Drug Control: Financial and Management Challenges Continue to
Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Columbia
(03-JUN-03, GAO-03-820T).
The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since
the early 1970s to help reduce illicit drugs. In 1999, the
Colombian government introduced Plan Colombia--program that,
among other things, proposed reducing illicit drug activities by
50 percent over 6 years. In fiscal years 2000-03 alone, the
United States provided more than $2.5 billion in counternarcotics
assistance. Despite this aid, Colombia remains the world's
leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a major source of
the heroin used in the United States. This testimony discusses
the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian
Army and for a U.S.-supported Colombian police aerial eradication
program. It also addresses challenges Colombia and the United
States face in sustaining these programs.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-820T
ACCNO: A07064
TITLE: Drug Control: Financial and Management Challenges
Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities
in Columbia
DATE: 06/03/2003
SUBJECT: Controlled substances
Drug trafficking
Drugs
Federal aid to foreign countries
Financial management
Foreign governments
Foreign military training
Foreign technical aid
International cooperation
Narcotics
Colombia
Plan Colombia
UH-1N Helicopter
UH-60 Helicopter
UH-II Helicopter
******************************************************************
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GAO-03-820T
Testimony Before the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U. S.
Senate
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 9: 30 a. m. EDT Tuesday, June 3,
2003 DRUG CONTROL
Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to
Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade
GAO- 03- 820T
In fiscal years 2000- 03, the United States provided about $640 million in
assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade
and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related support. Most of this
assistance has been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics
operations.
In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program
has had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in every year
until 2002 and opium poppy cultivation remained relatively steady until
2001. But, for 2002, the U. S. Office of National Drug Control Policy
reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent and
net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25 percent* the second yearly
decline in a row. U. S. officials attributed this success primarily to the
Colombian government*s willingness to eradicate coca and poppy plants
without restriction.
Although the U. S.- supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has
recently begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in Plan Colombia,
Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and
management challenges. Neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian
National Police can sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs without
continued U. S. funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future.
According to U. S. embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up to
$230 million per year, and future costs for some other programs have not
been determined. Because of overall poor economic conditions, the
government of Colombia*s ability to contribute more is limited, but the
continuing violence from Colombia*s long- standing insurgency limits the
government*s ability to institute economic, social, and political
improvements. Moreover, Colombia faces continuing challenges associated
with the need to ensure it complies with human rights standards and other
requirements in order for U. S. assistance to continue. As GAO noted in
2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were
unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have
still
not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future
roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they
plan to achieve it.
Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation in Colombia, 1995- 2002 The United
States has been providing assistance to Colombia
since the early 1970s to help reduce illicit drugs. In 1999, the Colombian
government introduced Plan Colombia a program that, among other things,
proposed reducing illicit drug activities by 50 percent over 6 years. In
fiscal years 2000- 03 alone, the United States provided more than
$2. 5 billion in counternarcotics assistance. Despite this aid, Colombia
remains the world*s
leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a major source of the
heroin used in the United States. This testimony discusses the status of
U. S. counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army and for a
U. S.- supported Colombian police aerial eradication program. It also
addresses challenges Colombia and the United States face in sustaining
these programs.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 820T. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512- 4268 or FordJ@ gao. gov.
Highlights of GAO- 03- 820T, testimony
before the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U. S. Senate
June 3, 2003
DRUG CONTROL
Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to
Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia
Page 1 GAO- 03- 820T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus:
I am pleased to be here to discuss GAO*s work on U. S. counternarcotics
assistance to Colombia. Today we will highlight the preliminary findings
from our ongoing review of U. S. assistance to Colombia. Our draft report
is with the responsible agencies for comment; we expect to issue a final
report in mid- June. I will focus my comments on (1) the status of U. S.
counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army in fiscal years 2000- 03
and how this assistance has been used, (2) what the U. S.- supported
Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has accomplished in
recent years, and (3) what challenges Colombia and the United States face
in sustaining these programs.
In 1999, the Colombian government introduced Plan Colombia a $7.5 billion
program that, among other things, proposed reducing the cultivation,
processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent over 6
years. 1 A key component of the Colombian- U. S. counternarcotics
strategy was the creation of a Colombian Army 2,285- man counternarcotics
brigade, for which the United States agreed to provide helicopters to help
it move around southern Colombia to reduce cocaine production and
trafficking. Closely allied with this objective was U. S. support for the
Colombian National Police*s aerial eradication program to significantly
reduce, if not eliminate, coca and opium poppy cultivation. 2 In fiscal
years 2000- 03, the United States provided about $640 million to
train and equip the Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and supply the
army with 72 helicopters and related training, maintenance, and
operational support. Most of this assistance has been delivered and is
being used for counternarcotics operations. However, some problems were
encountered. For example,
After a successful first year of operations, the brigade*s results
dropped off in 2002. U. S. and Colombian officials attribute this, in
part, to coca
1 For more information on U. S. assistance for Plan Colombia, see U. S.
General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U. S. Assistance to Colombia Will
Take Years to Produce Results, GAO- 01- 26 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 17,
2000). 2 The leaves of the coca plant are the raw ingredient of cocaine,
and opium poppy is used to produce heroin. The aerial eradication program
involves spraying the coca and poppy plants from low- flying airplanes
with an herbicide that attacks the root system and kills the plant.
Summary
Page 2 GAO- 03- 820T
growers and producers moving out of the brigade*s range in southern
Colombia. In late 2002, with U. S. assistance, the Colombian Army
reorganized the brigade and gave it authority to operate anywhere in the
country. This change, according to U. S. embassy and Colombian Army
officials, will improve the brigade*s ability to conduct operations
against high- value, drug- trafficking targets, such as cocaine production
laboratories and the leadership of insurgent groups involved in
drugtrafficking activities. One of the brigade*s retrained battalions has
been operating in Narino department since early May 2003.
Some initial impediments slowed the delivery and operational use of the
helicopters. The start of entry- level helicopter pilot training was
delayed 5 months while the United States determined who would provide and
fund the training. The delivery of 25 UH- II helicopters was delayed 5
months
while the United States and Colombia decided what type of engine to use in
the aircraft. U. S. funding for the brigade*s operations was slowed for a
total of about 5 months in 2002 because the Department of State did not
meet congressional deadlines for reporting on Colombia*s progress in
addressing human rights violations.
U. S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan
Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army
taking over the responsibilities of operating and maintaining the
aircraft.
However, U. S. embassy and Colombian officials stated that a continued
level of U. S. assistance will be needed beyond this date because the army
is not expected to have the personnel trained or the resources necessary.
Although U. S. embassy officials stated that they have not officially
estimated what this assistance level will be, they tentatively projected
that it would cost between $100 million and $150 million a year to sustain
ongoing counternarcotics programs. In addition, other recently initiated
U. S. programs will require additional support.
In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program
has had mixed results. Since 1995, net coca cultivation rose in every year
until 2002 and net opium poppy cultivation remained between 6,100 to 7,500
hectares. But in recent months, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
reported that
net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent in 2002, from
169,800 hectares in 2001 to 144,450 hectares, and net opium poppy
cultivation in Colombia decreased 25 percent in 2002, from 6,500 hectares
in 2001 to 4,900 hectares* the second yearly decline in a row.
Page 3 GAO- 03- 820T
U. S. embassy officials attributed this recent success primarily to the
current Colombian government*s willingness to spray coca and poppy plants
without restriction in all areas of the country. However, since at least
1998, U. S. embassy officials have been concerned with the rising U. S.
presence in Colombia and the associated costs of the aerial eradication
program. At the time, the embassy began developing a 3- year plan to have
the Colombian National Police assume control over the program; but, for
various reasons, the police never agreed to the plan. Since then,
contractor involvement and the associated costs have continued to rise,
and the Colombian National Police are not yet able to assume more control
of the aerial eradication program. In fiscal year 1998, U. S. embassy
officials reported that the costs for the U. S. contractor, fuel,
herbicide, and related support totaled $48.5 million. For fiscal year
2003, U. S. embassy officials
estimated that the comparable costs totaled $86.3 million. Much of this
increase occurred between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to support the
additional spray aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the
anticipated continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia.
According to U. S. embassy officials, these costs are expected to remain
relatively constant
for the next several years. Although the U. S.- supported counternarcotics
program has recently shown some of the results envisioned when Plan
Colombia was first introduced, Colombia and the United States continue to
face financial and management challenges in sustaining programs in
Colombia.
Colombia*s financial resources are limited. Neither the Colombian Army
nor the Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing counternarcotics
programs without continued U. S. funding and contractor support for the
foreseeable future. According to U. S. embassy officials, ongoing programs
alone may cost up to $230 million per year, and future costs for some
other
programs have not been determined. Colombia also continues to face
challenges associated with its political
and economic instability fostered by its long- standing insurgency and,
for U. S. assistance to continue, the need to ensure that (1) the military
and police comply with human rights standards, (2) the aerial eradication
program meets certain environmental conditions, and (3) alternative
development is provided in areas subject to aerial eradication. Colombia
is a longtime ally and significant trading partner of the United
States and, therefore, its economic and political stability is important
to the United States as well as the Andean region. Colombia*s long-
standing insurgency and the insurgents* links to the illicit drug trade
complicate its
Page 4 GAO- 03- 820T
efforts to tap its natural resources and make systemic economic reforms.
Solving these problems is important to Colombia*s future stability. On the
other hand, recent world events* from the global war on terrorism to the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* have diverted scarce U. S. resources and
made it paramount that the United States fully consider the resources
committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the
total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown.
Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not
developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in
Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to
achieve it.
The United States has provided assistance to help reduce illegal drug
production and trafficking activities in Colombia since the 1970s. Yet,
Colombia is still the world*s leading cocaine producer and distributor and
a major source of the heroin used in the United States. According to
State, Colombia provides 90 percent of the cocaine and about 40 percent of
the
heroin entering the United States. The Drug Enforcement Administration
reports that several billion dollars flow into Colombia each year from the
cocaine trade alone, and this vast amount of drug money has helped the
country*s two largest insurgency groups the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia and the National Liberation Army gain unprecedented economic,
political, and social power and influence. The insurgents exercise some
degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia*s territory east and south
of the Andes where much of the coca is grown.
In an effort to address the influx of cocaine and heroin from Colombia,
the United States has funded a counternarcotics strategy in Colombia that
includes programs for interdiction, eradication, and alternative
development, which must be carefully coordinated to achieve mutually
reinforcing results. Besides assistance for the Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade and the Colombian National Police aerial
eradication program, the United States has supported Colombian efforts to
interdict illicit- drug trafficking along rivers and in the air as well as
alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced
persons programs. The Departments of Defense and State have provided most
of the funding and State, through its Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Narcotics Affairs Section in the
U. S. Embassy Bogota, oversees the program. In fiscal years 2000 through
2003, the United States provided more than $2.5 billion to Colombia for
counternarcotics assistance. (See table 1.) For fiscal year 2004, the
administration has proposed an additional $700 million in aid. Background
Page 5 GAO- 03- 820T
Table 1: U. S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, Fiscal Years 2000-
03
Dollars in millions Fiscal years Agency 2000 a 2001 2002 2003 b
(estimated) Total
State $774.9 $48.0 275.4 $452.0 $1,550.3
DOD 128.5 190.2 119.1 149.9 $587.7
USAID c 123.5 0 104.5 151.0 $379.0 Total $1,026.9 $238.2 $499.0 $752.9
$2,517.0
Source: Departments of Defense and State and the U. S. Agency for
International Development. a Includes funds appropriated for Plan Colombia
through the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2000
(Division B of P. L. 106- 246). b Includes $93 million in Foreign Military
Financing funds appropriated in the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division E, Title
III of P. L. 108- 7); $34 million appropriated to State and $34 million
appropriated to Defense in the Supplemental Appropriations Act to Support
Department of Defense Operations in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2003 (P. L. 108-
11); and $37. 1 million for Foreign Military Financing allotted from
fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations. c In fiscal years 2000- 03,
State transferred $375 million to the U. S. Agency for International
Development for alternative development, judicial sector reform, and
internally displaced persons programs.
Following increased violence in Colombia during early 2002, the Congress
provided *expanded authority* for the use of U. S. assistance to Colombia,
which enabled the Colombian government to use the U. S.- trained and
equipped counternarcotics brigade, U. S.* provided helicopters, and other
U. S. counternarcotics assistance to fight groups designated as terrorist
organizations as well as to fight drug trafficking. Similar authority was
provided for fiscal year 2003 and is being sought for fiscal year 2004.
U. S. assistance to the Colombian Army during fiscal years 2000- 03 $640
million for the counternarcotics brigade, 72 helicopters, and related
support has, for the most part, been delivered and is being used for
counternarcotics operations. However, both the United States and the
Colombian Army experienced some unanticipated problems that delayed the
operational use of the helicopters. In addition, U. S. support will be
needed for the foreseeable future to sustain operations.
The United States initially agreed to train and equip a Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade of three battalions and a total of about 2,285
professional and conscripted soldiers. The United States provided the
Assistance to the
Colombian Army Has Been Delivered, but Problems Were Encountered
Status of the Brigade
Page 6 GAO- 03- 820T
counternarcotics brigade with about $45 million in training and equipment*
from weapons and ammunition to rations, uniforms, and canteens. The
brigade*s primary mission was to plan and conduct interdiction operations
against drug- trafficking activities, including destroying illicit drug-
producing facilities, and, when called upon, to provide security in
insurgent- controlled areas where aerial eradication operations were
planned. According to U. S. and Colombian officials, the brigade was
highly effective in 2001 for example, it destroyed 25 cocaine
hydrochloride laboratories 3 but was less successful in 2002, when it
destroyed only 4 such labs. U. S. embassy officials stated that the
brigade became less effective because the insurgents moved their drug-
producing activities, such as the laboratories, beyond the brigade*s
reach. In addition, according to these officials, the brigade became more
involved in
protecting infrastructure, such as bridges and power stations, and
performing base security. Moreover, the aerial eradication program did not
call on the brigade to provide ground security on very many occasions,
essentially planning spray missions in the less threatening areas.
In August 2002, U. S. embassy and Colombian military officials agreed to
restructure the brigade to make it a rapid reaction force capable of
making quick, tactical strikes on a few days* notice. As part of this
restructuring,
the Colombian Army designated the brigade a national asset capable of
operating anywhere in Colombia rather than just in its prior area of
responsibility in southern Colombia. The newly restructured brigade
consists of three combat battalions and a support battalion with a total
of about 1,900 soldiers, all of whom are professional. Two of the combat
battalions have been retrained. The third combat battalion should be
retrained by mid- June 2003. This change, according to U. S. embassy and
Colombian Army officials, will improve the brigade*s ability to conduct
operations against high- value, drug- trafficking targets, such as
laboratories containing cocaine and the leadership of insurgent groups
involved in drug- trafficking activities. One of the retrained battalions
has been
operating in Narino department since early May 2003. A key component of U.
S. assistance for Plan Colombia was enhancing the brigade*s air mobility.
To do this, the United States provided the
3 The laboratories are used in the final stages of processing coca into
cocaine and are considered high- value targets. Status of the Helicopters
Page 7 GAO- 03- 820T
Colombian Army with 33 UH- 1N helicopters, 14 UH- 60 Black Hawk
helicopters, and 25 UH- II helicopters. 4 The 33 UH- 1N helicopters were
supposed to serve as interim aircraft until the UH- 60 and UH- II
helicopters funded under Plan Colombia were
delivered. The UH- 1Ns were delivered in stages between November 1999 and
March 2001. Since flying their first mission in December 2000, the
helicopters have logged 19,500 hours in combat and have supported more
than 430 counternarcotics brigade operations. Colombian Army personnel are
qualified as pilots and mechanics, but many of the experienced pilots and
mechanics who operate and maintain the aircraft are provided through a U.
S. contractor.
The UH- 60 Black Hawk helicopters were delivered between July and
December 2001 but did not begin support operations for the brigade until
November 2002 because of a shortage of fully qualified Colombian Army
pilots. Forty- two Colombian Army personnel have completed the
minimum UH- 60 pilot training, of which 13 have qualified as pilot-
incommand. U. S.- funded contract pilots fill in as pilots- in- command.
In addition, a U. S.- funded contractor continues to maintain the
helicopters and provide maintenance training.
State procured 25 UH- II helicopters under Plan Colombia and planned to
deliver them to the Colombian Army between November 2001 and June 2002.
However, they were delivered between March and November 2002 instead
because the Colombian military was considering whether to use a more
powerful engine in the helicopters than the one usually installed.
Ultimately it decided to use the more common engine. According to NAS
officials, although some of the UH- II helicopters are being used for
missions, all the helicopters will not be operational until June 2003. As
of January 2003, 25 Colombian Army pilots had completed their initial
training and 21 of these pilots are completing the training needed to
qualify for operational missions. However, contractor pilots continue to
supplement Colombian Army pilots and a U. S.- funded contractor continues
to provide maintenance support.
Although all the U. S.- provided helicopters are in Colombia, a number of
unanticipated problems in training Colombian Army pilots and mechanics 4
Of the 33 UH- 1Ns, 28 remain available for use by the brigade; 1 crashed
on a mission and 4 were transferred to support the aerial eradication
program. Problems with Pilot and Mechanic Training
Page 8 GAO- 03- 820T
to operate and maintain the helicopters were encountered. Some of these
problems continue to limit the Colombian Army*s ability to operate and
maintain the aircraft. Primarily, the Colombian Army will have to continue
to rely on contractor support because it will not have enough trained
pilots- in- command and senior mechanics for the foreseeable future.
When the United States agreed to provide the UH- 60 and UH- II
helicopters for the Colombian Army in July 2000, the assistance for Plan
Colombia did not include any funds to train the Colombian pilots and
mechanics needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. About 6 months
after passage of U. S. assistance for Plan Colombia, Defense agreed to
provide the training and reported that it would transfer up to $20 million
from other counternarcotics projects in Colombia to pay for it.
A training plan was approved in mid- 2001. Although the plan provided
training for Colombian Army personnel to meet the minimum qualifications
for a pilot and mechanic, it did not include the additional training
necessary to fly missions in a unit or to become a senior mechanic. Basic
training for 117 helicopter pilots* known as initial entry rotary wing
training* began in November 2001 and is projected to be completed by
December 2004. This training is intended to provide a pool or pipeline of
pilots for more advanced training to fly specific helicopters.
In addition, according to U. S. embassy officials, a new pilot takes an
average of 2 to 3 years to progress to pilot- in- command.
According to U. S. embassy and contractor officials, 105 out of 159
Colombian Army personnel have completed the basic UH- 60 and UH- II
maintenance training and are taking more advanced training to qualify as
senior mechanics. These officials told us that the remaining 54 personnel
will receive the contractor- provided basic training in the near future,
but they did not know when it would begin. Moreover, these officials also
told us that it typically takes 3 to 5 years for mechanics to gain the
experience necessary to become fully qualified on specific helicopter
systems, in
particular the UH- 60 Black Hawks. The Colombian Army Aviation Battalion
is responsible for providing
helicopters and other aircraft and personnel for all Colombian Army
missions with an aviation component, including counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency operations throughout Colombia. Information provided by
the Colombian Aviation Battalion shows that it is staffed at only 80
percent of its required levels and that, over the past several years, it
has received between 60 percent to 70 percent of its requested budget for
logistics and maintenance. The Colombian military*s decision to continue
using the UH- 1N helicopters in addition to the UH- 60 and UH- II
helicopters
Page 9 GAO- 03- 820T
will also make it more difficult for the Aviation Battalion to provide the
numbers of personnel needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. State
originally intended that the UH- 1N helicopters would not be used after
the UH- 60 and UH- II helicopters were available to support operations.
According to bilateral agreements between Colombia and the United
States, the Colombian Army must ensure that pilots and mechanics who
receive U. S. training be assigned to positions using their training for a
minimum of 2 years. This has not always been the case. For example,
although 19 Colombian Army personnel were qualified to serve as pilotsin-
command on UH- 1N helicopters, only 1 pilot was assigned to serve in this
position. The remaining pilots- in- command were provided by a U. S.
contractor.
Of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2002, $140 million was used to
support Colombian Army counternarcotics efforts. Most of this amount was
used for U. S.- provided helicopter operations and maintenance,
logistical, and training support. However, not all the funding could be
released until the Secretary of State certified, in two separate reports
to appropriate congressional committees, 5 that the Colombian military was
making progress meeting certain human rights conditions. Because State was
late in providing these reports, the U. S. embassy could not use this
funding for operations and training on two occasions for a total of about
5 months during 2002. 6 These delays resulted in fewer counternarcotics
operations and limited the training and experience Colombian Army pilots
could obtain to qualify as pilots- in- command.
5 Section 567 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P. L. 107- 115). Specifically, the act
provided that not more than 60 percent of the funds could be obligated
until after the Secretary of State made a determination and certification
that the Colombian military was (1) suspending members of the Colombian
Armed Forces who have been creditably alleged to have committed gross
violations of human rights, (2) cooperating with civilian prosecutors and
investigators, and
(3) severing links between the Armed Forces and paramilitary groups. In
addition, the remaining 40 percent of the funds could be obligated only
after June 1, 2002, and after the Secretary of State made a second
determination and certification with respect to the same conditions.
6 According to U. S. embassy political section personnel, they encountered
difficulties developing the information required to make the human rights
determination and certification. The first report was issued on May 1,
2002* almost 2 months later than State*s target date. The second report
was issued on September 9, 2002* almost 3 months later than State*s target
date.
Page 10 GAO- 03- 820T
U. S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan
Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army
taking over these responsibilities. However, U. S. embassy and Colombian
Army officials stated that a continued level of U. S. contractor presence
will be needed beyond this date because the Aviation Battalion is not
expected to have the personnel trained or the resources necessary.
Although the embassy officials stated that they have not officially
estimated what this assistance level will be, they tentatively projected
that it would cost between $100 million and $150 million annually to
sustain the U. S.- supported counternarcotics programs. Moreover, other
recently initiated U. S. programs will likely require U. S. assistance and
contractor support, but the long- term costs of sustaining such programs
are not known.
Since the early 1990s, State*s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (through the U. S. Embassy*s Narcotics Affairs Section
(NAS) and the Office of Aviation) has supported the Colombian National
Police*s efforts to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the
cultivation of coca and opium poppy. However, for the most part, the net
hectares of coca under cultivation in Colombia continued to rise until
2002, and the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation remained
relatively steady until 2001- 02. 7 In addition, the U. S. embassy has
made little progress in having the Colombian National Police assume more
responsibility for the aerial eradication program, which requires costly
U. S. contractor assistance to carry out. As shown in figure 1, the number
of hectares under coca cultivation rose more than threefold from 1995 to
2001* from 50,900 hectares to 169,800
hectares* despite substantially increased eradication efforts. 8 But in
2002, the Office of Aviation estimated that the program eradicated 102,225
7 The estimates of net hectares of coca and opium poppy under cultivation
are prepared annually by the U. S. Director of Central Intelligence, Crime
and Narcotics Center. See U. S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control:
Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia, GAO- 03- 319R
(Washington, D. C.: Jan. 8, 2003). 8 The number of hectares eradicated is
provided by the Office of Aviation and is based on the number of net
hectares sprayed multiplied by an estimated *kill rate.* Although many
thousands of hectares of coca and poppy are killed, coca and poppy farmers
often replant in the same or other areas, which helps explain why the
number of hectares under
cultivation often does not decline. Continued U. S. Support
Needed to Sustain Operations
Colombia*s Aerial Eradication Program Has Had Mixed Results
Recent Progress in Reducing Net Cultivation of Coca and Poppy
Page 11 GAO- 03- 820T
hectares of coca* a record high. In March 2003, the Office of National
Drug Control Policy reported for the first time since before 1995 a net
reduction in coca cultivation in Colombia* from 169,800 hectares to
144,450 hectares a 15 percent decline.
Figure 1: Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation and Hectares Eradicated
in Colombia, 1995- 2002
As shown in figure 2, the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation
varied between 6,100 and 6,600 for the period 1995- 98 but rose to 7,500
hectares in 1999 and 2000. In 2001, the net hectares of poppy estimated
under cultivation declined to 6,500 and, in 2002, further declined to
4,900* nearly a 35 percent reduction in net cultivation over the past 2
years.
Page 12 GAO- 03- 820T
Figure 2: Net Hectares of Poppy under Cultivation and Hectares Eradicated
in Colombia, 1995- 2002
U. S. embassy officials attributed the recent unprecedented reductions in
both coca and poppy cultivation primarily to the current Colombian
government*s willingness to allow the aerial eradication program to
operate in all areas of the country. They also noted that
the number of spray aircraft had increased from 10 in July 2001 to 17 in
January 2003;
recently acquired spray aircraft can carry up to twice the herbicide as
the older aircraft; and as of January 2003, aircraft were flying spray
missions from three forward
operating locations* a first for the program. The ability to keep an
increased number of spray aircraft operating out of three bases was made
possible, at least in part, because the U. S. embassy hired a contractor
to work with the Colombian National Police to, among other things, help
maintain their aircraft. As a result, the availability of police aircraft
for the spray program increased. Moreover, in August 2002, the Colombian
government allowed the police to return to a higher
strength herbicide mixture that, according to embassy officials, improved
the spray*s effectiveness. 9 These officials project that the aerial
eradication program can reduce the amount of coca and poppy cultivation to
30,000
9 In March 2002, the previous Colombian government reduced the strength of
the spray mixture because of environmental concerns.
Page 13 GAO- 03- 820T
hectares and 5,000 hectares, respectively, by 2005 or 2006, assuming the
police continue the current pace and can spray in all areas of Colombia.
As we reported in 2000, 10 beginning in 1998, U. S. embassy officials
became concerned with the rising U. S. presence in Colombia and the
associated costs of the aerial eradication program. At the time, the
embassy began
developing a 3- year plan to have the Colombian National Police assume
increased operational control over the program. But for various reasons,
the police did not agree to the plan. Since then, contractor involvement
and the associated costs have continued to rise and the Colombian National
Police are not yet able to assume more control of the aerial eradication
program. As shown in table 2, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of Aviation
reported that
the direct cost for a U. S. contractor providing aircraft maintenance and
logistical support and many of the pilots was $37.8 million. In addition,
NAS provided $10.7 million for fuel, herbicide, and related support, for a
total of $48.5 million. For fiscal year 2003, the comparable estimates for
contractor and NAS- provided support were $41.5 million and $44.8 million,
respectively, for a total of $86.3 million. Most of this increase occurred
between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and is for the most part to support the
additional spray aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the
anticipated continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia.
According to NAS and Office of Aviation officials, these costs are
expected to remain relatively constant for the next several years.
10 GAO- 01- 26. Colombian National Police
Have Not Assumed Control over Aerial Eradication Operations
Page 14 GAO- 03- 820T
Table 2: U. S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program, Fiscal Years
1998- 2004 Dollars in millions Fiscal years Cognizant office 1998 1999
2000 2001 2002 2003
(estimated) 2004 (proposed) Total
Office of Aviation $37.8 $36.8 $52.5 a $38.0 $38.2 $41.5 $45.0 $289.8
Narcotics Affairs Section 10.7 14.1 20.9 11.1 17.6 44.8 b 44.2 $163.4
Total $48.5 $50.9 $73.4 $49.1 $55.8 $86.3 $89.2 $453.2
Source: U. S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office of Aviation. a Includes $20 million
for additional spray aircraft.
b In addition, NAS paid $38.8 million for a contractor to support the
Colombian National Police Aviation Service. NAS could not readily identify
the proportion of this contract that is related to aerial eradication. NAS
officials stated that they expect this expenditure to continue for the
next 2 years and possibly up to 4 years.
The Colombian National Police do not provide funding per se for the aerial
eradication program and, therefore, the value of its contributions is more
difficult to quantify. In recent years, the police have provided
helicopters and fixed- wing aircraft for spray mission support and the use
of many of its facilities throughout Colombia. In addition, the police
have about 3,600 personnel assigned to counternarcotics missions and
estimate that 84 are directly supporting the aerial eradication program.
To help the Colombian National Police increase its capacity to assume more
responsibility for the aerial eradication program, NAS has initiated
several efforts. In February and March 2002, the Office of Aviation
conducted an Aviation Resource Management Survey of the Colombian National
Police Aviation Service. According to Office of Aviation officials, these
surveys are
intended to provide a stringent on- site assessment of flight operations
from management and safety to logistics and maintenance. The survey team
made a number of critical observations. For example,
The Aviation Service*s organizational structure, lines of authority, and
levels of responsibility were not clear. Relying on an overly centralized
command structure resulted in unnecessary delays and the cancellation of
some planned aerial eradication missions because the commanding general
could not be reached. U. S. Efforts to Improve
Police Capacity for Aerial Eradication
Page 15 GAO- 03- 820T
The Aviation Service did not have a formal flying hour program to help
forecast its budgetary requirements and enhance maintenance scheduling.
About 35 percent of the maintenance staff were inexperienced. According
to the survey team, this could result in improper maintenance procedures
being performed, which could adversely affect flight safety and endanger
lives.
Management of items needing repair and control of spare parts were
deficient. The survey team found 230 items awaiting repair* some from
August 1998* and more than $4 million in UH- 1H helicopter blades and
parts stored outside and unprotected.
As a result of the survey, in July 2002, a NAS contractor (a $38.8
million, 1- year contract with options for 4 additional years) began
providing on- the- job maintenance and logistical training to the Aviation
Service and helping the police address many of the issues raised by the
Aviation Resource Management Survey team. Embassy officials noted that a
more formal flying hour program has improved the availability rates of
many of the Aviation Service*s aircraft. For example, the availability
rate of the Aviation Service*s UH- II helicopters* often used to support
aerial eradication missions* increased from 67 percent in January 2002 to
87 percent in December 2002. According to these officials, improved
availability rates made it easier to schedule and conduct spray missions.
In addition, NAS has begun a program for training pilots to fly T- 65
spray planes and plans to start training for search and rescue personnel
who accompany the planes. U. S. officials stated that the contractor
presence should decline and the police should be able to take over more of
the eradication program by 2006, when NAS estimates that coca and poppy
cultivation will be reduced to *maintenance levels** 30,000 hectares and
5,000 hectares, respectively.
The U. S.- supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently
begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999- 2000. However,
Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and
management challenges. Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the
Colombian government
had pledged $4 billion and called on the international community to
provide $3.5 billion. Until recently, Colombia had not provided any
significant new funding for Plan Colombia and, according to U. S. embassy
Financial and
Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit
Drug Activities
Page 16 GAO- 03- 820T
and Colombian government officials, anticipated international assistance
for Plan Colombia* apart from that provided by the United States* did not
materialize as envisioned. But because of overall poor economic
conditions, the government of Colombia*s ability to contribute more is
limited.
The Colombian government has stated that ending the civil conflict is
central to solving Colombia*s problems* from improving economic conditions
to stemming illicit drug activities. A peaceful resolution to the long-
standing insurgency would help stabilize the nation, speed economic
recovery, help ensure the protection of human rights, and restore the
authority and control of the Colombian government in the coca- growing
regions. The continuing violence limits the government*s ability to
institute economic, social, and political improvements.
For U. S. assistance to continue, Colombia faces continuing challenges
associated with the need to ensure that the army and police comply with
human rights standards, that the aerial eradication program meets certain
environmental conditions, and that alternative development is provided in
areas subject to aerial eradication.
Overall, neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian National Police can
sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs without continued U. S. funding
and contractor support for the foreseeable future. According to U. S.
embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up to $230 million per
year, and future costs for some recently initiated programs have not been
determined. In addition, we note that this estimate does not include
future funding needed for other U. S. programs in Colombia, including
other aerial and ground interdiction efforts; the police Aviation
Service*s U. S.- funded contractor; and alternative development, judicial
sector reform, and internally displaced persons programs.
In recent years, world events* from the global war on terrorism to the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* have diverted scarce U. S. resources and
made it paramount that the United States fully consider the resources
committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the
total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown.
Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not
developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in
Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to
achieve it.
Page 17 GAO- 03- 820T
In conducting our work, we reviewed pertinent planning, implementation,
and related documentation and met with cognizant U. S. officials at the
Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D. C.; the U. S. Southern
Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U. S. Embassy in Bogota,
Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed Colombian military, police, and
government officials and visited the Colombian Army bases at Larandia,
Tolemaida, and Tres Esquinas and other sites in the primary coca- growing
regions of Colombia. In addition, we observed a Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade airlift operation and several aerial eradication
missions.
We also discussed this testimony with cognizant officials from State*s
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and its
Office of Aviation and State*s Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs. They
generally concurred with our treatment of the issues presented.
We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at
(202) 512- 4268 or Albert H. Huntington, III, at (202) 512- 4140.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Jocelyn
Cortese, Allen Fleener, Ronald Hughes, Jose Pena, George Taylor, Kaya
Taylor, and Janey Cohen. Rick Barrett and Ernie Jackson provided technical
assistance. Scope and
Methodology Contacts and Acknowledgments
(320142)
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