Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed	 
for Army Stryker Brigades (30-JUN-03, GAO-03-801).		 
                                                                 
The Army is organizing and equipping rapidly deployable Stryker  
brigades as the first step in its planned 30-year transformation.
Stryker brigades are to help fill a gap in capabilities between  
current heavy and light forces--heavy forces require too much	 
time to deploy, and light infantry forces lack the combat power  
and mobility of the heavy forces. The Army has a goal to be able 
to deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world with 4 days. As
part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army transformation, GAO  
assessed the Army's progress in (1) meeting its deployment goal  
for Stryker brigades and (2) supporting and sustaining a deployed
Stryker brigade in combat operations.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-801 					        
    ACCNO:   A07383						        
  TITLE:     Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines  
Needed for Army Stryker Brigades				 
     DATE:   06/30/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Mobilization					 
	     Strategic mobility forces				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Abrams Tank					 
	     C-130 Aircraft					 
	     C-17 Aircraft					 
	     C-5 Aircraft					 
	     DOD Stryker Brigade				 
	     Galaxy Aircraft					 
	     Globemaster Aircraft				 
	     Hercules Aircraft					 
	     M1A1 Tank						 

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GAO-03-801

Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2003 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades

GAO- 03- 801

The Army has made significant progress in creating forces that can be more
rapidly deployed than heavy forces with its medium weight Stryker
brigades, but it cannot deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world
within 4 days. Meeting the 4- day worldwide deployment goal of a brigade-
size force would require more airlift than may be possible to allocate to
these brigades; at present, it would take from 5 to 14 days, depending on
brigade location and destination, and require over one- third of the Air
Force*s C- 17 and C- 5 transport aircraft fleet to deploy one Stryker
brigade by air. Because airlift alone may not be sufficient, the Army is
planning to use a combination of airlift and sealift to deploy the

brigades. However, if sealift were used to deploy the Stryker brigades,
deployment times to many global regions would be significantly longer than
the 4- day goal the Army has set for itself.

The Army*s plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in combat
operations is still evolving. The Army will not be able to finish its
support plan until November 2003, when the results from an operational
evaluation of the first Stryker brigade will be issued. Before it can
fully implement the support plan, the Army will also need to make funding
and other decisions relating to implementing some of the plan*s logistical

support concepts. Deployment goals may need modification should the
brigades* design significantly change in response to direction from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to enhance the brigades* capabilities.
The Army is organizing and

equipping rapidly deployable Stryker brigades as the first step in its
planned 30- year transformation.

Stryker brigades are to help fill a gap in capabilities between current
heavy and light forces-- heavy forces require too much time to

deploy, and light infantry forces lack the combat power and mobility of
the heavy forces. The Army has a goal to be able to deploy a Stryker
brigade anywhere

in the world with 4 days. As part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army
transformation, GAO assessed the Army*s progress in (1) meeting its
deployment goal for Stryker brigades and (2)

supporting and sustaining a deployed Stryker brigade in combat operations.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army work with the U. S.
Transportation Command and its components to set realistic

deployment timelines for the brigades that (1) reflect the use of both
airlift and sealift, size of the

deployed force, brigade location, and destination and (2) take into
account any organizational or

operational changes resulting from modifications and enhancements directed
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In commenting on a draft of
this report, the Department of Defense

generally concurred with the report.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 801. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 512- 8365 or solisw@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 801, a report to

Congressional Committees

June 2003

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades

Page i GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 4 Progress Has Been Made, but the Army Cannot Currently Achieve
Its Deployment Goal of 4 Days 6 Army*s Plan for Supporting and Sustaining
Stryker Brigades in

Combat Operations Is Still Evolving 12 Army*s Plans for Deploying and
Sustaining Stryker Brigades Could Change 14 Conclusions 15 Recommendations
for Executive Action 16 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 16 Scope and
Methodology 17 Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 21

Appendix II Stryker Brigade Locations and Planned Initial Operational
Capability Dates 23

Appendix III Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times By Origin and
Destination 24

Appendix IV Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times by Origin and Destination
25

Related GAO Products 26

Tables

Table 1: Percentages of U. S. Air Force*s Total Airlift Inventory in 2005
Needed to Strategically Airlift One Stryker Brigade 10 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Figures

Figure 1: Stryker Brigade Locations 5 Figure 2: Comparison of Army*s
Stryker Brigades* Airlift Requirements to That of Armored and Light
Infantry Brigades 7 Figure 3: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Air
Deployment

Times to Selected Global Regions 8 Figure 4: Estimated Ranges of Stryker
Brigade Sea Deployment Times 11 Abbreviation

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
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copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
materials separately from GAO*s product.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation June 30, 2003 Congressional
Committees

The capability to rapidly deploy and effectively sustain combat forces
over distant locations anywhere in the world is a major objective of the
Army*s planned 30- year transformation. According to the Army, current
heavy forces lack strategic responsiveness and deployability, and they
have significant logistical support requirements. On the other hand, the
Army*s current light infantry forces can be deployed rapidly and are
easier to support once deployed, but they lack the combat power,
survivability, and tactical mobility of the heavy forces. To address this
gap in capabilities between heavy and light forces, the Army is organizing
and equipping a rapidly deployable force, called Stryker brigades,
intended to provide the combatant commanders with increased land power
options, including the ability to execute and sustain early- entry
operations, potentially into remote areas of the world. 1 Stryker brigades
will also validate new doctrine and organizational structures and develop
insights for subsequent transformation to the Army*s future force* the
Objective Force. 2 To this end, the Army has established a goal to deploy
a combat capable Stryker brigade (including its 1,000 plus vehicles and
pieces of equipment as well as 3,900 personnel) anywhere in the world
within 4 days. Having realistic deployment goals is important to the Army
for measuring its progress in creating forces to meet them, as well as to
theater combatant commanders so that these forces can be integrated into
contingency planning.

This is the sixth in a series of reports identifying key challenges the
Army faces in implementing its transformation plans. (A list of related
GAO products appears at the end of this report.) As with the other five,
we initiated this review under the authority of the Comptroller General.
Our objectives were to assess the Army*s progress in (1) meeting its
deployment goal for Stryker brigades and (2) supporting and sustaining a

1 The Army plans to establish six Stryker brigades. Appendix II lists the
brigades* locations and their planned initial operational capability
dates. 2 Beginning in 2010 and continuing beyond 2030, the Army plans to
transition to its

Objective Force. The Objective Force is the force that achieves the
objectives of the Army*s transformation. This future force will capitalize
on advances in science and technology enabling the Army to equip its
forces with significantly advanced systems such as the

Future Combat System.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation deployed Stryker brigade in
combat operations. We also address potential changes in deployment and
support plans the Army may need to make in

response to direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
enhance the brigades* capabilities. We briefed your offices on the results
of our work in November and December 2002. This report summarizes and
updates those briefings and is being provided because of your committees*
oversight responsibilities for these issues.

To conduct our review, we analyzed planning data on military air and sea
mobility that the U. S. Transportation Command and the Military Traffic
Management Command developed. 3 We also reviewed the Army*s concepts and
plan for supporting Stryker brigades in an operational environment. We
limited our review of mobility requirements to the strategic deployment of
the brigades* we plan to address Stryker brigades* tactical mobility
requirements and capabilities in another report we will be issuing later
this year. 4 The Army has made significant progress in creating brigades
that can be more rapidly deployed than heavy armored brigades, but it
cannot deploy

a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days. By equipping
Stryker brigades with 19- ton armored vehicles and reducing support
structure and sustainment requirements, the Army will have achieved close
to a 50 percent reduction in the brigade*s deployment requirements
compared to that of a heavier brigade equipped with Bradley fighting
vehicles and Abrams tanks weighing 33 to 68 tons* along with their large
logistical support structure. However, meeting the 4- day worldwide
deployment goal of a brigade- size force would require more airlift than
may be possible to allocate to these brigades; at present, it would take
from 5 to 14 days, depending on destination, and require over one- third
of the Air Force*s C- 17 and C- 5 transport aircraft fleet to deploy one
Stryker brigade by air. Because airlift alone may not be sufficient, the
Army is now planning to use a combination of airlift and sealift to deploy
the brigades. In the Stryker brigades, the Army has achieved forces that
are more

3 The U. S. Transportation Command and its component commands (Air
Mobility Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Military
Sealift Command) manage the Department of Defense*s transportation system.

4 Strategic mobility is the movement of forces over long distances, such
as from the continental United States to overseas locations. Tactical
mobility is the movement of forces in an operational environment over
shorter distances within an operational theater. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation rapidly deployable than heavy
forces and more lethal and mobile than light forces; however, without more
realistic deployment goals, the brigades

cannot be effectively integrated into theater combatant commanders*
contingency planning efforts.

The Army*s plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in combat
operations is still evolving and cannot be considered finalized until a
number of issues are resolved. The Army evaluated the Stryker brigades*
support and sustainment capabilities for the first time during the
congressionally mandated operational evaluation that was completed at the
end of May 2003. 5 The results from the operational evaluation will not be
issued until November 2003, and they may lead to adjustments in the Army*s
plan. Funding decisions relating to implementing some of the plan*s
logistical support concepts, including Stryker armored vehicles and
digital equipment replacement reserves, also will need to be made before
the Army can fully implement its plan.

In addition, the Secretary of Defense wants modifications to the brigades
to give them a higher level of combat capability and sustainability so
that they are capable of being employed independently of higher- level
command formations and support. Adding capabilities to the brigades * such
as aviation and air defense* could significantly increase deployment and
logistical support requirements, potentially requiring more time to deploy
a Stryker brigade as well as different plans for supporting it.

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of the Army for examining
alternative strategic deployment goals for Stryker brigades and setting
goals that are based on a brigade*s expected deployment timelines and
possible modifications to the brigades.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
generally concurred with the report and stated that the Army continues to
maintain 96- hour worldwide deployment as an overall program goal for
Stryker brigade deployment and is working with the U. S. Transportation
Command to reduce constraints that limit the Army*s ability to meet that
goal. We agree the 96- hour goal is a useful longer- term target and the
Army should continue to work with the U. S. Transportation Command to
reduce enroute constraints. However, without deployment timelines

5 The operational evaluation was mandated by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P. L. 107- 107 (Dec. 28, 2001).

Page 4 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation reflecting near- term
deployment variables and alternatives, the Army does not have a reasonable
baseline from which to measure its progress toward

achieving its 96- hour goal; nor do the combatant commanders have
information on expected Stryker brigade deployment capabilities.

In 1999 the Army announced its intentions to transform its forces over a
30- year period into a more strategically responsive force that could more
rapidly deploy and effectively operate in all types of military
operations, whether small- scale contingencies or major theater wars. Army
transformation plans call for the ability to deploy a brigade anywhere in
the world in 4 days, a division in 5 days, and five divisions within 30
days. The first step in this transformation is to form and equip six
Interim Brigade Combat Teams, now called Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, as
an early- entry force that can be rapidly deployed, supported anywhere in
the world, and capable of conducting combat operations immediately upon
arrival into a theater of operations, if required. Initially, the Army
established a requirement for Stryker brigades of being capable of

deploying anywhere in the world within 4 days after first aircraft
liftoff. The Army has since made it a goal or target for the Stryker
brigades, rather than a requirement, to help set a vision and design
metric for developing the brigades.

According to the Army*s organizational and operational concept for Stryker
brigades, the brigades are designed to have higher levels of strategic and
tactical mobility than existing Army forces. Strategically, the brigades
are being organized, equipped, and configured to meet a 96- hour
deployment standard. To help achieve the envisioned rapid deployability,
the Army is developing logistical support plans and concepts that will
permit Stryker brigades to deploy with fewer quantities of supplies and
smaller numbers of support personnel and equipment than currently exists
in heavier brigade- size units. At the tactical level, the brigades are to
be capable of intratheater deployment by C- 130 air transport. Key to
their increased mobility is their primary combat platform, the Stryker
armored vehicle. According to the Army, the Stryker armored vehicle will
fulfill an immediate requirement for a vehicle that is air transportable
any place in the world, arriving ready for combat. The Stryker is an
eight- wheeled armored vehicle that will provide transport for troops,
weapons, and command and control. The Stryker vehicle weighs about 19
tons, substantially less than the M1A1 Abrams tank (68 tons) and the
Bradley fighting vehicle (33 tons), the primary combat platforms of the
Army*s heavier armored units. Background

Page 5 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation The Army selected one light
infantry brigade and one mechanized infantry brigade at Fort Lewis,
Washington, to become the first two of six planned Stryker brigades. The
Army completed a congressionally mandated

operational evaluation of the first of these brigades at the end of May
2003, and it plans to report the results of the evaluation by November
2003. At that time, the Secretary of Defense is to certify to Congress
whether or not the results of the operational evaluation indicate that the
Stryker brigade*s design is operationally effective and operationally
suitable, at which time this brigade can be deployed overseas for the
first time. The Army plans to complete the formation of the second of the
two Fort Lewis brigades in 2004 and to form four more Stryker brigades
from 2005 through 2010. The planned locations of the next four brigades
(see fig. 1) are Fort Wainwright/ Fort Richardson, Alaska; Fort Polk,
Louisiana; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and a brigade of the Pennsylvania
Army National Guard. Based on defense planning guidance, the Army is
planning for the relocation of one Stryker brigade to Europe in fiscal
year 2007.

Figure 1: Stryker Brigade Locations

Page 6 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Although Stryker brigades will
be more rapidly deployable than Army heavy armored brigades, the Army
cannot currently achieve its goal of

deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days. The Army
has achieved close to a 50 percent reduction in the Stryker brigades*
deployment requirements compared to that of a heavier armored brigade, but
the Stryker brigade*s airlift requirements* which include moving about
1,500 vehicles and pieces of equipment and 3,900 personnel* are still
sizable. Deployment times for Stryker brigades from their planned
continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii home stations to any one of
several potential overseas locations would range from 5 to 14 days,

depending on destinations. While the Army set out to design Stryker
brigades to be a rapidly air deployable force, Army officials now
recognize that airlift alone will not be sufficient and that some
combination of airlift and sealift will likely be used to deploy the
brigades. However, if sealift

were used to deploy the Stryker brigades, deployment times to many global
regions would be significantly longer than the 4- day goal the Army has
set for itself.

By equipping Stryker brigades with armored vehicles weighing about 19
tons, the Army has achieved close to a 50 percent reduction in the Stryker
brigades* deployment requirement compared to that of a heavy armored
brigade equipped with 68- ton Abram tanks and 33- ton Bradley fighting
vehicles, along with their larger numbers of support vehicles, equipment,
and personnel. Deploying a heavy armored brigade would require airlifting
almost 29,000 tons of armored vehicles, equipment, and supplies and about
4,500 personnel. Deploying a Stryker brigade would require airlifting
about 15,000 tons of vehicles, equipment, and supplies and about 3,900
personnel. Consequently, the amount of airlift that would be needed to
deploy a Stryker brigade would be about one- half of the airlift aircraft

needed to deploy a heavy armored brigade. Based on deployment planning
assumptions the Army uses, about 243 C- 17 strategic airlift sorties 6
would be needed to airlift a Stryker brigade, compared to about 478 C- 17
sorties needed to airlift a heavy armored brigade.

While the airlift requirement of a Stryker brigade is significantly less*
about one- half that of a heavy armored brigade, moving a brigade*s over
300 Stryker armored vehicles, over 1,200 trucks, utility vehicles, and
support equipment, and 3,900 personnel is about twice the deployment
requirement of an Army light infantry brigade. Deploying an Army light

6 In air operations, a sortie is defined as an operational flight by one
aircraft. Progress Has Been

Made, but the Army Cannot Currently Achieve Its Deployment Goal of 4 Days

Stryker Brigades* Deployment Requirements One- Half of Heavy Armored
Brigades* but Still Sizable

Page 7 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation infantry brigade would require
airlifting about 7,300 tons of materiel and about 3,800 personnel,
requiring about 141 C- 17 airlift sorties. Figure 2 shows a comparison of
Stryker brigades* airlift requirements to that of

Army heavy armored and light infantry brigades. Figure 2: Comparison of
Army*s Stryker Brigades* Airlift Requirements to That of Armored and Light
Infantry Brigades

The Army will likely not have the amount of airlift it would need to meet
its goal of deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4
days. Deployment times from any one of the four planned Stryker brigade
locations in the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii to selected
representative locations in South America, the Balkans, South Asia, South
Pacific, and Africa would range from about 5 days to Airlift Not
Sufficient to

Meet Army*s Four- Day Worldwide Deployment Goal for Stryker Brigades

Page 8 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation destinations in South America
to about 14 days to destinations in Africa. 7 The minimum time it would
take to airlift a Stryker brigade would be about 5 to 6 days to South
America and the Balkans, 7 days to South Asia

and South Pacific regions, and 13 days to Africa. While these timelines
are short of the Army*s 4- day deployment goal, meeting them would offer
joint task force commanders or theater combatant commanders more rapidly
deployable forces than currently exists in heavy armored brigades and more
lethal and mobile forces than currently exist in light infantry brigades.
Figure 3 shows estimated ranges of Stryker brigade air deployment times
from the four current and planned Stryker brigade locations to selected
global regions. (See app. III for a summary of Stryker brigade deployment
times by origins and destinations.)

Figure 3: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times to
Selected Global Regions

Note: Air deployment time is from the first aircraft*s wheels- up at an
aerial port of embarkation to the last aircraft*s wheels- down at an
aerial port of debarkation.

7 For the purpose of our analysis of deployment times we used four of the
five current and planned brigade locations* Fort Lewis, Alaska, Fort Polk,
and Hawaii. We treated the Alaska brigade as one brigade location,
although this brigade will be split- based between Fort Richardson and
Fort Wainwright. The bulk of the brigade is to be located at Fort
Wainwright. We did not include the planned Pennsylvania National Guard
brigade because it is not expected to become operational until 2010.

Page 9 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation According to the U. S.
Transportation Command*s Stryker brigade air mobility deployment analysis,
the Army*s deployment goal for Stryker

brigades has significant implications for the U. S. Transportation Command
and the defense transportation system. According to this analysis, the
Army must reduce its transportation requirements and simultaneously work
with the U. S. Transportation Command and the services to improve
deployment timelines.

A 2002 Rand report of Stryker brigade deployment options, sponsored by the
U. S. Air Force, also concluded that Stryker brigades cannot be deployed
by air from the continental United States to distant overseas locations in
4 days. The study found that it is possible to achieve global air
deployment timelines on the order of 1 to 2 weeks by using a combination
of continental United States based brigades, a Stryker brigade
forwardbased in Germany, and regional preposition sites. According to the
study, prepositioning of equipment or overseas basing of forces is the
single most effective way to increase the responsiveness of Army forces
for operations in key regions.

Under the 2002 Defense Planning Guidance, the Army is planning for the
relocation of one Stryker brigade to Europe in fiscal year 2007. By air, a
brigade based in Germany, for example, could reach some global regions in
less time than it could from the four currently planned brigade locations.
From Ramstein Air Base in Germany, minimum air deployment times to sub-
Saharan Africa would be 7 to 9 days, compared to a minimum of 13 days to
14 days from the other brigade locations. From Germany to the Balkans, it
would take 5 days to airlift a Stryker brigade, compared to about 6 days
to 7 days from the other locations. Although the Army recognizes that some
prepositioning of Stryker brigade equipment overseas would add to a
brigade*s strategic responsiveness and is considering it as a future
option, Army officials told us that it would be too costly to do so at
this time.

Based on our analysis of the U. S. Transportation Command*s air deployment
planning factors and airlift allocation assumptions, 8 achieving

8 Some of the significant strategic air mobility and aircraft allocation
assumptions the U. S. Transportation Command used in its analysis include
the Stryker brigade is the primary airlift claimant in a surge operation;
the airlift fleet does not include aircraft withheld for maintenance, high
priority missions, or training; air mobility infrastructure will support

20- minute departure intervals; and sufficient reserve augmentation is
available to provide support for increased airlift requirements.

Page 10 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation the 5 to 14 day air
deployment timelines would be difficult because it would require the Air
Force to dedicate about one- third of its projected

2005 primary strategic airlift aircraft fleet of C- 17s and C- 5s for
transporting only one Stryker brigade. Obtaining this amount of airlift
for deploying one Stryker brigade would require allocating 31 percent of
the Air Force*s total 2005 inventory of C- 17 aircraft and 38 percent of
its C- 5

aircraft inventory. 9 Obtaining an airlift allocation larger than this
would be possible* if airlifting a Stryker brigade is a National Command
Authority top priority and absent competing demand elsewhere for airlift
aircraft. Table 1 shows the U. S. Transportation Command*s estimated
airlift allocation 10 and the percentages of the projected 2005 total
airlift inventory of C- 17 and C- 5 aircraft needed to strategically
airlift one Stryker brigade. Table 1: Percentages of U. S. Air Force*s
Total Airlift Inventory in 2005 Needed to

Strategically Airlift One Stryker Brigade Airlift aircraft Projected total

2005 aircraft inventory Estimated airlift

allocation Percent of total inventory a

C- 17 Globemaster 136 42 31 C- 5 Galaxy 113 48 38

Total 249 90 36

Sources: U. S. Transportation Command and U. S. Air Force. a Percentages
are rounded.

Because it may not always be possible to obtain sufficient airlift to
deploy an entire Stryker brigade, Army officials anticipate using a
combination of airlift and sealift to deploy the brigades, although sea
deployment time would be slower than the Army*s 4- day worldwide
deployment goal to most locations. Army officials told us that current
plans are to deploy about one- third of a Stryker brigade by air and the
remainder of the brigade would be deployed by sea. While some areas in
South America could be reached by a Stryker brigade located at Fort Polk,
Louisiana, via gulf coast ports in about 4 days, sea deployment times to
South America and other global regions from the three other planned
Stryker brigade

9 According to Air Force budget documents, these are the total numbers of
C- 17 and C- 5 aircraft expected to be in the Air Force*s aircraft
inventory through 2005. 10 According to the U. S. Transportation Command,
this allocation is a reasonable approximation of the airlift a Stryker
brigade could claim if it was the principal ground force to move early in
a small- scale contingency operation. Army Plans to Use a Combination of
Airlift and

Sealift to Deploy Stryker Brigades

Page 11 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation locations would take longer.
For example, sailing time for a Fort Lewis- based Stryker brigade from
Seattle/ Tacoma, Washington, would be

about 10 days to ports in northern regions of South America and more than
2 weeks to ports in West Africa. From Alaska, sailing time to any of the
eight overseas destinations we included in this analysis would take from
12 days to 24 days. Similarly, sailing times to the Balkans from any one
of the four planned Stryker brigade locations would take a minimum of 2
weeks to over 3 weeks. With a Stryker brigade forward based in Europe, sea
deployment times to the Balkans from seaports in Germany, for example,
could be reduced to about 7 days. Figure 3 shows estimated ranges of
Stryker brigade sailing times from the four current and planned Stryker
brigade locations to selected global regions. (See app. IV for a summary
of sea deployment times by origins and destinations.)

Figure 4: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times

Note: Sea deployment times are sailing days from a port of embarkation to
arrival at an overseas port of debarkation.

In addition to the sailing times needed to reach overseas destinations, it
would take days to transport a Stryker brigade and all of its vehicles and
equipment from its home installation to a seaport. For example, the
Stryker brigade to be located in Alaska would need to travel about 350
miles by rail or highway from Fort Wainwright, near Fairbanks, to seaports
in or near Anchorage. In addition, loading and unloading cargo transport

Page 12 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation ships take much longer than
loading and off- loading aircraft. According to Army deployment planning
data, it would take about 2 days for loading ships and another 2 days to
unload them after arrival, compared to hours

for loading and unloading aircraft. Furthermore, many areas of the world
in which Stryker brigades are anticipated to operate have no access to a
seaport, and not all seaports would have the capacity to handle large
deep- draft vessels. Additional time would also be needed for Army forces
deployed by sea to move from a seaport to an in- land area of operations,
although a Stryker brigade would be able to move to in- land locations
faster than a heavy armored brigade because Stryker armored vehicles can
be driven while heavier armored vehicles and tanks might require rail or
truck transport. Also, a deployed Stryker brigade would need less time
than a heavy armored brigade would need to unload at a seaport, assemble,
and begin operations: Stryker brigades are organized and equipped to begin
operations soon after arrival in an operational theater, carrying up to 3
days* supplies of the fuel and ammunition and sustainment items, allowing
the brigades to immediately conduct a combat mission. This contrasts with
an Army armored or mechanized brigade,

which would need days to draw the fuel, ammunition, and other supplies it
would need before it can begin operations.

The Army*s plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in combat
operations is still evolving and cannot be considered finalized until a
number of issues are resolved. These issues include the results from the
operational evaluation of the first brigade, funding questions, and
decisions relating to implementing some of the plan*s logistical support
concepts.

The Army will not be able to finish its support plan until November 2003,
when results from the operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade
will be issued. The Army conducted the operational evaluation in April and
May 2003 to assess the first Stryker brigade*s overall operational
effectiveness and suitability. The operational evaluation included the
logistical support plan and processes that augment the brigade*s limited
capabilities to perform basic maintenance, supply, and transportation
services. To make Stryker brigades easier to deploy and support, the Army
designed the brigades with a support structure that is only about one-
third the size of that found in a heavy armored brigade. Thus, Stryker
brigades

do not have the capability to sustain operations without the assistance of
external support organizations and resources. Contractors will provide a
key part of this external support to service and maintain newly fielded
Stryker armored vehicles and complex digital command, control, Army*s Plan
for

Supporting and Sustaining Stryker Brigades in Combat Operations Is Still
Evolving

Page 13 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation communications, and computer
equipment. Contractor logistics support will be needed to support the
Stryker vehicles and digital systems at least

until these systems are fully fielded. Also, instead of transporting large
inventories of ammunition spare parts, and other supplies into an area of
operation* as a heavy armored brigade would do* Stryker brigades are to
sustain themselves in extended operations by having these items delivered
from numerous locations outside the area of operation, such as Army depots
and theater support bases, where they will be stored and configured for
rapid shipment and distribution to the brigades as they are needed.

Because these support and sustainment processes are new concepts and key
elements of the Army*s support plan for Stryker brigades, the Army will
complete the plan after it has reviewed the results and lessons learned
from the operational evaluation. Based on the results, the Army plans to
make any adjustments or modifications it determines are necessary before
the plan becomes final. Before it can fully implement the support plan,
the Army will need to determine the cost and decide whether it will fund
the acquisition of vehicles and equipment replacement reserves. The
brigades are designed to do only limited maintenance for vehicles and
equipment

on the battlefield; therefore, the Army*s support plan calls for rapidly
evacuating and replacing items needing major maintenance or repair with
what the Army calls ready- to- fight replacements. The plan depends on
having in reserve and readily available sufficient numbers of vehicles and
essential equipment, such as digital components, for rapid shipment into

an area of operation. Before the Army can make a final funding decision,
it will first need to determine the types, amounts, and total cost of the
readyto- fight replacements that would be needed. As of May 2003, the Army
had not made a final decision as to the number, types, and configuration
of the ready- to- fight vehicles, nor the method of their delivery to an
area of operations. Additionally, to reduce the amount of materiel that is
deployed and stockpiled within an operational theater, the Army*s Stryker
brigade support plan includes measures for rapidly distributing directly
to the brigades pre- configured loads of essential sustainment supplies
such as food, repair parts, and ammunition, as they are needed. Before the
Army can implement the plan, it will need to finish the instructions and
guidelines that will identify the types and amounts of supplies to be
distributed in configured loads and the locations and facilities
(including defense supply depots, Stryker brigade installations, and
theater support bases) where configured loads are to be built and stored.
The Army also still will need to identify the personnel and obtain the
equipment, supplies, and funding that will be needed to manage and carry
out its planned configured load distribution system.

Page 14 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation The Army*s current plans for
deploying and sustaining Stryker brigades could change after the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reviews

options it directed the Army to provide for enhancing the brigades*
capabilities. OSD wants the Army to modify the brigades to be more like
the Objective Force units the Army is developing. OSD has directed the
Army to present a plan by July 8, 2003, that provides options for adding
to the brigade*s enhanced combined arms capabilities. Currently, the

brigades do not have capabilities such as aviation and air defense. Such
changes would enhance the overall organizational effectiveness of the
brigades, but they also could increase deployment and support
requirements, potentially making the brigades more difficult to deploy by
air and to support.

OSD directed the Army to provide options for enhancing the Stryker
brigades to ensure that they would provide a higher level of combat
capability and sustainability across a broader spectrum of combat
operations than those for which they were originally conceived, along with
the capability of being employed independently of higher- level command
formations and support. According to OSD, this additional capability will
result in Stryker brigades that are more prototypical of the combined arms

Objective Force units the Army is developing and would enhance the
transformation of the Army by fielding added capabilities sooner. OSD has
directed the Army not to expend funds in fiscal year 2004 for the fifth
and sixth Stryker brigades until the Army presents a plan to provide
options for enhancing all but one of the brigades. 11 OSD wants the Army
to remodel the brigades to be distinctively different than their original
design, with enhanced combined arms capabilities that might include
aviation, air defense, sensors, and armor.

Many factors* including the numbers, size, and types of equipment* affect
the Stryker brigades* deployment and logistical support requirements.
Based on the U. S. Transportation Command*s deploymentplanning factors,
every additional 1,000 tons of weight to be airlifted reduces aircraft
range by 250 nautical miles and adds another 15 aircraft loads. If Stryker
brigades were redesigned to include an aviation unit, for example,
transporting the unit*s helicopters from the continental United States to
overseas destinations would most likely need to be done by sea, 11 The
fourth Stryker brigade will be the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light)
located at

Fort Polk, Louisiana. According to Army plans, this brigade is already
being designed to have some of the combined arms capabilities that OSD
wants the Army to add to the five other brigades. Army*s Plans for
Deploying and

Sustaining Stryker Brigades Could Change

Page 15 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation and it would take days to
unload them after arrival into a theater of operations. In addition,
adding aviation maintenance personnel and the

equipment that is needed to support an aviation unit would also
substantially increase deployment requirements. Once deployed, the
requirements for logistical support, such as fuel and spare parts, would
increase well beyond that for which the Army*s current Stryker brigade
support plan anticipates. Furthermore, the Stryker brigades* support
structure as currently designed does not have the levels of supply and
support personnel or the necessary equipment to move and distribute the
fuel, spare parts, and ammunition a brigade would need to support an
aviation unit in combat operations.

With the Stryker brigades, the Army has achieved its intent to create
rapidly deployable yet lethal forces, but currently the brigades*
requirements for airlift are too large for airlift alone to be a practical
option for strategically deploying an entire brigade within its goal of

4 days. The Army plans to use some combination of strategic airlift and
sealift, but it has not established strategic deployability timelines for
a Stryker brigade that reflect the modes of transportation to be used, the
wide range of deployment times that vary in terms of the size of the
deployed force, and the brigades* location and destination. In addition,
deployment goals may need further modification should the brigade*s
organizational and operational design significantly change in response to
direction from OSD to enhance the brigade*s capabilities. While the 4- day
deployment goal has created a strategic purpose and vision, and is serving
as a constructive design metric for developing the brigades, such a goal
is not a realistic standard by which to measure the considerable progress
the

Army is making toward creating more rapidly deployable forces. Without
deployment goals that reflect the wide range of deployment variables and
alternatives, the Army does not have a reasonable baseline from which to
measure its progress toward achieving desired deployment timelines for
Stryker brigades as well as for the future Objective Force; nor do the
theater combatant commanders have information on expected deployment
capabilities they would need in order to plan for the use of a Stryker
brigade in their theater.

Before the first Stryker brigade is certified for overseas deployment, the
Army will need to complete its support plan and make any necessary
adjustments or modifications to the plan based on the results of the
operational evaluation. Conclusions

Page 16 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation We recommend that the
Secretary of the Army examine alternatives to the 96- hour worldwide
deployment goal for Stryker brigades and work with the U. S.
Transportation Command and its components to set realistic

deployment timelines for the brigades that  reflect the use of both
airlift and sealift, the size of the deployed force,

a brigade*s location, and its destination and  take into account any
organizational or operational changes to the

brigades resulting from modifications and enhancements directed by OSD. In
commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense generally
concurred with the report and stated that the Army continues to maintain
96- hour worldwide deployment as an overall program goal for Stryker
brigade deployment, and is working with the U. S. Transportation Command
to reduce constraints that limit the Army*s ability to meet the goal.

In responding to our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army examine
alternatives to the 96- hour worldwide deployment goal for Stryker
brigades and work with the U. S. Transportation Command to set realistic
deployment timelines, the department stated that the Army is committed to
its 96- hour goal as a target that it needs to continue to work toward in
order to provide the necessary capabilities to combat commanders within
required response times. The department noted that achieving this goal
requires a concerted effort on the part of all services and the U. S.
Transportation Command to ensure that enroute constraints are reduced. We
agree that the 96- hour goal is a useful longer- term target and that the
Army should continue to work in concert with the Transportation Command
and the other services to achieve it. However, we continue to believe
other alternatives to the 96- hour goal should be considered for measuring
progress in the near- term. As we noted in the report, the Army cannot
currently air deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 96
hours and if sealift were used to deploy the Stryker brigades, deployment
times would be significantly longer than the 96- hour deployment goal. We
believe that without deployment timelines reflecting near- term deployment
variables and alternatives, such as brigade locations and the use of
sealift, the Army does not have a reasonable baseline from which to
measure its progress toward achieving its 96- hour deployment goal; nor do
the combatant commanders have information on expected Stryker brigade
deployment capabilities. Thus, we continue to believe our recommendation
has merit. Recommendations for

Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 17 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation In responding to our
recommendation for setting realistic deployment timelines for Stryker
brigades that take into account organizational or

operational changes to the brigades resulting from any modifications and
enhancements directed by OSD, the department said the Army should maintain
its 96- hour deployment goal, as it is a goal and not a deployment
standard. The department also noted that when the results of the
OSDmandated study are approved and published, the Army would work with the
combatant commanders and the U. S. Transportation Command to update the
standing contingency plans. We agree the Army should work with the
combatant commanders and the U. S. Transportation Command to update
contingency plans based on the final outcome of the OSD- mandated study.
However, if the results of the study significantly increase the Stryker
brigades* deployment and logistical support requirements, the Army would
need to reexamine brigade deployment goals as we have recommended.

Appendix I contains the full text of the department*s comments. To assess
the Army*s progress in meeting its 96- hour deployment goal for Stryker
brigades, we obtained documents and interviewed officials from the U. S.
Transportation Command, the Air Mobility Command, and the Military Traffic
Management Command. To determine Stryker brigade air deployment times and
airlift allocation estimates, we used data from a U. S.

Transportation Command*s air mobility deployment analysis conducted for
the Army in April 2002. To determine sea deployment times, we analyzed
data from the Military Traffic Management Command*s Transportation
Engineering Agency. In addition, we interviewed officials and obtained
documents from the Army*s Deployment Process Management Office and from
Army headquarters staff elements responsible for operations and plans and
logistics. We performed site visits to Stryker brigade home installations
at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Richardson and Fort Wainwright,
Alaska; we also interviewed U. S.

Army I Corps and U. S. Army Alaska and Garrison Command officials at these
locations. We also toured deployment processing and airfield facilities
and obtained information about infrastructure improvements planned at
these locations to validate key assumptions of the U. S. Transportation
Command*s air mobility analysis regarding air deployment infrastructure
capabilities. We did not visit Fort Polk, Louisiana; Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii; or the Pennsylvania National Guard. These locations are

the last three of the six- planned Stryker brigades that are to be formed
from 2006 through 2010. Because it is not planned to become operational
until 2010, we excluded from our review the planned Pennsylvania Scope and

Methodology

Page 18 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation National Guard Stryker
brigade. We also did not consider possible future developments in lift
assets such as High Speed Vessels or Ultra Heavy Lift

Aircraft in our assessment of Stryker brigade deployability. To obtain
information on the Army*s plan for supporting Stryker brigades in combat
operations, we analyzed Army information on the organizational design and
operational concepts for Stryker brigades to gain an understanding of the
logistical challenges of supporting and sustaining the brigades. We
interviewed officials at Fort Lewis and U. S. Army Alaska for information
relating to support and sustainment plans for the first three Stryker
brigades. In addition, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials
from Army headquarters staff elements responsible for operations and
plans, logistics, and force development. We also interviewed and obtained
documents from the Army*s Forces Command, the Combined Arms Support
Command, and the Tank- automotive and Armaments Command to learn about
support and sustainment options for the Stryker brigades.

Our review was conducted from April 2002 through March 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, and the Director of Management and Budget. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.
gao. gov.

Page 19 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation If you or your staffs have
any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512- 8365. Major
contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.;

Kevin C. Handley; Karyn I. Angulo; Pat L. Seaton; Frank C. Smith; and
Susan K. Woodward.

William M. Solis Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Page 20 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation List of Congressional
Committees The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House
of Representatives

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 21 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Appendix I: Comments from the
Department of Defense

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 22 GAO- 03- 801
Military Transformation

Appendix II: Stryker Brigade Locations and Planned Initial Operational
Capability Dates

Page 23 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Brigade Location Planned
initial operational

capability dates

1 Fort Lewis, Washington 2003 2 Fort Lewis, Washington 2004 3 Fort
Wainwright/ Fort Richardson, Alaska 2005 4 Fort Polk, Louisiana 2006 5
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 2007 6 Pennsylvania National Guard 2010 Source:
U. S. Army.

Appendix II: Stryker Brigade Locations and Planned Initial Operational
Capability Dates

Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times By Origin and
Destination Page 24 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Destinations and
air deployment times in days South America West

Africa Sub- Saharan Africa South

Asia South Pacific Europe

Brigade no. Origin installation

and airport Columbia Venezuela Sierra Leone Angola Congo Sri

Lanka New Guinea Balkans

1 & 2 Ft. Lewis/

McChord Air Force Base 5.3 6.7 13.4 13.6 13.9 8.1 7.3 6.3

3 Ft. Wainwright/

Eielson Air Force Base 5.6 5.6 13.6 13.7 14.0 7.3 7.0 5.9 3

Ft. Richardson/ Elmendorf Air Force Base 5.6 5.6 13.6 13.7 14.0 7.3 7.0
5.6 4

Ft. Polk/ Alexandria Airport 5.1 5.2 13.2 13.3 13.6 9.7 8.2 5.6

5 Schofield Barracks/

Hickam Air Force Base 5.6 5.6 13.7 14.0 14.1 7.5 6.9 6.9 Source: GAO*s
analysis of U. S. Transportation Command data.

Note: Air deployment time is from the first aircrafts* wheels- up at an
aerial port of embarkation to the last aircrafts* wheels- down at an
aerial port of debarkation.

Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times By Origin and
Destination

Appendix IV: Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times by Origin and
Destination

Page 25 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Destinations and sailing time
in days South America West

Africa Sub- Saharan Africa South

Asia South Pacific Europe

Brigade no. Origin installation

and airport Columbia Venezuela Sierra Leone Angola Congo Sri

Lanka New Guinea Balkans

1 & 2 Ft. Lewis/

Seattle- Tacoma, Wash. 9.5 10.5 17.3 21.3 20.4 18.3 13.2 21.5

3 Ft. Wainwright &

Ft. Richardson/ Anchorage, Alaska 12.0 12.9 19.8 23.8 22.9 16.5 11.9 24.0

4 Ft. Polk/

Beaumont, Tex. 4.0 4.3 10.3 14.4 13.4 21.4 20.5 13.5

5 Schofield Barracks/

Honolulu, Hawaii 10.7 11.6 18.5 22.5 21.5 15.8 8.2 22.7

Source: GAO*s analysis of Military Traffic Management Command,
Transportation Engineering Agency data. Note: Sea deployment times are
sailing days from a port of embarkation to arrival at an overseas port of
debarkation.

Appendix IV: Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times by Origin and
Destination

Related GAO Products Page 26 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Military
Transformation: Army*s Evaluation of Stryker and M- 113A3 Infantry Carrier
Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily

Mandated Comparison. GAO- 03- 671. Washington, D. C.: May 30, 2003.

Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should Be
Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army*s
Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO- 03- 484R. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 28,

2003.

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO- 02- 442. Washington, D. C.: May
17, 2002.

Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its
Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO- 02- 96. Washington, D. C.:
Nov. 16, 2001.

Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges.
GAO- 01- 311. Washington, D. C.: May 21, 2001. Related GAO Products

(350163)

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