Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to
Be Strengthened (27-AUG-03, GAO-03-760).			 
                                                                 
The sharing of information by federal authorities to state and	 
city governments is critical to effectively execute and unify	 
homeland security efforts. This report examines (1) what	 
initiatives have been undertaken to improve information sharing  
and (2) whether federal, state, and city officials believe that  
the current information-sharing process is effective.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-760 					        
    ACCNO:   A08204						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing
Need to Be Strengthened 					 
     DATE:   08/27/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Computer matching					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Surveys						 

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GAO-03-760

Report to the Secretary of Homeland Security

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

August 2003 HOMELAND SECURITY

Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened

GAO- 03- 760

Since September 11, 2001, federal, state, and city governments have
established initiatives to improve the sharing of information to prevent
terrorism. Many of these initiatives were implemented by states and cities
and not necessarily coordinated with other sharing initiatives, including
those by federal agencies. At the same time, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has initiatives under way to enhance information sharing,
including the development of a homeland security blueprint, known as an
*enterprise architecture,* to integrate sharing between federal, state,
and city authorities. GAO surveyed federal, state, and city government
officials on their

perceptions of the effectiveness of the current information- sharing
process. Numerous studies, testimonies, reports, and congressional
commissions substantiate our survey results. Overall, no level of
government perceived the process as effective, particularly when sharing
information with federal agencies. Information on threats, methods, and
techniques of terrorists is not routinely shared; and the information that
is shared is not perceived as timely, accurate, or relevant. Moreover,
federal officials have not yet established comprehensive processes and
procedures to promote sharing. Federal respondents cited the inability of
state and city officials to secure and protect classified information, the
lack of federal security clearances, and a lack of integrated databases as
restricting their ability to share information.

DHS needs to strengthen efforts to improve the information sharing process
so that the nation*s ability to detect or prepare for attacks is
strengthened.

Agencies Responding to Our Survey and Indicating That Information Sharing
with Federal Agencies Is Effective or Very Effective The sharing of
information by federal authorities to state and city governments is
critical to effectively execute and unify homeland security efforts. This

report examines (1) what initiatives have been undertaken to improve
information sharing and (2) whether federal, state, and city officials
believe that the

current information- sharing process is effective.

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with the heads
of other federal agencies,

and state and city officials to ensure that DHS*s enterprise architecture
fully integrates states and cities into the informationsharing process;
incorporates, where appropriate, other federal, state, and city
information- sharing initiatives; takes specific actions to evaluate and
overcome perceived barriers to information sharing; and measure progress
in improving information sharing as part of the enterprise architecture
initiative.

The Departments of Homeland Security and Defense concurred with our
report. DHS stated that it has made improvements in information sharing
but further progress will require a prudent and deliberate approach. The
Central Intelligence Agency provided only technical comments. The

Department of Justice did not agree with our findings. However, we believe
that our conclusions are well founded. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt?
GAO- 03- 760. To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact
Raymond J. Decker at (202) 512- 6020 or deckerrj@ gao. gov. Highlights of
GAO- 03- 760, a report to the

Secretary of Homeland Security August 2003

HOMELAND SECURITY

Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened

Page i GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Letter 1 Results in Brief 3
Background 6 Information- Sharing Initiatives Are Not Well Coordinated 11
Current Information- Sharing Process Not Perceived As Effective 15
Conclusions 29 Recommendations for Executive Action 30 Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation 31 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35 Use of a Survey to
Supplement Interviews and Review

of Documents 36 Appendix II Selected Initiatives to Promote Information
Sharing 38

Appendix III Survey Responses Showing Categories of Homeland Security
Information Deemed Needed by the Respondents 40

Appendix IV Survey Responses to Our Questions on the Elements of an
Information- Sharing Process That Are Already in Place 42

Appendix V Survey Responses to Perceived Barriers Faced by States/ Cities
in Providing the Federal Government with Information 44

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 45 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Appendix VII Comments from the
Department of Defense 47

Appendix VIII Comments from the Department of Justice 50

Appendix IX GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Related GAO Products 53

Tables

Table 1: GAO Surveys Distributed, Survey Responses, and Response Rates 2
Table 2: Percentage of Federal, State, and City Respondents That

View Their Sharing Relationships with One Another As Effective or Very
Effective 18 Table 3: Perceptions of Information Needed and Regularly
Received 20 Table 4: Survey Respondents Who Said the Information from the

Federal Government Was Timely, Accurate, or Relevant 23 Table 5: Survey
Respondents Who Said That Information from State Agencies Was Timely,
Accurate, or Relevant 24 Table 6: Survey Respondents Who Said That
Information from City Agencies Was Timely, Accurate, or Relevant 25 Table
7: Perceived Barriers Preventing Federal Agencies from Providing Other
Federal Agencies, States, and Cities with Information 27 Table 8:
Initiatives and Efforts to Share More Information 38 Table 9: Needed to
Critically- Needed Information and Intelligence and Frequently to
Regularly- Received Information and Intelligence 40 Table 10: Survey
Respondents Who Agreed That Elements of a

Sharing Framework Exists by Answering *Great* to *Very Great* 42 Table 11:
Great to Very- Great Barriers to Providing Federal Authorities with
Information and Intelligence 44

Page iii GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Abbreviations

CATIC California Anti- Terrorism Information Center DHS Department of
Homeland Security FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation JITF- CT Joint
Intelligence Task Force- Combating Terrorism JRIES JITF- CT/ RISS. NET
Information Exchange System JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

MDA Maritime Domain Awareness SATURN Statewide Anti- Terrorism Unified
Response Network

This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security August 27, 2003 The Honorable Thomas
J. Ridge

The Secretary of Homeland Security Dear Mr. Secretary: Information* its
timely collection, thorough analysis, and appropriate dissemination* is
critical to unifying the efforts of federal, state, and local government
agencies in preventing terrorist attacks. For this report, our objectives
were to determine (1) what initiatives have been undertaken to improve
information sharing and (2) whether federal, state, and city officials
believe that the current information- sharing process is effective. To
meet these objectives, we gathered information on national planning
efforts and obtained the perceptions of federal, state, and city
governments on how the current information- sharing process was working.

Specifically, we met with officials who were knowledgeable about
information sharing from federal, state, and city agencies and officials
from associations representing cities, police organizations, and research
groups. Our scope focused on the information- sharing process between
federal, state, and city governments. We did not include county
governments or the private sector (which owns more than 80 percent of the
nation*s critical infrastructure), although we recognize that both have
important roles in homeland security. We also did not include the federal
government*s critical infrastructure protection efforts, for which GAO has
made numerous recommendations over the last several years. Additionally,
most of our fieldwork was performed before the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) began operations in January 2003. Thus, some of the federal
agencies we worked with were still part of other cabinet departments at
the time of our research. Additionally, the department*s efforts to
establish a homeland security blueprint* referred

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security to as its *enterprise architecture*
1 *are in the early stages of development. We also reviewed relevant
reports, testimonies, and position papers. Additionally, to supplement
this analysis, we conducted a survey of

officials representing the federal intelligence community and law
enforcement agencies; state homeland security offices; all cities with a
population of 100,000 or more; and a sample of cities with a population
between 50,000 and 100,000, to obtain their perceptions about the current
information- sharing process. We did not independently validate that the
perceptions reported in our survey, such as the types of information that
respondents said they needed, accurately represent the condition of the
information- sharing process. However, our survey results typically
corroborated the condition of the current information- sharing process
that was described in our interviews with knowledgeable officials and in
our review of documents. Eighty percent, or 40 of the 50 state homeland

security advisors, completed the survey. Our overall response rate for the
survey was 50 percent and represents 284 government entities. Table 1
summarizes the number of surveys distributed and the response rates for
the federal, state, and city respondents.

Table 1: GAO Surveys Distributed, Survey Responses, and Response Rates
Cities Federal intelligence and

law enforcement agencies State homeland security advisors Population of
over 100,000 Population of under

100,000 a Totals

Number of surveys 29 50 242 243 564

Number of responses 16 40 106 122 284

Response rate in percents 55% 80% 44% 50% 50% Source: GAO. Note: Although
our results represent a substantial number of governmental entities, the
results do not represent the entire population of governmental entities
involved in information sharing.

a Cities with a population of between 50,000 and 100,000 were selected by
random sample.

1 An enterprise architecture can be viewed as a blueprint that describes
an entity*s operational and technical environments. The blueprint includes
descriptive models of the entity*s current and future business and
technical environments, along with a roadmap for transitioning from the
current to the future environment.

Page 3 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security We conducted our review from June
2002 through May 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. A complete

discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I.
Federal agencies and state and city governments have undertaken
initiatives to improve the sharing of information that could be used to
fight terrorism and protect the homeland. Many of the initiatives were
implemented by states and cities and are not necessarily coordinated with
other sharing initiatives, including those implemented by the federal
government. Recognizing that information sharing to fight terrorism is a
key factor in homeland security, the U. S. Department of Homeland Security
has a number of initiatives under way to enhance information- sharing,
including the development of a homeland security blueprint, referred to as
an enterprise architecture. Through this architecture, DHS plans to
integrate the sharing of information within the federal government and
between federal agencies, state and city governments, and the private
sector. According to DHS, the department plans to issue the enterprise
architecture in September 2003 and begin implementation in November 2003.

Recent legislation and various national strategies specify actions to
improve the sharing of information that could be used to fight terrorism.
For example, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 2 requires DHS to
coordinate homeland security information sharing with nonfederal entities,
including state and local government personnel, and requires the President
of the United States to prescribe and implement procedures, issued July
29, 2003, under which federal agencies share homeland

security information with other federal agencies and appropriate state and
local government personnel. 3 The July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland
Security 4 and the February 2003 National Strategy for the

2 Public Law 107- 296, enacted Nov. 25, 2002. 3 The President has assigned
responsibility for this function to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Executive Order 13311, Homeland Security Information Sharing, July 29,
2003. 4 Office of the President, The National Strategy for Homeland
Security (Washington, D. C.: July 2002). Results in Brief

Page 4 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets 5 also call for actions to improve
information sharing.

In the meantime, without this overall coordination, some federal, state,
and city entities have implemented their own information- sharing
initiatives. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has
significantly increased the number of its Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
Also, California established an antiterrorism information center that
collects, analyzes, and disseminates information to its law enforcement
officers, other law enforcement agencies, and FBI. In our survey, 34 of 40
states and 160 of 228 cities stated that they participate in information-
sharing centers. While these initiatives may increase the sharing of
information to fight terrorism, they are not well coordinated and
consequently risk creating partnerships that may actually limit some
participants* access to information and duplicating efforts of some key

agencies in each level of government. Moreover, while beneficial to these
participants, the initiatives do not necessarily integrate others into a
truly national system and may inadvertently hamper information sharing for
this reason. A lack of effective integration could increase the risk that
officials will overlook, or never even receive, information needed to
prevent a terrorist attack.

Despite various legislation, strategies, and initiatives to improve
information sharing, the documents we reviewed and officials we
interviewed from federal agencies, states, and cities and those that
responded to our survey generally do not consider the current process of
sharing information to protect the homeland to be effective. For example,
only 13 percent of federal government respondents reported that sharing
information with states and cities was *effective* or *very effective.*
And, of the 40 states that responded, only 35 percent reported that
sharing with the federal government was *effective* or *very effective.*

The three levels of government identified three main systemic problems
that account for this perception. First, no level of government was
satisfied that they receive enough information. In general, survey
respondents reported that they are typically receiving less than 50
percent of specified categories of information that they perceive they
need to

5 Office of the President, The National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, D. C.:
February 2003).

Page 5 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security support their homeland security
duties. For example, 98 percent of the large cities that completed our
survey reported that they needed

information on the movement of known terrorists; however, only 15 percent
reported that they received this information. Second, no level of
government was satisfied with the timeliness, accuracy, or relevance of
the information they received. States and cities reported that threat
information received is often untimely, inaccurate, or irrelevant. Third,
the federal government still perceives the fight against terrorism,
particularly its prevention, to be generally a federal responsibility,
which potentially undermines the unity of effort between federal, state,
and city governments needed to effectively secure the homeland.
Consequently, the federal government still has not established
comprehensive policies or procedures to effectively integrate state and
city governments into the information- sharing process or even routinely
recognize their role in this process. For example, 30 of 40 states and 212
of 228 cities responding to our survey reported that they were not given
the opportunity to participate in national policy making on information
sharing. As a result, opportunities are routinely missed to engage state
and city law enforcement officers in obtaining and providing the federal
government with information that could be vital in the war against
terrorism.

The federal agencies in our survey identified several barriers to sharing
threat information with state and city governments. On the other hand,
state and city governments did not perceive that the barriers identified
by the federal agencies were truly barriers. 6 According to our survey,
when federal agencies felt they could not provide states and cities with
information, they cited concerns over state and local officials* ability
to secure and protect classified information, the officials* lack of
security clearances, and the lack of integrated databases. However, we
believe that these perceived barriers could be overcome. For example,
state and local police agencies routinely handle and protect *law
enforcement sensitive* information to build cases against suspected
criminals, suggesting that* with proper training and equipment* these
government agencies could handle other categories of sensitive
information. An

information- sharing process in which needed information is not routinely
received or is received but is untimely or irrelevant hampers the nation*s
collective ability to effectively unify the efforts of all levels of
government. An unwillingness to share information because of a perception
that

6 The federal government perceived that more barriers exist to providing
states and cities with information than states and cities perceived.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security barriers prevent sharing further
affects information, collection, analysis, and dissemination at each level
of government charged with

homeland security. We are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in developing the enterprise architecture, (1) work in
conjunction with the heads of other federal agencies, state and city
authorities, and the private sector to ensure that the department*s
enterprise architecture fully integrates them into the information-
sharing process and (2) take specific actions, including obtaining the
private sector*s views regarding information sharing, to evaluate and
overcome the perceived barriers that prevent information sharing today. In
commenting on a draft of this report, the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security concurred with our report, and the latter indicated that
it has made improvements to information sharing but that further progress
will require a prudent and deliberate approach. The Department of Justice
did not concur with our report and questioned the reliability of our
evidence. However, we used evidence from a variety of sources including
well- respected research organizations, testimony before committees of the
Congress, interviews with intelligence or law enforcement officers at all
levels of government, and our survey, and consider this evidence to be
reliable and our conclusions well founded.

A constitutional role of the federal government is to provide for the
common defense, which includes preventing terrorist attacks. The
government must prevent and deter attacks on our homeland as well as
detect impending danger before attacks occur. Although it may be
impossible to detect, prevent, or deter every attack, steps can be taken
to reduce the risk posed by the threats to homeland security.
Traditionally, protecting the homeland against these threats was generally
considered a federal responsibility. To meet this responsibility, the
federal government gathers intelligence, which is often classified as
national security information. This information is protected and
safeguarded to prevent unauthorized access by requiring appropriate
security clearances and a *need to know.* Generally, the federal
government did not share national level intelligence with states and
cities, since they were not viewed as having a significant role in
preventing terrorism. Therefore, the federal government did not generally
grant state and city officials access to

classified information. However, as we reported in June 2002, the view
that states and cities do not have a significant role in homeland security
has changed since September 11, 2001, and the need to coordinate the
Background

Page 7 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security efforts of federal, state, and local
governments for homeland security is now well understood. 7 Protecting the
United States from terrorism has traditionally been a responsibility of
the federal government and, typically, the views of

states and cities in formulating national policy have not been considered.
In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress found that the federal
government relies on state and local personnel to protect against
terrorist

attacks and that homeland security information is needed by state and
local personnel to prevent and prepare for such attacks. Congress also
found that federal, state, and local governments; and intelligence, law
enforcement, and other emergency and response personnel must act in
partnership to maximize the benefits of information gathering and analysis
to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. As a result, the act
expressed

the sense of Congress that federal, state, and local entities should share
homeland security information to the maximum extent practicable. Federal,
state, and local governments and the private sector were not fully
integrated participants before the September 11, 2001, attacks, but the
need to integrate them became more widely recognized afterward.

In order to develop national policies and strategies to address terrorism
issues, senior policymakers obtain information from the intelligence
community. 8 The intelligence community uses a cyclic process for
intelligence production. Simplified, the intelligence community (1)
receives information requirements from policymakers, (2) collects and
analyzes the information from its sources, (3) creates intelligence
products from the information, (4) disseminates the products to

7 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Key Elements to
Unify Efforts Are Underway but Uncertainty Remains, GAO- 02- 610
(Washington, D. C., June 7, 2002). 8 The intelligence community consists
of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

(who is also the head of the intelligence community); the Central
Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Defense
Intelligence Agency; the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; the National
Reconnaissance Office; other offices within the Department of Defense for
the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance
programs; the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Air Force, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard; the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of

State, the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with
the analyses of foreign intelligence information; and such other elements
of any other department or agency as may be designated by the President,
or designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head
of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence
community. Preventing Terrorism Has

Traditionally Been Viewed As a Federal Responsibility

Page 8 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security consumers of intelligence, and (5)
receives feedback about the usefulness of the information from consumers.
This process can lead to additional information requirements and is
ongoing.

Since the late 1940s, the federal government generally separated law
enforcement and intelligence functions, although both have a role in
combating terrorism. 9 From this separation, law enforcement and
intelligence were created and handled differently, depending on which
community obtained the information and how it was to be used. The law
enforcement community investigates criminal activity and supports
prosecutions by providing information related to events that have
occurred. In contrast, the intelligence community tries to provide
policymakers and military leaders with information so that decisions can
be made to protect and advance national interests. Often, the intelligence
community collects information from sensitive sources or using special
methods and keeps the information classified to protect their sources and
methods and ensure a continual flow in the future.

Executive Order no. 12958, Classified National Security Information, as
amended, prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and
declassifying national security information, including information related

to defense against transnational terrorism. Executive Order no. 12968,
Access to Classified Information, states that access to classified
national security information is generally limited to persons who have
been granted a security clearance, been briefed as to their
responsibilities for protecting classified national security information,
have signed a nondisclosure agreement acknowledging those
responsibilities, and have agreed to abide by all appropriate security
requirements. In addition, these persons must have a demonstrated *need to
know* the information in connection with the performance of their official
functions. If these criteria are not met, then the information is not to
be shared.

The federal intelligence community has traditionally not always considered
states or cities to need access to intelligence that could be used to
fight terrorism. As a result, few officials at the state and local levels
have the clearances required for access to intelligence products.

9 The National Security Act of 1947 prohibited the Central Intelligence
Agency from having police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal
security functions. The intention of the law was to hold intelligence
separate and distinct from law enforcement activities. The investigations
of improper domestic intelligence gathering in the 1970s led to further
delineation of the separation between intelligence and law enforcement
functions.

Page 9 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Furthermore, the collection and use
of intelligence information on individuals for domestic law enforcement
purposes is constrained by the

application of constitutional protections, statutory controls, and rules
of evidence. For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 10 had, in effect, been interpreted as requiring some separation that
limited

coordination between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence
investigations, particularly with regard to the use of information
collected for foreign intelligence purposes in criminal prosecutions.

Although previous terrorist attacks* such as the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing* proved that the United States was not immune to attacks on its
homeland, the enormity of the loss of life and impact of the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, highlighted the increasing risk of
terrorist attacks on U. S. soil. Consequently, federal, state, and city
governments recognized an urgent need to effectively unify their efforts
to enhance homeland security by employing the unique contribution that
each level of government can make on the basis of its capabilities and
knowledge of its

own environment. After the September 11, 2001, attacks, policymakers
questioned the separation between law enforcement and intelligence, noting
that the distinctions may limit access to some information needed to
effectively execute homeland security duties. In October 2001, Congress
passed the USA PATRIOT Act, 11 to improve the sharing of information
between the intelligence and law enforcement communities, such as by
providing federal investigators with more flexibility in sharing
information obtained under the authority of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. In October 2002, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence: Joint Investigation inquiry into the attacks found problems
in maximizing the flow of relevant information both within the
Intelligence Community as well as to and from those outside the community.
12 The review found that the reasons for these information disconnects can
be, depending on the case, cultural, organizational, human, or
technological. The committee

10 Public Law 95- 511 (codified, as amended, at 50 U. S. C. S:S: 1801-
1811, 1821- 1829, 1841- 1846, 1861- 63). 11 Public Law 107- 56 (enacted
Oct. 26, 2001), the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA
PATRIOT Act) of 2001.

12 *Counterterrorism Information Sharing with Other Federal Agencies, and
with State and Local Governments and the Private Sector.* Testimony before
the Select Committee on Intelligence, U. S. Senate: Joint Investigation,
by Eleanor Hill, Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, Oct. 1, 2002. September
11, 2001,

Attacks Redefined Terrorism Responsibilities

Page 10 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security recommended that comprehensive
solutions, while perhaps difficult and costly, must be developed and
implemented if we are to maximize our

potential for success in the war against terrorism. At the same time,
recognizing a need to balance the protection of information with the
emerging homeland security requirements of those that had a newly
recognized need- to- know, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of
2002 to, among other purposes, specifically facilitate information
sharing. In creating the Department of Homeland Security, the act gives
the Secretary the responsibility to coordinate with other executive
agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector in order to
prevent future attacks. Among other responsibilities, the Secretary is to
coordinate the distribution of information between federal agencies and
state and local governments. Furthermore, the act requires the new
department*s Under Secretary for Information Analysis and

Infrastructure Protection to disseminate, as appropriate, information
analyzed by the department to other federal, state, and local government
agencies with homeland security roles; to consult with state and local
governments to ensure appropriate exchanges of information (including law-
enforcement- related information) relating to threats of terrorism; and to
coordinate with elements of the intelligence community and with federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies, and the private sector, as
appropriate. Additionally, a subtitle of the Homeland Security Act, titled
the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act, requires the President of
the United States to prescribe and implement governmentwide procedures for
determining the extent of sharing, and for the actual sharing, of

homeland security information between federal agencies and state and local
personnel, and for the sharing of classified (and sensitive but
unclassified) information with state and local personnel. To date, these
procedures have not been promulgated, although the President has recently
assigned this function to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 13
Furthermore, several national strategies that have been developed include

information sharing as major initiatives. Both the National Strategy for
Homeland Security and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets include, as objectives, improving
information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies at
all levels of government. In addition, FBI increased the number of its
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, from 35, as of September 11, 2001, to 13
Executive Order No. 13311, Homeland Security Information Sharing, July 29,
2003.

Page 11 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security 66, as of March 2003. Federal,
state, and local law enforcement officials can interact to prevent
terrorist attacks and share information in

investigations of terrorist events through the task forces. State and city
governments have also implemented several initiatives to improve the
information- sharing process, both within their jurisdiction as well as
with participants from other levels of government.

Congress passed legislation and the President issued strategic plans to
improve the sharing of information to fight terrorism. The Department of
Homeland Security was given the responsibility to coordinate the
distribution of information between federal agencies, and state and local
governments, and private industry. However, the department is in the early
phases of determining how to execute this responsibility. In the meantime,
some federal agencies and state and city governments undertook initiatives
on their own to improve sharing. However, these actions are not well
coordinated and consequently risk duplicating efforts. In addition,
without coordination, these actions may not be mutually

reinforcing and may create information- sharing partnerships that do not
necessarily include all agencies needing access to the information.

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Congress took legislative action to
improve information sharing. Several national strategies, such as the

National Strategy for Homeland Security contain actions to improve sharing
as well.

The Homeland Security Act directs the President to prescribe and implement
procedures for sharing homeland security information between federal
agencies and with appropriate state and local government personnel (a
function since assigned by the President to the Secretary of Homeland
Security). The act also created the Department of Homeland Security, which
consolidated 22 federal agencies with homeland security missions into a
single department. Within the department, the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and the Office of Private Sector Liaison were
created to provide state and local governments and appropriate private-
sector representatives with regular information, research, and technical
support to assist local efforts at securing the homeland. According to the
department, these offices will give these participants one primary federal
contact instead of many to meet their homeland security needs.
Information- Sharing Initiatives Are Not

Well Coordinated Legislation and Strategies to Improve Information Sharing

Page 12 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Since September 11, 2001, the
administration has developed several strategies containing actions to
improve information sharing and charge DHS, FBI, and other government
components with responsibility to

perform these actions. For example, the National Strategy for Homeland
Security (July 2002), the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Feb. 2003), and the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Feb. 2003) have, as one of their
priorities, actions to promote information sharing between federal
agencies and with state and city governments, law enforcement and
intelligence agencies,

and the private sector. 14 The National Strategy for Homeland Security
specifies that the federal government will *build a national environment
that enables the sharing of essential homeland security information
horizontally across each agency of the federal government and vertically
among federal, state, and local governments, private industry, and
citizens* by integrating all participants and streamlining the sharing
process. The strategy contains initiatives to declassify documents to
facilitate sharing, integrate databases at all levels of government, and
provide for a secure method of sharing information. Similarly, the
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures
and Key Assets has initiatives to facilitate information sharing by
improving processes for domestic threat data collection, analysis, and
dissemination to state and local governments as well as with private
industry. This strategy calls on DHS to lead the effort to (1) define
sharing requirements, (2) establish processes for providing and receiving
information, and (3) develop technical systems to share sensitive

information with public- private stakeholders. The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace has initiatives to improve and enhance public- private
information sharing involving cyber attacks by establishing, among other
things, protocols for ensuring that information voluntarily provided by
the private sector is securely stored and maintained. The Department of
Homeland Security has several initiatives to improve

the sharing of information that could be used to protect the homeland. In
particular, it is developing a homeland security enterprise architecture
that, among other actions, will integrate sharing between federal agencies

14 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Observations
on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO- 03- 519T (Washington, D.
C.: Mar. 3, 2003) for a list of 10 strategies relating to terrorism. The
National Money Laundering Strategy (July 2002) also calls for enhanced
information sharing with the financial community to identify methods used
by terrorist supporters to raise money.

Page 13 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security and between the federal government,
state and city governments, and the private sector. According to DHS, its
enterprise architecture is a businessbased

framework for cross- agency improvement and will provide DHS with a new
way of describing, analyzing, and integrating the data from the agencies,
thus enabling DHS to *connect the dots* to better prevent terrorist
attacks and protect people and infrastructure from terrorism. Architecture
working groups were established to collect, organize, and publish the
baseline information- sharing structure for the major components that were
transitioned to DHS. According to DHS officials, this effort will be
completed by June 2003. The working groups will also be used to integrate
the state and city governments, and the private sector. By September of
2003, the department anticipates it will have a plan that

provides a phased approach to achieving information sharing between the
federal government, states, cities, and the private sector. The department
anticipates beginning to implement the plan in November 2003.

Other federal agencies, and state and city homeland security participants
have implemented several initiatives to promote information sharing, yet
these initiatives are not well coordinated and may inadvertently limit
access to information to those entities that are not part of the
initiatives. Nonetheless, the initiatives seek to fulfill a perceived
information requirement not yet fully addressed by the federal
intelligence community, and include both technological solutions as well
as management and communication solutions. However, these initiatives may
be duplicating DHS and other federal efforts already under way, and, in
some cases, may create information- sharing partnerships that actually
limit access to information to only those agencies that are party to the
initiatives.

Sensing an urgency to improve their abilities to effectively perform their
homeland security duties, other federal agencies, and state and city
participants have implemented several initiatives to promote sharing with
others from different levels of government. 15 However, it is unclear how
these initiatives, while enhancing individual organization sharing, will
contribute to national information- sharing efforts. The Departments of
Defense and Justice have established initiatives using technology to
better gather, analyze, and share information with other homeland security

15 We did not attempt to build a comprehensive list of all sharing
initiatives. In our discussions with officials from all levels of
government and from our survey, we were able to identify some initiatives
that were ongoing. Initiatives Risk Duplicating Efforts and May Limit

Access for Some Entities

Page 14 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security participants. These initiatives
include expanding existing mechanisms for sharing; participating in
information- sharing centers like FBI*s Joint

Terrorism Task Forces; establishing new information- sharing centers; and
working with federal, state, and city agencies to integrate databases.
Also, the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which began operations
May 1, 2003, was created to fuse, analyze, and share terrorist- related
information collected domestically and abroad. It is an interagency joint
venture that reports directly to the Director of Central Intelligence in
his capacity as statutory head of the intelligence community. The center
will be comprised of elements of DHS, FBI*s Counterterrorism Division, the
Director of Central Intelligence Counterterrorist Center, the Department
of Defense, and other participating agencies. According to the President,
the center is to *close the seam* between the analysis of foreign and
domestic intelligence and will have access to all sources of information.

In responding to our survey, 85 percent (or 34 of 40) of the responding
states and 70 percent (or 160 of 228) of the responding cities said they
were currently participating in information- sharing centers, including
FBI*s Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Nonetheless, according to the survey
results, many participants expressed a need for still more interaction
with other homeland security participants to coordinate planning, develop
contacts, and share information and best practices.

In addition to the federal government, several states and cities have
implemented their own initiatives to improve sharing. For example, the
state of California has established a clearinghouse for all terrorist-
related activities and investigations. The clearinghouse collects,
analyzes, and disseminates information to its law enforcement officers,
other law enforcement agencies, and FBI. The City of New York established
a counterterrorism committee comprising FBI, the New York State Office of
Public Security, and the New York City Police Department to share
information and promote joint training exercises. Officials from the
Central Intelligence Agency acknowledged that states* and cities* efforts
to create their own centers are resulting in duplication and that some
cities may be reaching out to foreign intelligence sources independently

from the federal government. These officials emphasized that state and
local authorities should work through the Joint Terrorism Task Forces to
receive the information they require. Appendix II contains examples of
other initiatives that various information- sharing participants have
expanded and/ or implemented to protect the homeland since September 11,
2001.

Page 15 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security In written comments to our survey,
some respondents indicated that avoiding duplication and redundancy were
some of the reasons they were

not joining or establishing new information- sharing centers. For example,
rather than establishing local or regional databases* as some states and
cities have done* some respondents recommended creating a national
terrorism intelligence and information network and computer database.

However, in order to build a comprehensive national plan that integrates
multiple sharing initiatives (including those that integrate databases),
the federal government must first be aware of these efforts. In a speech
to the National Emergency Managers Association in February 2003, the
Secretary

of Homeland Security asked states to inform his department of newly
created initiatives when they learn of them. However, it is not clear if
states and cities have provided DHS with this information and whether DHS
has taken actions on the basis of the information. 16 As a result, federal
efforts to integrate initiatives may overlook some state or city
initiatives that could help to improve information sharing and enhance
homeland security.

Another way that information- sharing initiatives may limit access to
information for some entities is through partnerships that promote
information sharing between the partners but exclude those not
participating. Some federal agencies may try to meet their information
needs by forming partnerships with other agencies outside the purview of
DHS and its ongoing national strategy efforts. Thus, these organizations

may concentrate on local threat information and unknowingly have vital
information that, when combined with national or regional information,
could indicate an impending attack or help prepare for an attack.

In spite of legislation, strategies, and initiatives to improve
information sharing, federal agencies and state and city governments
generally do not consider the current information- and intelligence-
sharing process to be

effective. The documents that we reviewed, and officials from federal
agencies, states, and cities we interviewed, indicated that they did not
perceive the sharing process as working effectively. And, in our survey,
fewer than 60 percent of federal, state, and city respondents rated the
current sharing process as *effective* or *very effective.* Respondents

16 In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security published a document,
State and Local Actions for Homeland Security, in which the office asked
states, cities, and county governments to list initiatives for homeland
security. However, we were unable to meet with the Office of Homeland
Security to determine how this information will be used. Current
InformationSharing Process Not Perceived

As Effective

Page 16 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security identified three systemic problems.
First, they believe that needed information is not routinely provided.
Second, the information that they

do receive is not always timely, accurate, or relevant. Third, they feel
that the federal government still perceives the fight against terrorism to
be generally a federal responsibility and consequently does not integrate
state and city governments into the information- sharing process. An
information- sharing process characterized by such systemic problems or
shortcomings could contribute to a failure to detect a pending attack or
prepare for an attack.

According to recent reports and testimony, further improvement is needed
in the information- sharing process to better protect the homeland.
Federal officials have stated that information- sharing problems still
exist. We have also expressed concerns about information sharing in
previous reports and testimonies, as shown in the following examples:

 Inquiries into the events of September 11, 2001, have highlighted
ongoing problems with the existing sharing process and the need for
improvement. Both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have, in a joint inquiry
in 2002, stated that much information exists in the files and databases of
many federal, state, and local agencies. 17 However, that information is
not always shared or made available in timely and effective ways to
decision makers as well as analysts to better accomplish their individual
missions.  In October 2002, the Staff Director of the Joint Inquiry Staff
that

investigated the September 11, 2001, intelligence issues testified that
information sharing was inconsistent and haphazard.  On December 15,
2002, the Gilmore Commission 18 concluded that

information sharing had only marginally improved since the September 11,
2001, attacks, and that despite organizational reforms, more attention,
and better oversight, the ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate
critical information effectively remained problematic. Additionally, the
commission reported that current information- sharing practices neither

17 Testimony given by Eleanor Hill, Director of Joint Inquiry, before the
Joint Intelligence Committee, U. S. Congress, from September 18, 2002, and
October 17, 2002. 18 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Fourth
Annual Report IV, Implementing the National Strategy (Arlington, Va.: Dec.
15, 2002). The Advisory Panel, chaired by former Virginia Governor James
Gilmore, was established by section 1405 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105- 261. Further
Improvement

Is Needed in the Information- Sharing Process

Page 17 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security transfer to local authorities the
information they need, nor adequately assesses the information collected
by local authorities.

We have also expressed concerns about homeland security in previous
reports and testimonies that documented the lack of standard protocols for
sharing information and intelligence; the lack of partnerships between the
federal, state, and local governments; and the lack of a unified national
effort to improve the sharing process. In those reports, we concluded that
more effort is needed to integrate the state and local governments into
the national sharing process. 19 In our report on the integration of watch
list databases that contain information on known terrorists, we found that
sharing is more likely to occur between federal agencies than between
federal agencies and state or local government agencies because of
overlapping sets of data and different policies and procedures. 20 Our
work involving the interviewing of cognizant officials, reviewing

information- sharing documents, and analyzing the results of our survey
indicated that information- sharing participants do not perceive the
current process as *effective* or *very effective.* Without an effective
sharing process, it is not clear how important information obtained by
federal, state, or city agencies could be connected to relevant
information held by other agencies and potentially pointing to an imminent
attack. In a position paper, the Major Cities Chiefs Association stated
that the

federal government needed to better integrate the thousands of local
police officers into the sharing process and by not doing so, the federal
government is not taking advantage of their capabilities. 21 In March
2002,

the National Governors Association stated that law enforcement and public
safety officers do not have access to complete, accurate, and timely

19 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Key Elements to
Unify Efforts Are Underway but Uncertainty Remains. GAO- 02- 610
(Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002) and

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy, GAO- 02-
811T (Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002).

20 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist
Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and
Sharing, GAO- 03- 322 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 15, 2003). This is an
example of a lack of effective integration.

21 Major Cities Chiefs Association, Terrorism, the Impact on State and
Local Law Enforcement, Intelligence Commanders Conference Report (June
2002). (http:// www. neiassociates. org/ mccintelligencereport. pdf)
Participants Do Not

Perceive Current Information- Sharing Process as *Effective* or *Very
Effective*

Page 18 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security information. As a result, critical
information is not always shared at key decision points, sometimes with
tragic consequences. 22 The International Association of Chiefs of Police
testified in June 2002 that the current

sharing process is not effective because state and city governments are
not fully integrated into a national sharing process. 23 We conducted our
survey nearly a year later and found little change.

Our survey results indicate that participants do not perceive the current
sharing of information to fight terrorism to be *effective* or *very
effective,* regardless of the level of government with whom they shared
information. In our survey we asked all respondents to indicate the extent
of effectiveness when they shared information with the other government
levels. For example, we asked the federal respondents to rate their
responses from *not effective* to *very effective* when they shared
information with other state and city governments. Table 2 shows the
different perceived levels of effectiveness within the three levels of
government.

Table 2: Percentage of Federal, State, and City Respondents That View
Their Sharing Relationships with One Another As Effective or Very
Effective

Percent Jurisdiction Federal

sharing with State sharing with Large- city

sharing with Small- city sharing with

Federal 44 35 37 29 State/ Intrastate 13 43 51 42 City/ Intracity 13 40 57
54 Source: GAO. Notes: Although our results represent a substantial number
of governmental entities, the results do

not represent the entire population of governmental entities involved in
information sharing. Number of federal agency respondents = 16; number of
state respondents = 40; number of large- city respondents = 106; and
number of small- city respondents = 122.

As shown in table 2, generally fewer that 60 percent of the respondents
felt that the information- sharing process was *effective* or *very
effective.*

22 National Governors* Center for Best Practices, Improving Public Safety
Through Justice Information Sharing (Washington, D. C.: March 2002). 23
Statement of the President of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate, June
26, 2002.

Page 19 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security In particular, only 13 percent of
the federal agencies that completed our survey reported that when sharing
information with the states and cities,

the current process was *effective* or *very effective.* One reason for
this low percentage may be due to the historic reluctance of the federal
government to share terrorism information with states and cities. On the

other hand, 51 percent of large- city respondents reported that their
sharing relationships with states was *effective* or *very effective,*
reflecting a closer historic relationship that cites have with their
states.

Federal, state, and city authorities do not perceive the current sharing
process as *effective* or *very effective* because they believe (1) that
they are not routinely receiving the information they believe they need to
protect the homeland; (2) that when information is received, it is not
very useful, timely, accurate, or relevant; and (3) that the federal
government still perceives the fight against terrorism to be generally a
federal responsibility. Consequently, comprehensive policies and
procedures to effectively integrate state and city governments into the
process of determining requirements, analyzing and disseminating
information, and providing feedback have not been established. As a
result, opportunities may be routinely missed to engage state and city
officials in obtaining information from the federal government and
providing the federal government with information that could be important
in the war against terrorism.

The federal, state, and city officials that completed our survey indicated
that certain information was perceived to be extremely important to
execute their homeland security duties, but they reported that they were
not routinely receiving it. 24 In the survey, we listed different types of
homeland- security- related information and asked all respondents to
indicate the extent to which they needed and received the information.
With few exceptions, the federal, state, and city agencies that completed
our survey indicated that they are typically receiving less than 50
percent 24 For the purpose of this report, we consider information as
extremely important to

providing homeland security if respondents reported that they *needed* or
*critically needed* the types of information that we listed in our survey.
We did not determine if these needs were valid. Systemic Problems

Account for Perception That Process Is Ineffective

Participants Are Not Routinely Receiving Needed Information

Page 20 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security of the categories of information
they seek. 25 While our survey results found that state and local agencies
were generally dissatisfied with the results

of information sharing with the federal government, federal agencies were
just as dissatisfied with the flow of information from state and city
agencies.

As shown in table 3, the majority of the states and cities reported that
they needed many of the types of information listed in our survey
question. For example, 90 to 98 percent of the states and large and small
cities that completed our survey reported that they needed specific and
actionable threat information; yet only 21 to 33 percent of them

reported that they received this information. However, more than 50
percent of all respondents reported that they were receiving needed broad
threat information.

Table 3: Perceptions of Information Needed and Regularly Received Percent
Federal agencies

(n = 16) States (n = 40) Large cities

(n = 106) Small cities (n = 122)

Category Needed Received Needed Received Needed Received Needed Received

Broad threat information 75 75 93 75 81 77 72 57 Specific and actionable
threat information 88 56 98 33 98 28 90 21

Movement of WMD by *friendly* authorities 56 19 83 23 77 6 66 6

Movement of WMD by terrorists 88 25 95 15 98 5 89 2

Movement of known terrorists 69 31 98 15 98 15 93 3

Activities of known terrorist support groups 69 25 93 18 97 15 90 2

Notification of ongoing federal investigations 88 25 90 23 90 23 87 7

Notification of federal arrests 81 25 90 33 92 23 89 7

25 Areas where respondents indicated that they were receiving more than 50
percent of the information they seek included broad threat information
(ranging from 57 to 75 percent), and, for the federal government
respondents only, analysis of information within a national and
international perspective (63 and 56 percent, respectively), and access to
classified national security information (75 percent).

Page 21 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Percent Federal agencies

(n = 16) States (n = 40) Large cities

(n = 106) Small cities (n = 122)

Category Needed Received Needed Received Needed Received Needed Received

Notification of ongoing state investigations 75 13 92 17 87 4

Notification of state arrests 75 13 94 16 89 4

Notification of ongoing local investigations 63 13 93 33 Notification of
local

arrests 63 13 88 33 Access to classified national security information 88
75 80 28 60 13 43 6 Access to declassified national security information
75 56 85 45 75 33 60 15

Analysis of information within a regional perspective 81 50 95 25 97 24 88
7

Analysis of information within a national perspective 94 63 90 23 87 21 77
8

Analysis of information within an international perspective 88 56 83 28 69
17 64 4

Source: GAO. Notes: Although our results represent a substantial number of
governmental entities, the results do not represent the entire population
of governmental entities involved in information sharing. n = number. WMD
= weapons of mass destruction.

One reason that states and cities may not receive needed threat
information is that the information may not be available. For example,
actionable threat information is rarely available according to federal
intelligence officials we interviewed; however, if available, these
officials told us that they would not hesitate to provide those who needed
it with the information. Nonetheless, if the information is classified,
Executive Order no. 12968 specifies that the information is not to be
shared unless the would- be recipients have the proper security clearances
and a need- to- know. Thus, the issue arises of how actionable threat
information

Page 22 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security can be shared with state and local
personnel without unauthorized disclosure of classified information by
federal officials. 26 Longstanding

agency practices may also account for poor information sharing and may
include the institutional reluctance of federal officials to routinely
share information with local law enforcement officials. Without the
information that they feel they need, states and cities, as well

as the federal government, may not be adequately prepared to deter future
attacks. Consequently, the nation*s ability to effectively manage the risk
of future attacks may be undermined. For example, the National Governors
Association, the National League of Cities, and the National Emergency
Management Association have all stated that they need timely, critical,
and relevant classified and nonclassified information about terrorist
threats so that they can adequately prepare for terrorist attacks. And the
Major Cities Chiefs Association stated that law enforcement officers need
background information on terrorism, the methods and techniques of
terrorists, and the likelihood of an imminent attack. With this
information, the association believes that law enforcement would have the
background from which it could take seemingly random or unconnected
events* such

as minor traffic violations* and place them into a larger context, thereby
being able to perceive a bigger picture of potential attack or recognize
the need to pass the information to an appropriate homeland security
partner agency.

Our survey results confirm the perception that the information that
respondents do receive is not often seen as timely, accurate, or relevant.
And, of the three aspects, respondents reported that timeliness was more
of a problem than accuracy or relevancy. This supports a common complaint
we heard from police chiefs* that they wanted timely information but would
often receive information from national news sources at the same time that
the public received it. This lack of timeliness was often attributed to
the federal government*s historic reluctance to share this type of
information with local law enforcement officials. In the survey, we asked
all respondents to indicate the extent to which the information they
received from each other was timely, accurate, and relevant. Generally no
level of government, including the federal

26 The Homeland Security Act requires the President to address the sharing
of classified information with state and local personnel in establishing
procedures for facilitating homeland security information sharing.
Information Received Not Very Timely, Accurate, or Relevant

Page 23 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security government, was satisfied with the
information received from the federal government, as shown in table 4.

Table 4: Survey Respondents Who Said the Information from the Federal
Government Was Timely, Accurate, or Relevant

Timely Accurate Relevant a Federal sharing with Number Percent Number
Percent Number Percent

Federal (n = 16) 6 38 5 31 7 44 State

(n = 40) 15 38 19 48 20 50 Large cities (n = 106) 24 23 41 39 42 40

Small cities (n = 122) 17 14 26 21 27 22

Source: GAO. Notes: Although our results represent a substantial number of
governmental entities, the results do not represent the entire population
of governmental entities involved in information sharing. n = number. a
Great to very great extent.

In particular, table 4 highlights these problems for large cities. Only 23
percent of the large cities reported that the information they received
from the federal government was timely, and only 39 percent reported that
it was accurate. Only 40 percent reported that the information received
was relevant. When state agencies were the source of information, federal
and city

agencies were also dissatisfied, as shown in table 5.

Page 24 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Table 5: Survey Respondents Who
Said That Information from State Agencies Was Timely, Accurate, or
Relevant

Timely Accurate Relevant a State sharing with Number Percent Number
Percent Number Percent

Federal (n = 16) 2 13 1 6 1 6

Large cities (n = 106) 32 30 36 34 31 29

Small cities (n = 122) 21 17 36 30 36 30

Source: GAO. Notes: Although our results represent a substantial number of
governmental entities, the results do not represent the entire population
of governmental entities involved in information sharing. n = number. a
Great to very great extent.

Table 5 shows that in general, large and small cities view the information
they receive from their state as more timely, accurate, and relevant than
when compared with the view of federal agencies when they receive
information from the states. Few of the federal agencies that responded
view state information received as timely, accurate, or relevant.

Similarly, few federal or state agencies that responded to our survey
viewed information received from the cities as timely, accurate, or
relevant, as shown in table 6.

Page 25 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Table 6: Survey Respondents Who
Said That Information from City Agencies Was Timely, Accurate, or Relevant

Timely Accurate Relevant a Cities sharing with Number Percent Number
Percent Number Percent

Federal (n = 16) 2 13 2 13 1 6

State (n = 40) 14 35 17 43 10 25

Source: GAO. Notes: Although our results represent a substantial number of
governmental entities, the results do not represent the entire population
of governmental entities involved in information sharing. n = number. a
Great to very great extent.

Table 6 also shows that states view the information they receive from
cities more favorably than the federal agencies that responded to our
survey.

The nation*s fight against terrorism is still generally perceived to be a
federal responsibility, at least in terms of preventing (in contrast to
responding to) a terrorist attack. Even though states and cities develop
important information on potential terrorist threats to the homeland, the
federal government still has not established comprehensive policies or
procedures to effectively integrate state and city governments into the
process of determining requirements; gathering, analyzing, and
disseminating information; and providing feedback. Nor has the federal
government routinely recognized states and cities as customers in the

information- sharing process. Our survey results support the view that
preventing terrorism is still perceived generally as a federal
responsibility. We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which the
elements of a sharing framework for receiving information from the federal
government* such as clear guidance and access to needed databases* were in
place at the various Fighting Terrorism Still

Seen as Generally a Federal Responsibility

Page 26 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security governmental levels. 27 The
existence of these elements would indicate to some extent the level that
state and city governments were integrated into the sharing process.
Specifically, we found that more elements of a

sharing framework, such as clear guidance for providing and receiving
information, are in place at the federal level than at the state or city
level, indicating that terrorism- related information is managed more at
the federal level. 28 Moreover, the lack of such elements at the state and
city level nearly 2 years after the September 11, 2001, attacks may
perpetuate

the perception that the fight against terrorism remains generally a
federal responsibility. State and city governments that completed our
survey also indicated that they do not participate in national policy
making regarding information sharing, which also helps maintain the
perception. For

example, 77 percent of the responding states, 92 percent of large cities,
and 93 percent of small cities reported that they did not participate in
this policy- making process. By involving states and cities, this process
would help ensure a more unified and consolidated effort to protect the
homeland, and provide opportunities to improve information sharing at the
state and city levels. The view that preventing terrorism is generally a
federal responsibility is

also reflected in the perception of the existence of barriers to providing
information upwards or downwards. For example, according to the December
2002 report of the Gilmore Commission, the prevailing view continues to be
that the federal government likes to receive information but is reluctant
to share information with other homeland security partners. Furthermore,
the commission stated that the federal government must do a better job of
designating *trusted agents* at the state and local levels and in the
private sector, and move forward with clearing those

trusted agents. 29 In our survey, we listed a number of barriers and asked
all 27 In our survey, we listed over 20 elements of a sharing framework we
believe would need to be in place at the various levels of government and
would indicate that the states and cities were integrated into the sharing
process. Some of these elements are *receiving feedback,* *having
resources to analyze information,* and *routinely sharing information with
others.* See app. IV for the survey results for this question.

28 On March 4, 2003, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney
General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security signed an information-
sharing memorandum. It is intended to mandate requirements and procedures
for information sharing, use, and handling of analytic judgments among the
federal intelligence community.

29 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 15, 2002. Trusted agents would
be state, local, and private- sector officials that would be given
national security clearances in order to have better access to
information.

Page 27 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security respondents to indicate the extent
to which these barriers hindered sharing with each other. Table 7
identifies the barriers that federal, state,

and city agencies that responded to our survey believe exist in the
current information- sharing process.

Table 7: Perceived Barriers Preventing Federal Agencies from Providing
Other Federal Agencies, States, and Cities with Information

Percent Category Federal to

federal Federal to state Federal to

cities

Legal barriers 13 13 25 Authorities lack interest in information to be
provided 6 0 0 Culture of *information superiority* 6 0 0 Concerns about
jeopardizing ongoing

investigations 13 13 0 Lack of confidence in ability to limit disclosure
of information 6 19 6

Lack of confidence in ability to manage investigations 6 0 0 Concerns of
disclosing sources and methods 6 25 19

Lack of integrated databases 38 38 31 Lack of clearances NA 44 38
Difficulty with provision to secure, maintain, and destroy information NA
44 50

Source: GAO. Notes: Percentages include those respondents that answered
*great- to- very great* on this question. Although our results represent a
substantial number of governmental entities, the results do not represent
the entire population of governmental entities involved in information
sharing. NA = not applicable.

As shown in table 7, federal officials cited several barriers that they
perceive prevent them from sharing information, including concerns over
state and local officials* ability to secure, maintain, and destroy
classified information; their lack of security clearances; and the absence
of integrated databases. However, these perceived barriers were seen to
exist by only a few respondents and could be overcome. For example, state
and

local police routinely handle and protect law- enforcement- sensitive
information to support ongoing criminal investigations, which suggests
that* with proper training and equipment* officials of these governments
could handle other types of sensitive information as well.

Page 28 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security As mentioned earlier, the Homeland
Security Act requires the President, in establishing information- sharing
procedures, to address the sharing

of classified and sensitive information with state and local personnel.
Congress suggested in the Homeland Security Act that the procedures could
include the means for granting security clearances to certain state and
local personnel, entering into nondisclosure agreements (for sensitive but
unclassified information), and the increased use of information- sharing
partnerships that include state and local personnel. For example, Congress
found that granting security clearances to certain state and local
personnel is one way to facilitate the sharing of information

regarding specific terrorist threats between federal, state, and local
levels of government. 30 We found that the federal government has issued
security clearances to state or local officials in limited circumstances
and is increasing the number of such clearances. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency has provided certain state emergency management

personnel with security clearances for emergency response purposes, but
other federal agencies, including FBI, have not recognized the validity of
these security clearances. For FBI, this lack of recognition could prevent
it from providing state emergency management personnel with information.

At the same time, FBI has undertaken some initiatives to provide certain
state officials with clearances and could clearly expand this program at
the state and city levels, if officials believe that doing so will address
a perceived impediment to information sharing. And DHS is also developing
a new homeland security level classification for information to improve

sharing. For their part, states and cities reported few barriers in their
ability to provide the federal government with information, while federal
agencies cited a number of barriers to sharing. As shown in table 7, state
and city agencies perceived that the federal government faces few barriers
in

sharing information. Appendix V details the barriers that states and
cities perceive to providing federal authorities with information. All
categories of survey respondents identified the lack of integrated
information systems as the single most common barrier to information
sharing across all levels of government. The Markle Foundation stated in
its report that federal agencies have seen the information and homeland

30 Congress also found that methods exist to declassify, redact, or
otherwise adapt classified information so that it may be shared with state
and local personnel without the need for granting additional security
clearances.

Page 29 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security security problem as one of
acquiring new technology. 31 For example, for fiscal year 2003, FBI
budgeted $300 million for new technology, the

Transportation Security Administration has budgeted $1 billion over
several years, and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
(whose function is now within DHS) has a 5- year plan for $550 million.
However, the foundation reports that almost none of this money is being
spent to solve the problem of how to share this information between
federal agencies and with the states and cities. The foundations* report
states that when it comes to homeland security and using integrated
information systems, adequate efforts and investments are not yet in
sight. And in recent testimony, we stated that DHS must integrate the many
existing systems and processes within government entities and between them
and the private sector required to support its mission. 32 With the
current decentralized information- sharing process in which

actions to improve sharing are not organized, and participants at all
levels of government and the private sector are not well integrated into
the scheme, the nation may be hampered in its ability to detect potential
terrorist attacks and effectively secure the homeland. Additionally, the
lack of coordination of the various information- sharing initiatives
continues to hamper the overall national effort to effectively share
information that could be used to prevent an attack.

DHS has initiated an enterprise architecture to provide a road map to
address information- sharing issues with all levels of government and the
private sector. It is important that this be done in such a way as to
effectively integrate all levels of government and the private sector into
an information- sharing process. Until then, it is not clear how the
department will coordinate the various information- sharing initiatives to
eliminate

possible confusion and duplication of effort. Participants risk
duplicating each other*s efforts and creating partnerships that limit
access to information by other participants, thus increasing the risk that
decision makers do not receive useful information; developing initiatives
that are

31 See Markle Foundation, Protecting America*s Freedom in the Information
Age: A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, (Washington, D. C.:
Oct. 2002). 32 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security:
Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management
Issues, GAO- 03- 715T (Washington, D. C.: May 8, 2003). Conclusions

Page 30 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security not mutually reinforcing; and
potentially unnecessarily increasing the cost of providing homeland
security. The failure to fully integrate state and city governments into

the information- sharing policy- making process deprives the federal
government of the opportunity to (1) obtain a complete picture of the
threat environment and (2) exploit state and city governments* information
expertise for their own areas, with which they are uniquely familiar.

Finally, the effectiveness of the information- sharing process to provide
timely, accurate, and relevant information is also in question, creating a
risk that urgent information will not get to the recipient best positioned

to act on it in a timely manner. Until the perceived barriers to federal
information sharing are addressed, the federal government may
unnecessarily, and perhaps inadvertently, be hampering the state and city
governments from carrying out their own homeland security
responsibilities.

States, cities, and the private sector look to the federal government* in
particular the Department of Homeland Security* for guidance and support
regarding information- sharing issues. If DHS does not effectively
strengthen efforts to improve the information- sharing process, the
nation*s ability to detect or prepare for attacks may be undermined.

We recommend that, in developing its enterprise architecture, the
Secretary of Homeland Security work with the Attorney General of the
United States; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; the Director, Central Intelligence; and other

appropriate federal, state, and city authorities and the private sector to
ensure that the enterprise architecture efforts

 incorporate the existing information- sharing guidance that is contained
in the various national strategies and the information- sharing procedures
required by the Homeland Security Act to be established by the President;
 establish a clearinghouse to coordinate the various information- sharing
initiatives to eliminate possible confusion and duplication of effort; 
fully integrate states and cities in the national policy- making process
for

information sharing and take steps to provide greater assurance that
actions at all levels of government are mutually reinforcing;
Recommendations for

Executive Action

Page 31 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security  identify and address the
perceived barriers to federal information sharing; and

 include the use of survey methods or related data collection approaches
to determine, over time, the needs of private and public organizations for
information related to homeland security and to measure progress in
improving information sharing at all levels of government.

As you know, 31 U. S. C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on
Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A
written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate

Committees on Appropriations with the agency*s first request for
appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of this report.

We presented a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security, Defense, and Justice; and to the Director of Central
Intelligence. The Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice
provided written comments. The Central Intelligence Agency provided
technical comments. All the departments, except the Department of Justice,
concurred with our report.

The Department of Homeland Security concurred with our report and
recommendations. The department added that it has made significant strides
to improve information sharing. For example, the department pointed out
that it is in the process of providing secure telephones to the governors
and security clearances to the Homeland Security Advisors in every state
so that relevant classified information can be shared. The department also
pointed out that further progress will require a thoughtful, prudent, and
deliberate approach. However, it cautioned that issuing the

first draft of the national homeland security enterprise architecture
could go beyond the September 2003 target because of the time it may take
to obtain appropriate interagency coordination. The department*s comments
are reprinted in their entirety in appendix VI.

DOD concurred with our recommendations. DOD*s comments are reprinted in
their entirety in appendix VII.

The Central Intelligence Agency provided technical comments that we
incorporated into our draft as appropriate. Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 32 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security On the other hand, the Department
of Justice did not concur with our report and raised several concerns. The
department stated that our draft

report reaches sweeping and extraordinarily negative conclusions about the
adequacy of the governmental sharing of information to prevent terrorism
and that (1) our conclusions are fundamentally incorrect and unsupportable
by reliable evidence; (2) our review was beyond our purview; and (3) an
evaluation of information sharing requires a review of intelligence
sharing which by long standing practice the executive branch provides to
Congress but not us, thus we may not be able to provide useful

information to Congress. We disagree. First, we used reliable evidence
from a variety of sources, including the Central Intelligence Agency; the
Anser Institute of Homeland Security; the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001; reports of the RAND Institute and the
Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age; testimony
before congressional committees by federal, state, and local officials;
interviews that we conducted with federal, state, and local agency
officials and associations representing the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, the U. S. Conference of Mayors, the

National League of Cities, and the National Sheriffs Association; and our
survey results. Moreover, over 100 cities with populations in excess of
100,000, over 120 cities with populations of under 100,000, and 40 states
responded to our survey, representing a substantial number of governmental
entities providing us with evidence of information- sharing shortcomings.
These organizations are involved in information collection and analysis,
have conducted well respected studies on informationsharing issues, or
have significant experience in providing for homeland security through law
enforcement or emergency management at the state and the local level, and
are recognized as authorities in their fields of

endeavor. Our conclusions are based on this body of evidence. Our complete
scope and methodology is shown in appendix I.

Second, the Department of Justice stated that *our review of intelligence
activities is an arena that is beyond GAO*s purview* and that providing
GAO with information on intelligence sharing *would represent a departure
from the long- standing practice of Congress and the executive branch
regarding the oversight of intelligence activities.* The Department of
Justice*s impression that our review was a review of intelligence
activities is incorrect. As our report clearly indicates, the oversight of

intelligence activities was not an objective or focus of our review, which
did not require our access to intelligence information or involve our
evaluation of the conduct of actual intelligence activities. Rather, our
review considered the use of intelligence information in general in the

Page 33 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security context of the broader information-
sharing roles and responsibilities of various homeland security
stakeholders (including the intelligence

community). However, even if our review could be construed as involving
intelligence activities, we disagree that such a review is outside GAO*s
purview. We have broad statutory authority to evaluate agency programs and
activities and to investigate matters related to the receipt,
disbursement, and use of public money. To carry out our audit

responsibilities, we have a statutory right of access to agency records
applicable to all federal agencies. Although our reviews in the
intelligence area are subject to certain limited restrictions, 33 we
regard such reviews as fundamentally within the scope of our authority.

Third, as to the department*s assertion that providing GAO with
information on intelligence sharing practices would represent *a departure
from long- standing practice,* we believe our review in this area furthers
congressional oversight but does not require reviewing intelligence
sharing practices. For example, we are not aware that the views of state

and local government officials on information sharing contained in our
report have previously been provided to Congress in a comprehensive
manner, their views are not dependent on whether we do or do not have
access to intelligence sharing practices, and the department did not
indicate that this is the case in asserting that Congress is already
receiving sufficient information from the executive branch. Moreover, we
did not review the extent to which the executive branch provides useful
information to Congress so we cannot comment on the department*s
assertion. Nonetheless, as our report clearly discusses, numerous state
and local government officials believe that they had not received the
information that they need from federal agencies. It would have also been
useful, had the department shared with us its views on information sharing

for homeland security. We believe Congress should have available such
information in making informed decisions in this area. The department*s
comments are reprinted in appendix VIII.

33 These include narrow legal limitations on our access to certain
*unvouchered* accounts of the Central Intelligence Agency and on our
authority to compel our access to foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence information. For more detail, see our testimony, U. S.
General Accounting Office, Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on
GAO Access to Information on CIA Programs and Activities, GAO- 01- 975T,
(Washington, D. C., July 18, 2001).

Page 34 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security We are sending copies of this
report to appropriate congressional committees. In addition, we are
sending copies of the report to the

Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture,
Transportation, and the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director of
Central Intelligence; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.
We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.
gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about matters discussed in this
report, please contact me at (202) 512- 6020 or by E- mail at deckerrj@
gao. gov. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgements are listed in appendix
IX.

Sincerely yours, Raymond J. Decker, Director Defense Capabilities and
Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 35 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security
Our objectives were to determine (1) what initiatives have been undertaken
to improve the sharing of information that could be used to

protect the homeland and (2) whether federal, state, and city officials
believe that the current information- sharing process is effective.

To achieve the first objective, we reviewed documents to determine
legislative initiatives and other initiatives detailed in national
strategies to include the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the National Military Strategic
Plan of the United States of America, the National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, the
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and the National Security Strategy
of the United States of America. We also reviewed federal, state, and city
initiatives to share information. We interviewed officials from the
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
Defense Intelligence Agency on their initiatives to share information with
state and city entities, and discussed information or intelligence-
sharing policies and procedures with officials from the Central
Intelligence Agency; the Department of Defense (DOD), Departments of
Commerce, Agriculture, the Treasury, and Transportation; the U. S. Coast
Guard; and DOD*s new U. S. Northern Command. We also surveyed a select
group of federal, state, and city organizations to obtain information on
whether they were involved in information- sharing initiatives.

To determine whether the current information- sharing process is perceived
as effective by federal, state, and city governments, we interviewed
officials from DOD*s Office of the Inspector General and the Defense
Intelligence Agency; FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
within the Department of Justice; the U. S. Coast Guard; the

Treasury Department and the U. S. Customs Service; the Department of
Commerce; and the U. S. Department of Agriculture. We also interviewed
representatives from the California Department of Justice, city and county
of Los Angeles law enforcement authorities; the Director of Emergency
Management for the District of Columbia; and the chiefs of police of
Baltimore, Maryland; and Dallas, Fort Worth, and Arlington, Texas. We also
interviewed representatives of professional organizations and research
organizations, including the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, the National Sheriffs Association, Police Executive Research
Forum, the U. S. Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, the
RAND Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and
ANSER Institute for Homeland Security. To supplement our interviews, we
reviewed studies and testimonies before Congress. Among the documents we
reviewed are the testimonies of the President of the International
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 36 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security
Chiefs of Police before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, June
26, 2002; the former Central Intelligence Agency General Counsel

before the aforementioned committee, February 14, 2003; and the Chairman
of the Advisory Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response to
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction before the aforementioned
committee, February 14, 2003, and also the U. S. Select Committee on
Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
October 1, 2002. We also reviewed the position papers of the RAND
Institute, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Markle Task
Force on National Security in the Information Age, and others.

To achieve both objectives, we conducted a survey to augment our
interviews and review of testimonies, documents, and position papers. We
surveyed all 29 federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies; 50
state homeland security offices; and 485 cities, including all cities with
a population of 100,000 or greater, and 242 representing a random sample
of

cities with a population of between 50,000 and 100,000. The city surveys
were directed to the mayors; however, the mayors frequently delegated the
task of completing the survey to career employees such as chiefs of
police, city managers, directors of emergency management offices,
assistants to the mayors, and others. The survey was not sent to the
private sector, although we recognize that it has a sizeable role in
homeland security by virtue of owning about 80 percent of the critical
infrastructure in the United States. The survey collected information on
the types of information needed by participants, the extent that this
information was received and provided, the sources and usefulness of the
information, and the barriers that prevent participants from sharing.
However, the survey did not attempt to validate the information needs of
any level of government. To ensure the validity of the questions on the
survey, we pretested it with officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency; the homeland security directors
for the

states of North Dakota and Florida; the police chiefs from the cities of
Dallas, Fort Worth, and Arlington, Texas; and the Director of Emergency
Management for the District of Columbia. We subsequently followed up the
surveys with several phone calls and E- mail messages to all federal and
state agencies surveyed, and a large number of cities to increase our
response rate.

Of the 485 surveys sent to the cities, 228, or 47 percent, responded. The
257 cities that did not respond might have answered the survey differently
from those that did; however, we could not determine this. Therefore, we
present the results of those cities that did complete the surveys knowing
Use of a Survey

to Supplement Interviews and Review of Documents

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 37 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security
that the nonresponders could have answered differently. Where applicable
in the report, we present the results of large and small cities
separately, unless noted otherwise. Also, when presenting survey results,
we

judgmentally benchmarked the response level we believed would be
acceptable for an information- sharing process that is so vital to
homeland security. For example, for a process of this importance, we
believe that respondents should perceive that the overall sharing process
is *effective* or *very effective* and not *moderately effective* or
lower.

The scope of this review did not include the federal government*s critical
infrastructure protection efforts, for which we have made numerous
recommendations over the last several years. We also did not include the
private sector, although we recognize the importance of this sector in
that it owns about 80 percent of the nation*s infrastructure. Critical
infrastructure protection efforts are focused on improving the sharing of
information on incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities, and the providing
of warnings related to critical infrastructures both within the federal
government and between the federal government and state and local
governments, and the private sector. We conducted our review from June
2002 through May 2003 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Selected Initiatives to Promote Information Sharing Page 38
GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security In order to judge the extent of
initiatives, judge efforts to share more information, and identify
possible duplication of efforts, we gathered

documents that outlined these efforts. Also, in our survey, respondents
identified initiatives and efforts they were involved with. The following
table is not exhaustive, since all respondents did not complete this
survey question; however, it illustrates potential duplication of efforts
between the federal, state, and city governments.

Table 8: Initiatives and Efforts to Share More Information Name Lead
agency Participants Type and purpose

Terrorist Threat Integration Center Under the direction

of the Director of Central Intelligence

Elements of CIA, FBI, DHS, DOD, and other federal agencies

Began operation on May 1, 2003. The center will fuse and analyze
terrorist- related information collected domestically and abroad to form a
comprehensive threat picture. It is designed to be in one central location
where information from all sources is shared, integrated, and analyzed. A
senior U. S. government official, who will report to the Director of
Central Intelligence, will head the center. As soon as an appropriate
facility is available, FBI*s Counterterrorism Division, the Director of
Central Intelligence*s Counterterrorism Center, and the center will
relocate to a single new facility in order to improve collaboration and
enhance the government*s ability to prevent future attacks.

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) FBI Various local, state

law enforcement entities, and other federal agencies

Increased from the pre- 9/ 11 number of 33 to 66, the task forces are to
enhance FBI*s ability to promote coordinated terrorism investigations
between its field offices and with its counterparts in federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies, and other federal agencies. FBI is
providing task force agents and state and local law

enforcement personnel with specialized counterterrorism training. JTTF
InformationSharing Initiative FBI FBI, Illinois State

Police, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and other law
enforcement entities

Piloted in St. Louis, this initiative integrates the investigative records
of federal, state, and local agencies within a single database in order to
provide area law enforcement with a single source for all criminal
investigative records. This database provides investigators and

analysts the ability to search the actual text of investigative records
for names, addresses, phone numbers, scars, marks, and others. Each agency
that enters data into the warehouse will be able to access it through four
levels of security access.

JITF- CT/ RISS. NET Information Exchange System (JRIES)

Joint Intelligence Task ForceCombating

Terrorism (JITF- CT) of the Defense Intelligence Agency

DIA, California Anti- Terrorism Information Center (CATIC), NYPD

The Defense Intelligence Agency*s newly created JITF- CT is working with
the California Anti- Terrorism Information Center and the New York Police
Dept. *s Counter Terrorism Division to build a system that connects the
two entities in order to share information and intelligence about
suspected terrorists* activities, cases, and arrests. One of JRIES*
objectives is to provide information sharing functionality between
agencies, which cross federal, state, and local boundaries.

Appendix II: Selected Initiatives to Promote Information Sharing

Appendix II: Selected Initiatives to Promote Information Sharing Page 39
GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Name Lead agency Participants Type and
purpose

Statewide AntiTerrorism Unified Response Network (SATURN)

Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety

Massachusetts; Massachusetts state and local agencies; federal

SATURN was developed as a collaborative effort to provide a unified,
effective response to terrorism by bringing together the public, fire,
emergency management, and police officials from communities across
Massachusetts along with key community leaders, state agencies, and the
federal government to educate, prepare for, respond to, and prevent acts
of terrorism. The SATURN network fosters the necessary communication,
information sharing, training, and planning to enable the Commonwealth to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism.

Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF)

Florida (Florida Department of Law Enforcement)

Various Florida state agencies The Florida Department of Law Enforcement
established an RDSTF in each of the seven operational regions. Composed of
subcommittees including Health/ Medical, Emergency Medical Management, Law
Enforcement, Fire Services, and Public Affairs, the RDSTFs work to improve
Florida*s ability to detect and prevent potential terrorist threats by
collecting and disseminating intelligence and investigative information;
facilitating and promoting ongoing security audits and vulnerability
assessments; and protecting critical infrastructures. CATIC California

Department of Justice

Federal, state, and local law enforcement

CATIC is the state*s clearinghouse for all terrorist- related activities
and investigations. CATIC collects, analyzes, and disseminates information
to its 100,000 law enforcement officers, other law enforcement agencies,
and FBI. Officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency are working to
connect the CATIC system with the New York Police Department*s Division of
Counter- Terrorism.

Los Angeles County Sheriff*s Department: Office of Homeland Security

Los Angeles County Sheriff*s Department

Local law enforcement, state, county and federal agencies

The Los Angeles County Sheriff*s Department established the Office of
Homeland Security to enhance the department*s response to potential
threats related to local homeland security. The Office liaisons with
federal, state, county, and local agencies with missions concerning the
prevention and investigation of terrorist acts.

In addition, the department created the Terrorism Early Warning Group in
1996 as an interdisciplinary group in which local, state, and federal
agencies work together to share information, combine resources, and
enhance the county*s ability to identify and respond to acts and threats
of terrorism.

New York Metropolitan Counter- Terrorism Committee

New York City law enforcement agencies

Various local, state, and federal law enforcement

agencies The committee comprises FBI, the New York State Office of Public

Security, and the New York Police Department. The purpose of this
committee is to share intelligence, share information regarding
investigations, communicate information amongst its members, and promote
joint training exercises. It has five subcommittees, including
Intelligence and Investigations, which is working toward creating a
repository of all interactions with suspicious individuals by metropolitan
law enforcement agencies.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) U. S. Coast Guard MDA is a concept that
captures total awareness of vulnerabilities,

threats, and targets of interest on the water. MDA is the comprehensive
information, intelligence, and knowledge of all entities within America*s
waterways that could affect our safety, security, economy, or environment.
According to the U. S. Coast Guard, MDA will constitute a significant
force multiplier as missions expand against a background of limited
resources. Source: GAO.

Appendix III: Survey Responses Showing Categories of Homeland Security
Information Deemed Needed by the Respondents

Page 40 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security In order to establish a baseline
for the information requirements of federal agencies, and state and city
government officials, we provided survey

respondents with a list of potential types of homeland security
information and asked them to indicate what they thought they needed to
meet their homeland security objectives. We then asked the respondents to
tell us how frequently they received the information they perceived they
needed. Table 9 is a summary of the types of information the respondents
reported

they needed or critically needed and the percentage that they frequently
or regularly received the information. For example, 98 percent of state
officials reported that they needed or critically needed specific and
actionable threat information, while they also reported regularly
receiving this type of information only 33 percent of the time.

Table 9: Needed to Critically- Needed Information and Intelligence and
Frequently to Regularly- Received Information and Intelligence

Percent Federal agencies States Large cities Small cities Category Needed
Received Needed Received Needed Received Needed Received

Broad threat information 75 75 93 75 81 77 72 57 Specific and actionable
threat information 88 56 98 33 98 28 90 21

Movement of WMD by *friendly* authorities 56 19 83 23 77 6 66 6

Movement of WMD by terrorists 88 25 95 15 98 5 89 2 Movement of known
terrorists 69 31 98 15 98 15 93 3 Activities of known terrorist support
groups 69 25 93 18 97 15 90 2

Notification of ongoing federal investigations 88 25 90 23 90 23 87 7
Notification of federal arrests 81 25 90 33 92 23 89 7 Notification of
ongoing state investigations 75 13 92 17 87 4

Notification of state arrests 75 13 94 16 89 4 Notification of ongoing
local investigations 63 13 93 33 Notification of local arrests 63 13 88 33
Access to classified national

security information 88 75 80 28 60 13 43 6 Access to declassified
national security information 75 56 85 45 75 33 60 15

Analysis of information within a regional perspective 81 50 95 25 97 24 88
7

Appendix III: Survey Responses Showing Categories of Homeland Security
Information Deemed Needed by the Respondents

Appendix III: Survey Responses Showing Categories of Homeland Security
Information Deemed Needed by the Respondents

Page 41 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Percent Federal agencies States
Large cities Small cities

Category Needed Received Needed Received Needed Received Needed Received

Analysis of information within a national perspective 94 63 90 23 87 21 77
8

Analysis of information within an international perspective 88 56 83 28 69
17 64 4

Source: GAO. Note: Number of federal agency respondents = 16; number of
state respondents = 40; number of large- city respondents = 106; and
number of small- city respondents = 122.

Appendix IV: Survey Responses to Our Questions on the Elements of an
InformationSharing Process That Are Already in Place

Page 42 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security GAO provided a list of criteria
that it believes represents elements of a sharing framework and asked
respondents to identify which best

characterizes their current information- sharing framework. Table 10 shows
that at all three levels of government, the sharing framework is
incomplete, with cities* and small cities in particular*- having few
elements of a sharing framework operational.

Table 10: Survey Respondents Who Agreed That Elements of a Sharing
Framework Exists by Answering *Great* to *Very Great*

Percent Criteria Federal agencies States Large cities Small cities

Clear guidance for receiving from federal authorities 56 38 34 23 Clear
guidance for providing to federal authorities 56 63 58 43 Clear and known
process for receiving from federal authorities 81 45 46 33

Clear and known process for providing to federal authorities 63 60 62 47

Clearly defined person for receiving from federal 81 73 72 62 Clearly
defined person for providing to federal 63 73 68 59 Clear what federal
authorities should provide to you 38 38 25 22 Clear what you should
provide to federal authorities 38 50 54 44 Information received from
federal authorities is timely 38 38 23 14

Information provided to federal authorities is timely 56 68 62 48
Information received from federal authorities is accurate 31 48 39 21

Information provided to federal authorities is accurate 56 80 70 61

Information received from federal authorities is relevant 44 50 40 22

Information provided to federal authorities is relevant 56 58 60 39

Federal authorities give feedback when you share information with them 13
30 25 15

You give feedback when federal authorities share information with you 31
65 46 41

Have resources to analyze information received from federal authorities 31
40 42 33

Have the resources to analyze information to give to federal authorities
38 38 42 33

Routinely share information with federal authorities 69 65 60 36

Appendix IV: Survey Responses to Our Questions on the Elements of an
InformationSharing Process That Are Already in Place

Appendix IV: Survey Responses to Our Questions on the Elements of an
InformationSharing Process That Are Already in Place

Page 43 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Percent Criteria Federal agencies
States Large cities Small cities

Federal authorities routinely share information with you 56 28 22 10 You
are involved early in federal investigations 13 25 25 22 Federal
authorities are involved early in your investigations 13 38 45 30

Single credible source for receiving information/ intelligence 13 35 32 30

Single credible source for receiving warnings and alerts 6 50 42 39 You
have access to federal law enforcement databases 31 30 25 31

You have access to a secure, integrated Homeland Security database 19 25
12 20 You participate in national policy making process 38 25 8 7 Have
clearance needed to access information 81 40 32 26 Can meet provisions to
secure, maintain & destroy classified information 81 55 41 41

Source: GAO. Note: Number of federal agency respondents = 16; number of
state respondents = 40; number of large- city respondents = 106; and
number of small- city respondents = 122.

Appendix V: Survey Responses to Perceived Barriers Faced by States/ Cities
in Providing the Federal Government with Information

Page 44 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security We asked state, large- city and
small- city respondents to identify what they perceive to be factors that
hinder their organizations from providing

federal authorities with homeland security information or intelligence. In
contrast to the several barriers identified by federal respondents to
providing state and local officials with information and intelligence,
table 11 shows that states and city respondents identified the lack of
integrated databases as the only significant barrier.

Table 11: Great to Very- Great Barriers to Providing Federal Authorities
with Information and Intelligence

Percent Federal agencies States Large

cities Small cities

Legal barriers 13 3 4 3 Federal authorities* lack of interest in
information to be provided 6 10 6 7

Culture of *information superiority* 6 3 4 5

Concerns about jeopardizing ongoing investigations 13 0 3 3

Lack of confidence in ability to limit disclosure of information 6 0 5 0

Lack of confidence in ability to manage investigations 6 0 3 0

Concerns about disclosing sources and methods 6 0 5 2

Lack of integration of databases 38 43 32 29 Source: GAO. Note: Number of
federal agency respondents = 16; number of state respondents = 40; number
of large- city respondents = 106; and number of small- city respondents =
122.

Appendix V: Survey Responses to Perceived Barriers Faced by States/ Cities
in Providing the Federal Government with Information

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security Page 45
GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Appendix VI: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 47 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Appendix VII: Comments from the
Department of Defense

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 48 GAO- 03- 760
Homeland Security

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense Page 49 GAO- 03- 760
Homeland Security

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Justice

Page 50 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Appendix VIII: Comments from the
Department of Justice

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Justice Page 51 GAO- 03-
760 Homeland Security

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 52 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Raymond J. Decker (202) 512- 6020
Brian J. Lepore (202) 512- 4523

In addition to those named above, Lorelei St. James, Patricia Sari- Spear,
Tinh Nguyen, Rebecca Shea, Adam Vodraska, and R. K. Wild made key
contributions to this report. Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products Page 53 GAO- 03- 760 Homeland Security Information
Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better
Integration and Sharing. GAO- 03- 322.

Washington, D. C.: April 15, 2003.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to
Terrorism. GAO- 03- 519T. Washington, D. C.: March 3, 2003.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1013T. Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002.

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO- 02- 610. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.

Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure
Protection. GAO- 02- 24. Washington, D. C.: October 15, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO-
01- 822. Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001.

FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination within Justice on
Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited. GAO- 01- 780. Washington,
D. C.: July 16, 2001. Related GAO Products

(350240)

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