FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but
Major Challenges Continue (18-JUN-03, GAO-03-759T).
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI
needed to refocus its efforts to investigate those attacks and to
detect and prevent possible future attacks. To do this the FBI
has taken steps to change its priorities and sought to transform
itself to more effectively address the potential terrorist
threats. This testimony specifically addresses the FBI's (1)
progress in updating its strategic plan; (2) development of a
strategic human capital plan; (3) realignment of staff resources
to priority areas; (4) reallocation of staff resources from its
drug program; (5) efforts to recruit and hire new personnel to
address critical staffing needs; (6) efforts to enhance its
training program; and (7) implementation of new investigative
authorities and internal controls to ensure compliance with the
revised Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes,
Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations
and to help protect individual civil liberties.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-759T
ACCNO: A07243
TITLE: FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to
Transform, but Major Challenges Continue
DATE: 06/18/2003
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism
Crime prevention
Crimes or offenses
Federal agency reorganization
Human resources utilization
Internal controls
Labor force
Personnel management
Strategic planning
Terrorism
******************************************************************
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GAO-03-759T
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the
Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 1: 00 p. m. EDT Wednesday, June
18, 2003 FBI REORGANIZATION
Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue
Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States
GAO- 03- 759T
Last June, GAO highlighted the importance of the FBI*s success in
transforming itself, noting several basic aspects of a successful
transformation. Thus far, GAO is encouraged by the progress that the FBI
has made in some areas in the past year, but a number of major challenges
remain.
The commitment of Director Mueller and senior level leadership to the
FBI*s reorganization and the FBI*s communication of priorities warrant
recognition. However, a comprehensive transformation plan with key
milestones and assessment points to guide its overall transformation
efforts is still needed. The FBI has also not completed updating its
strategic plan and has not developed a strategic human capital plan,
although it has made some progress in both these areas.
To better ensure focus on the highest priorities, over the last year,
several actions were taken, including permanently redirecting a portion of
the field agent workforce from criminal investigative programs to
counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Increase in Allocation of FBI
Field Agent Positions to Priority Areas 21%
26% 26% 27% Organized criminal
enterprises & drugs Other field programs
White collar crime Counterterrorism/ counterintelligence/ cyber
14% 24% 36% 26%
Organized criminal enterprises & drugs Other field programs
White collar crime Counterterrorism/ counterintelligence/ cyber Source:
FBI.
FY 2002 FBI field agent positions before the change to new priorities (N=
9,139) FY 2003 FBI field agent positions after the change to new
priorities
(N= 9,190)
However, the FBI continues to face challenges in critical staffing areas
including: (1) utilizing staff resources from other criminal investigative
programs to address counterterrorism, and (2) a lack of adequate
analytical and technical assistance and administrative support personnel.
The FBI*s efforts to address critical skill needs and revise its training
program are commendable. GAO also found internal controls in place to help
ensure compliance with the revised Attorney General*s Guidelines and
protect individual civil liberties. Following the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, the FBI needed to refocus its efforts to investigate
those attacks and to detect and prevent possible future attacks. To do
this the FBI has taken steps to change its priorities and sought to
transform itself to more effectively address the potential terrorist
threats. This testimony specifically addresses the FBI*s (1) progress in
updating its strategic plan; (2) development of a strategic human capital
plan; (3) realignment of staff resources to priority areas; (4)
reallocation of staff resources from its drug program; (5) efforts
to recruit and hire new personnel to address critical staffing needs; (6)
efforts to enhance its training program; and (7) implementation
of new investigative authorities and internal controls to ensure
compliance with the revised
Attorney General*s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise
and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations and to help protect individual
civil
liberties.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 759T. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Laurie E. Ekstrand at (202) 512- 8777 or ekstrandl@
gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 759T, a testimony
before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
June 2003
FBI REORGANIZATION
Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue
Page 1 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to return today to discuss the
Federal Bureau
of Investigation*s (FBI) transformation efforts and the implementation of
new authorities granted agents under the revised Attorney General*s
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism
Enterprise Investigations. As a follow up to the statement that I provided
in June 2002, 1 and at your request, my testimony today will specifically
address the FBI*s progress updating its strategic plan; development of
a strategic human capital plan; realignment of staff resources to
priority areas; reallocation of staff resources from its drug program;
efforts to recruit and hire new personnel to address critical staffing
needs; efforts to enhance its training program; and implementation of
specific investigative authorities associated with the
revised Attorney General*s Guidelines and internal controls to ensure
compliance with the Guidelines and to help protect individual civil
liberties. 2 To prepare this testimony, we (1) reviewed FBI planning
documents,
budgetary, staffing, and workload data; written policies and procedures;
and other pertinent documents related to the FBI*s reengineering and
realignment efforts and implementation of the revised Attorney General*s
Guidelines; (2) interviewed management and program officials at FBI
headquarters as well as management personnel in charge of operations in 14
FBI field offices; 3 and (3) obtained input from 176 special agents and
1 See U. S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps
Encouraging but Broad Transformation Needed, GAO- 02- 865T (Washington, D.
C.: June 21, 2002). We are reviewing issues related to the FBI*s
information technology environment and related management practices under
a separate engagement.
2 We did not focus on internal controls associated with other statutes and
guidelines relevant to FBI investigations. For example, we did not focus
on the type of alleged abuses recently reported by the Department of
Justice*s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in June 2003 concerning
the detention of 762 aliens who were detained in connection with the FBI
terrorism investigations. 3 We judgmentally selected field offices with
the largest number of special agent positions to be reallocated either
away from drug enforcement or to the counterterrorism program areas based
on the FBI*s May 2002 reallocation plans. As a result, we visited the
FBI*s
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New
York City, Phoenix, Sacramento, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Washington
field offices.
Page 2 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization 34 analysts in these 14 FBI field
offices using a structured questionnaire and follow up interview
questions. 4 To address the effect of the FBI*s
realignment on drug enforcement efforts, we also interviewed selected
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
officials as well as local law enforcement representatives. 5
Additionally, we analyzed DEA*s budget, staffing, and workload data and
DOJ*s
Domestic Drug Enforcement Strategy. To address issues related to ensuring
FBI*s compliance with the Attorney General*s Guidelines, we also met with
officials from FBI and DOJ and several private sector groups interested in
civil liberties issues. 6 We did our work between September 2002 and June
2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Last June, I highlighted the importance of the FBI*s success in
transforming itself, noting several basic aspects of a successful
transformation as well as the need for broader government transformation.
Today, the importance of the FBI*s transformation has not diminished. The
FBI continues to stand at the forefront of our domestic intelligence
efforts to defend the public from the threat of terrorism, while still
maintaining responsibility for investigations of other threats to our
public safety such as those from drugs, violent crime, public corruption,
and crimes against children. As I pointed out last June, any changes at
the FBI must be part of, and consistent with, broader governmentwide
transformation efforts that are taking place, especially those resulting
from the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and in
connection with the intelligence community.
4 The 176 special agents and 34 analysts from whom we obtained input were
not randomly selected from all agents and analysts in the 14 offices we
visited. In addition, we did not specifically choose the agents who
completed our questionnaire. FBI field office managers selected agents and
analysts to participate in our questionnaire. Consequently, we consider
the questionnaire and interview results to be indicators of the FBI*s
transformation efforts but they cannot be generalized to all agents and
analysts in these offices or to the FBI nationwide.
5 We interviewed officials from the National Sheriffs* Association,
National Association of Chiefs of Police, International Association of
Chiefs of Police, and local police agencies located in 13 of the 14 cities
in which we made FBI field office visits. The New York City Police
Department declined participation. 6 We interviewed representatives from
the American Civil Liberties Union, Center for
Democracy and Technology, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Arab
American Institute, Coalition for American- Islamic Relations, and the
League of United Latin American Citizens. FBI Efforts Part of
Broader Transformati on Efforts
Page 3 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization To effectively meet the challenges
of the post- September 11, 2001, environment, the FBI needs to consider
employing key practices that have consistently been found at the center of
successful transformation efforts. 7 These key practices are to
ensure that top leadership drives the transformation; establish a
coherent mission and integrated strategic goals; focus on a key set of
principles and priorities; set implementation goals and a timeline;
dedicate an implementation team to manage the process; use a performance
management system to define responsibility and
establish accountability; establish a communication strategy; involve
employees; and build a world class organization that continually seeks
to implement best
practices. Strategic human capital management is the centerpiece of any
change management initiative, including any agency transformation effort.
Thus far, we are encouraged by the progress that the FBI has made in some
areas in the year since the announcement of phase II of its
reorganization. Specifically, the commitment of Director Mueller and
senior level
leadership to the FBI*s reorganization; the FBI*s communication of
priorities; and the FBI*s efforts to realign its activities, processes,
and resources warrant recognition. However, a comprehensive transformation
plan with key milestones and assessment points to guide its overall
transformation effort is still needed.
In addition, as I testified last June, the FBI can and should reinforce
its transformation efforts through its performance management system by
aligning unit, team, and individual employee performance expectations with
planned agency goals and objectives. High- performing organizations create
a clear linkage** line of sight** between individual performance
and organizational success and thus transform their cultures to be more
results- oriented, customer- focused, and collaborative in nature. 8 This
7 For more information, see U. S. General Accounting Office, Mergers and
Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and
Other Federal Agencies,
GAO- 03- 293SP (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 8 See U. S. General
Accounting Office, Results- Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage
between Individual Performance and Organizational Success, GAO- 03- 488
(Washington, D. C.: Mar. 14, 2003).
Page 4 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization alignment will help FBI employees
see the connection between their daily activities and the Bureau*s
success. The FBI may already show some indication that its agents see how
their work relates to agency priorities.
Eighty- five percent of the special agents and 31 of the 34 analysts who
completed our questionnaire in the 14 FBI field offices we visited
generally or strongly agreed that their daily activities have been
consistent with the
FBI*s top priorities. Coupled with this alignment is the need for a
performance management system that makes meaningful distinctions in
performance. The FBI currently uses a pass/ fail system to rate its
employees* performance. This type of system does not provide enough
meaningful information and dispersion in ratings to recognize and reward
top performers, help everyone attain their maximum potential, and deal
with poor performers. As a result, the FBI needs to review and revise its
performance management system to be in line with revisions to its
strategic plan, including desired outcomes, core values, critical
individual competencies, and agency transformational objectives.
Although a strategic plan is vital to an organization*s transformation
effort, the FBI has not completed the update to its strategic plan. At the
same time, it has made some progress in its strategic planning efforts.
Specifically, the FBI*s Office of Strategic Planning has developed a
framework for a revised strategic plan. The operational divisions have
made some progress in completing their program plans* the Bureau*s
building blocks, in addition to the FBI*s top 10 priorities, for
completing a strategic plan. Furthermore, information about the progress
of the strategic planning process seems to have been disseminated. Both
field office managers and field staff we spoke with generally reported
being afforded the opportunity to provide input. Director Mueller, through
leadership and management conferences, electronic communications, visits
to field offices, messages on the FBI*s intranet, public statements, and
press releases, has communicated the FBI*s top priorities. Additionally,
the FBI, through a strategic planning reengineering project, 9 is
developing a revised strategic management process to better align the
planning and budget processes with strategic priorities in the future. 9
The strategic planning reengineering project is one of about 30 ongoing
reengineering projects the FBI has to address issues related to its
transformation efforts. FBI Strategic Planning Efforts
Underway, but Revised Strategic Plan Not Completed
Page 5 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization The Office of Strategic Planning
has developed a framework for the revised strategic plan, and the
operational divisions were provided
guidance to develop their program plans. 10 According to the FBI, the
Counterintelligence and Cyber program plans have been completed, presented
to FBI executive management, and approved. The Office of Strategic
Planning is in the process of incorporating them into the revised
strategic plan. As of June 2003, the Counterterrorism and Criminal
Investigative Divisions* program plans 11 were in the final stages of
development. FBI officials indicated that the implementation of two staff
reprogrammings and delays in the appropriation of its fiscal year 2003
budget, as well as the war in Iraq, delayed the completion of these
program plans. FBI officials estimate that a new strategic plan should be
completed by the start of fiscal year 2004. It is unclear, however,
whether the FBI will achieve this milestone, and because the plan has not
been completed we cannot comment on the quality of its contents. As noted
earlier, employee involvement in strategic planning, and
transformation in general, is a key practice of a successful agency as it
transforms. FBI executive management seems to have recognized this. Based
on our discussions with program officials in FBI headquarters and visits
to FBI field offices, field management in the 14 field offices we visited
reported that they had been afforded opportunities to provide input into
the FBI*s strategic planning process. In addition, 68 percent of the
special agents and 24 of the 34 analysts who completed our questionnaire
reported that they had been afforded the opportunity to provide input to
FBI management regarding FBI strategies, goals, and priorities, by among
others, participating in focus groups or meetings, and assisting in the
development of the field offices* annual report. FBI managers in the field
offices we visited and 87 percent of the special agents and 31 of the
34 analysts who completed our questionnaire indicated that FBI management
had kept them informed of the FBI*s progress in revising its strategic
plan to reflect changed priorities.
10 In developing the program plans, operational divisions are to
incorporate information from field office annual reports about their
threats, crime situation, and resource needs. Field offices, in developing
these annual reports, conduct surveys of other federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies, as well as other sources, to gather
relevant information. 11 The Criminal Investigative Division*s program
plan is to cover 5 of the FBI*s priorities,
including plans for public corruption, civil rights, criminal enterprises,
violent crime, and white- collar crime.
Page 6 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization FBI management seems to also have
been effective in communicating the agency*s top 3 priorities (i. e.,
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and
cyber crime investigations) to the staff. In addition to the awareness of
management staff in FBI headquarters and field offices, nearly all of the
special agents and all of the analysts who answered our questionnaire
indicated that FBI executive management (i. e., Director Mueller and
Deputy Director Gebhardt) had communicated the FBI*s priorities to their
field offices. Management and most of the agents we interviewed in the
field were aware of the FBI*s top 3 priorities. 12 Further, over 90
percent of special agents and 28 of the 34 analysts who completed our
questionnaire generally or strongly agreed that their field office had
made progress in realigning its goals to be consistent with the FBI*s
transformation efforts and new priorities.
Completion of a revised strategic plan is essential to guide the decision
making in the FBI*s transformation. The Director has set the priorities
and they have been communicated; however, it is vital that the FBI place a
priority on the completion of a new and formal strategic plan, as it is a
key first step in transformation.
In my statement last June, I highlighted the importance of the development
of a strategic human capital plan to the FBI*s transformation efforts. A
strategic human capital plan should flow from the strategic plan and guide
an agency to align its workforce needs, goals, and objectives with its
mission- critical functions. Human capital planning should include both
integrating human capital approaches in the development of the
organizational plans and aligning the human capital programs with the
program goals. The FBI has not completed a strategic human capital plan,
but has taken some steps to address short- term human capital needs
related to implementing its changed priorities, as well as made progress,
through a variety of initiatives, to begin to link human capital needs
with
12 Over 80 percent of the special agents and 24 of the 34 analysts who
completed our questionnaire ranked counterterrorism, counterintelligence,
and cyber crime investigations as the FBI*s first, second, and third
priorities, respectively. FBI*s Progress in
Developing a Strategic Human Capital Plan
Page 7 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization the FBI*s strategic needs. 13 The
FBI should continue to build a long- term strategic human capital
approach, including maximizing use of human
capital flexibilities, 14 to identify future critical needs and to
attract, retain, and develop individuals with these skills.
The FBI has taken actions to address human capital concerns related to
implementing its changed priorities. These include (1) initiating several
reengineering projects on human capital issues, such as succession
planning, enhancing the FBI*s communication strategy and streamlining its
hiring process; (2) initiating the staffing of the Office of Intelligence,
a key component of building the FBI*s intelligence mission; (3) realigning
agents and support staff to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and
cyber
crime investigations to address priority areas; and (4) implementing plans
to enhance recruitment and hiring for critical skill needs and training
staff shifted to priority areas to address the change in the FBI*s
priorities. This statement further addresses the FBI*s progress in
realigning staff resources to priority areas and efforts to enhance
recruitment, hiring and training of personnel in the sections that follow.
Additional efforts underway within the FBI to address future human capital
needs include, among others:
Administrative Services Division actions to recruit personnel with
critical skills, as identified by the Counterterrorism,
Counterintelligence, and Cyber Divisions to support their priority
missions.
Steps to identify key staff competencies and establish comprehensive
career programs for all occupational groups in the FBI and plans to link
these competencies to training and developmental needs.
13 According to Bureau officials, the FBI is currently using the
Administrative Services Division*s Strategic Plan, reengineering projects,
as well as several ongoing initiatives that address long- term human
capital issues as a framework for strategic human capital planning
efforts. When the operational divisions finalize their strategic plans and
put forth their requirements, FBI officials said that the Administrative
Services Division will compare these requirements with their strategic
plan to ensure that human capital strategies, plans, and goals are aligned
with the operational divisions* requirements and needs.
14 In broad terms, human capital flexibilities represent the policies and
practices that an organization has the authority to implement in managing
its workforce to accomplish its mission and achieve its goals. See Human
Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing
Their Workforces, GAO- 03- 2 (Washington, D. C: Dec. 6, 2002).
Page 8 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization In support of the FBI*s
intelligence mission, the creation of two new intelligence analyst
positions, the reclassification of a third position, and
plans to establish career paths for these positions. Re- engineering the
Training Division*s mission and operations intended to
meet the present and future training needs of the FBI workforce. In
building a long- term approach, the FBI may want to focus on identified
aspects of successful human capital management systems, such as utilizing
existing human capital flexibilities. While the FBI has made use of
several human capital flexibilities, including work- life programs, such
as alternative work schedules and transit subsidies; monetary recruitment
and retention incentives, such as recruitment bonuses and retention
allowances; and incentive awards for notable job performance and
contributions, such as cash and time- off awards, 15 it needs to fully
maximize the use of available human capital flexibilities in recruiting
agents with critical skills, intelligence analysts, and other critically
needed staff. The use of such flexibilities should be based on a data-
driven assessment of the FBI*s specific needs and capabilities. Such an
analysis should be outlined in the FBI*s strategic human capital plan.
After fully
maximizing the use of its recruiting flexibilities, if they prove to be
inadequate in helping the FBI meet its recruiting and retention goals, the
FBI may then want to seek additional legislative authority. 16 Finally, as
the FBI has yet to hire a Human Capital Officer to oversee these
efforts, it is critical that this individual have the appropriate
expertise in strategic human capital management, as well as the necessary
resources to continue to develop and implement long- term strategic human
capital initiatives. Options for which may include enhancing existing
planning
resources or contracting out these functions. 15 For example, in fiscal
year 2002, the FBI offered 18 recruitment bonuses and 15 superior
qualification appointments. In addition to these, the FBI permits
reimbursement of relocation expenses for some counterterrorism new hires,
and in fiscal year 2002 these expenses were reimbursed for 35 new hires.
16 The FBI has taken steps to seek additional legislative authority by
conducting a pilot program to offer enhanced relocation entitlements to
fill critical skill positions.
Page 9 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization A key element of the FBI*s
reorganization and successful transformation is the realignment of
resources to better ensure focus on the highest
priorities. Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has permanently realigned
some of its field agent workforce from criminal investigative programs to
work counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber programs.
Additionally, over three- fourths of the new special agent positions in
the FBI*s fiscal year 2004 budget request are for the priority areas.
However, despite these efforts, the FBI continues to face major challenges
in critical staffing areas. Some of the more noteworthy challenges include
(1) a
continuing need to utilize special agent and staff resources from other
criminal investigative programs to address counterterrorism workload, (2)
lack of adequate analytical and technical assistance, and (3) lack of
adequate administrative and clerical support personnel.
As figure 1 shows, about 26 percent of the FBI*s field agent positions
were allocated to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime
programs prior to the FBI*s change in priorities. Since that time, as a
result of the staff reprogramming 17 efforts and funding for additional
special
agent positions received through various appropriations, the FBI staffing
levels allocated to the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber
program areas have increased to about 36 percent.
17 The FBI has the authority to reprogram funds (i. e., move funds between
activities within a given account) without notifying the relevant
appropriations committees unless a specific purpose is prohibited or the
amount of the reprogramming exceeds a dollar threshold ($ 500,000 or a 10-
percent change in funding level, whichever is less). Any other
reprogramming action requires notification to the relevant appropriations
committee 15 days in advance of the reprogramming. FBI Realigned Staff
Resources to Address Priorities, but Some Major Challenges Continue
Staff Resources Realigned to Address Investigative Priorities
Page 10 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Figure 1: Increase in Allocation
of FBI Field Agent Positions to Priority Areas
The FBI*s staff reprogramming plans, carried out over the last 12 months,
have permanently shifted 674 18 field agent positions (about 7.5 percent
of the 8,881 field agent positions existing before the change to new
priorities) from the drug, white- collar, and violent crime program areas
to counterterrorism and counterintelligence. In addition, the FBI
established the Cyber program, which consolidated existing cyber
resources. 19 Despite the reprogramming of agent positions in fiscal year
2002 to
counterterrorism and the additional agent positions received through
various supplemental appropriations since September 11, 2001, agents from
other program areas have also been continuously redirected to work
temporarily on counterterrorism. This demonstrates a commitment on the
part of the FBI to staff this priority area. The FBI has certain
managerial 18 This figure excludes 11 supervisory positions that were
returned to the drug program. 19 The FBI is working with Congress to
obtain some flexibility with respect to the funding for cyber- related
agent positions, according to FBI officials.
21% 26% 26% 27% Organized criminal
enterprises & drugs Other field programs
White collar crime Counterterrorism/ counterintelligence/ cyber
14% 24% 36% 26%
Organized criminal enterprises & drugs Other field programs
White collar crime Counterterrorism/ counterintelligence/ cyber Source:
FBI.
FY 2002 FBI field agent positions before the change to new priorities (N=
9,139) FY 2003 FBI field agent positions after the change to new
priorities
(N= 9,190)
Page 11 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization flexibilities to temporarily
redirect staff resources to address pressing needs and threats.
As figure 2 shows, the average number of field agent workyears 20 charged
to investigating counterterrorism- related matters 21 has continually
outpaced the number of agent positions allocated to field offices for
counterterrorism since September 11, 2001. The FBI*s current policy is
that no counterterrorism leads will go unaddressed, resulting in a need
for these shifts in resources. This policy results in substantial
commitment of resources that may have to be reassessed in the future. As
the FBI gains
more experience and continues assessing risk in a post September 11, 2001,
environment, it will gain more expertise in deciding which matters warrant
investigation and the investment of staff resources. To better manage the
investment of its staff resources in the future, the FBI should
systematically analyzing the nature of leads and the output of their
efforts. This will enable the FBI to better pinpoint how best to invest
staff resources based on value/ risk and overall resource considerations
in the future.
20 A workyear represents the full- time employment of one worker for 1
year. 21 For this statement, a matter is an allegation that is being or
has been investigated by the FBI.
Page 12 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Figure 2: Comparative Analyses of
FBI Field Agent Non- Supervisory Positions Allocated and Agent Workyears
Charged to Counterterrorism Matters
Note: The Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system is used by the
FBI to record the proportion of time spent by field agents on various
types of investigative matters such as organized crime, white- collar
crime, and counterterrorism. The FBI uses the TURK system to track and
project
the use of field resources. Data derived from the TURK system are only as
valid as the information reported by FBI field agents.
Use of field agent staff resources for three of the four other programs we
included in our review (i. e., drug enforcement, violent crime, and white
collar crime) were below their allocated staffing levels. Appendix I
provides comparative analyses of field agent positions allocated to field
offices for these other criminal programs and the average number of field
agent workyears charged to investigating these matters.
Last year, we testified that neither the FBI nor we were in a position to
determine the right amount of staff resources needed to address the
priority areas. Since that time, the FBI has completed a counterterrorism
threat assessment and has had some experience in staffing priority work
in a post- September 11, 2001, environment. This, along with an analysis
of the nature of leads and the output from them, may put the Bureau in a
0 1,000
2,000 3,000
4,000 5,000
6,000 7,000
4/ 20- 5/ 3 3/ 23- 4/ 5 2/ 23- 3/ 8
1/ 26- 2/ 8 12/ 29- 1/ 11 12/ 1- 12/ 14
11/ 3- 11/ 16 10/ 6- 10/ 19 9/ 8- 9/ 21
8/ 11- 8/ 24 7/ 14- 7/ 27
6/ 16- 6/ 29 5/ 19- 6/ 1
4/ 21- 5/ 4 3/ 24- 4/ 6 2/ 24- 3/ 9 1/ 27- 2/ 9
12/ 30- 1/ 12 12/ 2- 12/ 15
11/ 4- 11/ 17 10/ 7- 10/ 20 9/ 9- 9/ 22
8/ 12- 8/ 25 7/ 15- 7/ 28 6/ 17- 6/ 30 5/ 20- 6/ 2
4/ 22- 5/ 5 3/ 25- 4/ 7
2/ 25- 3/ 10 1/ 28- 2/ 10
12/ 31- 1/ 13 12/ 3- 12/ 16
11/ 5- 11/ 18 10/ 8- 10/ 21
FY 2001
Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the
Counterterrorism Program Average number of field agent workyears charged
to investigating counterterrorism- related matters
Field agent positions FY 2002 FY 2003
Source: GAO analysis of FBI TURK data. 9/ 11 Iraqi war effort
Page 13 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization better situation to assess the
actual levels of need in counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber
programs.
The level of effort in counterterrorism is further reflected in the number
of counterterrorism matters that have been opened following September 11,
2001. As figure 3 shows, the number of newly opened counterterrorism
matters has increased substantially.
Figure 3: Number of Counterterrorism Matters Newly Opened, Fiscal Years
2001 through Second Quarter Fiscal Year 2003
Previous internal and external studies of the FBI and our recent visits to
14 FBI field offices have identified a lack of adequate support personnel.
Among the critical support personnel needs identified were intelligence
analysts, foreign language specialists, computer engineering and technical
specialists, and administrative and clerical support. 22 Based on
information
22 In general, the FBI is currently operating below its authorized
staffing levels for support personnel. Counterterrorism Matters
Have Increased FBI Field Offices Lack Adequate Support Personnel
Number of newly opened counterterrorism matters 0 500
1,000 1,500
2,000 2,500
3,000 3,500
4,000 4,500
5,000 1st quarter 2nd
quarter 3rd quarter 4th
quarter 1st quarter 2nd
quarter 3rd quarter 4th
quarter 1st quarter 2nd
quarter FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003
Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 9/ 11
993 1,232
1,006 2,667
2,196 2,472
2,943 3,350
4,408 1,092
Page 14 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization obtained during our site visits
to FBI field offices and discussions with officials in the FBI
headquarters, there continues to be challenges
associated with meeting resource needs in these areas. During our site
visits, both management officials and field agents indicated that
inadequate numbers of intelligence analysts and foreign language
specialists resulted in delays to investigative work. Specifically, 70
percent of the agents and 29 of the 34 analysts who completed our
questionnaire responded that the staffing level of intelligence analysts
was less than adequate given their office*s current workload and
priorities. As a result, many agents said they spend time performing their
own intelligence analysis work.
FBI officials also expressed a need for more foreign language specialists
largely due to an increase in translation needs, for instance, translating
documents and electronic surveillance recordings. Fifty- four percent of
the agents and 17 of the 32 analysts who completed our questionnaire
indicated that the staffing level of foreign language specialists was less
than adequate given their office*s current workload and priorities.
Also, agents expressed a need for additional computer and technical
specialists. Fifty three percent of the agents and 21 of the 34 analysts
who completed our questionnaire indicated that staffing level of computer
and technical support was less than adequate given their office*s current
workload and priorities. Agents reported that they sometimes have to wait
for several days to get computer hardware support when needed.
Additionally, managers and agents in the field offices said that their
field office lacked adequate access to staff who could assist in the
search and seizure of computer evidence as well as provide forensic
examination of computers.
Lastly, FBI management and special agents with whom we met indicated that
the staffing level of administrative and clerical support personnel was
inadequate and that this adversely affected the efficiency of their
investigative activities. Over 60 percent of the agents and 18 of the 34
analysts who completed our questionnaire indicated that the level was less
than adequate given their office*s current workload and priorities.
According to FBI field office officials, it was not uncommon for
management, agents, and analysts to take on many of the administrative
support functions, such as answering telephones and entering data, in
addition to their other responsibilities.
Page 15 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Last year at this time the FBI
announced that, in keeping with its new priorities, it would move 400
field agent positions from its drug program to
counterterrorism. 23 Indeed, the FBI has transferred even more agent
positions than it originally announced and has augmented those agents with
the short- term assignment of additional field agents from drug and other
law enforcement areas to work on counterterrorism. As would be expected,
the number of newly opened drug cases has fallen in relation to the
decline in the number of field agent positions allocated to drug
enforcement. Additionally, according to the FBI and DOJ*s recent domestic
drug enforcement strategy, the FBI*s, as well as DEA*s, drug enforcement
efforts will primarily focus on targeting the most significant high- level
drug trafficking organizations leaving some other lower- level drug
enforcement activities (e. g., street sweeps) to state and local entities.
24 It is unclear the extent to which state and local law enforcement
agencies can sustain or enhance their drug enforcement efforts given that
they also have added homeland security responsibilities and face their
own fiscal challenges. Since September 11, 2001, about 40 percent of the
positions allocated to FBI field offices* drug program have been
reallocated to counterterrorism and counterintelligence priority areas. As
figure 4 shows, just prior to
September 11, 2001, about two- thirds (or 890) of the 1,378 special agent
positions allocated to FBI field offices for drug program matters were
direct- funded. 25 The remaining one- third (or 488) of the special agent
positions was funded by the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task
Force program (OCDETF). As of the second quarter of fiscal year 2003, the
number of direct- funded positions allocated to FBI field offices for the
drug program had decreased over 60 percent, going from 890 to 335. OCDETF-
funded agent positions, which have remained constant, now
23 The FBI also pledged to move 59 agent positions from the violent crime
and 59 agent positions from white- collar crime, but these moves
represented a much smaller reduction in agent staffing than the shift from
the drug enforcement area.
24 DEA officials said that DEA would continue to provide state and local
law enforcement agencies with investigative, intelligence, training, and
financial assistance in addressing their most significant or violent drug
trafficking problems. 25 FBI*s drug program workforce is composed of field
agent positions funded through direct FBI appropriations and those
supported with OCDETF funds. The OCDETF Program was established in 1982 to
focus federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts against
organized crime drug trafficking organizations that pose the most serious
threat to our national interests. Reallocation of FBI Resources Affects
DOJ*s Drug Enforcement Efforts
Nearly Half of the FBI Field Agent Drug Positions Have Been Reallocated to
Priority Program Areas
Page 16 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization account for about 60 percent of
the FBI field offices* drug program staff resources. Consistent with
Director Mueller*s commitment, the FBI has
not reduced the number of agents in the OCDETF program. Figure 4: Number
of Special Agent Positions Allocated to FBI Field Offices for Drug Work
Since September 11, 2001
While this reduction represents a substantial decline in the number of
field agent positions allocated to drug work, in fact, the reduction in
drug enforcement workyears was actually larger than these figures reflect.
Specifically, as needs arose for additional agents to work
counterterrorism leads, field agents assigned to drug program squads were
temporarily reassigned to the priority work. As figure 5 shows, at the
extreme, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2002 (just after the
events of September 11, 2001), while 1,378 special agent positions were
allocated to drug work only about half of these staff resources worked in
the drug program area. During fiscal year 2003, the allocated number of
drug agent positions and the average number of field agent workyears
charged to drug matters start to converge to the new targeted levels.
Number of field agent positions 0 200
400 600
800 1,000
1,200 1,400
Source: GAO anlaysis of FBI data.
4th quarter 1st
quarter 2nd
quarter 3rd
quarter 4th
quarter 1st
quarter 2nd
quarter
Direct- funded OCDETF
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003
890 890 890 891 891 493
335 488 488 488 488 488 488 488
Page 17 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Figure 5: Comparative Analyses of
FBI Field Agent Non- Supervisory Positions Allocated and Agent Workyears
Charged to Investigating Drug Program Matters
a These periods closely approximate, but do not exactly conform to the
TURK reporting periods included in each quarter.
The reduction in drug enforcement resources has reduced the number of drug
squads in FBI field offices, according to FBI officials. The number of FBI
agents supporting the High- Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)
program initiatives has also been reduced, according to FBI officials. 26
The significant reduction in agent- strength in the drug enforcement area
may be an important factor in the smaller number of drug matters opened in
the first two quarters of fiscal year 2003. As figure 6 shows, the number
26 The HIDTA Program began in 1990 to provide federal assistance to help
coordinate and enhance federal, state, and local drug enforcement efforts
in areas of major illegal drug production, manufacturing, distribution,
transportation, and use.
Field agent positions 0 150
300 450
600 750
900 1,050
1,200 1,350
1,500 1st quarter
2nd quarter 3rd quarter
4th quarter 1st quarter
2nd quarter 3rd quarter
4th quarter 1st quarter
2nd quarter 10/ 01/ 00- 12/ 31/ 00a
1/ 01/ 01- 3/ 31/ 01 4/ 01/ 01- 6/ 30/ 01
7/ 1/ 01- 9/ 30/ 01 10/ 01/ 01- 12/ 31/ 01
1/ 01/ 02- 3/ 31/ 02 4/ 01/ 02- 6/ 30/ 02
7/ 01/ 02- 9/ 30/ 02 10/ 01/ 02- 12/ 31/ 02
1/ 01/ 03- 3/ 31/ 03
Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the Drug
Program Average number of field agent workyears charged to investigating
drug matters Source: GAO analysis of FBI TURK data.
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003
9/ 11
Page 18 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization of newly opened drug matters went
from 1,825 in fiscal year 2000 to 944 in fiscal year 2002 and to 310 in
the first half of fiscal year 2003, indicating a rate for the entire year
that may be well below that of previous years.
Figure 6: Number of FBI Drug Matters Newly Opened, Fiscal Years 1998
through Second Quarter Fiscal Year 2003
a This figure includes only the first two quarters of fiscal year 2003. We
want to make clear that we are in no way intending to fault the FBI for
the reassignment of agents from drug enforcement to higher- priority
areas. Indeed, these moves are directly in line with their priorities and
in keeping with the paramount need to prevent terrorism.
The DEA, the lead federal drug enforcement agency, has taken a slightly
larger role in domestic drug enforcement through increasing its
participation in interagency drug enforcement activities. For example, in
fiscal year 2002, DEA began shifting 34 agent positions from headquarters
and various field divisions to support the southwest border* a region that
has experienced a significant reduction in FBI special agent positions.
During the same period, the DEA also increased its authorized staffing
level for HIDTA programs by 13 special agent positions. For fiscal year
DEA Is Taking Steps to Fill
Some of the Drug Enforcement Gap
0 500
1,000 1,500
2,000 2,500
3,000 FY 2003 FY 2002 FY 2001 FY 2000 FY 1999 FY 1998 Number of newly
opened drug matters
Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. OCDETF
Non- OCDETF 2,420
1,871 1,825 1,413
944 310 a
Page 19 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization 2003, DEA received a budget
enhancement that will fund an additional 216 special agent positions, to
among other things, strengthen its financial
investigations and increase its participation in OCDETF. For fiscal year
2004, DEA has requested an enhancement to fund 233 additional agent
positions, plus the reassignment of 293 special agent positions from their
Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) and Regional Enforcement Team (RET) to
investigate priority drug trafficking organizations. Overall, in terms of
combined DEA and FBI drug agent positions, DEA enhancements (received and
planned) will fill some, but not all, of the drug program personnel gap
left by the reassignment of FBI drug program agents to higher- priority
work.
According to the April 2003 Department of Justice Domestic Drug
Enforcement Strategy, DOJ*s drug enforcement effort, consistent with the
OCDETF initiative, will center on investigations of the most significant
international, national, regional, and local drug trafficking
organizations. Specifically, it focuses drug enforcement efforts on
disrupting or dismantling priority targets on its Consolidated Priority
Organization Target list. The proposed movement of resources out of DEA*s
MET and RET program is consistent with this new strategy.
In July 2001, we issued a report concerning the management of the MET
program. 27 At that time we reported that, according to DEA, the MET
program was needed because (1) state and local police agencies did not
have sufficient resources to effectively enforce the drug laws and (2)
local law enforcement personnel were known to local drug users and
sellers,
making undercover drug buys and penetration of local distribution rings
difficult and dangerous. DEA reported about 16,000 arrests as a result of
MET deployments from its inception in fiscal year 1995 through the third
quarter of fiscal year 2003. 28 DEA also noted that about a quarter of its
MET investigations involved either drug traffickers operating on a broader
scale than the local jurisdiction of the deployment of international
traffickers. 27 See U. S. General Accounting Office, DEA*s Mobile
Enforcement Teams: Steps Taken to Enhance Program Management, but More Can
Be Done, GAO- 01- 482 (Washington, D. C.: July 2001).
28 This figure is as of June 2003. New Domestic Drug
Enforcement Strategy Focuses at High- Level Activity
Page 20 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization The overall reduction in combined
FBI and DEA staffing of drug enforcement positions and the change in
strategy removes some drug
enforcement assistance from local jurisdictions at a time when many, if
not most, state and local budgets are under intense pressure. 29 While
this may in fact be the best use of scarce resources, drug crime data of
many kinds should be monitored closely to assess the impact of these
changes and ensure that we are using our resources to the best advantage.
The FBI has made some progress in developing and implementing its
recruitment strategies and in its efforts to hire special agents and
support staff with critical skills. While fiscal year 2002 special agent
hiring goals were met in terms of numbers, the FBI fell short of the
desired critical skills mix. For support staff, hiring for that year was
far lower than was targeted. For fiscal year 2003, as of May, the outlook
is better for both special agents and some support staff skill areas. For
special agents, only in the language skills area has hiring lagged below a
pace needed to meet the goal. Support staff hiring seems on track to meet
many, but not all, of their critical skill targets.
As previously noted, in order to recruit staff to align with its needs and
priorities after September 11, 2001, the FBI developed a National Special
Agent Recruitment Plan for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. This plan
established recruitment and hiring goals, identified critical skills the
FBI is targeting, and established a timeline for achieving these goals. To
implement its recruitment plan, in January 2002, the FBI began a hiring
initiative aimed at recruiting applicants with skills and backgrounds
identified as critical for new special agents. This includes a focus on
skills in computer science, specific foreign languages, physical sciences
and engineering, as well as experience in counterterrorism and
counterintelligence. The FBI has set specific numerical targets for these
skills to try to ensure that new agents as a group would be hired with the
targeted mix of skills. To enhance the special agent applicant pool in
29 In our report addressing challenges in an intergovernmental setting,
see U. S. General Accounting Office, Highlights of A GAO Symposium:
Addressing Key Challenges in an Intergovernmental Setting, GAO- 03- 365SP
(Washington, D. C.: Mar. 2003), we note that as a
result of revenue declines, 37 states had reduced their budgets and that
this shortfall translated into, among other things, reductions in aid to
local governments and across theboard spending reductions. In addition,
the National Association of State Budget Officers suggests that states
will face a fiscal gap of over $80 billion in fiscal year 2004. FBI Has
Made
Progress in Recruitment and Hiring
FBI Made Progress in Developing and Implementing Hiring Strategies for
Special Agents
Page 21 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization certain critical skill areas, for
example, the FBI established a Computer Science/ Information Technology
Special Entry Program.
The FBI was successful in meeting its overall hiring goals for special
agents during fiscal year 2002. During that year, the FBI hired 923 agents
of the 927 planned. The FBI, however, was less successful in hiring the
special agents, who as a group possessed the mix of critical skills
specified under the fiscal year 2002 hiring initiative. The timing of this
hiring process may have been a factor in not achieving the targeted skill
mix during this year. The FBI announced its critical skill goals
approximately 4 months after September 11, 2001, and at the end of a 2-
year hiring freeze. 30 In order to hire special agents quickly, in the
months following September 11, 2001, the FBI had to rely on its existing
applicant pool, which largely consisted of applicants with skills in
accounting, law, and law enforcement. The available applicant pool also
included applicants with foreign language skills, but not necessarily in
the newly targeted languages.
During the first 8 months of fiscal year 2003, the FBI hired about 80
percent (or 550) of the special agents it needs to meet its hiring goal of
663 agents. In all of its identified critical skill areas, except agents
with
foreign language skills, the FBI is on track to reach its stated hiring
goals, and in some areas has exceeded its goals. Appendix II contains
additional information concerning the FBI*s fiscal year 2002 and 2003
hiring.
It is important to note that the FBI hiring process for special agents has
been shortened considerably. While still lengthy, it is down to a minimum
of about 8 months from application submission to final processing, from 13
months several years ago. Appendix III includes a graphic presentation of
the steps in the hiring process and the time associated with each step.
Once new agents are hired, they are sent to 17 weeks of new agent training
at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, followed by a 2- year
probationary period during which time special agents receive developmental
supervision and on- the- job training. We note this to make the point that
it will take time to build up agent strength within the Bureau.
30 During the hiring freeze the FBI only hired for positions that program
managers deemed critical. FBI Is Meeting Special
Agent Hiring Goals and Is Improving in Hiring Agents with Critical Skills
Page 22 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization About 60 percent of the FBI*s
workforce is represented by support staff, which consists of analysts (e.
g., intelligence and financial), scientists,
technical specialists, administrative support, laborers, and other
nonagent personnel. In fiscal year 2002, the FBI did not meet its overall
goal for hiring support staff, filling only 643 (44 percent) of 1,465
positions. The initial goal for hiring support staff in fiscal year 2003
was set at about 2,000. However, the goal has been revised downward during
the year to reflect attrition rates that were lower than anticipated,
somewhat smaller enhancements for support staff than were anticipated, and
a reevaluation of their overall budget situation. 31 The capacity of the
FBI to process new support staff applications was approximately 1,500
applications per year, according to FBI officials. The current target for
support staff hiring is set at 1,023. As of May 2003, the FBI has hired
565 support staff, about 55 percent of the goal as compared to 80 percent
of its special agent goal.
The FBI does not set hiring goals for all types of support staff but only
for those that are deemed critical. Table 1 shows fiscal year 2003 hiring
goals for selected support staff positions. As the table shows, the FBI is
doing well in hiring for some critical areas but is lagging in others.
Table 1: FBI Support Staff Hiring for Some Critical Areas Critical support
positions FY2003
hiring goal FY2003 actual (as of 5/ 6/ 03) Percent
of goal
Field investigative support 60 2 a 3 Scientist/ forensic/ HAZMAT 17 37 218
Electronic technician/ electronic engineers 33 37 112 Information
technology specialists 44 45 102 Intelligence analysts, research
specialists, and operations specialists 126 115 91 Language specialists 45
20 b 44 Special surveillance groups/ lookout 180 53 29 Security
specialists 110 0 c 0
Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. a Nineteen positions were filled with
on- board employees. b The FBI plans to fill the remaining 25 positions
with existing contract linguists. c According to FBI officials, 39 of
these positions were filled with internal FBI personnel.
31 Because of the amount of overtime worked in fiscal year 2002, the
amount anticipated to be worked in fiscal year 2003 and pay raise
requirements that were not fully funded, the amount of funds available in
the FBI*s Salaries and Expense account for regular pay was less than
projected when the original goal was set, according to FBI officials.
Support Staff Hiring Goals
Not Met in 2002, but 2003 Shows Some Improvements
Page 23 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Consistent with Director
Mueller*s plans to enhance its intelligence program, the FBI has, as noted
earlier, redefined and revised intelligencerelated
analyst positions and has made some progress in hiring intelligence
analysts. In fiscal year 2002, the FBI did not specify hiring goals in the
intelligence area; however, in fiscal year 2003, the FBI identified
intelligence analysts as a priority hiring category. As of May 2003, the
FBI has hired 115 new analysts in the intelligence area* including
intelligence analysts, intelligence operations specialists, and
intelligence research specialists. On the basis of its revised fiscal year
2003 target* to hire 126 analysts in this area* the FBI is well on the way
to reaching its target.
While still short of meeting its foreign language critical skill targets,
the FBI has been able to bolster its foreign language capacity by
increasing the number of contract linguists and language specialists.
Before September 11, 2001, there were 405 contract linguists and 379
language specialists,
and as of May 2003, there were 712 contract linguists and 421 language
specialists. In the priority languages identified to support the FBI*s new
priorities, 195 contract linguists and 44 language specialists were hired
between October 2002 and March 2003.
Through our field visits, two other areas in which agents and managers
indicated that there were support staff challenges were information
technology and administrative support. For fiscal year 2003, the FBI plans
on hiring 44 information technology staff and 211 administrative staff. As
of May 2003, the FBI hired 45 information technology and 94 administrative
personnel* exceeding its goal for information
technology and hiring about 45 percent of its goal for administrative
personnel.
In addition to hiring new employees with critical skills, the FBI*s
reorganization plans called for revisions to the FBI*s training program.
Over the past 12 months, the FBI has improved its ability to train its
workforce and to address priority areas. Encouraging steps taken by the
FBI include: (1) efforts to provide revised training to new agents and
agents assigned to work in priority areas; (2) progress establishing the
College of Analytical Studies to train analysts; and (3) plans to
reengineer its overall training program to better meet the long- term
training needs of the Bureau*s workforce. FBI*s Training
Program Revamped to Address Priority Areas
Page 24 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization In January 2003, in an effort to
focus on the delivery of training to agents and analysts reassigned to
work in the priority areas, the FBI cancelled
most of its training for on- board staff that was not focused on
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime investigations.
This allowed the FBI to shift resources to develop training for new agents
and those agents who were moved to work in counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and cyber matters. For example, the FBI Training
Division revised existing new agent coursework to focus on the priority
areas and developed new courses for agents who were assigned to
counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Agents assigned to the newly
established Cyber Division are required to complete basic coursework on
cyber crime investigations and are encouraged to complete a core
curriculum consisting of eight classes, including technical coursework as
well as cyber investigative techniques.
As of April 2003, all new agents are to receive revised training in the
priority areas. In addition, as of May 2003, 545 of all agents assigned to
work on counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations have
received revised training in these areas. 32 Those agents who have been
designated by the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions as
needing revised training will have completed the required training by the
end of the 2003 calendar year, according to FBI officials. We did not
evaluate the curriculum of the revised training courses. Appendix IV
provides additional details about the FBI*s allocation of $10 million
provided in the House Conference Report 33 accompanying the fiscal year
2003 budget and revisions to the FBI*s training in priority areas.
32 Currently, the Training Division tracks the total number of agents who
have completed revised training in counterterrroism, but it does not track
whether those agents were permanently redirected from criminal programs to
counterterrorism. The Special Agents- in- Charge of the field offices have
the authority to designate which agents* permanently redirected or not*
should receive revised training. For example, an agent who was permanently
redirected from a criminal program may have had prior experience in
counterterrorism investigations, alleviating the need for basic
counterterrorism training, according to FBI officials.
33 The Conference report for the Department of Justice Appropriation Act,
2003 (P. L. 108- 7, 117 Stat. 49 (2003)) indicates that the Conferees
provided $10 million above the FBI*s budget request for training needs. H.
R. Conf. Rep. No. 108- 10, at 617 (2003). Agents Provided Revised
Training in Priority Areas
Page 25 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization To further enhance analysts*
skills and abilities, 34 the FBI created the College of Analytical Studies
at its Quantico training facility in October
2001. The College of Analytical Studies provides training to new and
inservice analysts in tools and techniques for both strategic and
technical analysis. 35 Completion of basic analytical coursework is
required of new analysts, while advanced analytical coursework is offered
to experienced analysts. The College of Analytical Studies trained 193
analysts in fiscal
year 2002 and is scheduled to train an additional 1,032 analysts in fiscal
year 2003. 36 Additionally, the FBI is continuing to identify and schedule
additional analysts from the priority areas who should receive analytical
training, according to FBI officials. As with the revised agent training,
we did not evaluate the content of the curriculum offered by the College
of Analytical Studies. FBI officials told us that after each training
course students are asked to provide feedback, which may be used to revise
coursework. We did not evaluate this feedback.
Additionally, the FBI*s Office of Intelligence has been tasked to develop
all policies, including education requirements, with regard to analysts
working in the intelligence area. The Office of Intelligence intends to
work with the College of Analytical Studies to ensure that appropriate
analytical training has been provided, according to FBI officials. The FBI
is also
pursuing accreditation for its College of Analytical Studies. The FBI
continues to work with other federal agencies to improve their analytical
capabilities. For example, the FBI is currently working with the Joint
Military Intelligence College to allow a select number of FBI personnel
with intelligence backgrounds to earn a Master of Science in Strategic
Intelligence. FBI officials anticipate that the program will begin
accepting applications from interested FBI personnel by the end of fiscal
year 2003, for consideration by FBI executives and final acceptance by the
Joint Military Intelligence College for classes in fiscal year 2004.
34 The College of Analytical Studies primarily provides training for
analysts in the intelligence area. 35 Instructors at the College of
Analytical Studies include both FBI and CIA personnel. As proposed in the
training reengineering plan, the Special Agent- in- Charge of the FBI
Academy will oversee the College of Analytical Studies.
36 In fiscal year 2003, the College of Analytical Studies, with the
assistance of CIA University, plans to train 188 analysts in basic
analysis and 844 analysts in specialty coursework. College of Analytical
Studies in Place to Build Analysts Skills
Page 26 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization To better address the longer-
term training needs of its entire workforce, the FBI is implementing a
plan to restructure its training programs. In
March 2003, Director Mueller approved a series of proposals contained in a
reengineering project addressing FBI training activities, which included a
goal of establishing an Office of Training and Development. This office,
among other duties, would assess the career- long training needs of all
employees, standardize training, and centralize the tracking of staff
progress through the curriculum. The training reengineering plan calls for
the Assistant Director of Training to function as the chief learning
officer and to oversee both the Office of Training and Development and the
FBI Academy. The FBI Academy will continue its primary mission of training
new agents, as well as operating the College of Analytical Studies. While
the FBI, in announcing its training reengineering plan, acknowledges the
long- term benefits of enhancing training as an investment in human
capital, it is too soon to tell how effective the plan will be in
improving performance. And, as the overall human capital plan for the
agency develops there will be a need to revise and enhance training plans.
Appendix IV also provides additional details on the FBI*s training
reengineering plan.
The revised Attorney General*s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (the *Guidelines*) are
intended to provide the FBI greater investigative flexibility to enhance
its ability to detect and prevent terrorist acts and other federal crimes.
As traditional investigative constraints are eased, however, appropriate
internal controls are needed to prevent investigative abuses and ensure
the protection of civil liberties. The Guidelines
themselves contain internal controls regarding specific investigative
procedures and prohibited activities, and the FBI and DOJ have other
internal control mechanisms in place to help ensure agents do not go
beyond their stated authorities. Although private sector groups we
interviewed have expressed concern regarding issuance of the new
Guidelines, neither we nor they have identified any reported allegations
or investigations of abuses under the new Guidelines authorities.
It should be noted that federal officials, including the FBI, have also
received additional investigative authorities from laws such as the USA
PATRIOT Act, and that FBI activities are also prescribed by various other
Attorney General guidelines. Our review focused on certain provisions of
the Attorney General*s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations. Among other things,
the revised Guidelines permit FBI agents to be more proactive by
Reengineering of Training Program Underway to
Address Long- Term Needs Implementation of the Revised Attorney General*s
Guidelines
Page 27 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization allowing certain investigative
activities* such as visiting public places and events or conducting online
searches* to be conducted outside the
context of an investigation. We did not focus on internal controls
associated with other statutes and guidelines relevant to FBI
investigations. For example, we did not focus on the type of alleged
abuses recently reported by the DOJ*s Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) in June 2003 concerning the detention of 762 aliens who had been
held in connection with the FBI terrorism investigations. Appendix V
provides a brief overview of a few selected statutes and guidelines
relevant to FBI investigations that were not a part of our analysis.
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States,
the Attorney General ordered a review of all investigative procedures
related to national security and criminal matters in an effort to
eliminate unnecessary investigative constraints and help prevent
terrorism. As a result, in May 2002, the Attorney General issued a revised
set of FBI domestic investigative guidelines* The Attorney General*s
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism
Enterprise Investigations* intended to provide consistent policy direction
so that FBI investigations are confined to matters of legitimate law
enforcement interest and protect individual rights, while also providing
new investigative flexibility. The Guidelines also delegate the authority
to initiate and approve certain types of investigations from FBI
headquarters to FBI field offices. Appendix VI presents more details on
selected key changes in the Guidelines.
As we pointed out a year ago, the FBI should have appropriate internal
controls in place to ensure that the new authorities permitted under the
revised Guidelines are carried out in a manner that protects individual
civil liberties. Internal controls serve as the first line of defense in
preventing and detecting errors, and they provide an organization*s
management with
reasonable assurance of compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
Thus, internal controls are a key component for ensuring that these new
authorities are implemented in a manner that protects civil liberties.
Under federal internal control standards, 37 a variety of internal control
mechanisms* including training, supervision, and monitoring* may be
37 U. S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO- 00- 21.3.1 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 1999).
Revised Guidelines Allow
FBI More Investigative Flexibility
Internal Controls Are Intended to Protect against FBI Noncompliance With
the Guidelines
Page 28 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization used by agencies to ensure
compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The Guidelines themselves
are an internal control, establishing standards
and requirements governing the FBI*s investigative authority. In addition,
the FBI has the following additional internal controls in place to help
ensure compliance with the Guidelines and prevent agents from going beyond
the authorities granted in the Guidelines: 38 (1) policies and procedures,
which communicate to agents in detail the levels of authority and
permissible activities; (2) training, which addresses civil liberties
issues so that agents understand the limitations of their authority; and
(3) supervision, which monitors agents* use of the new authorities.
Finally, the FBI and DOJ have other internal control mechanisms in place
to monitor FBI programs and personnel, as well as to identify and address
alleged incidents of agent misconduct or abuse of civil liberties*
specifically the FBI*s internal inspection process and the investigation
of allegations of abuse by the FBI *s Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) and DOJ*s OIG. All of these mechanisms, of course,
predate the revised Guidelines. To protect against civil liberties abuses
in relation to the new investigative authorities allowed by the revisions,
these controls must incorporate the revisions into their implementation.
In reviewing the key changes in the revised Guidelines, we looked for
evidence of internal controls in the document itself to help ensure
compliance and protect against potential civil liberties abuses. In some
cases, the Guidelines revisions include very specific internal controls
intended to ensure compliance. For example, the changes relating to the
process for conducting preliminary inquiries 39 and terrorism
investigations specify criteria for authorizing the activity, who is
authorized to approve
the activity, how long the activity may remain initially authorized until
reapproval is required, and what notifications of the activity are
required within and outside the FBI. On the other hand, changes related to
the new investigative authorities are not as specific in terms of controls
to ensure
compliance. For example: 38 These controls are intended to ensure
compliance with various FBI policies and procedures and are not
specifically focused on the Guidelines. The Guidelines are just one of
many areas that could be covered.
39 The FBI conducts preliminary inquiries in order to determine the
validity of an allegation of potential criminal activity and the need for
a more in- depth investigative effort. Internal Controls Included
in the Guidelines
Page 29 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization The FBI is now authorized to
operate and participate in counterterrorism information systems (such as
the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force),
and a periodic compliance review is required on any systems operated by
the FBI. However, there is no indication of when such reviews should be
conducted, what the review should entail (e. g., issues relating to
access, use, or retention of data), and whether any reviews are required
if the systems are not operated by the FBI. The FBI is now authorized to
visit public places or events, but retention of
information from these visits is prohibited unless it relates to potential
criminal or terrorist activity. However, there is no indication of whether
or how agents are to document the activity, how supervisors are to ensure
that the purpose of the activity is detecting or preventing terrorism, and
how compliance with the prohibition on maintaining information is to be
verified.
To implement the Guidelines themselves, the FBI and DOJ have other
internal control mechanisms in place to help ensure FBI compliance with
the Guidelines and help protect against potential abuses of individual
civil
liberties. Specifically: Policies and procedures * The FBI*s policies
and procedures manuals
provide agents with additional guidance on conducting investigations.
About 75 percent of the field agents who completed our questionnaire
considered themselves to be at least somewhat familiar with the
Guidelines. These agents indicated their familiarity came from a variety
of sources, including a hard copy version of the Guidelines, the FBI*s
intranet Web site, electronic communications and briefings from FBI
management, FBI program division or field office training, and supervisory
on- the- job training. Additionally, the FBI is in the process of updating
its Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG) policies and
procedures manuals to provide agents with additional guidance on
implementation of the Guidelines.
Training * Training on the Guidelines is included in all new agent
training provided at the FBI Academy. Additional training and guidance,
coordinated through the FBI*s Office of General Counsel and field office
legal coordinators, was made available to on- board agents after the
Guidelines were issued. As of April 2003, just over one- half (about 55
percent) of the field agents who completed our questionnaire indicated
they had received either formal or informal training on the Guidelines.
FBI and DOJ Internal
Controls in Place
Page 30 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Supervision * Supervisory
agents are to perform periodic case file reviews on all cases being worked
by their agents to, among other things,
monitor the progress of cases and verify compliance with applicable
policies and procedures, such as the Guidelines. As of April 2003, nearly
all the field agents who completed our questionnaire indicated that their
supervisors performed case file reviews at least every 90 days* more often
in some cases.
Inspections * FBI inspectors are to verify agents* compliance with the
Guidelines and other applicable policies and procedures by reviewing case
files and supervisory case file reviews. In reviewing selected inspection
reports completed since October 1999, we found evidence that such reviews
were being performed. At the same time, we identified no findings in the
inspection reports of noncompliance with or misuse of the new
investigative authorities granted under the Guidelines.
Allegations of abuse * Both the FBI*s OPR and DOJ*s OIG have the
authority to investigate allegations of FBI misconduct; the OIG also
reviews all incoming FBI allegations to ensure the appropriate
investigative response. Between October 2000 and March 2003, OPR
investigated 1,579 cases of alleged FBI misconduct. The OIG investigated
another 85 cases of alleged misconduct and 35 cases of alleged civil
rights abuses between July 2001 and February 2003. However, based on the
descriptions of the alleged offenses, we found no allegations or
investigations that appeared to involve noncompliance with or abuse of the
new investigative authorities granted under the Guidelines. In June 2003,
the OIG reported on allegations of mistreatment and abuse of aliens
detained on immigration charges in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks. These allegations did not relate to the FBI*s use
of investigative authorities under the revised Guidelines and, in fact,
the vast majority of these aliens were detained before the Guidelines were
issued.
When the revised Guidelines were issued, private sector groups raised
concerns about what they saw as a relaxing of investigative controls over
the FBI, which represented a potential threat to individual civil
liberties. In particular, they noted that the revised Guidelines allowed
the FBI to use its new investigative authorities even in the absence of
any prior indication of criminal activity. However, the private sector
officials we met with could not provide any specific examples of the FBI
abusing the new authorities granted under the Guidelines. Rather, their
concerns largely No Reported Allegations or
Investigations of Noncompliance with the New Guidelines Authorities
Page 31 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization stemmed from the belief that
granting the FBI broader investigative authorities ignores the lessons of
past abuses and is unlikely to result in tangible gains to law
enforcement. 40 Officials from the FBI*s OPR and
DOJ*s OIG told us they do not separately track allegations of
noncompliance with the Guidelines; nor could they identify any specific
cases that involved noncompliance with or abuse of the new investigative
authorities granted under the Guidelines.
FBI headquarters officials indicated that the supervisory case file review
process is the primary vehicle to ensure that agents comply with
applicable policies and procedures* such as the Guidelines* and do not go
beyond their stated authorities. Regarding the new authorities, FBI field
office managers told us that the number of leads that require followup,
plus the number of ongoing preliminary inquiries and investigations
related to counterterrorism, have field agents fully engaged. This,
according to FBI field office managers, does not afford agents time to
visit public places and events or search the Internet absent a legitimate
lead. A recent FBI informal survey of 45 of its field offices found that
fewer than
ten offices had conducted investigative activities at mosques since
September 11, 2001. All but one of these visits was conducted pursuant to,
or was related to, open preliminary inquiries or full investigations.
Notwithstanding this, however, FBI headquarters officials are currently
considering whether to require mandatory supervisory approval prior to
allowing an agent to enter a public place or attend a public meeting.
Given the sensitivity of these issues and the FBI*s history of
investigative abuses, the FBI has been reaching out to communities to
assure them that, despite the emphasis on counterterrorism, investigating
civil rights abuses remains a high priority of the FBI. For example, FBI
field offices have been contacting Muslim leaders for the purpose of
establishing a dialogue and discussing procedures for alerting the FBI to
civil rights abuses. In one
field office we visited, discussions had recently been held with the
Muslim community and its leaders covering topics related to homeland
security, FBI employment, and community outreach. Throughout the FBI, over
500 such meetings occurred in the first 5 months after September 11, 2001.
More recently, in February 2003, the FBI Director met with key leaders of
40 The original Guidelines were adopted in 1976, in large part to curb a
history of FBI abuses* including surveillance and investigation of U. S.
citizens when there was no credible evidence of criminal activity.
Page 32 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization national Arab- American, Muslim,
and Sikh organizations to discuss the FBI*s response to hate crimes and
other civil rights issues.
The revised Guidelines are in their infancy in terms of implementation.
While it is a good sign that we have not identified any reported
allegations, investigations, or indications of abuse of the new
investigative authorities, this is not a situation that should result in
reduced vigilance on the part of DOJ or the Congress. Appendix VII
presents more details about the
internal controls discussed above. We continue to be ready to assist this
and other congressional committees in any oversight of the FBI*s
implementation of its transformation efforts. Based on our work, there are
specific areas related to the transformation of the FBI that seem to
warrant continued monitoring. These areas include (1) the FBI*s completion
and implementation of a revised strategic plan; (2) the FBI*s progress in
integrating a human capital approach consistent with its mission and
goals; (3) the long term impact on state and local law enforcement
agencies, and the public, of the FBI*s shift of staff resources away from
drug enforcement and other criminal programs; and (4) FBI agents*
compliance with the new investigative authorities granted under the
revised Attorney General*s Guidelines.
In closing, I would like to thank the FBI Director, DEA Administrator, and
their staff for their cooperation in providing documentation and
scheduling meetings needed to conduct our work. Especially, I would like
to note the cooperation and candidness of FBI officials* managers, agents,
and analysts* during our site visits to 14 field office locations.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you and the
Subcommittee members may have.
For further information about this statement, please contact Laurie E.
Ekstrand, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202) 512-
8777 or at ekstrandl@ gao. gov or Charles Michael Johnson, Assistant
Director, Homeland Security and Justice, on (202) 512- 7331 or at
johnsoncm@ gao. gov. For further information on governmentwide human
capital or transformation issues, please contact J. Christopher Mihm,
Director, Strategic Issues, on (202) 512- 6806 or at mihmj@ gao. gov.
Major contributors to this testimony included David Alexander, Tida E.
Barakat, Karen Burke, Chan My J. Battcher, Gary A. Bianchi, Nancy Briggs,
Philip D. Caramia, Sue Conlon, Seth Dykes, Geoffrey Hamilton, Summary
Observations GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
Page 33 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Mary Catherine Hult, Lori Kmetz,
E. Anne Laffoon, Ronald La Due Lake, Julio Luna, Jan Montgomery, Kay Muse,
and Andrew O*Connell, Sarah E. Veale.
Page 34 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization As shown in figures 7 through 9,
use of field agent workyears expended for the cyber crime, violent crime,
and white- collar crime program areas were
at or below their allocated staffing levels. 1 Figure 7: Comparative
Analysis of FBI Field Agent Non- Supervisory Positions Allocated and Agent
Workyears Charged to Investigating Cyber Crime Matters
a In March 2003, the FBI*s special agent positions in this program area
were reduced by 307 positions as a result of the transfer of the Key Asset
Program to the Department of Homeland Security.
1 We excluded details on changes in the counterintelligence program
because they are classified. Appendix I: Comparative Analysis of FBI
Field Agent Positions and Agent Workyears Charged to Investigating Other
Matters
0 100
200 300
400 500
600 700
4/ 20- 5/ 3 3/ 23- 4/ 5
2/ 23- 3/ 8a 1/ 26- 2/ 8
12/ 29- 1/ 11 12/ 1- 12/ 14 11/ 3- 11/ 16 10/ 6- 10/ 19 9/ 8- 9/ 21
8/ 11- 8/ 24 7/ 14- 7/ 27 6/ 16- 6/ 29 5/ 19- 6/ 1
4/ 21- 5/ 4 3/ 24- 4/ 6 2/ 24- 3/ 9 1/ 27- 2/ 9
12/ 30- 1/ 12 12/ 2- 12/ 15
11/ 4- 11/ 17 10/ 7- 10/ 20 9/ 9- 9/ 22
8/ 12- 8/ 25 7/ 15- 7/ 28 6/ 17- 6/ 30 5/ 20- 6/ 2
4/ 22- 5/ 5 3/ 25- 4/ 7
2/ 25- 3/ 10 1/ 28- 2/ 10
12/ 31- 1/ 13 12/ 3- 12/ 16
11/ 5- 11/ 18 10/ 8- 10/ 21
FY 2001
Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the Cyber
Program Average number of field agent workyears charged to investigating
cyber crime matters
Field agent positions FY 2002 FY 2003
Source: GAO analysis of FBI TURK data. 9/ 11 Iraqi war effort
Page 35 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Figure 8: Comparative Analysis of
FBI Field Agent Non- Supervisory Positions Allocated and Agent Workyears
Charged to Investigating Violent Crime Matters
0 500
1,000 1,500
2,000 2,500
4/ 20- 5/ 3 3/ 23- 4/ 5 2/ 23- 3/ 8 1/ 26- 2/ 8
12/ 29- 1/ 11 12/ 1- 12/ 14
11/ 3- 11/ 16 10/ 6- 10/ 19 9/ 8- 9/ 21
8/ 11- 8/ 24 7/ 14- 7/ 27
6/ 16- 6/ 29 5/ 19- 6/ 1
4/ 21- 5/ 4 3/ 24- 4/ 6 2/ 24- 3/ 9 1/ 27- 2/ 9
12/ 30- 1/ 12 12/ 2- 12/ 15
11/ 4- 11/ 17 10/ 7- 10/ 20 9/ 9- 9/ 22
8/ 12- 8/ 25 7/ 15- 7/ 28 6/ 17- 6/ 30 5/ 20- 6/ 2
4/ 22- 5/ 5 3/ 25- 4/ 7
2/ 25- 3/ 10 1/ 28- 2/ 10
12/ 31- 1/ 13 12/ 3- 12/ 16
11/ 5- 11/ 18 10/ 8- 10/ 21
FY 2001
Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the Violent
Crime and Major Offender Program Average number of field agent workyears
charged to investigating violent crime and major offender matters
Field agent positions FY 2002 FY 2003
Source: GAO analysis of FBI TURK data. 9/ 11 Iraqi war effort
Page 36 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Figure 9: Comparative Analysis of
FBI Field Non- Supervisory Positions Allocated and Agent Workyears Charged
to Investigating White- Collar Crime Matters 0
500 1,000
1,500 2,000
2,500 3,000
4/ 20- 5/ 3 3/ 23- 4/ 5 2/ 23- 3/ 8
1/ 26- 2/ 8 12/ 29- 1/ 11 12/ 1- 12/ 14
11/ 3- 11/ 16 10/ 6- 10/ 19 9/ 8- 9/ 21
8/ 11- 8/ 24 7/ 14- 7/ 27
6/ 16- 6/ 29 5/ 19- 6/ 1
4/ 21- 5/ 4 3/ 24- 4/ 6 2/ 24- 3/ 9 1/ 27- 2/ 9
12/ 30- 1/ 12 12/ 2- 12/ 15
11/ 4- 11/ 17 10/ 7- 10/ 20 9/ 9- 9/ 22
8/ 12- 8/ 25 7/ 15- 7/ 28 6/ 17- 6/ 30 5/ 20- 6/ 2
4/ 22- 5/ 5 3/ 25- 4/ 7
2/ 25- 3/ 10 1/ 28- 2/ 10
12/ 31- 1/ 13 12/ 3- 12/ 16
11/ 5- 11/ 18 10/ 8- 10/ 21
FY 2001
Special agent positions allocated to FBI field offices for the White-
Collar Crime Program Average number of field agent workyears charged to
investigating white- collar crime matters
Field agent positions FY 2002 FY 2003
Source: GAO analysis of FBI TURK data. 9/ 11 Iraqi war effort
Page 37 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization As shown in table 2, the FBI did
not fully achieve its goal for the mix of critical skills for fiscal year
2002.
Table 2: FBI Success in Hiring Special Agents with Critical Skills in
Fiscal Year 2002 Goal Actual Critical skill Number Percent Number Percent
Percent of goal
Law enforcement /military/ law/ other 232 25 589 64 254 Computer science/
information technology 185 20 66 7 36 Foreign language proficiency 186 20
48 5 26 Physical sciences 93 10 72 8 77 Engineering 93 10 68 7 73 Military
intelligence experience 46 5 26 3 57 Counterterrorism 46 5 15 2 33 Foreign
counterintelligence 46 5 39 4 85
Total 927 100 923 100 Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. Note: Totals may
not add due to rounding.
In fiscal year 2003, as shown in table 3, in all of its identified
critical skill areas, except agents with foreign language skills, the FBI
has already achieved over half of its stated goals for those areas.
Table 3: FBI Success in Hiring Special Agents with Critical Skills in
Fiscal Year 2003 Critical skill Goal Actual (as of 6/ 1/ 03) Number
Percent Number Percent Percent of goal Law enforcement/ military/ law/
other 165 25 184 33 112
Computer science/ information technology 133 20 114 21 86 Foreign language
proficiency 133 20 45 8 34 Physical sciences 66 10 75 14 114 Engineering
66 10 52 9 79 Intelligence a 99 15 80 15 81
Total 663 100 550 100 83
Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. Note: Totals may not add due to
rounding. a In fiscal year 2003, the FBI combined military intelligence
experience, counterterrorism, and foreign
counterintelligence into the intelligence critical skill.
Appendix II: FBI Special Agent Critical Skill Hiring
Page 38 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization As shown in figure 10, the FBI
reduced the minimum time it takes to hire a special agent from 379 days to
236 days.
Figure 10: FBI Hiring Process and Timeline for Special Agent Positions
Appendix III: FBI Special Agent Hiring Process
Page 39 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization The Conference report for the
Department of Justice Appropriation Act, 2003 (P. L. 108- 7, 117 Stat. 49
(2003)) indicates that the Conferees provided
$10 million above the FBI*s budget request for training needs. 1 Table 4
shows how the FBI plans to allocate these funds by program.
Table 4: FBI Workforce Training Requirements and Spending Plan for
Priority Programs FBI training program Curriculum
development Distance learning Courseware
development University
education program
Classroom training expenses
FBI Academy classroom
upgrades Program total
Cyber crime $215,275 $163,723 $71,758 0 $768,420 0 $1,219,176
Counterterrorism 1,065,719 810,508 355,240 0 477,000 0 2,708,467
Counterintelligence 532,860 405,254 177,620 0 308,000 0 1,423,734
Analytical training 586,146 445,779 195,382 0 265,000 0 1,492,307
Other training 600,000 456,316 200,000 $300,000 0 $1,600,000 3,156,316
Total $3,000,000 $2,281,580 $1,000,000 $300,000 $1,818,420 $1,600,000
$10,000,000
Source: FBI.
The FBI has taken steps to provide revised training to FBI personnel
assigned to the priority areas. Table 5 summarizes specific revisions to
the training programs offered to new agents in the priority areas, agents
assigned to priority areas, other agents involved in counterterrorism
work, and analysts.
1 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108- 10, at 617 (2003). Appendix IV: FBI*s Training
in the Priority
Areas Additional Funding Provided to FBI Priority Area Programs
Revisions to the FBI*s Training Programs in Priority Areas
Page 40 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Table 5: Selected Revisions to
FBI Training Programs in the Priority Areas Since September 11, 2001 Staff
Start date Number to be
trained in FY2003 Description of revisions
New agent training in counterterrorism and counterintelligence
April 2003 425 estimate a Integrated international terrorism fact pattern
used throughout training at Quantico and other coursework. New agents
assigned to counterterrorism and counterintelligence
On- going, as assigned 40 estimate b CD- ROM, depending on assignment.
New agents assigned to counterintelligence must also complete the 4- week
course given to agents reprogrammed to counterintelligence. Agents
reprogrammed to counterterrorism February 2003 480 c CD- ROM,
*Introduction to International
Terrorism* 1- week course, lecture- based. Agents reprogrammed to
counterintelligence October 2002 213 CDROM, *Introduction to
Counterintelligence* 4- week interactive course. Agents participating in
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) March 2003 224 2- day course.
Prepares trainer to provide 8- hours of training for FBI and JTTF members
in the field. Intelligence analysts October 2001 1,032 d 5- 6 week Basic
Intelligence Research Specialist
course. CIA assistance in course development and instruction in at least 2
weeks of the course. Source: GAO analysis of FBI data.
a Prior to revising the new agent counterterrorism and counterintelligence
training, between October and March 2003, the FBI Academy added 32 hours
of counterterrorism and counterintelligencerelated training to the new
agent- training curriculum. During this timeframe, 373 new agents received
an additional 32 hours of training. b Approximately 5 percent of each new
agent class is assigned to counterterrorism or
counterintelligence squads immediately following graduation from the FBI
Academy. c There were 480 agents permanently reassigned to
counterterrorism; however, according to FBI officials, SACs have the
authority to designate which of these agents need the revised
counterterrorism training. FBI officials said that they are planning to
extend classes in Basic International Terrorism Operations to the end of
the calendar year to ensure that all agents who need the training will be
provided an opportunity to take the class. d The 1,032 analysts are to
include 188 to be trained in basic analysis and 844 to be trained in
specialty analysis. Additionally, in fiscal year 2002, 55 analysts were
trained in basic analysis and 138 analysts trained in specialty
coursework.
The FBI*s training programs in the priority areas, as of June 1, 2003, are
summarized in table 6. Current Training Offered to FBI Employees in the
Priority Areas
Page 41 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Table 6: Summary of Training
Provided in the Priority Areas, as of June 1, 2003 Category of staff
Summary of training provided Examples of courses offered
New agent training at FBI Academy All new agents 17 weeks (684 hours)
Integrated case scenario
Independent study project
Legal Instruction, Ethics, Leadership
Civil Rights, Firearms, Interviewing
Behavioral Science, Forensic Science
Concepts and Tactics for Survival
Undercover Operations, Surveillance Counterterrorism/
counterintelligence
110 hours of Middle Eastern Criminal Enterprise case study, domestic
terrorism- related training
Integrated classroom investigative, counterterrorism and
counterintelligence training
Additional hours of reading Investigating Criminal Enterprises
Middle Eastern Cultural Issues International Terrorism
Asset Development Cyber 2- hour course specifically on Cyber
Division investigations 25 hours of general computer training 4 to 8
hours on cyber crime
Cyber Crime Exercise
Computer Skills Development/ Data Analysis
New agent training for agents assigned after completion of FBI Academy
Counterterrorism/ counterintelligence
CD- ROM, 15- hours additional training 4- week interactive course for
new
agents assigned to counterintelligence
Introduction to International Terrorism; Introduction to
Counterintelligence
Counterintelligence Operations Cyber 1- week, required introductory
course
Continuing education include 8 core courses from entry level to advanced
curriculum offered
Introduction to Cyber Crime Investigations
Agents shifted to work in priority areas Counterterrorism 1- week
course, lecture- based Basic International Terrorism
Operations Counterintelligence 4- week course, interactive course
for new agents assigned to counterintelligence
Counterintelligence Operations Course
Cyber 1- week, introductory course required
Continuing education includes 8 core courses from entry level to
advanced
Introduction to Cyber Crime Investigations
Page 42 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Category of staff Summary of
training provided Examples of courses offered
Agents All agents All agents must take at least 15
hours of training per year
Training is offered at Quantico, regionally, and in FBI field offices a
Agents must apply and get
approved
Arabic Romanization Training Bloodborne Pathogens
Financial Underpinnings of Crime
Hate Crimes Agents participating in JTTF 8- hours train- the- trainer
course on
counterterrorism
Course material will then be offered to FBI field office personnel and
JTTF members b Counterterrorism awareness
training Intelligence analysts All analysts College of Analytical
Studies provides 5- 6 week course on basic analysis
CIA assisted in development of curriculum and teaches 2 weeks
Analytical Thinking and Presentation
Arabic Romanization
Asset Vetting Analysts, with 2 years or less experience
College of Analytical Studies provides coursework
Basic Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) Course
Lexis/ Nexis, PenLink
Project Gateway/ Basic Financial Analysis Advanced Analysts, with 2
years or more experience
College of Analytical Studies provides coursework
Statement Analysis for the IRS
Strategic Thinking
Writing National Level Threat Assessments Source: GAO analysis of FBI
data.
a Course offerings are subject to change due to FBI priorities, according
to FBI officials. b This may include state and local law enforcement
officers.
The FBI has begun to implement a plan to restructure its training program.
As reflected in figure 11, the plan established several units to establish
curriculum, develop courses and tools, and deliver training for all FBI
personnel, special agents, as well as support staff. FBI Revised Overall
Training Program to Enhance Training to Entire Workforce
Page 43 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Figure 11: Proposed Training
Division Organization Chart
Page 44 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization To provide the intelligence
community and law enforcement with additional means to fight terrorism and
prevent future terrorist attacks,
Congress enacted a wide range of investigative enhancements in the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act. 1 Among other things,
the USA PATRIOT Act provides federal officials with
enhanced surveillance authorities to intercept wire, oral, and electronic
communications relating to terrorism. The act also provides the authority
to seize voice- mail messages pursuant to warrants. The act further
contains a number of provisions authorizing information sharing between
intelligence and law enforcement agencies* such as the sharing of foreign
intelligence information obtained as part of a criminal investigation with
any federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration,
national defense, or national security official in order to assist the
official in the performance of his or her official duties.
The USA PATRIOT Act also seeks to enhance federal law enforcement agency
abilities to, for example, investigate and combat financial- related
crimes by adding new money laundering and counterfeiting crimes and by
increasing related criminal penalties. The USA PATRIOT Act further seeks
to strengthen federal criminal laws against terrorism by, for example,
making it a crime to engage in terrorist attacks or other acts of violence
against mass transportation systems. The act also made it a crime to
harbor or conceal terrorists where a person knows, or has reasonable
grounds to believe, that the person harbored or concealed has committed or
is about to commit a specified terrorism- related offense.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 2 (FISA) as amended,
established legal standards and a process that the Attorney General,
including the FBI, must use to obtain authorization for electronic
surveillance and physical searches when seeking foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence information within the United States. FISA also
created a special court* the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court* with
jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving FISA
surveillance and searches. FISA orders may be issued, in general, upon a
FISA Court finding of probable cause to believe that a suspect target is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and that the places at which
1 P. L. 107- 56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 2 P. L. 95- 511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978). Appendix V: Selected Statutes and Guidelines
Relevant to FBI Investigations USA PATRIOT Act
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Page 45 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization the surveillance is directed are
being used, or are about to be used, by such targets. The USA PATRIOT Act
amended various FISA provisions to authorize, for
example, roving surveillance under FISA to, in essence, follow a person
who uses multiple communication devices or locations, where the FISA court
finds that the actions of the target may have the effect of thwarting the
identification of a specified person. Another amendment allows senior
level FBI personnel, in certain circumstances involving international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence, to apply to the FISA Court for an
order for the production of tangible items* such as books, records,
papers, or documents.
When conducting investigations, the FBI is subject to various sets of
guidelines established by the Attorney General. 3 The Attorney General*s
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism
Enterprise Investigations provide general standards and procedures for
the FBI*s conduct of criminal investigations. They are designed to govern
the circumstances under which such investigations may be begun, the
permissible scope, duration, subject matters, and objectives of such
investigations. Under these guidelines, for example, the FBI may conduct
investigations when the facts and circumstances reasonably indicate that a
federal crime had been, is being, or will be committed. Preliminary
inquiries may be performed when there is not yet a reasonable indication
of criminal activities but where information requires further scrutiny
beyond a prompt and limited checking of initial leads. The Attorney
General has also issued a separate set of guidelines prescribing the FBI*s
investigative authority related to international terrorism* that is,
terrorist activities occurring totally outside the United States or which
transcend national boundaries. The Attorney General Guidelines for FBI
Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence
Investigations (significant portions of which are classified) govern all
foreign intelligence, foreign counterintelligence, foreign intelligence
support activities, and intelligence investigations of international
terrorism. These guidelines also apply to FBI investigation of
3 Other guidelines include the Attorney General*s Guidelines on FBI
Undercover Operations, the Attorney General*s Guidelines Regarding the Use
of Confidential Informants, and the Attorney General*s Procedures for
Lawful Warrantless Monitoring of Verbal Communications. Selected Attorney
General Guidelines
Page 46 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization espionage statutes and
investigations on behalf of, or in cooperation with, foreign governments.
Page 47 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Table 7 presents a side- by- side
comparison of the key changes in the 2002 Guidelines, as compared with the
most recent previous version of the
Guidelines, which were issued in 1989 (and amended slightly in 1994).
Table 7: Comparison of Selected Changes between the 2002 and 1989 Attorney
General*s Guidelines 1989 Attorney General*s Guidelines 2002 Attorney
General*s Guidelines
Section I: General Principles
Preliminary inquiries and investigations shall be conducted with as little
intrusion into individual privacy as needs permit.
No significant change except:
FBI shall not hesitate to use any authorized investigative technique.
Intrusive techniques are warranted based on seriousness of crime or
strength of information indicating its commission. Inquiries and
investigations should not be initiated based solely on the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.
No significant change. Section II: General Crimes Investigations
Preliminary inquiry General authority May be initiated in response to
information
indicating possible criminal activity. Measured investigative response, as
little intrusion as possible, and short duration.
No significant change except:
duration is subject only to the maximum specified limitation on length.
Authorizations Authorized for up to 90 days. Renewal for 30- day periods.
Authorized for up to 180 days. Renewal for 90- day periods. FBI HQ grants
all renewals, based on a written request and statement of reasons. Field
office Special Agent- in- Charge (SAC)
may grant two renewals, based on a statement of reasons.
FBI HQ may grant further renewals, based on a written request and
statement of reasons. Investigative techniques Matter of judgment
considering:
intrusiveness, privacy concerns, and damage to reputation;
seriousness of possible crime, and
strength of evidence. No significant change except matter of
judgment should also consider:
objectives and available resources. All lawful techniques authorized
except :
mail covers
mail openings
nonconsensual electronic surveillance All lawful techniques authorized
except:
mail openings
nonconsensual electronic surveillance Specified techniques require no
FBI supervisory agent approval.
Other lawful techniques require FBI supervisory agent approval, except in
exigent circumstances. No significant change.
Appendix VI: Comparison of the 2002 and 1989 Attorney General*s Guidelines
Page 48 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization 1989 Attorney General*s
Guidelines 2002 Attorney General*s Guidelines
Generally should be less intrusive than full investigation. Highly
intrusive techniques should be approved only in compelling circumstances.
Given a choice, consider less intrusive methods if they would be just as
timely and effective.
Do not hesitate to use intrusive techniques if warranted by the
circumstances.
Full investigation General authority May be initiated when facts or
circumstances reasonably indicate that a crime has, is being, or will be
committed. May be conducted to prevent, solve, or prosecute such activity.
No significant change. For future criminal acts, facts and circumstances
must reasonably indicate that such a crime will occur in the future.
No significant change. Authorizations FBI supervisory agent may authorize.
Notification to U. S. Attorney, DOJ, and FBI HQ required for sensitive
criminal matters.
No specified limit on duration. No significant change. Investigative
techniques See section IV below. See section IV below. Section III:
Criminal Intelligence Investigations
Racketeering enterprise investigation General authority May be initiated
when two or more persons are
engaged in racketeering for monetary or commercial gain.
May be initiated when two or more persons are engaged in racketeering as
defined in federal racketeering statutes. Racketeering must involve
violence, extortion,
narcotics, or public corruption. Otherwise, requires approval by FBI
Director and Attorney General (AG).
If federally- defined terrorism is involved, investigation is to be
conducted under terrorism enterprise investigative standards.
Authorizations SAC may authorize defined racketeering, with notification
to AG or designee (1994
amendment). Otherwise requires approval by FBI Director with AG
concurrence. AG may request status reports.
SAC may authorize based on written statement of facts, with notification
to FBI HQ, DOJ Criminal Division, U. S. Attorney, and AG.
DOJ may request status reports. Authorized for up to 180 days. Renewal for
up to 180- day periods.
Authorized for up to 1 year. Renewal for up to 1- year periods. FBI HQ
grants all renewals, with AG concurrence if needed initially. SAC may
grant renewals, with notification to
FBI HQ, DOJ Criminal Division, and AG. Investigative techniques See
section IV below. See section IV below.
Page 49 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization 1989 Attorney General*s
Guidelines 2002 Attorney General*s Guidelines Terrorism enterprise
investigation General authority Domestic security/ terrorism investigation
may be initiated when two or more persons are involved in:
furthering political or social goals through force or violence and a
violation of federal criminal law.
Terrorism enterprise investigation may be initiated when two or more
persons are involved in:
furthering political or social goals through force or violence and a
violation of federal criminal law,
terrorism that involves a violation of federal law, or
committing a federal act of terrorism as defined in federal law.
Authorizations FBI HQ may authorize, with notification to DOJ
Office of Intelligence Policy Review (OIPR). AG may request status
reports.
SAC may authorize, with notification to FBI HQ, DOJ Criminal Division and
OIPR, U. S. Attorney, and AG.
DOJ may request status reports. Authorized for up to 180 days. Renewal for
up to 180- day periods.
Authorized for up to 1 year. Renewal for up to 1- year periods. FBI HQ
grants all renewals. SAC may grant renewals, with notification to
FBI HQ, DOJ Criminal Division, OIPR, and AG. Investigative techniques See
section IV below. See section IV below. Section IV: Investigative
Techniques General authority Unless otherwise indicated, all lawful
techniques
are authorized. No significant change. Matter of judgment considering:
intrusiveness, privacy concerns, and damage to reputation;
seriousness of possible crime, and
strength of evidence No significant change except matter of
judgment should also consider:
objectives and available resources Before employing a technique,
consider whether less intrusive means could be used as timely and
effectively.
Given a choice of techniques, consider less intrusive methods if they
would be just as timely and effective.
Do not hesitate to use intrusive techniques if warranted by the
circumstances. Specific techniques Specific requirements or restrictions
apply to use
of the following techniques:
Confidential informants,
Undercover operations,
Nonconsensual electronic surveillance,
Pen register/ trap and trace,
Access to stored wire and electronic records, Consensual electronic
surveillance,
Search and seizure, and
Persons represented by counsel. Specific requirements or restrictions
apply to use of the following techniques:
Same as 1989 guidelines, plus Classified investigative technologies.
Page 50 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization 1989 Attorney General*s
Guidelines 2002 Attorney General*s Guidelines
If undercover or informant activities may influence an organization*s
exercising of its 1st Amendment rights:
Must be approved by FBI HQ, with notification to DOJ.
If undercover or informant activities relate to an organization*s
exercising of its 1st Amendment rights:
Must fully comply with AG*s guidelines on undercover operations and
confidential informants. For consensual electronic surveillance:
Advance authorization must be obtained from SAC and U. S. Attorney For
consensual electronic surveillance:
Advance authorization must be obtained from SAC or Assistant SAC, and U.
S. Attorney or Assistant AG. Section V: Dissemination and Maintenance of
Information Information systems Not included. FBI shall maintain database
of inquiries and
investigations that permits retrieval of status and subjects. Section VI:
Counterterrorism Activities and Other Authorizations Counterterrorism
activities Not included. Regarding information systems:
FBI may operate and participate in identification, tracking, and
information systems for purposes of detecting, prosecuting, or preventing
terrorism.
System information may come from sources permitted by law, prior or
ongoing investigations, government sources, public sources, and voluntary
private sources.
Systems operated by the FBI shall be reviewed periodically. Not
included. Regarding public places and events:
FBI may visit any place and attend any event that is open to the public,
for purposes of detecting or preventing terrorism.
No information may be retained from such visits unless it relates to
potential criminal or terrorist activity. Other authorizations Not
included. Regarding general topical research:
Online sites and forums may be searched and accessed on subject areas
generally useful to investigations.
Research is not allowed on individual names or identifiers except where
incidental to topical research. Not included. Online resources are
generally authorized for
the purposes of detecting or preventing terrorism or other criminal
activities. Not included. FBI may prepare general reports and
assessments on terrorism or other criminal activities for purposes of
strategic planning or investigative support.
Page 51 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization 1989 Attorney General*s
Guidelines 2002 Attorney General*s Guidelines
Privacy and other limitations Not included. FBI may not maintain files on
individuals solely for the purpose of monitoring First Amendment
activities or other rights protected by the Constitution. Not included.
All law enforcement activities must have a
valid law enforcement purpose as described in the Guidelines. Source: GAO
analysis of the 2002 and 1989 Attorney General*s Guidelines.
Page 52 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization The following sections present
more detail about (1) the extent to which internal controls have been
incorporated into the Attorney General*s
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism
Enterprise Investigations, (2) other internal control mechanisms that are
in place to ensure FBI compliance with the Guidelines, 1 and (3) concerns
about how the Guidelines may adversely affect the protection of civil
liberties.
The Guidelines themselves are an internal control* establishing the
Attorney General*s parameters for the FBI*s investigative authority. For
example, the internal controls described in table 8 are designed to ensure
that only valid, authorized transactions and events* in this case,
investigative activities such as preliminary inquiries 2 and terrorism
enterprise investigations* are initiated or entered into by the FBI. These
controls specify who is authorized to approve the activity, how long the
activity may remain authorized until reapproval is required, and what
notifications of the activity are required within and outside the FBI,
thereby facilitating the verification of compliance.
1 These internal control mechanisms are intended to ensure compliance with
various FBI policies and procedures and are not specifically focused on
compliance with the Guidelines. The Guidelines are just one of many
policies and procedures that could be covered. 2 Preliminary inquiries are
undertaken in order to determine the validity of an allegation of
potential criminal activity and the need for a more in- depth
investigative effort. Appendix VII: Internal Controls to Protect
Against Civil Liberties Abuses Internal Controls Included in the
Guidelines
Page 53 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Table 8: Controls in the
Guidelines Relating to Authorization and Renewal of Preliminary Inquiries
and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations
Authorizing official Authorized length Required notifications Initiation
Extension Initiation Extension Initiation Extension
Preliminary inquiries FBI supervisor SAC,
first two extensions
FBI HQ, any further extensions
180 days 90 days Required for *sensitive criminal matters* only
SAC must notify U. S. Attorney or other DOJ official
None required Terrorism Enterprise investigations
SAC SAC 1 year 1 year SAC must notify FBI HQ
SAC must notify FBI HQ
FBI HQ must notify DOJ Criminal Division and OIPR, and any affected U.
S. Attorney
FBI HQ must notify DOJ Criminal Division
DOJ Criminal Division must notify AG and Deputy AG
DOJ Criminal Division must notify AG and Deputy AG Source: GAO analysis
of the 2002 Attorney General*s Guidelines.
Similarly, the controls described in table 9 are also designed to ensure
that only valid, authorized transactions and events are initiated or
entered into by the FBI* in this case, investigative techniques, including
the new
counterterrorism authorities granted under the revised Guidelines.
Page 54 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Table 9: Controls in the
Guidelines Relating to Authorized and Prohibited Investigative Activities
Authorized activities or techniques Prohibited activities or
techniques
Preliminary inquiries All lawful techniques except those specifically
prohibited.
Mail openings. Nonconsensual electronic surveillance. Terrorism
enterprise investigations
All lawful techniques. None identified. Counterterrorism activities
and other authorizations
For counterterrorism purposes, FBI may operate and participate in
identification, tracking,
and information systems containing data from FBI, government, public, or
private sources. None identified, but systems
must be periodically reviewed to ensure compliance with applicable, laws,
regulations, policies, and guidelines.
For counterterrorism purposes, FBI is authorized to visit places and
events that are also open to the public.
Information from such visits may not be retained unless it relates to
potential criminal or terrorist activity.
FBI is authorized to conduct topical and online research, including
accessing online sites and forums.
General online or topical research may not be conducted on individual
names or identifiers, except where
incidental to topical research.
Authorized activities must have a valid law enforcement purpose and
conform to applicable laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines.
Maintaining files on individuals
solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the 1st
Amendment or other
rights secured by the Constitution is prohibited. Source: GAO analysis of
the 2002 Attorney General*s Guidelines.
Regarding counterterrorism activities and other authorizations as
identified in table .9 above, the controls associated with these
authorities are less specific when compared with those associated with the
initiation and renewal of preliminary inquiries and terrorism enterprise
investigations, as described in table 7. For example:
Regarding the FBI*s authorization to operate and participate in
counterterrorism information systems, there is no indication of how agents
are to document this activity, nor how supervisors are to ensure that the
purpose of the activity is detecting or preventing terrorism. Further,
there is no indication of when such systems should be reviewed, what these
reviews should entail (e. g., verifying compliance with access,
use, or data retention requirements), and whether any such reviews are
required if systems accessed are not operated by the FBI.
Page 55 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Regarding the FBI*s
authorization to visit public places or events, there is no indication of
how agents are to document the activity, how supervisors
are to ensure that the purpose of the activity is detecting or preventing
terrorism, and how compliance with the prohibition on maintaining
information is to be verified. FBI headquarters officials said that agents
are not required to obtain supervisory approval before accessing terrorism
information systems, but they are encouraged to seek legal guidance to
ensure they comply with applicable guidelines. Also, the process of
creating such systems involves reviews for compliance with the Privacy Act
and other applicable
regulations, and any data that are collected, used, or disseminated are
subject to Privacy Act restrictions. Regarding visiting public places and
events, agents should obtain prior supervisory approval, if time permits,
and the date, time, and place of the visit should always be noted in the
case file. For either of these new authorities, the FBI*s supervisory case
file review process is the primary vehicle to ensure that agents comply
with the Guidelines and do not go beyond their stated authorities.
Regarding policies and procedures, FBI headquarters officials told us that
guidance such as that contained in the Guidelines is to be incorporated
into the FBI*s investigative and administrative manuals on a regular
basis. 3 Consistent with this practice, the FBI is in the process of
completing
revisions to its Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG)
policies and procedures manuals to incorporate guidance on the
implementation of Guidelines.
Training on the Guidelines is included in all new agent training provided
at the FBI Academy. In addition, on- board agents received training on the
Guidelines through the FBI*s Office of General Counsel, in the form of
direct guidance provided to each field office, various in- service
training presentations, and as part of basic training provided to agents
being transferred to counterterrorism from other program areas. The field
office Chief Division Counsels also received Guidelines training, and they
told us this training was subsequently provided to agents in their field
offices
during periodic legal updates. We found that about 55 percent of the field
agents who completed our questionnaire in April 2003 indicated that they
3 These are the Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines and the
Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures. FBI Policies and
Procedures, Training, and Supervision
Page 56 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization had received training relating to
the Guidelines* but the majority of that was on- the- job training. The
FBI*s training program was recently reengineered
to, among other things, update the new agent and in- service training
curriculum to better address the FBI*s shift in resources from criminal
programs to priority areas, such as counterterrorism. Training on the
Guidelines continues and is included in the new curriculum framework for
both new and in- service agents. With respect to supervision, supervisory
agents are responsible for
monitoring agents* work and, more formally, they are to perform periodic
case file reviews at least every 90 days on all cases being worked by
their agents. During these case file reviews, supervisors are to monitor
the progress of cases by reviewing investigative work completed
accomplished, verifying compliance with any applicable policies and
procedures (including the Guidelines), and assessing the validity of
continuing with the case. They also review investigative work planned for
the next period* including, for example, any significant data collection
that will be employed* and discuss any issues associated with or approvals
needed to carry out the investigative strategy. Nearly all the field
agents who completed our questionnaire indicated that their supervisors
performed case file reviews every 90 days* more often in some cases. As an
additional oversight, FBI officials told us that field office Assistant
Special Agents- in- Charge periodically check supervisory case file
reviews to ensure the adequacy of the case file review process. No
specific changes to the FBI*s supervisory case file review process were
made in response to the issuance of the revised Guidelines.
The FBI*s Inspection Division is responsible for reviewing FBI program
divisions and field offices to ensure compliance with applicable laws and
regulations and the efficient and economical management of resources.
The Inspection Division attempts to regularly inspect all FBI units at
least once every 3 years. Among other things, inspectors review field
office case files to (1) assess the adequacy of supervisors* case file
reviews and (2) ensure that investigative work complies with
administrative and investigative policies and procedures. According to FBI
headquarters inspection officials, it is in the context of reviewing case
files that inspectors determine compliance with the procedures and other
guidance contained in the Guidelines.
We reviewed selected FBI inspection reports completed since October 1999*
including the most recent inspections for the 14 field offices we visited
and 4 other field office inspections completed after the Guidelines FBI
Field Office
Inspections
Page 57 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization were issued. Our review confirmed
that inspectors were reviewing compliance with the Guidelines and adequacy
of supervisory case files
reviews during their inspection. We noted the following inspection
findings:
In four inspections, a preliminary inquiry was not converted to a full
investigation after expiration of the initial authorization period.
In seven inspections, some case file reviews were not performed in a
timely manner.
In one inspection, an investigation was opened without approval by the
field office Agent- in- Charge or notification to FBI headquarters.
With respect to the new investigative authorities granted under the
revised Guidelines, in reviewing the four inspection reports completed
after the Guidelines were issued, there were no findings related to FBI
noncompliance with these new investigative authorities.
The FBI*s inspections process was reengineered in late 2002, resulting in
revisions to the various inspection audit guides and checklists that
inspectors use to gather advance data about program operations and
investigative activities and plan their work. 4 In reviewing these audit
guides, we found two program review guides that included a reference to
the Guidelines* that is, that inspectors should *verify compliance with
Attorney General Guidelines relating to the initiation, renewal, or
continuance of investigations or investigative techniques.* According to
the FBI*s Chief Inspector, it is not necessary to incorporate specific
references to the revised Guidelines into the inspection audit guides,
since inspectors are already verifying compliance with all Attorney
General Guidelines (and other policies and procedures) by reviewing case
files and supervisory case file reviews.
4 For example, there are inspection audit guides covering the
investigative programs, executive management of the field office,
electronic surveillance procedures, and evaluation of internal controls.
Page 58 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization Within the FBI, the Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR) is generally responsible for
investigating and adjudicating allegations of
misconduct by FBI employees. OPR*s investigative case activity is shown in
table 10, below.
Table 10: Allegations of FBI Misconduct Received and Investigated by FBI
OPR* October 2000 through March 2003
Fiscal year 2001 2002 2003 a
Cases opened 612 685 282 Number of offenses alleged 1,154 1,188 408 Cases
closed 551 689 326 Substantiated and disciplinary action taken 347 519 168
Source: FBI OPR. a As of March 2003.
OPR does not currently capture statistics regarding the total number of
allegations received or the number of allegations that are closed without
inquiry. However, OPR officials told us they were not aware of any cases
involving violations of the authorities in the revised Guidelines related
to terrorism investigations. Based on their standardized offense codes and
the time period identified above, they identified a number of closed cases
involving violations of Attorney General Guidelines, violations of
individual civil rights, and violations of investigative policies and
procedures. However, they told us that the only way to verify whether any
of these cases specifically involved some aspect of the revised Guidelines
would be to review each of the individual investigative case files. An OPR
official told us that a redesign of their computer system is in progress,
and additional information on allegations received and investigations
opened will be captured when the redesign is complete. However, no changes
are planned to allow the tracking of misconduct cases specifically related
the revised Guidelines.
Within the Department of Justice, the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
also has responsibility for ensuring that allegations of FBI misconduct
are appropriately handled. Beginning in July 2001, all allegations against
FBI employees were to be submitted initially to the OIG for review. The
OIG then decides which complaints it will investigate and which it will
refer back to OPR for investigation. As shown in table 11, most
allegations of FBI misconduct are referred to OPR for investigation or
other disposition. The OIG did not specifically track the number of
allegations involving the Guidelines, but they did report that the most
common complaints received Investigations of FBI
Misconduct and Abuse
Page 59 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization were job performance failure,
waste and misuse of government property, and other official misconduct.
Table 11: Allegations of FBI Misconduct Received and Investigated by DOJ
OIG* July 2001 through February 2003
Disposition of allegations Number of
allegations Percent
Referred to OIG*s Investigation Division 71 5.6% Referred to OIG*s Office
of Oversight and Review 14 1.1 Forwarded to FBI OPR as *management issues*
a 1,061 84.3 Referred to FBI as *monitored referrals* b 41 3.3
Informational items filed for future reference c 72 5.7
Total 1,259 100.0%
Source: DOJ OIG. a This category includes allegations within the FBI*s
jurisdiction but not against FBI employees;
complaints that cite no improper act by an FBI employee; and
administrative issues such as lost credentials and misuse of FBI
equipment. b Monitored referrals require FBI OPR to investigate the
allegation and report their findings to the OIG.
c This category includes information that provides no viable leads to
investigate, repetitive information that has either been addressed or
previously filed, and information from sources in which the credibility of
the source is in question.
The OIG also has responsibility under the USA Patriot Act 5 to receive and
investigate all allegations of civil rights or civil liberties abuses
raised against DOJ employees. Between October 2001 and February 2003, the
OIG received 35 allegations involving FBI violations of individual civil
liberties, 2 of which were reported to involve noncompliance with
Attorney General Guidelines. Upon further review, however, one involved an
illegal search, one involved a coerced statement, and neither involved
noncompliance with the new authorities granted under the Guidelines. As
part of its mission to oversee DOJ programs and operations, the OIG
currently plans to conduct an evaluation of the FBI*s entire process of
employee discipline. Furthermore, in April 2003, the OIG began a review of
the FBI*s implementation of all Attorney General*s Guidelines that were
revised in May 2002* including the domestic investigative guidelines. 5 P.
L. 107- 56, 115 Stat. 272, 391 (2001).
Page 60 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization When the revised Guidelines were
issued, private sector groups raised concerns about what they saw as a
relaxing of investigative controls over
the FBI, which represented a potential threat to individual civil
liberties. For example:
Private sector officials said that the FBI is now allowed to gather
information at any place or event that is open to the public* even in the
absence of any indication of criminal activity. This encourages a return
to the days when the FBI sent agents into churches and other organizations
during the civil rights movement, in an attempt to block the movement and
suppress antigovernment dissent.
These officials also noted that liberalization of the Guidelines which
allows the FBI to access and analyze data from commercial and private
sector databases will result in a return to profiling of individuals and
building of intelligence dossiers. The inaccuracy or misuse of such data
could lead to innocent persons being suspected of crimes.
None of the private sector officials we met with could provide specific
examples of the FBI abusing the new authorities granted under the
Guidelines. Rather, their concerns stemmed from the notion that granting
the FBI broader investigative authorities* which can be used even in the
absence of any suspected criminal activity* not only ignores the lessons
of past abuses, but is unlikely to result in any tangible gains in law
enforcement. 6 FBI headquarters officials said that the supervisory case
file review
process is the primary vehicle to ensure that agents comply with
applicable policies and procedures* including the Guidelines. Regarding
the authority to visit public places and events, FBI field office managers
told us that, considering the number of legitimate leads coming in and the
number of ongoing preliminary inquiries and investigations, agents are
fully tasked to support existing work and do not have the time or need to
visit public places or surf the Internet to generate additional leads.
Based on our field visits, however, we found that some agents are
proactively using the new investigative authorities granted under the
revised
Guidelines. As shown in table 12, as of April 2003, 64 (about 36 percent)
of 6 In the mid- 1970s, we reported on the FBI*s domestic intelligence
program and also found that, despite intensive efforts to disrupt
dissident and subversive acts by domestic groups, the program showed
little evidence of advance knowledge of extremist acts or violence, and
overall showed few visible results. Concerns about How
the Guidelines May Adversely Affect Civil Liberties
Page 61 GAO- 03- 759T FBI Reorganization the 176 agents who completed our
questionnaire indicated they had accessed commercial information or
databases, 53 (about 30 percent)
conducted online Internet searches or accessed online sites, and 31 (about
18 percent) visited public places or events, prior to opening a
preliminary inquiry or investigation. In addition, most of the agents who
completed the questionnaire indicated prior supervisory approval was not
needed to perform these activities. Table 12: Use of New Investigative
Authorities under the Revised Guidelines by FBI Field Agents Who Completed
Our
Questionnaires Investigative activity
Used prior to a preliminary inquiry or
investigation Used during a preliminary inquiry or
investigation Supervisory
approval prior to the activity
No prior supervisory
approval needed
Accessed commercial information or databases 64 153 11 150 Accessed other
public or private information or databases 50 143 24 128 Visited public
places and events 31 104 48 96 Conducted general topical or subject matter
research 64 128 9 148 Conducted online searches or accessed online sites
or forums 53 122 22 126
Source: Analysis of FBI field agent responses to GAO questionnaire. To
help assuage public concerns about civil liberties issues, the FBI has
been reaching out to communities to assure them that, despite the emphasis
on counterterrorism, investigating abuses remains a high priority of the
FBI. FBI field offices have been tasked to contact Muslim leaders for the
purpose of establishing a dialogue and discussing procedures for alerting
the FBI to civil rights abuses. For example, in one field office we
visited, five meetings were held during the first 4 months of 2003*
including meetings with Muslim community leaders and a panel discussion to
answer questions from the public* covering topics related to homeland
security, FBI employment, and community outreach. Throughout the FBI, over
500 outreach meetings occurred during the first 5 months after September
11, 2001. In addition, some FBI field offices have provided sensitivity
training to field agents on the Islamic religion and culture. Finally,
regarding the new investigative authority to visit public places and
events, FBI headquarters officials are currently considering whether to
require mandatory supervisory approval prior to allowing an agent to enter
a public place or attend a public meeting.
(440161 and 440162)
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