Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs  
for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed (16-JUN-03,
GAO-03-783).							 
                                                                 
The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since
the early 1970s to help reduce illegal drug activities. In fiscal
years 2000-03 alone, the United States provided over $2.5	 
billion. Despite this assistance, Colombia remains the world's	 
leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a major source of
the heroin used in the United States. The report discusses the	 
status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army 
and for a U.S.-supported Colombian police aerial eradication	 
program. It also addresses challenges Colombia and the United	 
States face in sustaining these programs.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-783 					        
    ACCNO:   A07190						        
  TITLE:     Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term
Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed	 
     DATE:   06/16/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Drug trafficking					 
	     Drugs						 
	     Foreign economic assistance			 
	     Foreign military assistance			 
	     Foreign military training				 
	     International relations				 
	     Narcotics						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Black Hawk Helicopter				 
	     Colombia						 
	     Plan Colombia					 
	     T-65 Spray Plane					 
	     UH-1N Helicopter					 
	     UH-60 Helicopter					 
	     UH-II Helicopter					 

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GAO-03-783

                                       A

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2003 DRUG CONTROL Specific Performance Measures and Long- Term Costs
for U. S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed

GAO- 03- 783

Letter 1 Results in Brief 3 Background 6 U. S. Assistance to the Colombian
Army Has Been Delivered, but

Problems Were Encountered 9 Colombia*s Aerial Eradication Program Has Had
Mixed Results 17 Financial and Management Challenges Continue to
Complicate

Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities 24 Conclusions 29 Recommendation
for Executive Action 29 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30 Scope and
Methodology 30

Appendixes

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of State 33

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 36

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39 GAO Contact 39
Acknowledgments 39

Tables Table 1: U. S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, Fiscal
Years 2000- 03 8

Table 2: U. S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program, Fiscal Years
1998- 2004 21

Figures Figure 1: Coca- and Poppy- Growing Areas in Colombia, 2001- 02 7
Figure 2: Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation and Hectares Eradicated
in Colombia, 1995- 2002 18

Figure 3: Net Hectares of Poppy under Cultivation and Hectares Eradicated
in Colombia, 1995- 2002 19

Abbreviations

EPA Environmental Protection Agency NAS Narcotics Affairs Section, U. S.
Embassy, Bogota USAID U. S. Agency for International Development

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June 16, 2003 Let er t The Honorable Mitch McConnell, Chairman

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate The Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Chairman Caucus on
International Narcotics Control United States Senate

The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the
early 1970s to help reduce illegal drug production and trafficking
activities. Despite this assistance, Colombia remains the world*s leading
producer

and distributor of cocaine and a major source of the heroin used in the
United States. Recognizing that illicit drug activities are a serious
problem in Colombia, the Colombian government in October 1999 announced a
$7.5 billion plan, known as Plan Colombia, which among other things
proposed reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal
narcotics by 50 percent over 6 years. 1 In fiscal years 2000 through 2003,
the United States provided over $2.5 billion to Colombia for
counternarcotics assistance. 2 For fiscal year 2004, the administration
has proposed an additional $700 million in assistance to address many of
the same purposes. However, insurgent groups involved in illicit drug
activities control more than 40 percent of Colombia*s territory, making
Colombian government and U. S. interdiction and eradication operations
immensely difficult and

1 Although the government of Colombia announced Plan Colombia in 1999, U.
S. funding for counternarcotics purposes was not approved until July 2000,
leading to some uncertainty about when the 6- year goal was to be
achieved. The current Colombian government has announced that it intends
to eliminate coca cultivation by August 2006.

2 For a more complete explanation of U. S. assistance originally planned
for Plan Colombia, see our report titled Drug Control: U. S. Assistance to
Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, GAO- 01- 26 (Washington, D.
C.: Oct. 17, 2000).

dangerous and leaving illicit- drug growers with few legal alternatives to
earn a living. 3 A key component of the Colombian- U. S. counternarcotics
strategy was

forming a Colombian Army 2,285- man counternarcotics brigade and providing
it with helicopters to move the troops around southern Colombia where much
of the coca was being grown. 4 The brigade*s primary mission was to plan
and conduct interdiction operations against cocaine producers and
traffickers. Closely allied with the brigade*s objective was the Colombian
National Police*s goal to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, coca and
opium poppy cultivation through aerial eradication. 5 In some of the
insurgent- controlled areas of the country, the brigade was supposed to

provide security for the eradication program. Various components of the
Department of Defense* primarily with funding from the Department of
State* provided the training and equipment for the counternarcotics
brigade conditional on the Colombian military*s respect for human rights.
State*s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has
supported the police aerial eradication program.

You expressed concern that U. S. counternarcotics assistance provided to
the Colombian Army was slow to arrive and has not been used as originally
envisioned and that the aerial eradication program has little to show for
its efforts. In response to your concerns, we determined (1) the status of
U. S. counternarcotics assistance provided to the Colombian Army in fiscal
years 2000- 03, and how this assistance is being used; (2) what the U. S.
supported Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has
accomplished in recent years; and (3) what challenges Colombia and the
United States face in sustaining these programs.

3 The United States has supported alternative development programs in
Colombia, but because of the lack of security in the illicit- drug growing
regions, these efforts have been slow to get started. See our report
titled Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Illicit Crops in
Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles, GAO- 02-
291 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 8, 2002).

4 The leaves of the coca plant are the raw ingredient of cocaine, and
opium poppy is used to produce heroin. 5 The aerial eradication program
involves spraying the coca and poppy plants from low- flying airplanes
with an herbicide that attacks the root system and kills the plant.

To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent planning,
implementation, and related documentation and met with cognizant U. S.
officials at the Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D. C.; the
U. S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U. S. Embassy
in Bogota, Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed Colombian military,
police, and government officials and visited Colombian Army bases at
Larandia, Tolemaida, and Tres Esquinas and aerial eradication operational
sites in the primary coca- growing regions of Colombia. In addition, we
observed a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade airlift

operation and several aerial eradication missions. Results in Brief In
fiscal years 2000- 03, the United States provided about $640 million in

assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade
and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related training, maintenance,
and operational support. Nearly all this assistance has been delivered and
is being used for counternarcotics operations. However, some problems were
encountered. For example,

 After having a successful first year of operations during 2001, the
counternarcotics brigade*s success trailed off in 2002. According to U. S.
and Colombian officials, this was due in part to the coca growers and
producers moving out of the brigade*s range. In late 2002, the Colombian
Army, with U. S. assistance, reorganized the brigade and gave it authority
to operate anywhere in the country rather than just in its formerly
limited area of responsibility in southern Colombia.

 The United States delayed the start of entry- level helicopter pilot
training nearly 6 months due to uncertainty over who would conduct the
training and how it would be funded. To resolve the issue, Defense used
$20 million from other counternarcotics projects to pay for the training.

 The delivery of 25 UH- II helicopters was delayed 5 months while the
Colombian military considered using a different engine from the one
usually installed. After numerous discussions, Colombia decided to use the
more common engine.

 U. S. funds for the brigade were not available for a total of about 5
months in 2002 because State did not meet congressional deadlines for
reporting on Colombia*s progress in addressing human rights violations.
This slowed the brigade*s operations and helicopter pilot training.

 The Colombian Army cannot operate and maintain the U. S.- provided
helicopters at current levels without continued U. S. contractor support
because it does not yet have sufficient numbers of qualified pilots and
mechanics. U. S. Embassy Bogota officials estimate that up to $150 million
a year is needed to sustain the ongoing programs; additional assistance
may be needed for other recently initiated efforts.

In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program
has had mixed results. Since 1995, net coca cultivation rose in every year
until 2002 and net opium poppy cultivation remained between 6,100 to 7,
500 hectares. But, in recent months, the Office of National Drug Control
Policy reported that  net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15
percent in 2002, from 169,800 hectares to 144, 450 hectares, and  net
opium poppy cultivation in Colombia decreased 25 percent in 2002,

from 6, 500 hectares to 4,900 hectares* the second yearly decline in a
row. U. S. Embassy Bogota officials attributed this recent success
primarily to

the current Colombian government*s willingness to spray coca and poppy
plants without restriction in all areas of the country. They also noted
that the number of spray aircraft available had increased from 10 in July
2001 to 17 in January 2003, and a U. S. contractor began helping the
Colombian National Police to, among other things, maintain its aircraft,
resulting in greater availability for spray missions. These officials
estimate that about $80 million a year is needed to continue the program
at its current pace.

Although the U. S.- backed counternarcotics program in Colombia has
recently begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999- 2000,
Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and
management challenges. As we reported in 2000, the total costs and
specific programs required to meet Plan Colombia*s counternarcotics goals
were unknown, and a significant reduction in illicit drug production and
trafficking activities would likely take years. 6 Nearly 3 years later,
Colombia and the United States have not established specific performance

measures for assessing progress and time frames for achieving stated
objectives nor have they identified sources of funding for sustaining
ongoing programs. Until recently, Colombia had not provided any
significant new funding for its defense needs, and anticipated
international assistance for Plan Colombia* apart from that provided by
the United States* did not materialize as envisioned. 7 Because of
economic problems, the government of Colombia*s ability to contribute more
is limited. Moreover, Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with

its long- standing insurgency and the need to ensure it complies with
human rights standards and other requirements in order for U. S.
assistance to continue.

We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, establish clear objectives, including developing
specific performance measures, and estimate future U. S. funding
requirements for the programs with the Colombian Army and the Colombian
National Police.

6 GAO- 01- 26. 7 Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the
Colombian government pledged $4 billion and called on the international
community to provide $3.5 billion.

Background The United States has supported Colombia*s efforts to reduce
drugtrafficking activities and stem the flow of illegal drugs entering the
United

States for more than 2 decades. Despite Colombian and U. S. efforts to
disrupt drug- trafficking activities, the U. S. government has not
reported any net reduction in the processing or export of refined cocaine
to the United States. 8 According to State, Colombia provides 90 percent
of the cocaine and approximately 40 percent of the heroin entering the
United States. To further complicate matters, the country*s two largest
insurgent groups* the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the
National Liberation Army* and paramilitary groups have expanded their
involvement in drug trafficking. According to a State official, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the paramilitary United
SelfDefense Forces of Colombia are involved in every facet of narcotics
trafficking, including cultivating, processing, and transporting. The
insurgents exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia*s
territory east and south of the Andes* which, as illustrated in figure 1,

includes the primary coca- growing regions of Colombia. According to the
Drug Enforcement Administration, several billion dollars flow into
Colombia each year from the cocaine trade alone. This vast amount of drug
money has made it possible for these organizations to gain unprecedented
economic, political, and social power and influence. 8 Estimates of the
amount of cocaine produced in Colombia have almost tripled since 1995*

from 230 metric tons to 730 metric tons in 2001.

Figure 1: Coca- and Poppy- Growing Areas in Colombia, 2001- 02 a

a The growing areas for coca are based on 2002 estimates; the growing
areas for poppy are based on 2001 estimates.

In an effort to address the influx of cocaine and heroin from Colombia,
the United States has funded a counternarcotics strategy in Colombia that
includes programs for interdiction, eradication, and alternative
development which must be carefully coordinated to achieve mutually
reinforcing results. Besides assistance for the Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade and the Colombian National Police aerial
eradication program, the United States has supported Colombian efforts to
interdict illicit- drug trafficking along rivers and in the air and
alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced
persons programs.

State and Defense have provided most of the counternarcotics funding and
State, through its Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs and Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U. S. Embassy Bogota,
oversees the program. In addition, the Military Group in the U. S. Embassy
Bogota manages much of the assistance to the Colombian military. Since the
introduction of Plan Colombia in fiscal year 2000, the United States has
provided more than $2.5 billion in assistance. (See table 1.)

Table 1: U. S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, Fiscal Years 2000-
03 Dollars in millions

Fiscal years 2003 b Agency 2000 a 2001 2002 (estimated) Total

State $774.9 $48. 0 $275.4 $452.0 $1, 550.3

Defense 128.5 190. 2 119.1 149.9 $587.7

USAID c 123.5 0 104.5 151.0 $379.0 Total $1, 026.9 $238.2 $499.0 $752.9
$2, 517.0

Source: Departments of State and Defense and the U. S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). a Includes funds appropriated for Plan
Colombia through the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Fiscal
Year 2000 (Division B of P. L. 106- 246).

b Includes $93 million in Foreign Military Financing funds appropriated in
the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act,
2003 (Division E, Title III of P. L. 108- 7); $34 million appropriated to
State and $34 million appropriated to Defense in the Supplemental
Appropriations Act to Support Department of Defense Operations in Iraq for
Fiscal Year 2003 (P. L. 108- 11); and $37.1 million for Foreign Military
Financing allotted from fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations. c In
fiscal years 2000- 03, State transferred $375 million to USAID for
alternative development, judicial

sector reform, and internally displaced persons programs.

In response to increased violence in Colombia during early 2002 and the
recognition that the insurgents and illicit drug activities are
inextricably linked, the Congress provided *expanded authority* for the
use of the U. S. assistance to Colombia. This authority enables the
government of

Colombia to use the U. S.- trained and -equipped counternarcotics brigade,
the U. S.- provided helicopters, and other U. S.- provided
counternarcotics assistance to fight groups designated as terrorist
organizations as well as to fight drug trafficking. 9 Similar authority
was provided for fiscal year 2003 10 and is being sought for fiscal year
2004. For fiscal year 2004, the

administration has requested about $700 million in funding for Colombia.
U. S. Assistance to the

During fiscal years 2000- 03, the United States provided about $640
million Colombian Army Has

in assistance to the Colombian Army for initial training and equipment for
the counternarcotics brigade and for 72 helicopters and related Been
Delivered, but

operational, maintenance, and training support. These helicopters were
Problems Were

intended to transport the counternarcotics brigade on counternarcotics
Encountered

missions. Nearly all this assistance has been delivered and is being
utilized by the counternarcotics brigade in conducting operations.
However, both the United States and the Colombian Army experienced some
unanticipated problems that delayed the operational use of the
helicopters. In addition, U. S. support will be needed for the foreseeable
future to sustain operations.

Status of the Brigade The United States originally agreed to provide
training and equipment for a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade made
up of three battalions and a headquarters staff with a total of about
2,285 professional and conscripted soldiers. The battalions became
operational in December 1999, December 2000, and May 2001, respectively.
The counternarcotics brigade was assigned to the Colombian military*s
Joint Task Force- South, which

9 The 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States (P. L. 107- 206, Aug.
2, 2002). Similar language was included in the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P. L. 107- 306, Nov. 27, 2002) for intelligence
assistance provided in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 as well as any
unobligated funds available to the intelligence community for prior fiscal
years.

10 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P. L. 108- 7, Feb. 20, 2003).

was headquartered at Tres Esquinas in Caqueta* one of the principal
cocagrowing regions of Colombia. The task force comprised units from the
Colombian Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps and was tasked with the
overall military mission of regaining government control over southern
Colombia, primarily in the Putumayo and Caqueta departments. The United
States provided the counternarcotics brigade with about

$45 million in training and equipment* from weapons and ammunition to
rations, uniforms, and canteens. The brigade*s primary mission was to plan
and conduct interdiction operations against drug trafficking activities,
including destroying illicit drug- producing facilities, and, when called
upon, to provide security in insurgent- controlled areas where aerial
eradication operations were planned.

Although the Colombian Army*s counternarcotics brigade has achieved some
success, the Colombian military has not regained control over large parts
of the country where coca and opium poppy are grown. According to U. S.
and Colombian officials, the counternarcotics brigade was highly

effective during 2001 but somewhat less effective during 2002. For
example, during 2001 the brigade destroyed 25 cocaine hydrochloride
laboratories while in 2002 it destroyed only 4 laboratories. 11 U. S.
embassy officials stated that the brigade became less effective because
the insurgents moved their drug producing activities, such as the
laboratories, beyond the reach of the brigade. In addition, according to
these officials, the brigade became more involved in protecting
infrastructure, such as bridges and power stations, and performing base
security. Moreover, the aerial eradication program did not call on the
brigade to provide ground security on very many occasions, essentially
planning spray missions in the less threatening areas.

In August 2002, U. S. embassy and Colombian military officials agreed to
restructure the brigade to make it a rapid reaction force capable of
making quick, tactical strikes on a few days* notice. As part of this
restructuring, the Colombian Army designated the brigade a national asset
capable of operating anywhere in Colombia rather than just in its prior
area of responsibility in southern Colombia. The newly restructured
brigade

consists of three combat battalions and a support battalion with a total
of about 1,900 soldiers, all of whom are professional. Two of the combat
11 Hydrochloride laboratories are used in the final stages of processing
coca into cocaine and are considered high- value targets.

battalions have been retrained. The third combat battalion should be
retrained by mid- June 2003. This change, according to NAS, Military
Group, and Colombian Army officials, will improve the brigade*s ability to
conduct operations against high- value, drug- trafficking targets, such as
laboratories containing cocaine and the leadership of insurgent groups
involved in drugtrafficking activities. One of the retrained battalions
has been operating in Narino department since early May. Status of the
Helicopters A key component of U. S. assistance for Plan Colombia was
enhancing the

air mobility of the counternarcotics brigade. To accomplish this, the
United States provided the Colombian Army with 33 UH- 1N helicopters, 14
UH- 60 Black Hawk helicopters, and 25 UH- II helicopters. 12 The
helicopters were provided to give the brigade the airlift needed to
transport its personnel in the Joint Task Force- South*s area of
responsibility in southern Colombia. Both the UH- 1Ns and the UH- 60 Black
Hawks are operational; the UH- IIs are scheduled for full operations later
this year. However, the Colombian Army continues to need U. S. assistance
and contractor pilots and mechanics to fly the aircraft.

UH- 1Ns In September 1999, State and Defense initiated a plan to provide
the Colombian Army with 33 UH- 1N helicopters that State had purchased
from Canada to support the counternarcotics brigade. The helicopters were

intended to serve as interim aircraft until the UH- 60 and UH- II
helicopters funded by the United States as part of Plan Colombia were
delivered. The UH- 1N helicopters were delivered in various stages between
November 1999 and March 2001. 13 According to the U. S. embassy, the
helicopters flew

their first mission in December 2000. Since then, the helicopters have
flown 19,500 hours in combat and have supported more than 430
counternarcotics operations for the brigade. Although Colombian Army
personnel are qualified as pilots and mechanics, many of the experienced
pilots and mechanics who operate and maintain the helicopters are provided
through a U. S.- funded contractor. For example, 20 contractor personnel
serve as pilots- in- command when flying operations.

12 Of the 33 UH- IN helicopters, 28 remain available for use by the
counternarcotics brigade. One crashed on a mission and four were
transferred to support the aerial eradication program.

13 State sent 18 helicopters prior to the approval of U. S. assistance for
Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia provided $60 million to complete the delivery
and support of the remaining 15 helicopters.

UH- 60s With the $208 million provided as U. S. assistance under Plan
Colombia for UH- 60 Black Hawk helicopters, State and Defense procured 14
helicopters, a 2- year spare parts package, and a 1- year contractor
support package. The helicopters were delivered between July 2001 and
December 2001. However, the helicopters did not begin to support
operations of the counternarcotics brigade until November 2002 because of
the lack of Colombian Army pilots who met the minimum qualifications
needed to operate the helicopters. Forty- two Colombian Army personnel
have

completed the minimum UH- 60 pilot training, 13 have qualified as pilot-
incommand. U. S.- funded contract pilots fill in as pilots- in- command.
In addition, a U. S.- funded contractor continues to maintain the
helicopters and provide maintenance training.

UH- IIs With the $60 million provided as U. S. assistance under Plan
Colombia for UH- II helicopters, State procured 25 aircraft. The original
plan was to deliver the UH- II helicopters to the Colombian Army between
November 2001 and June 2002. However, the 25 helicopters were delivered
between March 2002 and November 2002. This 5- month delay occurred because
the Colombian military considered using a different engine than the one
usually installed because it may have been easier to maintain. After
numerous discussions, Colombia decided to use the more commonly used
engine.

According to NAS officials, although some of the UH- II helicopters are
being used for missions, all the helicopters will not be operational until
June 2003. As of January 2003, 25 Colombian Army pilots had completed
their initial training and 21 of these pilots are completing the training
needed to qualify for operational missions. However, contractor pilots
continue to supplement Colombian Army pilots and a U. S.- funded
contractor continues to provide maintenance support. Problems in Training

Although all the U. S.- provided helicopters are in Colombia, a number of
Helicopter Pilots and

unanticipated problems were encountered in training Colombian Army
Mechanics

pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the helicopters. Some of
these problems continue to limit the Colombian Army*s ability to operate
and maintain the aircraft. Primarily, the Colombian Army will have to
continue to rely on contractor support because it will not have enough
trained pilots- in- command and senior mechanics for the foreseeable
future.

Funding for Initial Training Was When the United States agreed to provide
the UH- 60 and UH- II helicopters

Not Provided for the Colombian Army in July 2000, the assistance for Plan
Colombia did

not include any funds to train the Colombian pilots and mechanics needed
to operate and maintain the helicopters. In October 2000* about 3 months
after passage of U. S. assistance for Plan Colombia* State reported that,

although the Colombian military had qualified pilots and support
personnel, it did not have the numbers of personnel required to field and
operate the new helicopters. State requested that Defense provide the
training needed for the pilots and mechanics. Although Defense agreed to
provide the training, it took an additional 3 months to decide that the U.
S. Army would be responsible and to identify a funding source. In February

2001, Defense reported that it would transfer up to $20 million from other
counternarcotics projects in Colombia for this training.

Training Has Not Been A training plan was approved in mid- 2001. Although
the plan provided

Completed training for Colombian Army personnel to meet the minimum
qualifications

for a pilot and mechanic, it did not include the additional training
necessary to fly missions in a unit or to become a senior mechanic. Basic
training for 117 helicopter pilots* known as initial entry rotary wing
training* began in November 2001 and is projected to be completed by
December 2004. This training is intended to provide a pool or pipeline of
pilots for more advanced training to fly specific helicopters. In
addition, according to NAS officials, a new pilot takes an average of 2 to
3 years to progress to pilot- incommand.

 Specific UH- 60 pilot training for 42 personnel began in August 2001 and
was completed in September 2002.

 Specific UH- II pilot training for 75 personnel began in May 2002 and is
projected to be completed in December 2003.

In addition, according to NAS and U. S. contractor officials, 105 out of
159 Colombian Army personnel have completed the basic UH- 60 and UH- II
maintenance training and are taking more advanced training to qualify as
senior mechanics. These officials told us that the remaining 54 personnel
will receive the contractor- provided basic training in the near future,
but they did not know when it would begin. NAS and U. S. contractor
officials also told us that it typically takes 3 to 5 years for mechanics
to gain the experience necessary to become fully qualified on specific
helicopter

systems, in particular the UH- 60 Black Hawks.

Colombian Army Support Is The Colombian Army Aviation Battalion is
responsible for providing

Limited helicopters and other aircraft and personnel for all Colombian
Army

missions with an aviation component, including counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency operations throughout Colombia. Information provided by
the Colombian Aviation Battalion shows that it is staffed at only 80
percent of its required levels and, over the past several years, it has
received between 60 percent to 70 percent of its requested budget for
logistics and maintenance. According to Colombian Army personnel, current
plans indicate that the missions the battalion needs to support will be
expanding, but they do not know if they will have sufficient resources to
meet these demands.

The decision by the Colombian military to continue using the UH- 1N
helicopters in addition to the UH- 60 and UH- II helicopters will make it
more difficult for the Aviation Battalion to provide the numbers of
personnel needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. State originally
intended that the UH- 1N helicopters would only be used by the
counternarcotics brigade until the UH- 60 and UH- II helicopters were
available to support operations. However, in 2002, the Colombian military
requested and received approval from the United States to continue using
these helicopters. NAS and Military Group officials stated that this means
the number of pilots and mechanics needed to operate all the aircraft
increases the total requirement for the Aviation Battalion. For example,
the battalion will have to have a total of 84 additional Colombian Army
personnel qualified to serve as pilots- in- command (42) and co- pilots
(42). Even though the U. S.- funded contractor has trained Colombian Army
personnel since the UH- 1N*s initial delivery in 1999, only 61 Colombian
Army personnel remain in the program.

Trained Personnel Were Not According to bilateral agreements between
Colombia and the United Available

States, the Colombian Army must ensure that pilots and mechanics who
receive U. S. training be assigned to positions using their training for a
minimum of 2 years. This has not always been the case. For example, 
According to U. S. embassy data, at least 105 Colombian Army personnel

have completed the basic helicopter maintenance course. As of January
2003, 65 of these individuals were scheduled to receive additional
training that would enable them to become fully qualified mechanics who
can perform maintenance without U. S.- contractor oversight. Of these, 22
had not reported for training. Neither the Military Group nor the Aviation
Battalion could provide us the location of these individuals.

 According to U. S. contractor personnel, at least 10 pilots- in- command
should be available to fly missions. 14 Although 19 Colombian Army
personnel were qualified to serve as pilots- in- command on UH- 1N
helicopters, as of January 2003, only one pilot was assigned to serve in
this position. The remaining nine pilots- in- command were provided by the
U. S. contractor. Again, neither the Military Group nor the Aviation

Battalion could provide us the location of these individuals. Operations
and Training Slowed

Of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2002, $140 million was used to
for 5 Months

support Colombian Army counternarcotics efforts. Most of this went to
support U. S.- provided helicopter operations, maintenance, logistical,
and training support. However, not all the funding could be released until
the Secretary of State certified, in two separate reports to appropriate
congressional committees, 15 that the Colombian military was making
progress meeting certain human rights conditions. According to U. S.
embassy political section personnel, they encountered difficulties
developing the information required to make the human rights determination
and certification. Because State was late in providing these reports, the
U. S. embassy could not use this funding for operations and

14 Although 14 helicopters are available for operations during a given
time period, 10 or fewer are typically used to support an operation. 15
Section 567 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P. L. 107- 115). Specifically, the act
provided that not more than 60 percent of the funds could be obligated
until after the Secretary of State made a determination and certification
that the Colombian Military was (1) suspending members of the Colombian
Armed Forces who have been creditably alleged to have committed gross
violations of human rights, (2) cooperating with civilian prosecutors and
investigators, and (3) severing links between the Armed Forces and
paramilitary groups. In addition, the remaining 40 percent of the funds
could be obligated only after June 1, 2002, and after the Secretary of
State made a second determination and certification with respect to the
same

conditions.

training on two occasions for a total of about 5 months during 2002. 16
According to NAS, these delays resulted in fewer counternarcotics
operations and limited the training and experience Colombian Army pilots
could obtain to qualify as pilots- in- command.

Continued U. S. Support U. S. assistance to support the helicopters
provided as part of Plan

Needed to Sustain Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the
Colombian Army

Operations taking over these responsibilities. However, NAS, Military
Group, and

Colombian Army officials stated that a continued level of U. S. contractor
presence will be needed beyond this date because the Aviation Battalion is
not expected to have the personnel trained or the resources necessary.
Although Military Group officials stated that they have not officially

estimated what this assistance level will be, they tentatively projected
that it would cost between $100 million and $150 million annually to
sustain the U. S.- supported counternarcotics programs. Moreover, other
recently initiated U. S. programs will likely require U. S. assistance and
contractor support, but the long- term costs of sustaining such programs
are not

known. Infrastructure Units In 2002, the United States agreed to provide
$104 million in training and equipment to Colombian Army units whose
primary mission is to protect important infrastructure but whose initial
mission is to minimize terrorist attacks along 110 miles of the Cano Limon
pipeline in the Arauca department. The units will focus on patrolling,
reconnaissance, and immediate reaction in the area of the pipeline and key
facilities.

Of the $104 million, $6 million is for ongoing U. S. Special Forces
training and $98 million is for procuring 2 UH- 60 and 4 UH- II
helicopters and associated training and ground support. NAS and Military
Group officials indicated that some level of contractor support will
likely be needed for the foreseeable future because the Colombian Army
Aviation Battalion does not have sufficient numbers of trained pilots and
mechanics to operate and maintain the helicopters.

16 The first report was issued on May 1, 2002* almost 2 months later than
State*s target date. The second report was issued on September 9, 2002*
almost 3 months later than State*s target date.

Commando Battalion In 2002, the Colombian military decided to form a
Commando Battalion whose mission will be to conduct operations against
high- value targets including the capture of high- level leaders of
insurgent and paramilitary units. The United States has agreed to provide
the battalion with training and equipment. Although the costs of training
are not readily available, Military Group officials estimated that the
United States will provide about

$5 million in equipment, including weapons and ammunition, communication
equipment, night- vision devices, and other individual equipment.

Planning Assistance Teams Also in early 2003, the United States began
assigning U. S. military personnel to selected Colombian military units
for up to 179 days. These personnel advise the commander and help plan
attacks on drug trafficking and related insurgent targets. Military Group
officials did not know when* or if* personnel or funds would be approved
for all the planned teams because of other priorities, such as deployments
to Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Military Group officials, these
teams could cost about $8 million annually if all become operational.

Colombia*s Aerial Since the early 1990s, State*s Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law

Eradication Program Enforcement Affairs (through the U. S. Embassy Bogota
NAS and the

bureau*s Office of Aviation) has supported the Colombian National Police*s
Has Had Mixed Results

efforts to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the cultivation of coca
and opium poppy. However, for the most part, the net hectares of coca
under cultivation in Colombia continued to rise until 2002, and the net
hectares of opium poppy under cultivation remained relatively steady until
2001- 02. 17 In addition, the U. S. Embassy Bogota has made little
progress in having the

Colombian National Police assume more responsibility for the aerial
eradication program, which requires costly U. S. contractor assistance to
carry out.

17 The estimates of net hectares of coca and opium poppy under cultivation
are prepared annually by the U. S. Director of Central Intelligence, Crime
and Narcotics Center. See also our report Drug Control: Coca Cultivation
and Eradication Estimates in Colombia, GAO03- 319R (Washington, D. C.:
Jan. 8, 2003).

Recent Progress in As shown in figure 2, the number of hectares under coca
cultivation rose

Reducing Net Cultivation of more than threefold from 1995 to 2001* from
50, 900 hectares to 169,800 hectares* despite substantially increased
eradication efforts. 18 But in 2002, Coca and Poppy

the Office of Aviation estimated that the program eradicated 102,225
hectares of coca* a record high. In March 2003, the Office of National
Drug Control Policy reported for the first time since before 1995 a net
reduction

in coca cultivation in Colombia* from 169, 800 hectares to 144, 450
hectares a 15 percent decline.

Figure 2: Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation and Hectares Eradicated
in Colombia, 1995- 2002

As shown in figure 3, the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation
varied between 6, 100 and 6, 600 for the period 1995- 98 but rose to 7,
500 hectares in 1999 and 2000. In 2001, the net hectares of poppy
estimated

18 The number of hectares eradicated is provided by the Office of Aviation
and is based on the number of net hectares sprayed multiplied by an
estimated *kill rate.* Although many thousands of hectares of coca and
poppy are killed, coca and poppy farmers often replant in the same or
other areas, which helps explain why the number of hectares under
cultivation often does not decline.

under cultivation declined to 6,500 and, in 2002, further declined to
4,900* nearly a 35 percent reduction in net cultivation over the past 2
years.

Figure 3: Net Hectares of Poppy under Cultivation and Hectares Eradicated
in Colombia, 1995- 2002

NAS and Office of Aviation officials attributed the recent unprecedented
reductions in both coca and poppy cultivation primarily to the current
Colombian government*s willingness to allow the aerial eradication program
to operate in all areas of the country. They also noted that

 the number of spray aircraft had increased from 10 in July 2001 to 17 in
January 2003;  recently acquired spray aircraft can carry up to twice the
herbicide as

the older aircraft; and  as of January 2003, aircraft were flying spray
missions from three

forward operating locations* a first for the program, according to NAS
officials.

The ability to keep an increased number of spray aircraft operating out of
three bases was made possible, at least in part, because NAS hired a
contractor to work with the Colombian National Police to, among other
things, help maintain their aircraft. As a result, the availability of the
police aircraft needed for the spray program increased. Moreover, in
August 2002, the Colombian government allowed the police to return to a
higher strength

herbicide mixture which, according to NAS officials, improved the spray*s
effectiveness. 19 NAS officials project that the aerial eradication
program can reduce the amount of coca and poppy cultivation to 30,000
hectares and 5, 000 hectares, respectively, by 2005 or 2006, assuming the
police continue the current pace and can spray in all areas of Colombia.

Colombian National Police As we reported in 2000, 20 beginning in 1998, U.
S. embassy officials became

Have Not Assumed Control concerned with the rising U. S. presence in
Colombia and associated costs

over Aerial Eradication of the aerial eradication program. At the time,
the embassy began

Operations developing a 3- year plan to have the Colombian National Police
assume

increased operational control over the program. But for various reasons,
the police never agreed to the plan. Since then, contractor involvement
and the associated costs have continued to rise and the Colombian National
Police are not yet able to assume more control of the aerial eradication
program.

As shown in table 2, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of Aviation reported
that the direct cost for the U. S. contractor providing aircraft
maintenance and logistical support and many of the pilots was $37.8
million. In addition, NAS

provided $10.7 million for fuel, herbicide, and related support for a
total of $48.5 million. For fiscal year 2003, the comparable estimates for
contractor and NAS- provided support were $41.5 million and $44.8 million,
respectively, for a total of $86.3 million. Most of this increase occurred
between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to support the additional spray
aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the anticipated continuation
of spray operations throughout Colombia. According to NAS and Office of
Aviation officials, these costs are expected to remain relatively constant
for the next several years. 19 In March 2002, the previous Colombian
government reduced the strength of the spray

mixture because of environmental concerns. 20 GAO- 01- 26.

Table 2: U. S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program, Fiscal Years
1998- 2004

Dollars in millions

Fiscal years State

2003 2004

office 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (estimated) (proposed) Total

Office of Aviation $37.8 $36. 8 $52.5 a $38. 0 $38. 2 $41.5 $45. 0 $289.8

Narcotics Affairs Section 10.7 14.1 20.9 11. 1 17. 6 44.8 b 44. 2 $163.4

Total $48. 5 $50.9 $73. 4 $49. 1 $55. 8 $86.3 $89. 2 $453.2

Source: U. S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office of Aviation. a Includes $20 million
for additional spray aircraft.

b In addition, NAS paid $38.8 million for a contractor to support the
Colombian National Police Aviation Service. NAS could not readily identify
the proportion of this contract that is related to aerial eradication. NAS
officials stated that they expect this expenditure to continue for the
next 2 years and possibly up to 4 years.

The Colombian National Police do not provide funding per se for the aerial
eradication program and, therefore, the value of its contributions are
more difficult to quantify. In recent years, the police have provided
helicopters and fixed- wing aircraft for spray mission support and the use
of many of its facilities throughout Colombia. In addition, the police
have about 3,600 personnel assigned to counternarcotics missions and
estimate that 84 are directly supporting the aerial eradication program.

U. S. Efforts to Improve To help the Colombian National Police increase
its capacity to assume Police Capacity for Aerial

more responsibility for the aerial eradication program, NAS has initiated
Eradication

several efforts. In addition to hiring a contractor to help with the
Aviation Service*s operations, NAS has initiated a program to train T- 65
spray plane pilots and plans to begin training search and rescue personnel
so they can accompany the aerial eradication missions. NAS officials
stated that the contractor presence should decline and the police should
be able to take over more of the eradication program by 2006, when NAS
estimates that coca and poppy cultivation will be reduced to *maintenance
levels** 30, 000 hectares and 5, 000 hectares, respectively.

Aviation Service Operations In February and March 2002, the Office of
Aviation conducted an Aviation Resource Management Survey of the Colombian
National Police Aviation Service. 21 According to Office of Aviation
officials, these surveys are intended to provide a stringent on- site
assessment of flight operations from management and safety to logistics
and maintenance. The study noted that the Aviation Service has some unique
circumstances that have made its

operations difficult to manage. In particular, it grew from 579 personnel
in 1995 to 1, 232 in 2002 and operates 8 different types of rotary- wing
and 9 different types of fixed- wing aircraft. Nevertheless, the team made
a number of critical observations. For example,

 The Aviation Service*s organizational structure, lines of authority, and
levels of responsibility were not clear. In most cases, only the
commanding general was allowed to commit resources and make operational
decisions. This reliance on an overly centralized command structure
resulted in unnecessary delays and, NAS officials told us, the
cancellation of some planned aerial eradication missions because the
commanding general could not be reached.

 The Aviation Service did not have a formal flying hour program. A flying
hour program is used to forecast budgetary requirements. It takes into
account the operational use and training requirements for each aircraft
and the various missions it performs and equates each flight hour to a
cost average for fuel and spare parts, which constitute the majority of an
aviation organization's annual expenses. The lack of a flying hour program
has prevented the police from more accurately forecasting budgetary
requirements. Moreover, according to NAS, maintenance scheduling is
enhanced when the number of flight hours can be projected, which
contributes to higher aircraft availability rates.

 About 35 percent of the maintenance staff were inexperienced. According
to the survey team, this could result in improper maintenance procedures
being performed, which could adversely affect flight safety and endanger
lives. In addition, all locations the team visited had deficiencies in
standard maintenance procedures and practices. For example, the survey
team found that a UH- 60 Black Hawk with gunshot

21 At about the same time, State began an investigation into a reported
diversion of $2 million in U. S. funding for the police. According to NAS
officials, the police had resisted having the Aviation Resource Management
Survey done until news of the alleged diversion became public.

damage to a fuel cell was used in several local area flights. While fuel
cells are self- sealing to enable an aircraft to return to base for
repairs after sustaining damage, aircraft are not supposed to be routinely
flown in this condition.

 Management of items needing repair and control of spare parts was
deficient. The survey team found 236 items awaiting repair* some from
August 1998. The team also found more than $4 million in UH- 1H helicopter
blades and parts stored outside and unprotected.

 The Aviation Service*s safety program did not have formal risk
management practices to ensure that all risk factors* such as weather,
crew experience, and mission complexity* are taken into account. In
addition, the team observed a majority of helicopter gunners failing to
take basic safety precautions, such as ensuring that their machine guns
and mini- guns were rendered harmless when personnel were around the
aircraft, especially during refueling and rearming operations. To help
correct these and other deficiencies, the survey team made numerous
recommendations for specific improvements. Overall, the team

rated the Aviation Service*s operational and maintenance procedures as
poor but concluded that it had an excellent chance for improvement over
the next 2 to 3 years due to the dedication of its young officers.

As a result of the survey, in July 2002, a NAS contractor (a $38.8
million, 1- year contract with options for 4 additional years) began
providing on- thejob maintenance and logistical training to the Aviation
Service and helping the police address many of the issues raised by the
Aviation Resource Management Survey team. NAS officials already noted that
a more formal flying hour program has improved the availability rates of
many of the

aircraft in the Aviation Service*s inventory. For example, the
availability rate of the Aviation Service*s UH- II helicopters* often used
to support aerial eradication missions* increased from 67 percent in
January 2002 to 87 percent in December 2002. Similar improvements also
occurred for other Aviation Service aircraft, such as UH- 60 Black Hawk
and Bell 212 helicopters. According to NAS, the improved availability
rates made it easier to schedule and conduct spray missions.

T- 65 Pilot Training According to NAS officials, the police managed the T-
65 pilot program prior to July 2002, but the police repeatedly violated
Office of Aviation standard operating procedures by requiring pilots to
fly without adequate rest and in poor weather. As a result, NAS took
tighter control of the program in April

2003. As currently planned, the program will train 21 Colombian pilots, 4
of whom will eventually be hired to fly the T- 65s. The training will
enable pilots to fly T- 65 spray missions in both flat and mountainous
areas.

Search and Rescue Training NAS is also planning to initiate a program in
mid- 2003 to standardize and modernize the police*s search and rescue
capabilities. Currently, the Office of Aviation contractor provides all
search and rescue coverage for the aerial eradication program. The
training will make it possible for the police

to provide search and rescue coverage for some spray missions by
standardizing its operating procedures to make them compatible with the
Office of Aviation*s. The program will also allow the police to replace
much of its current equipment, which is antiquated or not standard.
According to NAS officials, the program should be fully operational in
about a year and self- sufficient in about 3 to 5 years.

Financial and The U. S.- supported counternarcotics program in Colombia
has recently

Management begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999- 2000.
However, Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with
financial and

Challenges Continue to management challenges. In addition, Colombia faces
continuing challenges

Complicate Efforts to associated with its long- standing insurgency.
Moreover, for U. S. assistance

Reduce Illicit Drug to continue, Colombia needs to ensure that the army
and police comply

with human rights standards, that the aerial eradication program meets
Activities

certain environmental conditions, and that alternative development is
provided in areas subject to aerial eradication.

Performance Measures and In 2000, we noted that the Colombian government
had not finalized plans

Specific Time Frames Have for funding, sequencing, and managing activities
included in Plan Colombia

Not Been Developed and that State and Defense had not completed their
implementation plans

to support Plan Colombia. We concluded that if Colombia or the United
States did not follow through on its portion of Plan Colombia, including
identifying sources of funding, Plan Colombia could not succeed as
envisioned. 22 Nearly 3 years later, Colombia and the United States still
have not defined performance measures or identified specific time frames
for completing ongoing counternarcotics programs.

22 GAO- 01- 26.

After the new Colombian administration was inaugurated in August 2002, it
drafted a National Security Strategy to define Colombia*s vital interests,
principal threats, and short- and long- term objectives. According to
State officials, as of April 2003, the National Security Strategy had not
been finalized and was being held up while the Colombian military and
police complete their strategy for dealing with the insurgents, including
reclaiming the insurgent- controlled areas of Colombia and stemming
illicit drug activities.

As for the United States, we were told that in 2002, the President tasked
State to prepare a comprehensive, fully integrated political- military
implementation plan to reflect appropriate U. S. support for Colombia*s
National Security Strategy. The plan is supposed to include a statement of

the overall mission, goals, objectives, performance standards, timelines,
measures of effectiveness, and desired end state and outcomes. However,
according to State officials, development of this plan has not begun
because Colombia has not released its National Security Strategy and the

related military and police strategy. Colombian Financial

Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the Colombian government
Resources Are Limited

pledged $4 billion and called on the international community to provide
$3.5 billion. Until recently, Colombia had not provided any significant
new funding for Plan Colombia and, according to U. S. embassy and
Colombian government officials, anticipated international assistance for
Plan Colombia* apart from that provided by the United States* did not
materialize as envisioned. But because of overall poor economic
conditions, the government of Colombia*s ability to contribute more is
limited.

Since 1999, a combination of domestic and foreign events has limited
Colombia*s economic growth. Domestically, insurgent and paramilitary
organizations remained active and derailed the peace process. According to
the International Monetary Fund, the insurgency*s threats and attacks
displaced thousands of people, hindered investment, affected oil
production, and forced the government to increase military expenditures.
Externally, the price of coffee* a traditionally major Colombian export*
reached historically low levels, trade with some neighboring countries
fell as their economies under performed, and foreign private financing to
Colombia was limited by the continuing insurgency and political
developments in the region during 2002. By mid- 2002, Colombian finance
officials estimated that Colombia*s economic growth was below 2 percent

and its combined public sector deficit would likely exceed 5 percent of
gross domestic product.

In August 2002, the new Colombian administration announced a series of
decrees and proposals to increase defense expenditures and strengthen the
overall economy. Initially, the administration issued a decree
establishing a one- time tax on wealth that was supposed to raise about
$860 million. According to State, about $320 million of this amount would
likely be spent on the military. To help maintain this increased revenue,
the administration also submitted to the Colombian Congress a package of
economic and administrative reforms. Most were approved in December 2002,
but some reforms also require approval through a public referendum planned
for later in 2003. The overall reform program calls for tax measures to
raise revenues and a freeze on most current expenditures for 2 years. In
addition, structural reforms, particularly changes in the government
pension system and organizational streamlining, are planned to reduce
expenditures. 23

However, passage of the reforms subject to referendum is far from certain
and, according to U. S. Embassy Bogota and Colombian government officials,
Colombia*s ability to provide additional funding to sustain the
counternarcotics programs without a greatly improved economy is virtually
nonexistent.

Insurgency and Human The Colombian government has stated that ending the
civil conflict is

Rights Conditions central to solving Colombia*s problems* from improving
economic

Complicate conditions to stemming illicit drug activities. A peaceful
resolution to the

Counternarcotics Efforts long- standing insurgency would help stabilize
the nation, speed economic

recovery, help ensure the protection of human rights, and restore the
authority and control of the Colombian government in the coca- growing
regions. The continuing violence limits the government*s ability to
institute

economic, social, and political improvements. 23 Colombia also entered
into an arrangement with the International Monetary Fund in January 2003.
The fund agreed to provide $2.1 billion in stand- by credit through 2004
based on the reforms taken and proposed. However, Colombian finance
officials said they do not intend to draw on these funds.

The Colombian government has stated that it is committed to protecting the
human rights of its citizens. State and Defense officials reiterated that
they will not assist those who violate the basic tenets of human rights,
and State officials said they will apply the strictest human rights
standards before approving the provision of assistance to Colombian
military and police units. Nevertheless, human rights organizations
continue to allege that individuals in the Colombian armed forces have
been involved with or condoned human rights violations and that they do so
with impunity. If this

is the case, Colombia*s failure to adhere to U. S. human rights policies
could delay or derail planned counternarcotics activities.

The appropriations act for fiscal year 2003 makes $700 million available
for Colombia and other Andean ridge countries, but it imposed some
restrictions on the availability of 25 percent of the funds provided for
the Colombian armed forces until the Secretary of State makes certain
certifications. The Secretary of State must certify that Colombia*s armed
forces are making progress in meeting human rights standards and, among

other things, executing orders to capture paramilitary leaders to lift the
restriction on 12.5 percent of the funds. To obligate the remaining 12. 5
percent, the Secretary must certify after July 31, 2003, that Colombia
continues to make progress in meeting the conditions in the initial

certification. 24 Environmental and

The appropriations act for fiscal year 2003 also requires that the aerial
Alternative Development eradication program meet certain environmental
conditions in its use of

Conditions May Limit Aerial herbicide and that alternative development
programs be available in the

Eradication Efforts areas affected by the spray program. Otherwise, funds
provided in the act

that are used to purchase herbicide for the aerial eradication program may
not be spent. State officials are still trying to determine the
ramifications of the restrictions, but State and NAS officials are
concerned that these requirements could delay funding needed to purchase
herbicide and result in a temporary suspension of the program, making it
more difficult for the program to achieve its ambitious goals. Such a
suspension would also likely undermine the progress made in 2002 by
allowing the coca and poppy farmers to reestablish their fields.

24 P. L. 108- 7, the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003.

The 2003 appropriations act*s environmental conditions require the
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to certify that (1) the herbicide
mixture is being used in accordance with EPA requirements, the Colombian
Environmental Management Plan, and any additional controls that EPA may
recommend; (2) the mixture does not pose unreasonable risks or adverse
effects to humans or the environment; and (3) complaints of harm to health
or licit crops are evaluated and fair compensation is paid for meritorious
claims. 25 According to NAS and Office of Aviation officials,

similar conditions in the fiscal year 2002 appropriations act almost
resulted in a suspension of the aerial eradication program in October 2002
because of delays in finalizing the required reports. The program was able
to continue operations by using prior- year funds but, at one point, had
only a 10- day supply of herbicide available.

The 2003 appropriations act*s alternative development conditions require
that, in areas 26 where security permits, USAID, Colombian government, or
other organizations implement alternative development programs for small
growers whose coca and poppy plants are targeted for spraying. According
to State, NAS, and USAID officials, alternative development programs are
not being implemented in all the specific areas sprayed because of
concerns about physical security and the economic feasibility of
implementing such programs in some locations. As of March 31, 2003, USAID
reported accrued expenditures of about

$51.6 million for alternative development projects and projected that
expenditures for April through June 2003 would exceed $13.5 million. USAID
officials also said that the agency had 247 alternative development
projects benefiting more than 22,800 families in 9 departments where coca
or opium poppy are grown.

25 In addition, the conference report accompanying the legislation directs
the Secretary of State to submit a report, no later than 90 days after
enactment, describing (1) the steps the department is taking to enhance
environmental safeguards of the fumigation program, including implementing
the recommendations of the EPA in a separate fiscal year 2002 fumigation
report; (2) the department*s plan to conduct an independent, long- term
program to monitor the health and environmental effects of the fumigation
program, including conducting soil and water tests in areas sprayed,
toxicity tests on the spray formulation, and ground verification missions
to evaluate over spray; and (3) steps taken to implement environmental
training programs for spray pilots.

26 The term *areas* is not defined in the legislation. State is in the
process of creating guidelines for implementing and complying with the
act.

Conclusions Colombia is a long- time ally and significant trading partner
of the United States; therefore, its economic and political stability is
important to the

United States as well as the Andean region. Colombia*s long- standing
insurgency and the insurgents* links to the illicit drug trade complicate
its efforts to tap its natural resources and make systemic economic
reforms. Solving these problems is important to Colombia*s future
stability. Colombia and the United States continue to face financial and
management

challenges in implementing and sustaining counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency programs in Colombia. Neither the Colombian Army nor the
Colombian National Police have the capacity to manage ongoing
counternarcotics programs without continued U. S. funding and contractor
support. Colombia*s financial resources are limited and its economy is

weak and thus will need U. S. assistance for the foreseeable future.
According to U. S. embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up to
$230 million per year, and future costs for some recently initiated army
and police programs have not been determined. In addition, we note that
this estimate does not include future funding needed for other U. S.
programs in Colombia, including other aerial and ground interdiction
efforts; the police Aviation Service*s U. S.- funded contractor; and
alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced
persons programs. In recent years, world events* from the global war on
terrorism to the

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* have diverted scarce U. S. resources and
made it paramount that the United States fully consider the resources
committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the
total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown.
Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not
developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in
Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to
achieve it.

Recommendation for Because Colombia continues to face serious obstacles in
substantially

Executive Action curtailing illicit narcotics activities and resolving its
long- standing

insurgency, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense, examine the U. S. assistance programs to the
Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police to (1) establish clear
objectives for the programs reflecting these obstacles and (2) estimate
future annual funding requirements for U. S. support. This analysis should
designate specific performance measures for assessing progress, define the

roles of U. S. personnel and contractors, and develop a timeline for
achieving the stated objectives. The Secretary should provide this
information to the Congress for consideration in the fiscal year 2005
appropriations cycle.

Agency Comments and State and Defense provided written comments on a draft
of this report. See

Our Evaluation appendixes I and II, respectively.

Both concurred with our recommendation. State said it very much agreed
with the overall findings and, in particular, the recognition that
continued U. S. programs will be needed for the foreseeable future to
sustain

operations in Colombia and achieve U. S. foreign policy goals. It further
said that the time is appropriate for a comprehensive review of U. S.
programs with the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police and
intends to address our recommendation for providing key program
information to the Congress beginning in the fiscal year 2005
appropriations cycle. Defense stated that it would work with State to
establish clear objectives and would coordinate with State and other
agencies involved to develop performance measures. Defense added that,
once performance measures are established, it would augment staff at the
U. S. Embassy Bogota Military Group to collect information for measuring
progress.

Scope and To determine the status of U. S. counternarcotics assistance
provided to the

Methodology Colombian Army in fiscal years 2000- 03, and how this
assistance has been

used, we reviewed pertinent planning, implementation, and related
documentation and met with cognizant U. S. officials at the Departments of
State and Defense, Washington, D. C.; the U. S. Southern Command
headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U. S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia.
We also met with U. S.- funded contractor representatives at various
Colombian Army bases; the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion commander and
his staff at Tolemaida; and the counternarcotics brigade commander and his
staff at Larandia and Tres Esquinas. In addition, we observed a Colombian
Army counternarcotics brigade airlift operation.

To determine what the U. S.- supported Colombian National Police aerial
eradication program has accomplished in recent years, we reviewed
pertinent documentation and met with cognizant officials at the

Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs in Washington, D. C., and the Office of Aviation

headquarters office at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. In Colombia, we
met with Office of Aviation officials and contractor representatives at
the Office of Aviation headquarters office at the El Dorado International
Airport in Bogota; the Colombian National Police base at Guaymaral; and
operational sites at Larandia, San Jose del Guaviare, Santa Ana, and Villa
Garzon in the primary coca- growing regions of Colombia. We also met with
the Colombian National Police deputy commander and other police officials.
In addition, we observed several aerial eradication operations* from
loading the herbicide and refueling the spray planes to the actual spray
missions.

To determine what challenges Colombia and the United States face in
sustaining these programs, we met with numerous U. S. and Colombian
officials to obtain their views on the issues discussed in this report. In
Colombia, we interviewed U. S. embassy officials, including the

Ambassador; Deputy Chief of Mission; and others from the Narcotics Affairs
Section, the Military Group, the U. S. Agency for International
Development, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. We also interviewed
Colombian Army, police, and other government officials, including
officials from the Colombian Ministries of Defense and Finance and
Colombia*s National Planning Department.

We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the interested congressional committees and the Secretaries of State
and Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 512- 4268 or contact me at FordJ@ gao. gov. An additional
contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.

Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade

Appendi Appendi xes I x Comments from the Department of State

Appendi I I x Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendi I I I x GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact A. H.
Huntington, III (202) 512- 4140 Acknowledgments In addition to the above
named individual, Jocelyn Cortese, Allen Fleener,

Ronald Hughes, Jose Pena, George Taylor, Kaya Taylor, and Janey Cohen.
Rick Barrett and Ernie Jackson provided technical assistance.

(320135)

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a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

In fiscal years 2000- 03, the United States provided about $640 million in
assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade
and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related support. Nearly all
this assistance has been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics
operations. However, the Colombian Army cannot operate and maintain the U.
S.- provided helicopters at current levels without U. S. support because
it does not yet have

sufficient numbers of qualified pilots and mechanics. U. S. officials
estimate that up to $150 million a year is needed to sustain the ongoing
programs. In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial
eradication program has had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation
rose in every year until 2002 and opium poppy cultivation remained
relatively steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the U. S. Office of National
Drug Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia
decreased 15 percent, and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25
percent* the second yearly decline in a row. U. S. officials attributed
this success primarily to the Colombian government*s willingness to spray
coca and

poppy plants without restriction. These officials estimate that about $80
million a year is needed to continue the program at its current pace.

Although the U. S.- backed counternarcotics program in Colombia has begun
to achieve some of the results originally envisioned, Colombia and the
United States must deal with financial and management challenges. As GAO
noted in 2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in
Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and
Defense have still not developed estimates of future program costs,
defined their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state,
or determined how they plan to achieve it. Colombia*s ability to
contribute more is limited, and it continues to face challenges associated
with its long- standing insurgency and the need to ensure it complies with
human rights standards and other requirements in order for U. S.
assistance to continue. Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation in
Colombia, 1995- 2002 The United States has been providing assistance to
Colombia

since the early 1970s to help reduce illegal drug activities. In fiscal
years 2000- 03 alone, the United States provided over $2. 5 billion.
Despite this assistance, Colombia remains the world*s leading producer and
distributor of cocaine and a major source of the heroin used in the United
States.

The report discusses the status of U. S. counternarcotics assistance to
the Colombian Army and for a U. S. supported Colombian police aerial
eradication program. It also addresses challenges Colombia and

the United States face in sustaining these programs. GAO recommends that
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
establish clear objectives, including developing specific performance

measures, and estimate future U. S. funding requirements for the programs
with the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 783. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Jess T. Ford, (202) 512- 4268, FordJ@ gao. gov.
Highlights of GAO- 03- 783, a report to congressional committees

June 2003

DRUG CONTROL

Specific Performance Measures and Long- Term Costs for U. S. Programs in
Colombia Have Not Been Developed

Page i GAO- 03- 783 Drug Control in Colombia

Contents

Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 783 Drug Control in Colombia

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Appendix I

Appendix I Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix I Comments from the Department of State

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Appendix II

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

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Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

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Appendix III

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Service Requested

Presorted Standard Postage & Fees Paid

GAO Permit No. GI00
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