Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve
Enclaves (27-JUN-03, GAO-03-723).				 
                                                                 
While four previous base closure rounds have afforded the	 
Department of Defense (DOD) the opportunity to divest itself of  
unneeded property, it has, at the same time, retained more than  
350,000 acres and nearly 20 million square feet of facilities on 
enclaves at closed or realigned bases for use by the reserve	 
components. In view of the upcoming 2005 base closure round, GAO 
undertook this review to ascertain if opportunities exist to	 
improve the decision-making processes used to establish reserve  
enclaves. Specifically, GAO determined to what extent (1)specific
infrastructure needs for reserve enclaves were identified as part
of base realignment and closure decision making and (2) estimated
costs to operate and maintain enclaves were considered in	 
deriving net estimated savings for realigning or closing bases.  
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-723 					        
    ACCNO:   A07402						        
  TITLE:     Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future
Reserve Enclaves						 
     DATE:   06/27/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Base closures					 
	     Base realignments					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Military bases					 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Projections					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Decision making					 

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GAO-03-723

Report to the Secretary of Defense

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2003 MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves

GAO- 03- 723

The specific infrastructure needed for many DOD reserve enclaves created
under the previous base realignment and closure process was generally not
identified until after a defense base closure commission had rendered its
recommendations. While the Army generally decided it wanted much of the
available training land for its enclaves before the time of the
commission*s decision making during the 1995 closure round, time
constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying specific training
acreages and facilities until later. Subsequently, in some instances the
Army created enclaves that were nearly as large as the bases that were
being closed. In contrast, the infrastructure needed for Air Force reserve
enclaves was more defined during the decision- making process. Moreover,
DOD*s enclave- planning processes generally did not include a cross-
service analysis of military activities that may have benefited by their
inclusion in a nearby enclave.

The Army did not include estimated costs to operate and maintain its
reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated base realignment or closure
savings during the decision- making process, but the Air Force apparently
did so in

forming its enclaves. GAO*s analysis showed that the Army overestimated
savings and underestimated the time required to recoup initial investment
costs to either realign or close those bases with proposed enclaves.
However, these original cost omissions have not materially affected DOD*s
recent estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings from the
previous closure rounds because the Army subsequently updated its
estimates in its budget submissions to reflect expected enclave costs.

Major Reserve Component Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC Rounds

While four previous base closure rounds have afforded the Department of
Defense (DOD) the opportunity to divest itself of unneeded property, it
has, at the same time, retained more than 350, 000 acres and nearly 20
million

square feet of facilities on enclaves at closed or realigned bases for use
by the reserve components. In view of the upcoming 2005 base closure

round, GAO undertook this review to ascertain if opportunities exist to
improve the decision- making processes used to establish reserve enclaves.
Specifically, GAO determined to what extent (1) specific infrastructure
needs

for reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment and
closure decision making and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain
enclaves were considered in deriving net estimated savings for realigning
or closing bases.

As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for 2005,
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense provide the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission with data that clearly specify the (1)
infrastructure needed for any proposed reserve enclaves and (2) estimated
costs

to operate and maintain such enclaves. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD agreed with the recommendations.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 723. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Barry Holman at (202) 512- 8412 or holmanb@ gao. gov.
Highlights of GAO- 03- 723, a report to the

Secretary of Defense

June 2003

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves

Page i GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 4 Infrastructure Needs of Many Enclaves Not Identified Until
after BRAC Decision Making 8 Many Initial Base Savings Estimates Did Not
Account for Projected

Enclave Costs 17 Conclusions 20 Recommendations for Executive Action 20
Agency Comments 21 Scope and Methodology 21 Appendix I General Description
of Major Reserve Component Enclaves (Pre- BRAC and Post- BRAC) 24

Appendix II Reserve Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC Rounds 26

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 27

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 29

Tables

Table 1: DOD Pre- BRAC and Post BRAC Base Acreage and Facilities for Bases
Where Major Reserve Enclaves Were Created 11 Table 2: Estimated Annual
Costs to Operate and Maintain Selected

Army Reserve Enclaves 18 Table 3: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring
Savings and Payback Periods for Selected Bases with Reserve Enclaves 18
Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures Figures

Figure 1: Major Reserve Component Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC
Rounds 7 Figure 2: Property Layout of the Former March Air Force Base 15
Figure 3: Navy Compound at March Air Reserve Base 16 Abbreviations

BRAC base realignment and closure COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions

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Page 1 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

June 27, 2003 The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary: Since 1988, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
undergone four rounds of base realignments and closures and has reportedly
reduced its base infrastructure by about 20 percent, saving billions of
dollars in the process. While the closure process has afforded DOD the
opportunity to divest itself of property it no longer needed 1 to meet its
national security requirements, it has, at the same time, retained more
than 350,000 acres of land and nearly 20 million square feet of
facilities, typically referred to as enclaves, 2 on closed or realigned
bases for use by the reserve components. Most of the larger enclaves were
established during the 1995 round of base closures and are now managed by
either the Army National Guard or Army Reserve rather than the active
component.

We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities as
authorized by 31 U. S. C. S: 717 and are providing it to you because of
your responsibilities in the upcoming base closure round authorized for
2005. 3 In view of this round, we undertook this review to ascertain if
opportunities exist to improve the planning and decision- making processes
that were used to establish reserve enclaves in the previous closure
rounds. Specifically, our objectives were to determine to what extent (1)
specific infrastructure needs (e. g., needs for acreage and facilities)
for reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment and
closure decision making in previous closure rounds and (2) estimated

1 DOD reported that, as of December 2002, it had disposed of about 272,000
acres (53 percent) of an approximately 511,000 acres that it had
identified during the previous base closure rounds as unneeded and being
made available to others for reuse.

2 See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1995 Report to the
President (Washington D. C.: July 1, 1995), B- 2. An enclave is *a section
of a military installation that remains intact from that part which is
closed or realigned and which will continue with its current role and
functions subject to specific modifications.*

3 A single round of base realignments and closures in 2005 was authorized
with the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

costs to operate and maintain enclaves were considered in deriving the net
estimated savings for realigning or closing bases.

In performing our work, we focused our attention on the processes used by
the department to define infrastructure needs for major 4 reserve enclaves
for the Army in the 1995 round and for the Air Force in the earlier
rounds. We did not validate the need for any of the department*s enclaves
nor the specific infrastructure needs for those enclaves. Of the 10 major

reserve enclaves created during the previous closure rounds, 7 are within
the Army and 3 are within the Air Force. Neither the Navy nor the Marines
have formed a major enclave (see app. I for a brief description of DOD*s
major reserve component enclaves). We visited five major Army enclaves*
Fort Hunter Liggett, California; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort Pickett,
Virginia; Fort McClellan, Alabama; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania*
that were created during the 1995 closure round and account for nearly 90
percent, or more than 310,000 acres, of DOD*s total major reserve
component enclave acreage. We also visited two of three major Air Force
enclaves at Grissom Air Reserve Base in Indiana (a 1991 round action) and
March Air Reserve Base in California (a 1993 round

action). We also visited a smaller Air Force enclave at Rickenbacker Air
National Guard Base in Ohio (a 1991 round action) to gain a perspective on
Air Guard enclave formation processes. Our review efforts were constrained
by the limited availability of officials (owing to the passage of time)
who had participated in previous rounds of base closure

decision making and the general lack of planning documentation regarding
enclave infrastructure needs and estimated costs.

The specific infrastructure needed for many reserve enclaves was generally
not identified until after the base closure and realignment commission for
a closure round had rendered its recommendations. According to Army
officials, while the Army had generally decided it wanted much of the
available training land for its enclaves prior to completion of commission
decision making during the 1995 round, time constraints precluded the Army
from fully identifying specific training acreages and facility needs until
after the commission made its recommendations. Consequently, while some of
the commission*s

4 For the purpose of this report, we defined *major* as exceeding 500
acres. The amount of acreage has no bearing on the relative importance of
the missions being performed at these or other enclave locations. Results
in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

recommendation language 5 for the 1995 closure round suggested that many
Army reserve enclaves would be small, it was nevertheless sufficiently
general to allow, in practice, the Army wide flexibility in creating such
enclaves. Subsequently, the Army created several enclaves that were nearly
as large as the closing bases on which they were located. In contrast, the
infrastructure needed for Air Force enclaves was more defined during the
decision- making process and subsequent commission recommendations were
more specific than those provided for the Army. Moreover, the department*s
enclave- planning processes generally did not include a cross- service
analysis of the needs of military activities or

organizations near the enclaves that may have benefited by inclusion in
them. Without more complete data regarding the extent of needed enclave
infrastructure and cross- service needs* important considerations in the
decision- making process, the risk continues that a future base closure
commission will not have sufficient information to make informed judgments
on the establishment of proposed enclaves, including informed decisions on
the facility needs of these enclaves, decisions that can affect expected
closure costs and savings. Nor can the department be assured

that it is taking advantage of opportunities to achieve operational,
economic, and security benefits* such as enhanced readiness, savings, and
enhanced force protection* that cross- servicing can provide. However, the
department recently issued guidance for the upcoming base closure round
that addresses the potential benefits of considering crossservice needs in
its infrastructure analyses.

Although the Army did not include estimated costs to operate and maintain
most of its major reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated base savings
during the decision- making process, the Air Force apparently did so in
forming its enclaves. The Army Audit Agency reported in 1997 6 that about
$28 million in estimated annual costs to operate and maintain four of the
Army*s major enclaves were not considered in the bases* savings
calculations as part of the 1995 closure round. Our analysis showed that
the omission of these costs had a significant impact on the estimated

5 See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1995 Report. The
report recommendation language generally provided that the Army bases be
*closed, except that minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training
areas* be retained for reserve component use.

6 U. S. Army Audit Agency, Base Realignment and Closure: 1995 Savings
Estimates,

Audit Report AA97- 225 (Washington, D. C.: July 31, 1997).

Page 4 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

savings and payback periods 7 *important considerations in the realignment
and closure decision- making process* for several of these bases. In
particular, the estimated savings were overstated and the estimated
payback periods were understated for those specific bases. For example, if
expected enclave costs would have been considered at one Army location,
the annual recurring savings estimate for the base would have been reduced
by over 50 percent. However, these original cost omissions have not
materially affected the department*s recent estimate of $6.6 billion in
annual recurring savings from the previous closure rounds because the Army
has subsequently updated its savings estimates to reflect expected enclave
costs. On the other hand, Air Force officials told us that it had
considered expected costs to operate and maintain its proposed reserve
enclaves in deriving its base closure savings estimates. 8 We were unable
to verify this point, however, because of the passage of

time and lack of available supporting documentation. In the absence of
more complete data regarding cost and net savings estimates, a base
closure commission may be placed in the position of recommending
realignment or closure actions without sufficient information on the
financial implications of those proposed actions. We are making
recommendations that are intended to ensure that data

provided to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission for 2005
round actions clearly specify enclave needs and costs to operate and
maintain any proposed enclaves. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DOD concurred with our recommendations.

To enable DOD to more readily close unneeded bases and realign others to
meet its national security requirements, the Congress enacted base
realignment and closure (BRAC) legislation that instituted base closure
rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. A special commission established for
the 1988 round made recommendations to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and House of Representatives. For the remaining rounds, special
BRAC commissions were set up to recommend specific base realignments and
closures to the President, who in turn sent the

7 A payback period is the time required for cumulative estimated savings
to exceed the cumulative estimated costs incurred as a result of
implementing BRAC actions. 8 An exception is the commission- recommended
enclave on the former Homestead Air Force Base; DOD did not submit this as
a recommendation to the commission and therefore had not considered any
costs related to this action in its submission. Background

Page 5 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

commissions* recommendations with his approval to the Congress. The four
commissions generated nearly 500 recommendations* on 97 major base
closures and hundreds of realignments and smaller closures.

As a result of the BRAC process, DOD has reported that it reduced its
infrastructure 9 by about 20 percent; has transferred over half of the
approximately 511,000 acres of unneeded property to other federal and
nonfederal users and continues work on transferring the remainder; and
generated about $16.7 billion in estimated savings through fiscal year
2001, with an estimated $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings expected
thereafter. 10 We and others who have conducted reviews of BRAC savings
have found that the DOD*s savings are substantial, although imprecise, and
should be viewed as rough approximations of the likely savings. 11 Under
the property disposal process, unneeded DOD BRAC property is

initially made available to other federal agencies for their use. After
the federal screening process has taken place, remaining property is
generally provided to state and local governments for public benefit and
economic development purposes. In other cases, DOD has publicly sold its

unneeded property. Under the decision- making processes during the last 3
BRAC rounds, DOD assessed its bases or activities for closure or
realignment using an established set of eight criteria covering a broad
range of military, fiscal, environmental, and other considerations. DOD
subsequently forwarded its recommended list of proposed realignments and
closures to the BRAC Commission for its consideration in recommending
specific

9 The BRAC legislation* the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base
Realignment Act (P. L. 100- 526, as amended) for the 1988 round and the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P. L. 101- 510, as
amended) for the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds* was applicable to military
installations in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U. S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any
other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. 10 See
U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: Progress in

Completing Actions from Previous Realignments and Closures, GAO- 02- 433
(Washington, D. C.: Apr. 5, 2002). 11 See GAO- 02- 433 and U. S. General
Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: DOD*s Updated Net Savings
Estimate Remains Substantial, GAO- 01- 971 (Washington D. C.: July 31,
2001); Congressional Budget Office, Review of the Report of the Department
of

Defense on Base Realignment and Closure (Washington D. C.: July 1, 1998);
Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Cost
and Savings for 1993 Defense Realignments and Closures, Report No. 98- 130
(Washington D. C. May 6, 1998); and U. S. Army Audit Agency, Base
Realignment and Closure: 1995.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

realignments and closure actions. Although military value considerations
such as mission requirements and impact on operational readiness were
critical evaluation factors, potential costs and savings, along with
estimated payback periods associated with proposed closure or realignment
actions were also important factors in the assessment process. To assist
with the financial aspects of proposed actions, DOD and the BRAC
Commissions used a quantitative analytical model, frequently referred to
as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA), to provide decision
makers with a relative assessment of the potential costs, estimated
savings, and payback periods of proposed alternative realignment or
closure actions. Although the COBRA model was not designed to produce
budget- quality financial data, it was useful in providing a relative
financial comparison among potential alternative proposed base actions.
DOD generally provided improved financial data for each of the services in
its annual BRAC budget submission to the Congress following a BRAC
Commission*s recommendations. 12 The four previous BRAC Commissions
recommended 27 actions in

which either a reserve enclave or similar reserve presence was to be
formed at a base that was to be realigned or closed (see app. II). In many
instances, these actions were relatively minor in that they involved only
several acres, but in other cases the actions involved creating enclaves
with large acreages and millions of square feet of facilities under
reserve component management to conduct training for not only the reserve
component but also the active component as well. Figure 1 shows the
locations of DOD*s 10 major (i. e., sites exceeding 500 acres) reserve
component enclaves established under the previous BRAC rounds.

12 An exception to this involves the Air Force, which did not routinely
update its savings estimates from the COBRA model as part of BRAC decision
making.

Page 7 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Figure 1: Major Reserve Component Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC
Rounds

As shown in figure 1, the Army has 7 enclave locations; all of these
enclaves, with the exception of Fort Devens (a 1991 round action), were
created during the 1995 round. The Air Force has the remaining 3 enclaves:
Air Reserve* Grissom Air Reserve Base (a 1991 round action); Homestead Air
Reserve Base (a 1993 round action); and March Air Reserve Base (a 1993
round action). Neither the Navy nor the Marines created any major
enclaves. 13 13 We have excluded any joint reserve bases established by a
BRAC Commission, such as

the Navy- managed Joint Reserve Base- Ft. Worth in Texas, because they do
not conform to the definition of an enclave as previously defined.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Many of DOD*s specific enclave infrastructure needs were not identified
until after the commission for a BRAC round held its deliberations and had
rendered its recommendations. Although the Army*s enclave planning
process* particularly for the 1995 BRAC round* began before the issuance
of commission recommendations, 14 specificity of needed infrastructure was
not defined until after the recommendations were finalized. The subsequent
size of several of these enclaves was much greater than seemingly
reflected in commission recommendations that called for minimum essential
facilities and land for reserve use. On the other hand, the Air Force*s
planning process was reportedly further along and enclave needs were
better defined at the time the commission made its recommendations. In
addition, DOD*s enclave- planning processes generally did not include a
cross- service 15 analysis of the needs of military activities or
activities in the vicinity of a realigning or closing base with a proposed
enclave. As a result, the commission often held deliberations without the
benefit of some critical information, such as the extent of the enclave
infrastructure needed to support training and potential opportunities to
achieve benefits by collocating nearby reserve components on enclave
property.

While the Army*s enclave planning process for the 1995 round began
previous to completion of the BRAC Commission*s deliberations, specific
enclave infrastructure needs were not identified until after commission
recommendations had been issued on July 1, 1995. Army officials told us
that it was recognized early in the process that the Army wanted to retain
the majority of existing training land at some of its bases slated for
closure

or realignment that also served as reserve component maneuver training
locations, but time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying
specific enclave needs before the commission completed decision- making.
According to a 1999 DOD report on the effect of base closures on future
mobilization options, the retention of much of the Army maneuver training
acreage at the enclave locations served not only to meet current training
needs but also could serve, if necessary, as future maneuver bases with

new construction or renovation of existing facilities for an increased
force 14 This advance planning was based on the recommendations for an
enclave having already been included in the recommendations of the
Secretary of Defense, which were forwarded to the BRAC Commission for its
review. 15 Various service component (both active and reserve) units
travel to and conduct training at many reserve enclaves. Infrastructure
Needs

of Many Enclaves Not Identified Until after BRAC Decision Making

Army Enclave Infrastructure Needs Not As Well Defined As Those of the Air
Force during BRAC Decision Making

Page 9 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

structure. 16 In testimony before the commission, the Army had indicated
that much of the training land should be retained, but the Army was less
specific on the size and facility needs (i. e., in total square footage)
for the enclaves. Most facility needs fall within the enclaves* primary
infrastructure (or cantonment area) 17 necessary to operate and maintain
the enclaves.

The Army formed an officer- level committee* a *Council of Colonels** that
reviewed reserve component enclave proposals but did not approve them for
higher- level reviews until July 7, 1995* about 1 week after the BRAC
Commission had issued its recommendations. Following the Council of
Colonels* approval, a General Officer Steering Committee worked with the
Army reserve components to refine the infrastructure needs for the
enclaves, needs that the steering committee approved (except for Fort
Hunter Liggett 18 ) in October 1995*- more than 3 months following the
1995 BRAC Commission*s recommendations.

Although Army approval for most of its enclaves* infrastructure needs
occurred in late 1995, the number of acres and facilities for some
installations changed as various implementation plans took effect to
establish the enclaves. Changes occurred as a result of Army decisions and
community reuse plans for property disposed of by the department, as
illustrated in the following examples.

 At Fort Hunter Liggett, the number of facilities to be retained in the
enclave increased over time based on an Army decision to retain some of
the family housing (40 units); morale, welfare, and recreation facilities
(9 facilities) and other training- related facilities (3 barracks and 2
classrooms) that had originally been excluded from the enclave.  At Fort
McClellan, the expected cantonment area decreased considerably from an
initial proposal of about 10, 000 acres (excluding about 22,200

training- range acres) to about 286 acres in response to concerns raised
by the local community.

16 Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations), Report
on the Effect of Base Closures on Future Mobilization Options (Washington
D. C.: Nov. 10, 1999). 17 A cantonment area is that part of a base
containing the majority of the facilities and most areas that are not part
of the training areas. 18 The infrastructure needs for the Fort Hunter
Liggett enclave were not approved until November 1997.

Page 10 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

The Air Force*s enclave infrastructure needs were reportedly more defined
than those of the Army at the time of commission deliberation and decision
making. Air Force officials told us that the base evaluation process for
the 1991 and 1993 rounds* the rounds when the Air Force*s major reserve
enclaves were created* included a detailed analysis of the infrastructure
needed for the enclaves, including enclave size, identification of
required facilities, and expected costs to operate and maintain its
proposed enclaves prior to commission consideration of its proposals.
These officials did note that some revisions in the sizing of the enclaves
and associated enclave boundaries were minor and have occurred over time
as plans were further defined, but stated that these changes did not
materially affect enclave costs. Although documentation on the initial
plans was not available (due to the passage of time), we were able to
document some enclave revisions made after the issuance of the BRAC
Commissions* recommendations as follows:

 At March Air Reserve Base, the Air Force made at least 3 sets of
revisions to its enclave size which now encompasses 2,359 acres. These
revisions were relatively minor in scope, such as one revision that
expanded the boundaries by about 38 acres to provide a clear zone for
flight operations.  At Grissom Air Reserve Base, the Air Force has made
one revision* an

exchange of about 70 acres with the local redevelopment authority 19 *to
its enclave configuration, which now encompasses 1,380 acres. In addition,
base officials are negotiating with the redevelopment authority for
acquisition of a small parcel to improve force protection at the enclave*s
main gate.  At Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, the Guard made
several

revisions prior to reaching its current 168- acre enclave, including the
transfer of 3.5 acres of unneeded property to the local redevelopment
authority after the Guard relocated its fuel tanks for force protection
reasons.

The degree of specificity in a commission*s recommendation language for
proposed enclaves varied between the Army and the Air Force. In general,
the recommendation language for the Army*s 1995 round enclaves was

based largely on the Army*s proposed language, specifying that the bases
were to be closed, except that minimum essential ranges, facilities, and
training areas be retained for reserve component use. In contrast, for
Army and Air Force enclaves created in earlier rounds, the

19 A local redevelopment authority is the DOD- recognized local
organization whose role is to coordinate efforts of the community to reuse
assets of a former military base.

Page 11 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

recommendation language was more precise* even specifying specific
acreages to be retained in some cases.

Acting on the authority contained in the commissions* recommendations, the
Army and Air Force created enclaves that varied widely in size (i. e.,
from several acres to more than 164,000 acres). Table 1 provides a
comparison of the reported size and number of facilities of pre- BRAC
bases with those of post- BRAC enclaves for DOD*s 10 major enclaves.

Table 1: DOD Pre- BRAC and Post BRAC Base Acreage and Facilities for Bases
Where Major Reserve Enclaves Were Created Number of acres Square footage
of facilities Service Base Pre- BRAC Post- BRAC Percent Retained Pre- BRAC
Post- BRAC Percent

Retained

Army Fort Hunter Liggett 164,762 164,272 100 836,420 832,906 100 Fort
Chaffee 71,381 64,272 90 4,839,241 1,695,132 35 Fort Pickett 45,145 42,273
94 3,103,000 1,642,066 53 Fort Dix 30,997 30,944 100 8,645,293 7,246,964
84 Fort Indiantown Gap 17,797 17,227 97 4,388,000 1,565,726 36 Fort
McClellan 41,174 22,531 55 6,560,687 873,852 13 Fort Devens 9,930 5,226 53
5,610,530 1,537,174 27 Air Force March Air Force

Base 6,606 2,359 36 3,184,321 2,538,742 80 Grissom Air Force Base 2,722
1,380 51 3,910,171 1.023,176 26 Homestead Air Force Base 2,916 852 29
5,373,132 867,341 16

Total 394,430 351,386 89 46,450,795 19,823,079 43

Source: DOD. Note: *Major* reserve enclaves refer to those enclaves with
more than 500 acres. *Pre- BRAC* refers to base data at the time of the
BRAC Commission recommendation while *Post- BRAC* refers to enclave data
as of the end of fiscal year 2002. Percentages are rounded to nearest
whole number.

As shown in table 1, the vast majority* nearly 90 percent* of the pre-
BRAC land has been retained for the major reserve enclaves with most
enclaves residing in Army maneuver training sites (e. g., Forts Hunter
Liggett, Chaffee, Pickett, and Indiantown Gap). While the management of
these Army enclaves has generally shifted from the active to the reserve
component, the training missions at these Army bases have remained,
although the extent of use 20 has decreased slightly in some instances and

20 Comparative data on training day usage were not readily available at
the Ft. Devens location.

Page 12 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

increased in others (see app. I). On the other hand, the Air Force
enclaves are generally much smaller in acreage than those of the Army due
in large part to the departure of active Air Force organizations and
associated missions from the former bases. While the Army retained much of
the pre- BRAC acreage, it generally made greater reductions in the amount
of square footage for its enclave facilities. Many of these reductions
were due in part to the demolition of older unusable facilities built
during World War II, and the transfer of other facilities (such as family
housing activities once required for the departing active personnel) to
local redevelopment authorities. At Fort Indiantown Gap, for example, the
Army has reportedly demolished 349 facilities since the Army National
Guard assumed control of the base in 1998. As shown in table 1, the Air
Force significantly reduced the amount of its facilities* square footage
for 2 of its 3 major enclaves.

While the language of the 1995 BRAC Commission recommendations regarding
enclaves allowed the Army to form several enclaves of considerable size,
these enclaves are considerably larger than one might expect from the
language, which provided for minimum essential land and facilities for
reserve component use. In this regard, the Army*s Office of the Judge
Advocate General questioned proposed enclave plans during the planning
process. For example, the Judge Advocate General questioned Fort
Indiantown Gap and Fort Hunter Liggett enclave plans, 21 calling for
retention of essentially the entire former base while the commission*s
recommendation would suggest smaller enclaves comprising a section of the
base. Nonetheless, the Army approved the implementation plans based on
mission needs. Having more complete information regarding expected enclave
infrastructure would have provided previous commissions with an
opportunity to draft more precise recommendation language, if they chose
to do so, and produce decisions having greater clarity on enclave
infrastructure and expected costs and savings from the closure and
realignment actions.

21 See U. S. Army Judge Advocate General memorandum, Review of
Implementation Plan for Fort Indiantown Gap (Washington D. C.: Aug. 22,
1995) and U. S. Army Judge Advocate General memorandum, Legal Review of
Fort Hunter Liggett Facilities Utilization Plan

(Washington D. C.: Jan. 25, 1996). These memorandums were prepared for the
Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management in response to
his request for a review of plans to implement BRAC actions at these
specified locations.

Page 13 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

DOD generally did not consider cross- service needs of nearby military
activities in planning for many of its reserve enclaves, although their
inclusion may have been beneficial in terms of potential for increased
cost savings, force protection, or training reasons. While some other
reserve activities have subsequently relocated on either enclaves created
as part of the closure decision or later on former base property after it
was acquired by local redevelopment authorities, those relocations outside
enclave

boundaries have not necessarily been ideal for either DOD or the
communities surrounding the enclaves. Ideally, enclave planning analyses
would involve an integrated cross- service approach to forming enclaves
and enable DOD to maximize its opportunities for achieving operational,
economic, and security benefits while, at the same time, providing for the
interests of affected communities surrounding realigning or closing bases.

Officials at several Air Force bases we visited told us that while other
service and federal government organizations that had already resided on
the former bases may have been included in the enclaves, military
activities of other services in the local area were not generally
considered for possible inclusion in the proposed enclaves. These
officials told us that

these activities were either not approached for consideration or were not
considered due to service interests to minimize the size and relative
costs to operate and maintain the enclaves.

Following the formation of the enclaves, some additional reserve
activities have since relocated on either enclave or former base property.
Some have occupied available facilities on enclaves as tenants and are
afforded various benefits such as reduced operating costs, training
enhancements, or increased force protection. For example, a Navy Reserve
training

center, originally based in South Bend, Indiana, moved its operations to
an available facility at Grissom Air Reserve Base in August 2002 because
the activity could not meet force protection requirements at its previous
facilities in South Bend. After the move, the commander of the activity
told us that his personnel have experienced enhanced training
opportunities since they can now work closely with other military
activities on *hands- on* duties during weekend reserve drills. This
opportunity has led, in turn, to his assessment that both his recruiting
efforts and readiness have improved. Enclave Planning

Analyses Generally Did Not Consider Cross- Service Needs

Page 14 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

On the other hand, the relocation of some activities to the former base,
or those remaining on the former property outside the confines of the
enclave, has resulted in a less- than- ideal situation for both the
department and the communities surrounding the former base. For example,
at the

former March Air Force Base in California, other service activities from
the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy Reserve and Marine Corps
Reserve reside outside the enclave boundaries in a non- contiguous
arrangement. This situation, combined with the enclave itself and other
enclave *islands* established on the former base, has resulted in a
*checkerboard* effect, as shown in figure 2, of various military- occupied
property interspersed with community property on the former base.

Page 15 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Figure 2: Property Layout of the Former March Air Force Base

Note: Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserve properties are owned by DOD but
are not a part of the enclave.

Page 16 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Further, some of the activities located outside the enclave boundaries
have incurred expenses to erect security fences, as shown in figure 3, for
force protection purposes. These fences are in addition to the fence that
surrounds the main enclave area.

Figure 3: Navy Compound at March Air Reserve Base

Local redevelopment authority officials told us that a combination of
factors (including the dispersion of military property on the former base
along with the separate unsightly security fences) has made it very
difficult to market the remaining property.

In its April 16, 2003, policy guidance memorandum for the 2005 BRAC round,
DOD recognizes the benefits of the joint use of facilities. The memorandum
instructs the services to evaluate opportunities to consolidate or
relocate active and reserve components on any enclave of realigning and
closing bases where such relocations make operational and economic sense.
If the services adhere to this guidance in the upcoming round, we believe
it will not only benefit DOD but also will mitigate any

Page 17 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

potential adverse effects, such as the checkerboard base layout at the
former March Air Force Base, on community redevelopment efforts.

The estimated costs to operate and maintain the infrastructure for many of
the Army enclaves were not considered in calculating savings estimates for
bases with proposed enclaves during the decision- making process. As a
result, estimated realignment or closure costs and payback periods were
understated and estimated savings were overstated for those specific
bases. The Army subsequently updated its savings estimates in its
succeeding annual budget submissions to reflect estimated costs to operate
and maintain many of its enclaves. On the other hand, Air Force officials
told us that its estimated base closure savings were partially offset by
expected enclave costs, but documentation was insufficient to demonstrate
this statement. Because estimated costs and savings are an important
consideration in the closure and realignment decision- making process and
may impact specific commission recommendations, it is important that
estimates provided to the commission be as complete and accurate as
possible for its deliberations.

During the 1995 BRAC decision- making process, estimated savings for most
1995- round bases where Army enclaves were established did not reflect
estimated costs to operate and maintain the enclaves. The Army Audit
Agency reported in 1997 22 that about $28 million in estimated annual

costs to operate and maintain four major Army enclaves, 23 as shown in
table 2, were not considered in the bases* estimated savings calculations.
22 See U. S. Army Audit Agency, Base Realignment and Closure: 1995. 23 The
remaining two 1995 major enclaves* Fort Dix and Fort Hunter Liggett* were
not reviewed by the Army Audit Agency. An Army BRAC official told us that
enclave costs

were considered in deriving net savings estimates for Fort Dix but not for
Fort Hunter Liggett. Supporting documentation was unavailable to verify
this statement. Many Initial Base

Savings Estimates Did Not Account for Projected Enclave Costs

Army Enclave Costs Were Not Generally Considered in BRAC Decision- Making
Process

Page 18 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Table 2: Estimated Annual Costs to Operate and Maintain Selected Army
Reserve Enclaves

Dollars in millions Cost s Installation Maintenance Other support Total

Fort Chaffee $3.6 $3.2 $6.9

Fort Indiantown Gap 4.9 3.4 8.3

Fort McClellan 3.3 2.6 5.9

Fort Pickett 3.4 3.2 6.6 Total $15.2 $12.4 $27.7

Source: U. S. Army Audit Agency. Note: Estimated costs as reported by the
Army Audit Agency in fiscal year 1995 dollars. Totals may not add due to
rounding. a Other support costs include expenses for automated target
systems, environmental, personnel,

integrated training- area management, and security. Enclave costs are only
one of many costs that may be incurred by DOD in closing or realigning an
entire base. For example, other costs include expenditures for movement of
personnel and supplies to other locations and military construction for
facilities receiving missions from a realigning base. The extent of all
costs incurred have a direct bearing on the estimated savings and payback
periods associated with a particular closure or realignment. Table 3
provides the results of the Army Audit Agency*s review (which factored in
all costs) of the estimated savings and payback periods for the
realignment or closure of the same Army bases shown in table 2 where
enclaves were created. As shown in table 3, the commission*s annual
savings* estimates were overstated and the payback periods were
underestimated for these particular bases.

Table 3: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings and Payback
Periods for Selected Bases with Reserve Enclaves

Dollars in millions Estimated annual recurring savings Estimated payback
period Base 1995 BRAC Commission Army Audit Agency 1995 BRAC Commission
Army Audit Agency

Fort Chaffee $13.4 $1.4 1 year 18 years Fort Indiantown Gap 18.4 11.8
Immediate 1 year Fort McClellan 40.6 27.4 6 years 14 years Fort Pickett
21.8 5.9 Immediate 2 years

Total $94.2 $46.5 Sources: U. S. Army Audit Agency and 1995 BRAC
Commission. Note: GAO analysis of U. S. Army Audit Agency and 1995 BRAC
Commission data.

Page 19 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Our analysis showed that the omission of enclave costs significantly
affected the initial estimates of savings and payback periods at all
locations except Fort McClellan as shown in table 3. For example, the
omission of $6.8 million in enclave costs at Fort Chaffee (see table 2)
accounted for more than 50 percent of the $12 million in estimated reduced
annual recurring savings at that location. Further, the enclave cost
omissions were instrumental in increasing Fort Chaffee*s estimated payback
period from 1 year to 18 years. On the other hand, at Fort McClellan,
estimates on costs 24 other than those associated with the

enclave had a greater impact on the resulting estimated annual recurring
savings and payback periods.

Although it is unknown whether the enclave cost omissions or any other
similar omissions would have caused the 1995 BRAC Commission to revise its
recommendations for these installations, it is important to have cost and
savings estimates that are as complete and accurate as possible in order
to provide a commission with a better basis to make informed judgments
during its deliberative process.

Although the Army omitted enclave operation and maintenance costs from its
savings calculations for most of its 1995 actions during the initial
phases of the BRAC process, it subsequently updated many of these savings
estimates in its annual budget submissions to the Congress. In our April
2002 report on previous- round BRAC actions, we noted that even though DOD
had not routinely updated its BRAC base savings estimates over time
because it does not maintain an accounting system that tracks savings, the
Army had made the most savings updates of all the services in recent
years. 25 According to Army officials, the Army Audit Agency report

provided a basis for the Army to update the annual BRAC budget submissions
and adjust the savings estimates at the installations reviewed. As a
result, the previous estimated cost omissions have not materially affected
the department*s estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings
across all previous round BRAC actions due to the fact that the savings
estimates for these locations have been updated to reflect many enclave
costs in subsequent annual budget submissions.

24 The cost estimates included about $19 million in annual recurring
costs, about $40 million in one- time construction costs and about $26
million in one- time operations and maintenance costs related to the Fort
McClellan closure.

25 See GAO- 02- 433.

Page 20 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Because of the passage of time and the lack of supporting documentation,
we were unable to document whether the Air Force had considered enclave
costs in deriving its savings estimates for the former air bases we
visited at Grissom in Indiana (a 1991 round action), March in California
(a 1993 round action), and Rickenbacker in Ohio (a 1991 round action). Air
Force Reserve Command officials, however, told us that estimated costs to
operate and maintain their enclaves were considered in calculating savings
estimates for these base actions. Officials at the bases we visited were
unaware of the cost and savings estimates that were established for their
bases during the BRAC decision- making process.

With an upcoming round of base realignments and closures approaching in
2005, it is important that the new Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission have information that is as complete and accurate as possible
on DOD- proposed realignment and closure actions in order to make informed
judgments during its deliberations. Previous

round actions indicate that, in several cases, a commission lacked key
information (e. g., about the projected needs of an enclave infrastructure
and estimated costs to operate and maintain an enclave) because DOD had
not fully identified specific infrastructure needs until after the
commission had issued its recommendations. Without the benefit of more
complete

data during the deliberative process, the commission subsequently issued
recommendation language that permitted the Army to form reserve enclaves
that are considerably larger than one might expect based on the
commission*s language concerning minimum essential land and facilities for
reserve component use. In addition, because DOD did not adequately
consider cross- service requirements of various military activities
located in the vicinity of its proposed enclaves and did not include them
in the enclaves, it may have lost the opportunity to achieve several
benefits to obtain savings, enhance training and readiness, and increase
force protection for these activities. DOD has recently issued policy
guidance as part of the 2005 closure round that, if implemented, should
address cross- service requirements and the potential to relocate
activities on future enclaves where relocation makes operational and
economic sense.

As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for 2005,
we recommend that you establish provisions to ensure that data provided to
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission clearly specify the
(1) infrastructure (e. g., acreage and total square footage of facilities)

needed for any proposed reserve enclaves and (2) estimated costs to
operate and maintain such enclaves. Conclusions Recommendations for

Executive Action

Page 21 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

As you know, 31 U. S. C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to
the Senate Committee on Government Affairs and the House Committee on
Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A
written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations with the agency*s first request for appropriations made
more than 60 days after the date of this report.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs concurred with our recommendations. The
department*s response indicated that it would work to resolve the issues
addressed in our report, recognizing the need for improved planning for
reserve enclaves as part of BRAC decision making and include

improvements in selecting facilities to be retained, identifying costs of
operation, and assessing impacts on BRAC costs and savings. DOD*s comments
are included in appendix III of this report.

We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities as
authorized by 31 U. S. C. S: 717. We performed our work at, and met with
officials from, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the
headquarters of the Army Reserve Command and Air Force Reserve Command,
and Army and Air Force BRAC offices. We also visited and met with
officials from several reserve component enclave locations, including the
Army*s Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort McClellan, Alabama; and Fort Hunter Liggett,
California; as well as the Air Force*s March Air Reserve Base, California;
Grissom Air Reserve Base, Indiana; and Rickenbacker Air National Guard
Base, Ohio. We also contacted select officials who had participated in the
1995 BRAC round decision- making process to discuss their views on
establishing enclaves on closed or realigned bases. Our efforts regarding
previous- round enclave planning were hindered by the passage of time, the
lack of selected critical planning documentation, and the general
unavailability of key officials who had participated in the process.

To determine whether enclave infrastructure needs had been identified
prior to BRAC Commission decision making, we first identified the scope of
reserve enclaves by examining BRAC Commission reports from the four
previous rounds and DOD data regarding those enclave locations. To the
extent possible, we reviewed available documentation and compared process
development timelines with the various commission reporting Agency
Comments

Scope and Methodology

Page 22 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

dates to determine the extent of enclave planning completed before a
commission*s issuance of specific BRAC recommendations. We examined
available commission hearings from the 1995 round to ascertain the extent
of commission discussion regarding proposed enclaves. We also interviewed
officials at most of the major enclave locations as well as at the major
command level to discuss their understanding of the enclave planning
process and associated timelines employed in the previous rounds. We also
discussed with these officials any previous planning actions or actions
currently underway to relocate various reserve activities or organizations
to enclave locations. To determine whether projected costs to operate and
maintain reserve

enclaves were considered in deriving estimated savings during the BRAC
decision- making process, we reviewed available cost and savings
estimation documentation derived from DOD*s COBRA model to ascertain if
estimated savings were offset by projected enclave costs. We reviewed Army
Audit Agency BRAC reports issued in 1997 on costs and savings

estimates at various BRAC locations, including some enclave sites.
Further, we analyzed how omitted enclave costs affected estimated annual
recurring savings and payback periods at selected Army bases. We also
discussed cost and savings estimates with Army and Air Force BRAC office
officials as well as officials at bases we visited. However, as in our
other efforts, we were generally constrained in our efforts by the general
unavailability of knowledgeable officials on specific enclave data and
adequate supporting documentation. We also examined recent annual BRAC
budget submissions to the Congress to ascertain if savings estimates at
the major enclave locations had been updated over time.

In performing this review, we used the same accounting records and
financial reports DOD and reserve components use to manage their
facilities. We did not independently determine the reliability of the
reported financial and real property information. However, in our recent
audit of the federal government*s financial statements, including DOD*s
and the reserve components* statements, we questioned the reliability of
reported financial information because not all obligations and

expenditures are recorded to specific financial accounts. 26 In addition,
we did not validate infrastructure needs for DOD enclaves.

26 U. S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Defense, GAO- 03- 98 (Washington, D. C.:
January 2003).

Page 23 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

We conducted our work from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees and
members. In addition, the report is available to others upon request and
can be accessed at no charge on GAO*s Web site at www. gao. gov.

Please contact me on (202) 512- 8412 if you or your staff have any
questions regarding this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV. Sincerely yours,

Barry W. Holman, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: General Description of Major Reserve Component Enclaves (Pre-
BRAC and Post- BRAC) Page 24 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Installation BRAC recommendation Utilization

Fort Hunter Liggett Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the Army
Test and Experimentation Center missions and functions to Fort Bliss,
Texas. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave
to support the reserve component.  Prior to BRAC 1995, the Army Reserve

managed the base, assuming control of the property in December 1994 from
the active Army.

 In September 1997, the base became a sub- installation of the Army
Reserve*s Fort McCoy. The training man days have increased by about 55
percent since 1998. Fort Chaffee Close Fort Chaffee except for minimum

essential ranges, facilities, and training areas required for a reserve
component training enclave for individual and annual training.  Prior to
BRAC 1995, the active Army

managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of training man
days (75 percent) while the active component had 24 percent; the remaining
training was devoted to non- DOD personnel.

 In October 1997, base management transferred to the Arkansas National
Guard. Overall training has decreased 51 percent with reserve component
training being down 59 percent.

Fort Pickett Close Fort Pickett except minimum essential ranges,
facilities, and training areas as a reserve component training enclave to
permit the conduct of

individual and annual training.  Prior to BRAC 1995, the Army Reserve
managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of the training
man days

(62 percent) while the active component had 37 percent; the remaining
training was devoted to non- DOD personnel.

 In October 1997, base management transferred to the Virginia National
Guard. Overall training has increased by 6 percent. Fort Dix Realign Fort
Dix by replacing the active

component garrison with an Army Reserve garrison. In addition, it provided
for retention of minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas
as an enclave required for reserve component training.

 Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army managed the base. The reserve
components had the majority of training man days

(72 percent) while the active component had 8 percent; the remaining
training was devoted to non- DOD personnel.

 In October 1997, base management transferred to the Army Reserve.
Overall training has increased 8 percent. Fort Indiantown Gap Close Fort
Indiantown Gap, except

minimum essential ranges, facilities and training areas as a reserve
component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual
training.  Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army

managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of training man
days (85 percent) while the active component had 3 percent; the remaining
training was devoted to non- DOD personnel.

 In October 1998, base management transferred to the Pennsylvania
National Guard. Overall training has increased by about 7 percent.

Appendix I: General Description of Major Reserve Component Enclaves (Pre-
BRAC and Post- BRAC)

Appendix I: General Description of Major Reserve Component Enclaves (Pre-
BRAC and Post- BRAC) Page 25 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Installation BRAC recommendation Utilization

Fort McClellan Close Fort McClellan, except minimum essential land and
facilities for a reserve component enclave and minimum essential
facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support

to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot,
Alabama.  Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army

managed the base.

 In May 1999, base management transferred to the Alabama National Guard.
Overall training has increased 75 percent.

Fort Devens Close Fort Devens. Retain 4600 acres and those facilities
necessary for reserve component training requirements.

 Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Army managed the base.

 In March 1996, base management transferred to the Army Reserve as a sub-
installation of Fort Dix. March Air Reserve Base Realign March Air Force
Base. The

445 th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve, 452 nd Air Refueling Wing, 163 rd
Reconnaissance Group, the Air Force

Audit Agency and the Media Center will remain and the base will convert to
a reserve base.

 Prior to BRAC 1993, the active Air Force managed the base, with major
activities being the 452 nd Air Refueling Wing, 445th Airlift Wing and the
452 nd Air Mobility Wing, 163 rd Air Refueling Wing.

 In April 1996, base management transferred to the Air Force Reserve with
major activities being the 63rd Air Refueling Wing and the 144 th Fighter
Wing as well as tenants such as U. S. Customs.

Grissom Air Reserve Base Close Grissom Air Force Base and transfer
assigned KC- 135 aircraft to the Air reserve components.

 Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Air Force managed the base with major
activities being the 434th Air Refueling Wing and several Air Force
Reserve units.

 In 1994, base management transferred to the Air Force Reserve. Grissom
Air Reserve Base houses the 434 th Air Refueling Wing as well as other
tenants such as the Navy

Reserve. Homestead Air Reserve Base Realign Homestead Air Force Base.

The 482d F- 16 Fighter Wing and the 301 st Rescue Squadron and the North
American Air Defense Alert activity will remain in a cantonment area. 
Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Air Force

managed the base, with major activities being the 482 nd Fighter Wing and
the 301 st Rescue Squadron.

 In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew destroyed most of the base. After the
base was rebuilt and management transferred to the Air Force Reserve,
operations were reinstated with major activities being the 482 nd Fighter

Wing and the NORAD Air Defense Alert activity. Sources: 1991, 1993, and
1995 BRAC Commission reports and DOD.

Appendix II: Reserve Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC Rounds

Page 26 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

BRAC Round Bases With Enclaves Acreage

1988 Fort Douglas, Utah 50 Fort Sheridan, Ill. 100 Hamilton Army Airfield,
Calif. 150 Mather Air Force Base, Calif. 91 Pease Air Force Base, N. H.
218 1991 Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. 138

Fort Devens, Mass. 5,226 Grissom Air Force Base, Ind. 1,380 Sacramento
Army Depot, Calif. 38 1993 Griffiss Air Force Base, N. Y. 39

Homestead Air Force Base, Fla. 852 March Air Force Base, Calif. 2,359
Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Ohio 168 1995 Camp Kilmer, N. J. 24

Camp Pedricktown, N. J. 86 Fitzsimmons Medical Center, Colo. 21 Fort
Chaffee, Ark. 64,272 Fort Dix, N. J. 30,944 Fort Hamilton, N. Y. 168 Fort
Hunter Liggett, Calif. 164,272 Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. 17,227 Fort
McClellan, Ala. 22,531 Fort Missoula, Mont. 16 Fort Pickett, Va. 42,273
Fort Ritchie, Md. 19 Fort Totten, N. Y. 36 Oakland Army Base, Calif. 27
Sources: 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC Commission reports and DOD.
Appendix II: Reserve Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC Rounds

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 27 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 28 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 29 GAO- 03- 723 Military Base Closures

Michael Kennedy (202) 512- 8333 In addition to the individual named above,
Julie Chamberlain, Shawn Flowers, Richard Meeks, Maria- Alaina Rambus,
James Reifsnyder, Donna Weiss, and Susan Woodward made key contributions
to this report. Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments

(350231)

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