    Rebuilding Iraq (15-MAY-03, GAO-03-792R).

    Rebuilding Iraq is a U.S. national security priority. As part of
    this effort, Congress appropriated $79 billon in emergency
    supplemental funds for fiscal year 2003 for military operations
    and Iraq's reconstruction, including humanitarian relief,
    peacekeeping, and economic and political reform. We have issued
    reports on similar programs to rebuild countries in the former
    Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and other locations (see
    attachment III for a listing of previous GAO reports). Based on
    this work, we have developed short papers to help congressional
    decision-makers think about and prioritize the range of issues
    related to rebuilding Iraq.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-792R
        ACCNO:   A06958
      TITLE:     Rebuilding Iraq
         DATE:   05/15/2003
      SUBJECT:   Economic development
    	     Economic growth
    	     Emergency medical services
    	     Federal aid to foreign countries
    	     Food supply
    	     Foreign governments
    	     International economic relations
    	     Medical equipment
    	     Medical supplies
    	     Physical security
    	     Political activities
    	     Political candidates
    	     Weapons
    	     Peace keeping
    	     Iraq

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    GAO-03-792R

    GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    May 15, 2003 The Honorable Richard G. Lugar Chairman The Honorable Joseph
    R. Biden Ranking Minority Member Committee on Foreign Relations United
    States Senate

    The Honorable Henry J. Hyde Chairman The Honorable Tom Lantos Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on International Relations House of
    Representatives

    Subject: Rebuilding Iraq Rebuilding Iraq is a U. S. national security
    priority. As part of this effort, Congress appropriated $79 billon in
    emergency supplemental funds for fiscal year 2003 for military operations
    and Iraq*s reconstruction, including humanitarian relief, peacekeeping,
    and economic and political reform. We have issued reports on similar
    programs to rebuild countries in the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet
    Union, and other locations (see attachment III for a listing of previous
    GAO reports). Based on this work, we have developed short papers to help
    congressional decision- makers think about and prioritize the range of
    issues related to rebuilding Iraq. These papers cover the following
    topics.

    Food Aid and Humanitarian Relief

    The conflict in Iraq has compromised the country*s food security and its
    medical and water systems. In response, the World Food Program has
    developed an emergency plan to meet the food needs of 27 million Iraqis,
    at a cost of $1.2 billion, from March 25 to September 25, 2003. Other
    donors, including the United States, are providing medicine and potable
    water to many locations. In addition, as many as 1 million Arabs may be
    displaced in Northern Iraq by Kurds, who are retaking the homes and
    villages they were expelled from over the last three decades. Potential
    issues are the total cost of food and humanitarian aid, coordination and
    effectiveness of humanitarian aid, the transition from emergency aid to
    sustainable living, and efforts to provide for the internally displaced.

    Peace Operations

    The peace operation in Iraq presents significant security and political
    challenges for the United States. Some tasks for the peacekeeping phase
    are providing security,

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    2 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    establishing an interim authority, establishing conditions for a
    transition to democracy, and directing efforts to rebuild the economy.
    Another key task is rebuilding a professional, civilian- controlled
    military to help ensure stability and protect the territorial integrity of
    Iraq once the peacekeeping forces withdraw. Potential oversight issues
    include the role, structure, and transition strategy of the peace
    operation; progress and challenges in providing security and establishing
    an interim authority; the role of allies and international organizations;
    and the factors that could hinder the effectiveness of U. S. assistance to
    train and equip an Iraqi national army.

    Economic Reform and Reconstruction

    Building a sustainable market economy in Iraq will likely be a long- term
    effort. Iraq*s centralized economic and political structure will require
    fundamental changes similar to those that are taking place in the
    countries of the former Soviet Union. The most immediate concern is Iraq*s
    physical reconstruction, including building roads, schools, and power
    plants. Another immediate concern is Iraq*s external debt and its war
    reparations resulting from the 1990 invasion of Kuwait* estimated to be as
    much as $400 billion. Additional concerns are the U. N. sanctions against
    Iraq and the related oil for food program, which still has more than $3
    billion in escrow. Potential issues include oversight of the efficiency
    and effectiveness of reconstruction; the role and contributions of allies,
    the United Nations, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund; the
    pros and cons of forgiving Iraq*s external debt; and resolution of the oil
    for food program.

    Governance and Democracy Building

    Iraq lacks a democratic tradition, including a stable multiparty political
    structure and real opportunities for citizen involvement in government
    decision making. These conditions, together with sharp ethnic, religious,
    and regional differences in the country, present significant challenges to
    efforts to promote democracy. Some potential issues include the scope and
    effectiveness of democracy- building projects; efforts to draft a new
    constitution, reform existing criminal and civil codes, and develop a
    neutral and competent police force; effectiveness of anticorruption
    efforts; and the role of the allies, United Nations, and other
    international organizations in these efforts.

    Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Iraq implemented active programs to develop weapons of mass destruction
    (chemical, biological, and nuclear) and their delivery vehicles, but has
    not fully accounted for them. Uncertainties over the location of this
    material pose a threat to U. S. and coalition forces in country and a
    long- term threat of theft and proliferation to other states or terrorist
    groups. Iraq*s past record of developing weapons of mass destruction also
    raises questions about the various multilateral export control
    arrangements and their ability to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction in countries of concern, such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and
    Iran. Potential issues include the cost and effectiveness of U. S.
    programs to locate and destroy Iraq*s weapons, the role of international
    organizations in this effort, and the effectiveness of international
    export controls.

    3 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    These papers raise a number of oversight questions about rebuilding Iraq
    that Congress may wish to consider. Consistent with our Congressional
    Protocols, we encourage early discussion with us to explore whether GAO
    might be of assistance in this regard. If you have any questions, please
    contact me at (202) 512- 3655 or Joseph Christoff, Director, at (202) 512-
    8979.

    Susan S. Westin Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade

    Enclosure I 4 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag I. Iraq Point Paper Source:
    CIA.

    The United States does not maintain an embassy in Iraq. Iraq*s land area
    is about 432,000 square kilometers (about the size of California). Iraq is
    bordered by Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi

    Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, as well as by the Persian Gulf. In 1990, the
    United States imposed sanctions on Iraq in response to its invasion of
    Kuwait. On March 19, 2003, the United States launched military operations
    against Iraq to disarm the country of its weapons of mass destruction and
    to remove Saddam Hussein*s government from power. More than three-
    quarters of Iraq*s population is Arab, but the country has a significant
    Kurdish population. Nearly two- thirds of the population is Shi*a Muslim
    and more than a third of the population is Sunni Muslim. In addition, more
    than a third of Iraq*s population is under the age of 15. Under Saddam
    Hussein, the Iraqi government did not allow opposition parties to operate
    legally in the country. Iraq's economy was characterized by a heavy
    dependence on oil exports and an emphasis on development through central
    planning. Iraq has maritime and land boundary disputes with Iran.

    U. S. Assistance

    Between fiscal years 1990 and 2002, the United States provided about $25.5
    million in food assistance to Iraq. In addition, between 1991 and

    1996, the United States provided nearly $794 million in humanitarian
    assistance to internally displaced persons in northern Iraq. In March
    2003, the United States began military operations in Iraq in part to
    remove Saddam Hussein*s government from power. The fiscal year 2003
    emergency supplemental authorized about $2.5 billion for relief and
    reconstruction efforts in Iraq, available through fiscal year 2004. As of
    April 24, 2003, the Department of State and the U. S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID) estimated that they would provide about
    $596.5 million in assistance to Iraq in fiscal year 2003. This amount does
    not reflect all estimated assistance to Iraq for fiscal year 2003. U. S.
    Estimated Assistance, Fiscal Year 2003

    (U. S. dollars in millions) Agency and program Amount of assistance

    USAID Office of U. S. Foreign Disaster Assistance $49.2

    USAID Food for Peace 430.0 USAID Office of Transition Initiatives 2.3
    USAID Asia and Near East Region 78.4 Department of State Bureau of
    Population, Refugees, and Migration 36.6 Total $ 596.5 a Sources: U. S.
    Department of State and U. S. Agency for International Development. a The
    fiscal year 2003 emergency supplemental authorized about $2.5 billion for
    relief and reconstruction in Iraq.

    Enclosure I 5 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag International Aid Flows

    Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Assistance, 1990- 2001

    (Net disbursements, constant 2003 U. S. dollars in millions) From 1990
    through 2001, international aid

    flows totaled about $2.9 billion. U. S. and other countries* aid totaled
    about $2.2 billion, while multilateral aid totaled about $772 million.
    Primary donors included Germany,

    the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom, the
    European Commission, and the United Nations. 0

    200 400

    600 800

    Multilateral ODA 21.5 151.0 89.8 133.1 84.0 100.9 71.2 43.9 40.9 -3.4 17.4
    21.3 Other countries' ODA 86.5 119.3 80.6 83.8 87.9 134.9 197.8 198.4 81.4
    84.7 88.3 103.6 US ODA 0.0 420.0 0. 0 0.0 130.8 152.0 121.1 0. 0 0.0 0. 0
    0.0 0. 0

    1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Source:
    Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Note: Official
    development assistance (ODA) is defined as aid flows to a country provided
    by official agencies to promote economic development and welfare. ODA is
    reported as net disbursements and reflects total inflows of grants and
    loans minus total outflows of loan repayments. Demographics

    Key indicators Ethnic groups Religions

    Population (millions) 23.0 Growth rate (percentage)

    3.3 Under 15 years old (percentage)

    41.1 Life expectancy at birth (years) 67.4 Literacy (percentage)

    male female

    58 71 45 Seats in lower or single house held by women (percentage)

    7.6 Kurdish

    17.5% Other

    5.0% Arab 77.5%

    Sunni Muslim 34.5%

    Other 3.0%

    Shi'a Muslim 62.5% Sources: Global Insight, CIA, and the Inter-
    Parliamentary Union.

    Note: Ethnic and religious group percentages are estimated based on
    information from the CIA. The CIA lists ethnic group percentages as Arab
    (75 to 80 percent), Kurdish (15 to 20 percent), and other (5 percent) and
    religious group percentages as Shi*a Muslim (60 to 65 percent), Sunni
    Muslim (32 to 37 percent), and other (3 percent).

    Governance, Rights, and Freedoms

    Type of government Republic Type of legal system Based on Islamic law in
    special religious courts and civil law system elsewhere Source: CIA. Note:
    These indicators refer to the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein before
    March 19, 2003. Political rights and

    civil liberties Economic freedom

    Not free 7

    Repressed 5

    Free 1

    Free 1

    Enclosure I 6 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Sources: Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation. Note: These indicators
    refer to the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein before March 19, 2003.
    Economics and Trade

    Key indicators 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

    Gross domestic product (GDP) (purchasing power parity, 2002 U. S. dollars
    in billions) 9.2 10.2 11.4 12.7 14.2 14.6 14.8 Real GDP growth rate
    (percentage) 0.0 10.0 12.0 12.0 11.0 3.2 1.5 GDP per capita (purchasing
    power parity, 2002 U. S. dollars) 448 479 524 571 617 656 644 Inflation
    (consumer prices, percentage) 34.5 45.0 45.0 43.0 40.0 28.1 24.6 Exports
    (2002 U. S. dollars in billions) 1.1 4.3 6.4 12.2 17.0 11.1 10.6

    Imports (2002 U. S. dollars in billions) 1.2 4.9 5.4 9.4 12.9 9.5 10.4
    Source: Global Insight. Note: Lacking official data, these are estimates
    made in May 2002. GDP for 2002 may be revised upward.

    Key Transnational Issues

    Despite Iraq*s restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 1990, there are
    still maritime and land boundary disputes between the two countries.
    Outstanding issues from the Iran- Iraq War (1980- 1988), including
    prisoner of war exchanges and support for armed opposition parties
    operating in each other*s territory, have not been resolved.

    Dispute over water development plans by Turkey for the Tigris and
    Euphrates rivers. Sources: CIA and U. S. Department of State.

    7 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Enclosure II 8 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Food Aid and Humanitarian Assistance

    Issue The conflict in Iraq has compromised the country*s food security and
    its medical, water, and sanitation systems. The United States,
    international donors, and relief organizations are beginning to address
    Iraq*s postwar humanitarian needs. However, the scale of the crisis,
    together with ongoing security concerns, make the provision of
    humanitarian relief a significant challenge. The Congress has appropriated
    $2.5 billion in emergency supplemental funding for relief and
    reconstruction, including funding for food distribution and humanitarian
    assistance. The U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has
    deployed an interagency Disaster Assistance Response Team that is
    coordinating the delivery of potable water, medical supplies, and other
    aid by nongovernmental organizations, U. N. agencies, and the military.
    The World Food Program (WFP) also has developed an emergency plan to meet
    the food needs of 27 million Iraqis at a cost of $1.2 billion through
    September 25, 2003. This plan uses existing WFP facilities in Iraq (see
    fig. 1).

    Figure 1: Local Residents of Erbil, Iraq, Receiving Rations of Wheat Flour
    from a WFP Food Distribution Center

    Source: (c) (2003) World Food Program. Context U. S. government and
    international organizations face challenges in managing multiple food

    emergencies effectively. In fiscal year 2003, the growing number of
    humanitarian crises (Afghanistan, Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa,
    North Korea, and Iraq) has forced the U. S. government to budget $2.6
    billion on food aid* the highest in 25 years* with over 85 percent
    dedicated to emergency assistance. We have found that U. S. government
    management of food aid has been marked by significant weaknesses in
    internal controls, monitoring, and accountability. We also have reported
    that food aid programs have competing objectives and

    Enclosure II 9 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    management weaknesses, which hamper their ability to meet their
    objectives. 1 We have reviewed the U. S. government management of food aid
    programs in North Korea and Russia and has made a number of
    recommendations to improve the internal controls, monitoring, and
    accountability systems of these programs. 2 We expect to report on our
    ongoing review of U. S. food aid programs in Afghanistan and Southern
    Africa by June 2003.

    Although Iraq did not suffer complete devastation from the war, it has no
    functioning economy. Even before the war, 60 percent of Iraqis were
    dependent on the U. N. oil for food program to meet household needs.
    Currently, provision of potable water remains a top priority; the United
    Nations Children*s Fund estimates that 70 percent of children*s illnesses
    in Iraq stem from contaminated drinking water. The World Health
    Organization also has been actively trying to provide medical assistance
    to reestablish Iraq*s health system.

    Oversight Questions 1. What is the total cost of emergency humanitarian
    and food assistance necessary to satisfy Iraq*s needs in the short- term?
    2. How is the United States coordinating the delivery of humanitarian and
    food assistance

    among other international donors and relief organizations? 3. How
    effective and efficient is the delivery of humanitarian and food aid,
    particularly to

    vulnerable populations? 4. What are the monitoring and oversight
    procedures for humanitarian and food aid programs? 5. What are the
    obstacles to the effective and efficient provision of emergency
    humanitarian

    and food assistance? 6. How is the United States planning for and managing
    the transition from emergency

    humanitarian and food assistance to longer- term relief and sustainable
    recovery? 1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Food Aid: Experience of U. S.
    Programs Suggests Opportunities for Improvement, GAO- 02- 801T
    (Washington, D. C.: June 4, 2002). 2 U. S. General Accounting Office,
    Foreign Assistance: North Korean Constraints Limit Food Aid Monitoring, T-
    NSIAD- 00- 47 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 27, 1999), and Foreign Assistance:
    U. S. Food Aid to Russia Had Weak Internal Controls, GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 329
    (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 29, 2000).

    Enclosure III 10 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Internally Displaced Persons

    Issue After having been expelled by Saddam Hussein*s government over three
    decades ago, Kurds are now retaking land and villages in Northern Iraq
    that were recently occupied by Arabs. Thousands of Arabs have already fled
    Kurdish- controlled areas in the north, including the major urban areas of
    Kirkuk and Mosul. Humanitarian officials of the United Nations and other
    organizations estimate the changed political landscape in northern Iraq
    could result in the displacement of 1 million people in the coming months,
    with temporary shelters and assistance being needed for them (see fig. 2).

    Figure 2: Standard U. N. Tents for Internally Displaced Persons Source:
    (c) United Nations Humanitarian Information Center for Iraq. Context We
    have reported that international organizations have not effectively
    protected internally displaced persons because they have been prevented
    from doing so by ongoing armed conflict, governments, or political groups.
    3 Based on our survey of U. N. and humanitarian field level

    3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Affairs: Internally Displaced
    Persons Lack Effective Protection,

    GAO- 01- 803 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 17, 2001).

    Enclosure III 11 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    officials in 48 countries, we found that the internally displaced in 90
    percent of the countries, including Iraq, were at risk of direct physical
    attack or threat. In 58 percent of the countries, the internally displaced
    were at risk of forced migration. These and other incidents reflected in
    figure 3 below have the potential to occur in Northern Iraq.

    Figure 3: Threats to Internally Displaced Persons, 2001 Source: GAO survey
    of 48 of the more than 50 countries with internally displaced persons. The
    survey includes Iraq. We have also reported that international
    organizations are generally effective at delivering food, health care,
    shelter, and water to displaced persons to sustain life during the initial
    stages of displacement. However, as the displacement moves from the
    emergency phase into a longerterm situation, international organizations
    are less effective in meeting the needs of displaced populations.
    Oversight Questions 1. What steps are the United States, Iraq authorities,
    and international organizations taking to

    protect internally displaced persons from physical attack or threat,
    forced migration, loss of employment opportunities, and access to
    education, health care, and services? 2. Does adequate security exist for
    relief workers operating among displaced populations? 3. Are the United
    States and international organizations meeting the basic assistance needs*

    food, water and sanitation, health care* of the displaced population? Do
    international organizations factor the long- term assistance needs of
    displaced populations into their planning and programming? 4. How
    effective is coordination among U. N., international, and nongovernmental
    organizations in preventing gaps and duplication of coverage?

    Enclosure IV 12 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Post- conflict Peace Operation

    Issue The U. S.- led peace operation will provide the framework for Iraq*s
    reconstruction and political transformation; providing security and
    stability will be a critical task for the military aspects of the
    operation (see fig. 4). The operation also includes civilian aspects to
    establish an interim national government, foster conditions for a
    democratic transition, and rebuild the economy. The United States has
    worked with allies and the United Nations in conducting similar tasks in
    Bosnia and Kosovo, the largest recent peace operations. However, these
    entities have one- fifth the population of Iraq. The United States has not
    led a peace operation of the magnitude of Iraq since U. S. efforts at the
    end of World War II.

    Figure 4: U. S. Troops Provide Crowd Control in Baghdad

    Source: Department of Defense, U. S. Army (April 16, 2003). Context We
    have conducted more than 30 reviews of peacekeeping operations and have
    identified factors

    that are important to successfully implementing complex peace operations.
    4 First, establishing a secure environment is necessary for economic and
    political rebuilding to proceed. To provide security, the peace operation
    needs clear objectives, adequate resources, and clear measures of success.
    Second, peace operations need to be structured so that they can direct and
    coordinate allies, the United Nations, international financial
    institutions, and other organizations. The

    4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Issues in Implementing International
    Peace Operations, GAO- 02- 707R (Washington, D. C.: May 24, 2002) and
    Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of
    NATO*s Stabilization Force, GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 19 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 8,
    1998).

    Enclosure IV 13 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    structure of the Bosnia mission, where the high representative has clear
    authority to make and enforce decisions, has had some success in this
    regard. Third, peace operations are most successful when military and
    civilian components work together closely and involve local participation
    in making decisions. However, on some sensitive issues, such as the
    political status of volatile regions, decisions may have to be deferred so
    that progress can be made toward a

    transition. The Iraq peace operation differs from recent ones in that the
    United States, rather than the United Nations, will direct operations.
    Also, the United States will likely provide more troops than in previous
    operations. For example, in the first year of the peace operation in
    Bosnia, the United States provided approximately 18,000 troops. Several
    sources estimate the United States will have to deploy 70,000 to 100,000
    troops or more during the first year of stability operations in Iraq. 5 To
    lighten the U. S. load, the United States is consulting with allies
    regarding their possible role in post war Iraq. For example, in the past
    NATO has helped provided security (see fig. 5).

    Figure 5: NATO Forces Provide Security at a Checkpoint in Bosnia

    Source: GAO. Oversight Questions 1. What are the objectives of the peace
    operation? Are the U. S. and international resources

    available to the operation adequate to accomplish the tasks and
    objectives? What are the measures of success? 2. How is the peace
    operation structured? What are the respective roles of the military and

    civilian components of the operation? What are the roles of allies and
    international organizations? How effectively are U. S. agencies, allies,
    and international organizations coordinating their efforts? 3. What is the
    transition strategy, and how is it being implemented? What issues, if any,
    are

    being deferred? What are the time frames for the transition? 4. What
    progress is the peace operation making in providing security, establishing
    an interim government, and rebuilding the economy? What are the
    challenges?

    5 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, Background Paper:
    Potential Cost of a War With Iraq and Its Post- War Occupation (Feb. 25,
    2003).

    Enclosure V 14 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Training and Equipping an Iraqi National Army

    Issue A key component to ensure stability and protect the territorial
    integrity of Iraq is the establishment of a professional, civilian-
    controlled military. The United States is presently playing a role in
    training and equipping the Afghanistan national army and has done so for
    other militaries in the past (see fig. 6). While the U. S. role in
    training and equipping an Iraqi military is presently unclear, past
    endeavors have had to address several issues, including the host
    military*s capability to absorb, integrate, and maintain the training and
    equipment it receives, as well as determine how the training and equipment
    are ultimately used. Figure 6: U. S. Special Forces Issue Uniforms to New
    Recruits at the Afghan National Army Training Site in Kabul,

    Afghanistan

    Source: Department of Defense, U. S. Army (May 14, 2002). Context The
    Departments of State and Defense manage assistance programs that attempt
    to identify and address the requirements of selected foreign militaries.
    These programs frequently include some

    mix of foreign military financing of equipment and training, international
    military education and training, joint exercises, and provision of excess
    defense articles. The United States does not provide this assistance in a
    vacuum; other nations often provide similar types of assistance to foreign
    militaries. In some cases, these nations have aims and security objectives
    similar to those of the United States. Even when those aims and objectives
    are compatible, the United States*s and other nations* military
    traditions, doctrine, and equipment may not be compatible. This raises
    questions about whether the assistance provided by allies and other
    organizations

    Enclosure V 15 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    reinforces or counters our efforts, thus calling into question the value,
    sustainability, and effectiveness of U. S. assistance to foreign
    militaries.

    While our recent evaluations have not focused on building, training, and
    equipping entire foreign militaries, we have evaluated selected U. S.
    assistance efforts. For example, our review of defense drawdowns to Bosnia
    and Jordan highlighted the importance of ensuring that countries have
    sufficient funding to maintain or operate the defense articles provided. 6
    Our reviews of U. S. efforts to train and equip Colombian Army and
    national police counternarcotics units showed that U. S. assistance had
    been of limited utility for several reasons. 7 For example, there were
    long- standing problems in planning and implementing U. S. assistance,
    such as inadequate operations and maintenance funding. Further, we had
    concerns about the appropriateness and timeliness of the assistance.
    Moreover, the effectiveness of U. S. assistance was hampered because the
    Colombian government had little control over large parts of its territory.

    Questions have been raised about the adequacy of U. S. planning for post-
    conflict assistance to Iraq and the timeliness of these efforts. Although
    U. S. efforts to train and equip an Iraqi national army will likely be
    broader and more extensive than U. S. efforts in Colombia, many of the
    oversight and evaluation issues associated with U. S. efforts will be
    quite similar.

    Oversight Questions 1. What is the plan to build, train, and equip the
    Iraqi national army, and how does it fit into broader objectives for
    achieving security in Iraq? 2. What have been the costs associated with
    this plan, and what are the estimates of future

    costs? 3. What measures have been taken to ensure that U. S. assistance is
    used for intended purposes

    and that donor assistance is coordinated? 4. To what extent have lessons
    learned been identified and applied to improve the effectiveness

    of efforts to train and equip the Iraqi military? 5. What factors, if any,
    hinder the provision and/ or effectiveness of U. S. assistance, and what

    steps have U. S. officials taken to address these factors? 6 U. S. General
    Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Reporting of Defense Articles and
    Services Provided through Drawdowns Needs to be Improved, GAO- 02- 1027
    (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20, 2002). 7 U. S. General Accounting Office,
    Drug Control: U. S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce
    Results, GAO- 01- 26 (Washington, D. C.: Oct. 17, 2000).

    Enclosure VI 16 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Economic Transition Issues

    Issue The administration has stated that the creation of a competitive
    private sector within a democratic political system is one of its primary
    goals for Iraq. Although near- term economic assistance will focus on
    humanitarian and reconstruction needs, fostering long- term economic
    stability will require fundamental changes in institutions and laws that
    underpin market economies. Based on experience with other economic
    transitions, this transition is likely to face substantial challenges and
    will take a long time. For example, a major challenge facing Iraq is
    whether and how to privatize Iraq*s vast oil resources for the long- term
    benefit of all the Iraqi people. Some oil production is already coming
    back on- line (see fig. 7). Figure 7: American, British, and Iraqi Oil
    Workers Complete Reopening of Four Wells in the Rumeila Field Source:
    Department of State (April 2003). Context Since the mid- 1990s, our
    reports on U. S. and international efforts to assist economic transition
    in

    Russia and other former Soviet Union countries have highlighted challenges
    in moving from economic and political upheaval to long- term sustainable
    economic growth. 8 For example, we found that moving countries from state
    control to market economies rooted in democratic

    8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: International
    Efforts to Aid Russia*s Transition Have Had Mixed Results, GAO- 01- 8
    (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 1, 2000); Former Soviet Union: U. S. Rule of Law
    Assistance Has Had Limited Impact, GAO- 01- 354 (Washington, D. C.: Apr.
    17, 2001); Former Soviet Union: Information on U. S. Bilateral Program
    Funding, GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 37 (Washington, D. C.: Dec. 15, 1995).

    Enclosure VI 17 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    institutions has taken longer, cost more, and been considerably more
    difficult than anticipated. Because transition periods are often
    associated with increased economic hardships, maintaining public support
    for long- term goals can be especially difficult. Specific lessons have
    been learned from these transitions: (1) local *ownership* of reforms is
    necessary for long- term success; (2) coordinating international efforts
    to promote reform efforts has been a significant challenge; and (3) lack
    of program focus, poor design, and implementation problems have undermined
    efforts.

    U. S. and international efforts to promote economic and democratic
    transitions have relied on the consent of the countries, and little
    progress has been made without the support of the recipient country. This
    major barrier may not be as significant an issue in post war Iraq, because
    Iraqi authorities have indicated their interest in reviving the economy
    and needing the help and cooperation of the United States and
    international organizations.

    Oversight Questions 1. What role does the United States plan to play in
    promoting economic transition in Iraq? To what degree will the United
    States be responsible for directly writing and implementing new laws and
    procedures; how will the United States ensure the support and *buy- in* of
    Iraqi officials? 2. How long is U. S. involvement in Iraq*s economic
    transition expected to last? How much

    will it cost the United States? 3. How will the transition for specific
    sectors, such as oil, be carried out? What will be the

    mix of private and public ownership and control in such sectors? 4. What
    will be the respective roles of other foreign governments and
    international

    institutions in fostering economic reform in Iraq? How will coordination
    be handled among U. S. federal departments and agencies, and among the
    United States and other governments and organizations?

    5. If other institutions (e. g., the World Bank and the International
    Monetary Fund) are involved in covering the social costs, what role will
    they play in developing and implementing the programs? 6. To what extent
    will former Ba*ath Party members be allowed to participate in the new

    governing and judicial institutions? What authority will the United States
    and other donors have to ensure the implementation of economic reform
    efforts?

    Enclosure VII 18 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Reconstruction

    Issue The United States will spend a significant amount of money to help
    repair and rebuild Iraq*s infrastructure and social sectors. The Congress
    has appropriated $2.5 billion in emergency supplemental funding for relief
    and reconstruction. The U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
    will play a major role in the reconstruction of Iraq and has awarded

    several grants and contracts to help rebuild Iraq, including contracts for
    public health, capital construction, and local governance. The Department
    of Defense has been delegated overall responsibility for Iraqi relief and
    reconstruction and has begun some initial efforts (see fig. 8), but the
    precise roles of USAID and Defense in the reconstruction are unclear.

    Figure 8: U. S. Navy Seabee Engineers Refurbishing the Al Nasiriyah Police
    Headquarters Building Source: Department of Defense, U. S. Air Force
    (April 2003). Context USAID traditionally provides short- term, quickly
    disbursed emergency relief and long- term development assistance designed
    to bring about sustainable economic growth and improvements in health,
    education, governance, and other sectors. However, USAID also has been
    asked to provide large amounts of short- term disaster recovery assistance
    in efforts that differ from its usual mandate. For example, USAID provided
    $553 in hurricane reconstruction assistance over a 2 and a half- year
    period in Latin America. This work included infrastructure repair and
    construction, efforts not traditionally within USAID*s purview (see fig.
    9). During our review of that assistance, we made recommendations to USAID
    to develop mechanisms to quickly relocate

    Enclosure VII 19 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    or to hire the staff needed to oversee a large reconstruction program with
    a relatively short time frame. 9 Figure 9: Longer- term USAID Project
    Provided for Bridge Reconstruction in Honduras Source: GAO. In Iraq, USAID
    may be responsible for disbursing billions over the next few years* some
    analysts

    estimate an annual cost of $20 billion to fund reconstruction and maintain
    the U. S. presence-- and could face several problems even more challenging
    than those involved in hurricane reconstruction. First, although USAID
    will likely play a major role and has already entered into some contracts
    for Iraq, the President has delegated overall responsibility for relief
    and reconstruction to the Department of Defense. Second, project
    implementation and oversight will depend to a large extent on the security
    situation in country. Third, the amount of funding is projected to be much
    larger, and questions may arise about whether the Iraqi economy will be
    able to absorb it.

    Oversight Questions

    1. How will the Department of Defense, USAID, and other U. S. government
    agencies involved in the reconstruction program ensure that funds are
    spent for intended purposes? 2. What are USAID*s plans for staffing the
    reconstruction effort in a timely manner? 3. How will U. S. government
    agencies coordinate with one another and other international

    donors to minimize duplication and overlap? 9 U. S. General Accounting
    Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed Intended
    Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its Response
    Capability, GAO- 02- 787 (Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002).

    After Before

    Enclosure VIII 20 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq U. N. Oil for Food Program

    Issue The oil for food program provided goods and services to every sector
    of the Iraq economy* food and agriculture, water, sanitation, education,
    power generation, transportation, oil processing, and housing. 10 Since
    1996, the program has employed more than 44,000 people, required a
    national economic and distribution plan, and accounted for about 70
    percent (based on 2002 estimates) of Iraq*s gross domestic product. The
    Security Council has renewed the program until June 3, 2003. However, when
    to transfer control of Iraq*s oil resources from the United Nations to an
    Iraq authority and how to ensure a smooth transition are major issues.
    Figure 10 shows the physical location for monitoring Iraq*s oil exports
    and its imports* an element of the program to be eliminated.

    Figure 10: Exit and Entry Points for Oil for Food Imports and Exports

    Context Since 1996, the U. N. oil for food program has generated $64
    billion from oil sales and has been the primary provider of food for 60
    percent of Iraqis. Oil exports under the program have 10 U. S. General
    Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: U. N. Confronts
    Significant Challenges in Implementing Sanctions against Iraq, GAO- 02-
    625 (Washington, D. C.: May 23, 2002).

    Enclosure VIII 21 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    averaged nearly $10 billion per year since 1997. However, Iraq has not
    exported oil since March 2003. Despite this, as of May 2003, the program
    had about $3.2 billion dollars in uncommitted funds and another $10.1
    billion of funds that had been committed for goods not yet delivered to
    Iraq. The $10 billion had not yet been paid out. Some of the goods to be
    delivered included $2.4

    billion in food commodities and $506 million in water and sanitation
    equipment (see fig. 11). In addition to the above, the program approved
    but has not funded about $7 billion in contracts that were signed by the
    former Iraqi government.

    Figure 11: Oil for Food Program Funded the Construction of a Water Station
    in Northern Iraq Source: (c) United Nations (March 2003). The program*s
    rationale* allowing Iraq to provide for its essential civilian and
    humanitarian needs, while preventing the purchase of goods to develop
    weapons of mass destruction* has now largely ended. However, transitioning
    such a large program and its remaining funds and functions to a U. S. or
    Iraqi authority that can effectively undertake reconstruction remains a
    challenge.

    Oversight Questions 1. What are the options for dealing with the oil for
    food program*s $3.2 billion in available funds and $7 billion in contracts
    signed by the former Iraqi government? 2. To what extent are the $10
    billion in undelivered commodities coordinated with U. S. and

    other humanitarian and reconstruction plans? 3. How will the United
    Nations ensure a full accounting and reporting for a closeout of the

    program*s funds and assets? 4. How will the United States ensure that the
    functions of the oil for food program* food distribution, medical
    services, etc.* continue as needed?

    5. What are the plans for and challenges to effectively transitioning the
    oil for food functions to an Iraqi authority and within what time frame?
    6. What oversight will be in place to ensure that the transfer of the
    program and the future use

    of oil revenues are effective and without corruption?

    Enclosure IX 22 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Financing External Debt

    Issue By some estimates, Iraq*s external debt and war reparations from
    1991 may be as high as $200 billion and $227 billion, respectively. The
    large debt burden could significantly hinder humanitarian and economic
    reconstruction efforts. In addition, it is unclear whether Iraq should be
    made to honor its external obligations or whether creditors and others
    should relieve this burden.

    The precise amount of Iraq*s external debt is unknown because firm data
    are not available from some creditors or from the Iraqi government.
    Estimates vary widely* ranging from $42.1 billion to $200 billion (see
    table 1), making it difficult to know how much debt is owed to
    multilateral institutions, foreign governments, and the private sector.
    The Center for Strategic and International Studies projects that Iraq owes
    most of its debt to non- OECD countries, including Kuwait, other Gulf
    States, and Russia, which includes both governments and the private
    sector. Since Iraq ceased to service its debt to most creditors in 1990,
    it also has significant accumulated interest charges (see fig. 12). 11
    Table 1: Estimates of Iraq*s External Debts

    Source Amount

    (U. S. Dollars in billions) Comments CIA World Factbook (2001) $62 Does
    not provide a breakdown U. S. Energy Information Administration (2003)
    $100- 200 Does not provide a breakdown Center for Strategic and
    International Studies (2003)

    $127 Includes some creditors and accrued interest Government of Iraq
    (1991) $42 Does not include interest and $30b in loans from Gulf states
    Former Iraqi Central Bank (2002) $130 Does not provide a breakdown

    OECD (2001) a $11.5 Includes debt owed only to OECD members Source: GAO
    analysis. a The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
    (OECD) is composed of 30 industrialized countries.

    Context As of March 16, 2003, the United Nations estimates that Iraq still
    has unpaid or unsettled claims of $227 billion owed to individuals,
    families, companies, governments, and international organizations for
    different types of losses, such as personal injury, death, property,
    business, and nonpayment of goods and services (see fig. 13). 11 Iraq owes
    U. S. government $2 billion deriving from loan guarantees made by the
    Agriculture Department*s

    Commodity Credit Corporation.

    Enclosure IX 23 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Fig. 12: Iraqi External Debt ($ 127 billion) Fig. 13: Unpaid or Unsettled
    Reparations Claims ($ 227.4 billion) Source: Center for Strategic and
    International Studies, OECD, and GAO analysis. Source: U. N. Compensation
    Commission.

    The current forum for rescheduling or relieving Iraq*s official bilateral
    debt is through the *Paris Club,* 12 which is generally composed of
    members of the OECD. However, a large portion of Iraq*s debt is owed to
    countries that are not members of the Paris Club, and it is uncertain
    whether these countries would conform to a Paris Club framework. Relief of
    commercial debt is usually through the *London Club.* 13 Furthermore, it
    is unclear how to address a request for the pardon of Gulf war
    reparations, nor whether such a request would include claims that have
    been settled but not yet paid.

    Oversight Questions 1. What is a realistic estimate of Iraq*s external
    debt? What is the composition of this debt by creditor? 2. If debt relief
    is pursued, will there be full participation of all creditors, including
    multilaterals,

    Paris Club, non- Paris Club, and commercial creditors? Will any relief
    package result in comparable terms of forgiveness and equitable burden
    sharing to all creditors? 3. How are war reparations claims to be
    resolved? Is this process open to modifications by the

    U. N. Security Council, which established the resolution governing the war
    reparations claims? 4. What are the lessons learned from recent experience
    in relieving external debt of former

    regimes? 5. How does Iraq*s external debt burden affect its ability to
    attract new investments? Does the

    manner in which the existing debt and claims are resolved affect future
    investment decisions?

    12 A group of bilateral creditor countries that meet to negotiate
    sovereign debt rescheduling and debt relief. 13 A group of commercial
    creditors that meet to restructure sovereign debt owed to commercial
    banks. U. S.

    $2 Russia $12

    Kuw ait $17

    Other Gulf states $30 Multilateral

    creditors $0.5 Other OECD

    $9.5 Other non- OECD

    $9 Interest $47

    Governments/ International organizations

    $181.7 Corporations

    $25.1 Individuals

    $20. 6

    Enclosure X 24 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Developing a Commercial Strategy

    Issue Rebuilding Iraq is expected to be the largest reconstruction effort
    since World War II. The reconstruction will occur in many sectors,
    including environmental clean- up; oil well repairs and refinery
    improvements; construction of schools, water systems, roads, railroads,
    airports and seaports; telecommunications networks; and hospital
    equipment. U. S. firms can play a leading role in promoting economic
    stability by providing local employment and helping Iraq transition to a
    market economy. However, past reconstruction efforts indicate that U. S.
    trade agencies need to coordinate their efforts to identify and develop
    commercial opportunities that can be available to a wide variety of U. S.
    businesses (see fig. 14).

    Figure 14: A Compressed Earth Block Machine Intended to Help Build Schools
    in Kabul, Afghanistan

    Source: Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Context As we noted in
    our recent work, U. S. agencies play separate but integrated roles in the
    development of post conflict countries. 14 Initial USAID assistance can
    lead to commercial 14 U. S. General Accounting Office, Export Promotion:
    Mixed Progress in Achieving a Governmentwide Strategy, GAO- 02- 850
    (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 4, 2002).

    Enclosure X 25 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    opportunities for U. S. firms, particularly in the water and environmental
    sectors. To pursue these opportunities, the Trade and Development Agency
    funds U. S.- contracted studies that help foreign governments determine
    the design of infrastructure projects. Commerce*s Foreign Commercial
    Service informs U. S. businesses of project opportunities and coordinates
    with other U. S. agencies to help win projects and see them to completion.
    To help a business compete for a project, the Overseas Private Investment
    Corporation mitigates the risks businesses face in post crisis countries
    by providing project insurance and finance. The Export- Import Bank helps
    businesses export products, such as the equipment used in reconstruction,
    by providing loans and guarantees on exports.

    U. S. trade agencies routinely face challenges when participating in newly
    developing markets of transitional countries. In the Former Soviet Union
    (FSU), they have coordinated the development of an oil pipeline through
    the FSU and Turkey, and more recently have been doing market development
    in Southeast Europe. In a recent Department of Commerce survey, U. S.
    businesses cited the need for U. S. agencies to better coordinate the
    early identification and

    development of projects. In an effort to improve coordination and identify
    project opportunities, Commerce*s Foreign Commercial Service, the Overseas
    Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade and Development Agency have
    colocated in offices in Croatia and Turkey. The benefits of this approach
    have not been evaluated. Plans to rebuild Iraq will benefit from an
    examination of the lessons learned in prior U. S. government
    reconstruction efforts.

    Oversight Questions 1. How has the Foreign Commercial Service coordinated
    with other U. S. agencies in identifying business opportunities in post
    conflict countries, including Iraq? 2. How effective were USG commercial
    strategies in post conflict countries and regions of interest?

    3. What lessons can be learned from past U. S. efforts to develop business
    opportunities in post conflict countries and regions of interest? How can
    these lessons be integrated into the reconstruction of Iraq?

    Enclosure XI 26 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Promoting Democracy

    Issue The administration has linked regime change in Iraq with the
    opportunity to promote democracy and create a model for the spread of
    democratic values in the Middle East. However, Iraq*s underlying
    conditions, including the lack of a democratic tradition and sharp ethnic,
    religious, and regional differences, will likely present significant
    challenges to democratization efforts. World Bank indicators measuring
    broad dimensions of governance in individual countries demonstrate the
    challenge of transforming Iraq. Iraq ranked lower than virtually all other
    countries in the world on three crucial measures of good governance. The
    average ranking for countries in the Middle East is also considerably
    higher than for Iraq (see fig. 15).

    Figure 15: Ranking of Iraq and the Middle East Region on Good Governance
    Indicators, 2000- 2001 0% 10% 20%

    30% 40%

    50% 60%

    Iraq Middle East & North Africa Voice and Accountability Government
    Effectiveness Rule of Law

    Source: GAO analysis of World Bank data. Context In figure 15, voice and
    accountability measure political rights, civil liberties, and media

    independence; government effectiveness measures government abilities to
    implement sound policies and provide public services; and the rule of law
    measures crime, judiciary effectiveness, and the enforceability of
    contracts. We have reported that democratic reform is a slow and
    challenging process and that a long term

    U. S. commitment is necessary if U. S.- supported reforms are to be
    sustainable and have an impact. U. S. assistance generally has had greater
    success in helping countries administer elections and draft and enact new
    legislation. However, the more difficult challenges have been to develop
    an underlying culture for democratic reform and building institutions to
    implement reforms that lead to meaningful long- term change. U. S.
    assistance supporting democratic reforms in the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
    and Latin America has had mixed results in creating more transparent and
    accountable governments and increasing citizen participation in political

    Enclosure XI 27 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    life. 15 Factors affecting the results of this assistance have been the
    host country commitment to and resources provided for reform and the
    effectiveness of coordination among U. S. agencies and other international
    donors. Conditions in Iraq will present a number of significant and unique
    challenges to democratic development:

    Establishing a common national identity as a foundation for
    democratization appears to be a more difficult challenge than that faced
    in the FSU or Latin America. Iraq is characterized by significant
    religious, regional, and ethnic divisions. An additional dilemma is how to
    rid the new government of the influence of Ba*ath party functionaries, who
    may be extensively imbedded in the existing bureaucracy.

    Iraq currently lacks a rule of law, a multiparty political structure,
    separation of powers, and a democratic tradition. Iraqi exile figures
    appear to be largely distrusted within Iraq. In addition, new leadership
    will have to be built from the ground up.

    U. S. policymakers also face the dilemma that democratic development in
    Iraq and the Middle East could have the result of empowering Islamist
    groups that have widespread popularity and are unfriendly to U. S.
    interests.

    Oversight Questions 1. How are U. S. agencies planning for democracy-
    building activities in Iraq? What are the short- and long- term objectives
    of these efforts? What is the nature of these assistance efforts and their
    related costs? 2. To what extent are U. S. agencies involved in post war
    democracy- building activities

    coordinating their efforts to ensure that they have common objectives and
    provide assistance efficiently and effectively? How are these agencies
    coordinating with other donors? 3. Are U. S. agencies applying lessons
    learned from previous U. S. democracy- building efforts in

    post conflict societies? 4. To what extent are democracy- related foreign
    aid programs linked to high- level U. S. diplomatic efforts to encourage
    democratic development in Iraq?

    5. What are the administration*s plans for linking democratization in Iraq
    to wider democracybuilding efforts in the Middle East?

    15 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: U. S. Economic
    and Democratic Assistance to the Central Asian Republics, GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
    200 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 11, 1999), and Foreign Assistance: U. S.
    Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest
    Results,

    GAO- 03- 358 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 18, 2003).

    Enclosure XII 28 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    Oversight for Rebuilding Iraq

    Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Issue During the 1990s, Iraq developed weapons of mass destruction (WMD)*
    chemical, biological, and nuclear* and their delivery vehicles, including
    ballistic missiles (see fig. 16). However, Iraq did not fully account for
    this material and for its WMD infrastructure, as required by U. N.
    resolutions. Uncertainty about the location, type, and quantities of these
    materials and related technologies poses an immediate threat to U. S. and
    coalition forces in country. The possibility of unsecured WMD also poses
    long- term threats of theft and proliferation to other states or terrorist
    groups.

    Figure 16: Al Samoud 2 Missile Facility Near Baghdad

    Source: (c) (2003) United Nations. Context We reviewed U. S. programs
    intended to help the FSU secure and destroy its WMD stocks. These

    programs also tried to ensure that WMD scientists are employed in peaceful
    activities to discourage them from selling their skills to countries of
    concern or terrorist groups. We found that securing and destroying weapons
    of mass destruction can take longer and cost more than expected. 16
    Moreover, human proliferation of WMD knowledge is a significant concern.
    In this regard, State lacked complete information on the number and
    locations of senior scientists who

    16 U. S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to
    Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, GAO/
    NSIAD- 99- 76 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 13, 1999).

    Enclosure XII 29 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag

    once developed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile
    systems for the former Soviet Union. 17 The most significant difference
    between the U. S. experience in providing disarmament assistance

    to states of the former Soviet Union and Iraq is that the Russian
    government had to agree to participate in the U. S. Cooperative Threat
    Reduction programs. Issues over Russian cooperation and access to
    facilities have slowed U. S. efforts to help secure Russia*s arsenal of
    weapons of mass destruction. 18 These same issues may not arise with a
    strong U. S. presence in Iraq.

    Oversight Questions 1. What role should international organizations and
    the U. S. government play in disarming Iraq and in locating, securing, and
    destroying stockpiles and equipment related to chemical, biological, and
    nuclear weapons production? Are U. S. government agencies and American
    contractors with relevant experience and expertise involved in this
    process? 2. What are estimates of the size of Iraq*s stockpiles of
    available chemical, biological, and nuclear materials and facilities? What
    U. S. funds will be needed to secure such stocks from

    theft or diversion and, ultimately, to destroy them? 3. How many Iraqi
    scientists have WMD expertise, and where are they now? What steps should

    be taken to limit the proliferation of their expertise? 4. What military
    and dual- use items were exported to Iraq in violation of the U. N.
    embargo, and

    how did Iraq acquire these items? What companies and countries provided
    the items? How has the U. S. government responded to apparent violations
    of the embargo? 5. What lessons could be learned from the United Nations*
    inspection experience that would be

    relevant to U. S. or international WMD inspection procedures? 17 U. S.
    General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department
    Oversight of Science Centers Program, GAO- 01- 582 (Washington, D. C.: May
    10, 2001). 18 U. S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass
    Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U. S.
    Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO- 03- 482 (Washington, D.
    C.: Mar. 24, 2003).

    30 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag III: Related GAO Products

    Below are selected examples of recent GAO products related to
    reconstruction.

    Humanitarian Relief and Food Aid

    Food Aid: Experience of U. S. Programs Suggests Opportunities for
    Improvement. GAO- 02- 801T. Washington, D. C.: June 6, 2002. Humanitarian
    Affairs: Internally Displaced Persons Lack Effective Protection. GAO- 01-
    803.

    Washington, D. C.: Aug. 17, 2001.

    Foreign Assistance: U. S. Food Aid to Russia Had Weak Internal Controls.
    GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 329. Washington, D. C.: Sept. 29, 2000.

    Foreign Assistance: North Korean Constraints Limit Food Aid Monitoring. T-
    NSIAD- 00- 47. Washington, D. C.: Oct. 27, 1999.

    Peace Operations

    Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations. GAO- 02- 707R.
    Washington, D. C.: May 24, 2002.

    Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of Dayton
    Peace Agreement. T- NSIAD- 00- 219. Washington, D. C.: July 19, 2000.
    Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional
    Stability. GAO/ NSIAD- 00-

    125BR. Washington, D. C.: Apr. 24, 2000.

    Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of
    NATO*s Stabilization Force. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 138. Washington, D. C.: Oct.
    8, 1998.

    United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore
    Peace.

    GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 34. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 27, 1997.

    Economic Reform and Reconstruction

    Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed Intended Purposes,
    but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its Response Capability.
    GAO- 02- 787. Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002.

    Foreign Assistance: Implementing Disaster Recovery Assistance in Latin
    America. GAO- 01- 541T. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 21, 2001.

    Foreign Assistance: International Efforts to Aid Russia*s Transition Have
    Had Mixed Results.

    GAO- 01- 08. Washington, D. C.: Nov. 1, 2000. World Bank: Management
    Controls Stronger, but Challenges in Fighting Corruption Remain.

    GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 273. Washington, D. C.: Apr. 6, 2000.

    Governance and Democracy Building

    Foreign Assistance: U. S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American
    Countries Have Yielded Modest Results. GAO- 03- 058. Washington, D. C.:
    Mar. 18, 2003. Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, But Key Efforts
    Are Lagging. GAO- 02- 569. Washington, D. C.: June 13, 2002. Former Soviet
    Union: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and
    Sustainability.

    GAO- 01- 740T. Washington, D. C.: May 17, 2001. Foreign Assistance: Peru
    on Track for Free and Fair Elections but Faces Major Challenges. GAO01-
    496T. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 14, 2001.

    Foreign Assistance: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance to Five Latin American
    Countries. GAO/ NSIAD99- 195. Washington, D. C.: Aug. 4, 1999. Foreign
    Assistance: U. S. Economic and Democratic Assistance to Central Asian
    Republics. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 200. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 11, 1999.

    31 GAO- 03- 792R Rebuilding Irag Security Assistance and Agreements

    Central and Southwest Asian Countries: Trends in U. S. Assistance and Key
    Economic, Governance, and Demographic Characteristics. GAO- 03- 634R.
    Washington, D. C.: May 9, 2003).

    Foreign Assistance: Reporting of Defense Articles and Services Provided
    through Drawdowns Needs to Be Improved. GAO- 02- 1027. Washington, D. C.:
    Sept. 20, 2002.

    NATO: Progress Toward More Mobile and Deployable Forces. GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
    929. Washington, D. C.: Sept. 30, 1999.

    Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
    Facilitate U. S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO- 03-
    482. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 24, 2003. Weapons of Mass Destruction:
    Observations on U. S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation

    Programs in Russia. GAO- 03- 526T. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 5, 2003.

    Arms Control: Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.
    GAO- 02- 1038NI. Washington, D. C.: Sept. 30, 2002.

    Biological Weapons: Efforts to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers
    Benefits, Poses New Risks.

    GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 138. Washington, D. C.: Apr. 28, 2000.

    Weapons of Mass Destruction: U. N. Confronts Significant Challenges in
    Implementing Sanctions against Iraq. GAO- 02- 625. Washington, D. C.: May
    2002. (832013)
    *** End of document. ***