Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and  
Increase Readiness (07-JUL-03, GAO-03-753).			 
                                                                 
The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and 	 
infrastructure worth billions of dollars in many environments	 
where corrosion is causing military assets to deteriorate,	 
shortening their useful life. The resulting increase in required 
repairs and replacements drives up costs and takes critical	 
systems out of action, reducing mission readiness. GAO was asked 
to review military activities related to corrosion control.	 
Specifically, this report examines the extent of the impact of	 
corrosion on DOD and the military services and the extent of the 
effectiveness of DOD's and the services' approach to preventing  
and mitigating corrosion.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-753 					        
    ACCNO:   A07365						        
  TITLE:     Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion    
Costs and Increase Readiness					 
     DATE:   07/07/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Equipment maintenance				 
	     Military budgets					 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Military materiel					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     F-14 Aircraft					 
	     F-18 Aircraft					 
	     F-16 Aircraft					 
	     Hornet Aircraft					 
	     Tomcat Aircraft					 

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GAO-03-753

                                       A

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2003 DEFENSE MANAGEMENT Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and
Increase Readiness

GAO- 03- 753

Letter 1 Results in Brief 3 Background 4 Impacts on Military Costs,
Readiness, and Safety Indicate That

Corrosion Is an Extensive Problem 6 DOD and Services* Approach to
Corrosion Control Is Not Effective

but Has Achieved Some Successes 21 Conclusion 38 Recommendations for
Executive Action 39 Agency Comments 40

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42

Appendix II: Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
Realized Their Full Potential 45

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 52 Figures Figure 1:
Corrosion on Army 5- Ton Truck in Hawaii 8

Figure 2: Corroding Bridge Columns at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 9
Figure 3: Corrosion on Army UH- 60L Black Hawk Helicopter 11 Figure 4:
Corroded 500- Pound Bombs at Andersen Air Force Base,

Guam 14 Figure 5: Cracked Runway at Point Mugu Naval Air Station,

California 17 Figure 6: Marine Corps Helicopter Rinsing Facility Kaneohe
Bay, Hawaii 20

Figure 7: Army National Guard Controlled Humidity Preservation 23 Figure
8: K- Span Shelter at Army Reserve Unit Fort Shafter, Hawaii 29 Figure 9:
Corroded Connectors on Air Force F- 16 Main Fuel

Shutoff Valve 30 Figure 10: Corrosion Inhibitor Application Facility at
Army*s Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 32

Figure 11: Corrosion on High Temperature Pipelines at Air Force Tracking
Facility Antigua, West Indies 36 Figure 12: Corroded Air- Conditioning
Valves at Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia 38

Abbreviations

ASPRCS Aviation Systems Performance Readiness and Corrosion Study DOD
Department of Defense GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

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July 7, 2003 Let er t The Honorable John Ensign Chairman The Honorable
Daniel Akaka Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Joel Hefley Chairman The Honorable Solomon Ortiz Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Readiness Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains
equipment and infrastructure worth billions of dollars in many
environments where corrosion, in one form or another, is causing military
assets to deteriorate, shortening their useful lives. The resulting
increase in needed repairs and replacements drives up costs and takes
critical systems out of action, reducing mission readiness. 1 Corrosion
can also create severe safety hazards leading to loss

of life when, for example, corroded electrical contacts in aircraft cause
system failures during flight. Because numerous advances in products and
technologies have been found to enhance efforts to prevent and mitigate
corrosion, it is critical that DOD, as the steward of an enormous
investment in military assets, ensure that all appropriate measures are
implemented to reduce corrosion costs to the greatest extent possible.

1 Readiness is generally defined as a measure of the Department of
Defense*s ability to provide the capabilities needed to execute the
mission specified in the National Military Strategy. At the unit level,
readiness refers to the ability of units, such as Army divisions, Navy
ships, and Air Force wings, to provide capabilities required of the
combatant commands.

The Congress, recognizing corrosion as a serious military concern, enacted
legislation as part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003 which requires DOD to designate a senior official or
organization responsible for preventing and mitigating the corrosion of
military equipment and infrastructure. 2 The act requires the designated
official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts throughout the

department, recommend policy guidance, and review the funding levels
proposed by each military service. The Secretary of Defense is required to
develop and implement a long- term strategy to reduce the effects of
corrosion.

You requested that we review military activities related to the prevention
and mitigation of corrosion. In this report we address the following
questions: (1) What is the extent of the impact of corrosion on the
military services* equipment and facilities? (2) To what extent do DOD and
the military services have an effective approach to prevent and mitigate
corrosion?

To respond to these questions, we reviewed numerous studies and discussed
military corrosion impact issues with experts in and outside DOD. To
examine DOD and the military services* approach to corrosion prevention
and mitigation, we visited field installations and developed several case
studies on specific corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts that are
summarized in appendix II and referred to throughout the report. More
detailed information about our scope and methodology is contained in
appendix I.

2 P. L. 107- 314, section 1067.

Results in Brief Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be
quantified due to the limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and
the military

services, data on current cost estimates, 3 readiness, and safety indicate
that corrosion has a substantial impact on military equipment and
infrastructure. For example, in 2001, a 2- year, government- sponsored
study estimated the direct costs of corrosion for military systems and
infrastructure at approximately $20 billion annually and found corrosion
to be one of the largest components of life- cycle costs for military
weapon systems. 4 Another study puts the cost at closer to $10 billion. 5
Corrosion has also been shown to substantially increase equipment
downtime, thereby reducing readiness. For example, a 2001 study concluded
that corrective maintenance of corrosion- related faults has degraded the
readiness of all of the Army*s approximately 2,450 force modernization
helicopters; the Army estimated in 1998 that approximately $4 billion was
spent on corrosion repair of helicopters alone. In 2001, DOD also reported
that more than two thirds of its military facilities have serious
deficiencies and are in such poor condition that they are unable to meet
certain mission requirements; corrosion was identified as a major
contributor to much of this deterioration. Finally, a number of safety
concerns have also been associated with corrosion. During the 1980s, the
crashes of several F- 16 aircraft were traced to corroded electrical
contacts that caused uncommanded fuel valve closures. More recently, Navy
F- 14 and F- 18

aircraft have experienced landing gear failures (collapses) during carrier
operations that were attributed to corrosion- related cracking.

DOD and the military services do not have an effective approach to prevent
and mitigate corrosion. While the military services have achieved some
successes on individual corrosion prevention projects, their overall
approach to corrosion control has significant weaknesses that have
decreased the effectiveness of their efforts. For example, DOD does not
have a strategic plan for corrosion prevention and mitigation, and the
services have either not developed such plans or have not implemented
them. While DOD is in the process of establishing a central corrosion 3
Cost estimates were not audited.

4 Koch, Gerhardus H. et al., Corrosion Cost and Prevention Strategies in
the United States,

CC Technologies and NACE International in cooperation with the U. S.
Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Sept. 30,
2001. 5 Corrosion in DOD Systems: Data Collection and Analysis (Phase I),
Harold Mindlin et al.; Metals Information Analysis Center, February 1996.

control office, no single office exists within each of the military
services to manage corrosion control over equipment and infrastructure.
Instead, each service has multiple corrosion offices within various
operational

units and weapon systems programs. These offices often have different
policies, procedures, and funding channels that limit coordination and
standardization. In many cases, corrosion control officials were not aware
of the activities and achievements of their counterparts in other commands
and across the services. Further, corrosion control offices act largely in

an advisory role and are guided by goals and incentives that sometimes
conflict with those of the operational commands that they rely on to fund
project implementation. As a result, many proposed projects* even those
with the potential for very large future- year cost savings* are often
assigned a low funding priority compared to operations and repair projects
offering more immediate results. These weaknesses combine to reduce the
overall effectiveness of DOD*s approach to corrosion control and result in
the services missing important opportunities to achieve greater benefits,

including potentially billions of dollars in additional net savings
annually that would accrue from a long- term reduction in corrosion of
military equipment and infrastructure.

To strengthen DOD*s approach to corrosion control, we are recommending
that it define and incorporate into its long- term corrosion mitigation
strategy measurable, outcome- oriented objectives and performance measures
that show progress toward achieving results. In addition, we are
recommending that the strategy include a number of elements to address
problems and limitations we identified in current corrosion prevention
efforts. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with all our recommendations. The department also provided

technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. Background
Corrosion affects all military assets, including approximately

350,000 ground and tactical vehicles, 15,000 aircraft and helicopters,
1,000 strategic missiles, and 300 ships. Maintenance activities* including
corrosion control* involve nearly 700,000 military (active and reserve)
and DOD civilian personnel, as well as several thousand commercial firms
worldwide. Hundreds of thousands of additional mission support assets and
thousands of facilities are also affected.

Corrosion is defined as the unintended destruction or deterioration of a
material due to interaction with the environment. It includes such varied
forms as rusting; pitting; galvanic reaction; calcium or other mineral
build

up; degradation due to ultraviolet light exposure; and mold, mildew, or
other organic decay. It can be either readily visible or microscopic.
Factors influencing the development and rate of corrosion include the type
and design of the material, the presence of electrolytes (water, minerals,
and salts), the availability of oxygen, the ambient temperature, and the
amount of exposure to the environment. The rate of corrosion increases
exponentially when the ambient humidity is over 50 percent. Corrosion can
also occur in the absence of water, but only at high temperatures, such as
in gas turbine engines.

The effects of corrosion on DOD equipment and infrastructure have become
more prominent as the acquisition of new equipment has slowed and more
reliance is placed on the service of aging equipment and infrastructure.
The aging of military systems poses a unique challenge for maintenance and
corrosion control for all services. 6

A number of DOD and commercial studies have identified and evaluated
technologies and techniques for corrosion prevention and control. The
studies indicate that although effective corrosion prevention and control
methods and technologies are well known and have been recommended for
years, they have not been implemented effectively. The studies also
identify a number of relatively simple solutions* such as covered storage,

controlled environment, washing and rinsing, spray- on rust inhibitors,
and protective wrapping* to mitigate and control the effects of corrosion.
Congress has recognized the need to significantly reduce the economic
burden on the military services of the damage caused by corrosion and of
the efforts to mitigate its adverse affects. In November 2002, Congress
passed the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003, which required the Department of Defense to take the following
steps:

 Designate a responsible official or organization within the department
to (1) oversee and coordinate corrosion prevention and mitigation of
military equipment and infrastructure; (2) develop and recommend policy
guidance; (3) review programs and funding levels; and

6 For example, the average age of the Air Force aircraft fleet is 22
years. By fiscal year 2020, the average age will increase to nearly 30
years, with current programmed investments. This would translate to 60-
year- old tankers, 47- year- old reconnaissance/ surveillance platforms,
and 44- year- old bombers. (The B- 52 would be nearly 60 years old.)

(4) provide oversight and coordination of the efforts to incorporate
corrosion control during the design, acquisition, and maintenance of
military equipment and infrastructure.

 Develop and implement a long- term strategy to reduce corrosion and the
effects of corrosion on the military equipment and infrastructure of the
Department of Defense not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of the act.

 Submit to Congress an Interim Report regarding the actions taken to date
by the corrosion control office when the President submits the budget for
fiscal year 2004. On May 22, 2003, DOD submitted the report.

Impacts on Military Numerous studies in recent years have documented the
pervasive nature of

Costs, Readiness, and corrosion and its various effects on military
equipment and infrastructure.

Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the
Safety Indicate That

limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services,
Corrosion Is an

current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion
Extensive Problem

has a substantial effect on military equipment and infrastructure. Costs
are significant because corroded military assets must often be repaired or
replaced at great expense. Readiness is also severely impaired because
corrosion increases the maintenance needed and, therefore, the downtime on
a large quantities of military equipment. The effects extend to
infrastructure, which, in turn, has an adverse impact on the military*s
ability to meet mission requirements. Further, corrosion has an equally
profound effect on the safety of equipment and infrastructure.

Corrosion Costs Appear Corrosion*s impact on military costs appears to be
enormous, representing

to Be Enormous one of the largest life- cycle cost components of military
weapon systems.

In a 2001 government- sponsored study, corrosion is estimated to cost the
Department of Defense at least $20 billion a year. Another study done in
1996 puts the cost at closer to $10 billion annually. The costs identified
in these reports are direct costs such as the manpower and material that
are used primarily to inspect and repair damage resulting from corrosion.
However, there are also indirect costs that, were they to be quantified,
would significantly increase the total reported costs. Indirect costs
include the loss of the opportunity to use equipment that is not in
operating condition. Although extensive equipment downtime results from
corrosion, the attendant financial impacts have not been fully captured.
Even more difficult to quantify is the cost of using equipment that, while
not inoperable, has diminished utility due to corrosion. Considering the
enormous total value of all of the equipment owned by

the military services, these costs are considerable, to say the least.
Corrosion also shortens the service life and accelerates the depreciation
of DOD facilities, which in a recent GAO report are estimated to have a
replacement value of over $435 billion. 7 This impact on facilities
translates into costs that are not included in the government corrosion
cost study.

There are numerous examples of how profoundly corrosion affects costs. For
example, in 1993, the Army estimated spending about $2 billion to $2. 5
billion a year to mitigate the corrosion of wheeled vehicles, including 5-
ton trucks. 8 (See fig. 1.)

7 U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in
Funding Priorities and Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition
of Military Facilities, GAO- 03- 274 (Washington, D. C.: February 2003).

8 Corrosion Prevention for Wheeled Vehicles, DOD Inspector General Audit
Report, Number 93- 156, August 13, 1993.

Figure 1: Corrosion on Army 5- Ton Truck in Hawaii

Source: U. S. Army.

Corrosion was found to be so extensive on some of the trucks that the
repair costs were greater than 65 percent of the average cost of a new
vehicle. Cost impacts appear to be even greater on Army helicopters, as
evidenced by a 1998 analysis estimating costs of about $4 billion to
repair damage attributed to corrosion. 9 Corrosion is also a formidable
cost driver to the Navy. As an illustration, the Navy*s Pacific and
Atlantic Fleets estimate that about 25 percent of their total combined
annual maintenance budget is directed to the prevention and correction of
corrosion. Navy officials told us that the prevention and removal of
corrosion on shipboard tanks alone costs the Navy over $174 million a
year. Navy facilities such

as waterfront structures are also decaying because of corrosion, and 9 U.
S. Army TACOM- ARDEC communication referenced in Corrosion Costs and
Preventative Strategies in the United States, Gerhardus H. Koch, Ph. D.,
et al.; CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc., September 30, 2001.

these facilities will need to be replaced at considerable cost. For
example, naval military construction projects estimated to cost $727
million are required to restore 20 piers that have suffered extensive
corrosion damage. (See fig. 2.)

Figure 2: Corroding Bridge Columns at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

Source: U. S. Navy.

In 1990, the Air Force estimated the cost of corrosion to be about $700
million. Interestingly, even though the number of operational Air Force
aircraft decreased significantly, corrosion costs for the Air Force
increased to over $1 billion by 2001, 10 or $300 million more

than previously reported. 10 Cost of Corrosion: Final Report, prepared for
Air Force Research Laboratory, NCI Systems, Inc., Fairborn, Ohio, March
26, 2003.

Corrosion Substantially Corrosion has been shown to substantially increase
equipment downtime,

Degrades Equipment and thereby reducing readiness. Whether it affects a
truck, helicopter, ship, or

Facilities Readiness pipeline, corrosion is a major contributor to the
amount of maintenance

required on military equipment and infrastructure. Depending on the kind
and severity of corrosion, the maintenance may be performed as part of the
scheduled maintenance cycle or as emergency repairs, especially when it
involves safety concerns. Whether scheduled or not, maintenance translates
into equipment downtime. As a result, readiness is diminished because the
equipment cannot be used for training purposes or for other kinds of
operations. In addition, corrosion contributes to or accelerates the
deterioration of equipment and, therefore, reduces its service life. As a
result, the condition of some equipment is assessed to have deteriorated
beyond repair capability and the equipment is no longer usable.

The effects on readiness are extensive throughout the military services,
and they are clearly evidenced in regard to military aircraft. For
example, a 2001 study concluded that corrective maintenance of corrosion-
related faults has degraded the readiness of all of the Army*s
approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters. (See fig. 3.)

Figure 3: Corrosion on Army UH- 60L Black Hawk Helicopter

Fuel cell compartment Control rod linkage Spindle bolts Source: U. S.
Army.

The effects on the Air Force*s KC- 135 are particularly pronounced, with
corrosion identified as the reason for over 50 percent of the maintenance
needed on the aircraft. While the Air Force has yet to quantify the total
impact, one study identified corrosion of avionics equipment contacts to
be a significant cause of failure rates on all Air Force aircraft. Because
these failure rates affect equipment that is sophisticated and often
occurs

in hard- to- access areas, a significant amount of time is needed for
testing, inspection, and repair. This extends aircraft downtime and
reduces readiness levels. Corrosion has also reduced the readiness levels
for the Navy*s P- 3C aircraft. According to Navy officials, corrosion has
always been responsible for a large part of maintenance required for the
aircraft, but the amount has doubled in recent years. While these
officials do not have specific information regarding the effects of
corrosion, they did note that in just the past year they had to ground two
aircraft specifically because of severe corrosion.

The effects on readiness extend well beyond aviation and include virtually
every type of equipment maintained and operated by the military. Corrosion
also severely affects the readiness of other types of equipment, such as
Army vehicles. In 1996, the Army identified corrosion as the reason

why 17 percent of its trucks located in Hawaii were not mission capable.
Earlier in 1993, the availability of the Army*s High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) had been particularly diminished because of
corrosion. While some of the vehicles were out of service for as long as a
year, others had such severe corrosion that they had to be scrapped after
5 years, many years short of their expected 15- year service life. The Air
Force also identified severe corrosion on its ground vehicles, resulting
in increased maintenance and downtime. Some of the vehicles showed
significant deterioration just months after being delivered to field
units.

Corrosion and its impact on readiness are especially a concern for the
Navy, because its ships operate in highly corrosive salt water and in
high- humidity locations. A notable example of these effects occurred in
2001 on the aircraft carrier USS John F Kennedy. Maintenance problems,
including many that were corrosion- related, were so severe that the
carrier could not complete its planned operations. Even more recently, the
carrier USS Kitty Hawk returned from a series of deployments, including
Operation Enduring Freedom, with significant maintenance problems that
also included topside corrosion. As a result, the carrier is expected to
undergo extensive maintenance.

Such effects are found Navy- wide, and the Navy estimates that about 25
percent of its fleet maintenance budget goes toward corrosion prevention
and control. This and other kinds of maintenance are largely completed at
a Navy depot and require an average of 6 months. During this extended
period of time, the ship is not available for service. The amount

of time the ship is in the depot is due in part to the repairs needed
because of corrosion; Navy officials told us this amount of corrosion-
related maintenance is understated because it does not include the vast
amount of manpower and resources spent on corrosion removal and repainting
while the ships are on operations. These repairs, too, have an impact on

readiness, because crew members who would normally be undergoing training
or other kinds of operations are, instead, required to perform
maintenance.

Corrosion also impairs the readiness of military armament. For example,
the Army reported a significant number of failures due to corrosion on the
155 mm medium- towed howitzer so severe that they resulted in aborted
missions. The study estimates that between 30 to 40 percent of the aborts
are direct results of corrosion. Corrosion is also identified as
accounting for 39 percent of all unscheduled maintenance for the howitzer,
further reducing the readiness levels of the equipment. In addition,
corrosion has affected the readiness of the Air Force*s general purpose
iron bombs. (See fig. 4.)

Figure 4: Corroded 500- Pound Bombs at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam

Source: U. S. Air Force.

According to Air Force records, of the approximately 450,000 bombs of this
type in the Air Force inventory, more than 107,000 (or over 24 percent)
have varying levels of deterioration caused by corrosion and, as a result,
are not mission capable. While many of these bombs are repairable, a
certain level of maintenance is needed to restore most of them to

acceptable operational condition. Some of the bombs, however, are too
severely corroded to be salvageable. Military facilities are also decaying
due to corrosion and, as a result, readiness is affected adversely. In
2001, the Department of Defense reported that more than two- thirds of its
military facilities have serious deficiencies and are in such poor
condition that they are unable to meet certain mission requirements. The
department identifies corrosion as a major contributor to much of this
deterioration. According to military

service officials, the most significant area of concern may be the
condition of military airfields. Each of the military services has
reported runway cracking so severe that the runways were judged unusable.
Deterioration of this kind was even identified in airfields used for
operations during Enduring Freedom. For example, runway cracks at Pope Air
Force Base, North Carolina, were so extensive that several C- 130 cargo
planes and A- 10 fighters heading for Afghanistan were diverted to other
U. S. installations.

Further, Navy facilities officials told us that infrastructure
deterioration is so significant that it has adverse impacts on the
service*s ability to perform required maintenance on its equipment. For
example, they said that parts of the ceiling of an aircraft hanger located
at North Island Naval Air Station, California, had crumbled as a result of
corrosion. Because of the safety hazard and potential damage to aircraft,
the hanger had to be closed down for several months for repairs and the
aircraft relocated to other storage facilities. Corrosion of facilities
and the impacts on readiness go well beyond problems experienced at
airfields and hangars. The Pacific Air

Force Command cited corrosion as the cause of failures of numerous
critical infrastructure, including aircraft refueling, fire protection,
electrical, and command and control facilities. The Command noted that
this kind of deterioration can significantly impact its ability to perform
its mission.

Corrosion Poses Numerous Corrosion also poses numerous safety risks and is
a source of major

Safety Risks concern to all military services. This concern is
particularly acute when

associated with the safety of military aircraft. According to an Army
study, from 1989 through 2000 the Army experienced 46 mishaps, 9
fatalities, and 13 injuries directly related to corrosion. During calendar
year 2001, the Army issued four Safety of Flight messages for its rotary
wing systems due to corrosion- related material deficiencies that
adversely affected 2,100, or over 88 percent, of its force modernization
helicopters. As recently as March 2002, the Navy suspended carrier
operations for F- 14 aircraft when one aircraft crashed because its
landing gear collapsed due to corrosion.

Just 2 years earlier, the Navy had identified corrosion as the cause of a
landing gear failure on a F- 18 that occurred during carrier operations.
Despite regular inspections, stress cracking in the landing gear evaded
detection, and the problem was not revealed until after the accident when
the equipment was examined under an electron microscope. Perhaps even

more difficult to detect, but nevertheless just as significant, are the
safety risks corrosion presents on F- 16 avionics connectors. This
aircraft has sophisticated electronics equipment that is housed in Line
Replaceable Units. Although these containers provide considerable
protection from the elements, they cannot entirely eliminate moisture from
entering, and even microscopic amounts of moisture can cause catastrophic
accidents. For example, during the 1980s, uncommanded fuel valve closures
caused several F- 16 aircraft crashes. The equipment failures were
believed to

be the result of corrosion on the avionics connectors. Corrosion also
poses major safety hazards at military facilities. Perhaps the greatest
safety risk, according to facilities officials, is the cracking of
concrete runways at airfields operated by all of the military services.
(See fig. 5.)

Figure 5: Cracked Runway at Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California

Source: U. S. Navy.

One of the causes of this deterioration results from a corrosive chemical
process called alkali- silica reaction, which occurs when alkalis react
with water in ways that cause cracking, chipping, and expansion of
concrete. As airfields continue to decay and crumble, more pieces of
concrete are left on the runway, and these pieces have been absorbed by
military aircraft and cited as the causes of innumerable aircraft safety
incidents and accidents. Airfield cracking due to corrosion and the safety
risk that it presents is so extensive that all the military services have
experienced serious incidents resulting from this hazard. Examples of this
kind of damage have been reported at Osan Air Base, Korea; Ft. Campbell
Army Airfield, Kentucky;

Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California; and Marine Corps Air Station,
Iwakuni, Japan. The foreign object debris hazard was so severe at the
Little Rock Air Force Base that the Air Mobility Command assessed a
taxiway as unsuitable for operations. At Naval Air Station Pensacola,
several recent incidents were reported of Navy aircraft penetrating
cracked airfield pavement and jeopardizing pilot safety.

Pipelines that contain natural gas and other kinds of fuel also pose a
safety risk at military facilities. A majority of the pipelines are quite
old and are constructed largely of metal that is susceptible to corrosion,
which is the major cause of pipeline ruptures. Air Force facilities
officials told us that some of the pipelines were installed as far back as
the 1950s, and older pipelines pose an even greater hazard because they
have a higher probability of rupturing from corrosion. The services are
gradually

replacing many of the metal pipelines with pipelines made of high- density
polyethylene plastic and other materials that are more corrosion
resistant. The use of cathodic protection devices also helps to prevent
corrosion.

Facilities officials told us that despite these measures and periodic
inspections, they have experienced numerous pipeline ruptures they
attribute to corrosion. They said that until all of the existing pipelines
are replaced, such ruptures will continue to be a source of major concern.
However, replacing pipelines is very expensive, and facilities officials
said that it would take many years to obtain enough funds to replace all
of them. Facilities officials at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton,
California, said that they have experienced several fuel line ruptures,
many of them caused

by corroded pipe valves. They said fuel lines that run alongside base
housing pose the greatest safety concern, and they have begun to replace
these lines first. Eventually they hope to replace all of them throughout
the base.

Full Impact of Corrosion For more than a decade, a number of DOD, military
service, and

Unknown Due to private- sector studies have cited the lack of reliable
data to adequately

Incomplete Cost, Readiness, assess the overall impact of the corrosion
problem. Studies done in

and Safety Data 1996 and 2001 on DOD corrosion data collection and
analysis found that,

while individual services have attempted to quantify the cost of
corrosion, neither the mechanisms nor the methodologies exist to
accurately quantify the problem. 11 A 2001 Army study found that no single
data system provides aggregate corrosion data related to cost,
maintenance, and readiness, and that the existence of many separate
databases restrict the ability to collect standardized data reflecting
consistent characteristics. 12 The study, which focused on Army aviation,
concluded that existing automated information systems do not provide
decision makers with complete, accurate, or timely corrosion repair and
replacement data. An Air Force study came to similar

conclusions. 13 Navy officials told us that information regarding the cost
of corrosion is incomplete because these costs are difficult to isolate
from overall maintenance costs. They said these data limitations make it
difficult

to determine the severity of the problems and to justify the funding
needed to prevent corrosion problems in the future. Facilities officials
at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton said that their databases do not
specifically identify data as corrosion related. They told us they would
prefer to have better data for making investment decisions but instead
must rely primarily on information obtained from periodic and annual
corrosion inspections.

We identified many examples of how the lack of reliable and complete
information impeded the funding and progress of corrosion prevention
projects. In addition, military officials at the unit level told us that
they had trouble obtaining sufficient data and analysis to justify the
cost effectiveness of prevention projects. They cited the lack of
information as one of the main reasons why corrosion mitigation projects
were not being

funded. For example, Air Force officials told us that an aircraft rinsing
11 Corrosion in DOD Systems: Data Collection and Analysis (Phase I),
Harold Mindlin, et al.; Metals Information Analysis Center, February 1996;
and Corrosion Costs and Preventative Strategies in the United States,
Gerhardus H. Koch, Ph. D. et al.; CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc.,
September 30, 2001. 12 Aviation Systems Performance Readiness and
Corrosion Study (ASPRCS), Ken Mitchell, Study Director, Center for Army
Analysis, 2001. 13 A Study to Determine the Annual Direct Cost of
Corrosion Maintenance for Weapon Systems and Equipment in the United
States Air Force, prepared for the Air Force Corrosion Program Office, NCI
Information Systems, Inc., Fairborn, Ohio, February 6, 1998.

facility at Hickam Air Force Base is no longer operable, and they need
about $4 million for a new facility. They also said that although they do
not have sufficient data to accurately estimate expected cost savings from
reduced maintenance, they believe it would far exceed initial investment

costs. They added that their inability to move forward stems largely from
a lack of the data and analysis needed to justify the projects. The Marine
Corps faced similar obstacles in justifying the installation of a
helicopter rinsing facilities at Marine Corps Air Facility, Kaneohe Bay.
(See fig. 6.)

Figure 6: Marine Corps Helicopter Rinsing Facility Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii

Source: U. S. Marine Corps.

Officials told us that the corrosion maintenance costs they would avoid in
the first year alone would exceed the total amount of funding needed to
build an additional facility, but they do not have the data or resources
to support the necessary analysis, and without it they cannot justify the
project or obtain approval for the funds.

DOD and Services* While the military services have achieved some successes
on individual

Approach to corrosion prevention projects, significant weaknesses in their
overall

approach to corrosion control have decreased the effectiveness of their
Corrosion Control

efforts. An important limitation is the lack of a strategic plan that
includes Is Not Effective

long- term goals and outcome- based performance measures. In addition, but
Has Achieved coordination within and among the services is limited, and
the priorities of organizations that plan corrosion prevention projects
and those that

Some Successes implement and fund them are frequently in conflict. As a
result, promising

projects often fall far short of their potential, and many are never
initiated at all.

Some Corrosion Prevention Major commands, program offices, and research
and development

Improvements Are Being centers servicewide have made and continue to make
improvements

Introduced during and in the methods and techniques for preventing
corrosion. Corrosion

after Acquisition prevention improvements can either be introduced during
the design and

Production Process production phases or some time after equipment is
fielded. For example,

durable coatings, composite materials, and cathodic protection are being
incorporated to an increasing extent in the design and construction of
military facilities and equipment to reduce corrosion- related
maintenance.

Systems as diverse as the joint strike fighter, the DD- X destroyer,
amphibious assault vehicles, and HMMWV trucks plan to use composite
materials and advanced protective coatings to increase corrosion
resistance. The military services estimate that as much as 25 to 35
percent of corrosion costs can be eliminated by using these and other
corrosion prevention efforts, which would amount to billions of dollars in
potential savings each year. Our recent report on total ownership costs of
military equipment discusses some of the approaches DOD is using to
incorporate maintenance reduction techniques, including corrosion
mitigation, into the design and development of new systems. 14

Regarding the maintenance of existing equipment and infrastructure, we
have identified several examples of projects that show potential for a
high return on investment and advances in the technologies of corrosion
prevention but which have not, for various reasons, been fully
implemented. For example, the Naval Sea Systems Command has

14 U. S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting Requirements
Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems* Total Ownership Costs, GAO- 03-
57 (Washington, D. C.: February 2003).

developed durable coatings that increase the amount of corrosion
protection for various kinds of tanks (such as fuel and ballast tanks) on
Navy ships to 20 years instead of the 5 years formerly possible. The
installation of the coatings started in fiscal year 1996. However, by the
end of fiscal year 2002, the Navy had installed these coatings on less
than 7 percent of the tanks, for an estimated net savings of about $10
million a year. The tank preservation effort has not been widely
implemented because, Navy officials told us, the fleet has other needs
that have a higher priority. Navy officials told us they frequently have
to defer the installation

of the new coatings because of the limited availability of ships due to
the increased pace of Fleet operations and more pressing maintenance
requirements. As a result, the Navy estimates that it is about $161
million short of achieving the total annual net cost savings projected for
this corrosion prevention effort. The Command has numerous other projects
that have fallen short of their potential because the fleet had higher
priorities. While these projects have total projected annual net savings
of another $919 million, they have achieved about $33 million in yearly
savings to date. Once implemented, the benefits of these efforts extend
well beyond cost savings because they have the potential to significantly
reduce ship maintenance, thereby increasing the availability of ships for
operations.

The Army National Guard*s Controlled Humidity Preservation project
represents another example of a high potential savings effort that has not
been fully realized. Under this project, dehumidified air is pumped into
buildings or equipment to reduce the rate of corrosion. (See fig. 7.)

Figure 7: Army National Guard Controlled Humidity Preservation

Source: Army National Guard Bureau.

Project officials claimed net savings of $225 million through the end of
fiscal year 2002. While officials state the project has proven to be a
success so far, they now estimate that it will take about 15 years to
achieve the total projected savings, or 5 years longer than originally
planned. Army National Guard officials told us they could achieve greater
savings if they receive additional funding earlier than is currently
planned.

The Air Force*s bomb metalization project is also not achieving its full
cost savings potential. According to an Air Force study, treating cast
iron, general- purpose bombs with a special protective metallic spray
coating would save the Air Force at least $30 million in maintenance costs
over 30 years, although one study estimated the savings to be as much as
$100 million. The Air Force stores about 450,000 of this type of bomb in
locations throughout the world. Air Force officials told us that the total
investment costs for the project are about $5 million, which, based on the
higher cost savings estimate, translates into a return on investment ratio

of 20 to 1. After several years of planning and implementation, about 15,
000 bombs, or 3 percent, have received the treatment.

Appendix II provides more detailed information about these and other
examples of projects that are not reaching their full potential.

Strategic Plan Lacking for DOD does not currently have a strategic plan
for corrosion prevention and

DOD and Service mitigation, and the services either have not developed
such plans or have

Corrosion Efforts not implemented them.

However, DOD is required within 1 year of enactment of the Bob Stump
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (i. e., by
December 2, 2003) to submit to Congress a report setting forth

its long- term strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion
on military equipment and infrastructure. 15 The act requires DOD include
in its long- term strategy performance measures and milestones for
reducing corrosion that are compatible with the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). 16 GPRA offers a model for developing an
effective management framework to improve the likelihood of successfully
implementing initiatives and assessing results. Under GPRA, agencies at
all levels are required to set strategic goals, measure performance,
identify levels of resources needed, and report on the degree to which
goals have

been met. Without implementing these critical performance- measuring
elements, management is unable to identify and prioritize projects
systematically, allocate resources effectively, and determine which
projects have been successful. As a result, managers are not in a position
to make sound investment decisions on proposed corrosion control projects.

15 No later than 18 months after date of enactment of the act GAO is
required to submit to Congress an assessment of the extent that DOD has
implemented its long- term strategy to reduce corrosion.

16 P. L. 103- 62, Aug. 3, 1993.

The military services either have not established effective strategic
plans that include goals, objectives, and performance measuring systems 17
or they have not implemented them. The limitations to the military
services* efforts to establish strategic plans are as follows:

 The Army created a comprehensive corrosion control program plan*
including goals, objectives, and performance measures* but the plan was
never fully implemented. 18 As part of the plan, the Army defined specific
performance measures to track the progress of corrosion

mitigation efforts, but these were not put into effect. The strategy
called for the creation of panels comprised of top government and industry
corrosion experts who would use performance metrics to evaluate proposed
and ongoing projects against approved goals and objectives. However, the
panels were never established and the metrics

were not implemented. Army corrosion control officials told us that they
have very little performance data, such as return on investment or annual
savings, for any of their corrosion control initiatives. Officials at the
Army Center for Economic Analysis told us they have not measured
performance for the purpose of determining the return on investment

for any corrosion control project for many years; the last performance
evaluation was carried out in 1997.

 In 1998, the Air Force published a business plan for equipment corrosion
control, but the plan was implemented for a short time and did not contain
all of the elements of a strategic plan. For example, it identified three
management goals, 19 but did not include performance measures. Also, the
Air Force Equipment Maintenance Instruction that identifies
responsibilities for the Air Force Corrosion Prevention and Control Office
does not identify goals or performance measures. Although an Air Force
Instruction on Performance Management states that performance

17 Performance measures can include such data as return on investment,
frequency of required corrosion maintenance, equipment availability,
readiness rates, and mean time between failures.

18 The plan included three main objectives: decrease life- cycle costs by
40 percent, increase readiness by reducing downtime, and reduce the
maintenance burden on diminishing active and reserve workforce resources.
19 The goals are as follows: (1) identify, advance and apply emerging
materials and processes to existing and future weapon systems; (2)
identify current corrosion traits of weapon systems and logistics
processes, and (3) maintain data and technical manuals related to
corrosion control and provide expert consultation and technical support to
field and depot activities.

management, including goals and performance measures, is the Air Force*s
framework for a continual improvement system, officials told us that the
business plan was no longer being used. They said that, in the past, there
has been more emphasis on creating goals and monitoring performance, but
because of limited resources, reductions in personnel, and increased
optempo these activities are

no longer performed.  The Navy commands (Naval Air Systems Command and
Naval Sea

Systems Command) have engaged in some strategic planning for corrosion
control, but the Navy does not have a servicewide strategic plan in this
area, and its corrosion control offices lack the information and metrics
needed to track progress. The Naval Air Systems Command

planned to establish a corrosion control and prevention office but the
plan* which included goals and objectives and outlined how progress would
be measured* was never approved. The corrosion control and prevention
activity at Naval Sea Systems Command is also not a formal program, and it
lacks clearly defined overall goals and objectives. This office has
identified cost avoidance projects and tracks the amount of savings
achieved to date. However, more could be done to monitor performance. For
example, there was no analysis of the reasons why specific projects were
proceeding at a slow pace. Without this information, the office is not in
a position to know what actions can be taken to improve the effectiveness
of these projects.

 The Marine Corps has a corrosion control plan that includes long- term,
broadly stated goals but does not include measurable, outcome- oriented
objectives or performance measures. Marine Corps officials told us that
they are in the process of revising the plan to include measures that will
track progress toward achieving servicewide goals.

Corrosion control officials said they measure progress through a
combination of field surveys, special corrosion assessments, and
Integrated Product Teams. 20 They also rely on the evaluations of
operational and installation commands and program offices but readily
acknowledge that this is not sufficient. They told us that they would
prefer

20 Integrated Product Teams are comprised of individuals representing a
variety of competencies or disciplines such as material science, system
engineering, logistics, and environmental management. These teams are
assembled to take a multidisciplinary approach to finding solutions to
routine and nonroutine maintenance and acquisition problems.

to have more systematic performance measures and that these tools would
improve the success of individual projects and the corrosion effort as a
whole.

Limited Coordination Within DOD has multiple corrosion control efforts*
with different policies,

and Among the Services procedures, and funding channels* that are not well
coordinated with each other; as a result, opportunities for cost savings
have been lost. DOD is in

the process of establishing a central corrosion control office in response
to the authorization act, but no single office exists within each of the
military services to provide leadership and oversight for corrosion
control of equipment and infrastructure. Although the services have
attempted to establish central corrosion control offices, the
responsibility largely falls on numerous commands, installations, and
program offices to fund and implement projects. Military officials told us
the offices were not fully established, primarily because of limited
funding. The Army, for example,

has established a central office for corrosion control of all service
equipment; the chain of command for the Army corrosion office for
facilities is separate from this office. Although a central office for
equipment exists, each Army command also has separate corrosion control
offices that are responsible for certain types of equipment* for example,
tanks/ automotive, aviation/ missiles, armaments, and electronics.
Further, individual weapon system program offices within each command may
have their own corrosion control functions. In addition, installations
implement

their own corrosion control projects with the assistance of the Army
Department of Public Works and the Army Corps of Engineers. The recently
established Army Installation Management Agency provides overall
management and funding for upkeep on Army installations.

The Navy and Air Force also have multiple corrosion prevention and
mitigation offices. The Navy manages them through the materials offices
within the Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Aviation Command. The Air
Force Materiel Command manages the Air Force*s efforts at an office
located at Robins Air Force Base. Like the Army, these commands have
multiple weapon systems program offices that also plan and implement
corrosion projects. The Navy and Air Force also have separate
organizations that are responsible for corrosion prevention and mitigation
efforts related to infrastructure. The Naval Facilities Engineering Center
at Port Hueneme, California, provides this service for both the Navy and
Marine Corps and, in turn, relies on the individual installations to
manage

and implement their own efforts. The Air Force Civil Engineering Support
Agency provides this service for the Air Force.

This fragmentation of corrosion prevention efforts minimizes coordination
and limits standardization within and among the services, as evidenced by
the following examples:

 A June 2000 corrosion assessment of the Army*s Pacific area of
operations concluded that no standard corrosion control program, policy,
or training exists for any Army commodity, which reduces the effectiveness
of the Army*s efforts to control corrosion on vehicles, tanks, and other
equipment.

 Even when the services are in a severely corrosive environment in which
they operate relatively near to one another, few formal mechanisms exist
to facilitate the exchange of corrosion information. For example, in
Hawaii Army officials for the Reserve and National

Guard and active units stated that they had limited knowledge of one
another*s corrosion control activities or the activities of other
services. Army officials told us they cannot afford to miss an opportunity
to use the latest corrosion control products and practices, and it would
be unfortunate to be deprived of any advances, especially if they are
available and being used elsewhere. In addition, Air Force facilities

officials in Hawaii told us that they are not aware of any formal process
for sharing corrosion prevention and control information with other
services.  Officials at Marine Corps Air Facility Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, an
area of

high humidity and salt, told us that temporary shelters can be a very
cost- effective way to reduce the corrosion of equipment such as vehicles,
transformers, and aviation ground equipment that are currently stored
outside because of limited space. (See fig. 8.)

Figure 8: K- Span Shelter at Army Reserve Unit Fort Shafter, Hawaii

Source: GAO.

These officials were unable to acquire the shelters because they did not
have the time or resources to undertake the analysis necessary to support
the purchase. They were aware that temporary shelters are being used at
other Marine Corps and Army installations, but they did not know how the
installations acquired the shelters or justified their purchase. The
officials suggested a standard mechanism for gathering and communicating
the information necessary to justify purchase of the shelters.

 The Air Force conducted a series of multiyear studies that found that
using inexpensive corrosion- inhibiting lubricants on aircraft electrical
connectors has the potential to save hundreds of millions of dollars
annually. (See fig. 9.)

Figure 9: Corroded Connectors on Air Force F- 16 Main Fuel Shutoff Valve

Source: U. S. Air Force.

Air Force officials estimate that using corrosion- inhibiting lubricants
could save more than $500 million annually on the F- 16 fleet alone.
Although the use of these lubricants is recommended in a joint technical
manual on avionics corrosion control, 21 their use is not required. The
Air Force and Navy have developed different product specifications for the
lubricants. The Navy*s specification covers the lubricants* use on both
metal surfaces and electrical connectors, and more than a dozen products
have qualified for use under the

specification. However, Air Force studies determined that while some of
the products work well on electrical connectors, others are detrimental.
As a result, the Air Force created a new specification for lubricant use,
limiting it to electrical connectors. Air Force officials want the Navy to
modify its specification so that only the appropriate products can
qualify; otherwise, Air Force officials believe, those who refer to the
joint manual containing both specifications could order a product
detrimental to electronic systems. An Air Force contractor has drafted
specification revisions for the Navy, but due to differing requirements
and changes of personnel, the Navy has apparently

decided to conduct further studies before revising its specifications.
According to Air Force officials, these and other difficulties in
coordinating with the Navy have prompted the Air Force to consider
withdrawing from participation with the Navy in joint service manuals on
corrosion control of aircraft and avionics.

 Army National Guard officials in Hawaii told us that they were not aware
of the status of the Army*s nearby corrosion inhibitor application center.
(See fig. 10.) The facility currently has the capacity to apply corrosion
inhibitors to about 6,000 vehicles per year. National Guard officials told
us that they often store vehicles for long periods of time, and corrosion
is always a problem. They indicated interest in finding out more about the
Army*s facility and any opportunities for participating with the Army if
the corrosion inhibitors can reduce corrosion cost effectively.

21 Technical Manual Organizational/ Unit and Intermediate Maintenance,
Avionics Cleaning and Corrosion Control, NAVAIR 16- 1- 540, Air Force TO-
1- 1- 689, Army TM- 1- 1500- 343- 23; September 1, 2000.

Figure 10: Corrosion Inhibitor Application Facility at Army*s Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii

Source: GAO.

The services have created some valuable mechanisms, including special
working groups 22 and annual corrosion conferences, which make important
contributions to corrosion prevention efforts and help facilitate intra-
and inter- service coordination. However, these mechanisms do not
represent a systematic approach to coordination. The effectiveness of
these mechanisms is often dependent on the individual initiative of those
who participate directly, as well as on the funds available to initiate
corrosion- related activities. For example, each of the services hosts an
annual corrosion conference, but individuals attend only to the extent
that

available time and travel funds allow. Furthermore, the dissemination of
conference information relies to a large extent on attendees taking the
initiative to use the information or communicate it to others. Limited
follow- up is carried out to determine the extent to which this
information

22 Special working groups* within and across the services* have been
established, such as the Joint Council for Aging Aircraft, Air Force
Corrosion Prevention and Advisory Boards, and various Science and
Technology Advisor programs. DOD has also established working groups such
as the Maintenance Technology Senior Steering Group, Joint Technology
Exchange Group, and the Joint Logistics Commanders to share information on
acquisition and maintenance issues, including corrosion control.

is used in new applications. Several of the officers acting as corrosion
coordinators in Hawaii indicated that their commands were often unable to
allow them the time or travel funds to attend corrosion conferences.

They added that some, but not all, of the conference papers and briefings
were available to them.

Conflicting Incentives and Because of the differing priorities between
short- term operational needs

Priorities Limit Corrosion and long- term preventative maintenance needs,
corrosion projects are

Project Implementation often given a low priority.

Corrosion control offices act largely in an advisory role, providing
guidance, information, and expertise on initiatives and practices. They
have limited funding and authority, and they promote initiatives with
benefits that may not become apparent until a project is far along in its
implementation, which may be years in the future. These priorities and
incentives are very different from and sometimes conflict with those held
by the operational or installation commands and their subordinate units.
While these commands also strive for better corrosion prevention, they
place a greater emphasis on more immediate, short- term needs that are
directly tied to current operations.

Because the corrosion control offices generally receive only limited
start- up funding for corrosion prevention projects, they must rely
heavily on operational commands and other program offices to provide the
necessary resources and implementation. However, these commands often have
limited resources beyond those needed to carry out their immediate mission
objectives, and the military services have not established sufficient
incentives for the commands (which have the approval and funding
authority) to invest in the long- term, cumulative

benefits of corrosion prevention and control efforts. As a result, many
proposed corrosion control projects* even those with large cost saving
potential and other benefits, such as increased readiness and enhanced
safety* often remain underfunded because they are a low priority to the
commands compared to operational and repair projects that offer more
immediate results.

These conflicting incentives and priorities are demonstrated by the fact
that the services have sacrificed the condition of their facilities and
infrastructure by using base maintenance accounts, including funds for
corrosion prevention and control, to pay for training and combat
operations. We were told at many of the bases we visited that the problem

with maintaining the infrastructure was that base commanders siphon off
infrastructure maintenance and repair funds for other operational
priorities. For example, at Fort Irwin we were told that only 40 percent
of infrastructure requirements were funded and that most preventative
maintenance is deferred. Officials at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton
said that they have an infrastructure maintenance backlog totaling over
$193 million and many of the projects are to repair facilities that have
deteriorated due to corrosion. The backlog is not limited to this
location, as the Navy reports an infrastructure backlog of $2 billion
Navy- wide. Navy officials said they do not have accurate data but
estimate that a large percentage of the deferred maintenance is corrosion
related. Hickam Air Force Base facilities officials also told us that they
often have to defer or reduce corrosion prevention projects because the
base continually needs funds for higher priorities, usually those
associated with operations. At the same time, the Army, in its 2002 Annual
Report

to Congress, stated that it cannot continue to fully fund its Combat Arms
Training Strategy without further degrading its infrastructure and related
activities. The Army recently established a new agency that centralizes
all installation management activities to ensure that maintenance dollars,
including those for corrosion control, are disbursed equitably and
efficiently across installations. Officials of the new Installation
Management Agency said that the goal of centralization is to halt the
trend of major commands transferring funding from infrastructure
maintenance accounts to pay for other operations.

The Navy*s corrosion projects are similarly affected by a tendency to
postpone maintenance projects to address more immediate demands. For
example, the Navy*s efforts to reduce corrosion on more than 11, 700 tanks
on Navy ships are very time- consuming and expensive. (See app. II for
more details of this case study.) To reduce costs, the Navy developed
advanced coatings that are intended to last much longer, require less
maintenance, and result in net savings of over $170 million annually.

As of the end of fiscal year 2002, the Navy has only been able to install
the new coatings on about 750 tanks, or less than 7 percent. Navy
officials attribute the slow pace to the fact that shipyards place a
higher priority on maintenance that requires immediate attention. These
officials told us that the shipyards are hard- pressed to complete even
necessary repairs and have little incentive to undertake prevention
projects that will not show any benefits for many years.

Conflicting priorities are also evidenced by Navy and Marine Corps efforts
to prevent the corrosion of underground pipelines. Navy officials informed
us that pipeline corrosion is one of their major facilities maintenance
concerns. According to these officials, many pipelines at multiple Navy
installations are several decades old and made of metal that is highly
susceptible to corrosion. (See fig. 11.)

Figure 11: Corrosion on High Temperature Pipelines at Air Force Tracking
Facility Antigua, West Indies

Source: U. S. Air Force.

Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center officials told us that they do
not have accurate data, but they estimate that several million dollars are
being spent each year to fix leaks and ruptures that result from
corrosion. They further stated that they could save significant
maintenance costs if

they were to aggressively start replacing existing pipelines with
pipelines made of high- density polyethylene plastic and other nonmetallic
material that is much more corrosion resistant. Naval facilities officials
said that while this replacement project would be a big money- saver in
the long run, the strategy would require a substantial investment, and
they need to place

a higher priority on fixing more immediate problems that disrupt or impair
current operations. The Marine Corps is faced with similar conflicting
pressures. At Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, officials told us that
they have old and decaying pipelines and valves throughout the
installation. To save significant repair costs, they would prefer to
replace them with pipelines and valves made of high- density polyethylene
plastic as quickly as possible. (See fig. 12.)

Figure 12: Corroded Air- Conditioning Valves at Quantico Marine Corps
Base, Virginia

Source: GAO.

However, the process is labor- intensive and, therefore, very expensive.
They said that as a rule they must attend to more immediate problems, and
only when resources permit are they able to invest in projects that have
more long- term benefits.

Conclusion At present, DOD and the military services do not systematically
assess proposals for corrosion control projects, related implementation
issues,

or the results of implemented projects, and they disseminate project
results on a limited, ad hoc basis. Without a more systematic approach to
corrosion problems, prevention efforts that have a high return on
investment potential will likely continue to be underresourced and

continue to proceed at a slow pace. As a result, DOD and the military
services will continue to expend several billion dollars annually in

avoidable costs and continue to incur a significant number of avoidable
readiness and safety problems. Since corrosion that is left unmitigated
only worsens with time, costs will likely increase as weapon systems and
infrastructures age. Perhaps this is why the adage *pay now or pay more
later* so appropriately describes the dilemma with which the military
services are repeatedly confronted when making difficult investment
decisions. The military services will continue to pay dearly for their
limited corrosion prevention efforts and will be increasingly challenged
to find the funds for ongoing operations, maintenance, and new systems
acquisitions.

Recommendations for In an effort to improve current military approaches to
corrosion control,

Executive Action the Bob Stump Defense Authorization Act of 2003 requires
the department

to develop and implement a long- term strategy to mitigate the effects of
corrosion in military equipment and infrastructure. If properly crafted,
this strategy can become an important means of managing corrosion control

efforts and addressing the problems and limitations of these efforts as
described in this report.

To craft an effective strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct that the department*s strategic plan for corrosion prevention and
mitigation include the following:

 develop standardized methodologies for collecting and analyzing
corrosion cost, readiness, and safety data;

 develop clearly defined goals, outcome- oriented objectives, and
performance measures that show progress toward achieving objectives (these
measures should include such elements as the expected return on investment
and realized net savings of prevention projects);

 identify the level of resources needed to accomplish goals and
objectives;

 establish mechanisms to coordinate and oversee prevention and mitigation
projects in an interservice and servicewide context.

To provide greater assurances that the department*s strategic plan will be
successfully implemented, we recommend that the secretaries of each of the
services

* develop servicewide strategic plans that are consistent with the goals,
objectives, and measures in the departmentwide plan and  establish
procedures and milestones to hold major commands and

program offices that manage specific weapon systems and facilities
accountable for achieving the strategic goals.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred
with our recommendations. The comments are included in this report in

appendix III. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate. In its technical comments, DOD did not concur
with our finding that the department does not have an effective approach
to prevent and mitigate corrosion. DOD noted that the department develops
and incorporates prevention and mitigation strategies appropriate to DOD*s
national defense mission within various constraints associated with
operational needs, affordable maintenance schedules, environmental
regulations, and other statutory requirements. DOD noted that corrosion is
one of many issues that must be managed and incorporated into an overall
defense mission. DOD also noted that it continually endeavors to improve
its ability to manage corrosion through

advanced research, upgrading of systems and facilities, application of new
materials, processes and products and continuous information sharing. Our
report recognizes and mentions DOD's efforts and successes with corrosion
mitigation. However, we believe that DOD lacks an effective approach to
deal with corrosion since it lacks an overall strategy, has limited
coordination within and among the services, and conflicting incentives and
priorities. As we noted in our report, the current DOD approach has led to
readiness and safety issues as well as billions of dollars of corrosion-
related maintenance costs for DOD and the services annually.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

Please contact me on (202) 512- 8365 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were
Allan Roberts, Allen Westheimer, Dorian Dunbar, Sarah Prehoda, Sandra
Sokol, and

Susan Woodward. William M. Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and
Management

Appendi Appendi xes I x Scope and Methodology Our study focused on how the
military services implement and manage corrosion prevention and control
efforts for both equipment and infrastructure. To perform our review, we
contacted corrosion control offices and officials in each of the four
military services. We also reviewed studies and discussed military
corrosion issues with experts within and outside the Department of Defense
(DOD). To develop an in- depth understanding of how corrosion prevention
projects are initiated and managed, we visited field installations and
developed case studies on corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts. We
also contacted and obtained information from DOD, services headquarters,
materiel

management, research and development, logistics, systems acquisitions,
safety, and installation management and maintenance organizations.

To determine the extent of the military services* corrosion problems, we
reviewed numerous studies and contacted experts in both government and
private industry. We contacted and obtained information from DOD, military
service headquarters, strategic planning, research and development,
systems acquisitions, materiel management, logistics, safety, and
installation management and maintenance organizations. We also attended
the U. S. Navy and Industry Rust 2002 Corrosion Technology and Exchange
Conference, and we reviewed papers and presentations of other service and
private industry corrosion conferences and forums. In addition, we
contacted private industry suppliers, consultants, and research
organizations. We contacted the following research organizations to obtain
information regarding the extent of military service corrosion problems:

 National Research Council  National Materials Advisory Board  NCI
Information Systems, Inc.  CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc.  American
Power Jet Company  Science Applications International Corporation 
Battelle Laboratories  Calibre Systems, Inc.

 Sandia National Laboratories  Metals Information Analysis Center 
Center for Army Analysis  Joint Council on Aging Aircraft  Services
Command Corrosion Assessments and Surveys  Services Corrosion Prevention
and Advisory Boards  Services Science and Technology Advisor Programs 
Services Corrosion Conferences and Forums To determine the extent to which
DOD and the military services have an effective approach to corrosion
control, we interviewed officials and obtained documentation from the four
military services* corrosion

control program offices for equipment and infrastructure. For equipment,
these included the Army Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, the Air
Force Corrosion Prevention and Control Office, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA
Corrosion Prevention and Control Programs, and the Marine Corps Corrosion
and Prevention Program. For infrastructure we

contacted the Army Corps of Engineers and Department of Public Works, the
Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, and the Naval Facilities
Engineering Service Center Command. We also contacted and obtained
information from DOD, service headquarters, strategic planning, materiel
command, and field command officials. We reviewed corrosion prevention and
control plans, policies, procedures, instructions, regulations, studies,
trip reports, memos, and other forms of documentation. We also visited
selected military bases, where we held discussions with unit commanders,
facilities engineering and maintenance officials, and users of DOD
equipment such as aircraft, ships, tanks, trucks, and support equipment,
including discussions with operators, logistics, and maintenance

personnel. We interviewed officials and gathered data at the following
installations in California and Hawaii:

California  Fort Irwin Army Base  Los Angeles Air Force Base  March Air
Force Reserve Base  North Island Naval Air Station  Point Mugu Naval Air
Station  Port Hueneme Naval Base  Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton 
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar

Hawaii  Fort Shafter Army Base  Schofield Barracks Army Base  Wheeler
Army Air Field  Diamond Head Complex, Hawaii Army National Guard  Pearl
City Unit Training and Equipment Site, Hawaii Army

National Guard  Hickam Air Force Base  Pearl Harbor Naval Complex 
Lualualei Naval Magazine  Marine Corps Air Facility Kaneohe Bay  Marine
Corps Camp H. M. Smith We conducted our review from August 2002 through
April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts

Appendi I I x That Have Not Realized Their Full Potential Durable Coatings
for The Navy has over 11, 700 tanks, such as ballast, fuel, and potable
water Tanks on Navy Ships

tanks, on all of its surface vessels and submarines. Because of their
constant exposure to salt and moisture, these tanks rapidly lose their
exterior and interior protective coatings and begin to corrode. Although
maintenance personnel spend considerable time and resources removing as
much of the visible corrosion as possible and repainting while the ship is
deployed, some of the work cannot be accomplished until the ship returns
to its home port and undergoes scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.
Maintaining the tanks is labor intensive, costly, and extends the amount
of

time ships must spend undergoing maintenance, thereby reducing their
operational availability. Naval Sea Systems Command has developed coating
systems that are expected to last 20 years instead of the 5 years that
existing coatings last. According to the Navy, the effort could
potentially save more than $170 million a year in maintenance costs. The
initiative appears to be somewhat successful, because the Navy reports
that it has achieved net savings of about $10 million a year. However, in
the past several years, the Navy has installed the new coatings on only
about 750 tanks, or less than 7 percent of the total. Navy officials
attribute the slow pace to the fleet placing higher priorities on other
needs, and explained that they often must defer the installation of the
new coatings because of the limited availability of ships due to increased
optempo and

more pressing maintenance requirements. Navy officials added that because
of higher operational and maintenance priorities, resources in the form of
funding and manpower usually go to these needs instead of prevention
efforts such as tank coatings. These officials told us that the

shipyards that perform most of the maintenance for the fleet have
difficulty trying to complete the work currently scheduled with available
resources and would be further challenged by having to add the application
of new coatings to their existing workload. In addition, the officials
told us that there is limited incentive for shipyard maintenance workers
to carry out preventive projects that show benefits only in later years
instead of completing more immediate repairs that show more immediate
benefits.

Army National The Army National Guard maintains a wide range of equipment
that

Guard Controlled includes M1 tanks, howitzers, air defense artillery
systems, and radars.

This equipment is susceptible to corrosion, and one of the primary causes
Humidity Preservation

of corrosion is humidity. The Army National Guard estimates it could
achieve cost savings totaling more than $1.6 billion over 10 years by
storing its equipment in short- and long- term controlled- humidity
preservation centers. Depending on the type of equipment, some will be

stored in long- term facilities and some will be stored for the short-
term. Equipment that is not required for regular training use will be
preserved in metal shelters for an average of 3 years, while equipment for
which there is a recurring need will be preserved by installing
dehumidifying air ducts in

crew compartments and other vehicle spaces. The project, which started in
1997, is expected to have a return on investment of over 9 to 1. According
to Army National Guard officials, through the end of fiscal year 2002, the
project has achieved a total of $225 million in cost savings. While Army

officials state that the project has proven to be a success so far, they
now estimate that it will take about 15 years to accomplish the total
projected savings, or 5 years longer than originally planned. They
attribute the delay to other needs being given a higher priority and, as a
result, not receiving the necessary funds and having to defer the
installation of some controlled- humidity centers. These officials still
expect to acquire and install all of the facilities, but at a slower pace.
They acknowledge

that the delay will likely mean deferring a significant amount of cost
savings* perhaps as much as $100 million* for several years.

Fly Ash in Concrete airfield pavements for all of the military services
have

Concrete Airfields experienced cracking and expansion that pose
significant safety hazards,

impair readiness, and increase maintenance costs. One of the causes of
this deterioration results from a corrosive chemical reaction called
alkali- silica reaction, which occurs when alkalis react with water in
ways that cause cracking, chipping, and expansion of concrete. Examples of
this kind of damage have been reported at facilities for all military
services, such as Osan Air Base, Korea; Ft. Campbell Army Airfield,
Kentucky; Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California; and Marine Corps Air
Station, Iwakuni, Japan. The foreign object debris hazard caused by
cracking and crumbling concrete was so severe that the Air Mobility
Command assessed a taxiway at Little Rock Air Force Base as unsuitable for
use. While the military services do not have cost estimates, DOD
facilities officials told us that significant resources are spent each
year on mitigating the effects of alkali- silica reaction.

The Navy determined that one way to mitigate the effects of alkali- silica
reaction in the future is to substitute fly ash for a certain amount of
cement. According to a Navy study, the use of fly ash increases the
strength and

durability of cement structures such as airfields. Navy officials told us
that this mitigation would increase the operational availability of
airfields because the facilities would experience less cracking and
chipping and, therefore, pose fewer foreign object debris hazards. While
the Navy did not

perform the analysis, these officials told us that perhaps the greatest
benefit would be the savings that would result from a marked reduction in
manpower needed for maintenance. The study did not include cost savings or
a return on investment analysis because its focus was on the causes of and
methods for mitigating the deterioration. The study did note that fly ash
substitution could save the Navy about $4 million a year in construction
costs because the material is less expensive than the kinds of cement
currently being used. Navy officials told us that their understanding of
the overall benefits is convincing enough that the use of fly ash is
required for all Navy and Marine Corps construction projects that include
pavements.

The Air Force recommends the use of fly ash, but only in certain
circumstances. Air Force officials told us that requiring the use of fly
ash for all construction projects is not feasible because fly ash is not
available at all locations where the Air Force has facilities, and the
additional cost and time involved in transporting the material to these
places may be greater than the benefits from using it. However, Air Force
officials acknowledge that they have not done a return- on- investment
analysis that includes construction and maintenance costs, and additional
information like this would be very useful in making decisions regarding
the use of fly ash.

The services continue to study the effects of alkali- silica reaction and
what to do about them. However, due to limited funding, efforts to
identify feasible comprehensive solutions to the entire problem for all
military services have been delayed. In the meantime, airfields continue
to decay, resulting in high maintenance costs as well as restricted use.

Army Corrosion Corrosion damage to tactical wheeled vehicles and ground
equipment is

Inhibitors costly and prolongs equipment downtime. According to officials
of the

Army Materiel Command, seawater that seeps into the inner cavities of
equipment that is being transported overseas causes serious corrosion
damage and represents the highest risk to the command. The equipment then
decays rapidly in humid environments.

This kind of corrosion damage was so extensive that in 1998 the Commanding
General U. S. Army Pacific requested that all ground vehicles shipped to
his command be treated with rust inhibitors. Army data indicated that 17
percent of the Army trucks in Hawaii were so corroded that performance of
their missions was impaired. In 1999, the

Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii indicated that
unit readiness was in serious jeopardy and requested funding for several
corrosion control projects, including one to treat an estimated 3,000
remaining vehicles with corrosion inhibitors. Army testing had
demonstrated that corrosion inhibitors, compared to other products,
provided a high degree of corrosion protection and enough
corrosionreducing

potential to warrant beginning their limited use. Initial estimates
indicated a return on investment of 4 to 1 for every dollar spent.

In 2000, the Army awarded a contract for approximately $400,000 to treat
3,000 vehicles over a period of 12 months. The contract was later doubled,
increasing costs to nearly $900, 000 for 6,000 vehicles over a period of
24 months. Army officials plan to analyze the information obtained on the
performance of the product before deciding whether to continue using it or
expand the effort to other locations. The Army has over 341,000 tactical
vehicles and pieces of ground support equipment worldwide, as well as 3,
770 airframes, and a significant amount of this equipment is exposed to
harsh, corrosion- inducing environments.

The Army originally planned to establish an all- purpose, full service
corrosion control center to repair corrosion damage, as well as provide
preventative corrosion- inhibitor treatments. The center, which would have
had multiple service bays and wash racks would have processed more than
15, 000 vehicles per year, was to have been used by all the military
services in Hawaii. However, the center is currently only being used by
the Army as a corrosion- inhibitor application facility. 1 In addition, a
lack of coordination

exists within the individual services. For example, at an Army National
Guard facility in Hawaii officials told us that they were not aware of the
status of the Army*s corrosion- inhibitor application facility but that
they would be interested in finding out more about it, the application of
corrosion inhibitors, and participating in the project.

Air Force Bomb The Air Force stores about 450,000 cast iron general-
purpose bombs

Metalization in locations throughout the world. The bombs are estimated to
have

a replacement cost exceeding $1 billion. Many of the locations are in
high- humidity environments that contribute to corrosion. As of February
2003, more than 107,000 of these bombs, or 24 percent,

1 The services could not reach agreement on location, funding, and
standard application procedures.

have been assessed as being no longer mission capable because of excessive
corrosion. The Air Force acquires new bombs and repairs existing ones so
that it will have enough mission- capable bombs to meet its requirements.
The Air Force spends about $7 million a year for corrosion protection of
cast iron general- purpose bombs. Until 1996, all the bombs were renovated
by maintenance personnel who removed any signs of corrosion and recoated
them with liquid paint. The bombs would undergo this labor- intensive
process every 3 to 8 years. In 1996, the Air Force converted a bomb
renovation plant at Kadena Air Base, Japan, from a

facility that used liquid paint to one that used a metal wire arc spray
technique that is otherwise known as metalization. The plant conversion
cost about $3 million. A metal wire arc spray coating is expected to

preserve cast iron bombs for 30 years, or about 25 years longer than
liquid paint. By using this preservation method, the Air Force estimates
saving maintenance costs of $30 to $100 million over 30 years, resulting
in a return on investment ratio of 20 to 1. The plant successfully
renovated about 8,000 bombs. Based on previous successes, the Air Force
decided to acquire and install mobile versions of the Kadena unit in other
locations. In 2000, a prototype of the Mobile Bomb Renovation System was
acquired and installed at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, at a cost of
about

$2 million. About 500 bombs received the metal arc spray coating at Guam
before the system experienced equipment failures. To date, the system
remains inoperable. The Army has also refurbished and metalized about 6,
500 bombs for the Air Force.

Air Force studies show that although the metal arch spray coating process
is more expensive than the use of liquid paint, it greatly minimizes the
risk that bombs will need costly maintenance or deteriorate so severely
that

they will need replacing. Despite these benefits, about 3 percent of Air
Force bombs have been treated with this coating process. While Air Force
officials recommended that a much higher percentage of bombs receive this
treatment, they explained that their role is mostly advisory, and the Air
Force Material Command and Pacific Air Force Command together must
determine the relative importance of the project, given other competing
priorities.

F- 16 Aircraft Although not visible, the corrosion of connectors on
aircraft electronics

Corrosion Inhibitors equipment is prevalent throughout DOD and a
significant safety risk for

aircraft in all military services. The resources spent on this kind of
corrosion are so vast that it is estimated that the Air Force spends
perhaps as much as $500 million a year on corrosion control on the F- 16
fleet alone.

The costs are high because of the significant amount of labor that is
involved in locating and eliminating the often microscopic sources of
corrosion on very sophisticated avionics equipment. Avionics corrosion has
been a topic of major interest to the Air Force for several decades. This
concern was particularly heightened in 1989, when the Air Force reported

several F- 16 accidents caused by uncommanded fuel valve closures that
were believed to have been caused by corrosion.

For several decades, the Air Force has conducted extensive studies on the
corrosion of aircraft avionics connectors and what should be done about
it. In the 1990s, several studies recommended the use of certain
lubricants that have the potential of eliminating connector corrosion on
F- 16 aircraft, with estimated savings exceeding $500 million a year.
Although the Air Force did not complete a return on investment analysis,
the return would be very impressive, given the low cost of purchasing this
off- the- shelf product. The Air Force has yet to take full advantage of
these corrosioninhibiting lubricants, even though they appear to be widely
available. While the use of such lubricants is recommended in the joint
service technical manual on avionics corrosion control, it is not
required. We were told that the Air Force would need to amend in detail
more than 200 specific technical orders and job guides to require the use
of lubricant to protect F- 16 aircraft electrical connectors, but progress
in this area has been sluggish at best. 2 For every year that the Air
Force does not require the use of the lubricants, the service loses the
opportunity to avoid annual expenses that total hundreds of millions of
dollars.

Army Helicopter Conflicting incentives also impeded the Army*s efforts to
obtain modern

Rinse Facilities helicopter rinse facilities called *birdbaths.* According
to the Army

Aviation Corrosion Prevention and Control office, these facilities are
expected to extend the life of costly aircraft components, reduce
contractor man- hour expenditures, increase aircraft fleet readiness, and
provide an added margin of crew safety. The project is estimated to cost
$12 million for startup and $400 thousand per year in operating costs.
Even more notable was the analysis showing a 31 to 1 return on investment,
with the investment costs recouped within 2 years. Citing opportunities to
implement and promote effective corrosion control, the

2 The F- 15 aircraft program has established a pilot program requiring use
of corrosion inhibiting lubricants on electrical connectors during
flightline depot maintenance by simply mandating the recommended use as
stated in the joint service avionics technical manual.

Army recommended identification of locations and deployment areas for
establishing birdbath rinse facilities. Despite the potential benefits,
the project has not received funding to date. Army officials told us that
the project cannot compete with efforts that have a higher priority, and
they have deferred the request for funds until fiscal year 2005. The
Army*s attempt to obtain funding for a birdbath facility in Hawaii
suffered the

same fate. During our field visit to Hawaii, we were told that for a
number of years a birdbath facility was included in a list of projects
that required funding, but the facility never received the funds because
other operational needs were considered to have a higher priority. Army
officials said that funding more pressing operational needs almost always
takes precedence over funding projects that have a strong potential to
avoid future

maintenance costs.

Appendi I I I x Comments from the Department of Defense (350219)

a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the
limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services,
current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion
has a substantial impact on military equipment and infrastructure. In
2001, a government- sponsored study estimated the costs of corrosion for
military systems and infrastructure at about $20 billion annually and
found corrosion to be one of the largest components of life- cycle costs
for weapon systems. Corrosion also reduces readiness because the need to
repair or replace corrosion damage increases the downtime of critical
military assets. For example, a recent study concluded that corrective
maintenance of corrosionrelated faults has degraded the readiness of all
of the Army*s approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters.
Finally, a number of serious safety concerns have also been associated
with corrosion, including Navy F- 14 and F- 18 landing gear failures
during carrier operations and crashes of several Air Force F- 16 aircraft
due to the corrosion of electrical contacts that

control fuel valves. DOD and the military services do not have an
effective approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion. They have had some
successes in addressing corrosion problems on individual programs, but
several weaknesses are preventing DOD and the military services from
achieving much greater benefits, including potentially billions of dollars
in additional net savings annually. Each service has multiple corrosion
offices, and their different policies, procedures, and funding channels
limit coordination. Also, the goals and incentives that guide these
offices sometimes conflict with those of the operational commands that
they rely on to fund project implementation. As a result, proposed
projects are often assigned a lower priority compared to efforts offering
more immediate results. Together, these problems reduce the effectiveness
of DOD corrosion prevention. While DOD is in the process of establishing a
central corrosion control activity and strategy, it remains to be seen
whether these efforts will effectively address these weaknesses. Examples
of Corrosion Damage in the South Pacific

Left: Corroded 500- pound bombs, Guam. Right: Corroding bridge column,
Pearl Harbor.

The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and infrastructure
worth billions of dollars in many environments where corrosion is causing
military assets to deteriorate, shortening their useful life. The
resulting

increase in required repairs and replacements drives up costs and takes
critical systems out of action, reducing mission readiness.

GAO was asked to review military activities related to corrosion control.
Specifically, this report examines the extent of the impact of corrosion
on DOD and the

military services and the extent of the effectiveness of DOD*s and the
services* approach to preventing and mitigating corrosion. The
departmentwide strategic plan currently being developed should contain
clearly defined goals; measurable, outcome- oriented objectives; and
performance

measures. The strategy should also identify standardized methods for
evaluating project proposals, estimating resource needs, and coordinating
projects in an interservice and servicewide

context. The military services should develop overarching strategic plans
consistent with the departmentwide plan. In written comments, DOD agreed
with all of these recommendations.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 753. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact William Solis at (202) 512- 8365 or solisw@ gao. gov.
Highlights of GAO- 03- 753, a report to

Congressional Committees

July 2003

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase Readiness

Page i GAO- 03- 753 Defense Management

Contents

Contents

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Appendix I

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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Appendix II

Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
Realized Their Full Potential

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Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
Realized Their Full Potential

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Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
Realized Their Full Potential

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Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
Realized Their Full Potential

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Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
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Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
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Appendix III

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