Rebuilding Iraq (15-MAY-03, GAO-03-792R).			 
                                                                 
Rebuilding Iraq is a U.S. national security priority. As part of 
this effort, Congress appropriated $79 billon in emergency	 
supplemental funds for fiscal year 2003 for military operations  
and Iraq's reconstruction, including humanitarian relief,	 
peacekeeping, and economic and political reform. We have issued  
reports on similar programs to rebuild countries in the former	 
Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and other locations (see	 
attachment III for a listing of previous GAO reports). Based on  
this work, we have developed short papers to help congressional  
decision-makers think about and prioritize the range of issues	 
related to rebuilding Iraq.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-792R					        
    ACCNO:   A06958						        
  TITLE:     Rebuilding Iraq					      
     DATE:   05/15/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Economic development				 
	     Economic growth					 
	     Emergency medical services 			 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Food supply					 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     International economic relations			 
	     Medical equipment					 
	     Medical supplies					 
	     Physical security					 
	     Political activities				 
	     Political candidates				 
	     Weapons						 
	     Peace keeping					 
	     Iraq						 

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GAO-03-792R

GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

May 15, 2003 The Honorable Richard G. Lugar Chairman The Honorable Joseph
R. Biden Ranking Minority Member Committee on Foreign Relations United
States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde Chairman The Honorable Tom Lantos Ranking
Minority Member Committee on International Relations House of
Representatives

Subject: Rebuilding Iraq Rebuilding Iraq is a U. S. national security
priority. As part of this effort, Congress appropriated $79 billon in
emergency supplemental funds for fiscal year 2003 for military operations
and Iraq*s reconstruction, including humanitarian relief, peacekeeping,
and economic and political reform. We have issued reports on similar
programs to rebuild countries in the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet
Union, and other locations (see attachment III for a listing of previous
GAO reports). Based on this work, we have developed short papers to help
congressional decision- makers think about and prioritize the range of
issues related to rebuilding Iraq. These papers cover the following
topics.

Food Aid and Humanitarian Relief

The conflict in Iraq has compromised the country*s food security and its
medical and water systems. In response, the World Food Program has
developed an emergency plan to meet the food needs of 27 million Iraqis,
at a cost of $1.2 billion, from March 25 to September 25, 2003. Other
donors, including the United States, are providing medicine and potable
water to many locations. In addition, as many as 1 million Arabs may be
displaced in Northern Iraq by Kurds, who are retaking the homes and
villages they were expelled from over the last three decades. Potential
issues are the total cost of food and humanitarian aid, coordination and
effectiveness of humanitarian aid, the transition from emergency aid to
sustainable living, and efforts to provide for the internally displaced.

Peace Operations

The peace operation in Iraq presents significant security and political
challenges for the United States. Some tasks for the peacekeeping phase
are providing security,

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

2 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

establishing an interim authority, establishing conditions for a
transition to democracy, and directing efforts to rebuild the economy.
Another key task is rebuilding a professional, civilian- controlled
military to help ensure stability and protect the territorial integrity of
Iraq once the peacekeeping forces withdraw. Potential oversight issues
include the role, structure, and transition strategy of the peace
operation; progress and challenges in providing security and establishing
an interim authority; the role of allies and international organizations;
and the factors that could hinder the effectiveness of U. S. assistance to
train and equip an Iraqi national army.

Economic Reform and Reconstruction

Building a sustainable market economy in Iraq will likely be a long- term
effort. Iraq*s centralized economic and political structure will require
fundamental changes similar to those that are taking place in the
countries of the former Soviet Union. The most immediate concern is Iraq*s
physical reconstruction, including building roads, schools, and power
plants. Another immediate concern is Iraq*s external debt and its war
reparations resulting from the 1990 invasion of Kuwait* estimated to be as
much as $400 billion. Additional concerns are the U. N. sanctions against
Iraq and the related oil for food program, which still has more than $3
billion in escrow. Potential issues include oversight of the efficiency
and effectiveness of reconstruction; the role and contributions of allies,
the United Nations, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund; the
pros and cons of forgiving Iraq*s external debt; and resolution of the oil
for food program.

Governance and Democracy Building

Iraq lacks a democratic tradition, including a stable multiparty political
structure and real opportunities for citizen involvement in government
decision making. These conditions, together with sharp ethnic, religious,
and regional differences in the country, present significant challenges to
efforts to promote democracy. Some potential issues include the scope and
effectiveness of democracy- building projects; efforts to draft a new
constitution, reform existing criminal and civil codes, and develop a
neutral and competent police force; effectiveness of anticorruption
efforts; and the role of the allies, United Nations, and other
international organizations in these efforts.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Iraq implemented active programs to develop weapons of mass destruction
(chemical, biological, and nuclear) and their delivery vehicles, but has
not fully accounted for them. Uncertainties over the location of this
material pose a threat to U. S. and coalition forces in country and a
long- term threat of theft and proliferation to other states or terrorist
groups. Iraq*s past record of developing weapons of mass destruction also
raises questions about the various multilateral export control
arrangements and their ability to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction in countries of concern, such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and
Iran. Potential issues include the cost and effectiveness of U. S.
programs to locate and destroy Iraq*s weapons, the role of international
organizations in this effort, and the effectiveness of international
export controls.

3 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

These papers raise a number of oversight questions about rebuilding Iraq
that Congress may wish to consider. Consistent with our Congressional
Protocols, we encourage early discussion with us to explore whether GAO
might be of assistance in this regard. If you have any questions, please
contact me at (202) 512- 3655 or Joseph Christoff, Director, at (202) 512-
8979.

Susan S. Westin Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade

Enclosure I 4 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag I. Iraq Point Paper Source:
CIA.

The United States does not maintain an embassy in Iraq. Iraq*s land area
is about 432,000 square kilometers (about the size of California). Iraq is
bordered by Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi

Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, as well as by the Persian Gulf. In 1990, the
United States imposed sanctions on Iraq in response to its invasion of
Kuwait. On March 19, 2003, the United States launched military operations
against Iraq to disarm the country of its weapons of mass destruction and
to remove Saddam Hussein*s government from power. More than three-
quarters of Iraq*s population is Arab, but the country has a significant
Kurdish population. Nearly two- thirds of the population is Shi*a Muslim
and more than a third of the population is Sunni Muslim. In addition, more
than a third of Iraq*s population is under the age of 15. Under Saddam
Hussein, the Iraqi government did not allow opposition parties to operate
legally in the country. Iraq's economy was characterized by a heavy
dependence on oil exports and an emphasis on development through central
planning. Iraq has maritime and land boundary disputes with Iran.

U. S. Assistance

Between fiscal years 1990 and 2002, the United States provided about $25.5
million in food assistance to Iraq. In addition, between 1991 and

1996, the United States provided nearly $794 million in humanitarian
assistance to internally displaced persons in northern Iraq. In March
2003, the United States began military operations in Iraq in part to
remove Saddam Hussein*s government from power. The fiscal year 2003
emergency supplemental authorized about $2.5 billion for relief and
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, available through fiscal year 2004. As of
April 24, 2003, the Department of State and the U. S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) estimated that they would provide about
$596.5 million in assistance to Iraq in fiscal year 2003. This amount does
not reflect all estimated assistance to Iraq for fiscal year 2003. U. S.
Estimated Assistance, Fiscal Year 2003

(U. S. dollars in millions) Agency and program Amount of assistance

USAID Office of U. S. Foreign Disaster Assistance $49.2

USAID Food for Peace 430.0 USAID Office of Transition Initiatives 2.3
USAID Asia and Near East Region 78.4 Department of State Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration 36.6 Total $ 596.5 a Sources: U. S.
Department of State and U. S. Agency for International Development. a The
fiscal year 2003 emergency supplemental authorized about $2.5 billion for
relief and reconstruction in Iraq.

Enclosure I 5 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag International Aid Flows

Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Assistance, 1990- 2001

(Net disbursements, constant 2003 U. S. dollars in millions) From 1990
through 2001, international aid

flows totaled about $2.9 billion. U. S. and other countries* aid totaled
about $2.2 billion, while multilateral aid totaled about $772 million.
Primary donors included Germany,

the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom, the
European Commission, and the United Nations. 0

200 400

600 800

Multilateral ODA 21.5 151.0 89.8 133.1 84.0 100.9 71.2 43.9 40.9 -3.4 17.4
21.3 Other countries' ODA 86.5 119.3 80.6 83.8 87.9 134.9 197.8 198.4 81.4
84.7 88.3 103.6 US ODA 0.0 420.0 0. 0 0.0 130.8 152.0 121.1 0. 0 0.0 0. 0
0.0 0. 0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Source:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Note: Official
development assistance (ODA) is defined as aid flows to a country provided
by official agencies to promote economic development and welfare. ODA is
reported as net disbursements and reflects total inflows of grants and
loans minus total outflows of loan repayments. Demographics

Key indicators Ethnic groups Religions

Population (millions) 23.0 Growth rate (percentage)

3.3 Under 15 years old (percentage)

41.1 Life expectancy at birth (years) 67.4 Literacy (percentage)

male female

58 71 45 Seats in lower or single house held by women (percentage)

7.6 Kurdish

17.5% Other

5.0% Arab 77.5%

Sunni Muslim 34.5%

Other 3.0%

Shi'a Muslim 62.5% Sources: Global Insight, CIA, and the Inter-
Parliamentary Union.

Note: Ethnic and religious group percentages are estimated based on
information from the CIA. The CIA lists ethnic group percentages as Arab
(75 to 80 percent), Kurdish (15 to 20 percent), and other (5 percent) and
religious group percentages as Shi*a Muslim (60 to 65 percent), Sunni
Muslim (32 to 37 percent), and other (3 percent).

Governance, Rights, and Freedoms

Type of government Republic Type of legal system Based on Islamic law in
special religious courts and civil law system elsewhere Source: CIA. Note:
These indicators refer to the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein before
March 19, 2003. Political rights and

civil liberties Economic freedom

Not free 7

Repressed 5

Free 1

Free 1

Enclosure I 6 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Sources: Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation. Note: These indicators
refer to the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein before March 19, 2003.
Economics and Trade

Key indicators 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Gross domestic product (GDP) (purchasing power parity, 2002 U. S. dollars
in billions) 9.2 10.2 11.4 12.7 14.2 14.6 14.8 Real GDP growth rate
(percentage) 0.0 10.0 12.0 12.0 11.0 3.2 1.5 GDP per capita (purchasing
power parity, 2002 U. S. dollars) 448 479 524 571 617 656 644 Inflation
(consumer prices, percentage) 34.5 45.0 45.0 43.0 40.0 28.1 24.6 Exports
(2002 U. S. dollars in billions) 1.1 4.3 6.4 12.2 17.0 11.1 10.6

Imports (2002 U. S. dollars in billions) 1.2 4.9 5.4 9.4 12.9 9.5 10.4
Source: Global Insight. Note: Lacking official data, these are estimates
made in May 2002. GDP for 2002 may be revised upward.

Key Transnational Issues

Despite Iraq*s restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 1990, there are
still maritime and land boundary disputes between the two countries.
Outstanding issues from the Iran- Iraq War (1980- 1988), including
prisoner of war exchanges and support for armed opposition parties
operating in each other*s territory, have not been resolved.

Dispute over water development plans by Turkey for the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers. Sources: CIA and U. S. Department of State.

7 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Enclosure II 8 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Food Aid and Humanitarian Assistance

Issue The conflict in Iraq has compromised the country*s food security and
its medical, water, and sanitation systems. The United States,
international donors, and relief organizations are beginning to address
Iraq*s postwar humanitarian needs. However, the scale of the crisis,
together with ongoing security concerns, make the provision of
humanitarian relief a significant challenge. The Congress has appropriated
$2.5 billion in emergency supplemental funding for relief and
reconstruction, including funding for food distribution and humanitarian
assistance. The U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has
deployed an interagency Disaster Assistance Response Team that is
coordinating the delivery of potable water, medical supplies, and other
aid by nongovernmental organizations, U. N. agencies, and the military.
The World Food Program (WFP) also has developed an emergency plan to meet
the food needs of 27 million Iraqis at a cost of $1.2 billion through
September 25, 2003. This plan uses existing WFP facilities in Iraq (see
fig. 1).

Figure 1: Local Residents of Erbil, Iraq, Receiving Rations of Wheat Flour
from a WFP Food Distribution Center

Source: (c) (2003) World Food Program. Context U. S. government and
international organizations face challenges in managing multiple food

emergencies effectively. In fiscal year 2003, the growing number of
humanitarian crises (Afghanistan, Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa,
North Korea, and Iraq) has forced the U. S. government to budget $2.6
billion on food aid* the highest in 25 years* with over 85 percent
dedicated to emergency assistance. We have found that U. S. government
management of food aid has been marked by significant weaknesses in
internal controls, monitoring, and accountability. We also have reported
that food aid programs have competing objectives and

Enclosure II 9 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

management weaknesses, which hamper their ability to meet their
objectives. 1 We have reviewed the U. S. government management of food aid
programs in North Korea and Russia and has made a number of
recommendations to improve the internal controls, monitoring, and
accountability systems of these programs. 2 We expect to report on our
ongoing review of U. S. food aid programs in Afghanistan and Southern
Africa by June 2003.

Although Iraq did not suffer complete devastation from the war, it has no
functioning economy. Even before the war, 60 percent of Iraqis were
dependent on the U. N. oil for food program to meet household needs.
Currently, provision of potable water remains a top priority; the United
Nations Children*s Fund estimates that 70 percent of children*s illnesses
in Iraq stem from contaminated drinking water. The World Health
Organization also has been actively trying to provide medical assistance
to reestablish Iraq*s health system.

Oversight Questions 1. What is the total cost of emergency humanitarian
and food assistance necessary to satisfy Iraq*s needs in the short- term?
2. How is the United States coordinating the delivery of humanitarian and
food assistance

among other international donors and relief organizations? 3. How
effective and efficient is the delivery of humanitarian and food aid,
particularly to

vulnerable populations? 4. What are the monitoring and oversight
procedures for humanitarian and food aid programs? 5. What are the
obstacles to the effective and efficient provision of emergency
humanitarian

and food assistance? 6. How is the United States planning for and managing
the transition from emergency

humanitarian and food assistance to longer- term relief and sustainable
recovery? 1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Food Aid: Experience of U. S.
Programs Suggests Opportunities for Improvement, GAO- 02- 801T
(Washington, D. C.: June 4, 2002). 2 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Foreign Assistance: North Korean Constraints Limit Food Aid Monitoring, T-
NSIAD- 00- 47 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 27, 1999), and Foreign Assistance:
U. S. Food Aid to Russia Had Weak Internal Controls, GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 329
(Washington, D. C.: Sept. 29, 2000).

Enclosure III 10 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Internally Displaced Persons

Issue After having been expelled by Saddam Hussein*s government over three
decades ago, Kurds are now retaking land and villages in Northern Iraq
that were recently occupied by Arabs. Thousands of Arabs have already fled
Kurdish- controlled areas in the north, including the major urban areas of
Kirkuk and Mosul. Humanitarian officials of the United Nations and other
organizations estimate the changed political landscape in northern Iraq
could result in the displacement of 1 million people in the coming months,
with temporary shelters and assistance being needed for them (see fig. 2).

Figure 2: Standard U. N. Tents for Internally Displaced Persons Source:
(c) United Nations Humanitarian Information Center for Iraq. Context We
have reported that international organizations have not effectively
protected internally displaced persons because they have been prevented
from doing so by ongoing armed conflict, governments, or political groups.
3 Based on our survey of U. N. and humanitarian field level

3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Affairs: Internally Displaced
Persons Lack Effective Protection,

GAO- 01- 803 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 17, 2001).

Enclosure III 11 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

officials in 48 countries, we found that the internally displaced in 90
percent of the countries, including Iraq, were at risk of direct physical
attack or threat. In 58 percent of the countries, the internally displaced
were at risk of forced migration. These and other incidents reflected in
figure 3 below have the potential to occur in Northern Iraq.

Figure 3: Threats to Internally Displaced Persons, 2001 Source: GAO survey
of 48 of the more than 50 countries with internally displaced persons. The
survey includes Iraq. We have also reported that international
organizations are generally effective at delivering food, health care,
shelter, and water to displaced persons to sustain life during the initial
stages of displacement. However, as the displacement moves from the
emergency phase into a longerterm situation, international organizations
are less effective in meeting the needs of displaced populations.
Oversight Questions 1. What steps are the United States, Iraq authorities,
and international organizations taking to

protect internally displaced persons from physical attack or threat,
forced migration, loss of employment opportunities, and access to
education, health care, and services? 2. Does adequate security exist for
relief workers operating among displaced populations? 3. Are the United
States and international organizations meeting the basic assistance needs*

food, water and sanitation, health care* of the displaced population? Do
international organizations factor the long- term assistance needs of
displaced populations into their planning and programming? 4. How
effective is coordination among U. N., international, and nongovernmental
organizations in preventing gaps and duplication of coverage?

Enclosure IV 12 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Post- conflict Peace Operation

Issue The U. S.- led peace operation will provide the framework for Iraq*s
reconstruction and political transformation; providing security and
stability will be a critical task for the military aspects of the
operation (see fig. 4). The operation also includes civilian aspects to
establish an interim national government, foster conditions for a
democratic transition, and rebuild the economy. The United States has
worked with allies and the United Nations in conducting similar tasks in
Bosnia and Kosovo, the largest recent peace operations. However, these
entities have one- fifth the population of Iraq. The United States has not
led a peace operation of the magnitude of Iraq since U. S. efforts at the
end of World War II.

Figure 4: U. S. Troops Provide Crowd Control in Baghdad

Source: Department of Defense, U. S. Army (April 16, 2003). Context We
have conducted more than 30 reviews of peacekeeping operations and have
identified factors

that are important to successfully implementing complex peace operations.
4 First, establishing a secure environment is necessary for economic and
political rebuilding to proceed. To provide security, the peace operation
needs clear objectives, adequate resources, and clear measures of success.
Second, peace operations need to be structured so that they can direct and
coordinate allies, the United Nations, international financial
institutions, and other organizations. The

4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Issues in Implementing International
Peace Operations, GAO- 02- 707R (Washington, D. C.: May 24, 2002) and
Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of
NATO*s Stabilization Force, GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 19 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 8,
1998).

Enclosure IV 13 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

structure of the Bosnia mission, where the high representative has clear
authority to make and enforce decisions, has had some success in this
regard. Third, peace operations are most successful when military and
civilian components work together closely and involve local participation
in making decisions. However, on some sensitive issues, such as the
political status of volatile regions, decisions may have to be deferred so
that progress can be made toward a

transition. The Iraq peace operation differs from recent ones in that the
United States, rather than the United Nations, will direct operations.
Also, the United States will likely provide more troops than in previous
operations. For example, in the first year of the peace operation in
Bosnia, the United States provided approximately 18,000 troops. Several
sources estimate the United States will have to deploy 70,000 to 100,000
troops or more during the first year of stability operations in Iraq. 5 To
lighten the U. S. load, the United States is consulting with allies
regarding their possible role in post war Iraq. For example, in the past
NATO has helped provided security (see fig. 5).

Figure 5: NATO Forces Provide Security at a Checkpoint in Bosnia

Source: GAO. Oversight Questions 1. What are the objectives of the peace
operation? Are the U. S. and international resources

available to the operation adequate to accomplish the tasks and
objectives? What are the measures of success? 2. How is the peace
operation structured? What are the respective roles of the military and

civilian components of the operation? What are the roles of allies and
international organizations? How effectively are U. S. agencies, allies,
and international organizations coordinating their efforts? 3. What is the
transition strategy, and how is it being implemented? What issues, if any,
are

being deferred? What are the time frames for the transition? 4. What
progress is the peace operation making in providing security, establishing
an interim government, and rebuilding the economy? What are the
challenges?

5 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, Background Paper:
Potential Cost of a War With Iraq and Its Post- War Occupation (Feb. 25,
2003).

Enclosure V 14 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Training and Equipping an Iraqi National Army

Issue A key component to ensure stability and protect the territorial
integrity of Iraq is the establishment of a professional, civilian-
controlled military. The United States is presently playing a role in
training and equipping the Afghanistan national army and has done so for
other militaries in the past (see fig. 6). While the U. S. role in
training and equipping an Iraqi military is presently unclear, past
endeavors have had to address several issues, including the host
military*s capability to absorb, integrate, and maintain the training and
equipment it receives, as well as determine how the training and equipment
are ultimately used. Figure 6: U. S. Special Forces Issue Uniforms to New
Recruits at the Afghan National Army Training Site in Kabul,

Afghanistan

Source: Department of Defense, U. S. Army (May 14, 2002). Context The
Departments of State and Defense manage assistance programs that attempt
to identify and address the requirements of selected foreign militaries.
These programs frequently include some

mix of foreign military financing of equipment and training, international
military education and training, joint exercises, and provision of excess
defense articles. The United States does not provide this assistance in a
vacuum; other nations often provide similar types of assistance to foreign
militaries. In some cases, these nations have aims and security objectives
similar to those of the United States. Even when those aims and objectives
are compatible, the United States*s and other nations* military
traditions, doctrine, and equipment may not be compatible. This raises
questions about whether the assistance provided by allies and other
organizations

Enclosure V 15 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

reinforces or counters our efforts, thus calling into question the value,
sustainability, and effectiveness of U. S. assistance to foreign
militaries.

While our recent evaluations have not focused on building, training, and
equipping entire foreign militaries, we have evaluated selected U. S.
assistance efforts. For example, our review of defense drawdowns to Bosnia
and Jordan highlighted the importance of ensuring that countries have
sufficient funding to maintain or operate the defense articles provided. 6
Our reviews of U. S. efforts to train and equip Colombian Army and
national police counternarcotics units showed that U. S. assistance had
been of limited utility for several reasons. 7 For example, there were
long- standing problems in planning and implementing U. S. assistance,
such as inadequate operations and maintenance funding. Further, we had
concerns about the appropriateness and timeliness of the assistance.
Moreover, the effectiveness of U. S. assistance was hampered because the
Colombian government had little control over large parts of its territory.

Questions have been raised about the adequacy of U. S. planning for post-
conflict assistance to Iraq and the timeliness of these efforts. Although
U. S. efforts to train and equip an Iraqi national army will likely be
broader and more extensive than U. S. efforts in Colombia, many of the
oversight and evaluation issues associated with U. S. efforts will be
quite similar.

Oversight Questions 1. What is the plan to build, train, and equip the
Iraqi national army, and how does it fit into broader objectives for
achieving security in Iraq? 2. What have been the costs associated with
this plan, and what are the estimates of future

costs? 3. What measures have been taken to ensure that U. S. assistance is
used for intended purposes

and that donor assistance is coordinated? 4. To what extent have lessons
learned been identified and applied to improve the effectiveness

of efforts to train and equip the Iraqi military? 5. What factors, if any,
hinder the provision and/ or effectiveness of U. S. assistance, and what

steps have U. S. officials taken to address these factors? 6 U. S. General
Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Reporting of Defense Articles and
Services Provided through Drawdowns Needs to be Improved, GAO- 02- 1027
(Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20, 2002). 7 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Drug Control: U. S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce
Results, GAO- 01- 26 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 17, 2000).

Enclosure VI 16 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Economic Transition Issues

Issue The administration has stated that the creation of a competitive
private sector within a democratic political system is one of its primary
goals for Iraq. Although near- term economic assistance will focus on
humanitarian and reconstruction needs, fostering long- term economic
stability will require fundamental changes in institutions and laws that
underpin market economies. Based on experience with other economic
transitions, this transition is likely to face substantial challenges and
will take a long time. For example, a major challenge facing Iraq is
whether and how to privatize Iraq*s vast oil resources for the long- term
benefit of all the Iraqi people. Some oil production is already coming
back on- line (see fig. 7). Figure 7: American, British, and Iraqi Oil
Workers Complete Reopening of Four Wells in the Rumeila Field Source:
Department of State (April 2003). Context Since the mid- 1990s, our
reports on U. S. and international efforts to assist economic transition
in

Russia and other former Soviet Union countries have highlighted challenges
in moving from economic and political upheaval to long- term sustainable
economic growth. 8 For example, we found that moving countries from state
control to market economies rooted in democratic

8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: International
Efforts to Aid Russia*s Transition Have Had Mixed Results, GAO- 01- 8
(Washington, D. C.: Nov. 1, 2000); Former Soviet Union: U. S. Rule of Law
Assistance Has Had Limited Impact, GAO- 01- 354 (Washington, D. C.: Apr.
17, 2001); Former Soviet Union: Information on U. S. Bilateral Program
Funding, GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 37 (Washington, D. C.: Dec. 15, 1995).

Enclosure VI 17 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

institutions has taken longer, cost more, and been considerably more
difficult than anticipated. Because transition periods are often
associated with increased economic hardships, maintaining public support
for long- term goals can be especially difficult. Specific lessons have
been learned from these transitions: (1) local *ownership* of reforms is
necessary for long- term success; (2) coordinating international efforts
to promote reform efforts has been a significant challenge; and (3) lack
of program focus, poor design, and implementation problems have undermined
efforts.

U. S. and international efforts to promote economic and democratic
transitions have relied on the consent of the countries, and little
progress has been made without the support of the recipient country. This
major barrier may not be as significant an issue in post war Iraq, because
Iraqi authorities have indicated their interest in reviving the economy
and needing the help and cooperation of the United States and
international organizations.

Oversight Questions 1. What role does the United States plan to play in
promoting economic transition in Iraq? To what degree will the United
States be responsible for directly writing and implementing new laws and
procedures; how will the United States ensure the support and *buy- in* of
Iraqi officials? 2. How long is U. S. involvement in Iraq*s economic
transition expected to last? How much

will it cost the United States? 3. How will the transition for specific
sectors, such as oil, be carried out? What will be the

mix of private and public ownership and control in such sectors? 4. What
will be the respective roles of other foreign governments and
international

institutions in fostering economic reform in Iraq? How will coordination
be handled among U. S. federal departments and agencies, and among the
United States and other governments and organizations?

5. If other institutions (e. g., the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund) are involved in covering the social costs, what role will
they play in developing and implementing the programs? 6. To what extent
will former Ba*ath Party members be allowed to participate in the new

governing and judicial institutions? What authority will the United States
and other donors have to ensure the implementation of economic reform
efforts?

Enclosure VII 18 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Reconstruction

Issue The United States will spend a significant amount of money to help
repair and rebuild Iraq*s infrastructure and social sectors. The Congress
has appropriated $2.5 billion in emergency supplemental funding for relief
and reconstruction. The U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
will play a major role in the reconstruction of Iraq and has awarded

several grants and contracts to help rebuild Iraq, including contracts for
public health, capital construction, and local governance. The Department
of Defense has been delegated overall responsibility for Iraqi relief and
reconstruction and has begun some initial efforts (see fig. 8), but the
precise roles of USAID and Defense in the reconstruction are unclear.

Figure 8: U. S. Navy Seabee Engineers Refurbishing the Al Nasiriyah Police
Headquarters Building Source: Department of Defense, U. S. Air Force
(April 2003). Context USAID traditionally provides short- term, quickly
disbursed emergency relief and long- term development assistance designed
to bring about sustainable economic growth and improvements in health,
education, governance, and other sectors. However, USAID also has been
asked to provide large amounts of short- term disaster recovery assistance
in efforts that differ from its usual mandate. For example, USAID provided
$553 in hurricane reconstruction assistance over a 2 and a half- year
period in Latin America. This work included infrastructure repair and
construction, efforts not traditionally within USAID*s purview (see fig.
9). During our review of that assistance, we made recommendations to USAID
to develop mechanisms to quickly relocate

Enclosure VII 19 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

or to hire the staff needed to oversee a large reconstruction program with
a relatively short time frame. 9 Figure 9: Longer- term USAID Project
Provided for Bridge Reconstruction in Honduras Source: GAO. In Iraq, USAID
may be responsible for disbursing billions over the next few years* some
analysts

estimate an annual cost of $20 billion to fund reconstruction and maintain
the U. S. presence-- and could face several problems even more challenging
than those involved in hurricane reconstruction. First, although USAID
will likely play a major role and has already entered into some contracts
for Iraq, the President has delegated overall responsibility for relief
and reconstruction to the Department of Defense. Second, project
implementation and oversight will depend to a large extent on the security
situation in country. Third, the amount of funding is projected to be much
larger, and questions may arise about whether the Iraqi economy will be
able to absorb it.

Oversight Questions

1. How will the Department of Defense, USAID, and other U. S. government
agencies involved in the reconstruction program ensure that funds are
spent for intended purposes? 2. What are USAID*s plans for staffing the
reconstruction effort in a timely manner? 3. How will U. S. government
agencies coordinate with one another and other international

donors to minimize duplication and overlap? 9 U. S. General Accounting
Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed Intended
Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its Response
Capability, GAO- 02- 787 (Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002).

After Before

Enclosure VIII 20 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq U. N. Oil for Food Program

Issue The oil for food program provided goods and services to every sector
of the Iraq economy* food and agriculture, water, sanitation, education,
power generation, transportation, oil processing, and housing. 10 Since
1996, the program has employed more than 44,000 people, required a
national economic and distribution plan, and accounted for about 70
percent (based on 2002 estimates) of Iraq*s gross domestic product. The
Security Council has renewed the program until June 3, 2003. However, when
to transfer control of Iraq*s oil resources from the United Nations to an
Iraq authority and how to ensure a smooth transition are major issues.
Figure 10 shows the physical location for monitoring Iraq*s oil exports
and its imports* an element of the program to be eliminated.

Figure 10: Exit and Entry Points for Oil for Food Imports and Exports

Context Since 1996, the U. N. oil for food program has generated $64
billion from oil sales and has been the primary provider of food for 60
percent of Iraqis. Oil exports under the program have 10 U. S. General
Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: U. N. Confronts
Significant Challenges in Implementing Sanctions against Iraq, GAO- 02-
625 (Washington, D. C.: May 23, 2002).

Enclosure VIII 21 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

averaged nearly $10 billion per year since 1997. However, Iraq has not
exported oil since March 2003. Despite this, as of May 2003, the program
had about $3.2 billion dollars in uncommitted funds and another $10.1
billion of funds that had been committed for goods not yet delivered to
Iraq. The $10 billion had not yet been paid out. Some of the goods to be
delivered included $2.4

billion in food commodities and $506 million in water and sanitation
equipment (see fig. 11). In addition to the above, the program approved
but has not funded about $7 billion in contracts that were signed by the
former Iraqi government.

Figure 11: Oil for Food Program Funded the Construction of a Water Station
in Northern Iraq Source: (c) United Nations (March 2003). The program*s
rationale* allowing Iraq to provide for its essential civilian and
humanitarian needs, while preventing the purchase of goods to develop
weapons of mass destruction* has now largely ended. However, transitioning
such a large program and its remaining funds and functions to a U. S. or
Iraqi authority that can effectively undertake reconstruction remains a
challenge.

Oversight Questions 1. What are the options for dealing with the oil for
food program*s $3.2 billion in available funds and $7 billion in contracts
signed by the former Iraqi government? 2. To what extent are the $10
billion in undelivered commodities coordinated with U. S. and

other humanitarian and reconstruction plans? 3. How will the United
Nations ensure a full accounting and reporting for a closeout of the

program*s funds and assets? 4. How will the United States ensure that the
functions of the oil for food program* food distribution, medical
services, etc.* continue as needed?

5. What are the plans for and challenges to effectively transitioning the
oil for food functions to an Iraqi authority and within what time frame?
6. What oversight will be in place to ensure that the transfer of the
program and the future use

of oil revenues are effective and without corruption?

Enclosure IX 22 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Financing External Debt

Issue By some estimates, Iraq*s external debt and war reparations from
1991 may be as high as $200 billion and $227 billion, respectively. The
large debt burden could significantly hinder humanitarian and economic
reconstruction efforts. In addition, it is unclear whether Iraq should be
made to honor its external obligations or whether creditors and others
should relieve this burden.

The precise amount of Iraq*s external debt is unknown because firm data
are not available from some creditors or from the Iraqi government.
Estimates vary widely* ranging from $42.1 billion to $200 billion (see
table 1), making it difficult to know how much debt is owed to
multilateral institutions, foreign governments, and the private sector.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies projects that Iraq owes
most of its debt to non- OECD countries, including Kuwait, other Gulf
States, and Russia, which includes both governments and the private
sector. Since Iraq ceased to service its debt to most creditors in 1990,
it also has significant accumulated interest charges (see fig. 12). 11
Table 1: Estimates of Iraq*s External Debts

Source Amount

(U. S. Dollars in billions) Comments CIA World Factbook (2001) $62 Does
not provide a breakdown U. S. Energy Information Administration (2003)
$100- 200 Does not provide a breakdown Center for Strategic and
International Studies (2003)

$127 Includes some creditors and accrued interest Government of Iraq
(1991) $42 Does not include interest and $30b in loans from Gulf states
Former Iraqi Central Bank (2002) $130 Does not provide a breakdown

OECD (2001) a $11.5 Includes debt owed only to OECD members Source: GAO
analysis. a The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is composed of 30 industrialized countries.

Context As of March 16, 2003, the United Nations estimates that Iraq still
has unpaid or unsettled claims of $227 billion owed to individuals,
families, companies, governments, and international organizations for
different types of losses, such as personal injury, death, property,
business, and nonpayment of goods and services (see fig. 13). 11 Iraq owes
U. S. government $2 billion deriving from loan guarantees made by the
Agriculture Department*s

Commodity Credit Corporation.

Enclosure IX 23 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Fig. 12: Iraqi External Debt ($ 127 billion) Fig. 13: Unpaid or Unsettled
Reparations Claims ($ 227.4 billion) Source: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, OECD, and GAO analysis. Source: U. N. Compensation
Commission.

The current forum for rescheduling or relieving Iraq*s official bilateral
debt is through the *Paris Club,* 12 which is generally composed of
members of the OECD. However, a large portion of Iraq*s debt is owed to
countries that are not members of the Paris Club, and it is uncertain
whether these countries would conform to a Paris Club framework. Relief of
commercial debt is usually through the *London Club.* 13 Furthermore, it
is unclear how to address a request for the pardon of Gulf war
reparations, nor whether such a request would include claims that have
been settled but not yet paid.

Oversight Questions 1. What is a realistic estimate of Iraq*s external
debt? What is the composition of this debt by creditor? 2. If debt relief
is pursued, will there be full participation of all creditors, including
multilaterals,

Paris Club, non- Paris Club, and commercial creditors? Will any relief
package result in comparable terms of forgiveness and equitable burden
sharing to all creditors? 3. How are war reparations claims to be
resolved? Is this process open to modifications by the

U. N. Security Council, which established the resolution governing the war
reparations claims? 4. What are the lessons learned from recent experience
in relieving external debt of former

regimes? 5. How does Iraq*s external debt burden affect its ability to
attract new investments? Does the

manner in which the existing debt and claims are resolved affect future
investment decisions?

12 A group of bilateral creditor countries that meet to negotiate
sovereign debt rescheduling and debt relief. 13 A group of commercial
creditors that meet to restructure sovereign debt owed to commercial
banks. U. S.

$2 Russia $12

Kuw ait $17

Other Gulf states $30 Multilateral

creditors $0.5 Other OECD

$9.5 Other non- OECD

$9 Interest $47

Governments/ International organizations

$181.7 Corporations

$25.1 Individuals

$20. 6

Enclosure X 24 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Developing a Commercial Strategy

Issue Rebuilding Iraq is expected to be the largest reconstruction effort
since World War II. The reconstruction will occur in many sectors,
including environmental clean- up; oil well repairs and refinery
improvements; construction of schools, water systems, roads, railroads,
airports and seaports; telecommunications networks; and hospital
equipment. U. S. firms can play a leading role in promoting economic
stability by providing local employment and helping Iraq transition to a
market economy. However, past reconstruction efforts indicate that U. S.
trade agencies need to coordinate their efforts to identify and develop
commercial opportunities that can be available to a wide variety of U. S.
businesses (see fig. 14).

Figure 14: A Compressed Earth Block Machine Intended to Help Build Schools
in Kabul, Afghanistan

Source: Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Context As we noted in
our recent work, U. S. agencies play separate but integrated roles in the
development of post conflict countries. 14 Initial USAID assistance can
lead to commercial 14 U. S. General Accounting Office, Export Promotion:
Mixed Progress in Achieving a Governmentwide Strategy, GAO- 02- 850
(Washington, D. C.: Sept. 4, 2002).

Enclosure X 25 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

opportunities for U. S. firms, particularly in the water and environmental
sectors. To pursue these opportunities, the Trade and Development Agency
funds U. S.- contracted studies that help foreign governments determine
the design of infrastructure projects. Commerce*s Foreign Commercial
Service informs U. S. businesses of project opportunities and coordinates
with other U. S. agencies to help win projects and see them to completion.
To help a business compete for a project, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation mitigates the risks businesses face in post crisis countries
by providing project insurance and finance. The Export- Import Bank helps
businesses export products, such as the equipment used in reconstruction,
by providing loans and guarantees on exports.

U. S. trade agencies routinely face challenges when participating in newly
developing markets of transitional countries. In the Former Soviet Union
(FSU), they have coordinated the development of an oil pipeline through
the FSU and Turkey, and more recently have been doing market development
in Southeast Europe. In a recent Department of Commerce survey, U. S.
businesses cited the need for U. S. agencies to better coordinate the
early identification and

development of projects. In an effort to improve coordination and identify
project opportunities, Commerce*s Foreign Commercial Service, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade and Development Agency have
colocated in offices in Croatia and Turkey. The benefits of this approach
have not been evaluated. Plans to rebuild Iraq will benefit from an
examination of the lessons learned in prior U. S. government
reconstruction efforts.

Oversight Questions 1. How has the Foreign Commercial Service coordinated
with other U. S. agencies in identifying business opportunities in post
conflict countries, including Iraq? 2. How effective were USG commercial
strategies in post conflict countries and regions of interest?

3. What lessons can be learned from past U. S. efforts to develop business
opportunities in post conflict countries and regions of interest? How can
these lessons be integrated into the reconstruction of Iraq?

Enclosure XI 26 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Promoting Democracy

Issue The administration has linked regime change in Iraq with the
opportunity to promote democracy and create a model for the spread of
democratic values in the Middle East. However, Iraq*s underlying
conditions, including the lack of a democratic tradition and sharp ethnic,
religious, and regional differences, will likely present significant
challenges to democratization efforts. World Bank indicators measuring
broad dimensions of governance in individual countries demonstrate the
challenge of transforming Iraq. Iraq ranked lower than virtually all other
countries in the world on three crucial measures of good governance. The
average ranking for countries in the Middle East is also considerably
higher than for Iraq (see fig. 15).

Figure 15: Ranking of Iraq and the Middle East Region on Good Governance
Indicators, 2000- 2001 0% 10% 20%

30% 40%

50% 60%

Iraq Middle East & North Africa Voice and Accountability Government
Effectiveness Rule of Law

Source: GAO analysis of World Bank data. Context In figure 15, voice and
accountability measure political rights, civil liberties, and media

independence; government effectiveness measures government abilities to
implement sound policies and provide public services; and the rule of law
measures crime, judiciary effectiveness, and the enforceability of
contracts. We have reported that democratic reform is a slow and
challenging process and that a long term

U. S. commitment is necessary if U. S.- supported reforms are to be
sustainable and have an impact. U. S. assistance generally has had greater
success in helping countries administer elections and draft and enact new
legislation. However, the more difficult challenges have been to develop
an underlying culture for democratic reform and building institutions to
implement reforms that lead to meaningful long- term change. U. S.
assistance supporting democratic reforms in the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
and Latin America has had mixed results in creating more transparent and
accountable governments and increasing citizen participation in political

Enclosure XI 27 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

life. 15 Factors affecting the results of this assistance have been the
host country commitment to and resources provided for reform and the
effectiveness of coordination among U. S. agencies and other international
donors. Conditions in Iraq will present a number of significant and unique
challenges to democratic development:

Establishing a common national identity as a foundation for
democratization appears to be a more difficult challenge than that faced
in the FSU or Latin America. Iraq is characterized by significant
religious, regional, and ethnic divisions. An additional dilemma is how to
rid the new government of the influence of Ba*ath party functionaries, who
may be extensively imbedded in the existing bureaucracy.

Iraq currently lacks a rule of law, a multiparty political structure,
separation of powers, and a democratic tradition. Iraqi exile figures
appear to be largely distrusted within Iraq. In addition, new leadership
will have to be built from the ground up.

U. S. policymakers also face the dilemma that democratic development in
Iraq and the Middle East could have the result of empowering Islamist
groups that have widespread popularity and are unfriendly to U. S.
interests.

Oversight Questions 1. How are U. S. agencies planning for democracy-
building activities in Iraq? What are the short- and long- term objectives
of these efforts? What is the nature of these assistance efforts and their
related costs? 2. To what extent are U. S. agencies involved in post war
democracy- building activities

coordinating their efforts to ensure that they have common objectives and
provide assistance efficiently and effectively? How are these agencies
coordinating with other donors? 3. Are U. S. agencies applying lessons
learned from previous U. S. democracy- building efforts in

post conflict societies? 4. To what extent are democracy- related foreign
aid programs linked to high- level U. S. diplomatic efforts to encourage
democratic development in Iraq?

5. What are the administration*s plans for linking democratization in Iraq
to wider democracybuilding efforts in the Middle East?

15 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: U. S. Economic
and Democratic Assistance to the Central Asian Republics, GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
200 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 11, 1999), and Foreign Assistance: U. S.
Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest
Results,

GAO- 03- 358 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 18, 2003).

Enclosure XII 28 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Issue During the 1990s, Iraq developed weapons of mass destruction (WMD)*
chemical, biological, and nuclear* and their delivery vehicles, including
ballistic missiles (see fig. 16). However, Iraq did not fully account for
this material and for its WMD infrastructure, as required by U. N.
resolutions. Uncertainty about the location, type, and quantities of these
materials and related technologies poses an immediate threat to U. S. and
coalition forces in country. The possibility of unsecured WMD also poses
long- term threats of theft and proliferation to other states or terrorist
groups.

Figure 16: Al Samoud 2 Missile Facility Near Baghdad

Source: (c) (2003) United Nations. Context We reviewed U. S. programs
intended to help the FSU secure and destroy its WMD stocks. These

programs also tried to ensure that WMD scientists are employed in peaceful
activities to discourage them from selling their skills to countries of
concern or terrorist groups. We found that securing and destroying weapons
of mass destruction can take longer and cost more than expected. 16
Moreover, human proliferation of WMD knowledge is a significant concern.
In this regard, State lacked complete information on the number and
locations of senior scientists who

16 U. S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to
Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, GAO/
NSIAD- 99- 76 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 13, 1999).

Enclosure XII 29 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

once developed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile
systems for the former Soviet Union. 17 The most significant difference
between the U. S. experience in providing disarmament assistance

to states of the former Soviet Union and Iraq is that the Russian
government had to agree to participate in the U. S. Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs. Issues over Russian cooperation and access to
facilities have slowed U. S. efforts to help secure Russia*s arsenal of
weapons of mass destruction. 18 These same issues may not arise with a
strong U. S. presence in Iraq.

Oversight Questions 1. What role should international organizations and
the U. S. government play in disarming Iraq and in locating, securing, and
destroying stockpiles and equipment related to chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons production? Are U. S. government agencies and American
contractors with relevant experience and expertise involved in this
process? 2. What are estimates of the size of Iraq*s stockpiles of
available chemical, biological, and nuclear materials and facilities? What
U. S. funds will be needed to secure such stocks from

theft or diversion and, ultimately, to destroy them? 3. How many Iraqi
scientists have WMD expertise, and where are they now? What steps should

be taken to limit the proliferation of their expertise? 4. What military
and dual- use items were exported to Iraq in violation of the U. N.
embargo, and

how did Iraq acquire these items? What companies and countries provided
the items? How has the U. S. government responded to apparent violations
of the embargo? 5. What lessons could be learned from the United Nations*
inspection experience that would be

relevant to U. S. or international WMD inspection procedures? 17 U. S.
General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department
Oversight of Science Centers Program, GAO- 01- 582 (Washington, D. C.: May
10, 2001). 18 U. S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U. S.
Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO- 03- 482 (Washington, D.
C.: Mar. 24, 2003).

30 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag III: Related GAO Products

Below are selected examples of recent GAO products related to
reconstruction.

Humanitarian Relief and Food Aid

Food Aid: Experience of U. S. Programs Suggests Opportunities for
Improvement. GAO- 02- 801T. Washington, D. C.: June 6, 2002. Humanitarian
Affairs: Internally Displaced Persons Lack Effective Protection. GAO- 01-
803.

Washington, D. C.: Aug. 17, 2001.

Foreign Assistance: U. S. Food Aid to Russia Had Weak Internal Controls.
GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 329. Washington, D. C.: Sept. 29, 2000.

Foreign Assistance: North Korean Constraints Limit Food Aid Monitoring. T-
NSIAD- 00- 47. Washington, D. C.: Oct. 27, 1999.

Peace Operations

Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations. GAO- 02- 707R.
Washington, D. C.: May 24, 2002.

Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of Dayton
Peace Agreement. T- NSIAD- 00- 219. Washington, D. C.: July 19, 2000.
Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional
Stability. GAO/ NSIAD- 00-

125BR. Washington, D. C.: Apr. 24, 2000.

Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of
NATO*s Stabilization Force. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 138. Washington, D. C.: Oct.
8, 1998.

United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore
Peace.

GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 34. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 27, 1997.

Economic Reform and Reconstruction

Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed Intended Purposes,
but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its Response Capability.
GAO- 02- 787. Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002.

Foreign Assistance: Implementing Disaster Recovery Assistance in Latin
America. GAO- 01- 541T. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 21, 2001.

Foreign Assistance: International Efforts to Aid Russia*s Transition Have
Had Mixed Results.

GAO- 01- 08. Washington, D. C.: Nov. 1, 2000. World Bank: Management
Controls Stronger, but Challenges in Fighting Corruption Remain.

GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 273. Washington, D. C.: Apr. 6, 2000.

Governance and Democracy Building

Foreign Assistance: U. S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American
Countries Have Yielded Modest Results. GAO- 03- 058. Washington, D. C.:
Mar. 18, 2003. Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, But Key Efforts
Are Lagging. GAO- 02- 569. Washington, D. C.: June 13, 2002. Former Soviet
Union: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and
Sustainability.

GAO- 01- 740T. Washington, D. C.: May 17, 2001. Foreign Assistance: Peru
on Track for Free and Fair Elections but Faces Major Challenges. GAO01-
496T. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 14, 2001.

Foreign Assistance: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance to Five Latin American
Countries. GAO/ NSIAD99- 195. Washington, D. C.: Aug. 4, 1999. Foreign
Assistance: U. S. Economic and Democratic Assistance to Central Asian
Republics. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 200. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 11, 1999.

31 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag Security Assistance and Agreements

Central and Southwest Asian Countries: Trends in U. S. Assistance and Key
Economic, Governance, and Demographic Characteristics. GAO- 03- 634R.
Washington, D. C.: May 9, 2003).

Foreign Assistance: Reporting of Defense Articles and Services Provided
through Drawdowns Needs to Be Improved. GAO- 02- 1027. Washington, D. C.:
Sept. 20, 2002.

NATO: Progress Toward More Mobile and Deployable Forces. GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
929. Washington, D. C.: Sept. 30, 1999.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U. S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO- 03-
482. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 24, 2003. Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Observations on U. S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation

Programs in Russia. GAO- 03- 526T. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 5, 2003.

Arms Control: Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.
GAO- 02- 1038NI. Washington, D. C.: Sept. 30, 2002.

Biological Weapons: Efforts to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers
Benefits, Poses New Risks.

GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 138. Washington, D. C.: Apr. 28, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: U. N. Confronts Significant Challenges in
Implementing Sanctions against Iraq. GAO- 02- 625. Washington, D. C.: May
2002. (832013)
*** End of document. ***