    Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed
    for Army Stryker Brigades (30-JUN-03, GAO-03-801).

    The Army is organizing and equipping rapidly deployable Stryker
    brigades as the first step in its planned 30-year transformation.
    Stryker brigades are to help fill a gap in capabilities between
    current heavy and light forces--heavy forces require too much
    time to deploy, and light infantry forces lack the combat power
    and mobility of the heavy forces. The Army has a goal to be able
    to deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world with 4 days. As
    part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army transformation, GAO
    assessed the Army's progress in (1) meeting its deployment goal
    for Stryker brigades and (2) supporting and sustaining a deployed
    Stryker brigade in combat operations.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-801
        ACCNO:   A07383
      TITLE:     Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines
    Needed for Army Stryker Brigades
         DATE:   06/30/2003
      SUBJECT:   Combat readiness
    	     Defense contingency planning
    	     Military forces
    	     Military operations
    	     Mobilization
    	     Strategic mobility forces
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Abrams Tank
    	     C-130 Aircraft
    	     C-17 Aircraft
    	     C-5 Aircraft
    	     DOD Stryker Brigade
    	     Galaxy Aircraft
    	     Globemaster Aircraft
    	     Hercules Aircraft
    	     M1A1 Tank

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    GAO-03-801

    Report to Congressional Committees

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    June 2003 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

    Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades

    GAO- 03- 801

    The Army has made significant progress in creating forces that can be more
    rapidly deployed than heavy forces with its medium weight Stryker
    brigades, but it cannot deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world
    within 4 days. Meeting the 4- day worldwide deployment goal of a brigade-
    size force would require more airlift than may be possible to allocate to
    these brigades; at present, it would take from 5 to 14 days, depending on
    brigade location and destination, and require over one- third of the Air
    Force*s C- 17 and C- 5 transport aircraft fleet to deploy one Stryker
    brigade by air. Because airlift alone may not be sufficient, the Army is
    planning to use a combination of airlift and sealift to deploy the

    brigades. However, if sealift were used to deploy the Stryker brigades,
    deployment times to many global regions would be significantly longer than
    the 4- day goal the Army has set for itself.

    The Army*s plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in combat
    operations is still evolving. The Army will not be able to finish its
    support plan until November 2003, when the results from an operational
    evaluation of the first Stryker brigade will be issued. Before it can
    fully implement the support plan, the Army will also need to make funding
    and other decisions relating to implementing some of the plan*s logistical

    support concepts. Deployment goals may need modification should the
    brigades* design significantly change in response to direction from the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense to enhance the brigades* capabilities.
    The Army is organizing and

    equipping rapidly deployable Stryker brigades as the first step in its
    planned 30- year transformation.

    Stryker brigades are to help fill a gap in capabilities between current
    heavy and light forces-- heavy forces require too much time to

    deploy, and light infantry forces lack the combat power and mobility of
    the heavy forces. The Army has a goal to be able to deploy a Stryker
    brigade anywhere

    in the world with 4 days. As part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army
    transformation, GAO assessed the Army*s progress in (1) meeting its
    deployment goal for Stryker brigades and (2)

    supporting and sustaining a deployed Stryker brigade in combat operations.

    GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army work with the U. S.
    Transportation Command and its components to set realistic

    deployment timelines for the brigades that (1) reflect the use of both
    airlift and sealift, size of the

    deployed force, brigade location, and destination and (2) take into
    account any organizational or

    operational changes resulting from modifications and enhancements directed
    by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In commenting on a draft of
    this report, the Department of Defense

    generally concurred with the report.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 801. To view the full product,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 512- 8365 or solisw@ gao.
    gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 801, a report to

    Congressional Committees

    June 2003

    MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

    Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades

    Page i GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
    Background 4 Progress Has Been Made, but the Army Cannot Currently Achieve
    Its Deployment Goal of 4 Days 6 Army*s Plan for Supporting and Sustaining
    Stryker Brigades in

    Combat Operations Is Still Evolving 12 Army*s Plans for Deploying and
    Sustaining Stryker Brigades Could Change 14 Conclusions 15 Recommendations
    for Executive Action 16 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 16 Scope and
    Methodology 17 Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 21

    Appendix II Stryker Brigade Locations and Planned Initial Operational
    Capability Dates 23

    Appendix III Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times By Origin and
    Destination 24

    Appendix IV Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times by Origin and Destination
    25

    Related GAO Products 26

    Tables

    Table 1: Percentages of U. S. Air Force*s Total Airlift Inventory in 2005
    Needed to Strategically Airlift One Stryker Brigade 10 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Figures

    Figure 1: Stryker Brigade Locations 5 Figure 2: Comparison of Army*s
    Stryker Brigades* Airlift Requirements to That of Armored and Light
    Infantry Brigades 7 Figure 3: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Air
    Deployment

    Times to Selected Global Regions 8 Figure 4: Estimated Ranges of Stryker
    Brigade Sea Deployment Times 11 Abbreviation

    OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

    This is a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
    copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce copyrighted
    materials separately from GAO*s product.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation June 30, 2003 Congressional
    Committees

    The capability to rapidly deploy and effectively sustain combat forces
    over distant locations anywhere in the world is a major objective of the
    Army*s planned 30- year transformation. According to the Army, current
    heavy forces lack strategic responsiveness and deployability, and they
    have significant logistical support requirements. On the other hand, the
    Army*s current light infantry forces can be deployed rapidly and are
    easier to support once deployed, but they lack the combat power,
    survivability, and tactical mobility of the heavy forces. To address this
    gap in capabilities between heavy and light forces, the Army is organizing
    and equipping a rapidly deployable force, called Stryker brigades,
    intended to provide the combatant commanders with increased land power
    options, including the ability to execute and sustain early- entry
    operations, potentially into remote areas of the world. 1 Stryker brigades
    will also validate new doctrine and organizational structures and develop
    insights for subsequent transformation to the Army*s future force* the
    Objective Force. 2 To this end, the Army has established a goal to deploy
    a combat capable Stryker brigade (including its 1,000 plus vehicles and
    pieces of equipment as well as 3,900 personnel) anywhere in the world
    within 4 days. Having realistic deployment goals is important to the Army
    for measuring its progress in creating forces to meet them, as well as to
    theater combatant commanders so that these forces can be integrated into
    contingency planning.

    This is the sixth in a series of reports identifying key challenges the
    Army faces in implementing its transformation plans. (A list of related
    GAO products appears at the end of this report.) As with the other five,
    we initiated this review under the authority of the Comptroller General.
    Our objectives were to assess the Army*s progress in (1) meeting its
    deployment goal for Stryker brigades and (2) supporting and sustaining a

    1 The Army plans to establish six Stryker brigades. Appendix II lists the
    brigades* locations and their planned initial operational capability
    dates. 2 Beginning in 2010 and continuing beyond 2030, the Army plans to
    transition to its

    Objective Force. The Objective Force is the force that achieves the
    objectives of the Army*s transformation. This future force will capitalize
    on advances in science and technology enabling the Army to equip its
    forces with significantly advanced systems such as the

    Future Combat System.

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation deployed Stryker brigade in
    combat operations. We also address potential changes in deployment and
    support plans the Army may need to make in

    response to direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
    enhance the brigades* capabilities. We briefed your offices on the results
    of our work in November and December 2002. This report summarizes and
    updates those briefings and is being provided because of your committees*
    oversight responsibilities for these issues.

    To conduct our review, we analyzed planning data on military air and sea
    mobility that the U. S. Transportation Command and the Military Traffic
    Management Command developed. 3 We also reviewed the Army*s concepts and
    plan for supporting Stryker brigades in an operational environment. We
    limited our review of mobility requirements to the strategic deployment of
    the brigades* we plan to address Stryker brigades* tactical mobility
    requirements and capabilities in another report we will be issuing later
    this year. 4 The Army has made significant progress in creating brigades
    that can be more rapidly deployed than heavy armored brigades, but it
    cannot deploy

    a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days. By equipping
    Stryker brigades with 19- ton armored vehicles and reducing support
    structure and sustainment requirements, the Army will have achieved close
    to a 50 percent reduction in the brigade*s deployment requirements
    compared to that of a heavier brigade equipped with Bradley fighting
    vehicles and Abrams tanks weighing 33 to 68 tons* along with their large
    logistical support structure. However, meeting the 4- day worldwide
    deployment goal of a brigade- size force would require more airlift than
    may be possible to allocate to these brigades; at present, it would take
    from 5 to 14 days, depending on destination, and require over one- third
    of the Air Force*s C- 17 and C- 5 transport aircraft fleet to deploy one
    Stryker brigade by air. Because airlift alone may not be sufficient, the
    Army is now planning to use a combination of airlift and sealift to deploy
    the brigades. In the Stryker brigades, the Army has achieved forces that
    are more

    3 The U. S. Transportation Command and its component commands (Air
    Mobility Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Military
    Sealift Command) manage the Department of Defense*s transportation system.

    4 Strategic mobility is the movement of forces over long distances, such
    as from the continental United States to overseas locations. Tactical
    mobility is the movement of forces in an operational environment over
    shorter distances within an operational theater. Results in Brief

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation rapidly deployable than heavy
    forces and more lethal and mobile than light forces; however, without more
    realistic deployment goals, the brigades

    cannot be effectively integrated into theater combatant commanders*
    contingency planning efforts.

    The Army*s plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in combat
    operations is still evolving and cannot be considered finalized until a
    number of issues are resolved. The Army evaluated the Stryker brigades*
    support and sustainment capabilities for the first time during the
    congressionally mandated operational evaluation that was completed at the
    end of May 2003. 5 The results from the operational evaluation will not be
    issued until November 2003, and they may lead to adjustments in the Army*s
    plan. Funding decisions relating to implementing some of the plan*s
    logistical support concepts, including Stryker armored vehicles and
    digital equipment replacement reserves, also will need to be made before
    the Army can fully implement its plan.

    In addition, the Secretary of Defense wants modifications to the brigades
    to give them a higher level of combat capability and sustainability so
    that they are capable of being employed independently of higher- level
    command formations and support. Adding capabilities to the brigades * such
    as aviation and air defense* could significantly increase deployment and
    logistical support requirements, potentially requiring more time to deploy
    a Stryker brigade as well as different plans for supporting it.

    We are making recommendations to the Secretary of the Army for examining
    alternative strategic deployment goals for Stryker brigades and setting
    goals that are based on a brigade*s expected deployment timelines and
    possible modifications to the brigades.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
    generally concurred with the report and stated that the Army continues to
    maintain 96- hour worldwide deployment as an overall program goal for
    Stryker brigade deployment and is working with the U. S. Transportation
    Command to reduce constraints that limit the Army*s ability to meet that
    goal. We agree the 96- hour goal is a useful longer- term target and the
    Army should continue to work with the U. S. Transportation Command to
    reduce enroute constraints. However, without deployment timelines

    5 The operational evaluation was mandated by the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P. L. 107- 107 (Dec. 28, 2001).

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation reflecting near- term
    deployment variables and alternatives, the Army does not have a reasonable
    baseline from which to measure its progress toward

    achieving its 96- hour goal; nor do the combatant commanders have
    information on expected Stryker brigade deployment capabilities.

    In 1999 the Army announced its intentions to transform its forces over a
    30- year period into a more strategically responsive force that could more
    rapidly deploy and effectively operate in all types of military
    operations, whether small- scale contingencies or major theater wars. Army
    transformation plans call for the ability to deploy a brigade anywhere in
    the world in 4 days, a division in 5 days, and five divisions within 30
    days. The first step in this transformation is to form and equip six
    Interim Brigade Combat Teams, now called Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, as
    an early- entry force that can be rapidly deployed, supported anywhere in
    the world, and capable of conducting combat operations immediately upon
    arrival into a theater of operations, if required. Initially, the Army
    established a requirement for Stryker brigades of being capable of

    deploying anywhere in the world within 4 days after first aircraft
    liftoff. The Army has since made it a goal or target for the Stryker
    brigades, rather than a requirement, to help set a vision and design
    metric for developing the brigades.

    According to the Army*s organizational and operational concept for Stryker
    brigades, the brigades are designed to have higher levels of strategic and
    tactical mobility than existing Army forces. Strategically, the brigades
    are being organized, equipped, and configured to meet a 96- hour
    deployment standard. To help achieve the envisioned rapid deployability,
    the Army is developing logistical support plans and concepts that will
    permit Stryker brigades to deploy with fewer quantities of supplies and
    smaller numbers of support personnel and equipment than currently exists
    in heavier brigade- size units. At the tactical level, the brigades are to
    be capable of intratheater deployment by C- 130 air transport. Key to
    their increased mobility is their primary combat platform, the Stryker
    armored vehicle. According to the Army, the Stryker armored vehicle will
    fulfill an immediate requirement for a vehicle that is air transportable
    any place in the world, arriving ready for combat. The Stryker is an
    eight- wheeled armored vehicle that will provide transport for troops,
    weapons, and command and control. The Stryker vehicle weighs about 19
    tons, substantially less than the M1A1 Abrams tank (68 tons) and the
    Bradley fighting vehicle (33 tons), the primary combat platforms of the
    Army*s heavier armored units. Background

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation The Army selected one light
    infantry brigade and one mechanized infantry brigade at Fort Lewis,
    Washington, to become the first two of six planned Stryker brigades. The
    Army completed a congressionally mandated

    operational evaluation of the first of these brigades at the end of May
    2003, and it plans to report the results of the evaluation by November
    2003. At that time, the Secretary of Defense is to certify to Congress
    whether or not the results of the operational evaluation indicate that the
    Stryker brigade*s design is operationally effective and operationally
    suitable, at which time this brigade can be deployed overseas for the
    first time. The Army plans to complete the formation of the second of the
    two Fort Lewis brigades in 2004 and to form four more Stryker brigades
    from 2005 through 2010. The planned locations of the next four brigades
    (see fig. 1) are Fort Wainwright/ Fort Richardson, Alaska; Fort Polk,
    Louisiana; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and a brigade of the Pennsylvania
    Army National Guard. Based on defense planning guidance, the Army is
    planning for the relocation of one Stryker brigade to Europe in fiscal
    year 2007.

    Figure 1: Stryker Brigade Locations

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Although Stryker brigades will
    be more rapidly deployable than Army heavy armored brigades, the Army
    cannot currently achieve its goal of

    deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days. The Army
    has achieved close to a 50 percent reduction in the Stryker brigades*
    deployment requirements compared to that of a heavier armored brigade, but
    the Stryker brigade*s airlift requirements* which include moving about
    1,500 vehicles and pieces of equipment and 3,900 personnel* are still
    sizable. Deployment times for Stryker brigades from their planned
    continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii home stations to any one of
    several potential overseas locations would range from 5 to 14 days,

    depending on destinations. While the Army set out to design Stryker
    brigades to be a rapidly air deployable force, Army officials now
    recognize that airlift alone will not be sufficient and that some
    combination of airlift and sealift will likely be used to deploy the
    brigades. However, if sealift

    were used to deploy the Stryker brigades, deployment times to many global
    regions would be significantly longer than the 4- day goal the Army has
    set for itself.

    By equipping Stryker brigades with armored vehicles weighing about 19
    tons, the Army has achieved close to a 50 percent reduction in the Stryker
    brigades* deployment requirement compared to that of a heavy armored
    brigade equipped with 68- ton Abram tanks and 33- ton Bradley fighting
    vehicles, along with their larger numbers of support vehicles, equipment,
    and personnel. Deploying a heavy armored brigade would require airlifting
    almost 29,000 tons of armored vehicles, equipment, and supplies and about
    4,500 personnel. Deploying a Stryker brigade would require airlifting
    about 15,000 tons of vehicles, equipment, and supplies and about 3,900
    personnel. Consequently, the amount of airlift that would be needed to
    deploy a Stryker brigade would be about one- half of the airlift aircraft

    needed to deploy a heavy armored brigade. Based on deployment planning
    assumptions the Army uses, about 243 C- 17 strategic airlift sorties 6
    would be needed to airlift a Stryker brigade, compared to about 478 C- 17
    sorties needed to airlift a heavy armored brigade.

    While the airlift requirement of a Stryker brigade is significantly less*
    about one- half that of a heavy armored brigade, moving a brigade*s over
    300 Stryker armored vehicles, over 1,200 trucks, utility vehicles, and
    support equipment, and 3,900 personnel is about twice the deployment
    requirement of an Army light infantry brigade. Deploying an Army light

    6 In air operations, a sortie is defined as an operational flight by one
    aircraft. Progress Has Been

    Made, but the Army Cannot Currently Achieve Its Deployment Goal of 4 Days

    Stryker Brigades* Deployment Requirements One- Half of Heavy Armored
    Brigades* but Still Sizable

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation infantry brigade would require
    airlifting about 7,300 tons of materiel and about 3,800 personnel,
    requiring about 141 C- 17 airlift sorties. Figure 2 shows a comparison of
    Stryker brigades* airlift requirements to that of

    Army heavy armored and light infantry brigades. Figure 2: Comparison of
    Army*s Stryker Brigades* Airlift Requirements to That of Armored and Light
    Infantry Brigades

    The Army will likely not have the amount of airlift it would need to meet
    its goal of deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4
    days. Deployment times from any one of the four planned Stryker brigade
    locations in the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii to selected
    representative locations in South America, the Balkans, South Asia, South
    Pacific, and Africa would range from about 5 days to Airlift Not
    Sufficient to

    Meet Army*s Four- Day Worldwide Deployment Goal for Stryker Brigades

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation destinations in South America
    to about 14 days to destinations in Africa. 7 The minimum time it would
    take to airlift a Stryker brigade would be about 5 to 6 days to South
    America and the Balkans, 7 days to South Asia

    and South Pacific regions, and 13 days to Africa. While these timelines
    are short of the Army*s 4- day deployment goal, meeting them would offer
    joint task force commanders or theater combatant commanders more rapidly
    deployable forces than currently exists in heavy armored brigades and more
    lethal and mobile forces than currently exist in light infantry brigades.
    Figure 3 shows estimated ranges of Stryker brigade air deployment times
    from the four current and planned Stryker brigade locations to selected
    global regions. (See app. III for a summary of Stryker brigade deployment
    times by origins and destinations.)

    Figure 3: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times to
    Selected Global Regions

    Note: Air deployment time is from the first aircraft*s wheels- up at an
    aerial port of embarkation to the last aircraft*s wheels- down at an
    aerial port of debarkation.

    7 For the purpose of our analysis of deployment times we used four of the
    five current and planned brigade locations* Fort Lewis, Alaska, Fort Polk,
    and Hawaii. We treated the Alaska brigade as one brigade location,
    although this brigade will be split- based between Fort Richardson and
    Fort Wainwright. The bulk of the brigade is to be located at Fort
    Wainwright. We did not include the planned Pennsylvania National Guard
    brigade because it is not expected to become operational until 2010.

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation According to the U. S.
    Transportation Command*s Stryker brigade air mobility deployment analysis,
    the Army*s deployment goal for Stryker

    brigades has significant implications for the U. S. Transportation Command
    and the defense transportation system. According to this analysis, the
    Army must reduce its transportation requirements and simultaneously work
    with the U. S. Transportation Command and the services to improve
    deployment timelines.

    A 2002 Rand report of Stryker brigade deployment options, sponsored by the
    U. S. Air Force, also concluded that Stryker brigades cannot be deployed
    by air from the continental United States to distant overseas locations in
    4 days. The study found that it is possible to achieve global air
    deployment timelines on the order of 1 to 2 weeks by using a combination
    of continental United States based brigades, a Stryker brigade
    forwardbased in Germany, and regional preposition sites. According to the
    study, prepositioning of equipment or overseas basing of forces is the
    single most effective way to increase the responsiveness of Army forces
    for operations in key regions.

    Under the 2002 Defense Planning Guidance, the Army is planning for the
    relocation of one Stryker brigade to Europe in fiscal year 2007. By air, a
    brigade based in Germany, for example, could reach some global regions in
    less time than it could from the four currently planned brigade locations.
    From Ramstein Air Base in Germany, minimum air deployment times to sub-
    Saharan Africa would be 7 to 9 days, compared to a minimum of 13 days to
    14 days from the other brigade locations. From Germany to the Balkans, it
    would take 5 days to airlift a Stryker brigade, compared to about 6 days
    to 7 days from the other locations. Although the Army recognizes that some
    prepositioning of Stryker brigade equipment overseas would add to a
    brigade*s strategic responsiveness and is considering it as a future
    option, Army officials told us that it would be too costly to do so at
    this time.

    Based on our analysis of the U. S. Transportation Command*s air deployment
    planning factors and airlift allocation assumptions, 8 achieving

    8 Some of the significant strategic air mobility and aircraft allocation
    assumptions the U. S. Transportation Command used in its analysis include
    the Stryker brigade is the primary airlift claimant in a surge operation;
    the airlift fleet does not include aircraft withheld for maintenance, high
    priority missions, or training; air mobility infrastructure will support

    20- minute departure intervals; and sufficient reserve augmentation is
    available to provide support for increased airlift requirements.

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation the 5 to 14 day air
    deployment timelines would be difficult because it would require the Air
    Force to dedicate about one- third of its projected

    2005 primary strategic airlift aircraft fleet of C- 17s and C- 5s for
    transporting only one Stryker brigade. Obtaining this amount of airlift
    for deploying one Stryker brigade would require allocating 31 percent of
    the Air Force*s total 2005 inventory of C- 17 aircraft and 38 percent of
    its C- 5

    aircraft inventory. 9 Obtaining an airlift allocation larger than this
    would be possible* if airlifting a Stryker brigade is a National Command
    Authority top priority and absent competing demand elsewhere for airlift
    aircraft. Table 1 shows the U. S. Transportation Command*s estimated
    airlift allocation 10 and the percentages of the projected 2005 total
    airlift inventory of C- 17 and C- 5 aircraft needed to strategically
    airlift one Stryker brigade. Table 1: Percentages of U. S. Air Force*s
    Total Airlift Inventory in 2005 Needed to

    Strategically Airlift One Stryker Brigade Airlift aircraft Projected total

    2005 aircraft inventory Estimated airlift

    allocation Percent of total inventory a

    C- 17 Globemaster 136 42 31 C- 5 Galaxy 113 48 38

    Total 249 90 36

    Sources: U. S. Transportation Command and U. S. Air Force. a Percentages
    are rounded.

    Because it may not always be possible to obtain sufficient airlift to
    deploy an entire Stryker brigade, Army officials anticipate using a
    combination of airlift and sealift to deploy the brigades, although sea
    deployment time would be slower than the Army*s 4- day worldwide
    deployment goal to most locations. Army officials told us that current
    plans are to deploy about one- third of a Stryker brigade by air and the
    remainder of the brigade would be deployed by sea. While some areas in
    South America could be reached by a Stryker brigade located at Fort Polk,
    Louisiana, via gulf coast ports in about 4 days, sea deployment times to
    South America and other global regions from the three other planned
    Stryker brigade

    9 According to Air Force budget documents, these are the total numbers of
    C- 17 and C- 5 aircraft expected to be in the Air Force*s aircraft
    inventory through 2005. 10 According to the U. S. Transportation Command,
    this allocation is a reasonable approximation of the airlift a Stryker
    brigade could claim if it was the principal ground force to move early in
    a small- scale contingency operation. Army Plans to Use a Combination of
    Airlift and

    Sealift to Deploy Stryker Brigades

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation locations would take longer.
    For example, sailing time for a Fort Lewis- based Stryker brigade from
    Seattle/ Tacoma, Washington, would be

    about 10 days to ports in northern regions of South America and more than
    2 weeks to ports in West Africa. From Alaska, sailing time to any of the
    eight overseas destinations we included in this analysis would take from
    12 days to 24 days. Similarly, sailing times to the Balkans from any one
    of the four planned Stryker brigade locations would take a minimum of 2
    weeks to over 3 weeks. With a Stryker brigade forward based in Europe, sea
    deployment times to the Balkans from seaports in Germany, for example,
    could be reduced to about 7 days. Figure 3 shows estimated ranges of
    Stryker brigade sailing times from the four current and planned Stryker
    brigade locations to selected global regions. (See app. IV for a summary
    of sea deployment times by origins and destinations.)

    Figure 4: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times

    Note: Sea deployment times are sailing days from a port of embarkation to
    arrival at an overseas port of debarkation.

    In addition to the sailing times needed to reach overseas destinations, it
    would take days to transport a Stryker brigade and all of its vehicles and
    equipment from its home installation to a seaport. For example, the
    Stryker brigade to be located in Alaska would need to travel about 350
    miles by rail or highway from Fort Wainwright, near Fairbanks, to seaports
    in or near Anchorage. In addition, loading and unloading cargo transport

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation ships take much longer than
    loading and off- loading aircraft. According to Army deployment planning
    data, it would take about 2 days for loading ships and another 2 days to
    unload them after arrival, compared to hours

    for loading and unloading aircraft. Furthermore, many areas of the world
    in which Stryker brigades are anticipated to operate have no access to a
    seaport, and not all seaports would have the capacity to handle large
    deep- draft vessels. Additional time would also be needed for Army forces
    deployed by sea to move from a seaport to an in- land area of operations,
    although a Stryker brigade would be able to move to in- land locations
    faster than a heavy armored brigade because Stryker armored vehicles can
    be driven while heavier armored vehicles and tanks might require rail or
    truck transport. Also, a deployed Stryker brigade would need less time
    than a heavy armored brigade would need to unload at a seaport, assemble,
    and begin operations: Stryker brigades are organized and equipped to begin
    operations soon after arrival in an operational theater, carrying up to 3
    days* supplies of the fuel and ammunition and sustainment items, allowing
    the brigades to immediately conduct a combat mission. This contrasts with
    an Army armored or mechanized brigade,

    which would need days to draw the fuel, ammunition, and other supplies it
    would need before it can begin operations.

    The Army*s plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in combat
    operations is still evolving and cannot be considered finalized until a
    number of issues are resolved. These issues include the results from the
    operational evaluation of the first brigade, funding questions, and
    decisions relating to implementing some of the plan*s logistical support
    concepts.

    The Army will not be able to finish its support plan until November 2003,
    when results from the operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade
    will be issued. The Army conducted the operational evaluation in April and
    May 2003 to assess the first Stryker brigade*s overall operational
    effectiveness and suitability. The operational evaluation included the
    logistical support plan and processes that augment the brigade*s limited
    capabilities to perform basic maintenance, supply, and transportation
    services. To make Stryker brigades easier to deploy and support, the Army
    designed the brigades with a support structure that is only about one-
    third the size of that found in a heavy armored brigade. Thus, Stryker
    brigades

    do not have the capability to sustain operations without the assistance of
    external support organizations and resources. Contractors will provide a
    key part of this external support to service and maintain newly fielded
    Stryker armored vehicles and complex digital command, control, Army*s Plan
    for

    Supporting and Sustaining Stryker Brigades in Combat Operations Is Still
    Evolving

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation communications, and computer
    equipment. Contractor logistics support will be needed to support the
    Stryker vehicles and digital systems at least

    until these systems are fully fielded. Also, instead of transporting large
    inventories of ammunition spare parts, and other supplies into an area of
    operation* as a heavy armored brigade would do* Stryker brigades are to
    sustain themselves in extended operations by having these items delivered
    from numerous locations outside the area of operation, such as Army depots
    and theater support bases, where they will be stored and configured for
    rapid shipment and distribution to the brigades as they are needed.

    Because these support and sustainment processes are new concepts and key
    elements of the Army*s support plan for Stryker brigades, the Army will
    complete the plan after it has reviewed the results and lessons learned
    from the operational evaluation. Based on the results, the Army plans to
    make any adjustments or modifications it determines are necessary before
    the plan becomes final. Before it can fully implement the support plan,
    the Army will need to determine the cost and decide whether it will fund
    the acquisition of vehicles and equipment replacement reserves. The
    brigades are designed to do only limited maintenance for vehicles and
    equipment

    on the battlefield; therefore, the Army*s support plan calls for rapidly
    evacuating and replacing items needing major maintenance or repair with
    what the Army calls ready- to- fight replacements. The plan depends on
    having in reserve and readily available sufficient numbers of vehicles and
    essential equipment, such as digital components, for rapid shipment into

    an area of operation. Before the Army can make a final funding decision,
    it will first need to determine the types, amounts, and total cost of the
    readyto- fight replacements that would be needed. As of May 2003, the Army
    had not made a final decision as to the number, types, and configuration
    of the ready- to- fight vehicles, nor the method of their delivery to an
    area of operations. Additionally, to reduce the amount of materiel that is
    deployed and stockpiled within an operational theater, the Army*s Stryker
    brigade support plan includes measures for rapidly distributing directly
    to the brigades pre- configured loads of essential sustainment supplies
    such as food, repair parts, and ammunition, as they are needed. Before the
    Army can implement the plan, it will need to finish the instructions and
    guidelines that will identify the types and amounts of supplies to be
    distributed in configured loads and the locations and facilities
    (including defense supply depots, Stryker brigade installations, and
    theater support bases) where configured loads are to be built and stored.
    The Army also still will need to identify the personnel and obtain the
    equipment, supplies, and funding that will be needed to manage and carry
    out its planned configured load distribution system.

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation The Army*s current plans for
    deploying and sustaining Stryker brigades could change after the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reviews

    options it directed the Army to provide for enhancing the brigades*
    capabilities. OSD wants the Army to modify the brigades to be more like
    the Objective Force units the Army is developing. OSD has directed the
    Army to present a plan by July 8, 2003, that provides options for adding
    to the brigade*s enhanced combined arms capabilities. Currently, the

    brigades do not have capabilities such as aviation and air defense. Such
    changes would enhance the overall organizational effectiveness of the
    brigades, but they also could increase deployment and support
    requirements, potentially making the brigades more difficult to deploy by
    air and to support.

    OSD directed the Army to provide options for enhancing the Stryker
    brigades to ensure that they would provide a higher level of combat
    capability and sustainability across a broader spectrum of combat
    operations than those for which they were originally conceived, along with
    the capability of being employed independently of higher- level command
    formations and support. According to OSD, this additional capability will
    result in Stryker brigades that are more prototypical of the combined arms

    Objective Force units the Army is developing and would enhance the
    transformation of the Army by fielding added capabilities sooner. OSD has
    directed the Army not to expend funds in fiscal year 2004 for the fifth
    and sixth Stryker brigades until the Army presents a plan to provide
    options for enhancing all but one of the brigades. 11 OSD wants the Army
    to remodel the brigades to be distinctively different than their original
    design, with enhanced combined arms capabilities that might include
    aviation, air defense, sensors, and armor.

    Many factors* including the numbers, size, and types of equipment* affect
    the Stryker brigades* deployment and logistical support requirements.
    Based on the U. S. Transportation Command*s deploymentplanning factors,
    every additional 1,000 tons of weight to be airlifted reduces aircraft
    range by 250 nautical miles and adds another 15 aircraft loads. If Stryker
    brigades were redesigned to include an aviation unit, for example,
    transporting the unit*s helicopters from the continental United States to
    overseas destinations would most likely need to be done by sea, 11 The
    fourth Stryker brigade will be the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light)
    located at

    Fort Polk, Louisiana. According to Army plans, this brigade is already
    being designed to have some of the combined arms capabilities that OSD
    wants the Army to add to the five other brigades. Army*s Plans for
    Deploying and

    Sustaining Stryker Brigades Could Change

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation and it would take days to
    unload them after arrival into a theater of operations. In addition,
    adding aviation maintenance personnel and the

    equipment that is needed to support an aviation unit would also
    substantially increase deployment requirements. Once deployed, the
    requirements for logistical support, such as fuel and spare parts, would
    increase well beyond that for which the Army*s current Stryker brigade
    support plan anticipates. Furthermore, the Stryker brigades* support
    structure as currently designed does not have the levels of supply and
    support personnel or the necessary equipment to move and distribute the
    fuel, spare parts, and ammunition a brigade would need to support an
    aviation unit in combat operations.

    With the Stryker brigades, the Army has achieved its intent to create
    rapidly deployable yet lethal forces, but currently the brigades*
    requirements for airlift are too large for airlift alone to be a practical
    option for strategically deploying an entire brigade within its goal of

    4 days. The Army plans to use some combination of strategic airlift and
    sealift, but it has not established strategic deployability timelines for
    a Stryker brigade that reflect the modes of transportation to be used, the
    wide range of deployment times that vary in terms of the size of the
    deployed force, and the brigades* location and destination. In addition,
    deployment goals may need further modification should the brigade*s
    organizational and operational design significantly change in response to
    direction from OSD to enhance the brigade*s capabilities. While the 4- day
    deployment goal has created a strategic purpose and vision, and is serving
    as a constructive design metric for developing the brigades, such a goal
    is not a realistic standard by which to measure the considerable progress
    the

    Army is making toward creating more rapidly deployable forces. Without
    deployment goals that reflect the wide range of deployment variables and
    alternatives, the Army does not have a reasonable baseline from which to
    measure its progress toward achieving desired deployment timelines for
    Stryker brigades as well as for the future Objective Force; nor do the
    theater combatant commanders have information on expected deployment
    capabilities they would need in order to plan for the use of a Stryker
    brigade in their theater.

    Before the first Stryker brigade is certified for overseas deployment, the
    Army will need to complete its support plan and make any necessary
    adjustments or modifications to the plan based on the results of the
    operational evaluation. Conclusions

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation We recommend that the
    Secretary of the Army examine alternatives to the 96- hour worldwide
    deployment goal for Stryker brigades and work with the U. S.
    Transportation Command and its components to set realistic

    deployment timelines for the brigades that  reflect the use of both
    airlift and sealift, the size of the deployed force,

    a brigade*s location, and its destination and  take into account any
    organizational or operational changes to the

    brigades resulting from modifications and enhancements directed by OSD. In
    commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense generally
    concurred with the report and stated that the Army continues to maintain
    96- hour worldwide deployment as an overall program goal for Stryker
    brigade deployment, and is working with the U. S. Transportation Command
    to reduce constraints that limit the Army*s ability to meet the goal.

    In responding to our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army examine
    alternatives to the 96- hour worldwide deployment goal for Stryker
    brigades and work with the U. S. Transportation Command to set realistic
    deployment timelines, the department stated that the Army is committed to
    its 96- hour goal as a target that it needs to continue to work toward in
    order to provide the necessary capabilities to combat commanders within
    required response times. The department noted that achieving this goal
    requires a concerted effort on the part of all services and the U. S.
    Transportation Command to ensure that enroute constraints are reduced. We
    agree that the 96- hour goal is a useful longer- term target and that the
    Army should continue to work in concert with the Transportation Command
    and the other services to achieve it. However, we continue to believe
    other alternatives to the 96- hour goal should be considered for measuring
    progress in the near- term. As we noted in the report, the Army cannot
    currently air deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 96
    hours and if sealift were used to deploy the Stryker brigades, deployment
    times would be significantly longer than the 96- hour deployment goal. We
    believe that without deployment timelines reflecting near- term deployment
    variables and alternatives, such as brigade locations and the use of
    sealift, the Army does not have a reasonable baseline from which to
    measure its progress toward achieving its 96- hour deployment goal; nor do
    the combatant commanders have information on expected Stryker brigade
    deployment capabilities. Thus, we continue to believe our recommendation
    has merit. Recommendations for

    Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation In responding to our
    recommendation for setting realistic deployment timelines for Stryker
    brigades that take into account organizational or

    operational changes to the brigades resulting from any modifications and
    enhancements directed by OSD, the department said the Army should maintain
    its 96- hour deployment goal, as it is a goal and not a deployment
    standard. The department also noted that when the results of the
    OSDmandated study are approved and published, the Army would work with the
    combatant commanders and the U. S. Transportation Command to update the
    standing contingency plans. We agree the Army should work with the
    combatant commanders and the U. S. Transportation Command to update
    contingency plans based on the final outcome of the OSD- mandated study.
    However, if the results of the study significantly increase the Stryker
    brigades* deployment and logistical support requirements, the Army would
    need to reexamine brigade deployment goals as we have recommended.

    Appendix I contains the full text of the department*s comments. To assess
    the Army*s progress in meeting its 96- hour deployment goal for Stryker
    brigades, we obtained documents and interviewed officials from the U. S.
    Transportation Command, the Air Mobility Command, and the Military Traffic
    Management Command. To determine Stryker brigade air deployment times and
    airlift allocation estimates, we used data from a U. S.

    Transportation Command*s air mobility deployment analysis conducted for
    the Army in April 2002. To determine sea deployment times, we analyzed
    data from the Military Traffic Management Command*s Transportation
    Engineering Agency. In addition, we interviewed officials and obtained
    documents from the Army*s Deployment Process Management Office and from
    Army headquarters staff elements responsible for operations and plans and
    logistics. We performed site visits to Stryker brigade home installations
    at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Richardson and Fort Wainwright,
    Alaska; we also interviewed U. S.

    Army I Corps and U. S. Army Alaska and Garrison Command officials at these
    locations. We also toured deployment processing and airfield facilities
    and obtained information about infrastructure improvements planned at
    these locations to validate key assumptions of the U. S. Transportation
    Command*s air mobility analysis regarding air deployment infrastructure
    capabilities. We did not visit Fort Polk, Louisiana; Schofield Barracks,
    Hawaii; or the Pennsylvania National Guard. These locations are

    the last three of the six- planned Stryker brigades that are to be formed
    from 2006 through 2010. Because it is not planned to become operational
    until 2010, we excluded from our review the planned Pennsylvania Scope and

    Methodology

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation National Guard Stryker
    brigade. We also did not consider possible future developments in lift
    assets such as High Speed Vessels or Ultra Heavy Lift

    Aircraft in our assessment of Stryker brigade deployability. To obtain
    information on the Army*s plan for supporting Stryker brigades in combat
    operations, we analyzed Army information on the organizational design and
    operational concepts for Stryker brigades to gain an understanding of the
    logistical challenges of supporting and sustaining the brigades. We
    interviewed officials at Fort Lewis and U. S. Army Alaska for information
    relating to support and sustainment plans for the first three Stryker
    brigades. In addition, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials
    from Army headquarters staff elements responsible for operations and
    plans, logistics, and force development. We also interviewed and obtained
    documents from the Army*s Forces Command, the Combined Arms Support
    Command, and the Tank- automotive and Armaments Command to learn about
    support and sustainment options for the Stryker brigades.

    Our review was conducted from April 2002 through March 2003 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
    Secretary of the Army, and the Director of Management and Budget. We will
    also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this

    report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.
    gao. gov.

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation If you or your staffs have
    any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512- 8365. Major
    contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.;

    Kevin C. Handley; Karyn I. Angulo; Pat L. Seaton; Frank C. Smith; and
    Susan K. Woodward.

    William M. Solis Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation List of Congressional
    Committees The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman

    The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed
    Services United States Senate

    The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
    States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House
    of Representatives

    Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Appendix I: Comments from the
    Department of Defense

    Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 22 GAO- 03- 801
    Military Transformation

    Appendix II: Stryker Brigade Locations and Planned Initial Operational
    Capability Dates

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Brigade Location Planned
    initial operational

    capability dates

    1 Fort Lewis, Washington 2003 2 Fort Lewis, Washington 2004 3 Fort
    Wainwright/ Fort Richardson, Alaska 2005 4 Fort Polk, Louisiana 2006 5
    Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 2007 6 Pennsylvania National Guard 2010 Source:
    U. S. Army.

    Appendix II: Stryker Brigade Locations and Planned Initial Operational
    Capability Dates

    Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times By Origin and
    Destination Page 24 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Destinations and
    air deployment times in days South America West

    Africa Sub- Saharan Africa South

    Asia South Pacific Europe

    Brigade no. Origin installation

    and airport Columbia Venezuela Sierra Leone Angola Congo Sri

    Lanka New Guinea Balkans

    1 & 2 Ft. Lewis/

    McChord Air Force Base 5.3 6.7 13.4 13.6 13.9 8.1 7.3 6.3

    3 Ft. Wainwright/

    Eielson Air Force Base 5.6 5.6 13.6 13.7 14.0 7.3 7.0 5.9 3

    Ft. Richardson/ Elmendorf Air Force Base 5.6 5.6 13.6 13.7 14.0 7.3 7.0
    5.6 4

    Ft. Polk/ Alexandria Airport 5.1 5.2 13.2 13.3 13.6 9.7 8.2 5.6

    5 Schofield Barracks/

    Hickam Air Force Base 5.6 5.6 13.7 14.0 14.1 7.5 6.9 6.9 Source: GAO*s
    analysis of U. S. Transportation Command data.

    Note: Air deployment time is from the first aircrafts* wheels- up at an
    aerial port of embarkation to the last aircrafts* wheels- down at an
    aerial port of debarkation.

    Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times By Origin and
    Destination

    Appendix IV: Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times by Origin and
    Destination

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Destinations and sailing time
    in days South America West

    Africa Sub- Saharan Africa South

    Asia South Pacific Europe

    Brigade no. Origin installation

    and airport Columbia Venezuela Sierra Leone Angola Congo Sri

    Lanka New Guinea Balkans

    1 & 2 Ft. Lewis/

    Seattle- Tacoma, Wash. 9.5 10.5 17.3 21.3 20.4 18.3 13.2 21.5

    3 Ft. Wainwright &

    Ft. Richardson/ Anchorage, Alaska 12.0 12.9 19.8 23.8 22.9 16.5 11.9 24.0

    4 Ft. Polk/

    Beaumont, Tex. 4.0 4.3 10.3 14.4 13.4 21.4 20.5 13.5

    5 Schofield Barracks/

    Honolulu, Hawaii 10.7 11.6 18.5 22.5 21.5 15.8 8.2 22.7

    Source: GAO*s analysis of Military Traffic Management Command,
    Transportation Engineering Agency data. Note: Sea deployment times are
    sailing days from a port of embarkation to arrival at an overseas port of
    debarkation.

    Appendix IV: Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times by Origin and
    Destination

    Related GAO Products Page 26 GAO- 03- 801 Military Transformation Military
    Transformation: Army*s Evaluation of Stryker and M- 113A3 Infantry Carrier
    Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily

    Mandated Comparison. GAO- 03- 671. Washington, D. C.: May 30, 2003.

    Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should Be
    Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army*s
    Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO- 03- 484R. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 28,

    2003.

    Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
    Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO- 02- 442. Washington, D. C.: May
    17, 2002.

    Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its
    Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO- 02- 96. Washington, D. C.:
    Nov. 16, 2001.

    Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges.
    GAO- 01- 311. Washington, D. C.: May 21, 2001. Related GAO Products

    (350163)

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