Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve
Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources (06-AUG-03, GAO-03-804).
Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in
stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine,
industry, and research. These sealed sources could be a threat to
national security because terrorists could use them to make
"dirty bombs." GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of
sealed sources in the United States, (2) the number of sealed
sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, (3) the effectiveness of
federal and state controls over sealed sources, and (4) the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and state efforts since
September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of sealed sources.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-804
ACCNO: A08375
TITLE: Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to
Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources
DATE: 08/06/2003
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism
National preparedness
Nuclear waste management
Radioactive wastes
Strategic planning
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GAO-03-804
A
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial
Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate
August 2003 NUCLEAR SECURITY Federal and State Action Needed to Improve
Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources
GAO- 03- 804
Contents Letter 1
Results in Brief 4 Background 7 NRC and the Agreement States Lack Complete
Information on
Numbers of Sealed Sources 9 Over 1,300 Devices Containing Sealed Sources
Have Been Reported
Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Since 1998 17 Weaknesses Exist in Federal and
State Controls Over the Security of
Sealed Sources 20 NRC Efforts to Improve Security over Sealed Sources Have
Been
Limited and Disagreement Exists over the Appropriate Role of the States 27
Conclusions 32 Recommendations for Executive Action 33 Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation 34
Appendixes
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 40
Appendix II: Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources 45
Irradiators 45 Teletherapy 46 Industrial Radiography 47 Brachytheraphy 48
Well Logging Device 50 Fixed Industrial Gauge 52 Portable Gauge 53
Appendix III: Legislation Introduced in the 108th Congress Addressing
Security of Sealed Sources 57
Appendix IV: Results of Survey of Agreement States 59
Appendix V: Results of Survey of Non- Agreement States 94
Appendix VI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 116
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 119 GAO Contact 119
Acknowledgments 119
Tables Table 1: Number of Specific Licenses Issued By Use in the United
States as of December 31, 2002 13
Table 2: Type and Size of Sealed Sources Used in Medical and Industrial
Practices 55
Figures Figure 1: NRC Regulated Specific Licenses in NRC Regulated States
and on Federal Facilities in Agreement States as of
December 31, 2002 11 Figure 2: Agreement State Regulated Specific Licenses
as of
December 31, 2002 12 Figure 3: Results of Integrated Materials Performance
Evaluation
Program Reviews 25 Figure 4: Product Conveyor System in a Panoramic
Irradiator 46 Figure 5: Stereotactic Radiosurgery Device (Gamma Knife) 47
Figure 6: Industrial Radiography Camera and Storage Case 48 Figure 7: High
Dose Rate Remote After Loader Used for
Brachytherapy 50 Figure 8: Storage Container for Well Logging Sealed
Source 52 Figure 9: Fixed Industrial Gauge 53 Figure 10: Portable
Moisture/ Density Gauge 54
Abbreviations
CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRCPD Conference of Radiation Control
Program Directors DOE Department of Energy DOT Department of
Transportation GAO General Accounting Office NRC Nuclear Regulatory
Commission OAS Organization of Agreement States
This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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separately.
Le tt e r
August 6, 2003 The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International
Security Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Dear
Senator Akaka: Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks there has
been concern that certain radioactive material, such as cobalt- 60,
strontium- 90, iodine- 131, cesium- 137, iridium- 192, and americium- 241,
could be used in the
construction of a radiological dispersion device* commonly referred to as
a *dirty bomb.* Such radioactive materials are used in devices that treat
cancer, sterilize food and medical instruments, and detect flaws in
pipelines and other types of metal welds. Much of the radioactive material
used in these devices is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal such as
stainless steel, titanium, or platinum to prevent its dispersal. 1 A dirty
bomb could be produced by using explosives in combination with radioactive
material
upon detonation. Most experts agree that the dispersed radioactive
material would have few short- term health effects on exposed individuals
and that the explosives, not the radioactive material, would likely cause
the greatest amount of immediate injuries, fatalities, and property
damage. However, a dirty bomb* depending on the type, form, amount, and
concentration of radioactive material used* could cause radiation exposure
in individuals in close proximity to the material for an extended time and
potentially increase the long- term risks of cancer for those
contaminated. In addition, the evacuation and cleanup of contaminated
areas after such an explosion could lead to panic and serious economic
costs on the affected population.
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) regulates domestic medical, industrial, and research uses of sealed
sources through a combination of regulatory requirements, licensing,
1 Some loose material, such as iodine- 131, used in thyroid cancer
treatments, and technetium- 99m, commonly used in medical imaging
procedures is not in sealed source form. However, for simplicity this
report uses the term *sealed source* to refer to all radioactive materials
used for medical, industrial, and research purposes.
inspection, and enforcement. Section 274 of the act authorizes NRC to give
primary regulatory authority to states (called *agreement* states) under
certain conditions. 2 To date, NRC has relinquished its licensing,
inspection, and enforcement authority to 32 agreement states that
administer the use of sealed sources within their jurisdictions; 3 while
continuing to regulate
the use of sealed sources in the remaining states. NRC periodically
evaluates each agreement state*s regulatory program for compatibility with
NRC regulations and its effectiveness in protecting public health and
safety. Two types of licenses are associated with the use of radioactive
materials* general licenses and specific licenses. A generally licensed
device usually contains a sealed source within a shielded device, such as
gas
chromatograph units, fixed gauges, luminous exit signs, or reference and
check sources. Such devices are designed with inherent radiation safety
features so that persons with little or no radiation training or
experience can use it, and as such do not require NRC or agreement state
approval to purchase and are widely commercially available. Specific
licenses cover uses, such as cameras used for industrial radiography,
medical devices used to treat cancer, and facilities that irradiate food
or medical products for sterilization. These uses generally require larger
amounts of radioactive material than can be obtained with a general
license. Organizations or individuals wanting to obtain a specific license
must submit an application and gain the approval of either NRC or an
agreement state. In addition to
NRC and agreement states, other federal agencies, such as the Department
of Transportation, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Environmental
Protection Agency, regulate the safe transportation, medical use, and
cleanup of radioactive material. The Department of
2 The purpose of section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
(42 U. S. C. S: 2021) is to recognize the interest of the states in the
peaceful uses of atomic energy and to establish programs for cooperation
between the states and NRC to control the radiation hazards associated
with the use of radioactive materials. While it details procedures for NRC
to relinquish its regulatory authority to the states for medical,
industrial, and research
uses of radioactive materials, NRC retains sole regulatory authority over,
among other things, nuclear power plants and the export and import of
radioactive materials. In addition, NRC retains regulatory authority over
federal facilities (such as Department of Defense bases or Veterans
Administration hospitals)* see 10 C. F. R. S: 30.6( b)( 2).
3 At the time of our report, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
and Washington were agreement states. NRC expects Wisconsin will become an
agreement state in the summer of 2003.
Energy (DOE) regulates the use of radioactive material at its facilities
and at the national laboratories.
This report* the third that we have prepared at your request to examine
efforts to control sealed radioactive sources* examines efforts in the
United States to regulate the use of sealed sources domestically and to
prevent the use of this material by terrorists. 4 Specifically, you asked
us to determine (1) the known number of sealed sources in the United
States; (2) how many of these sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or
abandoned; (3) the effectiveness of federal and state controls over sealed
sources; and (4) NRC*s and agreement states* efforts considered or
implemented following September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of sealed
sources. To address these objectives, we distributed a survey to radiation
control agencies in the 32 agreement states, the 18 non- agreement states,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico to determine numbers and types
of radioactive materials licenses in their jurisdictions and to solicit
their views on the regulation of sealed sources. At the time of this
report, all of the agreement states except Arizona, 11 non- agreement
states, and Puerto Rico had responded to our survey. We did not receive
responses from the following non- agreement states* Alaska, Connecticut,
Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, and the
District of Columbia. 5 We also surveyed and interviewed officials in the
four NRC regional offices; interviewed officials at NRC headquarters in
Rockville, Maryland; and analyzed NRC license and incident databases. In
addition, we observed NRC evaluations of the effectiveness of state
regulatory programs in Rhode Island and Florida and a similar evaluation
of NRC*s
Region III radioactive materials regulatory program in Lisle, Illinois. We
visited 10 states to meet with officials of state radiation control
agencies 4 Our report, U. S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued Recovery of
Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources, GAO- 03- 483 (Washington, D. C.: Apr.
15, 2003) examined DOE*s efforts to recover and dispose of unwanted
*greater- than- Class- C* sources* sources that typically contain greater
concentrations of isotopes such as plutonium- 238, plutonium- 239, and
americium- 241, that cannot be disposed of at existing low- level
radioactive waste facilities. Our report, U. S. General Accounting Office,
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U. S. and International Assistance Efforts to
Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening, GAO- 03- 638
(Washington, D. C.: May 16, 2003) examined international efforts conducted
by the United
States, the Russian Federation, the International Atomic Energy Agency,
and others to control sealed sources. 5 Although we did not receive
surveys from these states, we obtained data on incidents involving sealed
sources and numbers and types of licensees from NRC.
and selected licensees representing a variety of types and uses of sealed
sources. Appendix I presents our scope and methodology in more detail.
Results in Brief The precise number of sealed sources in use today in the
United States is unknown. NRC estimates that there are approximately 2
million sealed sources in the United States. This estimate is based on the
number of specific and general licensees from NRC*s databases and
agreement states combined with data from an NRC survey conducted in the
early 1990s. NRC
and agreement states do not track the actual numbers of sealed sources,
but only track the number of specific licensees and have limited data on
general licensees. NRC, in cooperation with DOE, has begun examining
options for developing a national sealed source tracking system, but this
effort is limited in scope; importantly, it has had only limited
involvement of the agreement states. Our analysis of NRC*s specific
license database and responses to our survey of agreement states indicate
that about 20,000
entities (companies, hospitals, organizations, and in some cases,
individuals) have obtained specific licenses to possess and use
radioactive material, including sealed sources. Agreement states regulate
80 percent of these entities, while NRC regulates the remaining 20
percent.
NRC has had difficulty accounting for generally licensed devices. Owners
of these devices are not required to apply to NRC or agreement states for
licenses. Mishandling and improper disposal of generally licensed devices
has, in some cases, lead to expensive investigation and clean up. NRC
began tracking generally licensed devices in April 2001, but has
experienced problems locating device owners. To assist in this effort, NRC
has contracted with a private investigation firm to help locate owners. In
order to improve accountability over generally licensed devices, we are
recommending that NRC determine the need to require owners of these
devices to apply for specific licenses and whether the additional costs
presented by applying for and approving specific licenses are commensurate
with the risks these devices present.
Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 reported incidents of lost,
stolen, or abandoned devices containing sealed sources, an average of
about 250 per year. The majority of these devices were subsequently
recovered. Both NRC and DOE recognize the importance of determining how
many sealed sources are present in the United States, and which sealed
sources pose the greatest risk if they were to be used in a dirty bomb.
NRC and DOE are working together to categorize sealed sources by their
level of risk. However, NRC*s and DOE*s efforts are limited in scope
because they do not include an analysis of sealed sources in the agreement
states, which regulate 80 percent of the nation*s radioactive materials
licensees. This is because there is no single source of data on agreement
state licensees; instead each state has its own database of the licensees
it regulates. These databases are not linked to one another and NRC does
not have access to them. Therefore, we are recommending that NRC as part
of its continuing efforts to categorize the sealed sources that pose the
greatest
risk, consult with the agreement states to determine the types, amount,
and availability of the highest risk sealed sources.
Weaknesses exist in federal and state controls over the security of sealed
sources. Our visits to radiation control programs and licensees in 10
states found that security for devices containing sealed sources varied
among facilities we visited. For example, a medical device manufacturer
that we visited had extensive security measures, including electronic
access control to areas containing sealed sources, perimeter fencing, and
background checks on employees. On the other hand, a medical use
licensee that we visited kept its sealed sources in an unlocked, unguarded
space with the door propped open. In addition, we found a potential
security weakness in NRC*s licensing process to obtain sealed sources. The
process assumes an applicant is acting in good faith and allows applicants
to acquire sealed sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. It
can then take NRC as long as 12 months to conduct its first inspection,
leaving the possibility that materials will be obtained and used
maliciously in the meantime. Certain agreement states have implemented
measures to address this weakness, such as delivering licenses in person
or conducting inspections before the delivery of sealed sources. In
addition, NRC currently evaluates the effectiveness of state regulatory
programs, but these evaluations do not assess the security of sealed
sources. To address security weaknesses, we are recommending that NRC
modify its licensing process to ensure that radioactive sources cannot be
purchased before NRC verifies that the material will be used as intended.
We are also recommending that NRC modify its evaluations of agreement
state and NRC programs to include criteria and performance measures of
program effectiveness in ensuring the security of sealed sources.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC, along with the
agreement states, has notified licensees of the need for heightened
awareness to security and the need to take certain actions, but has not
issued, until recently, legally binding orders to improve the security of
sealed sources. NRC has been developing specific additional security
measures since the attacks, and issued orders on June 5, 2003, to
strengthen security at large irradiator facilities. Although irradiator
facilities contain large amounts of radioactive material, they are
specially designed to include thick concrete and steel walls, security
interlocks, and other protective equipment to protect against radiation
exposure and
secure the sealed sources. In light of such built- in security, agreement
state officials and others have questioned NRC*s decision to select
irradiators as the first recipient of additional security measures. Of
agreement states responding to our survey, 93 percent identified sealed
sources used in industrial radiography as of greater concern. Reasons for
this may include
that these devices are widely available and portable. NRC and some
agreement states disagree on the appropriate role of the states in the
regulation of sealed source security. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives
NRC the authority to issue rules, regulations, or orders to promote the
common defense and security and to protect the health and minimize danger
to life or property. Based on this authority, NRC intends to order
licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by agreement
states, to implement additional security measures. NRC has already done so
for large irradiator facilities. However, 82 percent of agreement states
responding to our survey indicate that they want to have responsibility
for inspection and enforcement of security measures for sealed sources. In
addition, 74 percent of agreement states responding to our survey
indicated that their state program could effectively respond to a
radiological incident with its current resources. NRC officials argue that
the agreement states lack the staff and funding to carry out the
additional responsibility of securing sealed sources. However, according
to NRC officials we contacted, NRC clearly faces similar staffing and
funding problems. NRC has initiated a materials security working group,
which includes the states, as a mechanism for discussing and identifying
potential resolutions to these issues. We are recommending that NRC
determine how agreement and non- agreement states can participate in the
development and implementation of additional security measures over sealed
sources.
We presented a draft of this report to NRC, the Conference of Radiation
Control Program Directors (CRCPD), and the Organization of Agreement
States (OAS) for comment. NRC stated that the draft report did not fully
present either the current status of NRC*s efforts to improve the security
of high- risk radioactive sources or the large effort that NRC has devoted
to this issue over the past 18 months. NRC believed that several of our
recommendations would require statutory changes at both federal and state
levels. We clarified our recommendations regarding the participation of
the states in the development and implementation of additional security
measures. CRCPD and OAS officials generally agreed with our conclusions
and recommendations.
Background Radioactive material in sealed sources is used in equipment
designed to diagnose and treat illnesses (particularly cancer), irradiate
food and
medical products for sterilization purposes, detect flaws and other
failures in pipeline and other types of metal welds, and determine the
moisture content of soil and other materials. 6 Until the 1950s, only
naturally occurring radioactive materials, such as radium- 226, were
available to be used in sealed sources. Since then, sealed sources
containing radioactive
material produced artificially in nuclear reactors and particle
accelerators have become widely available, including cobalt- 60,
strontium- 90, technetium- 99m, cesium- 137, and iridium- 192. Under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the states retain sole regulatory authority
over most naturally occurring radioactive material as well as radioactive
material produced in particle accelerators. Federal jurisdiction extends
only to those materials
used as a source of material for nuclear fuel or created as a result of
irradiation in nuclear reactors.
Radioactive material can be found in various forms. For example, cobalt-
60 is a metal, while the cesium- 137 in some sealed sources is in a powder
form closely resembling talc. Radioactive materials never stop emitting
radiation, but their intensity decays over time at various rates. The term
*half- life* is used to indicate the period during which the radioactivity
decreases by half as a result of decay. Radioactive materials are measured
by their level of activity. The greater the activity level* measured in
units called curies 7 *the more radiation emitted, which increases the
potential risk to the public if the radioactive materials are lost or
stolen.
6 See appendix II for a discussion of medical and industrial devices that
use radioactive sources. 7 The curie is the unit of measurement most
commonly used in the United States. The corresponding international
standard unit, the Bequerel (Bq) is the activity equal to one radioactive
disintegration per second. One bequerel= 2.7 x 10 -11 curies.
Two types of licenses are associated with the use of radioactive
materials* general licenses and specific licenses. A generally licensed
device usually consists of a sealed source within a shielded device, such
as gas
chromatograph units, fixed gauges, luminous exit signs, or reference and
check sources. These devices are designed with inherent radiation safety
features so that persons with little or no radiation training or
experience can use it. General licensees are automatically licensed
without having to apply to NRC or an agreement state for a license and are
subject to a
variety of requirements under NRC*s or agreement states* regulations. 8
Furthermore, manufacturers are required to report quarterly to NRC the
names of customers who purchase generally licensed devices. Examples of
requirements general licensees are subject to under NRC*s regulations
include:
general licensees shall not abandon the devices; complying with
instructions and precautions listed on device labels; performing tests
to ensure radioactivity is not leaking from the device at
least every 6 months, and, if leakage is detected, suspend operation of
the device and have it repaired or disposed of by the manufacturer or
another entity authorized to perform such work; and
reporting to NRC or an agreement state the transfer of a device to
another licensee or the disposal of the device.
A company seeking radioactive material for uses that do not qualify for a
general license must apply to NRC or, if it conducts business in an
agreement state, to the appropriate state for a specific license. Its
application must demonstrate how the use of the materials will meet the
safety requirements in NRC*s or agreement states* regulations. 9
Applicants must provide information on the type, form, and intended
quantity of material, the facilities in which the material will be used,
the qualifications of users of the materials, and radiation protection
programs the applicant has in place to protect their workers and the
public from receiving excessive doses of radiation.
8 NRC*s regulations are at 10 C. F. R. S: 31. 5. 9 NRC*s regulations are
at 10 C. F. R. Parts 19- 21, 30- 39, 40, 61, 70, and 71.
NRC and the The number of sealed sources in use today in the United States
is unknown
Agreement States Lack primarily because no state or federal agency tracks
individual sealed sources. Instead, NRC and the agreement states track
numbers of specific
Complete Information licensees. NRC and DOE have begun to examine options
for developing a
on Numbers of Sealed national tracking system, but to date, this effort
has had limited Sources
involvement by the agreement states. NRC had difficulty locating owners of
certain generally licensed devices it began tracking in April 2001 and has
hired a private investigation firm to help locate them. Twenty- five of
the 31 agreement states that responded to our survey indicated that they
track some or all general licensees or generally licensed devices, and 17
were able to provide data on the number of generally licensed devices in
their jurisdictions, totaling approximately 17,000 devices.
NRC and Agreement States NRC estimates that there are approximately 2
million licensed sealed
Track Licensees Rather sources in the United States. However, there is no
single source of
Than Individual Sealed information in the United States to verify
authorized users, locations, Sources
quantities, and movements of sealed sources. Separate systems are in place
at NRC and in each agreement state to track the identities of specific
licensees and the maximum quantity of radioactive material that they are
authorized to possess. These systems do not, however, record the number
of sealed sources actually possessed by specific licensees nor do the
systems track movements (such as purchase, transfer, or disposal) of
sealed sources by specific licensees. Licensees are required to maintain
records for the acquisition and disposition of each sealed source it
receives and inspections by NRC and/ or an agreement state includes
confirming inventory records.
The Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of NRC established a working
group in June 2002 to address, among other things, the options for
establishing a national source tracking system and the potential for the
use of technological methods for tagging and monitoring sealed sources in
use, storage, and transit. This working group reported in May 2003 that a
national source tracking system should provide a *cradle to grave* account
of the origins of each high- risk source, and record how, by whom, and
where a source has been transported, used, and eventually disposed of or
exported. According to the report, such a system would help NRC and DOE
to:
monitor the location and use of sealed sources,
detect and act on discrepancies, conduct inspections and
investigations, communicate sealed source information to other
government agencies, respond in the event of an emergency, verify
legitimate ownership and use of sealed sources, and further analyze
hazards attributable to the possession and use of sealed
sources. The working group did not determine how data on sealed source
licensees in the agreement states would be integrated into a national
level system.
While there are no complete data on the number of sealed sources in the
United States, data are available on the number of specific licensees
authorized to use sealed sources. Analysis of NRC*s specific license
database and responses to our survey of the agreement states indicates
that there are about 20,000 specific licensees in the United States (see
figs. 1 and 2). The majority (nearly 80 percent) are regulated by the 32
agreement states, the remaining 20 percent of specific licensees are
regulated by NRC.
Figure 1: NRC Regulated Specific Licenses in NRC Regulated States and on
Federal Facilities in Agreement States as of December 31, 2002
Notes: NRC regulates specific licensees on federal facilities in agreement
states. NRC also regulates 5 specific licensees in Guam, 120 specific
licensees in Puerto Rico, and 7 specific licensees in the U. S. Virgin
Islands.
Figure 2: Agreement State Regulated Specific Licenses as of December 31,
2002
Our analysis of NRC*s license tracking system and responses to our survey
of agreement states indicates that sealed sources for medical uses
comprise the largest portion of specific licenses issued (see table 1).
Tabl e 1: Number of Specific Licenses Issued By Use in the United States
as of December 31, 2002 Measuring
Industrial Well Irradiatorslarge Irradiatorssmall State Medical systems
radiography logging Other Tot al
Alabama 153 185 26 3 0 2 63 432
Alaska 10 21 7 0 0 1 5 44
Arizona NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 318
Arkansas 118 128 10 6 1 4 29 296
California 655 799 40 18 9 26 640 2,187
Colorado 85 166 12 10 0 4 79 356
Connecticut 69 38 3 0 0 3 63 176
Delaware 19 16 1 1 0 2 15 54
District of Columbia 18 6 0 0 1 3 12 40
Florida 866 367 20 8 2 24 111 1,398
Georgia 267 175 13 1 2 5 66 529
Guam 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 5
Hawaii 21 25 3 1 0 1 5 56
Idaho 20 36 0 0 0 0 12 68
Illinois 273 338 18 7 4 8 125 773
Indiana 144 86 4 0 0 1 39 274
Iowa 67 136 6 0 0 5 27 241
Kansas 130 142 12 20 0 2 13 319
Kentucky 158 180 6 8 0 3 11 366
Louisiana NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 548
Maine 47 57 4 0 0 3 22 133
Maryland 226 140 2 0 7 19 169 563
Massachusetts 120 180 7 0 2 13 239 561
Michigan 250 168 7 4 1 7 64 501
Minnesota 56 49 5 0 1 5 38 154
Mississippi 118 157 21 5 1 6 21 329
Missouri 136 84 7 0 0 3 56 286
Montana 16 38 1 0 0 2 11 68
Nebraska 50 66 4 0 3 4 19 146
Nevada 86 130 5 1 0 3 13 238
New Hampshire 27 39 2 0 1 1 13 83
New Jersey 239 98 5 0 7 13 128 490
New Mexico 44 99 9 11 2 5 22 192
New York 512 268 25 2 2 4 38 851
(Continued From Previous Page)
Measuring Industrial Well
Irradiatorslarge Irradiatorssmall State Medical systems radiography
logging Other Tot al
North Carolina 266 235 17 1 4 5 124 652
North Dakota 13 37 4 4 0 3 5 66
Ohio 341 274 22 4 2 5 128 776
Oklahoma 111 107 27 20 0 8 51 324
Oregon 88 262 8 0 0 4 97 459
Pennsylvania 296 215 11 4 1 24 145 696
Puerto Rico 65 35 3 0 2 3 12 120
Rhode Island 22 16 6 0 0 1 9 54
South Carolina 149 145 22 0 3 1 50 370
South Dakota 17 16 0 0 0 0 7 40
Tennessee 261 167 26 1 2 10 99 566
Texas 672 468 102 54 7 19 241 1,563
Utah 38 108 10 7 1 2 35 201
Ver mont 13 10 0 0 0 2 7 32
U. S. Virgin Islands 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 7
Virginia 126 155 12 2 1 6 57 359
Washington 110 199 10 0 0 2 98 419
West Virginia 66 89 2 3 0 0 15 175
Wisconsin 106 88 9 0 1 7 52 263
Wyoming 17 40 2 3 0 0 10 72 Tot al 7,781 7,090 578 209 70 284 3,411 20,
289
Sources: NRC license tracking system and GAO survey of agreement states.
Notes: NA= not available. Does not include licenses issued for naturally
occurring or accelerator- produced radioactive materials in NRC regulated
states. Twenty- nine of the 31 agreement states responding to our survey
do not distinguish between materials regulated under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 and naturally occurring or accelerator- produced radioactive
materials in their licensing actions.
Data for Arizona and Louisiana includes only the total number of
licensees.
Fixed and portable gauges used in industry to measure density, moisture
content, thickness, and so forth, are the next most prevalent use of
sealed sources, with nearly 7,100 specific licenses issued nationwide.
Over 570 specific licenses have been issued for industrial radiographers.
In addition, there are 70 large irradiators (containing high levels,
between 10,000 and 15 million curies, of cobalt- 60) across the United
States used for the sterilization of food and medical products, and 284
smaller irradiators (containing less than 10, 000 curies of, in most
cases, cesium- 137 and cobalt- 60) used in hospitals and other facilities
for sterilization of smaller
products, such as units of blood. The remaining specific licenses in the
United States are issued for a variety of purposes, including, among other
things, manufacturing and distribution of smoke detectors (containing
small amounts of americium- 241), academic research, and disposal of
radioactive waste.
NRC Has Had Difficulty While data exist on the numbers and locations of
specific licenses in the
Finding Owners of United States, complete data are not available on the
numbers of general
Generally Licensed Devices licenses. In most cases general licensees are
not required to apply to NRC
or an agreement state for a license to possess and use a device.
Therefore, in the past, data on general licensees have come from
manufacturers of generally licensed devices that are required to report
quarterly to NRC or the agreement states the names of customers purchasing
generally licensed devices. According to NRC, approximately 40, 000
general licensees possess an estimated 600,000 generally licensed devices
in the United States. Although general licensees are required to follow
NRC*s regulations, they traditionally have little contact with NRC.
Mishandling and improper
disposition of generally licensed devices has, on occasion, resulted in
limited radiation exposure to the public and, in some cases, entailed
expensive investigation, cleanup, and disposal activities. For example,
two incidents occurred in New Jersey in 1997 involving luminous exit signs
containing tritium. In May 1997, a 14- year old removed three tritium exit
signs from a demolition site near his home and opened one sign exposing
himself to radioactive material and contaminating his home. In October
1997, a patient at a state- run psychiatric hospital broke a tritium exit
sign. While no injuries resulted, the state spent more than $200,000
cleaning up the hospital and disposing of the more than sixty barrels of
radioactive waste* primarily contaminated carpeting, furniture, bedding,
and other debris* from the incident.
NRC amended its regulations effective February of 2001, to, among other
things, better enable NRC to verify and track the location, use, and
disposition of generally licensed devices. NRC focused its efforts to
improve accountability over generally licensed devices on a small subset
of devices that were determined to be of higher risk. The amended
regulations include a requirement for general licensees to register with
NRC devices that contain certain levels of radioactive material. 10
General licensees would be charged $450 to cover the costs of the
registration program.
Beginning in April 2001, NRC mailed registration forms to about 2,800 of
its general licensees. 11 As of May 2003, approximately 61 percent of them
had responded. Twenty- eight percent of the registration forms were
returned as undeliverable and the remaining 11 percent were not returned
by the
general licensee, a response rate significantly lower than NRC expected.
According to NRC, a significant amount of the submitted information is
incomplete or inaccurate, requiring additional follow up that was not
anticipated. To help increase the response rate, phone calls are being
made in advance to locate general licensees before registration forms are
sent to ensure the responsible individuals at the correct addresses
receive them. In addition, NRC has contracted with a private investigation
firm to help find general licensees whose addresses in the database are
incorrect.
Twenty- five of the 31 agreement states that responded to our survey said
that they require registration of some or all generally licensed devices.
Seventeen of these states were able to provide us with data on the number
of generally licensed devices they regulate. These 17 states estimate that
approximately 17,000 generally licensed devices are used in their
jurisdictions. 10 10 C. F. R. S: 31.5( c)( 13). Registration is required
for levels equal to or greater than 10 millicuries of cesium- 137, 0.1
millicuries of strontium- 90, 1 millicurie of cobalt- 60, or 1 millicurie
of any transuranic element (elements with atomic numbers higher than
uranium).
11 This registration effort did not include the agreement states because
the agreement states are not required to adopt compatible regulations
requiring registration of generally licensed devices until February 2004.
Once all agreement states have adopted rules compatible to NRC*s
regulations, NRC says that it is considering coordinating with them to
implement a national level database that will incorporate data from
agreement states and NRC regulated
states.
Over 1,300 Devices Since 1998, there have been more than 1, 300 incidents
where devices
Containing Sealed containing sealed sources have been reported lost,
stolen, or abandoned in
the United States, an average of about 250 per year. The majority of these
Sources Have Been
lost devices were subsequently recovered. Both NRC and DOE recognize
Reported Lost, Stolen,
the importance of not only determining how many sealed sources are or
Abandoned Since
present in the United States, but also which sealed sources pose the
greatest risk if used in a dirty bomb. NRC and DOE are working together to
1998 categorize sealed sources by their level of risk. However, NRC*s and
DOE*s
efforts have not, to date, addressed sealed sources in the agreement
states. Majority of Lost and Stolen
Analysis of NRC*s Nuclear Materials Events Database indicates that, Sealed
Sources
between 1998 and 2002, there were over 1,300 incidents of lost, stolen,
and Subsequently Recovered
abandoned sealed sources. These losses averaged about 250 per year. Many
and Represented Little Risk
of these incidents involved stolen portable gauges that are used to
measure the moisture content and density of soils, concrete, or asphalt on
to the Public
construction sites. By themselves, these gauges contain low amounts of
radioactive material and pose relatively little risk to the public.
Portable gauges are most often stolen from construction sites or from
vehicles such as pickup trucks. According to NRC and agreement state
officials,
individuals stealing gauges are usually unaware that they contain
radioactive material, and they often abandon or return them once
discovering their contents. Nevertheless, responding to these incidents
takes time and resources. Well logging sources also account for a
relatively large number of lost and abandoned sources. One major oil
services company accounts for over 30 of the 132 total well logging
sources abandoned since 1998. These sources contain several curies of
americium241 and cesium- 137. These losses usually consisted of a sealed
source becoming lodged down a well and subsequently abandoned. The well is
filled with concrete and a marker is attached warning of the presence of
radioactive materials. In addition, sealed sources are occasionally
abandoned when companies owning them go bankrupt.
According to NRC, most sealed sources that are lost, stolen, or abandoned
are subsequently recovered. In the past 5 years, few incidents have
occurred involving what NRC considers high- risk sealed sources. For
example, in March 1999, an industrial radiography camera containing over
88 curies of iridium- 192 (a quantity NRC considers to be of concern) was
stolen from a trailer at the radiographer*s home in Florida. The Florida
radiation control program, local law enforcement, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation conducted an investigation, but never recovered the
sealed
source. According to NRC, the iridium- 192 in the sealed source has now
decayed to the point where it is no longer a high risk to the public.
Another example of lost or stolen sealed sources took place in a North
Carolina hospital in March 1998. During a quarterly inventory of a
hospital*s sealed sources, it was discovered that 19 sealed sources were
missing, containing an aggregate of over 600 millicuries of cesium- 137* a
highly dispersible radioactive material. These sources included 18 cesium-
137 sealed sources* which had been locked in a safe at the time of the
disappearance* and a new cesium- 137 sealed source still stored in its
shipping container. The North Carolina radiation control program, NRC,
DOE, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an extensive joint
investigation. The investigation included air and ground searches using
radiation detection equipment. However, the sealed sources were not
recovered and a conclusion about the cause of the incident was not
reached.
NRC*s and DOE*s Efforts to The working group established by the Secretary
of Energy and the
Categorize Sealed Sources Chairman of NRC in June 2002 was also tasked
with determining which
of Greatest Concern Does radioactive materials pose the greatest risk if
used in a dirty bomb. Their
Not Include Sealed Sources analysis was to provide a relative ranking of
the degree of risk posed by
in Agreement States specific materials as a basis on which initial
judgments can be made
regarding specific protective measures to be developed for these
materials. Using experts from DOE*s Sandia National Laboratory, the task
force developed a methodology to systematically evaluate radioactive
materials for a dirty bomb. Researchers at Sandia considered the potential
dispersability of radioactive materials, the number of locations
possessing
the material, the quantity of material possessed at each facility, and the
protective measures already applied to the material. The combination of
these factors yielded a *hazard index,* which serves as an expression of
relative concern. Specific radioactive materials were rated high, medium,
low, or very low, depending upon the degree of health risk posed for their
use in a dirty bomb. 12 The analysis focused on the potential health
effects of
12 See U. S. Department of Energy and U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Radiological Dispersion Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive
Materials of Greatest Concern and Approaches to Their Tracking, Tagging,
and Disposition, (Washington, D. C., May 2003). The specific radioactive
materials identified as highest priority for increased
protection in the near term have not been listed in the report. This
information is *For Official Use Only.*
the use of radioactive materials in a dirty bomb and did not explicitly
address the psychological and economic consequences. According to an NRC
official, no specific data exists regarding how the public would react to
a dirty bomb, which complicates efforts to analyze its psychological
consequences.
The working group*s analysis included materials under an NRC license and
DOE*s control in the United States, excluding nuclear weapons materials,
radioactive materials in nuclear power plants, spent fuel, and other
radioactive waste. DOE*s and NRC*s report, however, did not consider
sealed sources held by the approximately 15,000 specific licensees in the
agreement states. Although the agreement states and NRC have similar types
of licensees, agreement states often have greater numbers of licensees
with certain types of sealed sources than NRC- regulated states. For
example, our survey of agreement states indicates that Texas has more well
logging specific licensees than any other state. 13 In addition, states
exclusively regulate the use of naturally occurring and accelerator
produced radioactive materials. Agreement state officials told us that any
consideration of the risks presented by sealed sources needs to include
all materials regulated by NRC and the agreement states because the
psychological and economic consequences of a dirty bomb are likely to be
similar whether the radioactive material is naturally or artificially
produced. NRC plans to work with the states to implement follow- up
actions based on the recommendations in the DOE/ NRC report. Vulnerability
studies have been initiated to identify security vulnerabilities and
appropriate security enhancements. Scenarios involving the aggregation of
sources in a single location will be considered. In addition, methods for
improved tracking of the locations of sources will be developed.
13 Well logging is a process that uses sealed sources and/ or unsealed
radioactive materials to determine whether a well, drilled deep into the
ground, contains minerals, such as coal, oil, and natural gas.
Weaknesses Exist in Weaknesses exist in federal and state controls over
the security of sealed
sources. 14 Security for devices containing sealed sources varied among
Federal and State
facilities we visited in 10 states. In addition, NRC*s licensing process
to Controls Over the
obtain sealed sources presents a potential security weakness, namely that
Security of Sealed
approved applicants may purchase sealed sources as soon as a new license
Sources is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that the applicant
is acting in good faith, it is possible that sealed sources can be
obtained for
malicious intent. It can take as long as 12 months before NRC conducts its
first inspection of the sealed source holder, potentially allowing sealed
sources to be obtained and used maliciously without NRC*s knowledge.
Security at Facilities Using During visits to licensees, regulated by both
NRC and agreement states, we Sealed Sources Varies
found a varied level of security provided to sealed sources. A medical
device manufacturer we visited in an agreement state had extensive
security measures in place to protect sealed sources. For example, a heavy
iron fence surrounds the building and guards are on duty to monitor the
facility 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. For shielding and security,
the concrete walls and ceiling containing the radioactive materials are
more than 6 feet thick. All areas housing materials have electronic locks
requiring a 4- digit code and card access. Visitors must be pre- arranged
and escorted at all times. Background and drug checks are conducted on all
personnel before hiring. Once hired, they are provided with varying
degrees of building access, depending upon their duties. Eighteen staff
members are fully trained in emergency response for hazardous materials
and every employee is required to complete a 3- hour training course on
radioactive materials and refresher training sessions are held frequently.
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the company examined risks for
the facility and established an in- house task force to develop scenarios
of potential terrorist attacks. To test the company*s security and
employees* preparedness, the company*s chief executive officer had a
helicopter land, unannounced, on the roof of one of the company*s
buildings. Following this drill, emergency plans were developed that were
integrated with the national Homeland Security Advisory System. For
example, whenever the national threat level is raised to orange, the
facility*s front gates are closed
14 As used in this report, security refers to measures to prevent
unauthorized access to, loss, and/ or theft of sealed sources. Safety
refers to measures intended to minimize the likelihood of an accident with
sealed sources and, should such an accident occur, to mitigate its
consequences.
and locked at all times. If the threat level were ever increased to red,
no visitors would be allowed. Furthermore, the company has entered an
agreement with the local police to hire armed off- duty police to provide
additional security for the facility should the national threat level be
raised to red.
Extensive security measures were also present at a facility we visited in
an agreement state that manufactures portable moisture density gauges. 15
Sealed sources, shipped to the manufacturer for installation in moisture
density gauges, are immediately placed in a shielded basement storage room
that is kept locked at all times. Only three staff members have keys to
access the room. Entrances to the manufacturing facility are kept locked
at all times, with an alarm system activated after closing time. Visitors
must be escorted during visits. Finally, the company has initiated a
computerized *cradle to grave* tracking system where all sealed sources
installed in moisture density gauges are tracked from manufacture, use,
and eventual
disposal. In the course of visits to a medical licensee, we observed poor
security practices with sealed sources. For example, during a visit to a
hospital in an agreement state, we were told that sealed sources,
including strontium- 90, cesium- 137, and iridium- 192, were securely
stored in a room equipped with
an electronic lock with limited access. Later, during a tour of the
hospital, we found the room unlocked, unattended, and the door propped
open. The hospital official explained that this practice was very unusual;
he locked the room door after inspection and continued the tour. Shortly
thereafter, we passed the room for a second time. Again, the room was
unlocked, unattended, and the door propped open. The storage room was in
close
proximity to the hospital*s laundry and maintenance facility, which is
accessible to any hospital employee. In addition, an entry to the hospital
from the outside was also nearby, and this entrance was not guarded nor
equipped with radiation detection equipment to notify security if any
sealed sources were being removed or stolen.
We also saw potential vulnerabilities at industrial radiography licensees
we visited in agreement states. Industrial radiographers use high
radioactivity iridium- 192 sources to produce an image on photographic
film to inspect
15 Moisture density gauges are commonly used to measure density of asphalt
and concrete surfaces and soil moisture content during road construction.
See appendix II for a complete descriptions of radioactive devices.
metal parts and welds for defects. These devices are very portable because
they are often used at remote locations. The devices are also subject to
limited security at the locations we visited* primarily a series of
padlocks on storage cases for the device. Personnel are not required to
have background checks and training was historically only on- the- job.
Most agreement states now require classroom training and testing to
enhance radiographers* knowledge and skills. One industrial radiographer
we visited added extra security measures consisting of a motion detector
alarm system* monitored by the local police* and an extra lock to the gate
of the storage room at its facility. However, this additional security
would
not prevent the theft of the sealed source when the device is being used
in the field or at a customer*s facility. This industrial radiographer had
taken additional steps to train his workers to be aware of security
threats and required* even before it was required by NRC and agreement
state regulations* for two people to be present whenever the sealed source
was being used.
Current Licensing Process To qualify for a specific license to use sealed
sources, an applicant must
Leaves Sealed Sources demonstrate that their use of sealed sources will
meet safety requirements
Vulnerable set forth in NRC regulations or in comparable agreement state
regulations
(if the license applicant is located in an agreement state). NRC requires
license applications to include information on, among other things, types
of sealed sources that will be used, details of the applicant*s radiation
protection program for workers dealing with sealed sources, and
qualifications of users of sealed sources. NRC reviews this information
for adherence to procedures and criteria documented in NRC licensing
guidance. 16 If the application meets approval criteria, a license is
issued.
NRC licensing procedures do not require inspection of licensee facilities
before the issuance of a license. Instead, NRC performs initial
inspections no later than 12 months after issuance of a license. 17
However, as pointed out by an agreement state official, a licensee can
purchase sealed sources as soon as a license has been acquired by mail. As
a result, licensees may purchase sealed sources legally without first
verifying that they will use the
16 NRC publishes guidance for specific license applicants that outlines
procedures for licensing the use of sealed sources. See U. S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, NUREG1556* Consolidated Guidance about Materials
Licenses, (Rockville, Maryland: Nov. 2001).
17 Chapter 2800 of NRC*s Inspection Manual contains guidance for
inspections of specific licensees with sealed sources.
material as intended. Several agreement states have developed methods to
verify the legitimacy of potential licensees. For example, one program we
visited conducts prelicensing inspections. Another state program
handdelivers licenses at the end of the application process. An agreement
state official explained that pre- licensing inspections and hand delivery
enabled regulators to establish authenticity of the prospective licensee
and whether information provided in the application is indeed valid.
NRC and Agreement States NRC conducts periodic evaluations of NRC regional
materials programs Generally Ensure Safe Use
and agreement state radiation control programs to ensure that public and
Handling of Sealed
health and safety is adequately protected. Accidents and injuries
resulting Sources
from the use of sealed sources are relatively few. For example, analysis
of NRC*s Nuclear Materials Events Database and responses to our survey of
the agreement states indicates that in fiscal year 2002, only 25 of the
approximately 20,000 licensees in the United States reported radiation
exposures in excess of regulatory limits. In addition, according to NRC,
there were only 32 reported accidents in fiscal year 2002 involving
medical use of sealed sources out of tens of thousands of medical
procedures conducted.
To evaluate the performance of its and agreement states* programs, NRC
developed the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program, which
uses several performance indicators in assessment of program
effectiveness, including timeliness and quality of licensee inspection,
program staffing and training, licensing activity, and response to
incidents and allegations. Officials from NRC and agreement states
participate in these periodic evaluations. During these evaluations, NRC
and agreement state officials review program documentation and interview
officials with the state or regional program to assess the program*s
performance. When
the results of each performance indicator have been determined, a final
report is issued. 18 Agreement state or NRC regional programs can be
evaluated as:
adequate to protect the public health and safety, adequate but needs
improvement, and
18 The final determination of program adequacy is made by a management
review board at NRC, which consists of NRC executives and a nonvoting
representative of the agreement states.
inadequate to protect public health and safety. Figure 3 outlines the
results of the most recent reviews of agreement state and four NRC
regional programs.
Figure 3: Results of Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program
Reviews
NRC*s most recent reviews of the 32 agreement states and NRC regional
programs, dating back to 1998, found that all programs are adequately
protecting public health and safety. Of the last 35 program reviews, 31
programs were found adequate to protect public health and safety* the
highest evaluation. Four programs were found *adequate but needs
improvement* and were placed on *heightened oversight.* 19 A program
placed on heightened oversight must follow a plan to improve performance
or it will be placed on probation for failing to correct programmatic
deficiencies. Furthermore, NRC reserves the right to suspend a state*s
agreement if the state does not comply with one or more of the
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
The Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program is intended to
ensure that the NRC and the agreement states adequately protect the health
and safety of the public in accordance with NRC standards. For example, in
February 2003, the Rhode Island program was found *adequate but needs
improvement.* As a result of its evaluation, the Rhode Island program was
placed on heightened oversight and was instructed to follow a detailed
plan to improve performance, which includes NRC monitoring of progress
through bimonthly teleconferences. In addition, the Rhode Island program
must periodically submit a progress report to NRC. The review team found
that a deficiency in staffing and training had led to Rhode Island*s
performance problems. Therefore, as part of the plan to improve
performance, Rhode Island was instructed to address staffing and training
concerns. In November 2003, a follow- up review will be conducted to
establish whether the program has improved enough to remove it from
heightened oversight status.
The review program also encourages states and NRC regions to learn good
practices from one another. For example, an NRC official recommended that
Florida be cited for a good practice for its in- house training efforts
for the program*s staff, including the creation of a new *training
coordinator* position. As a result of participation by an Ohio official
during Florida*s last
evaluation, Ohio*s program decided to hire a training coordinator.
Furthermore, because review results are available to the public and a good
practices report is periodically distributed to all agreement states and
NRC regions, all programs have access to the good practices of other
programs.
19 States under *heightened oversight* as of May 31, 2003, are Rhode
Island, Nevada, and New Hampshire. Tennessee was removed from *heightened
oversight* based on an October 2001 follow- up review.
The report not only shares the good practices, but also the reasons for
poor performance. Agreement state and NRC regional programs can take
action to improve performance by examining the strengths and weaknesses of
other programs. NRC Efforts to
Efforts undertaken by NRC and agreement states to strengthen the security
Improve Security over
of sealed sources for medical, industrial, and research use have only, to
date, required large irradiator facilities to take specific actions.
Additional Sealed Sources Have
orders to licensees that possess high- risk sealed sources are expected to
Been Limited and
follow. NRC and agreement states disagree over the appropriate role of the
Disagreement Exists
states in efforts to improve security. NRC intends to develop and
implement all additional security measures on licensees with sealed
over the Appropriate sources, including those licensed by agreement
states. However, 82 percent
Role of the States of agreement states responding to our survey feel they
should be
responsible for inspecting and enforcing security measures for sealed
sources in their states under their authority to ensure public health and
safety.
NRC*s Security Efforts Have Since the events of September 11, 2001, NRC
efforts have focused on
Not Focused on Sealed issuing advisories and orders for nuclear reactor
and nuclear fuel licensees Sources
and implementing changes within NRC to streamline its security
responsibilities. Specifically, NRC has issued over 30 advisories and 20
security orders requiring action to nuclear power plants, decommissioning
power reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and spent fuel facilities. 20
Between November and December 2001, NRC*s Office of Investigations visited
80 nuclear facilities, law enforcement agencies, and first responders
nationwide to interview officials and review records to identify potential
terrorist risks. NRC forwarded potential leads to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. In addition, NRC has revised the *design basis threat* for
nuclear power plants* the largest reasonable threat against which a
regulated private guard force should be expected to defend under existing
law* and issued a corresponding order in April 2003 requiring power 20
Advisories are non- public, rapid communications from NRC to its licensees
that provide information obtained from the intelligence community or law
enforcement agencies on changes to the threat environment, and guidance
for licensees to take specific actions promptly to strengthen their
capability against the threat. Security orders contain requirements for
licensees to implement interim compensatory security measures beyond that
currently required by NRC regulations and as conditions of licenses.
plants to implement additional actions to protect against sabotage by
terrorists and other adversaries. NRC also made a series of internal
administrative changes, such as consolidating the agency*s security
responsibilities in establishing an Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response, 21 which includes a Threat Assessment Team responsible
for working directly with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation on security issues. The Office of Nuclear Security
and Incident Response also works with the Department of Homeland
Security and other agencies concerned with terrorism to assess and respond
to potential threats. In an effort to more effectively communicate and
respond to threats, NRC developed a Threat Advisory and Protective
Measures System 22 based on the national Homeland Security Advisory
System, and increased staffing at its 24- hour Emergency Operations
Center. NRC also conducted a review of information available to the
general public on the NRC Web site for potential security risks.
Efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources for medical,
industrial, and research use* by both NRC and agreement states* have been
limited. Since September 11, 2001, NRC has issued a total of six
advisories urging licensees to ensure security of sources and advising
them to be more aware of the possibility of theft and sabotage. 23
Licensees were also advised to
double- check shipping documents and inform local police authorities of
their possession of sealed sources. On June 5, 2003, NRC issued its first
security order for large irradiator facilities* 70 facilities nationwide
that expose products, such as medical supplies, to radiation for
sterilization* that requires licensees to take action to strengthen
security. The decision to select irradiators first has been questioned by
agreement state officials and licensees, as they feel other uses of sealed
sources pose a higher risk. For example, 93 percent of agreement states
responding to our survey identified industrial radiographers as of greater
concern. Reasons for this may include that the sealed sources in these
devices are portable, have high
21 The Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response was established in
April 2002 and consists of two divisions * the Division of Nuclear
Security and the Division of Incident Response Operations. It is
responsible for the agency*s security, safeguards, and incident
response efforts and to serve as a point of contact and counterpart to the
Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. In this role,
the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response participates in a
number of interagency working groups and committees that address issues
relating to terrorism, information sharing, and planning.
22 NRC established this system in response to Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 3. 23 There were a total of seven advisories, one
of which was a correction to a prior advisory.
radioactivity, and are widely available (over 570 licensees in the United
States). Although irradiator facilities contain larger amounts of
radioactive material than industrial radiographers, they are specially
designed to include thick concrete and steel walls, security interlocks,
and other protective equipment to protect against radiation exposure. In
addition, the irradiator facilities we visited had taken the initiative to
implement supplementary security measures, such as installing motion
detectors, more extensive security alarms and monitoring, and employee
identification badges. Other uses identified by agreement states officials
in our survey as requiring stricter regulation include portable gauges and
welllogging devices* over 4,600 and over 200 licensees nationwide,
respectively.
Transportation was also identified as needing additional security.
Although most agreement states surveyed indicated that the Department of
Transportation*s (DOT) regulations are adequate to ensure safe
transportation of sealed sources, 81 percent of them identified weaknesses
in current regulations and 77 percent indicated that communications and
coordination needs to be improved between their state program and DOT.
Some DOT officials we spoke with disagreed that sealed sources were
particularly vulnerable during transportation. However, one DOT official
noted that large quantities of iridium- 192 are regularly shipped to the
United States from Europe and South America using regular commercial
freight services. Such sources are shipped in stainless steel transport
kegs that require no special tools or equipment to open. Once loaded with
up to 10, 000 curies of iridium- 192, the transport keg weighs only 150 to
200
pounds. While this official believed that, overall, security is sufficient
during transport, he told us that at certain phases such shipments could
be vulnerable to terrorist diversion.
NRC and the agreement states have formed a materials security working
group to develop and issue new security orders by the end of the year for
approximately 2,100 licensees* located throughout the United States* that
have been determined to be of the greatest risk based upon NRC*s and DOE*s
work to categorize sealed sources. When these orders are issued, affected
licensees will have a certain specified time period to comply with the
order and implement required security measures. At the end of this period,
licensees will be subject to inspections to ensure compliance and face
enforcement actions if actions have not been taken.
Agreement states* efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources
have focused primarily on facilitating NRC actions, such as forwarding NRC
advisories, increasing attention on security when conducting inspections
and license reviews, and coordinating with local law enforcement and first
responders to develop emergency response procedures. Eighty- six percent
of agreement state officials responding to our survey indicated that they
are adequately addressing post- September 11, 2001, heightened security
concerns involving malicious use of radioactive material.
NRC and the Agreement The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes NRC to
issue rules, regulations,
States Disagree over or orders to promote the common defense and security,
while granting
agreement states the authority to ensure public health and safety. 24
Development and Following the events of September 11, 2001, NRC determined
that securityrelated Enforcement of Additional
efforts for all medical, industrial, and research licensees* including
Security Requirements those licensed by agreement states* should be the
responsibility of NRC under its common defense and security authority.
However, 82 percent of agreement states responding to our survey noted
that they want to have responsibility for inspection and enforcement of
security measures for sealed sources under their authority to ensure
public health and safety. Agreement states already enforce NRC*s existing
security regulations under this authority. In addition, 74 percent of
agreement states responding to our survey indicated they could effectively
respond to a radiological incident with their current resources.
Individual commissioners at NRC have expressed concern with budget
shortfalls many states are currently experiencing. These commissioners
said that states experiencing budgetary difficulties may not be able to
assume additional responsibilities and that it may impact their program*s
performance. When asked whether their state had sufficient resources to
support new efforts, 60 percent of agreement states responding to our
survey indicated they would need additional resources. 25 However,
officials from organizations representing agreement states and non-
agreement states have met with NRC and advised NRC that, although many
states are
24 NRC*s regulations require licensees to secure licensed materials that
are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas from unauthorized removal
or access and to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed
material that is not in storage and is in a controlled or unrestricted
area. 10 C. F. R. S:S: 20.1801, 20.1802.
25 Approximately 20 percent of agreement state officials responding to our
survey indicated that they are having difficulty retaining sufficient and/
or qualified personnel to effectively regulate sealed sources.
Nevertheless, NRC has determined that all agreement state programs are
adequately protecting public health and safety.
facing budget cuts, funding of the radioactive materials programs in these
states have largely been stable and the programs have been able and will
likely be able to adequately fulfill their responsibilities.
According to our discussions with NRC officials, NRC is also facing budget
and staffing constraints, largely as a result of its dependence upon fees
from the licensees it regulates* only 20 percent of the total sealed
sources licensees nationwide* for funding of its sealed source licensing
and inspection activities. As more states become agreement states, NRC has
fewer licensees to support its licensing and inspection programs. 26 To
address the potential effect this reduction in funding may have on its
licensing and inspection programs, NRC and the agreement states have
entered into a partnership* called the National Materials Program* to
better share the responsibility for protecting public health and safety.
Since the agreement states regulate about 80 percent of the nation*s
sealed source licensees, the National Materials Program allows them to
participate more actively in the development of regulations and guidance,
particularly in areas where they possess expertise. For example, Texas, an
agreement state, regulates more well logging specific licensees than exist
in all NRC- regulated states. Thus, according to NRC officials, Texas
could take the lead in developing any new public health and safety
regulations for
well loggers. Both NRC and the agreement states are currently conducting
pilot projects to determine how the National Materials Program can and
will work. In addition, states remain solely responsible for regulating
certain radioactive materials, such as naturally occurring radioactive
material like radium and material produced in particle accelerators,
increasing the importance of federal and state cooperation in developing
and implementing additional safety and/ or security measures. NRC and the
agreement states are continuing to work cooperatively to develop
information on how responsibilities can be shared under the National
Materials Program.
NRC officials said that NRC lacks sufficient staff to conduct inspections
of all licensees expected to receive security orders* large irradiator
facilities and approximately 2, 100 licensees that NRC has identified as
presenting the greatest risk. To mitigate this staffing shortage, NRC
intends to enter
26 NRC is required by the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act,
2001 (P. L. 106- 377) to recover 94 percent of its budget through fee
recovery. As the number of NRC licensees decreases with an increasing
number of agreement states, fees paid by NRC*s licensees have increased in
order to support NRC*s regulatory program.
into contracts with agreement states or independent contractors to assist
in carrying out these inspections. According to agreement state officials
we spoke with, however, agreement states may be reluctant to participate
in these efforts if they have had no role in developing the additional
security
requirements or are not provided additional funding. NRC would remain
responsible for taking appropriate enforcement action for any security
violation found during these inspections. According to NRC, although final
details regarding funding have yet to be determined, NRC anticipates
increasing its licensees* fees and using funds NRC has received from
emergency supplemental appropriations to cover costs associated with
additional security.
Conclusions The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed the
focus of radioactive sealed sources regulation. Where NRC and the
agreement
states previously concentrated on ensuring the safe and effective use of
sealed sources, they must now increasingly consider how to prevent
terrorists from obtaining and using the material. Efforts to improve
controls over sealed sources face significant challenges, especially how
to balance the need to secure these materials while not discouraging their
beneficial use in academic, medical, and industrial applications. The
first step to improve security is to conduct a threat assessment that
would identify sealed sources most likely to be used in a terrorist attack
and the consequences of such an attack. Defining the types of sealed
sources that are of the greatest concern will allow federal and state
efforts to be appropriately prioritized. NRC*s and DOE*s current efforts
to categorize sealed sources by the greatest amount of risk and their
efforts to establish a national- level tracking system for the highest
risk sealed sources are commendable. However, these efforts could be
strengthened by involving the agreement states, which regulate 80 percent
of the nation*s radioactive materials licensees, in determining risk. In
addition, these efforts could be further strengthened by determining the
economic consequences of a dirty bomb and how to effectively mitigate any
resulting psychological consequences. In addition, NRC*s current
regulations leave sealed sources at risk of malicious use. Modifying its
regulations to eliminate general licensing of devices containing sealed
sources could improve accountability, potentially reducing the number of
sources that are lost, stolen, or abandoned. Furthermore, modifying NRC*s
licensing and/ or inspection process to verify* before a licensee
purchases radioactive material* that it will be used as intended may
increase the security of sealed sources.
The President*s National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the
critical importance of integrating federal, state, local, and private
sector efforts to prepare and respond to terrorist attacks, including
those using sealed sources. The initial responsibility, however, falls
upon state and local governments and their organizations* such as police,
fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies*
which will almost invariably be the first responders to any terrorist
event involving sealed sources. Because of state and local governments*
role in responding to incidents* in addition to the fact that the federal
government lacks authority over naturally occurring and accelerator
produced radioactive material* it is critical to involve state and local
governments in the development and implementation of additional security
over sealed sources. State radiological protection agencies can provide
valuable expertise on the licensees that they have been regulating, in
many cases, for decades. Developing criteria and performance measures to
gauge
NRC*s and agreement states* effectiveness at implementing additional
security as part of NRC*s performance evaluation process would help ensure
the consistent application of additional security measures across the
United States. NRC and the agreement states have a proven record of
cooperation in regulating the safe use of radioactive materials, including
sealed sources. As increasing demands are placed on budgets at all levels
of government, effectively leveraging the knowledge and resources of
federal, state, and local agencies will be crucial to ensuring that sealed
sources continue to be used safely and remain secure against terrorist
use. Recommendations for
To determine the sealed sources of greatest concern, we recommend that
Executive Action
the Chairman of NRC collaborate with the agreement states to identify the
types, amount, and availability of the highest risk sealed sources and the
associated health and economic consequences of their malicious use. In
addition, we recommend that NRC and the agreement states determine how to
effectively mitigate the psychological effects of their use in a terrorist
attack.
In addition, accountability over generally licensed devices needs to be
improved and gaps in the current licensing process need to be addressed.
Because new efforts will involve additional licensing and inspection of
potentially thousands of licensees and devices, we recommend that the
Chairman of NRC:
determine, in consultation with the agreement states, the costs and
benefits of requiring owners of devices that are now generally licensed
to apply for specific licenses and whether the costs are commensurate with
the risks these devices present and modify NRC*s process of issuing
specific licenses to ensure that sealed
sources cannot be purchased before NRC*s verification* through inspection
or other means* that the materials will be used as intended.
Finally, to ensure that the federal and state governments* efforts to
provide additional security to sealed sources are adequately integrated
and evaluated for their effectiveness, we recommend that the Chairman of
NRC:
determine how officials in agreement and non- agreement states can
participate in the development and implementation of additional security
measures and
include criteria and performance measures of the NRC*s and the agreement
states* implementation of additional security measures in NRC*s periodic
evaluations of its and agreement states* effectiveness.
Agency Comments and We provided NRC, CRCPD, and OAS with draft copies of
this report for
Our Evaluation their review and comment. NRC*s written comments are
presented as appendix VI. NRC, CRCPD, and OAS also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
NRC stated that the draft report does not fully present either the current
status of NRC*s efforts to improve the security of high- risk radioactive
sources or the large effort that it has devoted to this issue since
September 11, 2001. According to NRC, the draft report does not fully
reflect its existing statutory framework and does not recognize that
several of our recommendations would require statutory changes at both
federal and state levels. Furthermore, NRC commented that our draft report
should have focused on high- risk radioactive sources that are of greatest
concern for malevolent use by a terrorist rather than radioactive sources
of all types.
Regarding NRC*s comments that our draft report does not fully discuss its
activities to increase the security of the highest- risk sealed sources,
we note that our draft report detailed all advisories issued by NRC to
sealed
source licensees urging them to ensure security of sealed sources
following September 11, 2001, as well as NRC*s efforts with DOE to define
the
radioactive isotopes of concern. We have added information on the
organization and goals of NRC*s new materials security working group.
Furthermore, our report discusses that NRC*s security order to large
irradiators was issued on June 5, 2003. This order was issued four days
after our meeting with NRC officials to discuss our preliminary findings,
conclusions, and recommendations. At the meeting, NRC officials told us
that it could take until the end of 2003 for the order to be issued. It is
important to note that this is the first and only security order related
to sealed sources issued since the September 11, 2001, attacks and that it
applies only to 70 large irradiator facilities in the United States. As
discussed in our draft report, 93 percent of agreement states responding
to our survey identified industrial radiographers, of which there are over
500 nationwide, as of greater concern than large irradiator facilities.
Regarding NRC*s comment that our draft report does not recognize that
several of our recommendations would require statutory changes at both
federal and state levels, we have clarified our report to recommend that
NRC determine how officials in agreement and non- agreement states can
participate in the development and implementation of additional security
measures. We agree with NRC that its statutory framework reserves to NRC
the authority to promote the common defense and security and our report
discusses the distinction between federal and state authority. However, we
continue to believe, as do state officials we spoke with, that
involving the agreement and non- agreement states in the development and
implementation of additional security measures would be beneficial. As our
draft report stated, state and local governments will almost invariably be
the first responders to any terrorist event involving sealed sources.
States can also provide valuable expertise on licensees that they have
been
regulating for decades and which NRC has had no prior contact with. In its
comments, NRC states that the possibility of state budget shortfalls
played absolutely no role in its decision to develop and implement
additional security measures under its common defense and security
authority. However, numerous NRC officials told us during our review that
budget
difficulties could impact the performance of state radiation protection
programs and NRC*s former Chairman discussed the issue at a January 2003
meeting. NRC acknowledges in its comments that cooperation with agreement
states is vital to the success of its efforts. We are encouraged that NRC
stated in its comments that it will examine changes to its
statutory framework in its new materials security working group and
intends to work with the states to the maximum extent possible under
existing statutes.
Regarding NRC*s comment that the draft report should have focused only on
high- risk sources rather than radioactive sources of all types, we note
that the objectives of our review included determining the known number of
all sealed sources in the United States and the number of sources lost,
stolen, or abandoned. Our draft report noted that defining the types of
sealed sources that are of the greatest concern would allow federal and
state efforts to be appropriately prioritized. As we did when responding
to a similar comment NRC made in our May 2003 report, we agree that the
highest- risk sources present the greatest concern as desirable material
for a dirty bomb. 27 However, other sealed radioactive sources could also
be used as a terrorist weapon. No one can say with certainty what the
psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty bomb* regardless of
the
radioactive material used to construct it* would be. We are concerned that
NRC*s and DOE*s identification of the highest- risk sealed sources focuses
solely on the health risks of their use and does not address the
psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty bomb. It is also
important to note that NRC is still working with the International Atomic
Energy Agency to reconcile differences between their definitions of
highrisk sealed sources. Furthermore, many of the radioactive isotopes
identified by NRC and DOE as high- risk are used only at DOE facilities or
by very few NRC licensees in the United States. NRC and DOE did not
consider radioactive materials licensees in the agreement states, which
constitute 80 percent of the nation*s licensees. Without addressing the
total consequences of a dirty bomb and considering the availability of
sealed sources nationwide, we believe NRC*s and DOE*s determination of
risk is incomplete.
In general, both CRCPD and OAS agreed with the recommendations in the
report. However, both organizations noted that our use of the term *sealed
source* to refer to all radioactive materials used in medical, industrial,
and research purposes may exclude many radioactive isotopes that could be
used in a dirty bomb that are loose and not in sealed form, especially
those
used in medical and research facilities. We used the term *sealed source*
for simplicity to distinguish medical, industrial, and research
radioactive isotopes from material used in nuclear weapons and as fuel in
nuclear reactors. We did not intend to exclude unsealed radioactive
material from 27 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: U. S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control
Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening, GAO- 03- 638 (Washington,
D. C.: May 16, 2003).
our discussion of radioactive materials of concern and have clarified our
use of the term.
CRCPD stated that the report does not address four critical areas of
potential risk. First, CRCPD believes that a major area of risk is at
bankrupt facilities where sealed sources can be left unattended and/ or
unsecured for long periods of time, leaving the sources easy targets for
theft. We acknowledge this risk and have revised our discussion of lost,
stolen, and
abandoned sources appropriately. Second, CRCPD noted that radioactive
materials licensed for *storage only* tend to be neglected by the licensee
and the regulatory agency. While we agree that this is a potential
weakness in sealed source security, individual state practices on *storage
only*
licenses differ. We did not specifically examine these practices during
our review. Third, CRCPD stated that the report does not adequately
address the radioactive material under the control of DOE and naturally
occurring and accelerator produced radioactive material. While DOE does
control a large amount of radioactive material, discussion of the security
provided to it was outside of the scope of our review. We believe our
report adequately discusses the challenges of regulating naturally
occurring and accelerator produced materials. Finally, CRCPD states that
the report does not consider transportation hubs through which very large
quantities of radioactive material pass each day. While we do not
specifically discuss transportation hubs, our draft report noted that
weaknesses have been identified in the transportation of sealed sources
and, at certain phases of transport, these shipments could be vulnerable
to terrorist diversion.
OAS agreed with our recommendation that NRC should include criteria and
performance measures of the agreement states* implementation of additional
security measures in NRC*s periodic evaluations of agreement states*
effectiveness. OAS stated that such evaluation is not possible given the
current intention of NRC to issue and implement security orders under its
common defense and security authority. However, we believe that the
recommendation in our draft report that NRC determine how states can
participate in the development and implementation of additional security
measures addresses this concern.
OAS also noted that our draft report stated that licensees are tracked
instead of individual sealed sources and that the draft report lends
support to the formation of a national tracking system for sealed sources.
OAS commented that our discussion does not accurately describe the current
system. Licensees are required to maintain records for the acquisition and
disposition of each source it receives and maintain an accurate inventory
of
sources in their possession. While we agree with this comment and have
revised our discussion of license tracking, our draft report was accurate
in that there is no single source of information in the United States to
verify authorized users, locations, quantities, and movements of sealed
sources. OAS goes on to state that there are serious concerns with the
practicality and accuracy of a national tracking system and that the
development of such a system should be further evaluated with input from
the states and private industry. We agree with OAS*s comments, but believe
that our
recommendation to collaborate with the agreement states in order to
determine the types, amount, and availability of the highest risk sealed
sources and the health, psychological, and economic consequences of their
use in a terrorist attack addresses OAS*s concerns.
Finally, OAS commented that the states have long requested that the
federal government seriously consider placing the use and regulation of
all radioactive materials in a single federal agency. According to OAS,
the current approach results in a disjointed regulatory structure and
different standards for the same public health issue. While we agree that
consistency and avoiding duplication is important, addressing the overall
regulation of radioactive material in the United States was outside the
scope of our review on security of sealed sources.
We conducted our work from August 2002 through June 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I presents
our scope and methodology in detail.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days
from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Chairman and
Commissioners of NRC; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Secretary of
Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairman of the
Organization of Agreement States; the Chairman and Executive Director of
the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors; the directors of
the radiation control programs in the 32 agreement states; interested
congressional committees; and other interested parties. We will also make
copies available to others who request them. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, I can be
reached at (202) 512- 3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix VII.
Sincerely yours, Robert A. Robinson Managing Director, Natural Resources
and Environment
Appendi Appendi xes x I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology At the request of the Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and
International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate,
we examined the following questions: 1. What is the known number of sealed
sources in the United States? 2. How many of these sealed sources have
been lost, stolen, or
abandoned? 3. How effective are federal and state controls over sealed
sources? 4. What efforts have been initiated or considered since September
11,
2001, to better safeguard radiological sources? To answer these questions,
we distributed surveys to 32 agreement states, 18 non- agreement states,
Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and to NRC*s 4 regional offices. We
focused the survey on information about each state*s radiation control
program, specific and general licensing activities, enforcement actions,
effectiveness of controls over sealed sources, program evaluation
processes, transportation of sealed sources, and the
impact of September 11, 2001, on regulatory programs. We acquired a list
of the appropriate agreement and non- agreement state officials from NRC*s
Office of State and Tribal Programs Web site and from the Conference of
Radiation Control Program Directors. Because this was not a sample survey,
but rather a census of all states, there are no sampling errors.
However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce
errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,
measurement errors are introduced if difficulties exist in how a
particular question is interpreted or in the sources of information
available to respondents in answering a question. In addition, coding
errors may occur if mistakes are entered into a database. We took
extensive steps in the development of the questionnaires, the collection
of data, and the editing and analysis of data to minimize total survey
error. To reduce measurement error, we conducted two rounds of pretesting
to make sure questions and response categories were interpreted in a
consistent manner with both agreement and non- agreement states. We also
provided draft copies of the questionnaires to NRC, the Organization of
Agreement States (OAS), and the Conference of Radiation Control Program
Directors (CRCPD) for their
review and comment. Based on both pretesting and comments received from
NRC, OAS, and CRCPD, we made relevant changes to the questions based upon
these pretests. Copies of the agreement and non- agreement
state questionnaires, along with the results to each question, are in
appendixes IV and V, respectively.
In addition, we edited all completed surveys for consistency and, if
necessary, contacted respondents to clarify responses. All questionnaire
responses were double key- entered into our database (that is, the entries
were 100 percent verified), and a random sample of the questionnaires was
further verified for completeness and accuracy. In addition, all computer
syntax was peer reviewed and verified by separate programmers to ensure
that the syntax was written and executed correctly.
We made extensive efforts to encourage respondents to complete and return
the questionnaires, including sending up to four reminder electronic mail
messages to non- respondents, calling state radiation control program
directors directly, and collaborating with OAS to promote completion of
this survey. Our efforts yielded responses from 31 of 32 (96.8 percent
response rate) agreement states and 11 of 18 (61.1 percent response rate)
non- agreement states. We also received responses from Puerto Rico and the
four NRC regional offices. In total, we achieved an overall response rate
of 80.4 percent, receiving 45 of the 56 surveys disseminated. We did not
receive a response from one agreement state: Arizona. The non- agreement
states of Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, and Wyoming did not respond to our survey, nor did we receive a
response from the District of Columbia. Although we did not receive
surveys from these states, we obtained data on incidents involving sealed
sources and numbers and types of licensees from NRC. Three states (New
York, South Carolina, and Texas) have multiple agencies with jurisdiction
over sealed sources. We sent and received surveys from the appropriate
agencies in each of these states.
To determine the number and types of sealed source licenses in the United
States and the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, we
relied upon information provided by state radiation control programs in
their responses to our survey. In addition, we obtained data from NRC*s
license tracking system database on licensees NRC regulates* both in the
non- agreement states and on federal facilities in the agreement states.
To determine the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned over
the
past 5 years, we obtained data on incidents from NRC*s Nuclear Materials
Events Database. We chose to examine the past 5 years because information
was readily available through this database. Because each state uses
different systems to track its licensing activities, we did not
attempt to independently assess the reliability of data provided by the
states in their responses to our survey. However, we did ask states in
what ways and how frequently information in their databases is validated.
To assess the reliability of NRC*s databases, we interviewed officials at
NRC in
charge of maintaining its license tracking system database and the Nuclear
Materials Events Database to determine if data in these systems are
reasonably complete and accurate. As a result of these interviews, we did
not find any reasons to question the reliability of these data. In
addition, we
also performed limited testing on NRC*s license tracking system database
to find missing data or data outside expected ranges. We did not find
significant errors or incompleteness as a result of these tests and
concluded that the use of the data would not lead to incorrect or
unintentional findings. These are the only data on NRC licensing
activities in the United States and program managers at NRC regularly use
the data.
In addition to data on state programs obtained through our survey, we
obtained information through interviews with officials from state
radiation control programs. We visited the following states during our
review: Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah. We also interviewed
officials from the Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, and Ohio state
radiation control programs.
We selected states to visit based upon the numbers of licensees regulated
by the state and the different uses of sealed sources. We selected states
with a low number of licensees (Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah), a
medium number of licensees (Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina,
and Pennsylvania), and a high number of licensees (Florida and Illinois).
In addition, we considered the types of licensees in each state. For
example, we visited South Carolina and Utah because they have two of the
nation*s three low- level radioactive waste disposal facilities* the
ChemNuclear Systems, L. L. C. facility in Barnwell, South Carolina and the
Envirocare of Utah, Inc., facility in Clive, Utah. When visiting states,
we met with officials from selected licensees that represented the major
uses of sealed sources. We also visited manufacturers because they may
possess larger quantities of radioactive material for installation in
devices for sale. In summary, we visited three sites being decommissioned
and decontaminated, two low- level radioactive waste disposal facilities,
two moisture/ density gauge manufacturers, two industrial radiographers,
two medical licensees (hospitals), two large irradiator facilities, a
well- logging licensee, a nuclear pharmacy, a research and development
licensee, and an academic licensee to obtain their views on the
effectiveness of NRC and state regulations, including the challenges
associated with sealed source
security. Additionally, we examined physical security measures during
tours of these facilities.
We also visited Rhode Island, Florida, and the NRC Region III office in
Lisle, Illinois, because they were undergoing NRC program performance
evaluation reviews under the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation
Program. Visiting a program while it was being evaluated gave us the
opportunity to witness review procedures for evaluating performance,
consistency of application of NRC*s review criteria, transparency of the
review process, and the level of cooperation and involvement between NRC
officials and representatives from agreement states. To follow up our
review of the program evaluation process, we attended a 2- day NRC
training class on the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program
and observed two program evaluation Management Review Board meetings at
NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.
We attended two conferences related to sealed source regulation* the May
2002 CRCPD annual meeting held in Madison, Wisconsin, and the annual OAS
Conference held in October 2002, in Denver, Colorado. We also obtained a
position paper from the Health Physics Society on the regulation of sealed
sources. Furthermore, we met with the chairman of the Southeast Compact
for low- level radioactive waste and the Advisory Committee on
the Medical Uses of Isotopes to elicit views on the regulation and
security of sealed sources.
At the federal level, we interviewed numerous NRC officials representing
several different offices and programs. During these interviews, NRC
provided us with information and documents about the regulation of sealed
sources and the challenges it faces in the post September 11, 2001,
security environment. We met with NRC*s Office of Enforcement, Office of
Investigation, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, Office
of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, and Office of State and Tribal
Programs. Additionally, we attended an August 2002 meeting between
representatives of OAS and CRCPD and the Commissioners of NRC. Finally, to
gain the perspective of federal regulators at the regional level, we
visited three of the four NRC regional offices, including NRC Region I
located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania; Region II located in Atlanta,
Georgia; and Region III located in Lisle, Illinois.
In addition to officials at NRC, we interviewed several other federal
government agency officials. To learn about sealed source transportation
regulations and issues, we interviewed officials from the Department of
Transportation, including the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. To
establish the role of the Environmental Protection Agency in regulating
sealed sources, we met with officials from the Office of Radiation and
Indoor Air. We also met with officials from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and observed a FEMA evaluated exercise in March
2003 in Springfield and Morris, Illinois, that simulated a radiological
release at a nuclear power plant. We also interviewed Department of
Justice and Department of Energy officials.
We performed our review from August 2002 through June 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Medical and Industrial Devices That Use
Appendi x II
Sealed Sources Irradiators Irradiators are devices or facilities that
expose products to radiation for sterilization, such as spices, milk
containers, and hospital supplies. Irradiator facilities are relatively
few in number and contain very high activity sources, which vary in
physical size. Non- self shielded irradiators do not provide shielding
from the radiation beam; therefore, the facilities that contain the
irradiation must be specially designed, often including thickly shielded
walls, interlocks, and other protective equipment. Selfshielded
irradiators do not emit external radiation beams and are usually small
cabinet type devices. These irradiators are commonly used in research
applications or for blood irradiation. According to our survey and NRC
specific license data, there are a total of approximately 350 irradiator
specific licensees in the United States, about 70 of which are large
irradiators.
Figure 4: Product Conveyor System in a Panoramic Irradiator
Note: Cobalt- 60 sealed sources are placed in racks and stored while not
in use in a deep water- filled pool beneath the product conveyor system.
Tel et herapy Teletherapy is commonly referred to as external beam
radiation. Fixed multibeam teletheraphy units focus gamma radiation from
an array of over
200 cobalt- 60 sources on cancer lesions. The facilities within which the
units are located are specifically designed to include thickly shielded
walls and have other protective equipment, due to the high activity
sources. According to our survey and NRC specific license data, there are
approximately 60 teletherapy licensees and about 60 gamma knife licensees
in the United States.
Figure 5: Stereotactic Radiosurgery Device (Gamma Knife)
Industrial Radiography Industrial radiography is the use of radiation to
produce an image of internal features on photographic film to inspect
metal parts and welds for
defects. Industrial radiography sources and devices are generally small in
terms of physical size, although the devices are usually heavy due to the
internal shielding. The sources are attached to specially designed cables
for their operation. The use of radiography sources and devices is very
common* a total of over 570 licensees nationwide* and their portability
may make them susceptible to theft or loss. Further, the small size of the
source allows for unauthorized removal by an individual, and such a source
may be placed into a pocket of a garment. Industrial radiography cameras
typically contain a high radioactivity iridium- 192 source that is capable
of inflicting extensive radiation burns if handled improperly.
Figure 6: Industrial Radiography Camera and Storage Case
Brachytheraphy Brachytherapy is an advanced cancer treatment in which
radioactive seeds or sources are placed in or near the tumor itself,
giving a high radiation
dose to the tumor while reducing the radiation exposure in the surrounding
healthy tissues. Brachytheraphy applications are of three slightly
different varieties, generally referred to as low dose rate, medium dose
rate, and high dose rate. These applications use sealed sources that are
small physically (less than 1 centimeter in diameter and only a few
centimeters long), and, thus, are susceptible to being lost or misplaced.
High and
medium dose rate sources, and some low dose rate sources, may be in the
form of a long wire attached to a device (a remote after loading device).
The after loading device may be heavy, due to the shielding for the
sources when not in use, and the device may be on wheels for transport
within a facility. The remote after loading device may also contain
electrical and electronic components for its operation. Brachytherapy
sources and devices are located in hospitals, clinics, and similar medical
institutions, and such facilities may have a large number of sources.
Figure 7: High Dose Rate Remote After Loader Used for Brachytherapy
Well Logging Device Well logging is a process that uses sealed sources
and/ or unsealed radioactive materials to determine whether a well,
drilled deep into the
ground, contains minerals, such as coal, oil, and natural gas. The sources
are usually contained in long (1 to 2 meters, typically) and thin (less
than 10 centimeters in diameter) devices that also contain detectors and
various electronic components. The actual size of the sources inside the
devices is
generally small, but the device is heavy, due to the ruggedness needed for
the environments in which they are to be used. Our analysis of NRC*s
license tracking system and responses to our survey of agreement states
indicates that there are about 210 well logging licensees in the United
States.
Figure 8: Storage Container for Well Logging Sealed Source
Fixed Industrial Gauge Non- portable gauging devices are designed for
measurement or control of material density, flow, level, thickness,
weight, and so forth. The gauges* possessed by over 1,600 specific
licensees and an unknown number of general licensees* contain sealed
sources that radiate through the
substance being measured to a readout or controlling device. Depending
upon the specific application, industrial gauges may contain relatively
small quantities of radioactive material, or may contain sources with
activities approaching 30 curies. The devices generally are not large, but
may be located some distance from the radiation detector, which may have
electrical or electronic components located within the detector. A
facility may have a large number of these gauges and the locations of such
devices or sources within a facility may not be recognized, since the
devices may be connected to process control equipment. This lack of
recognition may result in a loss of control if the facility decides to
modernize or terminate operations.
Figure 9: Fixed Industrial Gauge
Portable Gauge Portable gauging devices, such as moisture density gauges,
are used at field locations and contain the sources, detectors, and
electronic equipment necessary for the measurement. These gauges* over
4,600 licensees in the United States* contain a gamma emitting sealed
source, usually cesium137,
and a sealed neutron source, usually americium- 241 and beryllium. The
source is physically small in size, typically a few centimeters long by a
few centimeters in diameter, and may be located either completely within
the device or at the end of a rod/ handle assembly. The portability of the
device makes it susceptible to loss of control or theft.
Figure 10: Portable Moisture/ Density Gauge
Tabl e 2: Type and Size of Sealed Sources Used in Medical and Industrial
Practices Range of radioactivity level Practice or Application Use
Radioisotope (curies)
Irradiator (sterilization/ food preservation) Industrial Cobalt- 60 5,000-
15,000, 000 Cesium- 137 5,000- 5,000, 000 Irradiator (self- shielded)
Research Cesium- 137 2, 500- 42, 000
Cobalt- 60 1, 500- 50, 000 Irradiator (blood) Medical Cesium- 137 1, 000-
12, 000
Cobalt- 60 1,500- 3, 000 Teletherapy Medical Cobalt- 60 1, 000- 15, 000
Cesium- 137 500- 1, 500 Teletherapy (fixed, multibeam/ gamma knife)
Medical Cobalt- 60 4, 000- 10, 000 Industrial radiography Industrial
Cobalt- 60 11- 200
Iridium- 192 5- 200 Selenium- 75 80 Ytterbium- 169 2.5- 10 Thulium- 170
20- 200 Brachytherapy (high/ medium dose rate) Medical Cobalt- 60 5- 20
Cesium- 137 3- 8 Iridium- 192 3- 12 Brachytherapy (low dose rate) Medical
Cesium- 137 .01-. 7
Radium- 226 .005-. 05 Strontium- 90 .02-. 04 Palladium- 103 .03 Iodine-
125 .04 Iridium- 192 .02-. 75 Gold- 198 .08 Californium- 252 .083
Ruthenium/ Rhodium106 .00022-. 0006 Well logging gauge Industrial
Americium241/ .5- 23
Beryllium Cesium- 137 1- 2 Californium- 252 .027-. 11 Fixed industrial
gauge (e. g. level/ thickness gauge) Industrial Americium- 241 .012-. 12
Cesium- 137 .05-. 065 Portable gauge (e. g. moisture/ density gauge)
Industrial Americium241/ .01-. 1 Beryllium
(Continued From Previous Page)
Range of radioactivity level Practice or Application Use Radioisotope
(curies)
Cesium- 137 .008-. 011 Radium- 226 .002-. 004 Californium- 252 .00003-.
00007 Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, *Categorization of
Radioactive Sources, Revision of IAEA- TECDOC- 1191* Vienna, Austria,
2003.
Legislation Introduced in the 108th Congress
Appendi x III
Addressing Security of Sealed Sources Legislation Major Efforts Study
Requested
S. 6 Comprehensive Homeland Amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to
include the Establishes a task force to develop a Security Act of 2003
following major efforts: (1) based on a new classification classification
system for sensitive sealed Sec. 3006 and Sec. 170.
system, develop a national system for recovery of sealed sources that is
based on the potential for sources that are stolen or lost; (2) develop a
national
use by terrorists and the extent of the tracking system that takes into
account the new
threat to public health and safety. classification system; and (3)
establish procedures to improve the security of sealed sources in use,
transport, and storage.
S. 350 A bill to amend the Atomic Directs a task force to (1) determine
which sealed Establishes a multiagency task force to Energy Act of 1954 to
strengthen
sources should be classified as sensitive sealed sources, evaluate the
security of sealed sources the security of sensitive
(2) develop a national system to recover sensitive sealed and recommends
administrative and radioactive material.
sources that are lost or stolen, (3) develop a national legislative
actions to provide the maximum tracking system for sealed sources, and (4)
establish
degree of security against radiological procedures to improve the security
of sensitive sealed threats. sources. H. R. 891 A bill to establish a task
Directs a task force to (1) establish or modify a
Establishes a multiagency task force to, in force to evaluate and make
classification system for sealed sources based on sealed
consultation with state agencies, make recommendations with respect to
source attractiveness to terrorists, (2) establish or modify
recommendations for appropriate the security of sealed sources of
a national tracking system, (3) establish a system to regulatory and
legislative changes to radioactive materials, and for impose refundable
fees for proper disposal, and (4)
strengthen controls over sealed sources. other purposes. improve the
security of sealed sources. S. 1043 A bill to provide for the
Changes the definition of byproduct material to include None. security of
commercial nuclear
naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive power plants and
facilities
material and, within 4 years, transition regulatory designated by the
Nuclear
authority over this material from non- agreement states to Regulatory
Commission
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Sec. 6
S. 1005 The Energy Policy Instructs the Secretary of Energy to establish a
research Directs the Secretary of Energy to conduct Policy Act of 2003 and
development program to develop alternatives to
a survey of industrial applications of large Title IX Subtitle D* Nuclear
sealed sources that reduce safety, environmental, or
radioactive sources. Requires the survey Energy Sec. 946 proliferation
risks to workers using the sources or the
to include information on the management public.
and disposal of sealed sources. S. 1045 Low- Level Radioactive Directs the
Secretary of Energy to (1) identify options for
None. Waste Act of 2003 disposal of low- level radioactive waste, (2)
develop a
report for Congress on a permanent disposal facility for greater- than-
Class C waste, and (3) submit to Congress a plan to ensure continued
recovery of greater- than- Class
C waste until a permanent disposal facility is available.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Legislation Major Efforts Study Requested
S. 1161 Foreign Assistance Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to engage in
activities
None. Authorization Act, fiscal year
with the International Atomic Energy Agency to (1) 2004
propose and conclude agreements with up to 8 countries Title III Sec. 301*
308
under which the countries would provide temporary Radiological Terrorism
Threat
secure storage for orphaned, unused, and surplus sealed Reduction Act of
2003 sources, (2) promote the discovery, inventory, and recovery of sealed
sources in member nations, and (3)
authorizes the Secretary of Energy to make voluntary contributions to the
International Atomic Energy Agency to achieve the aforementioned goals.
Source: GAO.
Appendi x IV
Results of Survey of Agreement States United States General Accounting
Office Agreement State Survey on Security of Radioactive Sources
Background
If you have any questions about the survey, The U. S. General Accounting
Office ( GAO) , the please contact: investigative arm of Congress, is
reviewing the regulation of radioactive materials in the United
Ryan T. Coles
States. Congress has asked the GAO to answer Office: 202- 512- 6888
the following questions: E- mail: ColesR@ gao. gov
1. What is the known universe of
Peter Ruedel radiological sources in the United States Office: 202- 512-
8753 and how many have been lost, stolen, or E- mail: RuedelP@ gao. gov
abandoned?
Heather Von Behren
2. How effective are federal and state Office: 202- 512- 6768
controls over radiological sources? E- mail: VonBehrenH@ gao. gov
3. What efforts are underway since If you prefer to return the survey via
FedEx, the
September 11, 2001, to improve the return address is:
controls over radiological sources? U. S. General Accounting Office As
part of our review, we are conducting
Attention: Ryan T. Coles surveys of state radiation control agencies,
Natural Resources and Environment including agreement and non- agreement
states,
441 G Street, NW Room 2T23 Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of
Washington, DC 20548 Columbia. The principal aims of this survey are to
obtain information from each state on the
Due to increased security put in place following number and types of
radiological sources being
the anthrax incidents of October 2001, please do regulated by the state
and obtain states views on
not use the U. S. Postal Service to return surveys the effectiveness of
the current federal and state
to GAO. regulatory framework.
Your cooperation in completing this survey is Although this questionnaire
may require input
essential for an accurate and timely report to the from various
individuals, we ask that one person
Congress on the current state of regulatory assume responsibility for
coordinating its control over radioactive materials. To be
completion. Please list that person s name included in our report, your
response within 3
below in case we have questions or need follow- weeks of receipt is
greatly appreciated.
up. Thank you.
Directions for Completing this Questionnaire Name: Please complete this
questionnaire and return it
Title:
via email ( ColesR@ gao. gov) , fax ( 202- 512- Telephone # : 6880) , or
FedEx within 3 weeks of receipt.
GAO will take steps to safeguard the privacy of E- mail: your responses. 1
PROGRAM INFORMATION 1. First, we d like to get some basic information
about your state s radiation control program.
Please provide the following information.
Program name: State department/ division/ office ( e. g. Department of
Health) : City the main office is located in: State: Current director of
program: 2. Please list your program s total budget for the following
calendar years:
2000 ( Actual) $ 51, 463, 128 ( N= 30)
2001 ( Actual) $ 56, 975, 299 ( N= 31)
2002 ( Actual) $ 59, 712, 939 ( N= 32)
2003 ( Projected) $ 61, 039, 121 ( N= 31) 3. What are the sources of your
program s funding? ( Mark all that apply
5. Of the total number of staff reported in question # 3, how many FTEs do
you have in the following categories? Category of Staff Number
Inspectors License reviewers Other Technical Staff Other Non- Technical
Staff 6. How many of your technical staff ( including inspectors and
license reviewers) are
professionally certified ( e. g. certified health physicists, nuclear
medicine technologists, etc. ) ? 7. How many staff were employed in your
state in the following categories on January 1,
1998? ( N= 34) Category of Staff Number on January 1, 1998
Inspectors License reviewers Other Technical Staff Other Non- Technical
Staff TOTAL 750
8. Over the next five years, do you estimate your total full- time
equivalent positions will increase or decrease for technical and non-
technical staff? ( Mark only one response
SPECIFIC LICENSING ACTIVITIES OF THE AGREEMENT STATES 10. Please complete
the following table on the total number of active specific licenses for
Atomic
Energy Act materials issued by your state as of December 31, 2002: 10 CFR
part( s) or the applicable agreement state equivalent
29
materials) NRC license tracking system program code and license use
03250 Introduction of byproduct material in exempt concentrations into
products or materials, and transfer of ownership or possession
Active licenses as of December 31, 2002
Part 32 380 ( N= 29)
Part 33 248 ( N= 29)
Part 34 417 ( N= 29)
Part 35 4,795 ( N= 29)
Part 36 134 ( N= 29)
Part 39 167 ( N= 29)
Part 40 137 ( N= 28)
Part 70 95 ( N= 27) Total 10,611 ( N= 32)
Naturally occurring radioactive materials 153 ( N= 20)
Accelerator produced radioactive materials 324 ( N= 19) 11. Next, we d
like to obtain data on the number of active specific licenses issued by
your state
program as of December 31, 2002 and how often licensees are inspected.
Enter number and mark only one response
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
03251 Application of byproduct material
0 ( N= 33)
More than once per year into devices exempt from regulation
under S: 30.15 Once a Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
03252 Manufacture of resins containing
2 ( N= 33)
More than once per year scandium- 46 designed for sand- consolidation in
oil wells
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03253 Manufacture, distribution, and
15 ( N= 32)
More than once per year transfer of exempt quantities of byproduct
material
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03256 Manufacture, preparation, or
14 ( N= 33)
More than once per year transfer of capsules containing carbon- 14 urea
for in vivo
Once a Year diagnostic use in humans
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
5
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
03254 Manufacture, process, produce, or
6 ( N= 33)
More than once per year initially transfer self- luminous products
containing tritium,
Once a Year krypton- 85 or promethium- 147
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
03255 Manufacture, process, produce, or
1 ( N= 33)
More than once per year initially transfer gas and aerosol detectors
containing byproduct
Once a Year material
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
03240 Manufacture or initially transfer
74 ( N= 33)
More than once per year generally licensed devices under S: 31. 5
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03241 Manufacture, assemble, repair, or
1 ( N= 33)
More than once per year initially transfer luminous safety devices for use
in aircraft
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
6
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
03242 Manufacture or initially transfer
5 ( N= 32)
More than once per year calibration or reference sources containing
americium- 241
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03243 Manufacture or initially transfer ice
1 ( N= 33)
More than once per year detection devices containing strontium- 90
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03244 Manufacture and distribution of
25 ( N= 33)
More than once per year byproduct material for in- vitro clinical or
laboratory testing under
Once a Year general license
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
02511 Manufacture, preparation, or
62 ( N= 33)
More than once per year transfer for commercial distribution of
radioactive drugs containing
Once a Year byproduct material for medical use
Every 2- 3 Years under part 35. Every 4- 5 Years
Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
7
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
02513 Manufacture and distribution of
20 ( N= 33)
More than once per year sources or devices containing byproduct material
for medical use
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
01100 Academic type A specific license of
100 ( N= 33)
More than once per year broad scope
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03211 Manufacturing and distribution type
11 ( N= 33)
More than once per year A specific license of broad scope
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03610 Research and development type A
57 ( N= 33)
More than once per year specific license of broad scope
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
8
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
01110 Academic type B specific license of
21 ( N= 33)
More than once per year broad scope
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03211 Manufacturing and distribution type
8 ( N= 33)
More than once per year B specific license of broad scope
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03611 Research and development type B
7 ( N= 33)
More than once per year specific license of broad scope
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
01120 Academic type C specific license of
31 ( N= 33)
More than once per year broad scope
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
9
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
03213 Manufacturing and distribution type
1 ( N= 33)
More than once per year C specific license of broad scope
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03612 Research and development type C
14 ( N= 33)
More than once per year specific license of broad scope
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03310 Industrial radiography fixed
95 ( N= 33)
More than once per year location
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03320 Industrial radiography temporary 379 ( N= 33)
More than once per year job sites
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
10
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
02120 Medical institution 2,519 ( N= 32)
More than once per year 02121
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
02200 Medical private practice 1,805 ( N= 32)
More than once per year 02201
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
02220 Mobile medical service 187 ( N= 32)
More than once per year 02231 02240
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
02210 Eye applicators ( strontium- 90) 74 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
11
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
02300 Teletherapy 55 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
02310 Stereotactic radiosurgery gamma
45 ( N= 33)
More than once per year knife
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
02400 Veterinary non- human 110 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
02410 In- vitro testing laboratories 147 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
12
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
02500 Nuclear pharmacies 280 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
03510 Irradiators self shielded less than
176 ( N= 33)
More than once per year 10,000 curies
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03511 Irradiators other less than 10,000
17 ( N= 33)
More than once per year curies
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03520 Irradiators self shielded greater than
9 ( N= 33)
More than once per year 10,000 curies
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
13
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
03521 All other irradiators greater than
40 ( N= 33)
More than once per year 10,000 curies
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03110 Well logging byproduct and/ or
70 ( N= 33)
More than once per year special nuclear material tracer and
Once a Year sealed sources
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
03111 Well logging byproduct and/ or
40 ( N= 33)
More than once per year special nuclear material sealed
Once a Year sources only Every 2- 3 Years
Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
03112 Well logging byproduct only 64 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
14
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
03120 Fixed gauges 1,193 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
03121 Portable gauges 3,715 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
03122 Analytical instruments 369 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
03123 Gas chromatographs 212 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
03124 Other measuring systems 146 ( N= 33)
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
15
NRC license tracking system Number of
Most Common Inspection program code and license use
licensees Frequency Within This Code
03221 Instrument calibration service
104 ( N= 33)
More than once per year only source less than 100 curies
Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not
Required
03222 Instrument calibration service
21 ( N= 33)
More than once per year only source greater than 100
Once a Year curies
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
16
12. Please complete the following table for radioactive materials licenses
issued by your state program that are NOT LISTED IN YOUR RESPONSE TO
QUESTION 11. Enter the license use, number of active licenses issued by
your program, and mark only one response
License use Number of Most Common Inspection
licensees Frequency Within This Code
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
More than once per year Once a Year Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over
5 Years Inspection Not Required
Please copy and paste above table for additional uses.
18
13. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials, from the
license uses listed in questions 11 and 12, require the strictest and
least strict regulation to protect public health and safety ?
Strictest regulation Least strict regulation 1. 1. 2. 2. 3. 3.
14. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials, from the
license uses listed in questions 11 and 12, require the strictest and
least strict regulation to ensure security ? ( i. e. to prevent the
materials use by terrorists in a radiological weapon)
Strictest regulation Least strict regulation 1. 1. 2. 2. 3. 3.
19
GENERAL LICENSE TRACKING 15. Does your state program require generally
licensed devices to be registered? Mark only one
response
SPECIFIC AND GENERAL LICENSE TRACKING OVERSIGHT 20. Briefly describe how
your program maintains data on materials licenses and inspections. 21.
Please estimate the percentage of inspections of your licensees that are
currently overdue.
22. Are your databases ( i. e. licensing records, computer files
containing licensee information) periodically validated to ensure that
licensees are still active ( i. e. still conducting business) ?
Mark only one response
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 27. What enforcement actions are available to your
state s program to ensure laws and
regulations are followed? ( Mark all that apply
29. How are fines/ civil penalties collected by your program utilized? (
N= 35)
25.7% Available for use by the state radiation control program 45.7%
Deposited into state general fund 11.4% Other, please specify: 20.0% Not
applicable
30. Please briefly describe any enforcement cases since January 1, 1998,
that have been difficult to resolve, have generated above average public
or press interest, have challenged your regulatory authority, or have or
will result in high clean up costs financed by state or federal funds.
23
EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS OVER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 31. To what extent,
if at all, do you agree that communications and coordination needs to be
improved between your state program and the following group? ( Mark only
one response
32. To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the following statements?
( Mark only one response
Group Very great Great Moderate Some
Little or no No Basis to extent
extent extent
Extent extent
Judge
i) DOT s regulations adequately 0.0% 40.0% 48.6% 8.6% 2.9% 0.0% ensure
safe and secure transport of radioactive materials
j) The federal government should 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 40.0% 57.1% 0.0%
have a greater role in regulating radioactive material in the United
States
k) Additional federal training 31.4% 28.6% 20.0% 11.4% 8.6% 0.0%
could improve regulation of radioactive material in my state
l) My state s public safety/ law 22.9% 31.4% 28.6% 8.6% 5.7% 2.9%
enforcement agencies need additional training to respond to radiological
incidents m) My state program can
5.7% 22.9% 45.7% 20.0% 5.7% 0.0% effectively respond to a radiological
incident with its current resources
n) In the event of a major 5.7% 34.3% 20.0% 20.0% 5.7% 14.3%
radiological incident, adequate federal resources can be brought to bear
in a timely manner
o) My state program is adequately 11.4% 42.9% 31.4% 11.4% 2.9% 0.0%
addressing the post- September 11 th heightened security concerns
involving malicious
use of radioactive material ( i. e. possible use as a dirty bomb )
p) Over the next five years , my 8.6% 20.0% 25.7% 20.0% 17.1% 8.6%
state program will have sufficient budgetary resources to effectively
regulate radiological sources
q) Over the next five years , my 8.6% 25.7% 31.4% 22.9% 5.7% 5.7%
state program will have sufficient technology ( e. g. radiation survey
meters, laboratory resources) to effectively regulate radiological sources
26
Group Very great Great Moderate Some
Little or no No Basis to extent
extent extent
Extent extent
Judge
r) Over the next five years , my 8.6% 20.0% 34.3% 20.0% 11.4% 5.7%
state program will have
sufficient personnel to effectively regulate radiological sources
s) Over the next five years , my 8.6% 31.4% 22.9% 25.7% 5.7% 5.7%
state program will have
qualified personnel to effectively regulate radiological sources
33. Please fill in the following table on the number of reportable
incidents ( under NRC or equivalent agreement state regulations) involving
radiological materials that have occurred in your state from 1998 through
2002. If no incidents, please enter 0 ( ( zero) .
Number of incidents per year Type of incident
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Equipment malfunction 48 ( N= 24) 32 ( N= 26) 26 ( N= 25) 33 ( N= 25) 47 (
N= 26) Radiation overexposure 18 ( N= 26) 33 ( N= 26) 33 ( N= 28) 32 ( N=
28) 21 ( N= 28) Lost, stolen, or abandoned
100 ( N= 28) 129 ( N= 27) 129 ( N= 27) 167 ( N= 28) 220 ( N= 28) materials
Medical events 101 ( N= 24) 107 ( N= 24) 123 ( N= 27) 114 ( N= 27) 91 ( N=
26) Transportation events 30 ( N= 26) 37 ( N= 26) 47 ( N= 28) 38 ( N= 28)
34 ( N= 27) Leaking sealed sources 9 ( N= 25) 20 ( N= 27) 19 ( N= 27) 14 (
N= 27) 23 ( N= 28)
TOTAL 341 ( N= 29) 388 ( N= 29) 408 ( N= 30) 454 ( N= 30) 540 ( N= 30)
34. For those materials that have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned
from 1998 through 2002, how many were subsequently recovered? ( N= 22)
235
27
INTEGRATED MATERIALS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAM 35. Do you conduct
periodic internal evaluations of your program s effectiveness? ( Mark only
36. one response
38. What are the strengths of the Integrated Materials Performance
Evaluation Program? 39. What are the weaknesses of the Integrated
Materials Performance Evaluation Program? 40. Briefly, what improvements,
if any, should be made to the Integrated Materials
Performance Evaluation Program process? 41. Overall, is the Integrated
Materials Performance Evaluation Program process an adequate
means to assess the effectiveness of your state s regulatory program? (
Mark only one response
TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 42. Does your program regulate the
transportation of radioactive material through your state?
( N= 35)
97.1% Yes 2.9% No
43. Do you require licensees to notify your program of shipments of
radioactive material? ( N= 35)
97.1% Yes 2.9% No ( skip to question 46)
44. If yes, which types of cargo do you require that your program be
notified of shipments of? 45. Which of the following types of shipments
does your state monitor? ( N= 35)
60.0% Spent nuclear fuel 57.1% DOE waste material ( i. e. shipments to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) 51.4% Byproduct material with high
radioactivity 37.1% Other, please specify:
2.9% No shipments monitored
46. Please describe any coordination efforts undertaken by your state with
other state and/ or federal agencies regarding the transportation of
radioactive material.
47. What are the strengths of the current regulations on transporting
radioactive materials? 48. What are the weaknesses of the current
regulations on transporting radioactive materials?
30
49. Under current regulations, to what extent is the transportation of
radioactive materials vulnerable to terrorist sabotage or other malicious
use?
31
IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11 TO YOUR STATE S REGULATORY PROGRAM 50. What impact,
if any, has the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks had on your state s
program in the following areas? ( Mark only one response
51. Please describe specific efforts that have been initiated or
considered by your state since September 11, 2001, to better safeguard
radiological sources.
52. In your opinion, should post- September 11 security measures be
developed and enforced by the NRC under the common defense and security
authority given it by the Atomic Energy Act or by the agreement states
under their health and safety authority? Why? ( N= 34)
States = 82.4% ; NRC = 5.9% ; Both = 11.8% 53. Does your state have
sufficient resources to support these new efforts or are additional
resources needed? ( N= 35) Yes = 34.3% ; No = 65.7%
33
CHANGES NEEDED AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 54. In your opinion, what are the 3
most significant changes ( in rank order) that could be made
at the federal level to improve the regulation of radioactive material to
protect public health and safety ?
# 1. # 2. # 3.
55. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes ( in rank
order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the security of
radioactive material?
# 1. # 2. # 3.
56. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes ( in rank
order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the
transportation of radioactive material?
# 1. # 2. # 3.
34
57. Please use the space below to list any additional information about
issues related to radioactive sources or concerns raised in this survey.
Thank you for your assistance in our survey.
35
Appendi x V
Results of Survey of Non- Agreement States United States General
Accounting Office Non- Agreement State Survey on Security of Radioactive
Sources
Background
If you have any questions about the survey, The U. S. General Accounting
Office ( GAO) , the please contact: investigative arm of Congress, is
reviewing the regulation of radioactive materials in the United
Ryan T. Coles
States. Congress has asked the GAO to answer Office: 202- 512- 6888
the following questions: E- mail: ColesR@ gao. gov
1. What is the known universe of radiological sources in the United States
Peter Ruedel and how many have been lost, stolen, or Office: 202- 512-
8753 abandoned?
E- mail: RuedelP@ gao. gov 2. How effective are federal and state
Heather Von Behren
controls over radiological sources? Office: 202- 512- 6768
E- mail: VonBehrenH@ gao. gov 3. What efforts are underway since
If you prefer to return the survey via FedEx, the September 11, 2001, to
improve the
return address is: controls over radiological sources?
As part of our review, we are conducting U. S. General Accounting Office
surveys of state radiation control agencies, Attention: Ryan T. Coles
including agreement and non- agreement states, Natural Resources and
Environment
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of 441 G Street, NW Room 2T23
Columbia. The principal aims of this survey are Washington, DC 20548
to obtain information from each state on the Due to increased security put
in place following number and types of radiological sources being
the anthrax incidents of October 2001, please do regulated by the state
and obtain states views on
not use the U. S. Postal Service to return surveys the effectiveness of
the current federal and state
to GAO. regulatory framework.
Your cooperation in completing this survey is Although this questionnaire
may require input
essential for an accurate and timely report to the from various
individuals, we ask that one person
Congress on the current state of regulatory assume responsibility for
coordinating its control over radioactive materials. To be
completion. Please list that person s name included in our report, your
response within 3
below in case we have questions or need follow- weeks of receipt is
greatly appreciated.
up. Thank you.
Directions for Completing this Questionnaire Name: Please complete this
questionnaire and return it
Title:
via email ( ColesR@ gao. gov ) , fax ( 202- 512- 6880) , or FedEx within 3
weeks of receipt.
Telephone # : GAO will take steps to safeguard the privacy of your
responses.
E- mail: 1
PROGRAM INFORMATION 1. First, we d like to get some basic information
about your state s radiation control program.
Please provide the following information.
Program name: State department/ division/ office ( e. g. Department of
Health) : City the main office is located in: State: Current director of
program: 2. Please list your program s total budget for the following
calendar years:
2000 ( Actual) $ 3,825,733 ( N= 10)
2001 ( Actual) $ 4,340,987 ( N= 10)
2002 ( Actual) $ 4,661,911 ( N= 10)
2003 ( Projected) $ 5,331,768 ( N= 11) 3. What are the sources of your
program s funding? ( Mark all that apply
5. Of the total number of staff reported in question # 3, how many FTEs do
you have in the following categories? Category of Staff Number
Inspectors License reviewers Other Technical Staff Other Non- Technical
Staff 6. How many of your technical staff ( including inspectors and
license reviewers) are
professionally certified ( e. g. certified health physicists, nuclear
medicine technologists, etc. ) ? 7. How many staff were employed in your
state in the following categories on January 1,
1998? ( N= 12) Category of Staff Number on January 1, 1998
Inspectors License reviewers Other Technical Staff Other Non- Technical
Staff TOTAL* 90
8. Over the next five years, do you estimate your total full- time
equivalent positions will increase or decrease for technical and non-
technical staff? ( Mark only one response
LICENSING ACTIVITIES OF THE NON- AGREEMENT STATES 9. As of December 31,
2002, how many active licenses are currently issued by your state
program for the production and/ or use of naturally occurring or
accelerator produced radioactive materials ( N= 12)
2751 10. Next, we would like to obtain information on licenses issued by
your program for uses of
naturally occurring radioactive material and accelerator produced
radioactive material
Enter the license use, mark whether it is for naturally occurring OR
accelerator produced radioactive material, and enter the number of active
licenses issued by your state program. Mark only one response
Use # 3: Type of Material Number of
Most Common Inspection licenses
Frequency Within This Code
Naturally occurring More than once per year Accelerator produced Once a
Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
Use # 4: Type of Material Number of
Most Common Inspection licenses
Frequency Within This Code
Naturally occurring More than once per year Accelerator produced Once a
Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
Use # 5: Type of Material Number of
Most Common Inspection licenses
Frequency Within This Code
Naturally occurring More than once per year Accelerator produced Once a
Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
5
Use # 6: Type of Material Number of
Most Common Inspection licensees
Frequency Within This Code
Naturally occurring More than once per year Accelerator produced Once a
Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
Use # 7: Type of Material Number of
Most Common Inspection licensees
Frequency Within This Code
Naturally occurring More than once per year Accelerator produced Once a
Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
Use # 8: Type of Material Number of
Most Common Inspection licensees
Frequency Within This Code
Naturally occurring More than once per year Accelerator produced Once a
Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
6
Use # 9: Type of Material Number of
Most Common Inspection licensees
Frequency Within This Code
Naturally occurring More than once per year Accelerator produced Once a
Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
Use # 10: Type of Material Number of
Most Common Inspection licensees
Frequency Within This Code
Naturally occurring More than once per year Accelerator produced Once a
Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
Use # 11: Type of Material Number of
Most Common Inspection licensees
Frequency Within This Code
Naturally occurring More than once per year Accelerator produced Once a
Year
Every 2- 3 Years Every 4- 5 Years Over 5 Years Inspection Not Required
Please copy and paste above table for additional uses.
7
11. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials byproduct,
naturally occurring, or accelerator produced require the strictest and
least strict regulation to protect public health and safety ?
Strictest regulation Least strict regulation 1. 1. 2. 2. 3. 3.
12. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials byproduct,
naturally occurring, or accelerator produced require the strictest and
least strict regulation to ensure security ? ( i. e. to prevent the
materials use by terrorists in a radiological weapon)
)
Strictest regulation Least strict regulation 1. 1. 2. 2. 3. 3.
8
LICENSE TRACKING OVERSIGHT 13. Briefly describe how your program maintains
data on materials licenses and inspections. 14. Please estimate the
percentage of inspections of your licensees that are currently overdue.
15. Are your databases ( i. e. licensing records, computer files
containing licensee information) periodically validated to ensure that
licensees are still active ( i. e. still conducting business) ?
Mark only one response
19. Briefly describe your state s program to identify and recover
abandoned sources.
10
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 20. What enforcement actions are available to your
state s program to ensure laws and
regulations are followed? ( Mark all that apply
22. How are fines/ civil penalties collected by your program utilized? (
N= 12)
16.7% Available for use by the state radiation control program 41.7%
Deposited into state general fund 16.7% Other, please specify: 33.3% Not
applicable
23. Please briefly describe any enforcement cases since January 1, 1998,
that have been difficult to resolve, have generated above average public
or press interest, have challenged your regulatory authority, or have or
will result in high clean up costs financed by state or federal funds.
12
EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS OVER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 24. To what extent,
if at all, do you agree that communications and coordination needs to be
improved between your state program and the following group( s) ? ( Mark
only one response
25. To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the following statement?
( Mark only one response
Group Very great Great Moderate Some
Little or no No Basis to extent
extent extent
Extent extent
Judge
i) DOT s regulations adequately 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 8.3% 8.3% ensure
safe and secure transport of radioactive materials
j) The federal government should 16.7% 0.0% 25.0% 16.7% 33.3% 8.3%
have a greater role in regulating radioactive material in the United
States
k) Additional federal training 33.3% 25.0% 16.7% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0%
could improve regulation of radioactive material in my state
l) My state s public safety/ law 50.0% 8.3% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0%
enforcement agencies need additional training to respond to radiological
incidents m) My state program can
0.0% 16.7% 41.7% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0% effectively respond to a radiological
incident with its current resources
n) In the event of a major 8.3% 0.0% 58.3% 8.3% 16.7% 8.3%
radiological incident, adequate federal resources can be brought to bear
in a timely manner
o) My state program is adequately 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 41.7% 33.3% 0.0%
addressing the post- September 11 th heightened security concerns
involving malicious
use of radioactive material ( i. e. possible use as a dirty bomb )
p) Over the next five years , my 0.0% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 8.3%
state program will have sufficient budgetary resources to effectively
regulate radiological sources
q) Over the next five years , my 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 16.7% 25.0% 8.3%
state program will have sufficient technology ( e. g. radiation survey
meters, laboratory resources) to effectively regulate radiological sources
15
Group Very great Great Moderate Some
Little or no No Basis to extent
extent extent
Extent extent
Judge
r) Over the next five years , my 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 75.0% 8.3%
state program will have
sufficient personnel to effectively regulate radiological sources
s) Over the next five years , my 0.0% 8.3% 33.3% 25.0% 25.0% 8.3%
state program will have
qualified personnel to effectively regulate radiological sources
26. Please fill in the following table on the number of reportable
incidents ( under your state regulations, if any) involving naturally
occurring or accelerator produced radiological materials that have
occurred in your state from 1998 through 2002. If no incidents, please
enter 0 ( ( zero) .
Number of incidents per year Type of incident
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Equipment malfunction 0 ( N= 7) 0( N= 7) 0( N= 7) 0( N= 7) 0( N= 7)
Radiation overexposure 0 ( N= 7) 0( N= 7) 2 ( N= 8) 2( N= 7) 1( N= 7)
Lost, stolen, or abandoned
26 ( N= 9) 32( N= 9) 13 ( N= 10) 18 ( N= 10) 19 ( N= 10) materials
Medical events 6 ( N= 7) 4 ( N= 7) 0 ( N= 8) 2 ( N= 8) 5 ( N= 8)
Transportation events 16 ( N= 8) 23 ( N= 8) 9 ( N= 8) 10 ( N= 9) 5 ( N= 8)
Leaking sealed sources 1 ( N= 7) 0 ( N= 7) 0 ( N= 7) 0 ( N= 7) 0 ( N= 7)
TOTAL 115 ( N= 11) 140 ( N= 11) 89 ( N= 11) 94 ( N= 11) 109 ( N= 12)
27. For those materials that have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned
from 1998 through 2002, how many were subsequently recovered? ( N= 12)
10
16
NON- AGREEMENT STATE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 28. Do you conduct periodic
internal evaluations of your program s effectiveness? ( Mark only
one response
TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 30. Does your program regulate the
transportation of radioactive material through your state?
( N= 12)
25.0% Yes 75.0% No
31. Do you require licensees to notify your program of shipments of
radioactive material? ( N= 12)
16.7% Yes 83.3% No ( skip to question 34)
32. If yes, which types of cargo do you require that your program be
notified of shipments of? 33. Which of the following types of shipments
does your state monitor?
100% Spent nuclear fuel 85.7% DOE waste material ( i. e. shipments to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) 100% Byproduct material with high
radioactivity 62.5% Other, please specify:
34. Please describe any coordination efforts undertaken by your state with
other state and/ or federal agencies regarding the transportation of
radioactive material.
35. What are the strengths of the current regulations on transporting
radioactive materials? 36. What are the weaknesses of the current
regulations on transporting radioactive materials? 37. Under current
regulations, to what extent is the transportation of radioactive materials
vulnerable to terrorist sabotage or other malicious use?
18
IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11 TO YOUR STATE S REGULATORY PROGRAM 38. What impact,
if any, has the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks had on your state s
program in the following areas? ( Mark only one response
39. Please describe specific efforts that have been initiated or
considered by your state since September 11, 2001, to better safeguard
radiological sources.
40. Does your state have sufficient resources to support these new efforts
or are additional resources needed? ( N= 12)
91.6% of states responding to the survey indicated they do not have
sufficient resources to support new efforts.
8.3% of states responding to the survey indicated they have sufficient
resources to support new efforts.
20
CHANGES NEEDED AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 41. In your opinion, what are the 3
most significant changes ( in rank order) that could be made
at the federal level to improve the regulation of radioactive material to
protect public health and safety ?
# 1. # 2. # 3.
42. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes ( in rank
order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the security of
radioactive material?
# 1. # 2. # 3.
43. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes ( in rank
order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the
transportation of radioactive material?
# 1. # 2. # 3.
21
44. Please use the space below to list any additional information about
issues related to radioactive sources or concerns raised in this survey.
Thank you for your assistance in our survey.
22
Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory
Appendi x VI Commission
Appendi x VII
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Gene Aloise (202) 512-
6870 Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T.
Coles, Robert G. Crystal, Doreen S. Feldman, Judy K. Pagano, Terry L.
Richardson, Peter E. Ruedel,
Rebecca Shea, and Heather W. Von Behren also made key contributions to
this report.
(360274)
a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
The number of sealed sources in the United States is unknown because NRC
and states track numbers of licensees instead of individual sealed
sources. Users of certain devices containing sealed sources are not
required to apply to NRC for a license. Accounting for these devices has
been difficult. In addition, since 1998, more than 1,300 incidents have
taken place in the United States where sealed sources have been lost,
stolen, or abandoned. The majority of these lost devices were recovered.
Security for sealed sources varied among the facilities GAO visited in 10
states. Also, a potential security weakness exists in NRC*s licensing
process to obtain sealed sources. Approved applicants may buy sealed
sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because the process
assumes that
the applicant is acting in good faith and it can take NRC as long as 12
months before conducting an inspection, it is possible that sealed sources
can be obtained for malicious intent. In addition, NRC currently evaluates
the effectiveness of state regulatory programs, but these evaluations do
not assess the security of sealed sources.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC and states have
notified licensees of the need for heightened awareness to security, but
have not required any specific actions to improve security. NRC has been
developing additional security measures since the attacks, and issued the
first security order to large facilities that irradiate such items as
medical supplies and food on June 5, 2003. Additional orders to licensees
that possess high risk sealed sources are expected to follow. NRC and
states disagree over the appropriate role of states in efforts to improve
security. NRC intends to develop and implement all additional security
measures on licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by
states. However, over 80 percent of states responding to our survey feel
they should be given responsibility to inspect and enforce security
measures.
Number of Medical, Industrial, and Research Users of Sealed Sources (About
20,000 Total Nationwide) as of December 31, 2002
Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in stainless
steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, industry, and
research. These sealed sources could be a threat to national security
because terrorists
could use them to make *dirty bombs.* GAO was asked to determine (1) the
number of sealed sources in the United States, (2) the number of sealed
sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, (3) the effectiveness of federal and
state controls over sealed sources, and (4) the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and state
efforts since September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of sealed
sources.
GAO recommends that NRC (1) collaborate with states to determine
availability of highest risk sealed sources, (2) determine if owners of
certain devices should apply for licenses, (3) modify
NRC*s licensing process so sealed sources cannot be purchased until NRC
verifies their intended use, (4) ensure that NRC*s evaluation of federal
and state programs assess security of sealed sources, and (5)
determine how states can participate in implementing additional security
measures. NRC stated that some of our recommendations would require
statutory changes. We clarified our report language to address this
concern. Agreement states and an organization of radiation experts agreed
with our recommendations. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 804.
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
Gene Aloise at (202) 512- 6870 or aloisee@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO-
03- 804, a report to
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget,
and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S.
Senate
August 2003
NUCLEAR SECURITY Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of
Sealed Radioactive Sources
Page i GAO- 03- 804 Nuclear Security
Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 804 Nuclear Security
Page 1 GAO- 03- 804 Nuclear Security United States General Accounting
Office Washington, D. C. 20548
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A
Letter
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Appendix I
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
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Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
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Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
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Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
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Appendix II
Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix II Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources
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Appendix III
Appendix III Legislation Introduced in the 108th Congress Addressing
Security of Sealed Sources
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Appendix IV
Appendix IV Results of Survey of Agreement States
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Appendix IV Results of Survey of Agreement States
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Appendix IV Results of Survey of Agreement States
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Appendix IV Results of Survey of Agreement States
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Appendix V
Appendix V Results of Survey of Non- Agreement States
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Appendix VI
Appendix VI Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 117 GAO-
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Appendix VI Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 118 GAO-
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Appendix VII
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