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

    To clarify and define DOT*s and TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
    transportation security, we believe that these entities should establish a
    mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement. Using such a mechanism would
    serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles and responsibilities
    of each entity. It would also serve to hold each entity accountable for
    its transportation security responsibilities. Finally, it could serve as a
    vehicle to communicate the roles and responsibilities of each entity to
    transportation security stakeholders. The mechanism* whether it is a
    memorandum of agreement or other

    document* used to clarify and define DOT*s and TSA*s roles and
    responsibilities should not be static. Rather, it should be a living
    document that changes as each entity*s roles and responsibilities in
    transportation security matters evolve and events occur. 2. We disagree
    that the report suggests that the continuation of security

    efforts by the DOT modal administrations represents a lack of
    coordination. The report credits TSA for meeting a number of aviation
    security deadlines during its first year of existence and highlights the
    efforts of DOT modal administrations and other federal agencies to improve
    the security of all modes since September 11. We also note that TSA is
    beginning to assert a greater role in securing all modes of transportation
    and DOT modal administrations are continuing or launching new security
    efforts. We did not suggest that the continuation of such efforts by DOT
    modal administrations represents a lack of coordination. Rather, we noted
    that as both entities move forward with security efforts, it is
    increasingly important that the roles of TSA and

    DOT modal administrations are clearly defined. The lack of clearly defined
    roles and responsibilities can lead to duplication, confusion, conflicts,
    and most importantly, gaps in preparedness.

    3. Our intention is not to suggest that the federal government*s efforts
    to secure the non- aviation modes of transportation have been
    insufficient. To the contrary, we highlight the efforts by DOT modal
    administrations and other federal agencies to secure the maritime and land
    modes of transportation. We also recognize that TSA*s aviation security
    focus during its first year of existence was primarily due to the ATSA
    deadlines.

    4. We agree that the newly created DHS brings a number of agencies
    responsible for transportation security under one roof, which could
    ultimately improve coordination and streamline and strengthen

    security efforts. However, this does not solve all the potential
    coordination problems we highlight in the report because important
    transportation stakeholders* specifically, the DOT modal administrations*
    are housed in another department. Because both DHS agencies and DOT modal
    administrations are moving forward with

    transportation security initiatives, it is critical that the roles and
    responsibilities of each entity are clearly delineated and communicated to
    all stakeholders and that they coordinate their security efforts. The lack
    of such clarification, communication, and coordination could create
    problems, such as duplication of efforts and gaps in preparedness.

    Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations

    Appendi V I x Governing Transportation Security Table 5: Authorizations
    Modes

    Related target dates Public law - Authorization impacted Key provisions
    for compliance Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. All
    Established Transportation Security

    11/ 19/ 2001 L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 et seq. (2001).

    Administration (TSA), responsible for, inter

    November 19, 2001

    alia, security in all modes of transportation. Aviation Established a more
    comprehensive federal

    air marshals program for international and domestic flights.

    Aviation Deployment of federal law enforcement officers at airports to
    meet aviation safety and security concerns.

    Aviation Directed FAA, in consultation with TSA, to 1/ 18/ 02

    develop security- training programs for flight and cabin crew.

    Aviation Deployment of federal personnel for the 11/ 19/ 02 screening of
    passengers and baggage at airports.

    Aviation Appointed Federal Security Managers to 11/ 19/ 02

    oversee the screening of passengers and baggage at each airport.

    Aviation Authorizes TSA to deploy explosive detection 12/ 31/ 2002

    systems (EDS) or equivalent measures allowed by law at all U. S. airports.

    Aviation Authorized $500,000, 000 (FY 2002) for FAA 4/ 1/ 2003

    to provide federal grants to fortify cockpit doors and for other aircraft
    security measures.

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Modes Related target dates

    Public law - Authorization impacted Key provisions for compliance Homeland
    Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. All Creates the Department of Homeland
    107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 et seq. (2002).

    Security. November 25, 2002

    All Creates Border and Transportation Security Directorate, responsible
    for maintaining the security of borders and transportation systems.

    Aviation Training and deputizing pilots to be Federal 2/ 25/ 2003 Flight
    Deck Officers to defend the flight decks of aircrafts in flight.

    All Transferred Transportation Security 3/ 1/ 2003

    Administration and Coast Guard from Department of Transportation to
    Department of Homeland Security.

    Aviation Moved date for EDS installation in all U. S. 12/ 31/ 2003
    airports. All Requires all companies that transport or ship

    explosives to give the ATF the names and identifying information of all
    employees authorized to possess explosive materials. Requires the ATF to
    conduct background checks of employees to determine if they are prohibited
    from possessing explosive materials.

    All Expands the responsibilities of the Research and Special Programs
    Administration (RSPA), within the Department of Transportation, for
    regulating hazardous materials to include hazardous materials
    transportation security.

    All Protects critical infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to
    a covered federal agency from the Freedom of Information Act and other
    federal and state disclosure requirements.

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Modes Related target dates

    Public law - Authorization impacted Key provisions for compliance Maritime
    Transportation Security Act of 2002, Seaport Set up a National Maritime
    Transportation Pub. L. No. 107- 295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).

    Security Plan. November 25, 2002

    Implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and coordinate area
    plans.

    Develop and maintain an antiterrorism cargo identification, tracking, and
    screening system for containerized cargo.

    To assign Coast Guard personnel as sea marshals to deter or respond to
    acts of terrorism.

    Authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to train and certify maritime
    security professionals. Establishes a program to evaluate and certify
    systems of international intermodal transportation.

    The Coast Guard shall conduct a vulnerability assessment of facilities and
    vessels that may be involved in a transportation security incident at
    least every 5 years.

    The Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue biometric transportation
    security cards and enhanced crew- member identification for individuals
    who require access to secure areas of vessels and port facilities.

    The Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Maritime
    Administration, shall establish a grant program to fund the implementation
    of Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and facility security
    plans.

    USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107- All Mandates federal background
    checks of 56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

    individuals operating vehicles carrying October 26, 2001

    hazardous materials. Criminalizes terrorist attacks and other acts of

    10/ 26/ 2001 violence against mass transportation systems.

    Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pipeline Authorizes the Secretary
    of Transportation to

    Pub. L. No. 107- 355, 116 Stat. 2985 (2002). reinforce pipeline facilities
    deemed potentially

    December 17, 2002 unsafe or vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

    Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107- 210, 116 All Authorizes the Secretary
    of Commerce to Stat. 933 (2002).

    create an electronic data interchange system August 6, 2002

    to ensure transportation safety and security of cargo. Source: GAO
    analysis of U. S. Code.

    Table 6: Appropriations Modes Public law * appropriation impacted Key
    provisions Funding appropriated 2001 Emergency Supplemental

    All Provided funding for increased transportation Specific appropriations
    are found Appropriations Act for Recovery security. Provided funding for
    repairing public

    in the Pub. L. No. 107- 117. from and Response to Terrorist

    facilities and transportation systems damaged by Attacks on the United
    States, the attacks. Pub. L. No. 107- 38, 115 Stat. 220 (2001). September
    18, 2001

    2002 Department of Aviation Provided funding for TSA for civil aviation

    $1, 250,000, 000 (app. FY 2002) Transportation Appropriations security
    services pursuant to the Aviation and Act, Pub. L. No. 107- 87, 115

    Transportation Security Act. Stat. 833 (2001).

    Aviation Provided funding for FAA operations for civil $150,154,000 (app.
    FY 2002)

    December 18, 2001 aviation security program activities. Department Of
    Defense And

    Seaport Funding for a port security program. $93,300, 000 (app. FY 2002)
    Emergency Supplemental Seaport Funding for Coast Guard for their response
    to $209,150,000 (app. FY 2002) Appropriations for Recovery

    9/ 11 terrorist attacks. From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
    United States

    Aviation Funding for FAA for their response to 9/ 11 $535,500,000 (app. FY
    2002) Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107- 117,

    terrorist attacks. 115 Stat. 2230 (2002). Highway Funding for Federal
    Highway Administration for

    $175,000,000 (app. FY 2002) January 10, 2002

    their response to 9/ 11 terrorist attacks. Transit Funding for Federal
    Transit Administration for $123,000,000 (app. FY 2002) their response to
    9/ 11 terrorist attacks. Rail Funding for Federal Railroad Administration
    for

    $106,000,000 (app. FY 2002) their response to 9/ 11 terrorist attacks. All
    Funding for Research and Special Programs

    $2, 500,000 (app. FY 2002) Administration.

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Modes Public law * appropriation impacted Key provisions Funding
    appropriated 2002 Supplemental

    Aviation Provides for the installation of explosives $738,000,000 (app. FY
    2003) Appropriations Act for Further

    detection systems in commercial service Recovery from and Response
    airports. to Terrorist Attacks on the

    Seaport Provides funds for port security activities, $125,000,000 (app. FY
    2003)

    United States, Pub. L. No. 107- including Port Security Grants. 206, 116
    Stat. 820 (2002).

    August 2, 2002 Seaport Appropriates funds for the port security pilot

    $28,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) program, Operation Safe Commerce. Motor Coach
    Appropriates grants and contracts to enhance

    $15,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) security for intercity bus operations.
    Aviation Funds for procurement of air- ground

    $15,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) communications systems and devices for the
    Federal Air Marshal Program.

    All Funds for grants and contracts for radiation $4, 000,000 (app. FY
    2003)

    detection system test and evaluation. Aviation Funds for grants to airport
    authorities for pilot $17,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) projects to improve
    airport terminal security. All Funds for grants and contracts for
    security,

    $10,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) research, development and pilot projects.
    Aviation Funds for replacement of magnetometers at

    $23,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) airport passenger screening locations in
    commercial service airports.

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Modes Public law * appropriation impacted Key provisions Funding
    appropriated Consolidated Appropriation Aviation Provides for aviation
    security (screening

    $4, 516,300, 000 (app. FY 2003) Resolution for 2003, Pub. L. No.

    activities, airport support, and enforcement including:

    108- 7, 117 Stat. 11 (2003). presence) including:

    February 20, 2003 additional funding from FAA appropriations for

    $144,000,000 (app. FY 2003) explosives detections systems additional
    funding for terminal modifications

    $265,000,000 (app. FY 2003) needed for the installation of EDS equipment
    additional funding for the procurement of $174, 500,000 (app. FY 2003)

    checked baggage EDS equipment All Funds administrative, including
    intelligence, $308,700,000 (app. FY 2003) activities of the Transportation
    Security Administration.

    All Enhances maritime and land security including: $244,800,000 (app. FY
    2003) including:

    provides additional funding for port security $150,000,000 (app. FY 2003)

    grants funds for radiation detection and monitoring $4, 000,000 (app. FY
    2003) system evaluation and procurement funds for the purpose of deploying
    Operation $30,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) Safe Commerce All Appropriates funds
    for research and $110, 200,000 (app. FY 2003) development related to
    transportation security

    including: including:

    funds for grants for port security $10,000, 000 (app. FY 2003) Emergency
    Wartime

    Aviation Provides financial assistance to US flag air $2, 395,750, 000 of
    which the first

    Supplemental Appropriations carriers for expenses and revenue forgone

    $100 million is to reimburse Act for FY 2003, Pub. L. No.

    related to aviation security. carriers for strengthening cockpit 108- 11,
    117 Stat. 559 (2003)

    doors. (app. FY 2003) Seaport Appropriates funds for the Coast Guard to

    $228,000,000 (app. FY 2003) support Operation Liberty Shield. Aviation
    Appropriates additional funds to TSA for the

    $235,000,000 (app. FY 2003) installation of explosive detection systems at
    airports.

    Seaport Appropriates additional funds to TSA for port $20,000, 000 (app.
    FY 2003)

    security. Aviation Appropriates additional funds to TSA for $280,000,000
    (app. FY 2003) passenger screener hiring, training, and related costs.
    Source: GAO analysis of U. S. Code.

    Table 7: Regulations Issuing Regulations a Modes impacted agency Key
    provisions

    Criminal History Records Checks, Aviation FAA Requires airport operators
    and aircraft operators to 66 Fed. Reg. 63474 (Dec. 6, conduct fingerprint-
    based criminal history records checks

    2001). (CHRC*s) of individuals with unescorted access authority

    Effective December 6, 2001 to secured areas.

    Civil Aviation Security Rules, 67 All TSA Transfers rules governing civil
    aviation security to TSA.

    Fed. Reg. 8340 (Feb. 22, 2002). Provides screener qualifications and
    training.

    Effective February 17, 2002 Defines and governs the release of *sensitive
    security

    information.* Security Programs for Aircraft

    Aviation TSA Requires aircraft operators of aircraft with a maximum 12,500
    Pounds or More, 67 Fed. takeoff weight of 12,500 lbs. or more to conduct
    criminal Reg. 8205 (Feb. 22, 2002).

    history records checks on flightcrew members. Effective June 24, 2002
    Requires access to the flight deck of such aircraft be restricted.

    Passenger Name Record Aviation Customs Service Requires air carriers, upon
    request, to electronically Information Required for

    provide U. S. Customs Service with access to Passenger Passengers on
    Flights in Foreign

    Name Record (PNR) information concerning the identity Air Transportation
    to or from the

    and travel plans of passengers for any international flight United States,
    67 Fed. Reg.

    to or from the United States. 42710 (June 25, 2002). Effective June 25,
    2002

    Picture Identification Aviation FAA Requires all certified pilots to carry
    photo identification Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg.

    subject to inspection upon request from the FAA or any 65858 (Oct. 28,
    2002).

    federal, state, or local law enforcement officer. Effective October 28,
    2002

    Discretionary Bridge Candidate Highways Federal Highway Allows
    discretionary bridge funds to be used for security

    Rating Factor, 67 Fed. Reg. Administration improvements on eligible
    bridges, subject to 23 USC 144

    63539 (Oct. 15, 2002). requirements.

    Effective November 14, 2002 Presentation of Vessel Cargo

    Seaport Customs Service Requires the advance and accurate presentation of
    Declaration to Customs Before

    certain manifest information prior to lading at the foreign Cargo Is Laden
    Aboard Vessel at port, in order to enable Customs to evaluate the risk of
    Foreign Port for Transport to the

    smuggling weapons of mass destruction. United States, 67 Fed. Reg. 66318
    (Oct. 31, 2002). Effective December 2, 2002.

    Aviation Security: Private Charter Aviation TSA Requires private charter
    operators using aircraft with a

    Security Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. maximum takeoff weight of at least 100, 000
    lbs. or which

    79881 (Dec. 31, 2002). can seat at least 61 passengers to ensure that

    Effective February 1, 2003 passengers and their carry- on baggage are
    screened prior to boarding.

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Issuing Regulations a Modes impacted agency Key provisions

    Coast Guard Transition to Seaport Coast Guard Transfers the Coast Guard
    from the Department of

    Department of Homeland Transportation to the newly created Department of

    Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 9533 (Feb. Homeland Security.

    28, 2003). Effective March 1, 2003

    Organization and Delegation of Motor Carrier Office of the

    Transfers authority of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Powers and Duties,
    Update of Secretary,

    Administration to determine security risks to the Secretarial Delegations,
    68 Fed.

    DOT Transportation Security Administration.

    Reg. 10988 (March 7, 2003). Effective March 7, 2003

    Screening of Aliens and Other Aviation DOJ Prohibits aviation training
    providers to train aliens or other

    Designated Individuals Seeking designated individuals without prior
    approval by the Flight Training, 68 Fed. Reg. 7313

    Attorney General. (Feb. 13, 2003). Effective March 17, 2003

    Security Requirements for Motor Motor Carrier Federal Motor Carrier
    Transfers rulemaking authority addressing the security of

    Carriers Transporting Hazardous Safety Administration

    motor carrier shipments of hazardous materials to the Materials, 68 Fed.
    Reg. 13250

    (FMCSA) Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)

    (March 19, 2003). from the FMCSA.

    Effective March 19, 2003 Hazardous Materials: Security

    All RSPA Requires shippers and carriers of certain highly Requirements for
    Offerors and

    hazardous materials to develop and implement security Transporters of
    Hazardous

    plans. Materials, 68 Fed. Reg. 14510

    Requires all shippers and carriers of hazardous materials (March 25,
    2003).

    to include a security component in their employee Effective March 25, 2003

    training programs. Notification of Arrival in U. S. Ports, Seaport Coast
    Guard Makes permanent changes in notification of arrival and 68 Fed. Reg.
    9537 (Feb. 28,

    departure requirements to ensure public safety and 2003)

    security, including requiring electronic submission of Effective April 1,
    2003. cargo manifest information to the U. S. Customs Service, and
    requiring additional crew and passenger information.

    Organization and Delegation of Seaport Office of the

    Transfers authority to the Maritime Administrator to Powers and Duties;
    Delegation to Secretary, DOT develop standards and curriculum for the
    training and the Administrator, Maritime certification of maritime
    security professionals. Administrator, 68 Fed. Reg. 16215 (April 3, 2003).
    Effective April 3, 2003

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Issuing Regulations a Modes impacted agency Key provisions

    Implementation of the Safe All ATF Requires applicants for licenses and
    permits to provide Explosives Act, 68 Fed. Reg.

    with the application the names and appropriate 13768 (March 20, 2003).

    identifying information regarding employees authorized to Effective May
    24, 2003

    possess explosive materials.

    Interim Final Rule

    Requires applicants for licenses and permits to provide with the
    application fingerprints and photographs of *responsible persons* (for
    example, site managers, sole proprietors, partners, corporate officers and
    directors, and majority shareholders).

    Requires the ATF to conduct background checks on responsible persons and
    employees authorized to possess explosive materials.

    Limitations on the Issuance of Motor Carrier FMCSA Prohibits States from
    issuing, renewing, transferring, or Commercial Driver's Licenses

    upgrading a commercial driver*s license (CDL) with a with a Hazardous
    Materials

    hazardous material endorsement unless TSA has Endorsement, 68 Fed. Reg.
    conducted a background check of the applicant, including 23844 (May 5,
    2003).

    administering a hazardous materials knowledge test. Effective May 5, 2003

    Interim Final Rule

    Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Motor Carrier, RSPA Requires shippers and
    transporters to comply with Hazardous Materials

    Seaport Federal security regulations that apply to motor carrier
    Transportation Security 68 Fed.

    and vessel transportation Reg. 23832 (May 5, 2003)

    Requires applicants for exemptions from the Hazardous Effective May 5,
    2003

    Materials Regulations compliance with applicable Interim Final Rule

    Federal transportation security laws and regulations. Security Threat
    Assessment for

    Motor Carrier TSA Establishes security threat assessment standards for
    Individuals Applying for a

    determining whether an individual poses a security threat Hazardous
    Materials warranting denial of a hazardous materials endorsement
    Endorsement for a Commercial for a CDL. Also established appeals and
    waiver Drivers License 68 Fed. Reg.

    procedures. 23852 (May 5, 2003) Effective May 5, 2003

    Interim Final Rule

    Source: GAO analysis of Code of Federal Regulations. a All regulations
    listed are final rules unless otherwise noted.

    Organizational Chart of the Transportation

    Appendi V x Security Administration Administrator Task Forces

    Deputy Administrator Chief of Staff Chief Counsel Strategic Management &

    ONRA Analysis

    Transition Security & Law Enforcement

    Liaison Communication & Public

    Information Legislative Affairs Transportation

    Civil Rights Security Policy

    Ombudsmen Executive Secretariat

    Operations Directorate

    International Support Systems Directorate Associate

    Associate Administrator/ Administrator/ Chief Support Systems Chief
    Operating Officer

    Officer Human Capital Officer Crisis Management

    Aviation Maritime and

    Intelligence Operation

    Human Training &

    Information Security

    Internal Finance and

    Operations Land

    Policy Resources

    Quality Technology

    Technology Affairs and

    Admin. Security

    Performance Program

    Assistant Assistant

    Assistant Assistant

    Assistant Assistant

    Reviews

    Assistant Administrator

    Assistant Administrator

    Administrator Administrator

    Assistant Administrator/

    Administrator Administrator/

    Administrator Administrator

    Chief Assistant

    Chief Financial Information

    Administrator Officer

    Officer Source: TSA.

    Appendi VI x GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Cathleen
    Berrick, (202) 512- 8777 Susan Fleming, (202) 512- 4431 Peter Guerrero,
    (202) 512- 2834

    Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Steven Calvo, Nikki
    Clowers, Michelle Dresben, Glenn Dubin, Scott Farrow, Libby Halperin,
    David Hooper, Hiroshi Ishikawa, Ray Sendejas, and Glen Trochelman made key

    contributions to this report.

    Related GAO Products Transportation

    Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and

    Security Reports and

    Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments, GAO- 03- 502
    (Washington, D. C.: May 1, 2003). Testimonies

    Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
    Homeland Security, GAO- 03- 594T (Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003).

    Transportation Security: Post- September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term
    Challenges, GAO- 03- 616T (Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003).

    Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot
    Certification Process, GAO- 03- 248NI (Washington, D. C.: February 3,
    2003). (Not for Public Dissemination)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
    Transportation, GAO- 03- 108 (Washington, D. C.: January 1, 2003)

    High Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
    Government and the Nation*s Critical Infrastructure, GAO- 03- 121
    (Washington, D. C.: January 1, 2003).

    Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT*s
    Enforcement Approach, GAO- 03- 22 (Washington, D. C.: January 10, 2003).

    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
    Cargo System, GAO- 03- 344 (Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002).

    Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
    Challenges, GAO- 03- 263 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).

    Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation
    Issues, GAO- 03- 253 (Washington, D. C.: November 22, 2002).

    Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and
    Assets Remain at Risk, GAO- 03- 303T (Washington, D. C.: November 19,
    2002).

    Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
    Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO- 03- 297T (Washington, D. C.: November
    18, 2002).

    Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort
    for All Missions, GAO- 03- 155 (Washington, D. C.: November 12, 2002).

    Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, GAO- 02- 1075T
    (Washington, D. C.: September 18, 2002).

    Pipeline Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and
    Communication Needed, GAO- 02- 785 (Washington, D. C.: August 26, 2002).

    Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
    Initiatives Successful, GAO- 02- 993T (Washington, D. C.: August 5, 2002).

    Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
    and Long- Term Challenges, GAO- 02- 971T (Washington, D. C.: July 25,
    2002).

    Critical infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be
    Addressed, GAO- 02- 961T (Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
    Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports, GAO- 02- 955TNI
    (Washington, D. C.: July 23, 2002). (Not for Public Dissemination)

    Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots, GA0- 02- 822R
    (Washington, D. C.: June 28, 2002).

    Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection
    Equipment, GAO- 02- 713C (Washington, D. C.: June 20, 2002). (Classified)

    Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO-
    02- 538T (Washington, D. C.: March 19, 2002).

    Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation*s Air
    Transportation System, GAO- 01- 1164T (Washington, D. C.: September 26,
    2001). (Not for Public Dissemination)

    Aviation Security: Information on the Nation*s Air Transportation System
    Vulnerabilities, GAO- 01- 1174T (Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001).
    (Not for Public Dissemination)

    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
    Screening Security Operations, GAO- 01- 1171T (Washington, D. C.:
    September 25, 2001).

    Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
    Assigning Screening Responsibilities, GAO- 01- 1165T (Washington, D. C.:
    September 21, 2001).

    Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
    Security, GAO- 01- 1166T (Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001).

    Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
    Security at the Nation*s Airports, GAO- 01- 1162T (Washington, D. C.:
    September 20, 2001).

    Terrorism and Risk

    Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges,

    Management

    and Key Management Issues, GAO- 03- 715T (Washington, D. C.: May 8, 2003).

    Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
    Results- Oriented Culture, GAO- 03- 190 (Washington, D. C.: January 17,
    2003).

    Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, GAO-
    03- 260 (Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Information Technology Funding and Associated
    Management Issues, GAO- 03- 250 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued
    Management Challenges, GAO- 02- 1122T (Washington, D. C.: October 1,
    2002).

    National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges,

    GAO- 02- 1048R (Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
    Success, GAO- 02- 1013T (Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002).

    Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More
    Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information Systems,
    GAO- 02- 474 (Washington, D. C.: July 15, 2002).

    Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security
    Challenges Need to Be Addressed, GAO- 02- 918T (Washington, D. C.: July 9,
    2002).

    Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be
    Critical to Success, GAO- 02- 901T (Washington, D. C.: July 3, 2002).

    Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
    Complicate Priority Setting, GAO- 02- 893T (Washington, D. C.: June 28,
    2002).

    National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
    Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy,

    GAO- 02- 811T (Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving
    National Goals, GAO- 02- 627T (Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002).

    National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private
    Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland
    Security, GAO- 02- 621T (Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a
    National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 550T
    (Washington, D. C.: April 2, 2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
    Preparedness Strategy, GAO- 02- 549T (Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance
    State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 548T (Washington, D. C.: March 25,
    2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy
    to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 547T (Washington, D. C.:
    March 22, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought,
    GAO- 02- 490T (Washington, D. C.: March 12, 2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State
    and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 473T (Washington, D. C.: March 1, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
    Long- Term National Needs, GAO- 02- 160T (Washington, D. C.: November 7,
    2001).

    Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
    Efforts, GAO- 02- 208T (Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001).

    Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
    and Biological Preparedness, GAO- 02- 162T (Washington, D. C.: October 17,
    2001).

    Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure
    Protection, GAO- 02- 24 (Washington, D. C.: October 15, 2001).

    Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,

    GAO- 02- 150T (Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001).

    Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory
    Management Are Needed, GAO- 01- 667 (Washington, D. C.: September 28,
    2001).

    Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Safeguarding
    Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer- Based Attacks,
    GAO- 01- 1168T (Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001).

    Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation*s Efforts, GAO-
    01- 1158T (Washington, D. C.: September 21, 2001).

    Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-
    01- 822 (Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001).

    (545030)

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    June 2003 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY Federal Action Needed to Help Address
    Security Challenges

    GAO- 03- 843

    Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 5 The Transportation System as a
    Whole Faces Numerous

    Challenges 7 Transportation Operators and State and Local Governments Have

    Taken Steps to Improve Security 25 Congress and Federal Agencies Have
    Taken Numerous Actions to

    Enhance Security, but Roles Remain Unclear 29 Experts and Associations
    Identified Future Actions to Advance the

    Security of the Transportation System 49 Conclusions 51 Recommendation for
    Executive Action 52 Agency Comments 52

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 56

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Transportation 59 GAO
    Comments 61

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 65 GAO
    Comments 68

    Appendix IV: Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
    Transportation Security 71

    Appendix V: Organizational Chart of the Transportation Security
    Administration 80

    Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 81 GAO Contact 81
    Acknowledgments 81

    Related GAO Products 82 Transportation Security Reports and Testimonies 82

    Terrorism and Risk Management 84 Tables Table 1: Comparison of
    Transportation Security Grant Requests to

    Federal Funding Available, 2002 to 2003 22

    Table 2: Key Actions Taken By DOT Modal Administrations to Secure the
    Different Transportation Modes, September 2001 to May 2003 32 Table 3:
    Elements of a Risk Management Approach 39 Table 4: List of Interviewees 56
    Table 5: Authorizations 71 Table 6: Appropriations 74 Table 7: Regulations
    77

    Figures Figure 1: Illustration of the Extensiveness of the Different Modes
    of Transportation 8

    Figure 2: Illustration of Possible Freight Movements within the
    Transportation System 15 Figure 3: Intermodal Activity at a U. S. Port 16
    Figure 4: Key Stakeholders in Transportation Security 18 Figure 5:
    Emergency Drill in Progress 27 Figure 6: Photograph of Inspection
    Equipment in Use 35 Figure 7: Organizational Chart of TSA*s Office of
    Maritime and Land Security, June 2003 38

    Figure 8: Illustration of How Risk Management Approach Can Guide Decision-
    Making 40

    Abbreviations

    ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act AASHTO American Association
    of State Highway and Transportation

    Officials CBP Bureau of Customs and Border Protection CSI Container
    Security Initiative C- TPAT Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
    DHS Department of Homeland Security DOT Department of Transportation FAA
    Federal Aviation Administration FHWA Federal Highway Administration FTA
    Federal Transit Administration Amtrak National Railroad Passenger
    Corporation TSA Transportation Security Administration TWIC Transportation
    Workers Identification Card

    This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    Securing the nation*s transportation system is fraught with challenges.
    The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our
    borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The
    extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and
    freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure.
    Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further
    complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved
    in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal,
    state, and local levels, and thousands of private sector companies.
    Further

    exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting
    transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has
    weakened the transportation industry*s financial condition by decreasing
    ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional
    funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far
    outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take a
    collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and
    future transportation challenges.

    Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance
    security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting aviation
    security deadlines during its first year of existence and DOT launched a
    variety of security initiatives to enhance the other modes of
    transportation. For example, the Federal Transit Administration provided
    grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the
    largest transit agencies, among other things. TSA has recently focused
    more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is
    planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation
    starting this summer. DOT is also continuing their security efforts.
    However, the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the
    transportation system have not been clearly defined, which creates the
    potential for overlap, duplication, and confusion as both entities move
    forward with their security efforts. The economic well being of the

    U. S. is dependent on the expeditious flow of people and goods through the
    transportation system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the
    threats and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to
    September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary
    responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake

    of September 11, Congress created the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary responsibility for the
    security of all modes of transportation. TSA was recently

    transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was
    asked to examine the challenges in securing the transportation system and
    the federal role and actions in

    transportation security. GAO recommends that DHS and DOT use a mechanism,
    such as a memorandum of agreement, to

    clarify and delineate DOT*s and TSA*s roles and responsibilities in
    transportation security matters. DHS and DOT generally agreed

    with the report*s findings; however, they disagreed with the
    recommendation. Based on the

    uncertainty in the entities* roles and responsibilities that
    transportation stakeholders surfaced to us, we continue to

    believe our recommendation is valid and would help address transportation
    security challenges.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 843. To view the full product,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Peter Guerrero at (202) 512- 2834 or guerrerop@ gao.
    gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 843, a report to

    Congressional Requesters

    June 2003

    TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

    Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges

    Page i GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Contents

    Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Contents

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    Page 1 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security United States General
    Accounting Office

    Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 1 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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    Appendix II

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Transportation

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    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Transportation

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    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Transportation

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    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Transportation

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    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Transportation

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    Appendix III

    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

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    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

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    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

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    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

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    Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

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    Appendix IV

    Appendix IV Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
    Transportation Security Page 72 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Appendix IV Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
    Transportation Security Page 73 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Appendix IV Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
    Transportation Security Page 74 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Appendix IV Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
    Transportation Security Page 75 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Appendix IV Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
    Transportation Security Page 76 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Appendix IV Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
    Transportation Security Page 77 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Appendix IV Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
    Transportation Security Page 78 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Appendix IV Highlights of Current Laws and Regulations Governing
    Transportation Security Page 79 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

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    Appendix V

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    Appendix VI

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    Related GAO Products Page 83 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Related GAO Products Page 84 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Related GAO Products Page 85 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

    Related GAO Products Page 86 GAO- 03- 843 Transportation Security

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