    Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and
    Increase Readiness (07-JUL-03, GAO-03-753).

    The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and
    infrastructure worth billions of dollars in many environments
    where corrosion is causing military assets to deteriorate,
    shortening their useful life. The resulting increase in required
    repairs and replacements drives up costs and takes critical
    systems out of action, reducing mission readiness. GAO was asked
    to review military activities related to corrosion control.
    Specifically, this report examines the extent of the impact of
    corrosion on DOD and the military services and the extent of the
    effectiveness of DOD's and the services' approach to preventing
    and mitigating corrosion.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-753
        ACCNO:   A07365
      TITLE:     Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion
    Costs and Increase Readiness
         DATE:   07/07/2003
      SUBJECT:   Equipment maintenance
    	     Military budgets
    	     Military cost control
    	     Military materiel
    	     Combat readiness
    	     F-14 Aircraft
    	     F-18 Aircraft
    	     F-16 Aircraft
    	     Hornet Aircraft
    	     Tomcat Aircraft

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    GAO-03-753

                                           A

    Report to Congressional Committees

    July 2003 DEFENSE MANAGEMENT Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and
    Increase Readiness

    GAO- 03- 753

    Letter 1 Results in Brief 3 Background 4 Impacts on Military Costs,
    Readiness, and Safety Indicate That

    Corrosion Is an Extensive Problem 6 DOD and Services* Approach to
    Corrosion Control Is Not Effective

    but Has Achieved Some Successes 21 Conclusion 38 Recommendations for
    Executive Action 39 Agency Comments 40

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42

    Appendix II: Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
    Realized Their Full Potential 45

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 52 Figures Figure 1:
    Corrosion on Army 5- Ton Truck in Hawaii 8

    Figure 2: Corroding Bridge Columns at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 9
    Figure 3: Corrosion on Army UH- 60L Black Hawk Helicopter 11 Figure 4:
    Corroded 500- Pound Bombs at Andersen Air Force Base,

    Guam 14 Figure 5: Cracked Runway at Point Mugu Naval Air Station,

    California 17 Figure 6: Marine Corps Helicopter Rinsing Facility Kaneohe
    Bay, Hawaii 20

    Figure 7: Army National Guard Controlled Humidity Preservation 23 Figure
    8: K- Span Shelter at Army Reserve Unit Fort Shafter, Hawaii 29 Figure 9:
    Corroded Connectors on Air Force F- 16 Main Fuel

    Shutoff Valve 30 Figure 10: Corrosion Inhibitor Application Facility at
    Army*s Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 32

    Figure 11: Corrosion on High Temperature Pipelines at Air Force Tracking
    Facility Antigua, West Indies 36 Figure 12: Corroded Air- Conditioning
    Valves at Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia 38

    Abbreviations

    ASPRCS Aviation Systems Performance Readiness and Corrosion Study DOD
    Department of Defense GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
    HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

    This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
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    separately.

    July 7, 2003 Let er t The Honorable John Ensign Chairman The Honorable
    Daniel Akaka Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Readiness and
    Management Support Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

    The Honorable Joel Hefley Chairman The Honorable Solomon Ortiz Ranking
    Minority Member Subcommittee on Readiness Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains
    equipment and infrastructure worth billions of dollars in many
    environments where corrosion, in one form or another, is causing military
    assets to deteriorate, shortening their useful lives. The resulting
    increase in needed repairs and replacements drives up costs and takes
    critical systems out of action, reducing mission readiness. 1 Corrosion
    can also create severe safety hazards leading to loss

    of life when, for example, corroded electrical contacts in aircraft cause
    system failures during flight. Because numerous advances in products and
    technologies have been found to enhance efforts to prevent and mitigate
    corrosion, it is critical that DOD, as the steward of an enormous
    investment in military assets, ensure that all appropriate measures are
    implemented to reduce corrosion costs to the greatest extent possible.

    1 Readiness is generally defined as a measure of the Department of
    Defense*s ability to provide the capabilities needed to execute the
    mission specified in the National Military Strategy. At the unit level,
    readiness refers to the ability of units, such as Army divisions, Navy
    ships, and Air Force wings, to provide capabilities required of the
    combatant commands.

    The Congress, recognizing corrosion as a serious military concern, enacted
    legislation as part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2003 which requires DOD to designate a senior official or
    organization responsible for preventing and mitigating the corrosion of
    military equipment and infrastructure. 2 The act requires the designated
    official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts throughout the

    department, recommend policy guidance, and review the funding levels
    proposed by each military service. The Secretary of Defense is required to
    develop and implement a long- term strategy to reduce the effects of
    corrosion.

    You requested that we review military activities related to the prevention
    and mitigation of corrosion. In this report we address the following
    questions: (1) What is the extent of the impact of corrosion on the
    military services* equipment and facilities? (2) To what extent do DOD and
    the military services have an effective approach to prevent and mitigate
    corrosion?

    To respond to these questions, we reviewed numerous studies and discussed
    military corrosion impact issues with experts in and outside DOD. To
    examine DOD and the military services* approach to corrosion prevention
    and mitigation, we visited field installations and developed several case
    studies on specific corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts that are
    summarized in appendix II and referred to throughout the report. More
    detailed information about our scope and methodology is contained in
    appendix I.

    2 P. L. 107- 314, section 1067.

    Results in Brief Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be
    quantified due to the limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and
    the military

    services, data on current cost estimates, 3 readiness, and safety indicate
    that corrosion has a substantial impact on military equipment and
    infrastructure. For example, in 2001, a 2- year, government- sponsored
    study estimated the direct costs of corrosion for military systems and
    infrastructure at approximately $20 billion annually and found corrosion
    to be one of the largest components of life- cycle costs for military
    weapon systems. 4 Another study puts the cost at closer to $10 billion. 5
    Corrosion has also been shown to substantially increase equipment
    downtime, thereby reducing readiness. For example, a 2001 study concluded
    that corrective maintenance of corrosion- related faults has degraded the
    readiness of all of the Army*s approximately 2,450 force modernization
    helicopters; the Army estimated in 1998 that approximately $4 billion was
    spent on corrosion repair of helicopters alone. In 2001, DOD also reported
    that more than two thirds of its military facilities have serious
    deficiencies and are in such poor condition that they are unable to meet
    certain mission requirements; corrosion was identified as a major
    contributor to much of this deterioration. Finally, a number of safety
    concerns have also been associated with corrosion. During the 1980s, the
    crashes of several F- 16 aircraft were traced to corroded electrical
    contacts that caused uncommanded fuel valve closures. More recently, Navy
    F- 14 and F- 18

    aircraft have experienced landing gear failures (collapses) during carrier
    operations that were attributed to corrosion- related cracking.

    DOD and the military services do not have an effective approach to prevent
    and mitigate corrosion. While the military services have achieved some
    successes on individual corrosion prevention projects, their overall
    approach to corrosion control has significant weaknesses that have
    decreased the effectiveness of their efforts. For example, DOD does not
    have a strategic plan for corrosion prevention and mitigation, and the
    services have either not developed such plans or have not implemented
    them. While DOD is in the process of establishing a central corrosion 3
    Cost estimates were not audited.

    4 Koch, Gerhardus H. et al., Corrosion Cost and Prevention Strategies in
    the United States,

    CC Technologies and NACE International in cooperation with the U. S.
    Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Sept. 30,
    2001. 5 Corrosion in DOD Systems: Data Collection and Analysis (Phase I),
    Harold Mindlin et al.; Metals Information Analysis Center, February 1996.

    control office, no single office exists within each of the military
    services to manage corrosion control over equipment and infrastructure.
    Instead, each service has multiple corrosion offices within various
    operational

    units and weapon systems programs. These offices often have different
    policies, procedures, and funding channels that limit coordination and
    standardization. In many cases, corrosion control officials were not aware
    of the activities and achievements of their counterparts in other commands
    and across the services. Further, corrosion control offices act largely in

    an advisory role and are guided by goals and incentives that sometimes
    conflict with those of the operational commands that they rely on to fund
    project implementation. As a result, many proposed projects* even those
    with the potential for very large future- year cost savings* are often
    assigned a low funding priority compared to operations and repair projects
    offering more immediate results. These weaknesses combine to reduce the
    overall effectiveness of DOD*s approach to corrosion control and result in
    the services missing important opportunities to achieve greater benefits,

    including potentially billions of dollars in additional net savings
    annually that would accrue from a long- term reduction in corrosion of
    military equipment and infrastructure.

    To strengthen DOD*s approach to corrosion control, we are recommending
    that it define and incorporate into its long- term corrosion mitigation
    strategy measurable, outcome- oriented objectives and performance measures
    that show progress toward achieving results. In addition, we are
    recommending that the strategy include a number of elements to address
    problems and limitations we identified in current corrosion prevention
    efforts. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
    with all our recommendations. The department also provided

    technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. Background
    Corrosion affects all military assets, including approximately

    350,000 ground and tactical vehicles, 15,000 aircraft and helicopters,
    1,000 strategic missiles, and 300 ships. Maintenance activities* including
    corrosion control* involve nearly 700,000 military (active and reserve)
    and DOD civilian personnel, as well as several thousand commercial firms
    worldwide. Hundreds of thousands of additional mission support assets and
    thousands of facilities are also affected.

    Corrosion is defined as the unintended destruction or deterioration of a
    material due to interaction with the environment. It includes such varied
    forms as rusting; pitting; galvanic reaction; calcium or other mineral
    build

    up; degradation due to ultraviolet light exposure; and mold, mildew, or
    other organic decay. It can be either readily visible or microscopic.
    Factors influencing the development and rate of corrosion include the type
    and design of the material, the presence of electrolytes (water, minerals,
    and salts), the availability of oxygen, the ambient temperature, and the
    amount of exposure to the environment. The rate of corrosion increases
    exponentially when the ambient humidity is over 50 percent. Corrosion can
    also occur in the absence of water, but only at high temperatures, such as
    in gas turbine engines.

    The effects of corrosion on DOD equipment and infrastructure have become
    more prominent as the acquisition of new equipment has slowed and more
    reliance is placed on the service of aging equipment and infrastructure.
    The aging of military systems poses a unique challenge for maintenance and
    corrosion control for all services. 6

    A number of DOD and commercial studies have identified and evaluated
    technologies and techniques for corrosion prevention and control. The
    studies indicate that although effective corrosion prevention and control
    methods and technologies are well known and have been recommended for
    years, they have not been implemented effectively. The studies also
    identify a number of relatively simple solutions* such as covered storage,

    controlled environment, washing and rinsing, spray- on rust inhibitors,
    and protective wrapping* to mitigate and control the effects of corrosion.
    Congress has recognized the need to significantly reduce the economic
    burden on the military services of the damage caused by corrosion and of
    the efforts to mitigate its adverse affects. In November 2002, Congress
    passed the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2003, which required the Department of Defense to take the following
    steps:

     Designate a responsible official or organization within the department
    to (1) oversee and coordinate corrosion prevention and mitigation of
    military equipment and infrastructure; (2) develop and recommend policy
    guidance; (3) review programs and funding levels; and

    6 For example, the average age of the Air Force aircraft fleet is 22
    years. By fiscal year 2020, the average age will increase to nearly 30
    years, with current programmed investments. This would translate to 60-
    year- old tankers, 47- year- old reconnaissance/ surveillance platforms,
    and 44- year- old bombers. (The B- 52 would be nearly 60 years old.)

    (4) provide oversight and coordination of the efforts to incorporate
    corrosion control during the design, acquisition, and maintenance of
    military equipment and infrastructure.

     Develop and implement a long- term strategy to reduce corrosion and the
    effects of corrosion on the military equipment and infrastructure of the
    Department of Defense not later than 1 year after the date of the
    enactment of the act.

     Submit to Congress an Interim Report regarding the actions taken to date
    by the corrosion control office when the President submits the budget for
    fiscal year 2004. On May 22, 2003, DOD submitted the report.

    Impacts on Military Numerous studies in recent years have documented the
    pervasive nature of

    Costs, Readiness, and corrosion and its various effects on military
    equipment and infrastructure.

    Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the
    Safety Indicate That

    limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services,
    Corrosion Is an

    current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion
    Extensive Problem

    has a substantial effect on military equipment and infrastructure. Costs
    are significant because corroded military assets must often be repaired or
    replaced at great expense. Readiness is also severely impaired because
    corrosion increases the maintenance needed and, therefore, the downtime on
    a large quantities of military equipment. The effects extend to
    infrastructure, which, in turn, has an adverse impact on the military*s
    ability to meet mission requirements. Further, corrosion has an equally
    profound effect on the safety of equipment and infrastructure.

    Corrosion Costs Appear Corrosion*s impact on military costs appears to be
    enormous, representing

    to Be Enormous one of the largest life- cycle cost components of military
    weapon systems.

    In a 2001 government- sponsored study, corrosion is estimated to cost the
    Department of Defense at least $20 billion a year. Another study done in
    1996 puts the cost at closer to $10 billion annually. The costs identified
    in these reports are direct costs such as the manpower and material that
    are used primarily to inspect and repair damage resulting from corrosion.
    However, there are also indirect costs that, were they to be quantified,
    would significantly increase the total reported costs. Indirect costs
    include the loss of the opportunity to use equipment that is not in
    operating condition. Although extensive equipment downtime results from
    corrosion, the attendant financial impacts have not been fully captured.
    Even more difficult to quantify is the cost of using equipment that, while
    not inoperable, has diminished utility due to corrosion. Considering the
    enormous total value of all of the equipment owned by

    the military services, these costs are considerable, to say the least.
    Corrosion also shortens the service life and accelerates the depreciation
    of DOD facilities, which in a recent GAO report are estimated to have a
    replacement value of over $435 billion. 7 This impact on facilities
    translates into costs that are not included in the government corrosion
    cost study.

    There are numerous examples of how profoundly corrosion affects costs. For
    example, in 1993, the Army estimated spending about $2 billion to $2. 5
    billion a year to mitigate the corrosion of wheeled vehicles, including 5-
    ton trucks. 8 (See fig. 1.)

    7 U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in
    Funding Priorities and Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition
    of Military Facilities, GAO- 03- 274 (Washington, D. C.: February 2003).

    8 Corrosion Prevention for Wheeled Vehicles, DOD Inspector General Audit
    Report, Number 93- 156, August 13, 1993.

    Figure 1: Corrosion on Army 5- Ton Truck in Hawaii

    Source: U. S. Army.

    Corrosion was found to be so extensive on some of the trucks that the
    repair costs were greater than 65 percent of the average cost of a new
    vehicle. Cost impacts appear to be even greater on Army helicopters, as
    evidenced by a 1998 analysis estimating costs of about $4 billion to
    repair damage attributed to corrosion. 9 Corrosion is also a formidable
    cost driver to the Navy. As an illustration, the Navy*s Pacific and
    Atlantic Fleets estimate that about 25 percent of their total combined
    annual maintenance budget is directed to the prevention and correction of
    corrosion. Navy officials told us that the prevention and removal of
    corrosion on shipboard tanks alone costs the Navy over $174 million a
    year. Navy facilities such

    as waterfront structures are also decaying because of corrosion, and 9 U.
    S. Army TACOM- ARDEC communication referenced in Corrosion Costs and
    Preventative Strategies in the United States, Gerhardus H. Koch, Ph. D.,
    et al.; CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc., September 30, 2001.

    these facilities will need to be replaced at considerable cost. For
    example, naval military construction projects estimated to cost $727
    million are required to restore 20 piers that have suffered extensive
    corrosion damage. (See fig. 2.)

    Figure 2: Corroding Bridge Columns at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

    Source: U. S. Navy.

    In 1990, the Air Force estimated the cost of corrosion to be about $700
    million. Interestingly, even though the number of operational Air Force
    aircraft decreased significantly, corrosion costs for the Air Force
    increased to over $1 billion by 2001, 10 or $300 million more

    than previously reported. 10 Cost of Corrosion: Final Report, prepared for
    Air Force Research Laboratory, NCI Systems, Inc., Fairborn, Ohio, March
    26, 2003.

    Corrosion Substantially Corrosion has been shown to substantially increase
    equipment downtime,

    Degrades Equipment and thereby reducing readiness. Whether it affects a
    truck, helicopter, ship, or

    Facilities Readiness pipeline, corrosion is a major contributor to the
    amount of maintenance

    required on military equipment and infrastructure. Depending on the kind
    and severity of corrosion, the maintenance may be performed as part of the
    scheduled maintenance cycle or as emergency repairs, especially when it
    involves safety concerns. Whether scheduled or not, maintenance translates
    into equipment downtime. As a result, readiness is diminished because the
    equipment cannot be used for training purposes or for other kinds of
    operations. In addition, corrosion contributes to or accelerates the
    deterioration of equipment and, therefore, reduces its service life. As a
    result, the condition of some equipment is assessed to have deteriorated
    beyond repair capability and the equipment is no longer usable.

    The effects on readiness are extensive throughout the military services,
    and they are clearly evidenced in regard to military aircraft. For
    example, a 2001 study concluded that corrective maintenance of corrosion-
    related faults has degraded the readiness of all of the Army*s
    approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters. (See fig. 3.)

    Figure 3: Corrosion on Army UH- 60L Black Hawk Helicopter

    Fuel cell compartment Control rod linkage Spindle bolts Source: U. S.
    Army.

    The effects on the Air Force*s KC- 135 are particularly pronounced, with
    corrosion identified as the reason for over 50 percent of the maintenance
    needed on the aircraft. While the Air Force has yet to quantify the total
    impact, one study identified corrosion of avionics equipment contacts to
    be a significant cause of failure rates on all Air Force aircraft. Because
    these failure rates affect equipment that is sophisticated and often
    occurs

    in hard- to- access areas, a significant amount of time is needed for
    testing, inspection, and repair. This extends aircraft downtime and
    reduces readiness levels. Corrosion has also reduced the readiness levels
    for the Navy*s P- 3C aircraft. According to Navy officials, corrosion has
    always been responsible for a large part of maintenance required for the
    aircraft, but the amount has doubled in recent years. While these
    officials do not have specific information regarding the effects of
    corrosion, they did note that in just the past year they had to ground two
    aircraft specifically because of severe corrosion.

    The effects on readiness extend well beyond aviation and include virtually
    every type of equipment maintained and operated by the military. Corrosion
    also severely affects the readiness of other types of equipment, such as
    Army vehicles. In 1996, the Army identified corrosion as the reason

    why 17 percent of its trucks located in Hawaii were not mission capable.
    Earlier in 1993, the availability of the Army*s High Mobility Multipurpose
    Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) had been particularly diminished because of
    corrosion. While some of the vehicles were out of service for as long as a
    year, others had such severe corrosion that they had to be scrapped after
    5 years, many years short of their expected 15- year service life. The Air
    Force also identified severe corrosion on its ground vehicles, resulting
    in increased maintenance and downtime. Some of the vehicles showed
    significant deterioration just months after being delivered to field
    units.

    Corrosion and its impact on readiness are especially a concern for the
    Navy, because its ships operate in highly corrosive salt water and in
    high- humidity locations. A notable example of these effects occurred in
    2001 on the aircraft carrier USS John F Kennedy. Maintenance problems,
    including many that were corrosion- related, were so severe that the
    carrier could not complete its planned operations. Even more recently, the
    carrier USS Kitty Hawk returned from a series of deployments, including
    Operation Enduring Freedom, with significant maintenance problems that
    also included topside corrosion. As a result, the carrier is expected to
    undergo extensive maintenance.

    Such effects are found Navy- wide, and the Navy estimates that about 25
    percent of its fleet maintenance budget goes toward corrosion prevention
    and control. This and other kinds of maintenance are largely completed at
    a Navy depot and require an average of 6 months. During this extended
    period of time, the ship is not available for service. The amount

    of time the ship is in the depot is due in part to the repairs needed
    because of corrosion; Navy officials told us this amount of corrosion-
    related maintenance is understated because it does not include the vast
    amount of manpower and resources spent on corrosion removal and repainting
    while the ships are on operations. These repairs, too, have an impact on

    readiness, because crew members who would normally be undergoing training
    or other kinds of operations are, instead, required to perform
    maintenance.

    Corrosion also impairs the readiness of military armament. For example,
    the Army reported a significant number of failures due to corrosion on the
    155 mm medium- towed howitzer so severe that they resulted in aborted
    missions. The study estimates that between 30 to 40 percent of the aborts
    are direct results of corrosion. Corrosion is also identified as
    accounting for 39 percent of all unscheduled maintenance for the howitzer,
    further reducing the readiness levels of the equipment. In addition,
    corrosion has affected the readiness of the Air Force*s general purpose
    iron bombs. (See fig. 4.)

    Figure 4: Corroded 500- Pound Bombs at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam

    Source: U. S. Air Force.

    According to Air Force records, of the approximately 450,000 bombs of this
    type in the Air Force inventory, more than 107,000 (or over 24 percent)
    have varying levels of deterioration caused by corrosion and, as a result,
    are not mission capable. While many of these bombs are repairable, a
    certain level of maintenance is needed to restore most of them to

    acceptable operational condition. Some of the bombs, however, are too
    severely corroded to be salvageable. Military facilities are also decaying
    due to corrosion and, as a result, readiness is affected adversely. In
    2001, the Department of Defense reported that more than two- thirds of its
    military facilities have serious deficiencies and are in such poor
    condition that they are unable to meet certain mission requirements. The
    department identifies corrosion as a major contributor to much of this
    deterioration. According to military

    service officials, the most significant area of concern may be the
    condition of military airfields. Each of the military services has
    reported runway cracking so severe that the runways were judged unusable.
    Deterioration of this kind was even identified in airfields used for
    operations during Enduring Freedom. For example, runway cracks at Pope Air
    Force Base, North Carolina, were so extensive that several C- 130 cargo
    planes and A- 10 fighters heading for Afghanistan were diverted to other
    U. S. installations.

    Further, Navy facilities officials told us that infrastructure
    deterioration is so significant that it has adverse impacts on the
    service*s ability to perform required maintenance on its equipment. For
    example, they said that parts of the ceiling of an aircraft hanger located
    at North Island Naval Air Station, California, had crumbled as a result of
    corrosion. Because of the safety hazard and potential damage to aircraft,
    the hanger had to be closed down for several months for repairs and the
    aircraft relocated to other storage facilities. Corrosion of facilities
    and the impacts on readiness go well beyond problems experienced at
    airfields and hangars. The Pacific Air

    Force Command cited corrosion as the cause of failures of numerous
    critical infrastructure, including aircraft refueling, fire protection,
    electrical, and command and control facilities. The Command noted that
    this kind of deterioration can significantly impact its ability to perform
    its mission.

    Corrosion Poses Numerous Corrosion also poses numerous safety risks and is
    a source of major

    Safety Risks concern to all military services. This concern is
    particularly acute when

    associated with the safety of military aircraft. According to an Army
    study, from 1989 through 2000 the Army experienced 46 mishaps, 9
    fatalities, and 13 injuries directly related to corrosion. During calendar
    year 2001, the Army issued four Safety of Flight messages for its rotary
    wing systems due to corrosion- related material deficiencies that
    adversely affected 2,100, or over 88 percent, of its force modernization
    helicopters. As recently as March 2002, the Navy suspended carrier
    operations for F- 14 aircraft when one aircraft crashed because its
    landing gear collapsed due to corrosion.

    Just 2 years earlier, the Navy had identified corrosion as the cause of a
    landing gear failure on a F- 18 that occurred during carrier operations.
    Despite regular inspections, stress cracking in the landing gear evaded
    detection, and the problem was not revealed until after the accident when
    the equipment was examined under an electron microscope. Perhaps even

    more difficult to detect, but nevertheless just as significant, are the
    safety risks corrosion presents on F- 16 avionics connectors. This
    aircraft has sophisticated electronics equipment that is housed in Line
    Replaceable Units. Although these containers provide considerable
    protection from the elements, they cannot entirely eliminate moisture from
    entering, and even microscopic amounts of moisture can cause catastrophic
    accidents. For example, during the 1980s, uncommanded fuel valve closures
    caused several F- 16 aircraft crashes. The equipment failures were
    believed to

    be the result of corrosion on the avionics connectors. Corrosion also
    poses major safety hazards at military facilities. Perhaps the greatest
    safety risk, according to facilities officials, is the cracking of
    concrete runways at airfields operated by all of the military services.
    (See fig. 5.)

    Figure 5: Cracked Runway at Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California

    Source: U. S. Navy.

    One of the causes of this deterioration results from a corrosive chemical
    process called alkali- silica reaction, which occurs when alkalis react
    with water in ways that cause cracking, chipping, and expansion of
    concrete. As airfields continue to decay and crumble, more pieces of
    concrete are left on the runway, and these pieces have been absorbed by
    military aircraft and cited as the causes of innumerable aircraft safety
    incidents and accidents. Airfield cracking due to corrosion and the safety
    risk that it presents is so extensive that all the military services have
    experienced serious incidents resulting from this hazard. Examples of this
    kind of damage have been reported at Osan Air Base, Korea; Ft. Campbell
    Army Airfield, Kentucky;

    Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California; and Marine Corps Air Station,
    Iwakuni, Japan. The foreign object debris hazard was so severe at the
    Little Rock Air Force Base that the Air Mobility Command assessed a
    taxiway as unsuitable for operations. At Naval Air Station Pensacola,
    several recent incidents were reported of Navy aircraft penetrating
    cracked airfield pavement and jeopardizing pilot safety.

    Pipelines that contain natural gas and other kinds of fuel also pose a
    safety risk at military facilities. A majority of the pipelines are quite
    old and are constructed largely of metal that is susceptible to corrosion,
    which is the major cause of pipeline ruptures. Air Force facilities
    officials told us that some of the pipelines were installed as far back as
    the 1950s, and older pipelines pose an even greater hazard because they
    have a higher probability of rupturing from corrosion. The services are
    gradually

    replacing many of the metal pipelines with pipelines made of high- density
    polyethylene plastic and other materials that are more corrosion
    resistant. The use of cathodic protection devices also helps to prevent
    corrosion.

    Facilities officials told us that despite these measures and periodic
    inspections, they have experienced numerous pipeline ruptures they
    attribute to corrosion. They said that until all of the existing pipelines
    are replaced, such ruptures will continue to be a source of major concern.
    However, replacing pipelines is very expensive, and facilities officials
    said that it would take many years to obtain enough funds to replace all
    of them. Facilities officials at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton,
    California, said that they have experienced several fuel line ruptures,
    many of them caused

    by corroded pipe valves. They said fuel lines that run alongside base
    housing pose the greatest safety concern, and they have begun to replace
    these lines first. Eventually they hope to replace all of them throughout
    the base.

    Full Impact of Corrosion For more than a decade, a number of DOD, military
    service, and

    Unknown Due to private- sector studies have cited the lack of reliable
    data to adequately

    Incomplete Cost, Readiness, assess the overall impact of the corrosion
    problem. Studies done in

    and Safety Data 1996 and 2001 on DOD corrosion data collection and
    analysis found that,

    while individual services have attempted to quantify the cost of
    corrosion, neither the mechanisms nor the methodologies exist to
    accurately quantify the problem. 11 A 2001 Army study found that no single
    data system provides aggregate corrosion data related to cost,
    maintenance, and readiness, and that the existence of many separate
    databases restrict the ability to collect standardized data reflecting
    consistent characteristics. 12 The study, which focused on Army aviation,
    concluded that existing automated information systems do not provide
    decision makers with complete, accurate, or timely corrosion repair and
    replacement data. An Air Force study came to similar

    conclusions. 13 Navy officials told us that information regarding the cost
    of corrosion is incomplete because these costs are difficult to isolate
    from overall maintenance costs. They said these data limitations make it
    difficult

    to determine the severity of the problems and to justify the funding
    needed to prevent corrosion problems in the future. Facilities officials
    at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton said that their databases do not
    specifically identify data as corrosion related. They told us they would
    prefer to have better data for making investment decisions but instead
    must rely primarily on information obtained from periodic and annual
    corrosion inspections.

    We identified many examples of how the lack of reliable and complete
    information impeded the funding and progress of corrosion prevention
    projects. In addition, military officials at the unit level told us that
    they had trouble obtaining sufficient data and analysis to justify the
    cost effectiveness of prevention projects. They cited the lack of
    information as one of the main reasons why corrosion mitigation projects
    were not being

    funded. For example, Air Force officials told us that an aircraft rinsing
    11 Corrosion in DOD Systems: Data Collection and Analysis (Phase I),
    Harold Mindlin, et al.; Metals Information Analysis Center, February 1996;
    and Corrosion Costs and Preventative Strategies in the United States,
    Gerhardus H. Koch, Ph. D. et al.; CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc.,
    September 30, 2001. 12 Aviation Systems Performance Readiness and
    Corrosion Study (ASPRCS), Ken Mitchell, Study Director, Center for Army
    Analysis, 2001. 13 A Study to Determine the Annual Direct Cost of
    Corrosion Maintenance for Weapon Systems and Equipment in the United
    States Air Force, prepared for the Air Force Corrosion Program Office, NCI
    Information Systems, Inc., Fairborn, Ohio, February 6, 1998.

    facility at Hickam Air Force Base is no longer operable, and they need
    about $4 million for a new facility. They also said that although they do
    not have sufficient data to accurately estimate expected cost savings from
    reduced maintenance, they believe it would far exceed initial investment

    costs. They added that their inability to move forward stems largely from
    a lack of the data and analysis needed to justify the projects. The Marine
    Corps faced similar obstacles in justifying the installation of a
    helicopter rinsing facilities at Marine Corps Air Facility, Kaneohe Bay.
    (See fig. 6.)

    Figure 6: Marine Corps Helicopter Rinsing Facility Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii

    Source: U. S. Marine Corps.

    Officials told us that the corrosion maintenance costs they would avoid in
    the first year alone would exceed the total amount of funding needed to
    build an additional facility, but they do not have the data or resources
    to support the necessary analysis, and without it they cannot justify the
    project or obtain approval for the funds.

    DOD and Services* While the military services have achieved some successes
    on individual

    Approach to corrosion prevention projects, significant weaknesses in their
    overall

    approach to corrosion control have decreased the effectiveness of their
    Corrosion Control

    efforts. An important limitation is the lack of a strategic plan that
    includes Is Not Effective

    long- term goals and outcome- based performance measures. In addition, but
    Has Achieved coordination within and among the services is limited, and
    the priorities of organizations that plan corrosion prevention projects
    and those that

    Some Successes implement and fund them are frequently in conflict. As a
    result, promising

    projects often fall far short of their potential, and many are never
    initiated at all.

    Some Corrosion Prevention Major commands, program offices, and research
    and development

    Improvements Are Being centers servicewide have made and continue to make
    improvements

    Introduced during and in the methods and techniques for preventing
    corrosion. Corrosion

    after Acquisition prevention improvements can either be introduced during
    the design and

    Production Process production phases or some time after equipment is
    fielded. For example,

    durable coatings, composite materials, and cathodic protection are being
    incorporated to an increasing extent in the design and construction of
    military facilities and equipment to reduce corrosion- related
    maintenance.

    Systems as diverse as the joint strike fighter, the DD- X destroyer,
    amphibious assault vehicles, and HMMWV trucks plan to use composite
    materials and advanced protective coatings to increase corrosion
    resistance. The military services estimate that as much as 25 to 35
    percent of corrosion costs can be eliminated by using these and other
    corrosion prevention efforts, which would amount to billions of dollars in
    potential savings each year. Our recent report on total ownership costs of
    military equipment discusses some of the approaches DOD is using to
    incorporate maintenance reduction techniques, including corrosion
    mitigation, into the design and development of new systems. 14

    Regarding the maintenance of existing equipment and infrastructure, we
    have identified several examples of projects that show potential for a
    high return on investment and advances in the technologies of corrosion
    prevention but which have not, for various reasons, been fully
    implemented. For example, the Naval Sea Systems Command has

    14 U. S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting Requirements
    Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems* Total Ownership Costs, GAO- 03-
    57 (Washington, D. C.: February 2003).

    developed durable coatings that increase the amount of corrosion
    protection for various kinds of tanks (such as fuel and ballast tanks) on
    Navy ships to 20 years instead of the 5 years formerly possible. The
    installation of the coatings started in fiscal year 1996. However, by the
    end of fiscal year 2002, the Navy had installed these coatings on less
    than 7 percent of the tanks, for an estimated net savings of about $10
    million a year. The tank preservation effort has not been widely
    implemented because, Navy officials told us, the fleet has other needs
    that have a higher priority. Navy officials told us they frequently have
    to defer the installation

    of the new coatings because of the limited availability of ships due to
    the increased pace of Fleet operations and more pressing maintenance
    requirements. As a result, the Navy estimates that it is about $161
    million short of achieving the total annual net cost savings projected for
    this corrosion prevention effort. The Command has numerous other projects
    that have fallen short of their potential because the fleet had higher
    priorities. While these projects have total projected annual net savings
    of another $919 million, they have achieved about $33 million in yearly
    savings to date. Once implemented, the benefits of these efforts extend
    well beyond cost savings because they have the potential to significantly
    reduce ship maintenance, thereby increasing the availability of ships for
    operations.

    The Army National Guard*s Controlled Humidity Preservation project
    represents another example of a high potential savings effort that has not
    been fully realized. Under this project, dehumidified air is pumped into
    buildings or equipment to reduce the rate of corrosion. (See fig. 7.)

    Figure 7: Army National Guard Controlled Humidity Preservation

    Source: Army National Guard Bureau.

    Project officials claimed net savings of $225 million through the end of
    fiscal year 2002. While officials state the project has proven to be a
    success so far, they now estimate that it will take about 15 years to
    achieve the total projected savings, or 5 years longer than originally
    planned. Army National Guard officials told us they could achieve greater
    savings if they receive additional funding earlier than is currently
    planned.

    The Air Force*s bomb metalization project is also not achieving its full
    cost savings potential. According to an Air Force study, treating cast
    iron, general- purpose bombs with a special protective metallic spray
    coating would save the Air Force at least $30 million in maintenance costs
    over 30 years, although one study estimated the savings to be as much as
    $100 million. The Air Force stores about 450,000 of this type of bomb in
    locations throughout the world. Air Force officials told us that the total
    investment costs for the project are about $5 million, which, based on the
    higher cost savings estimate, translates into a return on investment ratio

    of 20 to 1. After several years of planning and implementation, about 15,
    000 bombs, or 3 percent, have received the treatment.

    Appendix II provides more detailed information about these and other
    examples of projects that are not reaching their full potential.

    Strategic Plan Lacking for DOD does not currently have a strategic plan
    for corrosion prevention and

    DOD and Service mitigation, and the services either have not developed
    such plans or have

    Corrosion Efforts not implemented them.

    However, DOD is required within 1 year of enactment of the Bob Stump
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (i. e., by
    December 2, 2003) to submit to Congress a report setting forth

    its long- term strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion
    on military equipment and infrastructure. 15 The act requires DOD include
    in its long- term strategy performance measures and milestones for
    reducing corrosion that are compatible with the Government Performance and
    Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). 16 GPRA offers a model for developing an
    effective management framework to improve the likelihood of successfully
    implementing initiatives and assessing results. Under GPRA, agencies at
    all levels are required to set strategic goals, measure performance,
    identify levels of resources needed, and report on the degree to which
    goals have

    been met. Without implementing these critical performance- measuring
    elements, management is unable to identify and prioritize projects
    systematically, allocate resources effectively, and determine which
    projects have been successful. As a result, managers are not in a position
    to make sound investment decisions on proposed corrosion control projects.

    15 No later than 18 months after date of enactment of the act GAO is
    required to submit to Congress an assessment of the extent that DOD has
    implemented its long- term strategy to reduce corrosion.

    16 P. L. 103- 62, Aug. 3, 1993.

    The military services either have not established effective strategic
    plans that include goals, objectives, and performance measuring systems 17
    or they have not implemented them. The limitations to the military
    services* efforts to establish strategic plans are as follows:

     The Army created a comprehensive corrosion control program plan*
    including goals, objectives, and performance measures* but the plan was
    never fully implemented. 18 As part of the plan, the Army defined specific
    performance measures to track the progress of corrosion

    mitigation efforts, but these were not put into effect. The strategy
    called for the creation of panels comprised of top government and industry
    corrosion experts who would use performance metrics to evaluate proposed
    and ongoing projects against approved goals and objectives. However, the
    panels were never established and the metrics

    were not implemented. Army corrosion control officials told us that they
    have very little performance data, such as return on investment or annual
    savings, for any of their corrosion control initiatives. Officials at the
    Army Center for Economic Analysis told us they have not measured
    performance for the purpose of determining the return on investment

    for any corrosion control project for many years; the last performance
    evaluation was carried out in 1997.

     In 1998, the Air Force published a business plan for equipment corrosion
    control, but the plan was implemented for a short time and did not contain
    all of the elements of a strategic plan. For example, it identified three
    management goals, 19 but did not include performance measures. Also, the
    Air Force Equipment Maintenance Instruction that identifies
    responsibilities for the Air Force Corrosion Prevention and Control Office
    does not identify goals or performance measures. Although an Air Force
    Instruction on Performance Management states that performance

    17 Performance measures can include such data as return on investment,
    frequency of required corrosion maintenance, equipment availability,
    readiness rates, and mean time between failures.

    18 The plan included three main objectives: decrease life- cycle costs by
    40 percent, increase readiness by reducing downtime, and reduce the
    maintenance burden on diminishing active and reserve workforce resources.
    19 The goals are as follows: (1) identify, advance and apply emerging
    materials and processes to existing and future weapon systems; (2)
    identify current corrosion traits of weapon systems and logistics
    processes, and (3) maintain data and technical manuals related to
    corrosion control and provide expert consultation and technical support to
    field and depot activities.

    management, including goals and performance measures, is the Air Force*s
    framework for a continual improvement system, officials told us that the
    business plan was no longer being used. They said that, in the past, there
    has been more emphasis on creating goals and monitoring performance, but
    because of limited resources, reductions in personnel, and increased
    optempo these activities are

    no longer performed.  The Navy commands (Naval Air Systems Command and
    Naval Sea

    Systems Command) have engaged in some strategic planning for corrosion
    control, but the Navy does not have a servicewide strategic plan in this
    area, and its corrosion control offices lack the information and metrics
    needed to track progress. The Naval Air Systems Command

    planned to establish a corrosion control and prevention office but the
    plan* which included goals and objectives and outlined how progress would
    be measured* was never approved. The corrosion control and prevention
    activity at Naval Sea Systems Command is also not a formal program, and it
    lacks clearly defined overall goals and objectives. This office has
    identified cost avoidance projects and tracks the amount of savings
    achieved to date. However, more could be done to monitor performance. For
    example, there was no analysis of the reasons why specific projects were
    proceeding at a slow pace. Without this information, the office is not in
    a position to know what actions can be taken to improve the effectiveness
    of these projects.

     The Marine Corps has a corrosion control plan that includes long- term,
    broadly stated goals but does not include measurable, outcome- oriented
    objectives or performance measures. Marine Corps officials told us that
    they are in the process of revising the plan to include measures that will
    track progress toward achieving servicewide goals.

    Corrosion control officials said they measure progress through a
    combination of field surveys, special corrosion assessments, and
    Integrated Product Teams. 20 They also rely on the evaluations of
    operational and installation commands and program offices but readily
    acknowledge that this is not sufficient. They told us that they would
    prefer

    20 Integrated Product Teams are comprised of individuals representing a
    variety of competencies or disciplines such as material science, system
    engineering, logistics, and environmental management. These teams are
    assembled to take a multidisciplinary approach to finding solutions to
    routine and nonroutine maintenance and acquisition problems.

    to have more systematic performance measures and that these tools would
    improve the success of individual projects and the corrosion effort as a
    whole.

    Limited Coordination Within DOD has multiple corrosion control efforts*
    with different policies,

    and Among the Services procedures, and funding channels* that are not well
    coordinated with each other; as a result, opportunities for cost savings
    have been lost. DOD is in

    the process of establishing a central corrosion control office in response
    to the authorization act, but no single office exists within each of the
    military services to provide leadership and oversight for corrosion
    control of equipment and infrastructure. Although the services have
    attempted to establish central corrosion control offices, the
    responsibility largely falls on numerous commands, installations, and
    program offices to fund and implement projects. Military officials told us
    the offices were not fully established, primarily because of limited
    funding. The Army, for example,

    has established a central office for corrosion control of all service
    equipment; the chain of command for the Army corrosion office for
    facilities is separate from this office. Although a central office for
    equipment exists, each Army command also has separate corrosion control
    offices that are responsible for certain types of equipment* for example,
    tanks/ automotive, aviation/ missiles, armaments, and electronics.
    Further, individual weapon system program offices within each command may
    have their own corrosion control functions. In addition, installations
    implement

    their own corrosion control projects with the assistance of the Army
    Department of Public Works and the Army Corps of Engineers. The recently
    established Army Installation Management Agency provides overall
    management and funding for upkeep on Army installations.

    The Navy and Air Force also have multiple corrosion prevention and
    mitigation offices. The Navy manages them through the materials offices
    within the Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Aviation Command. The Air
    Force Materiel Command manages the Air Force*s efforts at an office
    located at Robins Air Force Base. Like the Army, these commands have
    multiple weapon systems program offices that also plan and implement
    corrosion projects. The Navy and Air Force also have separate
    organizations that are responsible for corrosion prevention and mitigation
    efforts related to infrastructure. The Naval Facilities Engineering Center
    at Port Hueneme, California, provides this service for both the Navy and
    Marine Corps and, in turn, relies on the individual installations to
    manage

    and implement their own efforts. The Air Force Civil Engineering Support
    Agency provides this service for the Air Force.

    This fragmentation of corrosion prevention efforts minimizes coordination
    and limits standardization within and among the services, as evidenced by
    the following examples:

     A June 2000 corrosion assessment of the Army*s Pacific area of
    operations concluded that no standard corrosion control program, policy,
    or training exists for any Army commodity, which reduces the effectiveness
    of the Army*s efforts to control corrosion on vehicles, tanks, and other
    equipment.

     Even when the services are in a severely corrosive environment in which
    they operate relatively near to one another, few formal mechanisms exist
    to facilitate the exchange of corrosion information. For example, in
    Hawaii Army officials for the Reserve and National

    Guard and active units stated that they had limited knowledge of one
    another*s corrosion control activities or the activities of other
    services. Army officials told us they cannot afford to miss an opportunity
    to use the latest corrosion control products and practices, and it would
    be unfortunate to be deprived of any advances, especially if they are
    available and being used elsewhere. In addition, Air Force facilities

    officials in Hawaii told us that they are not aware of any formal process
    for sharing corrosion prevention and control information with other
    services.  Officials at Marine Corps Air Facility Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, an
    area of

    high humidity and salt, told us that temporary shelters can be a very
    cost- effective way to reduce the corrosion of equipment such as vehicles,
    transformers, and aviation ground equipment that are currently stored
    outside because of limited space. (See fig. 8.)

    Figure 8: K- Span Shelter at Army Reserve Unit Fort Shafter, Hawaii

    Source: GAO.

    These officials were unable to acquire the shelters because they did not
    have the time or resources to undertake the analysis necessary to support
    the purchase. They were aware that temporary shelters are being used at
    other Marine Corps and Army installations, but they did not know how the
    installations acquired the shelters or justified their purchase. The
    officials suggested a standard mechanism for gathering and communicating
    the information necessary to justify purchase of the shelters.

     The Air Force conducted a series of multiyear studies that found that
    using inexpensive corrosion- inhibiting lubricants on aircraft electrical
    connectors has the potential to save hundreds of millions of dollars
    annually. (See fig. 9.)

    Figure 9: Corroded Connectors on Air Force F- 16 Main Fuel Shutoff Valve

    Source: U. S. Air Force.

    Air Force officials estimate that using corrosion- inhibiting lubricants
    could save more than $500 million annually on the F- 16 fleet alone.
    Although the use of these lubricants is recommended in a joint technical
    manual on avionics corrosion control, 21 their use is not required. The
    Air Force and Navy have developed different product specifications for the
    lubricants. The Navy*s specification covers the lubricants* use on both
    metal surfaces and electrical connectors, and more than a dozen products
    have qualified for use under the

    specification. However, Air Force studies determined that while some of
    the products work well on electrical connectors, others are detrimental.
    As a result, the Air Force created a new specification for lubricant use,
    limiting it to electrical connectors. Air Force officials want the Navy to
    modify its specification so that only the appropriate products can
    qualify; otherwise, Air Force officials believe, those who refer to the
    joint manual containing both specifications could order a product
    detrimental to electronic systems. An Air Force contractor has drafted
    specification revisions for the Navy, but due to differing requirements
    and changes of personnel, the Navy has apparently

    decided to conduct further studies before revising its specifications.
    According to Air Force officials, these and other difficulties in
    coordinating with the Navy have prompted the Air Force to consider
    withdrawing from participation with the Navy in joint service manuals on
    corrosion control of aircraft and avionics.

     Army National Guard officials in Hawaii told us that they were not aware
    of the status of the Army*s nearby corrosion inhibitor application center.
    (See fig. 10.) The facility currently has the capacity to apply corrosion
    inhibitors to about 6,000 vehicles per year. National Guard officials told
    us that they often store vehicles for long periods of time, and corrosion
    is always a problem. They indicated interest in finding out more about the
    Army*s facility and any opportunities for participating with the Army if
    the corrosion inhibitors can reduce corrosion cost effectively.

    21 Technical Manual Organizational/ Unit and Intermediate Maintenance,
    Avionics Cleaning and Corrosion Control, NAVAIR 16- 1- 540, Air Force TO-
    1- 1- 689, Army TM- 1- 1500- 343- 23; September 1, 2000.

    Figure 10: Corrosion Inhibitor Application Facility at Army*s Schofield
    Barracks, Hawaii

    Source: GAO.

    The services have created some valuable mechanisms, including special
    working groups 22 and annual corrosion conferences, which make important
    contributions to corrosion prevention efforts and help facilitate intra-
    and inter- service coordination. However, these mechanisms do not
    represent a systematic approach to coordination. The effectiveness of
    these mechanisms is often dependent on the individual initiative of those
    who participate directly, as well as on the funds available to initiate
    corrosion- related activities. For example, each of the services hosts an
    annual corrosion conference, but individuals attend only to the extent
    that

    available time and travel funds allow. Furthermore, the dissemination of
    conference information relies to a large extent on attendees taking the
    initiative to use the information or communicate it to others. Limited
    follow- up is carried out to determine the extent to which this
    information

    22 Special working groups* within and across the services* have been
    established, such as the Joint Council for Aging Aircraft, Air Force
    Corrosion Prevention and Advisory Boards, and various Science and
    Technology Advisor programs. DOD has also established working groups such
    as the Maintenance Technology Senior Steering Group, Joint Technology
    Exchange Group, and the Joint Logistics Commanders to share information on
    acquisition and maintenance issues, including corrosion control.

    is used in new applications. Several of the officers acting as corrosion
    coordinators in Hawaii indicated that their commands were often unable to
    allow them the time or travel funds to attend corrosion conferences.

    They added that some, but not all, of the conference papers and briefings
    were available to them.

    Conflicting Incentives and Because of the differing priorities between
    short- term operational needs

    Priorities Limit Corrosion and long- term preventative maintenance needs,
    corrosion projects are

    Project Implementation often given a low priority.

    Corrosion control offices act largely in an advisory role, providing
    guidance, information, and expertise on initiatives and practices. They
    have limited funding and authority, and they promote initiatives with
    benefits that may not become apparent until a project is far along in its
    implementation, which may be years in the future. These priorities and
    incentives are very different from and sometimes conflict with those held
    by the operational or installation commands and their subordinate units.
    While these commands also strive for better corrosion prevention, they
    place a greater emphasis on more immediate, short- term needs that are
    directly tied to current operations.

    Because the corrosion control offices generally receive only limited
    start- up funding for corrosion prevention projects, they must rely
    heavily on operational commands and other program offices to provide the
    necessary resources and implementation. However, these commands often have
    limited resources beyond those needed to carry out their immediate mission
    objectives, and the military services have not established sufficient
    incentives for the commands (which have the approval and funding
    authority) to invest in the long- term, cumulative

    benefits of corrosion prevention and control efforts. As a result, many
    proposed corrosion control projects* even those with large cost saving
    potential and other benefits, such as increased readiness and enhanced
    safety* often remain underfunded because they are a low priority to the
    commands compared to operational and repair projects that offer more
    immediate results.

    These conflicting incentives and priorities are demonstrated by the fact
    that the services have sacrificed the condition of their facilities and
    infrastructure by using base maintenance accounts, including funds for
    corrosion prevention and control, to pay for training and combat
    operations. We were told at many of the bases we visited that the problem

    with maintaining the infrastructure was that base commanders siphon off
    infrastructure maintenance and repair funds for other operational
    priorities. For example, at Fort Irwin we were told that only 40 percent
    of infrastructure requirements were funded and that most preventative
    maintenance is deferred. Officials at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton
    said that they have an infrastructure maintenance backlog totaling over
    $193 million and many of the projects are to repair facilities that have
    deteriorated due to corrosion. The backlog is not limited to this
    location, as the Navy reports an infrastructure backlog of $2 billion
    Navy- wide. Navy officials said they do not have accurate data but
    estimate that a large percentage of the deferred maintenance is corrosion
    related. Hickam Air Force Base facilities officials also told us that they
    often have to defer or reduce corrosion prevention projects because the
    base continually needs funds for higher priorities, usually those
    associated with operations. At the same time, the Army, in its 2002 Annual
    Report

    to Congress, stated that it cannot continue to fully fund its Combat Arms
    Training Strategy without further degrading its infrastructure and related
    activities. The Army recently established a new agency that centralizes
    all installation management activities to ensure that maintenance dollars,
    including those for corrosion control, are disbursed equitably and
    efficiently across installations. Officials of the new Installation
    Management Agency said that the goal of centralization is to halt the
    trend of major commands transferring funding from infrastructure
    maintenance accounts to pay for other operations.

    The Navy*s corrosion projects are similarly affected by a tendency to
    postpone maintenance projects to address more immediate demands. For
    example, the Navy*s efforts to reduce corrosion on more than 11, 700 tanks
    on Navy ships are very time- consuming and expensive. (See app. II for
    more details of this case study.) To reduce costs, the Navy developed
    advanced coatings that are intended to last much longer, require less
    maintenance, and result in net savings of over $170 million annually.

    As of the end of fiscal year 2002, the Navy has only been able to install
    the new coatings on about 750 tanks, or less than 7 percent. Navy
    officials attribute the slow pace to the fact that shipyards place a
    higher priority on maintenance that requires immediate attention. These
    officials told us that the shipyards are hard- pressed to complete even
    necessary repairs and have little incentive to undertake prevention
    projects that will not show any benefits for many years.

    Conflicting priorities are also evidenced by Navy and Marine Corps efforts
    to prevent the corrosion of underground pipelines. Navy officials informed
    us that pipeline corrosion is one of their major facilities maintenance
    concerns. According to these officials, many pipelines at multiple Navy
    installations are several decades old and made of metal that is highly
    susceptible to corrosion. (See fig. 11.)

    Figure 11: Corrosion on High Temperature Pipelines at Air Force Tracking
    Facility Antigua, West Indies

    Source: U. S. Air Force.

    Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center officials told us that they do
    not have accurate data, but they estimate that several million dollars are
    being spent each year to fix leaks and ruptures that result from
    corrosion. They further stated that they could save significant
    maintenance costs if

    they were to aggressively start replacing existing pipelines with
    pipelines made of high- density polyethylene plastic and other nonmetallic
    material that is much more corrosion resistant. Naval facilities officials
    said that while this replacement project would be a big money- saver in
    the long run, the strategy would require a substantial investment, and
    they need to place

    a higher priority on fixing more immediate problems that disrupt or impair
    current operations. The Marine Corps is faced with similar conflicting
    pressures. At Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, officials told us that
    they have old and decaying pipelines and valves throughout the
    installation. To save significant repair costs, they would prefer to
    replace them with pipelines and valves made of high- density polyethylene
    plastic as quickly as possible. (See fig. 12.)

    Figure 12: Corroded Air- Conditioning Valves at Quantico Marine Corps
    Base, Virginia

    Source: GAO.

    However, the process is labor- intensive and, therefore, very expensive.
    They said that as a rule they must attend to more immediate problems, and
    only when resources permit are they able to invest in projects that have
    more long- term benefits.

    Conclusion At present, DOD and the military services do not systematically
    assess proposals for corrosion control projects, related implementation
    issues,

    or the results of implemented projects, and they disseminate project
    results on a limited, ad hoc basis. Without a more systematic approach to
    corrosion problems, prevention efforts that have a high return on
    investment potential will likely continue to be underresourced and

    continue to proceed at a slow pace. As a result, DOD and the military
    services will continue to expend several billion dollars annually in

    avoidable costs and continue to incur a significant number of avoidable
    readiness and safety problems. Since corrosion that is left unmitigated
    only worsens with time, costs will likely increase as weapon systems and
    infrastructures age. Perhaps this is why the adage *pay now or pay more
    later* so appropriately describes the dilemma with which the military
    services are repeatedly confronted when making difficult investment
    decisions. The military services will continue to pay dearly for their
    limited corrosion prevention efforts and will be increasingly challenged
    to find the funds for ongoing operations, maintenance, and new systems
    acquisitions.

    Recommendations for In an effort to improve current military approaches to
    corrosion control,

    Executive Action the Bob Stump Defense Authorization Act of 2003 requires
    the department

    to develop and implement a long- term strategy to mitigate the effects of
    corrosion in military equipment and infrastructure. If properly crafted,
    this strategy can become an important means of managing corrosion control

    efforts and addressing the problems and limitations of these efforts as
    described in this report.

    To craft an effective strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
    direct that the department*s strategic plan for corrosion prevention and
    mitigation include the following:

     develop standardized methodologies for collecting and analyzing
    corrosion cost, readiness, and safety data;

     develop clearly defined goals, outcome- oriented objectives, and
    performance measures that show progress toward achieving objectives (these
    measures should include such elements as the expected return on investment
    and realized net savings of prevention projects);

     identify the level of resources needed to accomplish goals and
    objectives;

     establish mechanisms to coordinate and oversee prevention and mitigation
    projects in an interservice and servicewide context.

    To provide greater assurances that the department*s strategic plan will be
    successfully implemented, we recommend that the secretaries of each of the
    services

    * develop servicewide strategic plans that are consistent with the goals,
    objectives, and measures in the departmentwide plan and  establish
    procedures and milestones to hold major commands and

    program offices that manage specific weapon systems and facilities
    accountable for achieving the strategic goals.

    Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred
    with our recommendations. The comments are included in this report in

    appendix III. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which we
    incorporated as appropriate. In its technical comments, DOD did not concur
    with our finding that the department does not have an effective approach
    to prevent and mitigate corrosion. DOD noted that the department develops
    and incorporates prevention and mitigation strategies appropriate to DOD*s
    national defense mission within various constraints associated with
    operational needs, affordable maintenance schedules, environmental
    regulations, and other statutory requirements. DOD noted that corrosion is
    one of many issues that must be managed and incorporated into an overall
    defense mission. DOD also noted that it continually endeavors to improve
    its ability to manage corrosion through

    advanced research, upgrading of systems and facilities, application of new
    materials, processes and products and continuous information sharing. Our
    report recognizes and mentions DOD's efforts and successes with corrosion
    mitigation. However, we believe that DOD lacks an effective approach to
    deal with corrosion since it lacks an overall strategy, has limited
    coordination within and among the services, and conflicting incentives and
    priorities. As we noted in our report, the current DOD approach has led to
    readiness and safety issues as well as billions of dollars of corrosion-
    related maintenance costs for DOD and the services annually.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
    Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
    congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
    upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
    the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

    Please contact me on (202) 512- 8365 if you or your staff have any
    questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were
    Allan Roberts, Allen Westheimer, Dorian Dunbar, Sarah Prehoda, Sandra
    Sokol, and

    Susan Woodward. William M. Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and
    Management

    Appendi Appendi xes I x Scope and Methodology Our study focused on how the
    military services implement and manage corrosion prevention and control
    efforts for both equipment and infrastructure. To perform our review, we
    contacted corrosion control offices and officials in each of the four
    military services. We also reviewed studies and discussed military
    corrosion issues with experts within and outside the Department of Defense
    (DOD). To develop an in- depth understanding of how corrosion prevention
    projects are initiated and managed, we visited field installations and
    developed case studies on corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts. We
    also contacted and obtained information from DOD, services headquarters,
    materiel

    management, research and development, logistics, systems acquisitions,
    safety, and installation management and maintenance organizations.

    To determine the extent of the military services* corrosion problems, we
    reviewed numerous studies and contacted experts in both government and
    private industry. We contacted and obtained information from DOD, military
    service headquarters, strategic planning, research and development,
    systems acquisitions, materiel management, logistics, safety, and
    installation management and maintenance organizations. We also attended
    the U. S. Navy and Industry Rust 2002 Corrosion Technology and Exchange
    Conference, and we reviewed papers and presentations of other service and
    private industry corrosion conferences and forums. In addition, we
    contacted private industry suppliers, consultants, and research
    organizations. We contacted the following research organizations to obtain
    information regarding the extent of military service corrosion problems:

     National Research Council  National Materials Advisory Board  NCI
    Information Systems, Inc.  CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc.  American
    Power Jet Company  Science Applications International Corporation
    Battelle Laboratories  Calibre Systems, Inc.

     Sandia National Laboratories  Metals Information Analysis Center
    Center for Army Analysis  Joint Council on Aging Aircraft  Services
    Command Corrosion Assessments and Surveys  Services Corrosion Prevention
    and Advisory Boards  Services Science and Technology Advisor Programs
    Services Corrosion Conferences and Forums To determine the extent to which
    DOD and the military services have an effective approach to corrosion
    control, we interviewed officials and obtained documentation from the four
    military services* corrosion

    control program offices for equipment and infrastructure. For equipment,
    these included the Army Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, the Air
    Force Corrosion Prevention and Control Office, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA
    Corrosion Prevention and Control Programs, and the Marine Corps Corrosion
    and Prevention Program. For infrastructure we

    contacted the Army Corps of Engineers and Department of Public Works, the
    Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, and the Naval Facilities
    Engineering Service Center Command. We also contacted and obtained
    information from DOD, service headquarters, strategic planning, materiel
    command, and field command officials. We reviewed corrosion prevention and
    control plans, policies, procedures, instructions, regulations, studies,
    trip reports, memos, and other forms of documentation. We also visited
    selected military bases, where we held discussions with unit commanders,
    facilities engineering and maintenance officials, and users of DOD
    equipment such as aircraft, ships, tanks, trucks, and support equipment,
    including discussions with operators, logistics, and maintenance

    personnel. We interviewed officials and gathered data at the following
    installations in California and Hawaii:

    California  Fort Irwin Army Base  Los Angeles Air Force Base  March Air
    Force Reserve Base  North Island Naval Air Station  Point Mugu Naval Air
    Station  Port Hueneme Naval Base  Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton
    Marine Corps Air Station Miramar

    Hawaii  Fort Shafter Army Base  Schofield Barracks Army Base  Wheeler
    Army Air Field  Diamond Head Complex, Hawaii Army National Guard  Pearl
    City Unit Training and Equipment Site, Hawaii Army

    National Guard  Hickam Air Force Base  Pearl Harbor Naval Complex
    Lualualei Naval Magazine  Marine Corps Air Facility Kaneohe Bay  Marine
    Corps Camp H. M. Smith We conducted our review from August 2002 through
    April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards.

    Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts

    Appendi I I x That Have Not Realized Their Full Potential Durable Coatings
    for The Navy has over 11, 700 tanks, such as ballast, fuel, and potable
    water Tanks on Navy Ships

    tanks, on all of its surface vessels and submarines. Because of their
    constant exposure to salt and moisture, these tanks rapidly lose their
    exterior and interior protective coatings and begin to corrode. Although
    maintenance personnel spend considerable time and resources removing as
    much of the visible corrosion as possible and repainting while the ship is
    deployed, some of the work cannot be accomplished until the ship returns
    to its home port and undergoes scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.
    Maintaining the tanks is labor intensive, costly, and extends the amount
    of

    time ships must spend undergoing maintenance, thereby reducing their
    operational availability. Naval Sea Systems Command has developed coating
    systems that are expected to last 20 years instead of the 5 years that
    existing coatings last. According to the Navy, the effort could
    potentially save more than $170 million a year in maintenance costs. The
    initiative appears to be somewhat successful, because the Navy reports
    that it has achieved net savings of about $10 million a year. However, in
    the past several years, the Navy has installed the new coatings on only
    about 750 tanks, or less than 7 percent of the total. Navy officials
    attribute the slow pace to the fleet placing higher priorities on other
    needs, and explained that they often must defer the installation of the
    new coatings because of the limited availability of ships due to increased
    optempo and

    more pressing maintenance requirements. Navy officials added that because
    of higher operational and maintenance priorities, resources in the form of
    funding and manpower usually go to these needs instead of prevention
    efforts such as tank coatings. These officials told us that the

    shipyards that perform most of the maintenance for the fleet have
    difficulty trying to complete the work currently scheduled with available
    resources and would be further challenged by having to add the application
    of new coatings to their existing workload. In addition, the officials
    told us that there is limited incentive for shipyard maintenance workers
    to carry out preventive projects that show benefits only in later years
    instead of completing more immediate repairs that show more immediate
    benefits.

    Army National The Army National Guard maintains a wide range of equipment
    that

    Guard Controlled includes M1 tanks, howitzers, air defense artillery
    systems, and radars.

    This equipment is susceptible to corrosion, and one of the primary causes
    Humidity Preservation

    of corrosion is humidity. The Army National Guard estimates it could
    achieve cost savings totaling more than $1.6 billion over 10 years by
    storing its equipment in short- and long- term controlled- humidity
    preservation centers. Depending on the type of equipment, some will be

    stored in long- term facilities and some will be stored for the short-
    term. Equipment that is not required for regular training use will be
    preserved in metal shelters for an average of 3 years, while equipment for
    which there is a recurring need will be preserved by installing
    dehumidifying air ducts in

    crew compartments and other vehicle spaces. The project, which started in
    1997, is expected to have a return on investment of over 9 to 1. According
    to Army National Guard officials, through the end of fiscal year 2002, the
    project has achieved a total of $225 million in cost savings. While Army

    officials state that the project has proven to be a success so far, they
    now estimate that it will take about 15 years to accomplish the total
    projected savings, or 5 years longer than originally planned. They
    attribute the delay to other needs being given a higher priority and, as a
    result, not receiving the necessary funds and having to defer the
    installation of some controlled- humidity centers. These officials still
    expect to acquire and install all of the facilities, but at a slower pace.
    They acknowledge

    that the delay will likely mean deferring a significant amount of cost
    savings* perhaps as much as $100 million* for several years.

    Fly Ash in Concrete airfield pavements for all of the military services
    have

    Concrete Airfields experienced cracking and expansion that pose
    significant safety hazards,

    impair readiness, and increase maintenance costs. One of the causes of
    this deterioration results from a corrosive chemical reaction called
    alkali- silica reaction, which occurs when alkalis react with water in
    ways that cause cracking, chipping, and expansion of concrete. Examples of
    this kind of damage have been reported at facilities for all military
    services, such as Osan Air Base, Korea; Ft. Campbell Army Airfield,
    Kentucky; Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California; and Marine Corps Air
    Station, Iwakuni, Japan. The foreign object debris hazard caused by
    cracking and crumbling concrete was so severe that the Air Mobility
    Command assessed a taxiway at Little Rock Air Force Base as unsuitable for
    use. While the military services do not have cost estimates, DOD
    facilities officials told us that significant resources are spent each
    year on mitigating the effects of alkali- silica reaction.

    The Navy determined that one way to mitigate the effects of alkali- silica
    reaction in the future is to substitute fly ash for a certain amount of
    cement. According to a Navy study, the use of fly ash increases the
    strength and

    durability of cement structures such as airfields. Navy officials told us
    that this mitigation would increase the operational availability of
    airfields because the facilities would experience less cracking and
    chipping and, therefore, pose fewer foreign object debris hazards. While
    the Navy did not

    perform the analysis, these officials told us that perhaps the greatest
    benefit would be the savings that would result from a marked reduction in
    manpower needed for maintenance. The study did not include cost savings or
    a return on investment analysis because its focus was on the causes of and
    methods for mitigating the deterioration. The study did note that fly ash
    substitution could save the Navy about $4 million a year in construction
    costs because the material is less expensive than the kinds of cement
    currently being used. Navy officials told us that their understanding of
    the overall benefits is convincing enough that the use of fly ash is
    required for all Navy and Marine Corps construction projects that include
    pavements.

    The Air Force recommends the use of fly ash, but only in certain
    circumstances. Air Force officials told us that requiring the use of fly
    ash for all construction projects is not feasible because fly ash is not
    available at all locations where the Air Force has facilities, and the
    additional cost and time involved in transporting the material to these
    places may be greater than the benefits from using it. However, Air Force
    officials acknowledge that they have not done a return- on- investment
    analysis that includes construction and maintenance costs, and additional
    information like this would be very useful in making decisions regarding
    the use of fly ash.

    The services continue to study the effects of alkali- silica reaction and
    what to do about them. However, due to limited funding, efforts to
    identify feasible comprehensive solutions to the entire problem for all
    military services have been delayed. In the meantime, airfields continue
    to decay, resulting in high maintenance costs as well as restricted use.

    Army Corrosion Corrosion damage to tactical wheeled vehicles and ground
    equipment is

    Inhibitors costly and prolongs equipment downtime. According to officials
    of the

    Army Materiel Command, seawater that seeps into the inner cavities of
    equipment that is being transported overseas causes serious corrosion
    damage and represents the highest risk to the command. The equipment then
    decays rapidly in humid environments.

    This kind of corrosion damage was so extensive that in 1998 the Commanding
    General U. S. Army Pacific requested that all ground vehicles shipped to
    his command be treated with rust inhibitors. Army data indicated that 17
    percent of the Army trucks in Hawaii were so corroded that performance of
    their missions was impaired. In 1999, the

    Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii indicated that
    unit readiness was in serious jeopardy and requested funding for several
    corrosion control projects, including one to treat an estimated 3,000
    remaining vehicles with corrosion inhibitors. Army testing had
    demonstrated that corrosion inhibitors, compared to other products,
    provided a high degree of corrosion protection and enough
    corrosionreducing

    potential to warrant beginning their limited use. Initial estimates
    indicated a return on investment of 4 to 1 for every dollar spent.

    In 2000, the Army awarded a contract for approximately $400,000 to treat
    3,000 vehicles over a period of 12 months. The contract was later doubled,
    increasing costs to nearly $900, 000 for 6,000 vehicles over a period of
    24 months. Army officials plan to analyze the information obtained on the
    performance of the product before deciding whether to continue using it or
    expand the effort to other locations. The Army has over 341,000 tactical
    vehicles and pieces of ground support equipment worldwide, as well as 3,
    770 airframes, and a significant amount of this equipment is exposed to
    harsh, corrosion- inducing environments.

    The Army originally planned to establish an all- purpose, full service
    corrosion control center to repair corrosion damage, as well as provide
    preventative corrosion- inhibitor treatments. The center, which would have
    had multiple service bays and wash racks would have processed more than
    15, 000 vehicles per year, was to have been used by all the military
    services in Hawaii. However, the center is currently only being used by
    the Army as a corrosion- inhibitor application facility. 1 In addition, a
    lack of coordination

    exists within the individual services. For example, at an Army National
    Guard facility in Hawaii officials told us that they were not aware of the
    status of the Army*s corrosion- inhibitor application facility but that
    they would be interested in finding out more about it, the application of
    corrosion inhibitors, and participating in the project.

    Air Force Bomb The Air Force stores about 450,000 cast iron general-
    purpose bombs

    Metalization in locations throughout the world. The bombs are estimated to
    have

    a replacement cost exceeding $1 billion. Many of the locations are in
    high- humidity environments that contribute to corrosion. As of February
    2003, more than 107,000 of these bombs, or 24 percent,

    1 The services could not reach agreement on location, funding, and
    standard application procedures.

    have been assessed as being no longer mission capable because of excessive
    corrosion. The Air Force acquires new bombs and repairs existing ones so
    that it will have enough mission- capable bombs to meet its requirements.
    The Air Force spends about $7 million a year for corrosion protection of
    cast iron general- purpose bombs. Until 1996, all the bombs were renovated
    by maintenance personnel who removed any signs of corrosion and recoated
    them with liquid paint. The bombs would undergo this labor- intensive
    process every 3 to 8 years. In 1996, the Air Force converted a bomb
    renovation plant at Kadena Air Base, Japan, from a

    facility that used liquid paint to one that used a metal wire arc spray
    technique that is otherwise known as metalization. The plant conversion
    cost about $3 million. A metal wire arc spray coating is expected to

    preserve cast iron bombs for 30 years, or about 25 years longer than
    liquid paint. By using this preservation method, the Air Force estimates
    saving maintenance costs of $30 to $100 million over 30 years, resulting
    in a return on investment ratio of 20 to 1. The plant successfully
    renovated about 8,000 bombs. Based on previous successes, the Air Force
    decided to acquire and install mobile versions of the Kadena unit in other
    locations. In 2000, a prototype of the Mobile Bomb Renovation System was
    acquired and installed at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, at a cost of
    about

    $2 million. About 500 bombs received the metal arc spray coating at Guam
    before the system experienced equipment failures. To date, the system
    remains inoperable. The Army has also refurbished and metalized about 6,
    500 bombs for the Air Force.

    Air Force studies show that although the metal arch spray coating process
    is more expensive than the use of liquid paint, it greatly minimizes the
    risk that bombs will need costly maintenance or deteriorate so severely
    that

    they will need replacing. Despite these benefits, about 3 percent of Air
    Force bombs have been treated with this coating process. While Air Force
    officials recommended that a much higher percentage of bombs receive this
    treatment, they explained that their role is mostly advisory, and the Air
    Force Material Command and Pacific Air Force Command together must
    determine the relative importance of the project, given other competing
    priorities.

    F- 16 Aircraft Although not visible, the corrosion of connectors on
    aircraft electronics

    Corrosion Inhibitors equipment is prevalent throughout DOD and a
    significant safety risk for

    aircraft in all military services. The resources spent on this kind of
    corrosion are so vast that it is estimated that the Air Force spends
    perhaps as much as $500 million a year on corrosion control on the F- 16
    fleet alone.

    The costs are high because of the significant amount of labor that is
    involved in locating and eliminating the often microscopic sources of
    corrosion on very sophisticated avionics equipment. Avionics corrosion has
    been a topic of major interest to the Air Force for several decades. This
    concern was particularly heightened in 1989, when the Air Force reported

    several F- 16 accidents caused by uncommanded fuel valve closures that
    were believed to have been caused by corrosion.

    For several decades, the Air Force has conducted extensive studies on the
    corrosion of aircraft avionics connectors and what should be done about
    it. In the 1990s, several studies recommended the use of certain
    lubricants that have the potential of eliminating connector corrosion on
    F- 16 aircraft, with estimated savings exceeding $500 million a year.
    Although the Air Force did not complete a return on investment analysis,
    the return would be very impressive, given the low cost of purchasing this
    off- the- shelf product. The Air Force has yet to take full advantage of
    these corrosioninhibiting lubricants, even though they appear to be widely
    available. While the use of such lubricants is recommended in the joint
    service technical manual on avionics corrosion control, it is not
    required. We were told that the Air Force would need to amend in detail
    more than 200 specific technical orders and job guides to require the use
    of lubricant to protect F- 16 aircraft electrical connectors, but progress
    in this area has been sluggish at best. 2 For every year that the Air
    Force does not require the use of the lubricants, the service loses the
    opportunity to avoid annual expenses that total hundreds of millions of
    dollars.

    Army Helicopter Conflicting incentives also impeded the Army*s efforts to
    obtain modern

    Rinse Facilities helicopter rinse facilities called *birdbaths.* According
    to the Army

    Aviation Corrosion Prevention and Control office, these facilities are
    expected to extend the life of costly aircraft components, reduce
    contractor man- hour expenditures, increase aircraft fleet readiness, and
    provide an added margin of crew safety. The project is estimated to cost
    $12 million for startup and $400 thousand per year in operating costs.
    Even more notable was the analysis showing a 31 to 1 return on investment,
    with the investment costs recouped within 2 years. Citing opportunities to
    implement and promote effective corrosion control, the

    2 The F- 15 aircraft program has established a pilot program requiring use
    of corrosion inhibiting lubricants on electrical connectors during
    flightline depot maintenance by simply mandating the recommended use as
    stated in the joint service avionics technical manual.

    Army recommended identification of locations and deployment areas for
    establishing birdbath rinse facilities. Despite the potential benefits,
    the project has not received funding to date. Army officials told us that
    the project cannot compete with efforts that have a higher priority, and
    they have deferred the request for funds until fiscal year 2005. The
    Army*s attempt to obtain funding for a birdbath facility in Hawaii
    suffered the

    same fate. During our field visit to Hawaii, we were told that for a
    number of years a birdbath facility was included in a list of projects
    that required funding, but the facility never received the funds because
    other operational needs were considered to have a higher priority. Army
    officials said that funding more pressing operational needs almost always
    takes precedence over funding projects that have a strong potential to
    avoid future

    maintenance costs.

    Appendi I I I x Comments from the Department of Defense (350219)

    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the
    limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services,
    current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion
    has a substantial impact on military equipment and infrastructure. In
    2001, a government- sponsored study estimated the costs of corrosion for
    military systems and infrastructure at about $20 billion annually and
    found corrosion to be one of the largest components of life- cycle costs
    for weapon systems. Corrosion also reduces readiness because the need to
    repair or replace corrosion damage increases the downtime of critical
    military assets. For example, a recent study concluded that corrective
    maintenance of corrosionrelated faults has degraded the readiness of all
    of the Army*s approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters.
    Finally, a number of serious safety concerns have also been associated
    with corrosion, including Navy F- 14 and F- 18 landing gear failures
    during carrier operations and crashes of several Air Force F- 16 aircraft
    due to the corrosion of electrical contacts that

    control fuel valves. DOD and the military services do not have an
    effective approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion. They have had some
    successes in addressing corrosion problems on individual programs, but
    several weaknesses are preventing DOD and the military services from
    achieving much greater benefits, including potentially billions of dollars
    in additional net savings annually. Each service has multiple corrosion
    offices, and their different policies, procedures, and funding channels
    limit coordination. Also, the goals and incentives that guide these
    offices sometimes conflict with those of the operational commands that
    they rely on to fund project implementation. As a result, proposed
    projects are often assigned a lower priority compared to efforts offering
    more immediate results. Together, these problems reduce the effectiveness
    of DOD corrosion prevention. While DOD is in the process of establishing a
    central corrosion control activity and strategy, it remains to be seen
    whether these efforts will effectively address these weaknesses. Examples
    of Corrosion Damage in the South Pacific

    Left: Corroded 500- pound bombs, Guam. Right: Corroding bridge column,
    Pearl Harbor.

    The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and infrastructure
    worth billions of dollars in many environments where corrosion is causing
    military assets to deteriorate, shortening their useful life. The
    resulting

    increase in required repairs and replacements drives up costs and takes
    critical systems out of action, reducing mission readiness.

    GAO was asked to review military activities related to corrosion control.
    Specifically, this report examines the extent of the impact of corrosion
    on DOD and the

    military services and the extent of the effectiveness of DOD*s and the
    services* approach to preventing and mitigating corrosion. The
    departmentwide strategic plan currently being developed should contain
    clearly defined goals; measurable, outcome- oriented objectives; and
    performance

    measures. The strategy should also identify standardized methods for
    evaluating project proposals, estimating resource needs, and coordinating
    projects in an interservice and servicewide

    context. The military services should develop overarching strategic plans
    consistent with the departmentwide plan. In written comments, DOD agreed
    with all of these recommendations.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 753. To view the full product,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact William Solis at (202) 512- 8365 or solisw@ gao. gov.
    Highlights of GAO- 03- 753, a report to

    Congressional Committees

    July 2003

    DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

    Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase Readiness

    Page i GAO- 03- 753 Defense Management

    Contents

    Contents

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    Page 1 GAO- 03- 753 Defense Management United States General Accounting
    Office Washington, D. C. 20548

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

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    Appendix II

    Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
    Realized Their Full Potential

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    Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
    Realized Their Full Potential

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    Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
    Realized Their Full Potential

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    Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
    Realized Their Full Potential

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    Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
    Realized Their Full Potential

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    Appendix II Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
    Realized Their Full Potential

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    Appendix III

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